

## APPLYING THE LOYAL OPPOSITION TRADITION TO FOREIGN POLICY: A U.S.-UKRAINE CASE STUDY

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### Abstract:

*This two-part research project analyzes U.S. foreign policy during the Ukraine Crisis from the viewpoint of loyalty to democracy. By applying the standard expected of loyal opposition parties to the U.S., the foreign policy approach taken is shown to have been disloyal to Ukraine's fragile democracy, as it contributed to an undemocratic transition of power in the form of a coup d'état. Ultimately, the failure of the U.S. to remain loyal to Ukraine's democratic process (the way a "loyal opposition state" would have) is explained by the Obama administration's liberal imperialist approach to foreign policy, whose first loyalty was to U.S. interests, not Ukrainian political sovereignty.*

**Keywords:** Ukraine Crisis; democracy; loyal opposition; U.S. foreign policy; liberal imperialism

### Introduction

Over the last four and a half years, Ukraine has gone through a tumultuous transition of government that has left the country more polarized than ever before. The West's role in Ukraine's dramatic regime change has ostensibly been to promote democracy and reform in the hopes that Ukraine will one day join the E.U. and NATO. However, there is far more complexity to this transition of power that casts doubt over whether attempting to pull westward a country so crucial to Russia's security is a

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prudent policy. This research is ultimately an analysis of the foreign policy approach taken in Ukraine by the West (and by the U.S. in particular) that places said approach within the context of loyalty to democracy.

This research will be divided into two separate articles that together seek to give unique insight into the Ukraine Crisis, with particular emphasis on whether the U.S. was right to promote regime change by undemocratic, rather than democratic, means. This first article will start by providing general background information on the major challenges facing Ukraine given its precarious position as a borderland between the West and Russia. Broadly speaking, these challenges are most pronounced in the areas of politics, economics, and security. Ultimately, the U.S. had key interests in each of these three areas that it prioritized over Ukrainian political sovereignty, a fact which was shaped by the liberal imperialist foreign approach taken by the Obama administration.

In addition, the present article will introduce the relevant literature on the loyal opposition tradition in an effort to create a standard for the U.S. to be measured by as though it were an “opposition state” still loyal to Ukraine’s democratic process. To first provide a historical context, the literature review will reference numerous primary and secondary sources germane to loyal power-sharing and the gradual development of the loyal opposition tradition. In addition, this literature review will include a definition and outline of the key components of the type of loyal opposition needed to sustain contemporary democracy. The aim is to apply (in part two of this research) the standard expected of a loyal opposition party to the foreign policy approach taken by the U.S. during the Ukraine Crisis to see the extent to which it was either loyal or disloyal to Ukraine’s nascent democratic tradition.

## **Ukraine the Borderland**

The very name “Ukraine” is strongly indicative of the challenges that location and geography can pose to a country. Meaning “borderland,”<sup>1</sup> the various imprints left across Ukraine’s vast, rivered, and fertile plains give validity to its appellation. Centuries ago, Ukraine formed a complex buffer zone between numerous loci of power, with “Poland-Lithuania to the

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<sup>1</sup> Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine, A History, Third Edition*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000, p. 3.

northwest, Muscovy to the northeast, and the Crimean Khanate and Ottoman Empire to the south.”<sup>2</sup> Author Anna Reid further illustrates the precariousness of Ukraine’s position in the introduction to her book “Borderland”:

Flat, fertile and fatally tempting to invaders, Ukraine was split between Russia and Poland from the mid seventeenth century to the end of the eighteenth, between Russia and Austria through the nineteenth, and between Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania between the two world wars. Until the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it had never been an independent state.<sup>3</sup>

From the perspective of contemporary international relations, Ukraine is seen as a frontier between a resurgent Russia and an expanding West, a reality which has made for complex and often unstable relations. Defined as a “cleft country” divided between “the Uniate nationalist Ukrainian-speaking west and the Orthodox Russian-speaking east,” Ukraine’s civilizational bifurcation is unlikely to mend itself any time soon.<sup>4</sup> With Ukraine’s complex geopolitical position as context, three crucial touchpoints which set the stage for the Ukraine Crisis will be detailed in this section: They are the political, economic, and security influences pulling Ukraine apart both from within and from without.

### **Ukraine’s Turbulent Politics**

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the gradual and at times flawed democratization process that has been sweeping through most of Central and Eastern Europe has received great support and approbation from the West.

Since 1991, the U.S. alone has invested over \$5 billion in Ukraine to help “build democratic skills and institutions.”<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, in the wake

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<sup>2</sup> Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996, p. 176.

<sup>3</sup> Anna Reid, *Borderland: A Journey Through the History of Ukraine*, New York: Basic Books, 2015, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, p. 138.

<sup>5</sup> Victoria Nuland, *Assistant Secretary Nuland Speaks at U.S.-Ukraine Foundation Conference*, Mission of the United States Geneva, Switzerland, 13 December 2013, [<http://geneva.usmission.gov/2013/12/17/assistant-secretary-nuland-speaks-at-u-s-ukraine-foundation-conference/>], 17 June 2017.

of what has come to be known as the “Third Wave” of democratization,<sup>6</sup> Ukraine has unfortunately remained one of the states in the region still oscillating between the promise of democracy and the specter of authoritarianism.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine developed a hybrid regime featuring some formal aspects of democracy, such as representative institutions and political competition. According to Valerie Bunce, such regimes tend to fall short of liberal standards as a result of “unfair elections, extensive corruption, irregular recognition of civil liberties, significant biases in the media, opposition parties that are poorly organized in comparison with parties in power that are led by authoritarians, and weak ties between political representatives and the citizenry.”<sup>7</sup> Critically, Ukraine developed another feature of hybrid regimes that would severely plague its post-Soviet politics: rapid and often tumultuous regime changes.

Probably the best example of how quickly Ukrainian politics can oscillate from authoritarian regress to democratic progress is the 2004 presidential elections between then-opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko and then-prime minister Viktor Yanukovich, when the first two rounds of voting “failed to meet a considerable number of OSCE Commitments, Council of Europe and other international standards for democratic elections.”<sup>8</sup> However, after the elections were found to have been marred by large-scale fraud, the Ukrainian Supreme Court fortunately invalidated the decisions of the Central Election Commission and ordered a repeat runoff election that brought Ukraine “substantially closer” to meeting observers’ standards.<sup>9</sup> In a supreme twist of irony, the very candidate suspected of this fraud—then-Prime Minister Yanukovich—would go on in 2010 to win the presidency in elections that were widely praised at the

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<sup>6</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century” in *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 2, no. 2, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991, p. 12.

<sup>7</sup> Valerie Bunce, “The Political Transition”, in Sharon L. Wolchik, Jane L. Curry (eds.), *Central and East European Politics, Second Edition*, Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011, p. 33.

<sup>8</sup> OSCE, *Ukraine Presidential Election 31 October, 21 November and 26 December 2004 Final Report*, 11 May 2005, [<http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/14674?download=true>], 4 February 2017, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 33.

time for their relative fairness and openness,<sup>10</sup> a topic which will be explored in more detail in the second portion of this two-part research project. Such is the tumultuous nature of Ukrainian politics.

### **Ukraine's Janus-Faced Economic Interests**

Much like its politics, Ukraine's economy is also imperiled at a crossroads between East and West. This was made clear when President Yanukovich reneged on a promise to sign an association agreement with the E.U. in 2013. Citing his country's inability to afford sacrificing trade with Russia and the inadequacy of the E.U.'s loan of 610 million Euros for upgrading to European standards,<sup>11</sup> President Yanukovich abruptly redirected his country's economic trajectory from the West back to Russia, throwing Ukrainian society into paroxysms almost immediately. Though this backpedaling was viewed by much of the world as an alarming volte-face, the reasons why President Yanukovich backed out of the E.U. deal should not come as a surprise given Ukraine's complex borderland position.

Internally, Ukraine is caught between its Europe-inclined west and Russia-oriented east, resulting in a tug-of-war for influence between the West and Russia. Sharing long borders on either side of Ukraine, both Russia and the E.U. have been the most substantial trading partners of Ukraine in recent history.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, trade has been one area in need of particularly careful balancing, both on the part of Ukraine and its trade partners. However, the 2013 association agreement between the E.U. and Ukraine neglected to consider the concerns of Russia and the depths to which the Russian government would go to complicate the process, like offering cash-strapped Ukraine a \$15 billion loan and lower gas prices as a counter-offer.<sup>13</sup> This remissness was, in hindsight, a grave mistake on

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<sup>10</sup> Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine Muddling Along", in Sharon L. Wolchik, Jane L. Curry (eds.), *Central and East European Politics, From Communism to Democracy*, Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011, p. 347.

<sup>11</sup> Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine, Democratization, Corruption, and the New Russian Imperialism*, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LCC, 2015, p. 455.

<sup>12</sup> European Commission 2016, *European Union Trade in goods with Ukraine*, 4 November 2016, [[http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc\\_113459.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113459.pdf)], 4 February 2017, p. 8.

<sup>13</sup> Hall Gardner, *Crimea, Global Rivalry, and the Vengeance of History*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 65.

behalf of the West that would become part of an unfortunate chain of events eventually leading to a *coup d'état*, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and the bloody stalemates in the Donbass.<sup>14</sup>

### The Security Struggle over Ukraine

NATO expansion further into Eastern Europe is another area where Ukraine and the West should be more careful, as every move eastward brings a hostile military alliance closer to Russia's borders. The first large move eastward for NATO was in 1999, when Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined. It was followed by further expansion into seven more countries in 2004, three of which shared borders with Russia. According to John Mearsheimer, it was after NATO's issuing of the Bucharest Summit Declaration in 2008, which declared that Ukraine and Georgia "will become members of NATO,"<sup>15</sup> that Russia made it clear that Western military assistance to these two states would come with significant consequences. Later that year, the Russo-Georgian War proved just that. According to Mearsheimer, the potential for Russia to violently escalate the conflict in Ukraine could have been inferred from events that occurred in Georgia five years prior but, tragically, few observers made this connection before it was too late.<sup>16</sup>

George Kennan, the distinguished Russia expert and architect of the U.S.'s Cold War containment policy, similarly voiced his concerns over NATO expansion to Russia's borders. Kennan considered later enlargement to be a "strategic blunder of potentially epic proportions"<sup>17</sup> and "the most

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<sup>14</sup> Juliane von Mittelstaedt, Erich Follath, "Interview with Henry Kissinger: 'Do We Achieve World Order Through Chaos or Insight?'," *Spiegel Online*, 13 November 2014, [<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-henry-kissinger-on-state-of-global-politics-a-1002073.html>], 4 February 2017.

<sup>15</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2008, *Bucharest Summit Declaration Section 23*, 8 May 2014, [[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_8443.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm)], 4 February 2017.

<sup>16</sup> The University of Chicago 2015, *John Mearsheimer: UnCommon Core: The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine Crisis*, YouTube video, 25 September 2015, [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JrMiSQAGOS4>], 4 February 2017.

<sup>17</sup> Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy*, New York: Random House, 2002, p. 220.

fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.”<sup>18</sup> Kennan’s reasoning for why such a policy was folly coincides with that expressed above by Mearsheimer, i.e. expansion would “inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion[,] restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations[, and] impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.”<sup>19</sup> Given Russia’s current trajectory, Kennan’s words were nothing short of prophetic.

### A Cautionary Conclusion

As this section has shown, the precarious position that Ukraine straddles as a borderland between Russia and the West is one that merits extreme caution both internally and externally. Ukraine is caught in the balance between its indelible Russian connections and many of its citizens’ penchant for greater Western integration. Politically, this has led to uncertainty as to which direction Ukraine’s government will go from election to election. Economically, it has left the country vulnerable to the vicissitudes of foreign creditors bidding on Ukraine’s future in economic proxy wars. Finally, in terms of security, Ukraine has the precarious misfortune of being located within the overlapping spheres of interest of the U.S. and Russia, the world’s two greatest nuclear powers.

The 2010 presidential elections gave many a glimmer of hope that Ukraine was making modest strides towards developing a more stable, functioning democracy; however, the post-election policies of President Yanukovich quickly put a damper on these hopes for many pro-Western Ukrainians. Externally, the strong influence that both Russia and the West have had on Ukraine’s development suggests a tumultuous future, as these foreign powers have been less than cooperative over issues concerning politics, economic development, and security in the region. As a result, Ukraine is an unfortunate proxy front in what some are calling a “new Cold

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<sup>18</sup> Tim Weiner, Barbara Crossette, “George F. Kennan Dies at 101; Leading Strategist of Cold War”, *The New York Times*, 18 March 2005,

[<https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/18/politics/george-f-kennan-dies-at-101-leading-strategist-of-cold-war.html>], 4 February 2017

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*.

War.”<sup>20</sup> The West’s three-pronged approach of Westernizing Ukraine’s politics, economy, and security—and Russia’s willingness to sabotage these efforts—are factors that set the stage for the bloody Ukraine Crisis.

### **Literature Review**

The following literature review seeks to introduce relevant literature on loyal power-sharing with particular emphasis on the loyal opposition tradition that is so crucial to democracy. Such a literature review will provide the much-needed historical background related to the development of power-sharing and the loyal opposition tradition. It will also provide a definition of “loyal opposition” and list its salient features. Together, the history, definition, and features of loyal opposition will be conducive to establishing a standard that can be applied to U.S.-Ukraine foreign policy later in the second portion of this research project.

### **On Power-Sharing and Loyal Opposition**

Literature on power-sharing can be found as far back as Aristotle,<sup>21</sup> who thought democratic power-sharing produced the best results when the middle class was heavily involved. To Aristotle, a middle class carries neither of the extremes of the upper and lower classes: i.e., a haughty lack of obedience and a reluctance to rule, respectively. This “middle road” approach to power-sharing, according to Aristotle, protected a political community from the instability caused by pure oligarchy on the one hand, and extreme democracy on the other.

Of course, power-sharing was not the preferred political arrangement for all. For example, Thomas Hobbes considered a system of democratic power-sharing to be less practical and more prone to anarchy because of the nature of man.<sup>22</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau similarly took a deeply pessimistic

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<sup>20</sup> Stephen F. Cohen, *Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism to the New Cold War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.

<sup>21</sup> Aristotle, *The Politics*, TA Sinclair (trans.), New York: Penguin Books, 1962, Book 4, Chapter 11.

<sup>22</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 1651,

[<https://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hobbes/Leviathan.pdf>], 18 June 2017, p. 116.



view of power-sharing arrangements, especially in regards to the British, who prided themselves on being free to choose their rulers.<sup>23</sup> Rousseau inferred that election day was the day voters—winners and losers alike—became enslaved by their representatives until the next round of elections could take place.<sup>24</sup> Looking at the U.S., Alexis de Tocqueville took a more optimistic approach, arguing that in that country, the minority values the empowerment of the majority, as the former understands that it may soon have that power for itself.<sup>25</sup>

The loyal opposition tradition noted by Tocqueville did not develop in a vacuum, but is rather the end result of an evolution in power-sharing that began long before in England. The first step in this long, turbulent evolution away from absolute monarchical power is considered to be the signing of the Magna Carta by King John in 1215, an event which precipitated the development of the rule of law and loyal power-sharing between representatives and their constituents.<sup>26,27</sup> Later kings would renew this great power-sharing charter which laid the foundation for loyalty from powerful barons in exchange for certain limitations to monarchical power.

These assemblies of barons, nobles, and knights, which later became known collectively as “parliaments,”<sup>28</sup> would slowly wrest more and more power from the Crown over the centuries until the monarch became little more than a ceremonial head of state with few, mainly symbolic powers.

Thomas Hockin provides a conceptual framework for the development of the loyal opposition tradition that he separates into three models.<sup>29</sup> First is the Old Tory Model, which was characterized by minimal loyal opposition at the local level that did not extend to “Great Matters of

<sup>23</sup> Simon Tormey, *The End of Representative Politics*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015, p. 47.

<sup>24</sup> Subrata Mukherjee, Sushila Ramaswamy, *A History of Political Thought: Plato to Marx, Second Edition*, New Delhi: PHI Learning Private Limited, 2011, p. 254.

<sup>25</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America, Volume II*, James T. Schleifer (trans.), Eduardo Nolla (ed.), Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Inc., 2010, pp. 406-407.

<sup>26</sup> Sterling E. Edmunds, *The Loyal and Lawful Opposition*, 2016, [<http://utdr.utoledo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2386&context=ur-87-68>], 16 March, 2017, p. 1.

<sup>27</sup> Frank N. Magill, *The Middle Ages: Dictionary of World Biography, Volume 2*, New York: Routledge, 1998, p. 455.

<sup>28</sup> Gideon Doron, Itai Sened, *Political Bargaining: Theory, Practice and Process*, London: Sage Publications, 2001, pp. 95-96.

<sup>29</sup> Thomas A. Hockin, “The Roles of the Loyal Opposition in Britain’s House of Commons: Three Historical Paradigms” in *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 25, no. 1, 1971, pp. 50-68.

State” and was not party-based, as parties were seen as factional and even treasonous at the time. Next came the Balanced Constitution Model, when a constitutional basis for checks began to emerge and the opposition, though still not disciplined or organized, began to assert more influence over what were formally considered royal prerogatives of state. Currently, the Parliamentary Party Model favors political parties as stable, organized factions that are poised to either rule or criticize the ruling faction within the bounds of shared constitutional commitments.

During the later stages of this power reallocation, the term “loyal opposition” was coined by British parliamentarian John Cam Hobhouse, who in 1826 referred in jest to “His Majesty’s opposition,” a phrase which afterward entered into common political usage.<sup>30</sup> Although the development of parties in general certainly stemmed from political developments in Britain, the first political parties that characterize modern democracies emerged in the U.S. at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Thus, by the time the term “loyal opposition” was coined, the U.S. had already had a quarter century of “very avant-garde experimentation with oppositional politics.”<sup>31</sup>

Today loyal opposition is defined as “a minority party especially in a legislative body whose opposition to the party in power is constructive, responsible, and bounded by loyalty to fundamental interests and principles.”<sup>32</sup> This tradition is recognized as being an integral component of a healthy, functioning democracy in both parliamentary and presidential systems of government. Abbot Lowell, a prominent American legal scholar, described the institutionalization of loyal parliamentary opposition as the greatest contribution to the art of government for the entire 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>33</sup>

British legal scholar Ivor Jennings went so far as to argue that without a loyal opposition there could be no democracy. In Jennings’ words, “‘Her Majesty’s Opposition’ is no idle phrase. Her Majesty needs an Opposition as well as a Government.”<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> John Cam Hobhouse, *Recollections of a Long Life, Volume 4, 1829-1834*, Charlotte Hobhouse Carleton (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge Library Collection, 2011, pp. 129-131.

<sup>31</sup> Richard Hofstadter, “The Birth of American Political Parties” in *Government and Opposition*, vol. 1, iss. 1, 1965, pp. 126-131.

<sup>32</sup> Merriam-Webster Dictionary n.d., *Loyal Opposition*, [<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/loyal%20opposition>], 30 December 2016.

<sup>33</sup> A. Lawrence Lowell, *The Government of England*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912, p. 451.

<sup>34</sup> Ivor Jennings, *Cabinet Government, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

In his book "On Loyalty and Loyalties," John Kleinig<sup>35</sup> details the four main ideas underpinning modern parliamentary loyal opposition:

- (1) [The loyal opposition] refers specifically to elected representatives of the nongoverning major party (or coalition), whichever party that happens to be.
- (2) Its central role is to critique the policies and practices of the governing party, with some debate as to how relentless that criticism should be.
- (3) It is expected to be prepared with alternative policies and a shadow ministry so as to assume the responsibilities of political power if elected in a seamless or at least peaceful transfer of power either through shifts in parliamentary opinion or through general elections.
- (4) The tactics employed by the loyal opposition are expected to be consistent with the laws and conventions of the state so as to avoid chaos.

There is a crucial countervailing quality that a loyal opposition conducive to democratic culture requires, and this quality is quite distinct from the obedience taught in early political socialization.<sup>36</sup> Kleinig emphasizes this point when he notes that a powerless, compliant, or marginalized opposition need not be a loyal one, as servility and complaisance are counterproductive traits for a proper loyal opposition.

According to Kleinig, loyalty is appropriate only when the regime in power merits it, and any regime which does not may need to face a more radical opposition that is capable of reforming the object of loyalty.<sup>37</sup>

Though at first counterintuitive, dissent, criticism, and opposition can at times be the most resounding manifestations of loyalty. When it is clearly the regime in power that is ailing society, constructive criticism with the aim of improving government falls into Albert O. Hirschman's "voice" category of loyal responses, i.e. vocalizing dissatisfaction so as to improve

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1969, p. 16.

<sup>35</sup> John Kleinig, *On Loyalty and Loyalties: The Contours of a Problematic Virtue*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 115-116.

<sup>36</sup> Richard E. Dawson, Kenneth Prewitt, *Political Socialization*, Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1969, p. 21.

<sup>37</sup> John Kleinig, *On Loyalty and Loyalties: The Contours of a Problematic Virtue*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 112.

reigning institutions.<sup>38</sup> In such cases, notes Sterling E. Edmunds, a loyal and lawful opposition is the only safeguard against government which violates the “fundamental law” and “the freedom of its people.”<sup>39</sup> Ultimately, in a mature, healthy democracy, the interplay between the opposition and governing parties should be based on the two factions seeing “themselves as partners in the development of the democratic process.”<sup>40</sup>

### **The Standard for a “Loyal Opposition State”**

In short, a “loyal opposition state” is a state whose opposition to another democratic (or democratizing) state’s regime is constructive, responsible, and bounded by loyalty to fundamental interests and principles, especially those concerning democracy and political sovereignty.

### **Research to Come**

The second half of this research (to be released at a later date) will begin with the methodological approach for this qualitative research, which centers on a case study—i.e. the foreign policy approach of the U.S. during the early stages of the Ukraine Crisis—and ultimately seeks to apply the standard expected of a loyal opposition party to the U.S. as a “loyal opposition state.” This application will center on four main research questions:

- Was President Yanukovich legitimately elected?
- Is it fair to call President Yanukovich’s ouster a coup?
- To what extent was the U.S. involved in the coup?
- Was the U.S. Ultimately Disloyal to Ukrainian Democracy?

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<sup>38</sup> Albert O. Hirschman, “Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States” in *The Social Contract*, vol. 4, no. 4, 1994, pp. 274-275.

<sup>39</sup> Sterling E. Edmunds, *The Loyal and Lawful Opposition*, 2016, [<http://utdr.utoledo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2386&context=ur-87-68>], 16 March, 2017, p. 20.

<sup>40</sup> Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, *Government and Opposition – Roles, Rights and Responsibilities*, 25-27 July 2005, [<https://www.agora-parl.org/sites/default/files/CPA%20-%20Government%20and%20Opposition-Roles,%20Rights%20and%20Responsibilities%20-%202005%20-%20EN%20-%20PI.pdf>], 19 June 2017, p. 2.

The second article will then answer each of these research questions at length and then apply the standard expected of loyal opposition parties to the U.S. in order to determine whether or not it acted as a “loyal opposition state” would have. Following this, the answers will be placed within the context of the two major foreign policy approaches of the U.S. since the end of the Cold War: neo-conservatism and liberal imperialism.

This will be followed by a conclusion that will review the most salient points made in both research articles, including a few brief remarks on the research limitations of this project.

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