

THE EU AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISM: DIRECT AND INDIRECT ENGAGEMENT

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Abstract

From being a traditional hot spot of conflicts, then entering into its longest peaceful age, Europe (the European Union) is now increasingly becoming a promoter of peace and an important actor in conflict resolution. This paper aims to identify the conflict resolution mechanisms available to the EU and proposes new analytical tools by distinguishing direct and indirect mechanism of conflict resolution.

Keywords: EU, conflict resolution, mechanism, peace building, CSDP.

As a responsible stakeholder in international global system, the EU, by the virtue of its stakes in it, has to play a role in conflicts occurring throughout the world, and claims to be interested in conflict resolution, “as a global actor committed to the promotion of peace, democracy, human rights and sustainable development.”¹ The EU’s goal is to “promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples”² and to “preserve peace, prevent

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¹ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 3.1, 2010 O.J. C 83/01. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2010.083.01.0001.01.ENG (accessed on 31.12.2017).

² *Ibidem*.

conflicts and strengthen international security.”³ Moreover, peace-making in its neighbourhood has been marked a priority as an “essential aspect of the EU’s external action.”⁴ Since the founding treaty of the European Union, conflict resolution, strengthening of the international security, promoting regional cooperation, promoting democracy, the rule of law and human rights, combating international crime have been underlined as foreign policy objectives.⁵ Even though the EU Security Strategy emphasizes the immediate neighbourhood to the east and south as a key geographical priority, the EU has also been involved elsewhere in the world.

Conflict resolution is a very wide concept with many varieties in form, objective or philosophy. While broadly it means the process of facilitating a peaceful ending of the conflict⁶, the concepts of conflict prevention, mediation, transformation, management and post-conflict rehabilitation etc. approach the conflict differently, though share the same broad objective of peace. Even though conflicts do share common features, all are distinct in their contexts, therefore need to be approached individually and with the application of the appropriate conflict resolution forms. The EU appreciates and applies most of the above mentioned forms, as outlined in the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and The Council on “The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises”⁷, doing so according to each particular case and to the extent of its abilities.

In order to avoid running into the above-mentioned terminological limbo, as each case includes the intertwining of several conflict resolution forms, this paper will refer to conflict resolution without singling-out any form of it. Rather the conflict resolution mechanisms refer to those EU

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ European Commission (2004a:3), *European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper*, Communication from the Commission COM (2004) 373 final, 12 May. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52004DC0373> (accessed on 31.12.2017).

⁵ Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 1992, 1992 O.J. C 191/1, Article J.1. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.1992.191.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:1992:191:TOC (accessed on 01.01.2018).

⁶ Donelson Forsyth, *Group Dynamics* (5th ed.). Boston: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009, pp. 430-438.

⁷ Document 52013JC0030, points 1,3,5. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52013JC0030> (accessed on 01.01.18).

diplomatic, executive or financial efforts that aim to improve conflictual situations one way or another, contributing to peace. This paper will revise the Union's conflict resolution mechanisms and briefly spell out their underlying logic of contributing to peace. It will do so by revising EU primary sources, analytical secondary sources and by our own data analyses of the CSDP military and civilian missions' mandates and objectives.

For analytical purposes, we can divide these mechanisms into two big subgroups – *direct engagement* and *indirect engagement* in conflict resolution processes. Direct engagement describes the situation in which the EU explicitly deals *with the conflict* - the direct involvement in the mediation process, military missions, coercive sanctions etc. Indirect engagement entails the scenario in which the EU works *around a conflictual situation*, meaning it prevents, transforms the conflict or creates conditions so that the stakeholders deem the escalation of a conflict unnecessary. Under these subgroup fall the promotion of democratic institution-building, constraining and signalling sanctions, civilian missions, contractual relation, and other policy instruments (that come with conditionality, social learning, passive enforcement etc.).

Direct Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution

'Contributor to Peace'

One of the EU's claimed international roles is being a contributor to peace.⁸ This role entails the Union's participation in conflict mediation processes worldwide. It is a direct (albeit very broad) mechanism, as it invests the EU's efforts into a process on which the conflict resolution is directly dependent. This role and its particularities are articulated in the "Joint Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities", adopted by the Council. Besides lead- or co-mediation, the mechanism also spells out promoting, leveraging, supporting and funding mediation as its roles in peace processes. The EU brings added value to the coordinated peace processes and offers a variety of advantages thanks to its collective

⁸ EEAS, The EU's International Roles, 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/3637/The%20EU's%20international%20roles#Contributor+to+peace, (accessed on 02.01.2018).

political leverage, worldwide presence, strong normative framework etc.⁹ After the Lisbon Treaty, the EU's capacity to act accordingly has grown, in addition to the advantage of having two of its Member States as UN Security Council permanent members. The EU Member States' financial contribution to the UN also invests in its leverage over peace processes. Its political leverage has also been instrumentalised for balancing the agenda of powerful bilateral actors in some mediation processes.¹⁰ The Union's widespread diplomatic presence in more than 130 places gives an upper hand over almost any international actor, providing the advantage of the informational and human resources asymmetry, which adds to the capacity of the adequate mediator and to the well-informed process policy making. When involved in overseas mediation, the EU can enjoy the contributions from its Members' bilateral influences on particular countries in case of good coordination and if the latter do not prefer to engage unilaterally (read the French "monopolization" of the mediation talks between Georgia and Russia in 2008).

Notwithstanding its failure to prevent bloodshed in the Western Balkans in early 90's, since then the EU has succeeded to vindicate through the later peace support, such as the 2002 Belgrade Agreement for Serbia and Montenegro and through probably one of the best success stories of the EU diplomacy as a Contributor to Peace - the 'First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations' between Serbia and Kosovo in 2013. Overall, the EU truly lives up to the status of the Contributor to Peace in its closest periphery (e.g. the Western Balkans), for further regions when expressly invited from the outside (e.g. Aceh) and when backed by world powers (e.g. Iran P5+1)¹¹. This limitation can generate scepticism towards the EU's status as an important actor in conflict resolution, however they are natural for any international actor and even for states, save extremely limited number of superpowers, whose freedom in mediation capabilities can also be questioned.

⁹ Canan Gündüz and Kristian Herbolzheimer, "Standing United for Peace: The EU in Coordinated Third-party Support to Peace Processes", in *Initiative for Peacebuilding*, 2010, pp. 14-17.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

¹¹ Steven Blockmans, "Peacemaking: Can the EU Meet Expectations?", in *NUPI Working Paper* No. 840, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2014, p. 22.

CSDP Military Operations

The Lisbon Treaty states that the Common Security and Defence Policy shall empower the EU with an “operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets’ that can be used on ‘missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.”¹²

This role is connected to the Petersberg Tasks and is expanded by the Berlin Plus Agreement allowing the access to NATO capabilities and assets, under certain conditions.¹³ An assessment of the operations’ mandates demonstrates that this operations’ tasks commonly include military advice and assistance, peacekeeping, combat forces in crisis management, post-conflict stabilisation, humanitarian and rescue tasks etc.

They share similarities with UN operations as third-party interventions that do not take sides. Even though some aspects of the deployed military missions lean towards indirect mechanisms of conflict resolution, theoretically there is ‘nothing that prevents the EU from engaging in peace enforcement, and indeed the expanded ‘Petersberg tasks’ include “tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making”¹⁴ – to be understood as peace enforcement, which induces us to distinguish it as a direct mechanism for conflict resolution. The EU’s security ambitions lack a doctrine, a ‘grand strategy’ based on a consensus of the Member States to lead the Union’s stand on crisis management through CSDP, which is inherently difficult to achieve due to the sensitivity of the communitarian military dimension. Consequently, the EU military operations are funded by Member States as opposed to the civilian missions that are mainly financed from the Community budget. Because the military policy making is conducted in an intergovernmental mode, the final mandate of the missions, and therefore the achievements of the

¹² Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 42.1, 2010 O.J. C 83/01. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_2010.083.01.0001.01.ENG (accessed on 31.12.2017).

¹³ EES, *Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy*, 2016 [https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5388/shaping-of-a-common-security-and-defence-policy_en], 5 January 2018.

¹⁴ Thierry Tardy, “CSDP in Action. What contribution to international security?”, in *Chaillot Paper* no. 134, Condé-sur-Noireau: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2015, p. 23.

missions, which usually do live up to their mandates' objectives¹⁵, turn out to be very limited, which creates the gap between EU capabilities and what it actually ends up doing.¹⁶

Indirect Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution

Sanctions

Sanctions as a mechanism for conflict resolution were institutionalised in the 'Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)', 'Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)', 'EU Best Practices' documents, that allowed the Union to impose visa bans, freeze assets, employ arms embargoes, impose diplomatic sanctions and other forms of sanctions: "Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides a legal basis for the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of the Union's economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, where such restrictive measures [sanctions] are necessary to achieve the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy."¹⁷ This line of justification the necessity of sanctions plays along the 'naïve theory' of sanctions¹⁸, according to which the measure will hit the target and the latter will prefer compliance with the requests of the 'punisher' based on cost/benefit calculations. The realist accounts argue that in conflicting situation when the stakes are high, the sanctions will have a 'little effect'¹⁹. In order to render away this desperate 'uselessness' of sanctions, particularly those of the EU, Giumelli offers new analytical categories – coercive, constraining

¹⁵ Annemarie Peen Rodt, "Taking Stock of EU Military Conflict Management", in *Democracy and Security*, 7:2, 99-122, 2011, p. 116.

¹⁶ Thierry Tardy, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

¹⁷ EUROPEAN COMMISSION Service for Foreign Policy Instruments European Union Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force (Regulations based on Article 215 TFEU and Decisions adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy). http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf (accessed on 02.01.2018).

¹⁸ Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia", in *World Politics*, Volume 19, Issue 3, 378-416, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1967, p. 388.

¹⁹ John Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin", in *Foreign Affairs* (Council on Foreign Relations), Volume 93, Issue 5, 2014.

and signalling sanctions²⁰. The naïve theory overlaps with the Giumelli's coercive typology, which implies imposing a cost on misconduct that is meant to coerce targets into doing something that they would otherwise not do²¹ - this is an explicit engagement in the conflict itself. However, the EU sanctions often go fruitless²² due to the lack of coordination, of conflicting interests of the 28, the vulnerability when brought in front of the courts and the caution in order to avoid unintended humanitarian consequences. Oftentimes, these can have an immediate material or psychological impact, though over time the targets learn 'to live with it' and find other sources of the restricted measures²³. Moreover, sanctions are tools designed in accordance with the sovereign state system, and are inapplicable to non-state armed actors²⁴. While the coercive sanctions are intended to change behaviours, the constraining sanctions 'attempt to undermine the capacity of targets to achieve their objectives and, sometimes, to manoeuvre at all'. The EU has imposed more than 20 such sanctions to limit the capabilities of the addressees politically, economically and socially. By signalling sanctions the EU communicate its position to the case in question, influence the decisions that are to be made or please domestic audiences without causing material damage. The constraining and signalling sanctions work around the conflict and can be regarded as indirect mechanisms of conflict resolution, as defined in the framework of this paper.

For a better evaluation of sanctions as conflict resolution tools, others suggest to give greater importance to the piecemeal achievements, rather than to the ultimate goals²⁵, (e.g. constraining Russian activities in Eastern Ukraine as opposed to forcing total withdrawal. Arguably, strong

²⁰ Francesco Giumelli, "New Analytical Categories for Assessing EU Sanctions", in *The International Spectator*, 45:3, 2010, pp. 131-144.

²¹ Margaret Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*, London: Macmillan, 1987, pp. 7-17.

²² Francesco Giumelli, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-135.

²³ Iana Dreyer and Jose Luengo-Cabrera, "On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools", in *REPORT N° 25*, Condé-sur-Noireau: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2015, p. 62.

²⁴ John Agbonifo, "Sanctions, Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: Coercing Non-State Armed Actors in Africa", in *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 12:1, 65-78, 2017, p. 66.

²⁵ Iana Dreyer and Jose Luengo-Cabrera, "On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools", in *REPORT N° 25*, Condé-sur-Noireau: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2015, p. 75.

measures, like restricting state-owned and private enterprises' access to capital market, imposing hydrocarbon embargoes have had crippling effects on the addresses and made them reconsider some policies, (e.g. bringing Iran back to negotiating table to reach Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)). To do so, the sanctions have to 'bite' and bite painfully when the demands are high. The real potential of sanctions is a matter of a debate, as Mearsheimer won't grant them much importance, as opposed to a top Ukrainian diplomat's view, that cutting off Russia from the SWIFT system will do the job.²⁶

Contractual Relations

In her book *The EU and Conflict Resolution. Promoting peace in the backyard* Nathalie Tocci uses this framework to analyse the EU leverage upon its neighbours' conflict resolution dynamics, that derive from the nature of the bilateral accords between them. The EU has a particular strategic interest in the resolution processes of the conflicts in the neighbourhood, as they threaten the stability and security of the EU due to their proximity and potential spillover effects²⁷, migration flows, disrupted commercial routes etc. Hill distinguishes two conflict resolution mechanism for the EU's neighbourhood²⁸ (which would equally apply to other countries engaging in such contractual relations with the Union) – the EU framework of governance, policy and law that create conducive context for dispute settlement, and the Union's inbuilt incentives encouraging resolution. Tocci suggests that in the framework of the contractual relations, such as the accession process, the Stabilization and Association Process, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Eastern Partnership (currently we can add the Action Plans, Association Agreements, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement etc.) the EU gains mechanism to contribute to the conflict resolution efforts through conditionality, social

²⁶ Interview with former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, 11 December, 2017, Prague.

²⁷ European Council 2003b:4–5. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20836/77679.pdf> (accessed on 02.01.2018).

²⁸ Christopher Hill, "The EU's Capacity for Conflict Prevention", in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 6:3, 2001, pp. 315–318.

learning and passive enforcement.²⁹ This is an indirect mechanism, as it contributes to the environment of the conflict and changes the ethos of doing things, and a direct one only when the benefit of the contract is explicitly made conditional upon the resolution of the conflict in question.

Conditionality: “entails the linking, by a state or international organization, of perceived benefits to another state, to the fulfilment of conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the advancement of democratic principles.”³⁰ The EU can make conflict resolution conditional to the benefits that a conflicting side in question aspires to receive. When applied directly, it prescribes certain solutions, eliminating others (e.g. The 1995 Stability Pact, making the opening of the accession negotiations for Central, Eastern European States directly conditional to the solution of the minority and border issues), or indirectly by influencing domestic opportunity structure, which in its turn will contribute to the conflict resolution³¹ (e.g. the trade policy requirements imposed by the Commission on Serbia and Montenegro, altering their tactics in the conflict settlement).

Social Learning: as an indirect conflict resolution mechanism, social learning is based on the constructivist approach that gives great importance to identity construction by the means of socialization. According to the logic of this mechanism, instead of altering rational cost/benefit structure of the parties involved in a conflict, the EU can influence their identities, values and perceptions of the phenomena surrounding the conflict (sovereignty, human rights, conduct of foreign affairs etc.) that will drive the agents closer to the resolution. Instead of coercing certain solutions, the EU provides new institutional and discursive frameworks inductive to transformation of identities and indirectly conducive to conflict resolution.³² A change in discourse can be assimilated in change of beliefs

²⁹ Nathalie Tocci, *The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard*, London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 10-17.

³⁰ Karen Smith, “The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?”, in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 3:1, 1998, p. 256.

³¹ Christoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl, “How Europe Matters: Mechanisms of Europeanization”, in *European Integration Online Papers*, 3:7, 1999, pp. 33-36.

³² Thomas Diez, “Why the EU Can Nonetheless Be Good for Cyprus”, in *Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 2002, pp 6-7.

and interests, and by penetrating into different layers of the society this deep process of change may lead to societal reconciliation.³³

Passive enforcement: also known as 'rule application'³⁴, set by the EU.

It is based on mutually beneficial legal framework, that does not necessitate additional 'carrots', as in the case of conditionality and expects both sides to abide to the agreed rules of their contractual relations. The logic is based on a strict respect of the rules, and the contract should be valued as highly important for the EU's interlocutor so that the costs be viewed, though high, but as obligatory³⁵ (e.g. abolishing death penalty in Turkey, as a rule for opening accession negotiations).

The limitation of the contractual relations as a conflict resolution mechanism, is the contract itself, specifically the limited number of countries it can be signed with. Used heavily prior to the enlargements, it does not work in countries outside of the neighbourhood (and as the prospects of enlargement are not promising, the EU contractual incentives for conflict transformation are going to play out in lesser cases), unless the Union comes up with such beneficial offer to far away states that would allow it to gain enough leverage to alter the latter's cost/benefit calculations.

CSDP Civilian Missions

The civilian missions make up the other most important part of the CSDP toolkit, next to the military operations. Outnumbering the military operations of the EU, civilian missions can be split into three broad categories according to their mandates - strengthening missions, monitoring missions, and executive missions.³⁶ The strengthening missions contribute to the capacity-building in the field of rule of law, by reforming judicial and law enforcement agencies, through monitoring, mentoring and advising (MMA), providing equipment and training (e.g. EUPOL Afghanistan, EUCAP Sahel etc.). The monitoring missions 'provide third-party observation

³³ Nathalie Tocci, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

³⁴ Johan Olsen, "The Many Faces of Europeanization", in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40:5, pp. 921-52, 2002, p. 925.

³⁵ Nathalie Tocci, *op. cit.* pp. 17-18.

³⁶ Thierry Tardy, "CSDP in Action. What contribution to international security?", in *Chaillot Paper* no. 134, Condé-sur-Noireau: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2015, pp. 23-25.

of an activity or a process, be it the performance of a given sector (police, justice, border, etc.) or the implementation of an agreement'³⁷ (e.g. EUMM Georgia, Aceh Monitoring Mission etc.). Lastly, the executive missions, that have been implemented so far only in Kosovo, take the responsibility of certain functions of the state. This concentration of the civilian missions on the police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection is specified in Council's conclusions as the civilian crisis management priorities.³⁸ By working towards such objectives, the EU addresses some of the structural issues that enable escalation or distract peace-making, therefore this mechanism falls in the category of the EU's indirect mechanisms of conflict resolution. As already mentioned, the civilian missions are mostly financed by the EU budget and here the Commission enjoys wider freedom in the decision-making process to deploy such missions. This could be one of the reasons why, since its inception, the CSDP has deployed considerably more civilian missions, as opposed to very limited number of the military operations.

Democracy and Human Rights Promotion

This mechanism of conflict resolution is based on the Democratic Peace theory's assumption that democracies do not engage in wars with each other, therefore promotion of democracy and related liberal democratic values, besides being ends in themselves, serve as conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation and settlement mechanisms. It is an indirect mechanism, that accompanies explicitly or implicitly most of the EU foreign policies and actions, seeking pacification in the long term and focusing on the transformation of the conditions around conflicts. The EU has recognised that a world of democratic states, also serves its own security interests.³⁹ For this and conflict prevention purposes the Conflict Prevention Partnership has been established, whose guiding philosophy is

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p.24

³⁸ 109 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency (19-20 June 2000), Annex 1, Appendix 3(b). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei2_en.htm (accessed on 03.01.2018).

³⁹ European Council (2003), *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December, available online at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

that human rights, democracy and conflict prevention are inextricably linked.⁴⁰ In deeply divided societies, caught up in internal conflicts the EU has preferred the promotion of power-sharing consociational democracies as a resolution mechanism (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina). This mechanism is likely to be implemented and be an appropriate one when/if the cause of the societal governance is diagnosed as the cause of the conflict. In Kosovo, such power-sharing model had been advocated until the stability of the region appeared to be distressed, in the EU's view, more by a political leader - Milosevic – than by the political system.⁴¹ As democracy comes in different forms, and due to the peculiarities of each entity in relation to a system of governance, this mechanism takes different forms and dictates different EU approaches from case to case (e.g. supporting 'no-party democracy' in Uganda; 'stability-oriented' one, as opposed to pure democracy in Sierra Leone; concentrating more on basic human rights, during deadly escalation in Nigeria; relying on local structures and warlords in Afghanistan etc.). Even though, there is a lack of "cross cutting expertise on conflict and governance"⁴² and a conceptual roadmap from crisis management to democratic institution-building⁴³, there is an EU commitment to this mechanism as a conflict prevention/resolution instrument.⁴⁴

The Instrument contributing for Stability and Peace

The Instrument contributing for Stability and Peace (IcSP), established in 2014 (taking over the Instrument for Stability (IfS), provides direct support for Union's external policies⁴⁵, specifically by providing

⁴⁰ James Hughes, "Introduction: The Making of EU Conflict Management Strategy—Development through Security?", in *Ethnopolitics*, 8:3-4, 275-285, 2009, p. 284.

⁴¹ Richard Youngs, "Democratic institution-building and conflict resolution: emerging EU approaches", *International Peacekeeping*, 2004, 11:3, 526-543, p. 528.

⁴² Marta Martinelli, "Conflict Prevention and the Great Lakes: The Belgian Presidency's Emerging Agenda", *European Security Review*, No.8, Oct. 2001, p.6.

⁴³ Sophi da Camara and Andrew Sherrif, "The EU's Development Response towards Crisis and Conflict Affected Countries", *ECDPM-International Alert*, 2001, p. 14.

⁴⁴ Richard Youngs, *op. cit.*, pp. 530-531.

⁴⁵ Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 Art. 1. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/documents/140311_icsp_reg_230_2014_en.pdf (accessed on 03.01.2018).

short and mid-term assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts⁴⁶, for conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness⁴⁷ and assistance in addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats.⁴⁸ The duties of this mechanism may sound as a reproduction of other mechanisms, however IcSP is distinct in the fact that is neither diplomatic nor executive mechanism, but a financial one, meaning, the EU does not engage in the implementation of the projects proposed within its framework, instead, it finances such local or transnational initiatives (by NGOs, the UN and EU Member State agencies organisations). This aspect of IcSP clearly demonstrates the indirect character of this mechanism, as the Union delegates its conflict resolution objectives through financial means, instead of taking those measures on its own. The EU delegations locally play an important role in this process and having an IcSP personnel posted to EU Delegations, assists at real-time crises and helps to monitor the implementation of response measures. The IcSP is one of the mechanisms of the EU's toolkit with the widest areas of involvement varying from humanitarian mine action and reintegration of ex-combatants to transitional justice and electoral assistance. As a financial instrument IcSP also has an advantage over other multilateral institutions' mechanisms of this kind, providing faster disbursable support without the need to solicit such funds.⁴⁹ Recently, financial support of capacity building for security and development (CBSD) also become possible through this mechanism⁵⁰, which did not go without controversy.⁵¹ The mechanism is also one of the widest in its outreach

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, Art. 3.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, Art. 4.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, Art. 5.

⁴⁹ Canan Gündüz and Kristian Herbolzheimer, "Standing United for Peace: The EU in Coordinated Third-party Support to Peace Processes", in *Initiative for Peacebuilding*, 2010, p. 15.

⁵⁰ EU2017.EE, *Contributing to global stability and peace - Council confirms deal with the EP on improvements to the EU's assistance instrument*, 2017

[<https://www.eu2017.ee/news/press-releases/contributing-global-stability-and-peace-council-confirms-deal-ep-improvements>], 5 January, 2018.

⁵¹ Harry Cooper, *EU's plans to militarize aid face legal scrutiny in Parliament*, 2017

EU's plans to militarize aid face legal scrutiny in Parliament <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-stability-and-peace-plans-to-militarize-aid-face-legal-scrutiny-in-parliament/>, (accessed 03.01.2018).

(present in 70 countries worldwide⁵², as it is less problematic to send funds then deploy mission.

Conclusions

The list of the mechanisms addressed in this paper is of course not fully developed, nevertheless it has tackled the main instruments of EU's engagement in conflict resolution processes, defined as any effort that furthers the situation's path towards peace, be it prevention, management, transformation, post-conflict rehabilitation etc. The paper has divided those mechanisms into two broad categories of direct and indirect engagement, and has demonstrated how 'working on the conflict' and 'around the conflict' distinguishes each mechanism along the above-mentioned categories. Further research can prolong this list and concentrate on the identification of policy areas, the decision-making apparatus, the financing and the role of the member states along the lines of the direct and indirect mechanisms.

After the revision of the mechanisms done in this paper, it is possible to identify the underlying modes of policy-making and actions of the two categories. The objectives of the indirect mechanisms are 'low politics' in their nature and therefore politically less sensitive and easier to employ on the supranational level. In contrast, for employing direct the mechanism, which involves issues of 'high politics', matters get more complicated, due to the need of wide consensus of member states. This implies the use of liberal intergovernmental mode of policy making according to the lowest common denominator. For this reason, the direct mechanisms suffer quantitatively (the substantially less use availability and use) and qualitatively (limited mandates). We could also observe how the EU externalizes and promotes its values and ethos through these mechanisms, especially in the indirect forms, where some aspects of (the EU's own) neo-functional philosophy of conflict resolution can be noticed.

⁵² European Commission, *Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, preventing conflict around the world*, 2014

[http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/what-we-do/instrument_contributing_to_stability_and_peace_en.htm], 5 January, 2018.

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7. Doxey, Margaret, (1987), *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*, London: Macmillan.
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