

THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ROMANIA

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DOI: 10.24193/subbeuropaea.2021.2.12

Published Online: 2021-12-30

Published Print: 2021-12-30

Abstract

In addition to Romania's economic backwardness, the experiences of repressive political culture have contributed to restricting society's ability to act by impairing the development of its own identity for centuries. The background to the emergence of totalitarian regimes can be derived from the context of the European modernization processes, which have gripped the whole of Europe through the industrialization and consequently secularization and rationalization process. By reproducing these processes, political situations and the experiences of Romanian society on which they are based, reveals the significance of their political culture. The aim is to put together the political culture of modern Romanian society in order to ultimately understand what the problems are for their current political consciousness.

Keywords: Political Culture, Romania, Religion, Orthodox Church, Post-socialism, Modernity, Tradition, Democracy, Civil Society

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Introduction

This paper sees itself as an attempt to shed light on Romania's political culture. The Orthodox Church, the orthodox religion and the Orthodox faith see themselves as the sacred center of Romania's political culture.¹ For the analysis of political culture it goes without saying that the political cannot be examined separately from this sacred culture, since the dimension of the "political" must include all human actions that thus shape the social community and thus also culture. Using this cultural anthropological approach, this work promises a much broader and deeper empiricism than is usual in current social science analyzes. The main focus in dealing with the question of the relationship between politics, economy and culture in Romania lies in the attempt to work out the attitude and position of the post-socialist Romanian society to politics and civic participation in democratic processes and to the economy, work ethics and economic performance. It must be examined how the Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Faith influence these attitudes. The aim is to determine what power the Romanian Orthodox Church still has on real politics and what influence the Orthodox faith exerts on the political consciousness of a post-socialist citizen in Romania and how this conflict-laden interaction affects the economic performance of the country and the social one Structure affects. Through the contribution of this paper an answer should be found, whereby the Romanian post-socialist society is "held together". The answers to such questions should create starting points for considerations about how a post-socialist society could help itself to build an intact democracy based on the rule of law, which enables citizens to actively participate as demos in the socio-political sphere of action and political, economic and to expand and consolidate the social structures of the young democratic state. For now one can say that the obvious pathological symptoms of Romania, such as the complex of backwardness, the struggle for survival and the resulting lack of values of independence or self-determination have led to a missing intact public and the corresponding liberal political culture. Consequently, this helped to bring about the dictatorships of the 20th century in Romanian society, which grew on the breeding ground of economic, political and social problems

¹ Daniel Barbu, *Au cetățenii suflet? O teologie politică a societăților post-seculare*, București: Editura Vremea, 2016, see pp. 104-107, 111, 115, 126.

reaching far back into feudal society and which can all be ascribed to the consequences of a "catching up modernity".

Common theories of modernity

At this point it makes sense to distinguish the term "modernity"² from that of modernism, modernity and the modern age³, „since the term modern⁴, modernity⁵ or modernism can also be applied to other epochs and is not only indicative of the 17th and 18th centuries is. In the history of mankind, the terms "modern"⁶ and "modernism" have always been used to distinguish them from the concept of "obsolete", "traditional" or

² Gerhart von Graevenitz, (Konstanz), "Einleitung", first published in *Konzepte der Moderne*, Stuttgart/Weimar: J.B. Metzler, 1999, pp. 2-16, <http://www.metzlerverlag.de/>, 1, "The totalizing "modernity" terms are juxtaposed with limited meanings of "modernity", "modernity", "modernization" and "modernism."

³ Markus Prutsch, "Politik, Religion und Gewalt. Zur Politiktheoretischen Bestimmung des Phänomens Fundamentalismus in der Moderne," MA, Paris-London-University Salzburg, 2006, p. 15: "Numerous theories tend to equate" modernity "with" modern times ". This institution has - as Peter V. Zima (2001, 26f.) points out - a long philosophical tradition that begins with the disintegration of the Hegelian system among the Young Hegelians. For example, the Hegel student Friedrich Theodor Fischer (1922, 175) speaks of "the great crisis [...] that separates modern times from the Middle Ages". However, not only in German, but also in Anglo-Saxon literature, the expression "modern" is often equated with "modern", but here - as in French - mainly due to the lack of alternative terminology. In the following, however, such an automatic equation is to be refrained from, since "modernity" in the contemporary understanding - as can be shown - is undoubtedly located in the modern era, although it cannot be understood as the sole designation of the epoch. Rather, with a view to modernity, a distinction must be made between a historical concept of periodization and a comprehensive social diagnosis." Compare Hennen 1990, 56.

⁴ Jürgen Habermas, *Kleine politischen Schriften I-V*, Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp, 1981, 445 „The word modern was first used in the late 5th century to delimit the Christian present, which has just become official, from the pagan-Roman past.“

⁵ *Ibidem*, „With changing content, modernity repeatedly expresses the consciousness of an epoch that relates to the past of antiquity in order to understand itself as a result of a transition from the old to the new. This does not apply to the Renaissance, with which the modern age begins for us.“

⁶ Prutsch, *Politik, Religion und Gewalt*, p. 11: Derived from the Latin modernus - "new (in time)" - "modern" is used by the historical human sciences to periodise as well as to structure and evaluate in order to characterize turning points or stages of development in human development.

“classical”⁷ and not only represent a phenomenon of the “modern society” or “Modern”.⁸

This dichotomous or bipolar thinking separates societies into “modern” and “unmodern” or “premodern” societies and not only imposes a turning point on them by dividing societies into “new” and “old” societies on the one hand, by evaluating these as “non-modern societies”

⁷ *Ibidem*, “As an antithetical concept and bipolar thinking, H. Gumbrecht crystallized the concept of modernity by associating the following pairs of words with the modern concept: “present / previous”; “new / old”; “Temporarily / forever.” Compare Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, “Modern, Modernität, Moderne,” in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Kosellek (ed.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, Stuttgart 1978, IV, 93-131, in Prutsch, *Politik, Religion und Gewalt*, pp. 11-12: “In this context, three fundamentally possible interpretations of “modern” can be named: First, those who understand “modern” as “present”, from which the complementary term “previous” results. In this meaning, the predicate “modern” is assigned to concepts, objects or people who represent an institution that has existed over a long period of time. The second possible meaning of “modern” is that of “new”, contrasting the term “old”. Here the predicate “modern” designates a present experienced as an epoch, which is set apart from epochs of the past by certain properties that are uniformly comprehensible in their complexity. The beginning of this present can largely be postponed at will, while its end remains indefinite. Finally, the third possible meaning of modern is that of “temporary”, as opposed to “eternal”. This attribution of meaning becomes possible whenever a present and its concepts can be thought of by contemporaries as the “past of a future present”. It wins its full right in the designation of a now that is felt to be so quickly temporary that one can no longer oppose it with a qualitatively different past, but only with eternity as a resting pole.”

⁸ Prutsch, *Politik, Religion und Gewalt*, p.15: Determining the special characteristics of such modern societies in a dedicated manner or naming their break with traditional social configurations historically encounters difficulties [...] However, what is characteristic of all these processes is that they extend over long periods of time and occur in different parts of the world clearly different times are to be determined. In attempts at specification, the industrial and democratic revolutions are accordingly identified as social phenomena that constitute modernity. (Compare Ulrich Wehler, “200 Jahre amerikanische Revolution und Revolutionsforschung” in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Göttingen: Sonderheft 2, 1976) Even these revolutions, however, are spatially rather extensive and uneven phenomena, which - under the premise of a clear delimitation of the “modernity” - leads to the search for further ones Restrictions necessary. This can be found, provided that the political changes in England in the 17th century followed by the economic upheavals there in the second half of the 18th century are recognized as the starting point for a slow but powerful change in political thought and economic organization, culminating in the relatively close coincidence of the American (1776) and French (1789) revolutions - a sufficiently short period of time that could be described as the beginning of political modernity. Compare R. Palmer, *The age of democratic revolution*; v. 1: the challenge, Princeton, 1959.

and thereby locating them outside “modernity”. A judgment with a negative connotation resonates in the theories and above all concepts of modernity,⁹ which through their discourses,¹⁰ legitimized nothing other than violence and exclusion and thus unleashed dynamics in which people were not only denied belonging to modernity, but to humanity itself.¹¹

„The” figure of thought “of the” great dichotomy “not only encompasses the history of modernization, it also divides it from within. Social modernization and cultural modernity (Habermas) diverge and solidify into what Matei Calinescu calls the “two moderns”: the action system of social modernization on the one hand, the symbolic system of modern culture on the other (Schönert), the social constraints on the one hand and their “counter-institution”, the autonomous art of the avant-garde on the other hand (citizens). “¹²

It should be noted that “modernity” is difficult to determine in terms of time, since it appeared at different times, in different places, in different

⁹ Graevenitz, “Einleitung” 10: „With an expression by Hans-Ulrich Wehler one could say that modernity is basically spelled with the help of a »dichotomy alphabet« [...] The double structure has an impact in the fashion theories, for example in the evolution theories, which, according to Wehler, »strike a skeptical or optimistic polarization “... “Great social science thinkers of the late 18th and 19th centuries clung to these symmetrical dichotomies of social development.” With the ideal type of tradition, the starting point was determined, with the ideal type of modernity, the current state or the goal of a directed evolutionary process was determined. Such pairs of opposites can be found e.g. in Herbert Spencers Homogenität und Differenzierung (Homogeneity and differentiation), Max Webers Traditionalität und Rationalisierung (Traditionality and Rationalization), Emile Durkheims mechanical and organic solidarity, Ferdinand Tönnies' Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and society), Henry S. Maines Status und Kontrakt (Status and Contract).” Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte*, Göttingen, 1975 and c. footnote. 8, 14.

¹⁰ Compare Michel Foucault, *Die Ordnung des Diskurses*, Frankfurt a . M.: Suhrkamp, 1991.

¹¹ Teresa Koloma Beck, “(Staats-)Gewalt und moderne Gesellschaft. Der Mythos vom Verschwinden der Gewalt”, *Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung*, published January, 2017, <https://www.bpb.de/apuz/240909/staats-gewalt-und-moderne-gesellschaft-der-mythos-vom-verschwinden-der-gewalt?p=all>, accessed on 02. September 2020.

¹² Graevenitz, “Einleitung”, 10, op. cit. Jörg Schönert, “Gesellschaftliche Modernisierung und Literatur der Moderne”, in Christian Wagenknecht (ed.), *Zur Terminologie der Literaturwissenschaft. Akten des 9. Germanistischen Symposions der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft 1986*, Stuttgart 1988, 393-413.

forms. Temporal caesuras are therefore difficult to pin down and to tie them to characteristic forms such as the historical premises of the Enlightenment,¹³ the industrial and bourgeois revolutions, which have contributed to the development of capitalist societies and arise on the one hand from the development of new sciences and technologies and on the other from the liberal capitalism of civil society and its urbanization. So one can say that "the uniform, normative concept of "modernity" (can) can be equated with modern western rationality (Max Weber)".¹⁴ The modern society is therefore understood as a synonym and characteristic of the social formation of the modern age, which extends to the present day, which is strictly different from the so-called "tradition",¹⁵ since "modern" is a break with the "order" that was valid until then - the "old world" and thus embodies a political program.¹⁶ Whether modernization is understood to be a process of rationalization, as Max Weber formulated it, or whether it is understood to mean the disappearance of the community in favor of the contract-based society through the criticism of F. Tönnies, or as G. Simmel understands hereby the individualization as the result of modernization and its increasing differentiation. In this regard, it can be criticized that what all these thinkers have in common is that they understand

¹³ Walter Rothholz, *Politik und Religion. Eine kurze Einführung in die Grundkategorien ihrer Beziehung*, Szczecin: Politisches und Europäisches Institut der Universität Szczecin, 2013, p. 20: „The concept of progress associated with the term modern was decisively shaped by Bernard de Fontenelle, who developed the theory of unlimited linear progress in his work "Digression sur les Ancients et les Modernes", published in 1688. This was primarily due to advances in the natural sciences of the 17th century. But this also shook the aesthetic role model. The role model effect of the "ancients" was suppressed by deeper insights into the contradictions of the historical process. In France in the 17th and 18th centuries in particular, the debate on poetic, aesthetic and historical-philosophical issues made the term "modern" a symbol of a broad conception of history. The term congealed into a cipher that symbolized the emancipation of "modernity" from Christianity. In the end it was Hegel who, in idealistic form, created the historical-philosophical expression for those ideas of "modern" that have remained alive to this day."

¹⁴ Graevenitz, "Einleitung", 1: „An »evolutionary-theoretical generalized term of modernization« (Jürgen Habermas, *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne. Zwölf Vorlesungen*, Frankfurt a. M., 1985, p.11, has largely replaced the orientation towards Weber's concept of modernity in the historical and social sciences."

¹⁵ Peter Wagner, *Soziologie der Moderne*, Frankfurt a. Main: Campus, 1995, see *Theorie und Gesellschaft*, p. 33.

¹⁶ Compare Rothholz, *Politik und Religion*, p. 20.

modernization as a linear, progress-driven process that is not only unstoppable, but is projected onto all societies. However, it was not so much "modernity" itself with its revolutions that brought about these upheavals, but rather the discourse of modernity¹⁷, its theories and ideas. On the one hand, as we have been able to see so far, the opinions and theories on the concept of modernity or modernism differ widely and can be summarized as the "self-reflexivity"¹⁸ of modernity, in which the "discourse" of modernity (about itself) falls into this, because the discourse,¹⁹ as M. Foucault defined it, has a certain knowledge of its own time within a certain culture with a certain regularity²⁰ and is linked to given power structures, whereby "knowledge and reality are the results of socio-cultural processes",²¹ which through the discourse (communication (Habermas) or

¹⁷ Graevenitz, "Einleitung", 14: "For Charles Taylor's categorical imperative of modernity, the "articulation", a kind of discursive self-presence of the modern age, the aesthetic "expressivism" is the modern idea of the individual« (Charles Taylor, *Das Unbehagen an der Moderne*, Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 1995, 72, Model case and instrument at the same time.

¹⁸ „Reflexivity“- the“ thinking about oneself“, deputy authors would be J. Habermas, Ulrich Beck, A. Giddens and Scott Lasch.; Graevenitz, "Einleitung", p.14: „Scott Lash, with Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens a member of the triumvirate of the »reflective second modernism«, Scott Lash persistently recalls the »aesthetic dimension« of this recent modernization of the modernity. In any case, in the second modernity of the communication society, the discourses as "media" of modernization (Richard Münch) are on the advance. Modernization processes and the processing of discourses are becoming increasingly identical. According to Scott Lash, this global expansion of discourse corresponds to the expansion of the aesthetic into the everyday world. The »images, sounds and stories« belong »as a commodity-shaped intellectual property of the culture industry to the characteristic, highly industrialized overall structure of power. On the other hand, they open up virtual and real spaces for the spread of aesthetic criticism of this power-knowledge complex. The basic principle of aesthetic reflexivity in the »everyday life of today's consumer capitalism« is again, as with Charles Taylor, »expressive individualism«. " op. cit. Scott Lash, "Reflexivität und ihre Doppelungen: Struktur, Ästhetik und Gemeinschaft," in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Scott Lash (ed.), *Reflexive Modernisierung. Eine Kontroverse*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1996, pp. 195-286, here 234 ff., compare also Scott Lash, "Reflexive Modernization: The Aesthetic Dimension", *Theory, Culture and Society*, no 10/1, 1993, pp.1-24.

¹⁹ Foucault, *Die Ordnung des Diskurses*, Other alternate authors would be J. F. Lyotard's language games and J. Habermas with the keyword of discourse ethics (*Diskursethik*) (*Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns*), worked out with O. J. Appelt.

²⁰ Michel Foucault, *Die Ordnung der Dinge*, Frankfurt. a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974, p. 9 – „Introduction“.

²¹ Achim Landwehr, *Diskurs und Diskursgeschichte* (Potsdam: Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, 2010), Version: 1.0, in: Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, 11.02.2010,

the media (R.Münch)) are mediated by themselves and are ultimately a manifestation of modernity itself. The “project of modernity”²² or the project of the Enlightenment thus shows an inner division, both in theory and in practice, because the gap is especially between the “ideas” of modernity and the institutions themselves, as the ideas and concepts of modernity are historically definable, but in practice they remain ideal-typical constructions, especially since they have been implemented very differently.²³ Of course, this also goes hand in hand with Max Weber's concept of “disenchanted the world”, whereby “modernity” is understood as a break with the past. The extent to which this “modern upheaval” is supposed to have affected all European societies economically, politically and socially remains open to dispute. It is much easier to speak of “concepts of modernity” than “modernity” as a linear and progressive epoch.²⁴

“The variables for this are urbanization, industrialization and democratization as well as an empirical-analytical understanding of knowledge”.²⁵

If the modern age is marked by the Reformation and the Renaissance,²⁶ the “modern age” is marked by the American Declaration of Independence

http://docupedia.de/zg/landwehr_diskursgeschichte_v1_de_2010, accessed on 04. September 2020; This debate also includes the discussion of constructivism and realism.

²² Jürgen Habermas, *Die Moderne. Ein unvollendetes Projekt. Philosophisch-politische Aufsätze*, Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, 1977-1992.

²³ Prutsch, *Politik, Religion und Gewalt*, p.16.

²⁴ Walter Rothholz, “Anmerkungen zur politischen Kultur in Rumänien,” *Studia Europaea*, no. 2, June 2016, pp. 33–61, pp. 38-40.

²⁵ Prutsch, *Politik, Religion und Gewalt*, p.15.

²⁶ Rothholz, *Politik und Religion*, p. 20: „As early as the Renaissance, the term appears in its current form. However, the Renaissance image of history remained cyclical, while the connection between the term “modern” and a teleological image of history can only be demonstrated from the 17th century: From then on, we can finally establish a historical image that appeared as a model of historical progress, but it to be motivated in terms of salvation history. The dispute between “old” and “modern” that began at the end of the 17th century and quickly grew beyond a mere aesthetic debate ultimately created the concept of modernity that we are familiar with today.“

(1776) and the French Revolution (1789) on the other hand.²⁷ The term “modern” means, one can say, in all current theories (scientific) progress and is therefore also understood as “emancipation from Christianity”. Secularization and technical-scientific progress were thus decisive for the changed modern consciousness of the so-called modernity, in which a “modern”, “civilized” and consequently rational view of man has developed, which was diametrically opposed to the organic view of mankind and the world that had prevailed until then together with the changed social structures and their increasingly complex interdependencies grew together to form a new “technical” worldview. This is how the modern state theories of capitalistically developed countries emerge, which were imported to Eastern Europe and Romania and which demanded the foundation for the development of a new political and economic system and which were to find their final form in the nation, in which at the same time modern man - as an individual - was born or should emerge from it. What the political culture of south-east European countries, especially Romania, looks like in the face of these modernization processes, will now be discussed below.

Political culture

In order to get closer to Romania's political culture, it must be clarified that the concept of political culture based on Eric Voegelin is used in this article. Accordingly, political culture is understood to mean the cosmion - i.e. the self-interpretation - of every society and thus the source of its social order. It should be noted that politics and culture are directly connected and therefore cannot be treated separately, as in the sense of the *political culture approach* of Almond and Verba, in which the ideas of T. Parsons, M. Weber's student, were incorporated. The analysis of political culture²⁸ in this article therefore does not use the political culture approach

²⁷ Prutsch, *Politik, Religion und Gewalt*, p.15, Compare. Robert Palmer, *The age of democratic revolution*, Princeton, 1959.

²⁸ The sociologists Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba coined the term “political culture” in their work: *The Civic Culture, Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, N.Y: Princeton, 1963; „The term political culture developed here describes the sum of the basic attitudes and orientations specific to a certain society with regard to the various areas of politics that are conveyed to the individual in the process of their individual socialization in family, school, circle of friends or at work and that are political Determine action. [...] Accordingly, political

by Almond and Verba, since here the political culture²⁹ is only considered under the aspect of the relationship of the citizen to the political system (subsystem fourth degree of the AGIL scheme Parsons)³⁰ and leaves out all other parts of the overall social context. The understanding of politics and the role of the political system is only viewed as a subsystem of the social system. The political system is no longer assigned a role other than that of a goal-pursuing subsystem,³¹ which pursues a functionally differentiated process. As a result, the political system is reduced to a mediating authority between individuals who give external input into the system through interests and demands and the political institutions that take this input and transform it system-specifically and functionally into so-called outputs according to their performance.³² The political system is only understood as a *functional* process, which, via the state institution (s), achieves the transition from social inputs to political outputs, whereby the political system is only assigned a functional significance and as a legislative, judicial, executive and “distributing institution” “Can be grasped by goods and resources.³³ The role of the political system, its power and rule, especially in the capitalistically developed societies, is thus reduced to the function of a “distribution institution” and politics is thus viewed from the overall social context. This approach neglects the fact that the individual is embedded in a society in which he creates certain models of order on the basis of certain worldviews, which include religious - from rite and myth to theoretical and thus political systems of order that are based on a symbolism, that is, the symbolic language is made understandable.³⁴

culture is something like a middle and mediating authority between the political institutions and the individuals, the “missing link”[...].“ Volker Pesch, *Handlungstheorie und Politische Kultur*, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000, 11.

²⁹ Pesch, *Handlungstheorien*, 55.

³⁰ Compare Talcott Parsons, *The Social System*, London: Routledge, 1951.

³¹ *Ibidem*. This scheme was developed by Parsons, where AGIL stands for A - Adaptation, G - Goal - Attainment, I - Integration and L - Latency.

³² Rothholz, “Anmerkungen”, pp. 35-37 and 38.

³³ Compare Nikolas Winkler, “Ergündung der politischen Kultur Litauens. Eine Untersuchung von Vorstellungen politischer Ordnung in ihrer historischen Gewordenheit”, PhD. diss., Universität Greifswald, 2015, p. 12.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, compare also Walter Rothholz, “Anmerkungen zur politischen Kultur in Rumänien,” *Studia Europaea*, no. 2 (June 2016), 33–61, Peter L. Berger/Thomas Luckmann,

Politics, in the sense of the *zoon politikon*, is understood to mean an order system with an inherent worldview that regulates the coexistence of people according to a naturally ordered law and is conveyed through the symbolic language, since people are provided with language and rationality. In order to be able to maintain this system of order, the individual must take part in the maintenance of this community - through participation - i.e. communication and action in it, because only in this way does the individual take part in the community at all.³⁵ The liberal theories of modernization, however, as we have been able to observe so far, cannot express the "missing link between the individual and the institutions", since these do not consist of "the sum of individual preferences (inputs)" which then react with "corresponding outputs" but rather from common meanings of the political,³⁶ which are anchored in people and world views - that is, in the imaginary³⁷ and reflect the experiences of society "or represent the answers that have been given in the past to solve political-social problems",³⁸ whereby "action" and consequently "political" emerge at all social drafts of order.³⁹ "Politics is thus produced through action and people act, always intentionally and purposefully, that is, intentionally and teleologically, since there is no action at all without the question of the reason, the intention and the goal," however, the "condition of action" is Language and consciousness.⁴⁰ According to this definition, all human action would be "political".⁴¹ Culture, on the other hand, always encompasses a collective, as culture encompasses phenomena such as shared ideas, beliefs, values, but also rites and practices that are passed on

Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit. Eine Theorie der Wissenssoziologie, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2000.

³⁴ Berger/Luckmann, *Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion*, p. 83.

³⁵ By combining these two analyzes - the political - as a dimension of overall social action and culture, which together produce a certain symbolic language, it should be made clear how the individual is connected to his society in all of his social actions. Berger/Luckmann, *Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion*.

³⁶ Rothholz, *Politik und Religion*, p. 36.

³⁷ Cornelius Castoriadis Cornelius, *Gesellschaft als imaginäre Institution*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990.

³⁸ Rothholz, „Anmerkungen zur politischen Kultur in Rumänien“, p. 36.

³⁹ Rothholz, *Politik und Religion*, pp. 36-38.

⁴⁰ Compare Pesch, *Handlungstheorien*, p. 107.

⁴¹ Charles Taylor, *Negative Freiheit*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992.

from generation to generation. Politics and religion must therefore be viewed as a connecting medium that guide action and consequently this includes customs, ethics, morals, etc. and represent “the result of people who act together”, so for example religion. Therefore, for a long time there was no “awareness of a difference between religion and politics” and “the mighty could be understood as sacred and the sacred as powerful”,⁴² so the modern distinction was made between “a supernatural and earthly power, or between subject and *Transsubject*”,⁴³ or the immanent and the transcendent only through the “modernity”, which inevitably has to be brought into connection with secularization. Both religion and politics revolve around the concept of power, since power in Weber’s sense means “the possibility of actions and processes”, but at the same time also “the possibility of becoming effective within political-social processes”,⁴⁴ where power arises “if People interact”⁴⁵, whereby “this potential of power is not in the hands of the individual”.⁴⁶ Of course, the (bourgeois) public, liberally capitalistically developed societies, play a key role here, since “public” has always been a political term, because rule is always represented publicly, which, however, up to the modern age has not yet been a public space for *debate* in the modern sense - the “public communication and common action”⁴⁷ of the citizens, which brought about a new form of *Vergesellschaftung* (socialization).⁴⁸ This public is based “horizontally on mutual recognition, that is, on the freely acting individual”.⁴⁹ This in turn meant that modern societies could no longer present themselves as a “unified body”, without destroying the precondition of the “transcendent legitimation of political rule”, since “an autonomously self-governing

⁴² Rothholz, „Anmerkungen“, p. 50 and see also *Politik und Religion*, p. 12.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 17; Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Tübingen, 1989, p. 28.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*; Hannah Arendt, *The human condition*, Chicago Press, 1998.

⁴⁶ Helmut Kuhn, *Der Staat. Eine philosophische Darstellung*, München, 1967, p. 112.

⁴⁷ Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp, 1997.

⁴⁸ Rothholz, “Anmerkungen“, p. 38.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 37: This is where the concept of “civil religion” appears, since all societies that have been captured by Western modernity follow a “secular belief in progress, who took the place of unifying religious worldviews”. Compare Eric Voegelin, *Die neue Wissenschaft der Politik*, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2004.

society” is diametrically opposed to this concept.⁵⁰ Since then, modern societies have found themselves in a constant state of uncertainty, since the “position of power can only be filled temporarily”.⁵¹ In order to escape this uncertainty, society has to submit to a “will for unity” - such as that of rationality, as has repeatedly appeared since the French Revolution and was later enforced by the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century with far more radical means. The totalitarian regimes reacted to “the secularization of the legitimation basis of politics, which led to the separation of society and power”,⁵² especially in the countries of Eastern Europe with the “violent original surrender of the position of power and the uncompromising submission of society to an ideologically interpreted course of history”.⁵³ This process of rationalization of societies, it can be said, emerged in the capitalistically developed societies because of the glorification of science and at the same time through the radical restructuring of working conditions through the industrialization processes as a result of political liberalism. Whereas in the former socialist countries the process of rationalization did not develop through liberal capitalism, but through Soviet communism, it’s forced industrialization and the accompanying glorification of the workers’ dictatorship. The modernization processes of Romania took place through violence and were imposed on Romania, so to speak, from the outside and from above, which endangered their own “national” and “traditional values”, which were conveyed in particular by the Orthodox Church. In principle, one can say that the Orthodox Church and its beliefs are incompatible with the concept of “modernity”, since this would not only result in the disintegration of a uniform concept of progress and thus the independent social articulation of moral norms, but it would also raise the question of the legitimation of political rule in a secularized form.⁵⁴ On the other hand, because in Romania the modernization processes did not take place “naturally” and gradually, but were imposed from the outside and thus did not represent the “own” processes of modernization and were experienced violently,

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 40.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 38.

⁵² *Ibidem*, pp. 38-39.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, pp. 38-40.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 40.

which is why this tension is still pervasive in society today . Robert Adam adds that one of the Romanian paradoxes lies in the Proustic attempt to make up for “lost time” and an essential feature of Romanian culture is that “modernity” and its currents in Romania did not take place successively, but simultaneously.⁵⁵ In this context, however, the social system was not renewed, only what was taken over that served the construct of one's own nation.⁵⁶

Due to inadequate and sometimes non-existent modernization structures within Romanian society, a constant lack of education and identity-creating factors in the social structure arose very early on. Due to the lack of communication and especially educational media, such as one's own writing and the dissemination of what is written, “Modernity” as the era of the Enlightenment and the cornerstone of a reformation, secularization and the beginning of the rationalization process, as well as the development of a bourgeoisie and the associated development of a modern public as a political, economic and social space of action of an intact political culture was experienced violently.⁵⁷ Compared to the early capitalist development of other (western) European countries, the long lack of a foundation for a common written culture has led to a low level of education within Romanian society, especially in the country's rural regions. In addition, the development of a middle class in the sense of the western bourgeoisie failed to materialize. The protagonists of a sphere of political, institutional and administrative public that laid the foundation for the political culture of later democratization in other countries were missing. The absence of the *public* has made the development of the national identity very difficult and slowed down, which also significantly delayed the establishment of a state in European comparison. Even later, the model of the modern nation state was only adopted in its structural

⁵⁵ Robert Adam, *Două Veacuri de Populism Românesc*, București: Humanitas, 2018, p. 31.

⁵⁶ Alex Drace-Francis, *Geneza Culturii Române Moderne. Instituțiile scrisului și dezvoltarea identității naționale 1700-1900*, București: Polirom, 2016, pp. 210-211, compare also Adam, *Două Veacuri*. See also Lucian Boia, *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, București: Humanitas, 2011 and Lucian Boia *Miturile comunismului românesc*, București: Nemira, 1998.

⁵⁷ Compare Nikolai Genov, “Transformation als makrosoziale Rationalisierung, Die Tradition Max Webers und die osteuropäischen Realitäten,” in Anton Sterbling/Heinz Zipparian (ed.), *Max Weber und Osteuropa. Beiträge zur Osteuropaforschung*, Stuttgart: Krämer Verlag, 1997, pp. 229-241.

form, but without implementing the associated history of ideas of the Western tradition and its models of order,⁵⁸ the idea of the Enlightenment and its liberal and socialist theories in society. On the one hand, the economic potential of the nation state could not be used and, on the other hand, there was no change in values or no new value orientation at all, far removed from the rural traditions within the population. Due to the violent development of modernity, Romanian society lacked the foundation for the emergence of a bourgeois-democratically organized society and its political culture. Without the liberal-bourgeois and consequently democratic society, the principles of the capitalist market could not be anticipated, and there was no understanding of the parliamentary public by professionally trained officials of a democracy which, according to Weber, represents a heterogeneous system, in which a political leader, a representative of the victorious party was elected through direct popular elections, who appoints his "bureaucratic apparatus" and is only bound to the approval of parliament in matters of the administration of the state budget and legislation.⁵⁹ The modern parliamentary system of early capitalist countries emerged from a long tradition of political theory of the history of Western ideas and represents a gradual and permanent modernization. A further development in the sense of a modernization was thus largely absent in Romania.

The political culture of Romania

This 'rethinking' with regard to a general social orientation towards democratic values⁶⁰ is prevented by the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Romanian Orthodox faith in interaction with the underdeveloped political, economic and social conditions of the post-socialist country.

⁵⁸ Compare Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *Die großen Revolutionen und die Kulturen der Moderne*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006.

⁵⁹ Compare Max Weber, *Politik als Beruf*, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 2006, p. 9: „Specialist officials and "political officials.“

⁶⁰ See Helmut Thome, "Wertewandel in Europa," in Hans Joas/Klaus Wiegandt (ed.), *Die kulturellen Werte Europas*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005, pp. 391-402 and especially Ronald Inglehart, *Modernisierung und Postmodernisierung. Kultureller, wirtschaftlicher und politischer Wandel in 43 Gesellschaften*, Frankfurt, New York: Campus, 1998, pp. 98-115.

Thus, areas of life that are related to work, production, action,⁶¹ possessions and individualism are in Romania on the one hand; still characterized by the 'socialist' ideology⁶² and on the other hand by the orthodox faith and its spirituality.⁶³ For Romania, secularization does not only mean the sacralization of inner-worldly holdings, rather the attempt to save the old Romanian culture in the transition to the modern age.

As a result, neither a "bourgeois" political nor a democratic consciousness could develop in the latitude of Romanian society. So, it can be said that due to the belated process of reformation, secularization, Enlightenment, and rationalization of Romania, cultural memory is largely determined by the experiences of feudal and/or repressive systems of power and the Orthodox Church, its spirituality and its traditions.

Therefore, it is difficult to fix the political culture of Romania to its traditional records, especially because of the political instrumentalization⁶⁴ of the literature and historiography developed in communism.⁶⁵ Scripture was not used to "delineate special areas" and to use them for "purposes and as a medium of a culture of debate in many fields, from medicine and geometry to poetry, theater, rhetoric and philosophy," but was much sooner only the "special resource of religious and political rule"⁶⁶ in ethnic discourses and means of national Communist propaganda.⁶⁷ Thus, the multitude of rites, customs, ceremonies and cults practiced in rural areas (i.e. oral cultural symbols and cultural practices of Romania) indicate that Romania's cultural development, as repressive systems of rule, seized the

⁶¹ Hannah Arendt, *Vita Activa oder Vom Tätigen Leben*, München: Piper Verlag, 2002.

⁶² Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaușescu's Romania*, Berkley/L.A./Oxford: University of California Press, 1991.

⁶³ Daniel Barbu, *Au cetățenii suflet? O teologie politică a societăților post-seculare*, București: Editura Vremea, 2016.

⁶⁴ Michael Shafir, *Romania, Politics, Economics and Society. Political Stagnation and Simulated Change*, London: Frances Printer, 1985, Part 1, Cap. 5.

⁶⁵ Reinhart Koselleck, *Begriffsgeschichten. Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006, p. 29.

⁶⁶ Niklas Luhmann, *Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1997, p. 281.

⁶⁷ See Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003; see also Hans Kohn, "Die kommunistische und die faschistische Diktatur. Eine Vergleichende Studie," in Bruno Seidel and Siegfried Jenkner (eds.), *Wege der Totalitarismusforschung (Wege der Forschung)*, Darmstadt, 1974.

country, was at a medieval-feudal level of development and was not yet advanced enough⁶⁸ to produce political institutions of an intact political system. These cultural practices have survived the regime, however, so that today in social science linguistic usage one can speak of a “cultural overlap” or “cultural lag” - “theory of cultural phase shift”⁶⁹ and the lack of a cultural “transfer process” - “cultural turn”⁷⁰; because feudal-rural cultural practices mingle with elements of socialist realism and (post-)modernity. The construction of the Romanian nation state, the invention of the Romanian nation⁷¹ and the Romanian national identity⁷² took place with the help of political myths,⁷³ which have their roots in the cultural myths of a country. The cultural myths of Romania have been reinterpreted by the political systems of power in political myths and revived⁷⁴ in order to anchor their political course in society, to gain the confidence of the people and consolidate political power. Finally, political myths helped to legitimize weak and repressive political systems⁷⁵ in order to initiate the nationalization of Romania and to summon and consolidate a Romanian sense of nationality through the “ritualized affirmation” of “national

⁶⁸ Stefan Zeletin, *Burghezia română*, București: Cultura Națională, 1925, p. 81, 157. Compare Kenneth accessed on 10. May 2016, “Social Change in Romania 1860-1940. A Debate on Development in a European Nation”, *Research Series*, no. 36, 1978, p. 15, see also Angela Harre, “Conceptul de progres: relația conflictuală dintre liberalism și intervenția statală”, in Victor Neumann and Armin Heinen (ed.), *Istoria României prin concepte-perspective alternative asupra limbajelor social-politice*, București: Polirom, 2010.

⁶⁹ Compare William F. Ogburn, *Kultur und sozialer Wandel*, Neuwied am Rhein: Luchterhand Verlag, 1969, 130 f.

⁷⁰ Compare Doris Bachmann - Medick, *Cultural Turns, Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften*, Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt's Enzyklopädie, 2009, 13 ff.

⁷¹ Benedict Anderson, *Die Erfindung der Nation*, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2005.

⁷² Constantin Iordachi and Balázs Trencsényi, “In search of a usable past: The Question of National Identity in Romanian Studies 1990-2000”, in *East European Politics and Societies*, vol. 17, no. 3, 2003 and see also Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party systems and voter alignments: cross national perspectives*, New York: Free Press, 1967, <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~mishler/LipsetRokkan.pdf>, accessed 21 May 2016.

⁷³ Lucian Boia, *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, București: Humanitas, 2011.

⁷⁴ Cosmina Tănăsioiu, *Post-communist political symbolism: new myths – same old stories? Analysis of romanian political mythology*, <http://sar.org.ro/files/Tanasoiu.pdf>, accessed 02 May 2016, pp. 124-125.

⁷⁵ Compare Lucian Boia, *Miturile comunismului românesc*, pp. 175-197 (quoted after Daniel Barbu, *Destinul colectiv, servitutea involuntară, nefericirea totalitară: trei mituri ale comunismului românesc*, București: Kriterion, 1998.

identity".⁷⁶ Thus, only a rudimentary national political culture could emerge, because the Romanian middle class is already scarce in terms of numbers, the poor performance of Romania's economic sector and the still insufficient educational institutions continue to oppose institutional change and its failure is reflected in the reproduction of traditional, social and economic structures.⁷⁷ The reason for this is the faith and practice of faith in Orthodox Christianity, which continues to be strongly bound to the institution of the Church, its representatives and liturgy.⁷⁸ As a result, the Orthodox Church bound its followers to its institutions and thus largely halted the process of rationalization,⁷⁹ since the believer was given his faith for a long time only through the Church and the understanding or interpretation of the Holy Scriptures was only predetermined.

As a result, the rationalization and literacy process were slow, as the individual was made dependent on the religious community. Whereas in the capitalistically developed societies and the Roman Church, faith in the course of the Bible translation by Luther, the Reformation, secularization, the Enlightenment, and mass literacy became a private and personal thing, independent of the church as an institution. In particular, the focus here is on the analysis of Romania's political experience, which is characterized by feudal,⁸⁰ repressive or authoritarian rule, and elsewhere by orthodox beliefs and traditional values. Values, according to Charles Taylor, are social goods for which we are taking sides, ultimately resulting from our own radical⁸¹ election. He believes that values can either lead to a moral

⁷⁶ Detailed in Anneli – Ute Gabanyi, *The Ceaușescu Cult*, București: Fundația Culturală Română, 2000.

⁷⁷ Holm H. Sundhausen, „Wandel ohne Modernisierung. Theorien nachholender Entwicklung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Südosteuropas“, in Krista Zach and Cornelius Zach (ed.), *Modernisierung auf Raten in Rumänien*, München: IKGS Verlag, 2004, 30.

⁷⁸ Sergius N. Bulgakov, *The Orthodox Church*, Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1988, p.22 ff.

⁷⁹ Wolfgang Schluchter, „Rationalität-das Spezifikum Europas?“, in Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt (ed.), *Die kulturellen Werte Europas*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005.

⁸⁰ See Sabina Fati, *Transilvania o provincie în căutarea unui centru*, Cluj- Napoca: Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturala, 2007.

⁸¹ Lat. radix: to change from the root; in *Meyers Illustrierte Weltgeschichte Teil 1: Zweiter Weltkrieg*, Redaktion Geschichte des Bibliographischen Instituts und Leitung Werner Digel (ed.), Augsburg: Weltbild Verlag, 1987, 76.

decision, not on the individual will, but rather based on strong valuations, or that the values lead to an expression of preferences, since these are actually based on a variety of moral concepts.⁸² This means *that strong judgments inevitably play a role in a conception of the agent and his experience because they are linked to our particular notion of the self*.⁸³ Taylor concludes that doers who make strong judgments can be described as 'deep' because the choices that matter for a choice are selected not only in terms of their own goals but also in their lifestyle and thus enter into the 'nature' of the actor and are thus closely linked to the idea of identity and must become an integral part of the self.⁸⁴ It can therefore be said that the Romanian political identity and the related values of Romanian society were determined by the experiences of the prevailing political systems of feudalism,⁸⁵ fascism, the military dictatorship,⁸⁶ national communism⁸⁷ and post-communism and their religious-traditional social structures and their spatial-temporal framework. Based on this experience of predominantly authoritarian-repressive and religious-traditional political culture, it seems likely that Romanian society has been experiencing a political identity crisis since its emergence as a nation. According to Taylor, by preventing individuals from developing their own values through violence they deny them the opportunity to develop their own (political) identity, which forms the basis of their ability to act. They would not be able to value and determine the meaning of things.⁸⁸ The repressive forms of rule of the military dictatorship of Antonescu and Dejs⁸⁹ and the paternalistic⁹⁰ austerity policy

⁸² Charles Taylor, *Negative Freiheit. Zur Kritik des Neuzeitlichen Individualismus*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988, pp. 28-29, 34-35.

⁸³ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

⁸⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 36.

⁸⁵ Stelian Tănase, *Elite și societate. Guvernarea Gheorghiu-Dej 1948-1965*, București, 1998; Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Fantoma lui Gheorghiu-Dej*, București: Univers, 1995.

⁸⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁷ Gabanyi, *The Ceaușescu Cult*.

⁸⁸ Taylor, *Negative Freiheit*, 37.

⁸⁹ See Dennis Deletant, *Romania under Communist Rule*, Bucharest: Civil Academy Foundation, 2006; Klaus-Detlev Grothusen, *Romania*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998 and Dionisie Ghemani, *Die nationale Souveränitätspolitik der SR Rumänien 1. Teil im Rahmen des sowjetischen Bündnissystems*, München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1981, see Comisia Internațională pentru studierea Holocaustului în România. Raport Final, București: Polirom, 2004.

of Ceaușescu make it almost impossible for Romanian society to develop democratic values, since up to now everyday life has been characterized by violence or the fear of violent repression and political ideologies.⁹¹ Interesting is the fact that even dictatorships like fascism and communism, which actually strongly advocated atheist, anti-religious and anti-church political ideologies and attitudes, worked well with the Orthodox Church in Romania. It is not difficult to see this in the Antonescu regime and the Archangel Michael Legion, which was founded by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu⁹² and with the mythical-religious movement or 'political' party of the Iron Guard, as a military apparatus of repression established fascism in Romania in the form of a national legionary fascist dictatorship, in whose ranks there were even clergymen. The cooperation also worked in the royal dictatorship of King Carol II, whose prime minister was none other than the Patriarch Miron Cristea himself.

In addition, the Romanian church was not separated from the state for a long time, whereas state and church were in the so-called "symphonia",⁹³ an interplay⁹⁴ in which the Orthodox Church in Romania sees itself as the national church or the founder of a national religion, a state religion.⁹⁵ In this way the church remained legally autonomous from the state.⁹⁶ Due to the interdependence between church and state - religion

⁹⁰ Winfried Thaa, *Die Wiedergeburt des Politischen. Zivilgesellschaft und Legitimitätskonflikt in den Revolutionen von 1989*, Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 1996, p. 48.

⁹¹ Annelie - Ute Gabanyi, "Die rumänischen Eliten in der Systemtransformation", in Hans-Joachim Veen (ed.), *Alte Eliten in jungen Demokratien: Wechsel, Wandel und Kontinuität in Mittel-Osteuropa*, Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2004, p. 315.

⁹² Oliver Jens Schmitt, *Căpitan Codreanu. Aufstieg und Fall des rumänischen Faschistenführer*, Wien: Paul Zsolnay Verlag, 2016, compare pp. 200-207.

⁹³ Novelae 6 Justinians (535), compare "Novelle 137 from year 545," in *Corpus juris civilis*, Vol. 3 Novellae, ed. R. Schoell und G. Kroll (Berlin 1963), 695, see also „Das Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche aus konfessioneller Perspektive," in *Bibliothek der Ausbildungseinrichtung für Orthodoxe Theologie*, 26, accessed July 12, 2016, http://www.orththeol.uni-muenchen.de/archiv/alte_lehrmaterialien/ss10_lma_anapliotis/staat-kirche-verh/ss10_kirche_staat_f1.pdf, accessed on 12. July. 2016, at 10. 13 h.

⁹⁴ Ibidem. Compare *Bibliothek der Ausbildungseinrichtung für Orthodoxe Theologie*, especially 26, compare Raul Rognean, „Beziehung von Kirche und Staat. Einordnungsmöglichkeiten der Orthodoxien" (MA, University Babeș-Bolyai, 2011), p.31.

⁹⁵ BOR (Biserica Ortodoxa Română) Law/ Art. 5 (1).

⁹⁶ The 1866 constitution recognizes the "autocephaly" of the Orthodox Church. See BOR, Biserica Ortodoxa Română Law Art. 4 (2) and compare Walter Rothholz, *Anmerkungen zur*

and politics - the church is still allowed to participate in draft laws and political decision-making issue, which creates difficult-to-balance power relationships in the distribution of social interests and forces, which still have a strong inhibiting effect on democratization efforts. The "incomplete" secularization⁹⁷ resulted in a comparatively laborious and delayed nation-building process⁹⁸ and favored the emergence of structural weaknesses in the legislative, judicial and executive branches as well as in the administrative apparatus. Corruption within the political and economic elite is therefore still a topical issue. Corruption increases state and institutional structural problems, so the country remains backward and the population consequently poor, dissatisfied and at a relatively low level of education. The social system is unstable, so that nationalism and populism find greater breeding ground than democratic ideas.

Conclusions

The Orthodox Church supports national movements through the sacralization of politics, as the national state of Romania is still strongly ethnically defined. The Romanian Orthodox Church is therefore regarded as the driving force behind the identity of the Romanian nation and enjoys a high reputation. The strong revival of national identity constructions after 1989 also strengthened the position of the Orthodox Church, which represented the religious majority, in Romanian society. This creates a

politischen Kultur in Rumänien, p. 33–61, Compare Rupert Klieber, *Jüdische – Christliche – Muslimische Lebenswelten der Donaumonarchie 1848 – 1918*, Wien, Köln, Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2010, p.91.

⁹⁷ See Holm H. Sundhausen, "Wandel ohne Modernisierung. Theorien nachholender Entwicklung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Südosteuropas," in Krista Zach/Cornelius Zach (ed.), *Modernisierung auf Raten in Rumänien*, München: IKGS Verlag, 2004, 28. See also Reinhart Koselleck, "Fortschritt," in Otto Brunner (ed.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, Stuttgart, 1994, pp. 351-423, especially pp.351-352 and more about modernization processes in Wolfgang Zapf, "Modernisierung und Modernisierungstheorien," in Wolfgang Zapf (ed.), *Die Modernisierung moderner Gesellschaften*, Campus:Frankfurt/N.Y., 1990, 23-39; compare Wolfgang Zapf, "Modernisierungstheorien in der Transformationsforschung," in Klaus von Beyme/Claus Offe (ed.), *Politische Theorien in der Ära der Transformation*, Westdeutscher Verlag: Opladen, 1996, 169-181.

⁹⁸ Walter Rothholz, "Anmerkungen" see also Keith Hitchins, *Rumania 1866 – 1947*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994 and especially Angela Harre, "Conceptul de progress".

complicit collaboration between the corrupt Romanian policies and the spiritual and religious representatives of the Orthodox faith community. This political and religious collaboration or 'simphonia' is also due to the communist period of Romania, where the Orthodox Church, unlike all other churches, was tolerated and promoted by the communist regime. It is even said to have maintained, especially under the Patriarch Teoctist (1986-2007) connections to the intelligence service of the Securitate.⁹⁹ The growing importance of church and religion is also witnessed by the enormous increase in Orthodox Church buildings. Since 1989, about 90 new churches were built annually, which stands in a ratio of 1: 5 for the construction of new schools. Because of this strengthening and revival of the patriarchal Orthodox Church, their influence in society and also the identification of Romanians with national and religious-traditional identity constructs are growing. The Romanian Orthodox Church is criticized above all for its rather backward religious philosophy, which refuses a modern debate, further development and reinterpretation of orthodox spirituality, beliefs and scriptures, as it is customary, for example, in Catholicism, at least in the conscience frame. For this reason, critics understand Romanian Orthodox religiosity as a 'ritual' rather than as 'religious metaphysics'.¹⁰⁰

These experiences of a repressive and religious-traditional political culture, which can be understood as a "ritualization of politics", have contributed to a political identity crisis in addition to the economic and social backwardness of Romania, that still affect the political capacity of the Romanian post-socialist society. Another reason for this is that the religious and especially traditional society continues to be shaped by a religious understanding of unity, while the democratic political cultures in the course of secularization and the rationalization process, which Habermas

⁹⁹ Compare Klara A. Csiszar, "Religion in Rumänien," in *Religionen in den Ländern der Welt*, vol. I, ed. Markus Porsche-Ludwig and Jürgen Bellers, Nordhausen, 2012, Compare Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Comisia Prezidențială pentru analiza dictaturii comuniste din România – Raport final*, București, 2006, 465, see V. A. Maté-Tóth and P. Mikluščák, *Nicht wie Milch und Honig*, Wien, 2000, p.34, http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/RAPORT_FINAL_CPADCR.pdf, accessed on 15. May 2016.

¹⁰⁰ Andrei Marga, *Bildung und Modernisierung*, Cluj: University Press, 2005, p. 101, compare Gabriel Ibrăileanu, *Din psihologia poporului român*, București: Librăria Leon Alcalay, 1907, p. 359.

generally also understands as "Enlightenment" at their core of individual self-determination, that is, of individualism. This modern concept is at the center of the action theory of a modern and secular state with its active civil society, which embodies the modern public with its associated institutions and thus diametrically opposed to the traditionally valid political power and its legitimation. Exactly this modern concept is incompatible with the Orthodoxy of Romania, since the secularization of the Orthodox faith has not taken place and the society continues to be stuck in its religious-traditional structures, while the institutions and the entire structure of a modern and liberal nation-state have been adopted.

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