THE "HOMOGENIZATION PROCESS" IN ROMANIA

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Abstract

The present research examines the relationship between the development of the nation state and homogenization efforts in Romania. On the one hand, this requires examining the establishment of ideological and dictatorial power practices that emerge from the historical context of capitalist and imperialist developments. On the basis of which the national conceptions of a closed "body" evolved, and thus certain groups, experienced because of their "otherness" compared to the national similarities, social exclusivity. Thus, the racial ideological attitudes and the resulting homogenization and repression policies of the dictatorships of the 20th century emerged. The aim of this work is to show how the homogenization process took place in Romania.

Keywords: dictatorship, total rule, nation, anti-Semitism, homogenization, modernization, Romania.

Introduction

In the 19th century, after the French Revolution, the formation of nation states in Western Europe is largely completed. This means that initially republics were founded and the absolute monarchies slipped into a kind of transitional phase. They had to restructure themselves because the

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political construct of the monarchies could no longer keep up with the economic conditions of the time. The economic change was based on rapid industrialization, the liberalization of social conditions, increased population growth and others. W. Reinhard sees in his work *The Life Forms of Europe*, this chain of political, economic and social conditions exactly the other way conditioned and namely:

> "At the beginning there is the population growth, which produced an increasing social division of labor and thus - as Luhmann said - an increasing complexity of life. This led to the wider interdependence of the people on the one hand, the formation of a public monopoly of power: the state and to constant conflicts on the other hand."[1]

Basically, both statements amount to the same thing. Reinhard is concerned to illustrate the "process of civilization": The increased ratio is necessary to overcome the increasingly complex problems of European societies. As a result, external compulsion or foreign coercion is increasingly being replaced by the inner self-compulsion; the compulsory apparatus is relocated into man himself.[2] Similarly, Elias argues in his "On the Process of Civilization."[3] The reorganization of the political construct at the beginning of the twentieth century was that the monarchies developed the first social and welfare state, partly constitutional elements, as the power of the nobility became increasingly diminished. This meant that political power no longer belonged only to the sovereign and his servants, but gradually had to be shared with an ever-widening administrative state apparatus. By the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the great powers were already in the age of imperialism in the struggle for resources. During this time Germany fought in Europe for territories and economic power with the colonial powers France and Great Britain, which pursued their imperialist plans. In Europe and America, cities and municipalities were supplied with electricity throughout the second industrial revolution.

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[1] Wolfgang Reinhard, *Lebensformen Europas. Eine historische Kulturanthropologie* [engl. *Life forms of Europe. A historical cultural anthropology*], München: C.H. Beck, 2006, p. 62.

[2] *Ibidem*, p. 62.

[3] Norbert Elias, *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation -Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen* [engl. *About the process of civilization - Sociogenetic and psychogenetic investigations*], Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976.

The invention of the internal combustion engine contributed to a considerable increase in economic and private mobility. The space-time relationships were almost turned upside down, and novel social phenomena such as migration, population growth, urbanization, social mobility, and networking served as a catalyst for immense capitalist economic growth, fueled by new modes of production, changing work conditions, and rising consumption. In Western Europe and America, the beginning of the third energy revolution was marked by the discovery of oil, which ushered in a new stage of capitalist development and another epoch of "civilization" in the West. John D. Rockefeller[4] founded the Standard Oil Company of Pennsylvania in 1868, recognizing that the key to the success of the oil business lay in the ownership of the refineries and thus in the control of the transport and marketing of the final products.[5] The legendary American *Way of life* of capitalist societies was intended to fundamentally redefine the values of modern man.[6] Not only is the beginning of the modern capitalist global

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[4] As a staunch capitalist and utilitarian, it's interesting to see what John D Rockefeller believes: See John D. Rockefeller, „An was ich glaube", in Christoph Fehige and Georg Meggle (ed.), *Der Sinn des Lebens*, [engl. *"What I believe"* in Christoph Fehige and Georg Meggle (ed.), *The Meaning of Life*], München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004, p. 356.

[5] Jeremy Rifkin, *Die empathische Zivilisation. Wege zu einem globalen Bewusstsein* [engl. *The empathic civilization. Paths to a global consciousness*], Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2010, see pp. 285-286: "Refined oil provided the fuel to get almost everyone in the world at the wheel of a car." [...] "He concluded preferential contracts with the railway companies and later bought up Pipelines. In 1879, the Standard Oil Company controlled nearly 95% of the refinery capacity in the country. (Quoted from Robert Anderson, *Fundamentals of the Petroleum Industry*, Norman: University Press, 1984, p. 20) In the 1930s, all the major oil companies already existed that would shape this world's largest industry, including Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Gulf Oil, Humble Oil, Atlantic Refining Company, Sinclair Oil, Standard Oil of Indiana, Phillips 66, Sucony, Sun, Union 76 and Texaco. A total of 26 companies together owned two-thirds of the capital of this industry, 60% of boron equipment, 90% of pipelines, 70% of refineries and 80% of distribution networks."

[6] *Ibidem*, p. 286: „In 1911, the first gas station in the United States opened in Detroit. The staggering speed of automobile production meant an insatiable fuel demand for the petroleum industry: [...] Oil companies therefore had to expand their exploration steadily and opened up new oil fields almost weekly (in 1916 there were 3.4 million cars in the US and in 1930 already more than 23, 1 million cars (quoted in Daniel Yergin, *Der Preis. Die Jagd nach Öl, Geld und Macht*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1993, p. 269). [...] For the remainder of the twentieth century, automobiles formed the core of industrial capitalism [...] especially because the automotive industry was networked with other industries. In the 1960s cars

market economy emerging at this point, but also an increasingly ruthless competition for resources between internationally competing actors and nations - the age of the war industry begins.

> "The relations between different nations depend on how far each of them has developed their productive forces, the division of labor and the internal traffic [...] not only the relationship of one nation to another, but also the whole internal organization of these Nation itself depends on the stage of development of its production and its internal and external traffic."[7]

The more mature the capitalist economic system is in a nation, the more structured and articulated its internal structure and forms of work are; the more progressive their work organization, the better the social system and the higher the standard of living.[8] Furthermore, the economic power of a nation also increases its political power, also on an international level. The increased and rationalized power was to culminate in the twentieth century in its "mightiest" form in the two world wars, which in turn should lead us back to the dictatorships of the twentieth century in Romania. Since both dictatorships emerged in economically difficult times for Romania and got their political legitimacy, through nationalism and the promise of modernization of Romania. The cornerstone of Romania's political culture was to maintain (political and economic) power and its unity, no matter what (repressive) forms it was supposed to take. In order, as we shall see below, to meet the quest for economic growth, prosperity and modernization, and the construct of one's own nation.

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devoured 20% of the steel, 12% of the aluminum, 10% of the copper, 51% of the lead, 95% of the nickel, 35% of the tin and 60% of the rubber, which were consumed in the US. (Quoted from A. Q. Mowbray, *Road to Ruin*, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1969, p. 15.)

[7] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie. Kritik der neuesten deutschen Philosophie in ihren Repräsentanten Feuerbach, B. Bauer und Stirner und des deutschen Sozialismus in seinen verschiedenen Propheten* [engl. *The German ideology. Criticism of the latest German philosophy in their representatives Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Stirner and German socialism in its various prophets*], Berlin/DDR: Dietz Verlag, 1958.

[8] See Helmut Thome, „*Wertewandel in Europa*", [engl. „*Changing Values in Europe*"], in Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt (ed.), *Die kulturellen Werte Europas* [engl. *The Cultural Values of Europe*], Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005, pp. 386-444.

Homogenization as the cornerstone of national economic policies in Romania

In order to better understand the development of anti-Semitism in Romania, it is worth taking a closer look at the dictatorships of the 20th century.[9] It shows how totalitarian violence[10] has been used to complete the construct of the Romanian nation. A theoretical basis appropriate to this theme provides Hannah Arendt's *Origins of Totalitarianism*, whose concepts help in the reconstruction of Romanian development towards the nation state in times of dictatorships. Especially those upheavals in Romania that correspond to the concept of "totality and the degree of politicization and centralization under the deliberate absence of autonomous intermediary actors" are important here.[11] In order to understand the historical, political and economic contexts, the reverse side of the highly technological development of capitalist production relations and their forces must be taken into account in the development of Romanian history and its modernization efforts. For this reason, with reference to Arendt, the foundations of racial ideological and anti-Semitic attitudes and ideologies are described below.[12] The beginnings of modern anti-Semitism can be

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[9] See Manfred Funke, „Braune und rote Diktaturen- Zwei Seiten einer Medaille? Historikerstreit und Totalitarismustheorie", [engl. "Brown and Red Dictatorship - Two sides of a coin? Historikerstreit and totalitarian theory"], in Eckhard Jesse (ed.), *Totalitarismus im 20. Jahrhundert*, [engl. *Totalitarianism in the 20th century*], Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1996, pp. 152-153.

[10] *Ibidem*.

[11] Raj Kollmorgen, "Gesellschaftstransformation als sozialer Wandlungstyp. Eine komparative Analyse", in Raj Kollmorgen (ed.), *Politische Soziologie*, First published in Raj Kollmorgen, *Transformation als Typ sozialen Wandels. Postsozialistische Lektionen. Historische und internationale Vergleiche*, [engl. „*Social transformation as a social transformation type. A comparative analysis*", in Raj Kollmorgen (ed.), *Political Sociology*, *First published in Transformation as a type of social change. Post-socialist lessons. Historical and international comparisons*], Münster: LIT, 2005, p. 17.

[12] Eric D. Weitz, "From Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights. Forced Deportations and Civilizing Missions", in *American Historical Review*, No. 5, Vol. 113. 2008, p. 1323: „The first genocide of the 20th century was perpetrated by the German Army at the Hereros and Namas in South Africa, today's Namibia, under lieutenant Lothar von Trotha, the commander of the German troops, from racial ideological attitude, that has killed about 60-80% of the Herero and 40-60% of the

traced back, according to Arendt, in the 19th century, where anti-Semitic movements emerged, especially in Austria and France. Anti-Semitism, however, was a pan-European movement and by no means an exclusively German phenomenon.[13] According to Arendt; "The hatred of Jews in Poland and Romania" outweighed everything we know from Western and Central European countries and it was owed in contrast to these essentially economic and non-political causes."[14] The reason for this, Arendt sees in the fact, that the eastern countries like Romania, for example, had difficulties in building their own nation state, and in Romania the young national government was unable to resolve ethnic conflicts and reform feudal conditions.[15] At the same time, whereby the majority of the nobility, which belonged to minority population in Romania, continued to maintain a stable political position and inhibited the development of a Romanian bourgeoisie or middle class. The ethnic composition of Transylvania, for example, in 1920 consisted of about 57% Romanians, 26, 5% Hungarians, about 10% Germans and about 6, 5% other ethnic groups[16] and remained virtually unchanged until 1930, while in 1910, during the dual monarchy and at the height of the Magyarization policy, were counted 53, 8%

Namas and introduced the system of apartheid, in which were introduced separate settlement areas and dwellings for all "tribes"; for all Africans were introduced passports and "rational" physical punishment and a monitoring system." (Quoted from National Archievs of Namibia relating to the districts of Okahandja and Reheboth: BRE 14/B.10.3/4, 4RS; BRE 14/B. 10.a/1; BRE 22/E. 1.c/10; BRE 26/E.1.8.1/; DOK 29/E.4.a, Vol. ¼,5,25,17,31; DOK29/E.4.d,Bd.7/17RS; see also Jürgen Zimmmrer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner: Staatlicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia*, Münster, 2002.

[13] *Ibidem* and see Hannah Arendt, *Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft*, [engl. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*], München: Piper Verlag, 2009, p. 98.

[14] *Ibidem*, p. 84.

[15] See detailed Ladislau Gyemant, *Mișcarea națională a românilor din Transilvania între anii 1790 și 1848*, [engl. *The National Movement of the Romanians in Transylvania between 1790 and 1848*], București: Editura Științifică, 1986.

[16] See Buletinul Statistic al României. Serie IV, Bd. XV, Nr. 3, 1920, pp. 156- 157. These statistics take into account all territories beyond the Carpathians, which formerly belonged to the dual monarchy (including the Banat and the Maramures). Quoted in Lucian Leuștean, „Rumänische Mehrheit und Ungarische Minderheit" [engl. "Majority and Hungarian minority"] in Flavius Solomon, Alexander Rubel, Alexandru Zub (eds.), *Südosteuropa im 20. Jahrhundert. Ethnostrukturen, Identitäten, Konflikte*, [*Southeastern Europe in the 20th century. Ethno structures, identities, conflicts*], Iași: Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza"/ Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre Verlag, 2004, p. 102.

Romanians and 31, 6% Hungarians.[17] Lucian Leuștean attributes the decrease of about 5% of the Hungarian population not to the Romanization policy,[18] but to the exodus of about 200.000 Hungarians during the period of 1918-1924,[19] as well as the renewed ethnic differentiation, supported by the Romanian state, of the already Hungarian-assimilated Danube Swabians, Armenians or Slovaks.[20] At national level, the proportion of Romanians in 1930 was 71, 9%, that of Hungarians as the largest ethnic minority 7, 9% of the total population.[21] According to Leuștean, statistically speaking, Hungary did not pose an obstacle to the consolidation of the Romanian state. However, the short quarter of Transylvanian citizens of Hungarian descent were made up of the economic, cultural and social former power elites of the region, their favor it was to won. Economically, this group was still one of the most influential players in the region, including the magyarized Jews with about 3,2%.[22] According to Leuștean, the Romanians themselves were more or less the "national proletariat" and for that reason had to form their "own" middle class and national elite, which would have required a social revolution under national auspices.[23]

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[17] See Ioan Bolovan and Sorina Bolovan, „Contribuții privind structura etnică și confesională a Transilvaniei in sec. XX", [engl. "Contributions to the Ethnic Structure and Confession of Transylvania in the 20th Century"], in Sorina Bolovan and Ioan Bolovan (ed.), *Sabin Mănuilă, Istorie și demografie. Studii privind societatea românească între sec. XVI- XX, [engl. „History and demography. Studies on the Romanian society during the XVI-XX centuries"]*, Cluj- Napoca: Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 1995, p. 159.

[18] Ilyes (cf. note. 2), p. 58f., quoted in Leuștean, *op.cit.*, pp. 102-103.

[19] See on the exodus of the Hungarians from Transylvania in Istvan Mocsy, "Partition of Hungary and the Origins of the Refugee Problem", in Bela K. Kiraly, Peter Pasztor, Ivan Sanders (eds.), *War and Society in East Central Europe,* (Vol. VI, *Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, A Case Study on Trianon*), New York, 1982, pp. 491-508, quoted in Leuștean, *op.cit.*, p. 103.

[20] See Ioan Bolovan, Sorina Bolovan, *op.cit.*, p. 160f.

[21] Irina Livezeanu, *Cultură și naționalism în România mare. 1918-1930*, [engl. *Cultural politics in Greater Romania. 1918-1930*], București: Humanitas, 1998, p. 19.

[22] Ioan Bolovan, Sorina Bolovan, *op.cit.*, p. 159. See also D. Scharry, "The jewish Policy in Great Romania between the Two World Wars", in Ion Stanciu (ed.), *The Jews in the Romanian History*, București, 1996, p. 153, quoted in Leuștean, *op cit.*, p. 103.

[23] C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors, The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences, 1919- 1937*, Oxford, 1937, p. 287, quoted in Leuștean, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

The general problem of minorities stems from the fact that in Romania, in the constitution of 1866 it was stated that only foreigners of Christian denomination could be naturalized, whereby the majority of the Jews, for example, were stateless until after the First World War and could be at any time deported abroad as "vagabonds". For this reason, the great powers demanded in 1878 at the Congress of Berlin a naturalization of all Jews. Serbia and Bulgaria are implementing the request, but Romania has only ostensibly done so. According to Lazare, the number of 1075 naturalization cases published at that time, contains in 600 cases, the names of Jews which already died in the war.[24] According to a study, L. Boia notes that in 1899 in the Moldovan capital Iași, which had 76.277 inhabitants, lived only 26.747 Romanians and more than half of the city population (48.530) was of Jewish origin.[25] At the end of the 19th century, Bucharest, which had 250.000 inhabitants, had 32.000 Catholics and Protestants and 31.000 Muslims. The figures illustrate that a quarter of the capital's population did not belong to the Romanian ethnic group and Orthodox denomination, not to speak of the other parts of Romania, such as the Transylvanian cities, where the Romanians, especially in the cities, constituted a minority against inhabitants of German or Hungarian descent.[26] Nevertheless, the great powers tolerated the situation of stateless Jews in Romania for the peace conference after the

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[24] Mariana Hausleitner, „Minderheitenpolitik in Rumänien", [engl. „Minority policy in Romania"], in Larisa Schippel (ed.), *Im Dialog: Rumänistik im deutschsprachigen Raum*, [engl. *In dialogue: Romanian in the German-speaking area*], Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2004, p. 361.

[25] Lucian Boia, *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, [engl. *History and myth in Romanian consciousness*], București: Humanitas, 2011, p. 66.

[26] *Ibidem*, and see Leuştean, *op. cit.*, p. 104: [...] „the cities of Transylvania first had to be romanized, as the Romanians represented there until 1930 only about 35% of the population, while the proportion of Hungarians was 38%, that of Germans 13% and that of magyarized Jews about 10, 5%." and p. 105 (Zvi Hartmann, „The Issue of the Jewish Identity in Transylvania between the Two World Wars", in Ion Stanciu (ed.), *The Jews in the Romanian History*, București, 1996, p. 190) and p. 104: „Only in 1992, after about 70 years of Romanian administration, the Romanization could be realized with the increase of about 75% urbanized Romanian population."; see also Ioan Bolovan, Sorina Bolovan, *op.cit.*, p. 159): „[...] the percentage of magyarized Jews was over 50% at the beginning of the interwar period."

Balkan wars[27] in 1912/1913, so as not to harm their own economic interests.[28] The situation of the Jews did not improve in view of the fact that in 1912 they accounted for just 3, 5% of the total population (239.967), after 13.777 Jews emigrated between 1904 and 1912 and 9.288 were expelled, so that by the First World War one third of the Jews had left Romania. But especially after the Romanian unification, during which Romania doubled its territory and gained several areas where large Jewish, Hungarian, German and Slavic populations lived, the unresolved minority issue became more alarming.[29] Anti-Semitism in Romania gained ground in the fact that the only class that resembled a Western European middle-class model, according to Arendt, was the Jews. Although the Jews from the perspective of the economic development of the Eastern European countries were basically insignificant, especially since they were just as little involved in industrial undertakings to develop a capitalist bourgeoisie as in Western Europe, especially because they are operating a malfunctioning, chaotic monopolization of retail trade in consumer goods, which did not correspond to any production system. Although their social status bore witness to great poverty, they were still perceived as a political and social threat, as they were socially located exactly there, where one could expect the development of a Romanian bourgeois class.[30]

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[27] Eric D. Weitz, "From Vienna to the Paris System", pp. 1322-1323: „Indeed, following the Balkan Wars, treaties among Greece, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire led to new rounds of deportations, each designed to make the respective states more homogeneous."; also: "Tens of thousands of Muslims were forced out of their homelands and fled to Anatolia, and some 100.000 Pontic Greeks were compulsorily removed beginning in 1913. The deportations continued during World War I."

[28] Fritz Stern, *Gold und Eisen. Bismarck und sein Bankier Bleichröder*, [engl. *Gold and iron. Bismarck and his banker Bleichröder*], Reinbeck, 1988, pp. 490-547, quoted in Mariana Hausleitner, *op.cit.*, p. 361: „Bismarck no longer supported the Romanian Jews after the Romanian government took over the Strousberg railway company, whose bankruptcy threatened many German shareholders."

[29] Leon Ghelerter, "Decreșterea populației izraelite în România 1899-1912" [engl. "Decrease of Israeli Population in Romania 1899-1912"], in *Convorbiri sociale*, [engl. *Social Conversations*], *1* (1916): p. 10-11, quoted in Mariana Hausleitner, *op.cit.*, p. 362.

[30] See Hannah Arendt, *Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft*, pp. 84-85.

"Insofar as it gave the appearance of representing the bourgeois class of the country, it came into conflict with the layers of the indigenous people, who claimed that for themselves. In addition, in their loathsome attempts to favor the emergence of a middle class without eliminating the noble landlordism and reforming the feudal structure of the country, the governments adhered to and repeatedly tried to persuade the Jews, to liquidate Jewish positions administratively - partly as a concession to public opinion and a diversionary maneuver so that it might appear as if at least something was happening, but partly because the Jews were indeed sitting there, where a beginning bourgeois class really should have been sitting."[31]

Another reason for the pronounced anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe and especially Romania, according to Dumitru Ivanescu, could be due to the fact that the Russian anti-Semitism after the murder of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 forced a large number of Russian Jews to emigrate. These arrived on the way to Palestine or in the United States first in the Moldova and then in the Kingdom of Romania. This led the Romanian state to a restrictive legislation against the "strangers"; other language speakers and other-faith groups were particularly disadvantaged, in order to strengthen the ethnic-Romanian majority.[32] These tensions between Romanians and the minorities, especially the Hungarian minority, were aggravated by the linguistic possibilities of communication. Most Romanian families rejected Magyarization during the Dual Monarchy, just as the Hungarians resisted their Romanization, so that in the 1920s there were relatively few Romanians who spoke Hungarian and even fewer Hungarians who spoke Romanian. In addition, the sense of territorial and political superiority, which is historically grounded, most Hungarians created an aversion to the Romanian language and culture.[33] The image of Romanians in Hungarian society before 1918 points to the different mentality of these two ethnic

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[31] *Ibidem*, p. 85.

[32] Dumitru Ivănescu, „Die Emanzipation einer Minderheit. Die Geschichte der rumänischen Juden vom Ende des 19. bis zum Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts.", [engl. "The emancipation of a minority. The history of Romanian Jews from the end of the 19th to the beginning of the 20th century."], in Flavius Solomon, Alexander Rubel, Alexandru Zub (eds.), *op.cit.*, p. 79.

[33] A.M.A.E., Fond 71/ (1920-1944), Transylvania, Propaganda revizionistă ungară. [engl. Transylvania, Hungarian *Revisionist Propaganda*] Vol. 1, quoted in Leuștean, *op.cit.*, p. 105.

groups and illustrates that in this situation there were hardly any possibilities for communication and similarities. Rather, mutual attributions of stereotypes and prejudices dominated the image of the other group: "If the Jew was 'greedy,' the Slovak 'stupid' and the Serb 'terrible', then the Romanian were 'dirty'.[34] Expressions such as these show why the Hungarian minority was reluctant and resentful of their new Romanian "masters".[35] The Romanians were considered to be the backward people of the Dual Monarchy, notorious as drunken and vindictive people, as dishonest illiterates, working just as much as needed for self-preservation.[36] The homogenization policy of the Romanian government, which aimed to secure the new position of power and the construct of the Romanian nation, brought, among other things, difficult conditions with regard to access to education for the Romanian-based minorities and conflicts over land ownership and property reform of post-1918 Bucharest authorities, which were not resolved throughout the 20th century. In addition, the centralization of the public administration[37] contributed to the fact that already since the interwar period, but especially since the Second World War, about 2 million people, mainly from the German, Jewish, Hungarian and Roma minority population, emigrated from Romania.[38] The 15 other ethnic minorities in Romania, such

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[34] Andrea Petö, "The Image of a Remote Enemy", in László Kontler (ed.), *Pride and Prejudice. National Stereotypes in 19th an 20th Century Europe East to West*, Budapest, 1995, p. 199, quoted in Leuștean, *op. cit.*, *p*p. 107-108.

[35] Leuștean, *op.cit.*, p. 108.

[36] Marian Nagy, "Ninteenth Century Hungarian Authors on Hungary´s Ethnic Minorities", in László Kontler (ed.), *Pride and Prejudice. National Stereotypes in 19th an 20th Century Europe East to West*, Budapest, 1995, p. 40, quoted in Leuștean, *op.cit.*, pp. 106-108.

[37] *Ibidem*, pp. 106-107: Leuștean notes that, with regard to these issues, corruption unexpectedly has had a positive effect on Romanian-Hungarian relations and has been a communication factor in settling many conflicts, because many members of the minorities, in conflict situations, had the choice between submitting a petition to the League of Nations or bribery of a local official; in which the second way was undoubtedly the more promising. C.A. Macartney wrote in 1937: „Bribery can solve a lot of problems. 'The corruption of the Romanians', an old Jew told me with cynicism: 'is our Geneva'.

[38] Andrei Roth, „Abwanderung aus Rumänien", in Anton Sterbling (ed.), *Migrationsprozesse. Probleme von Abwanderungsregionen, Identitätsfragen*, [engl. "Emigration from Romania", in *Migration processes. Problems of emigration regions, Identity issues.*], Beiträge zur Osteuropaforschung Bd. 12, Hamburg: Krämer Verlag, 2006, pp. 61-62: "Among them was the largest minority, those of Hungarians with 1.6 million people, Germans and Jews with about 800,000 each and in addition, there are the Roma," whose number is uncertain in view

as Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians, Slovaks, Russians, Ukrainians, Turks, Tartars, etc., remained and did not present a problem for the Romanian state, nor did their own situation as a minority in Romania seem to be problematic.[39]

> "The Jewish emigration was thus almost completed at Ceauşescu's time, since the census of 1992 recorded only 8,959 citizens of Jewish ethnicity, so not much more than one percent of the Jews in 1930 [...] 2002 then designated only 5,870 Romanian citizens as Jews, while the German minority counted about 800,000 people before the war, in the 2002 census, there were only 60,088 Germans, or 7.5 percent, since the first wave of emigration took place between 1944 and 1950, the second after 1967 and the third and most extensive in 1988 and 1991."[40]

Due to the growing nationalist movements in the context of dying of the monarchically organized feudal system of Europe, the ethnic minorities of the national development stage of Romania appeared more and more as a disruptive factor because they were associated within a "homogeneous" national construct with the "stranger".[41] On the other hand, as a "Romanian"

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of the fact that until today their real number is unknown and estimated at around 1.5 million to 2.5 million.

[39] *Ibidem*: "In Romania there are 19 ethnic minorities represented in the parliament." See Andrei Roth, "Gehen oder Bleiben? Dilemmata der Emigration aus Rumänien" [engl. „Go or stay? Dilemmas of emigration from Romania"], in Armin Nassehi (ed.), *Nation, Ethnie, Minderheit. Beiträge zur Aktualität ethnischer Konflikte.* [engl. *Nation, ethnic group, minority. Contributions to the topicality of ethnic conflicts*], Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1997, p. 433 f.

[40] Andrei Roth, „Abwanderung aus Rumänien", p. 62: „The emigration process of the Hungarians is still ongoing: between 1992 and 2002, about 11.8 per cent emigrated (but this large number of emigrants can also be attributed to factors such as mixed marriages - assimilation - or a decline in natural reproduction) [...] and continued between 2002 and 2004." See also p. 63.

[41] Wolfgang Reinhard, *Lebensformen Europas*, pp. 325-330: „The "stranger" includes the non - sedentary - that is, the nomads and the traveling people - nomads - like the Gypsies, for example, were especially meant, while a full member of the (European - especially Western) society(s), since their appearance in the 15th century was only a married man with a house and a yard"; p. 325: "Gypsies appeared in the 14th century in the Balkans, in the 15th century in Central Europe, where they first gained a nimbus as pilgrims and even imperial protection. Their predominantly nomadic way of life and the corresponding refusal to integrate themselves culturally led quickly to a reversal and their rejection as robbers, thieves and fraudsters. In addition, they were considered spies of the Turks."; p. 329: "In the

nation, they also wanted to liberate themselves from the hitherto prevailing minority populations, such as the Hungarians and their former political, economic and social superiority, and to assert them anew by trying to assimilate them. As a result, in Romania, the emergence of radical parties; as nationalist, fascist, ethnocratic or anti-Semitic parties followed soon after 1918. Due to the national aspirations of Romania at the beginning of the 20th century, therefore, increased ethnic homogenization and assimilation efforts emerged. The reason was particularly that the still very young Romanian and politically inexperienced nation and its elite had through ideologies such as National Socialism and later national Communist an easier match winning the votes of the national majority in this way and thereby to secure their own political power easier and above all, to legitimize better. According to Arendt, the anti-Semitic parties of Europe have clearly been differentiated from other parties from the very beginning. They expressly did not declare themselves "*a party among parties*," but rather a "*party over the parties*," declaring themselves representatives of the state and the nation as a whole.[42] One of the anti-Semitic movements was, for example, the Pan movement in the context of continental imperialism in Russia and Austria. The Pan Movement addressed its adherents by

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sense of the English vagrancy law of 1531, non-sedentaries were suspected because they were poor, unemployed, but able to work and homeless." [...] "The exclusion of non-sedentaries or nomadic people was and still is culturally conditioned, because Western society is sedentary. They sought to expel them (Gypsies) in Central, Southern and Western Europe together with the Jews and Muslims [...] in Eastern Europe they fared better until even there, the enlightened absolutism slammed and led or resulted to violent attempts to integrate this cultural foreign body into the well-ordered, subordinate societies through sedentary action. [...] In 1937 their massive persecution set in the Third Reich, although they belonged to the so-called "Aryan race" in contrast to the Jews and only in 1981, when their 3rd World Congress met in Göttingen, the politically correct self-designation Sinti and Roma was introduced."

[42] Hannah Arendt, *Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft*, see p. 104: "This was precisely the function and monopoly of the state apparatus, while the parties openly and admirably represented the special interests of certain groups within the nation [...] in these power struggles, of the parties that ran against each other, the state had the task of balancing interests and parties. With their claim to be above the parties and beyond the classes, the anti-Semite parties made clear, that they intended to seize power, to seize the state apparatus, liquidate the party-politically neutral civil service and place its party members in its place. [...] Here is the first clear declaration of war on the nation-state, as we know it later under the name of the fascist movement throughout Europe."

belonging to an ethnic group and considered using certain groups of peoples such as "the Slavic" and "Germanic" to seize world domination. H. Arendt links the emergence of anti-Semitism in the 19th century not only with the ideology[43] of the nation that aroused the xenophobia, but above all with the emerging nation state and thus the collapse of imperialism. There are multiple reasons for this: The nation also means the end of the imperial state monarchies and empires and thus also the discrimination of the Jewish population, since national affiliation defined by the common origin, common language, common beliefs and common national heroes of a Christian institutionalized state for a Christian people. Through this conservative ideology, the Jews and other minorities who did not share social spaces with the Orthodox population were credited with the role of the exotic strangers,[44] and finally those of a threat, due to their unavailable source or ostensibly unjustified wealth.[45] The more closely the categories of national affiliation were knit and the more powerful the nation's ideology became in the population, the more difficult it became for Jews and other minorities with more complex or simply little-known ethnic and religious roots to be included in the nation's existing schema. Thus, an increasingly pronounced anti-Semitic or hostile attitude developed in the majority population towards the minorities. The minorities themselves, like the Hungarian population of Romania, not only did find themselves "superior" to the Romanians because of their historically grown socially and economically

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[43] *Ibidem*, pp. 40-41: "[…] Ideologies are desperate attempts to escape political responsibility for actions and events. [...] Modern ideologies, on the other hand, are all about achieving a permanent victory at the expense of reality itself. [...] One of the purposes of ideologies is to replace the no longer valid rules of common sense; the ideological susceptibility of the modern masses grows to the extent that common sense (and that is common sense, the sense of community through which we experience and understand each other in our common world) is no longer sufficient, to understand the public political world and their events. "

[44] See Andrei Marga, *Fratii mai mari. Intalniri cu iudaismul,* [engl. *The bigger brothers. Encounters with Judaism*], Bukarest: Hasefer, 2009, p. 203: "The "stranger" continued to be an element of anti-Semitic attitudes in communism and was still used as a symbolic language in the interests of power." Quoted from Liviu Rotman, *Evreii din Romania in perioada comunista. 1944-1965.* [engl. *The Jews from Romania during the time of communism. 1944-1965*], 2004, p. 163.

[45] See Georg Simmel, *Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung*, see ch. „Exkurs über den Fremden" [engl. *Sociology. Investigations on the forms of socialization*, see ch. "Excursus on the stranger"], Berlin: Duncker & Humblot Verlag, 1908, pp. 685-708.

privileged position, they also consciously took themselves out of the construct of the Romanian nation, as did the Jewish population, since they had anyway no integration and recognition to expect from the rest (Romanian) population.

Conclusions

The aim of this repressive policy was the "modernization"[46] of Romania, which went hand in hand with a unified concept of progress.[47] However, the Romanian agricultural historian D. Șandru stated that the land reform of 1918/21 and the large land redistribution promised no long-term effective improvement in the material situation of the peasants and that the agricultural structure in Romania had not changed effectively, because despite the land redistribution no structural transformation successes took place.[48] The difficulties of Romania to assert itself as a nation after the unification of Greater Romania in 1918 contributed to the economic difficulties. Thus, especially after the First World War,[49] Romania is on the one hand concerned with the reconstruction of caused war damage and material losses and on the other hand with the integration of large ethnic minorities[50] and the economic and political administration of the resulting Greater Romania. As it turned out, inflation - also known as the "monetary agreement"[51] created by the integration of the new

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[46] Walter Rothholz, *Politik und Religion. Eine kurze Einführung in die Grundkategorien ihrer Beziehung*, Szczecin: Politisches und Europäisches Institut der Universität Szczecin, 2013, see p. 20.

[47] Walter Rothholz, "Anmerkungen zur politischen Kultur in Rumänien", in *Studia Europaea*, no. 2, June 2016, 33–61, see pp. 38-40.

[48] Valeriu Bulgaru, *Către o nouă reformă Agrară* ? [engl. *Another land reform*?], București, 1963, p. 8; Dumitru Șandru, *Reformă agrară din 1945 în România*, București: Editura Academiei, 2000, p. 275.

[49] See more detailed Bogdan Murgescu, *România și Europa*, [engl. *Romania and Europe*], București: Polirom, 2007, cap. III. 1. and III. 2, p. 203 f.

[50] See Rudolf Poledna, „Zur Rezeption der Soziologie Max Webers in Rumänien, Hintergründe einer unbefriedigenden Situation", [engl. „To the reception of the sociology Max Webers in Romania, background of an unsatisfactory situation"], in Anton Sterbling and Heinz Zipparian (eds.), *Max Weber und Osteuropa*, Hamburg: Krämer Verlag, 1997, p. 275.

[51] Murgescu, *op.cit.*, p. 223.

territories due to the unification of Romania - was a particularly difficult undertaking for the young nation. The main difficulty was the large amount of Russian rubles and Austro - Hungarian crowns that circulated in the market to convert to Romanian lei.[52] Influenced by political and economic crises, in Romania, under the head of state Ion Antonescu,[53] in a populist manner and with bio-political[54] measures, the "peasant question" was once again adopted as King Ferdinand had already submitted from exile in Moldavia in 1917, and announced in the Official Journal of the Government of 22 April 1942, that after the war, frontline troops in the eastern territories of Bessarabia and Bukovina would receive land allocations of all non-Romanians.[55]

> "The land redistribution served the purpose of creating larger land holdings for Romanians[56] by confiscating or nationalizing the land holdings of displaced or murdered Jewish farmers in Bessarabia or Ukrainian farmers from Bukovina and the resettled German peasants from the two reconquered eastern provinces."[57]

The forced or enforced land redistribution by biopolitical and authoritarian rule practices, which served its own national or class enrichment, became a strategy that was also adopted by subsequent regimes in Romania. In communism, the expropriation of the entire non-Romanian population

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[52] *Ibidem*, p. 223, see cap. III. 2: Greater Romania and its economic failure.

[53] Comisia Internationala pentru studierea Holocaustului in Romania [engl. International Commission for the Study of Holocaust in Romania], *Final Report*, București: Polirom, 2004, p. 179.

[54] Michel Foucault, *Der Wille zum Wissen. Sexualität und Wahrheit* [fra. La volonté de savoir] Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979; Michel Foucault, *In Verteidigung der Gesellschaft. Vorlesungen am Collège de France (1975-76)*, [fra. *Il faut défendre la société*], Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1999, pp. 276-305.

[55] Monitorul Oficial Nr. 93 v. 22. 04. 1942, 179-181, quoted in Dumitru Șandru, *Satul românesc între anii 1918- 1944*, [engl. *Romanian village between 1918 and 1944*], Iași: Editura Cronica, 1996, p. 103, p. 148.

[56] Dumitru Șandru, *Satul românesc între anii 1918- 1944*, p. 103 f.

[57] „The latter had the Romanian state replaced in a compensation agreement with the "Third Reich"." in Krista Zach, "M. Gormsens Modernisierungskonzept für die rumänische Agrarwirtschaft (1939/1945)", in Krista Zach and Cornelius Zach (eds.), *Modernisierung auf Raten in Rumänien*, München: IKGS Verlag, 2004, p. 275.

generated considerable state property. In post-communism, state ownership passed through privatization into the hands of the nomenklatura's political and economic elites. It is not hard to see that repressive measures of population homogenization, based on ideologies, served to strengthen ("their own") political and, above all, economic power. The ideology of communism also served to legitimize the country's political power and became Romania's political system when the coup d'état of 23 August 1944 was perpetrated, the military dictatorship and the replacement of Antonescu by King Mihai I took place and the constitution of the great Romanian unity and constitutional monarchy of 1923 was reintroduced. The goal of this political ideology was to remedy the backward development of Romania, which was still largely agricultural. Through these forced modernization measures, Romania and all other Eastern European countries sought to catch up with the ever-widening gap with Western European and capitalist countries. This gap with the western European countries had become particularly large in view of the economic restructuring of the capitalist countries and the steadily increasing modernization. Communism and its repressive policy replaced the hitherto constructed "foreigner" - enemy image with the "class enemy" and forced the population to work with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus, the dictatorships of Romania represent the desperate attempt of a backward country to achieve modernization of the western type.

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