



STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS

BABEȘ-BOLYAI



EUROPAEA

3/2017

**STUDIA
UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI**

STUDIA EUROPAEA

**3 / 2017
September**

STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEȘ-BOLYAI STUDIA EUROPAEA

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF:

Prof. Dr. Nicolae PĂUN

EXECUTIVE EDITORS-IN-CHIEF:

Conf. Dr. habil. Sergiu MIȘCOIU, miscoiu@yahoo.com

Conf. Dr. Georgiana CICEO, gciceo@yahoo.com

Conf. Dr. Laura HERTA, laura.herta@ubbcluj.ro

EXECUTIVE EDITORS:

Lect. Dr. Ovidiu VAIDA, ovidiuvaida@yahoo.com

Lect. Dr. Șerban VĂETIȘI, vaetisis@yahoo.com

Lect. Dr. Monica MERUȚIU, monica.merutiu@ubbcluj.ro

Lect. Dr. Ana PANTEA, ana.pantea@ubbcluj.ro

EDITORIAL BOARD:

Babeș-Bolyai University:

Prof. Dr. Ovidiu PECICAN

Prof. Dr. Marius JUCAN

Prof. Dr. Vasile PUȘCAȘ

Conf. Dr. Alina ANDREICA

Conf. Dr. Mircea MANIU

Conf. Dr. Carmen LAZĂR

Conf. Dr. Nicoleta RACOLȚA-PAINA

Conf. Dr. Valentin NAUMESCU

Lect. Dr. Miruna BALOSIN

Lect. Dr. Ciprian BOGDAN

Lect. Dr. Christian SCHUSTER

Lect. Dr. Adrian CORPĂDEAN

Prof. Dr. Dr.h.c. Reinhard MEYERS, WWU Münster

Prof. Dr. Albert van GOUDOEVER, Utrecht

Prof. Dr. Alfredo CANAVERO, Univ. degli Studi di Milano

Prof. Dr. Chantal DELSOL, Académie des Sciences
Morales et Politiques, Paris

Prof. Dr. Michael O'NEILL, Nottingham Trent University

Prof. Dr. Philippe CLARET, Université Bordeaux IV,
Montesquieu

Conf. Dr. Michael IANCU, Institut Maimonide,
Montpellier

Lect. Dr. Karen SCHLUETTER, Otto von Guericke
University, Magdeburg

Dr. Hygin KAKAÏ, Université Abomey-Calavi, Benin

Conf. Dr. Adrian BASARABA, West University, Timișoara

Prof. Dr. Dr.h.c. Basarab NICOLESCU, Centre National
de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris

Prof. Anna KRASTEVA, Nouvelle Université Bulgare, Sofia

Dr. Sergiu GHERGHINA, Goethe University,
Frankfurt-am-Main

Prof. Dr. Roberto Di QUIRICO, University of Cagliari

YEAR
MONTH
ISSUE

(LXII) 2017
SEPTEMBER
3

PUBLISHED ONLINE: 2017-09-30
PUBLISHED PRINT: 2017-09-30
ISSUE DOI:10.24193/subbeuropaea.2017.3

S T U D I A
UNIVERSITATIS BABEȘ-BOLYAI
STUDIA EUROPAEA

3

STUDIA UBB EDITORIAL OFFICE: B.P. Hasdeu no. 51, 400371 Cluj-Napoca, Romania,
Phone + 40-264-405352, www.studia.ubbcluj.ro, office@studia.ubbcluj.ro

SUMAR – CONTENTS – SOMMAIRE – INHALT

P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M Y

OANA ALBESCU, MIRCEA MANIU

The Inexorable Rise of the New Interventionism..... 5

ENIKÓ VINCZE

The Ideology of Economic Liberalism and
the Politics of Housing in Romania..... 29

DANA DÖMŞÖDI

Populist Hysteria and Eastern European Economic Migration.
The Impact of Romanian Migration on the UK Labor Market..... 55

LUCIAN T. BUTARU

Towards a Universal Basic Income. An Evolutionary Approach..... 81

P O P U L I S M

SERGIU MIȘCOIU

Qu'est-ce que le néo-populisme? Quelques explications factuelles
pour un éclaircissement théorique..... 105

SORINA SOARE

Populism and Leadership: Is There Anything New Under the Sun?..... 121

P R O T E S T

MIKOŁAJ RAKUSA-SUSZCZEWSKI

Radicalism and Modernity 151

VICTORIA STOICIU

Romanian Social Movement: Between Repoliticization and
Reinforcement of the Status-Quo (2012-2017) 177

C R I T I Q U E O F I D E O L O G Y

CODRIN TĂUT

La logique de la dissimulation. Claude Lefort et
le questionnement de l'idéologie..... 197

CIPRIAN BOGDAN

How to Look at Neoliberalism. Revisiting Adorno's Social Physiognomy... 215

G L O B A L P O W E R S

ȘERBAN VĂETIȘI

Ideological Constructions and Sociological (Mis)Understandings in
International Relations. The Case of 'Transatlantic Community' 239

MARTIN DAHL, YELYZAVETA SKOMOROKHOVA

The Balance of Power in the European Union after Brexit267

ANA PANTEA

The European Union and China: On the Challenges of the
Strategic Partnership285

THE INEXORABLE RISE OF THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM

Oana Albescu*, Mircea Maniu**

DOI: 10.24193/subbeuropaea.2017.3.01

Published Online: 2017-09-30

Published Print: 2017-09-30

Abstract

The present research follows two different movements: what happens and the way we think about what actually happens in terms of global political and economic governance. The first is a realistic approach considering the recent developments throughout the world, the second is an idealistic approach of ideologies attempting to change reality - but nevertheless influenced by the very reality they aspire to model. Towards the end we try to articulate these two tracks: 1. In terms of ideology, we believe we are witnessing today a sharp decline in ideological rigor. Contrasted to the Second World War fanatical clash of ideologies, or with the rigid dogmatism of the Cold War, we cannot help noticing that we live somehow phlegmatic times. Ideologies do exist, but there is a hegemonic "centrist", "gray" tendency, put between the clearly understandable black and white. 2. In terms of politics and economics, "the real world" is heading on different ways. Both Russia and China have enforced heterodox interventionist policies. But even US acted ad hoc during the financial crisis. And the same might be said about EU during the migration crisis. Our point is that the rise of the new interventionism goes hand in hand with the recent softening of ideological constraints. In our closing chapter we argue that the ideological „vacuum" behind the new interventionism has been filled mostly by either technocratic or/and ad hoc-ratic attitudes.

Keywords: post-ideology, interventionism, pragmatism, technocracy, ad hoc-racy, fairness

* Dr. Oana Albescu holds a Ph.D. in International Relations and European Studies at Babeş-Bolyai University (2014).

Contact: oanaalbescu@yahoo.com

** Dr. Mircea Teodor Maniu is an Associate Professor with the Department of European Studies and Governance, Faculty of European Studies at Babeş-Bolyai University

Contact: mircea.maniu@euro.ubbcluj.ro

Prolegomena

Ideology is a concept that is more and more often observed today from the angle of its abandonment. An intellectual product of the eighteenth century Illuminist view, both ideology and doctrine as a complex framework of ideas, values, conceptions and consequent practices, as well as the way these are publicly reflected and taught, came under strong pressure during the age of post-industrialist pragmatism. While most of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century witnessed conflicting ideologies, in most cases with significant utopian peculiarities, starting with the mid twentieth century the process of deconstructing ideology could be observed, let's say only for the sake of thinkers' benchmarking, starting with Raymond Aron or John Kenneth Galbraith and entering world-wide debates with Francis Fukuyama. Probably the most prominent name illustrating this view in the field of economics (actually within a comprehensive approach on economic and social forecasting) would somehow puzzling, be a sociologist, namely Daniel Bell.¹

Three main reasons are relevant for the gradual or even sudden disappearance of ideology and its plethora of interpretations from the public discourse, in Bell's vision: the ambiguities embedded from the start in each major ideology, the exhaustion of utopias and last but not least the complexities of contemporary life that unavoidably drive any less rigidly structured ideology toward a dead end. Thus, due to the fact that, historically speaking, the political and economic ideologies of the moment were constantly mirrored in the process of governing; therefore establishing a true unbiased balance between the evolutionary frameworks of economics and politics, under the *present day aegis of pure pragmatism*, seems difficult indeed. Non-ideological interventionism following the gradual vanishing of classical core ideologies could be easily considered as a major challenge of present day government and governance.² It is also a

¹ Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology*, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2000.

² Terence Ball, Richard Dagger, Daniel O'Neill, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal*, Boston, Columbus, Indianapolis: Pearson, 2014, pp. 329-331, available at [<https://www.politicalavenue.com/PDF/Political%20Avenue%20-%20Political%20Ideologies%20and%20the%20Democratic%20Ideal,%209th%20Edition.pdf>], accessed July 2017.

hard task to reflect the various social perspectives, as politics should do, using a pattern that is basically grounded on a single parameter, namely efficiency.

We must acknowledge that the last two centuries were decidedly ideologically infused in all respects. The Second World War and the Cold War were true *ideological wars* - that is, wars between different political systems, not only conflicts of all sorts between different opposing countries. The main combatant forces during WWII were Fascism and Communism and Fascism and Liberalism. The Cold War witnessed opposing Capitalism and Communism. These communities of ideas and territories were without doubt clear cut *ideological blocks*.³ This meant that public policy, no matter if of purely political or of political and economic consistence, needed to conform to a specific ideology first, rather than to reality. Today we live very different times. There are not two opposing ideological camps fighting on the world stage, though we can witness of course plenty of competing geo-political and geo-economic interests and an open as well as a hidden confrontation over natural resources.

Our main aim within this research would be to better understand this new kind of interventionism. We believe that such a task could be performed if we pursue at least the following three steps. The inception will be a short overview of the main modern schools of economic thought and doctrines, as well as their positioning concerning capitalism's trends of today. We do not undertake any comprehensive approach here, just point out what seems to be contextually relevant for us. Secondly, we will analyze some current challenges and atypical solutions reflecting the spirit of this new interventionism. Though the contemporary economic jargon uses more and more the *out of the box* phrase to describe the situation, we believe that actually we are talking just *another kind of box*. Last but not least, we will try to connect *technocracy* and the relatively new concept of *ad hoc-racy* with the non-ideological nature of the new interventionism. If the ideological constraints are more relaxed, then pragmatic approaches can be easily taken mostly based on contextual rather than abstract evaluations.

³ Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes 1914-1991*, London: Abacus, 1995, pp. 5-7.

1. Interpreting capitalism in the utilitarian manner. Orthodox and heterodox views

Present day capitalism has a plethora of facets. It could be the classical *free-market* capitalism or *laissez-faire* capitalism. Or it could take the shape of *social-market* economy (*Sozialmarktwirtschaft*), or that illustrated by the various inflexions of socialism - from genuinely democratic to communist – or a mixture of these, the most common pattern that could be retrieved today around the world. It is not uncommon that such a patched landscape would be even more patched from the ideological and doctrinarian perspectives. Plain liberalism, libertarianism, Neo-liberalism on the one hand, Keynesianism, neo-Keynesianism, institutionalism, post-Keynesianism, *public choice* on the other. Or, and out of the main track today, Marxism and radicalism of various consistence. Which one would be the most appropriate for the present stage of evolution of the global economy and consequent business environment, is still debatable. But we have to acknowledge that capitalism of all textures and consistencies is heavily predominant throughout the world today.⁴ According to Kiely, liberalism and even Neo-liberalism ceased to represent the global convergence engine. Are we heading towards a sort of capitalism, far away from the industrial revolution capitalism, that is illustrated above all not by the huge technological leap forward but by the lack of ideology?⁵

Much of the answer in this respect depends on the methodological standpoint of the analysis. While for the most time during modern history, the orthodox, mainstream economics approach prevailed, generating neoclassical, Keynesian, Austrian or Chicago schools views, more recently institutionalism, environmentalism, evolutionary or thermo-economics, to add this niche only in order to invoke the name of one of the few Romanian economists that distinguished themselves on the world stage, namely Georgescu-Roegen.⁶ So, if the classical approach of pioneers such as Smith, Ricardo, Say or Mill expressed mostly an empirically generated view

⁴ Paul Bowles, *Capitalism*, Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2007, pp. 133-164.

⁵ Ray Kiely, "Poverty Reduction through Liberalisation? Neo-liberalism and the Myth of Global Convergence", in *Review of International Studies*, vol. 33, no. 3, July, 2007, pp. 415-434.

⁶ Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, *The Entropy Law and the Economic Process*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

concerning the evolution of the economic life, one should observe that the classical liberal framework is much more *utilitarian* when compared both to the preceding *laissez-faire*, or the succeeding *neo-classics*. There is no better example of economic orthodoxy in this respect than the views of Malthus, considered appropriate and evidently pragmatic for that time. While the very grounds of this kind of orthodoxy could be retrieved in the individualism that was glorified in Hobbes' *Leviathan*, we should also remember the fact that the very idea of a *social contract* as a fair ground for the balanced evolution of the economy and society is also present in this capital work.

And this paves the way for the utilitarian view, as expressed by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. They consider that *freedom* should be both a private and a public model and in this public model they see the potential for progress in all respects, potential that is denied by all conservative thinkers, as Friedrich Hayek will point in his crucial *Road to Serfdom*.⁷ The utilitarian approach, as retrieved by both orthodox and heterodox schools, would be a set of values that are affecting the whole society while maintaining the main motif of maximizing the net utility of all the players of the economic game. There is no better reflection of this utilitarian mix than Max Weber's approach as expressed in his many dealings with economic sociology. Weber⁸ was extremely strict in placing the public domain on the coordinates of *rationality* - a concept retrieved and developed later by many, Jürgen Habermas⁹ for instance, but was much more flexible when dealing with the private one. In this respect it could be said that beyond the fact that the whole Weberian discourse is a *de facto* capitalist (bourgeois in some opinions) response to Marxian economics, it brings to surface the issue of legitimacy of the capitalist system in connection with its ethics. Thus the moral theory of capitalism is further deepened by *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.

⁷ Friedrich A. Hayek, *Drumul către servitute* (Romanian edition of the *Road to Serfdom*), București: Editura Humanitas, 1994.

⁸ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1947, available at [https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.276724/2015.276724.Max-Weber_djvu.txt], accessed July 2017.

⁹ Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.

As the previously invoked Hayek considered that in the very manner freedom of market operates, social justice cannot be achieved but in utopian minds and efficiency should be pursued by whatever tactical means, a wealthy society having ultimately the strategic resorts to put at work the so called *checks and balances* that would avoid the alienation of some segments of the society due to inequality. His view could somehow be considered a follow-up of the extension of liberalism named *Fabians* that advocated a gradual collective organization of the society, organization that should be performed by the state, but only if certain wealth benchmarks are fulfilled. We will add here a methodological angle, namely the *instrumentalist approach*, sometimes branded as a version of *pragmatism* and so well illustrated by John Dewey,¹⁰ angle that allows us to conclude the fact that liberalism and even libertarianism, the most prominent bearers of individualism do not reject the idea of social justice. Though Dewey was a fierce opponent of the *New Deal* and whatever it meant from a Keynesian perspective, his economic perspective would be nearer to the classical social justice concept, seen as the *utilitarian methodology* already introduced by Mill as early as 1861.¹¹

2. Contemporary Neo-liberalism. The Washington Consensus

Neo-liberalism is a concept belonging to both the realm of political economy as well as to a social and philosophical one. The present day embodiment of it would be the Washington Consensus, a *free-market* regime that was globally reinforced as a cure to the stagnation of economies that were common among the highly developed countries in the eighties of the last century. Since its inception and up to this day, it remains a rather controversial set of economic policies, particularly due to the proven impossibility of efficient implementation throughout the world. It is still used as a label for *The neo-liberal Manifesto*, emerging during the same period and describing among other things: a) widespread capital

¹⁰ John Dewey, *The Essential Dewey*, Larry Hickman and Thomas Alexander (eds.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

¹¹ John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarismul*, București: Alternative, 1994, available at [<https://polifilosofie.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/j-s-mill-utilitarismul.pdf>], accessed July 2017.

investment and trade liberalization; b) massive privatizations of inefficient state companies; c) tight if not restrictive monetary policies; d) fiscal policy discipline; e) deregulation. It epitomizes the years of beginning of ICT market domination, but also and differently mirrored, the peak years of the Cold War, with whatever that implied for the economic evolution of the two conflicting systems. Not to mention the view that considers an overall evolution towards a libertarian world with American inflexions, implied by the Washington Consensus, as retrieval of the long forgotten *laissez-faire*.¹²

The fall of the Berlin Wall signaled the end of state-dominated type of planned economies. They crumbled down due to multiple causes that synchronized over the last years of the communist regimes. The most visible symptoms were widespread shortages of food and commodities and the break-down of many public services. This has raised social and political backlash on the part of the people. It was obvious that the state alone could not provide a functional prosperous economy under the political constraints in place. The apparent victory of the free, liberal capitalist world, symbolically led by the United States and its main allies over the system that was patronized by the Soviet Union for almost half a century was resounding and overwhelming. This triumphant spirit was famously captured by Fukuyama's thesis of *the end of the history*, thesis that would soon show its unfortunate limits. But for the early nineties it has definitely reinforced the spirit of The Washington Consensus, inaugurating a decade of wild capitalism, simple mimetic changes, throughout the ex-communist world but not only. The main concept in place was *transition*, as so eloquently Aligică points to.¹³ Transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy and from inefficient planned economies, to free market open economies.

Though extremely relevant for the realm of the former communist countries, the principles of transition, which are actually those of the Washington Consensus, were applied also to other type of economic and social movements, such as the switch from military led regimes of South America or South Korea to democracies, or to a lesser extent as a remedy

¹² Murray Rothbart, *For a New Liberty. The Libertarian Manifesto*, Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2006, available at [https://mises.org/system/tdf/For%20a%20New%20Liberty%20The%20Libertarian%20Manifesto_3.pdf?file=1&type=document], accessed July 2017.

¹³ Paul Aligică, *Tranziții economice. Convorbiri cu Nicholas Spulber*, București: Humanitas, 2004.

for the state of backwardness of some African and Asian countries. Conceivable in the early nineties, in a global world without most of the previous political barriers, the economy will flourish grounded on openness, comparative and competitive advantages. As the post-Cold War dichotomy East-West vanished, the only gap to fill was the developmental one, the traditional dichotomy North-South. But in a manner that could be called *Huntington-ian* the world became soon much more entropic than any political guru would have expected. We are not investigating here the political consequences of the new dialectic, or maybe metaphysic of the present day world, but only the economic ones. And in terms of economics, the world became even more polarized.

Apparently, the systematic removal of the trade barriers, mild in the case of the World Trade Organization, abrupt in the case of the European Union, or in some other custom unions around the world, did not bear the expected fruit. International trade, though significantly increased, failed to become the main engine of development and fairness of economic relations among nations. No matter if we are considering developed countries, new emerging economies or underdeveloped ones, the expectations of the early nineties were never met during the next two decades. Moreover, the crisis that hit the world in the late 2000s' was of a peculiar consistence due precisely to the openness that was considered one of the main assets of the new liberalism, so popular around the world. Therefore, it seems only natural that starting with the mid 2010s', we witnessed a slash back in the liberal policies of the early XXIst century. A new Keynesian wave of policies, more precisely of post-Keynesian consistence emerged. The role of the state re-emerged as savior, but this time in a non-ideological, purely pragmatic way. Post-transition was the term that reflects the present day situation, when neither the targets, nor the benchmarks of the process of evolution of the present day economy are clear. Many blame for this state of fuzziness the political establishment, but in all honesty, the economic environment played its own (false) tune.

3. The ethical quest. Efficiency vs. fairness

Originally, economics was a philosophical approach born out of ethics and politics. Among the first contributions to the field, we could

mention Aristotle's reflections on exchange, division of labor, money or interest within the framework of his ethical and political analysis. Closer to us, we should never forget that Adam Smith was himself a professor of morals who wrote in 1759 *A Theory of Moral Sentiments*. His meditations on human happiness, inclinations, needs and obligations resulted, many years later, in his masterpiece *The Wealth of Nations*. All ideological clashes – mostly concerning capitalism *vs.* socialism are deeply rooted in perennial ethical concerns. And consequently the contemporary arrangement within our so called *mixed-economies* (neither capitalist, nor socialist or better capitalist and socialist in different degrees) was justly called *social market economy*. This hybrid notion describes the mutual accommodation of social concerns with market conditions, or vice versa. The situation can be regarded, on the one hand as the result of an ideological compromise, on the other hand it can be seen as a pragmatic setting aside of ideological orthodoxy in the name of satisfactory results – a trend we set to analyze as a key to better understand contemporary interventionism.

Religious approaches always tended to conceive the economic act within the broader form or ethical concerns. Of course, this must not eliminate altogether the economic science as such. But it can nevertheless enrich it: "The general idea is to promote a humane economic order that benefits from market activity but does not reduce the human person to just another element in economic phenomena (...) Orthodox inspired economic personal-ism could be better positioned to achieve the desired transfiguration of the individual-based economic analysis into a person-based one".¹⁴ As opposed to the Austrian or Chicago School, also understanding people as rational actors, always in search of maximizing results, a religious perspective on economics will try to understand concrete poverty in the light of *God's Kingdom* as moral commandment. This was named as the "preferential option for the poor". In light of this, scientific facts remain the same, but the ethical urgency in reading the facts is quite a different one: "The principle operates as hermeneutics for the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures; as a principle for the solidarity with the poor people (...) through which marginalized members of the society become active participants in social life. It is aimed that, by enabling the

¹⁴ Petre Comșa; Costea Munteanu, "Economics and Religion – A Personalist Perspective", in *The Journal of Philosophical Economics*, vol. II, issue 2, 2009, pp. 5-8.

poor and marginalized people to take part in the politic and economic life, the preferential option for the poor could help society to contribute to the benefit of *all* and not only for the *individual*.”¹⁵

Most of the concern with fairness comes from different sources than pure economic science. It comes from a vision of man that is more encompassing than the view of the rational calculating actor used in classical economic theory. This idea was given a very clear formulation: *Economic Personalism* tries “to provide a *holistic account of personal existence* and thus supplement genuine economic science with a science of morality for the marketplace”.¹⁶ An encouraging development is that similar concerns spring out not only from religious attitudes but also from non-conventional business formats. The very recent development described as *sharing economy*¹⁷ exhibits the same concern with combining fairness and efficiency within the very economic process. Or, to put it in the European Union’s framework: the three pillars of the so called *social Europe* would consist in truly making operational the freedom of movement of persons, the double convergence of social standards and social performances and making investment in human capital the core of the European action.¹⁸

A quite different experience could be mentioned in this respect, the Israeli *Kibbutz*. This is not directly religious, nor again directly political. But neither it is entrepreneurial in the classical economy style. It is actually a *voluntary communal association* in order to form a moral as well as economic community. What characterizes the Kibbutz spirit is a tenacious mentality or as we can put it – a very significant *social capital*: “The group would be founded on the individual consciousness of every settler, and the whole framework would be entirely voluntary, lacking any form of external coercion (...) and they would undertake every type of work, including the

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 12.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 12-14.

¹⁷ Oana Albescu; Mircea Maniu, “Sharing Economy: Evaluating its Structural Dimensions for Policy Design Purposes”, in *Journal Modelling the New Europe*, 22 June 2017, pp. 85-103.

¹⁸ Sofia Fernandes; Frank Vandenbroucke, “Faire de l’Europe sociale une realite pour les europeens”, in *Le Mot*, 31 Mai, 2017, available at [<http://www.institutdelors.eu/media/europesociale-fernandesvandenbroucke-lemot-mai2017.pdf?pdf=ok>], accessed June 2017.

guarding of their own security".¹⁹ "It puts into practice those values of self-labor, productive work, equality and mutual aid."²⁰

And to mention just one more move from pure efficiency to fairness, multinational corporations themselves acknowledged that long-term fairness is more efficient. We use the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to describe responsibilities that the corporations take charge of beyond what they are legally bound. The CSR movement emerged as a reflection of wider and long-term concern with the impact of business for the community. There are multiple approaches on how to think of this responsibility, between purely instrumental or purely ethical approaches. But, in line with the softening of rigid ideological views, we believe a middle way tends to forge consensus: "The hybrid approach describes the congruence of the company interests with the general interests of society and has the purpose to offer a solution to the choice dilemma between economic and ethical consideration facing the executives of multinational corporations".²¹ Many companies have already a record of CSR achievements, proving they have managed to reconcile efficiency with fairness, directly contributing to local communities and gaining a new trust.

4. The Rise of the *New Interventionism*. Ideology does not matter anymore?

Given the fluctuating dynamic of the economy, we can observe a new concern with the economic role of the state. This concern virtually exploded during the most recent global economic and financial crisis. It is with the Obama mandate that the US government massively undertook the task to fix the economy, notably in the areas of banking and automotive industry, both flagships of American entrepreneurship. But all across the globe, out of different perspectives and interests a new anti-globalist movement called into question the free-trade consensus, the true meaning of liberalization and consequently the supposedly limited role of the

¹⁹ Dan Leon, *The Kibbutz. A New Way of Life*, Oxford, Edinburgh: Pergamon Press, 1969, pp. 7-8.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 24.

²¹ Oana Albescu, *Etica în afacerile internaționale contemporane. Practicile multinaționalelor la începutul secolului XXI*, Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2015, p. 35.

government in the economic process. It seems obvious that following the 2008 unprecedented *bailout scheme* amounting to USD 700bn nothing would be the same in the traditional balance between *interventionism and non-interventionism*. Actually, the very essence of the role of government in a capitalist world, as postulated by many Keynesian schools, has to be reinterpreted. And this should be done remembering the fact that Keynes vision and policies were initially meant to ease the burden of social aspects in the charge of the entrepreneur, transferring them to the government. In this process, Keynesianism *de facto* became the ground for modern day social-democrat regimes. Does the new type of interventionism, we observe today, fit the pattern?

4.1 Practice beats theory. Russia and China

During the few years of the twenty-first century, most if not all the states tend to conceive public policies, economic one included, in a much more *non-ideological* way. This new type of interventionism is obviously *technocratic*, not *ideological*. The empirical nexus of such an assessment could be the binomial case of the United States and China. Even though still representing opposing systems, capitalism and socialism, they are both running policies that do not conform to their old ideological reputation, instead following mostly pragmatic choices.²² Of course, technocracy itself could be labeled as an ideology, but it is very difficult to assign it a standard, historically built list of so called orthodox policies. This means that today, political and economic ideology is less reflected in the process of governing. Instead, interventionism is rather oriented *in a problem-solving, pragmatic manner* which is open to orthodox as well as heterodox policies – or a mix of both as long as they appear to solve a social, economic, technological or any problem of a given importance for a certain state at a certain moment.

A different opposition to Neo-liberalism from the standpoint of an interventionist perspective is to be observed in Russia. There are of course multiple ways to understand Russia's reaction to the liberal world epitomized by the Washington Consensus. The United States, as a global

²² Li Yining, *Chinese Economy in Disequilibrium*, Heidelberg: Springer, 2014, pp. 39-43.

political and trading empire, a *thalassocracy*, is naturally inclined to free trade, since the American economy is very diverse and very industrialized. Therefore, it is more likely to benefit from free trade agreements while Russia, by opposition, is mostly a continental power, a *geocracy*, and still has a relatively homogenous economy fundamentally based on the exploitation of giant natural resources. This naturally brings about different attitudes concerning the role of state policy and control of economy in basically the same system, capitalism, sometime considered to be in its postmodernist phase.²³ Russia has developed an early commitment to a state command of strategic resources. This has been associated with the advent of Vladimir Putin and the remaking of the Russian power after the post-soviet decline in a radical manner that has been even branded as *New Jacobinism*, just as the revolutionary America has been branded after separating from Britain. The confrontational approach of the last decade has led Russia to reject the neo-liberal hegemony and to build an economy centered on state command, mostly in strategic branches. It has designed its own view of a selective-trade as opposed to a generalized uncontrolled free-trade.

The Chinese example is even more striking because China never abandoned the communist party centered political system, while adopting a completely new policy (*China Model*) towards, economics, business and markets as early as the late seventies of the last century.²⁴ No wonder that theoretically the Chinese replaced the Washington Consensus by so-called and less known concept of Beijing Consensus. How does this change the approach towards free markets, which are so desirable for the Chinese economy? While the first would be a *Universalist* model, backed by the institutional frameworks such as IMF, IBRD or WTO, the second one addresses mostly developing countries, no matter of political orientation.²⁵ The peculiarity of the model is that accelerated growth is targeted, mostly

²³ Hall Thomas Wilson, *Capitalism after Postmodernism*, Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 2002, p. 273-292.

²⁴ Vinod K. Aggarwal, Sara A. Newland, *Responding to China's Rise. US and EU Strategies*, Heidelberg: Springer, 2015, pp. 27 – 50.

²⁵ Jiakun Jack Zhang, *Seeking the Beijing Consensus in Asia: An Empirical Test of Soft Power*, Duke, Department of Political Science, 2011, available at [<https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/5383/Duke%20Honors%20Thesis.pdf?sequence=1>], accessed July 2017.

through unlimited trade, but “defending” the national interests of those less fortunate countries. In other words, pure pragmatic interventionism, that has been (Western) labeled as no consensus at all except in those matters serving Chinese interests.²⁶ If one takes into consideration in the large spectrum of interests reflected in the present day policies pursued by China, its common interests with the main traders of the world, but also its evident divergences from any recorded pattern of the modern economic history, one cannot express but the feeling that the approach clearly fits the description of *non-ideological pragmatism*.

4.2 The Migratory Crisis and Neo-nationalism. Globalism vs. protectionism

World migration, especially migration towards EU, has been always a controversial issue, due to the fact that no decent procedure in order to separate *political refugees* from *economic migrants* could be made operational in time. EU policies in this area are either in the stage of conception, or too often fuzzy and even contradictory from country to country or domain. While most of the Western European countries benefited of the cheap labor cost associated with immigration from poorer countries throughout the twentieth century, nowadays this seems to be an obsolete move. Moreover, a very radical reaction against Neo-liberalism has been raised in migration-related issues during the last couple of years. While globalization operates on the free-trade idea and this implies the free-movement or free-circulation of capital, goods and people, this latter category objectively moves from country to country due to *income differential*. So, theoretically this comes as natural, but if we articulate this with economic, social, political or cultural differences between developed and less developed countries it is all too clear that free-movement becomes an incentive to massive immigration.²⁷ Neo-liberalism created not only investment abroad,

²⁶ Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence. China, Europe and the Making of Modern World Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 31 - 42.

²⁷ Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas, Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World*, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1993, pp. 13-16, available [<http://migrationmatters.me/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/AgeOfMigrationChapter1and.pdf>] accessed July 2017.

but also a permanent migration potential from poor countries to rich countries.

At its turn, this unfolding of events has naturally provoked a populist reaction against Neo-liberalism viewed as the ultimate root of chaotic migratory movements. Once again, the free-market was pointed to as chaos generator, rather than provider of natural order. The migratory crisis is presented by interested political parts as the triggering factor of the destruction of the social standards of Western European employees in favor of a new global (even) lower class proletariat (*Lumpenproletariat*). This has lately put immense pressure on already overloaded public services convincing many that socially inclusive policies are not infinitely elastic and new social conflicts are to come. Uncontrolled migratory processes resulted in immigrants either functioning as cheap labor supply against more qualified local workers, socially protected and trade unionized.²⁸ It is precisely here that socialist and nationalist angles of populism somehow joined forces and combined their different narratives into a rejection of the Neo-liberal free-circulation policy. So the social facets of migration overshadow the two main issues that actually are the economic core of the problem: remittances that leave a certain country and fuel another and the brain and workforce drain in so many countries. Therefore, an urgent need for pragmatic measures in this field, measures that definitely should not fall in the zero-sum category seems a must today.

4.3 Global crisis and the renewal of Keynesianism

Phelps, a Nobel Prize laureate in 2006 entitled one his articles “Keynes had no sure cure for slumps”.²⁹ But it is clear that more than a decade later both microeconomic and macroeconomic approaches of post-Keynesian inspiration make sense, since this particular economists and the followers conceived and deepened the issue of decision-making environments in conditions of uncertainty situation that is indicative for

²⁸ Timothy J. Hatton, Jeffrey G. Williamson, *What Fundamentals Drive World Migration?*, Cambridge: NBER Working Paper 9159, 2002, available at [<http://www.nber.org/papers/w9159.pdf>], accessed June 2017.

²⁹ Edmund Phelps, “Keynes Had no Sure Cure for Slumps”, in *Financial Times*, November 4, 2008, available at [<https://www.ft.com/content/00a01b2e-aa87-11dd-897c-000077b07658?mhq5j=e2>], accessed July 2017.

today's world economy.³⁰ Or, nowadays both a microeconomic stabilization plan makes sense from a pragmatic perspective and could lead to any macroeconomic conceived scheme that cannot avoid being biased by political factors, ideological ones first. Actually we believe this is the lesson of the 2008 bailout scheme and the success, proven in a couple of years, of this American experience induces the idea of world scale operations. But an objective observer could notice that in EU, the Greek debt crisis, the Euro crisis or even the *Brexit* case, situations obviously manageable on the micro-macro coordinates, failed to be successfully achieved.

Is there any economic significance of the active role of the government in the economy during a time of departure from the Washington Consensus and the instauration of a new Keynesianism following the demise of the old methodology of state interventionism?³¹ From now on, if a Government undertakes the main responsibilities of economic recovery, just as the Obama administration did, would that work for any other country, not to mention the capitalist system as a whole? Probably the right answer would lie in abandoning the traditional receipt including financial stimulus in the form of massive public investment and a monetary policy including quantitative easing and low-interest rate policy designed to stimulate consumption. This has been the dominant policy in the US, to a lesser extent and up to moment of the crisis as well as in the EU. But along with the gradual shift away from the Washington Consensus and the more recent consistent moves towards country and block protectionism, we could state that we witness the rise of a *new interventionism*.

Probably this will lead just as in the case of US, which was formalized by modern schools of thought into the concept of *mixed economy*, broadly defined as a mixture of capitalism and American flavored "socialism" as Buchanan labeled it during the late eighties. The involvement of the US Government and the long time established patterns

³⁰ Paul Davidson, "Is Probability Theory Relevant for Uncertainty? A Post-Keynesian Perspective", in *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1991, available at [<http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.5.1.129>], accessed June 2017.

³¹ Robert Leeson, *The Eclipse of Keynesianism*, Chippenham, Wiltshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2000, pp. 16-22; 42-44.

of intervention are more or less embedded in the American culture, though not at all perceived by commoners or outside the country as the American way of doing business. Only during Trump administration this feature became notorious, though embedded in the interventionism of most if not all previous administrations. It is precisely the American history and the constraints the country had to face during most of the tense moments of its history that allowed that such a degree of interventionism appears but is not repudiated as economic distortion, as for instance the First Article of the Treaty of Rome regulates in the case of EU. It derives from the need to harmonize various interests in a *strong hand manner* rather than with the traditional *invisible hand*. Are we going to see this type of interventionism world scale if we consider that during the time of crisis a tough military like style of governing is indicated and even widely accepted?

5. Technocracy and Ad hoc-racy. Pragmatism as ideology

The present day tendency to categorize everything, or to label facts and actions according to various structured or non-structured groups of interests, inevitably leads to the conclusion that precisely the lack of ideological consistence could be interpreted as the core of a new ideology, namely the *pragmatic interventionism*, so often observed today throughout the world. There is no doubt that the lack of predictability of so many contemporary events, crises, evolutions or revolutions induces the idea that institutionalizing spontaneity and cultivating the culture of the so called *ad hoc-racy* makes more sense today that sticking to the traditional ideological dichotomies of the past. If this still controversial assessment stands, it is our opinion that there is not better stage to observe the non-ideological types of interventionism than throughout the world of economics and its business environments. After all *primum vivere deinde philosophari* acquired new and often unexpected, down-to-earth meanings in the process of globalization of our economies and societies.

One of the main reasons for the *switch from classical ideology to a new (pragmatic) ideology* seems to be – in all these cases - the pragmatic stance: a spontaneous and concrete way out of a challenging situation. We may of course label pragmatism, technocracy or ad hoc-racy as ideologies in themselves. But the ideological disposition and argument is by nature theoretical and some would argue it is a never-ending debate. This makes

ideology more the domain of academics or public intellectuals – by nature, vocation and profession dedicated to analysis, argumentation and theoretical consideration. Politicians or entrepreneurs are, on the contrary, exactly the opposite: practical natures, they are not so much *problem-oriented* as they are *solution-oriented*. While intellectuals are questioning, entrepreneurs or politicians are fixing things up. Hybrid notions such as „social market economy” are not originally a theoretical construction as they are a practical accommodation imposed by social challenges here and now. Is this good? Is this bad?

We suggest two patterns in order to better understand the move towards a non-ideological interventionism: technocracy and ad hoc-racy. We believe both terms capture something from the new vision dedicated to a practical and more immediate approach to public policies that is not predetermined by strong ideological commitments.

5.1. The non-ideological nature of Technocratic Interventionism

Technocracy is defined as that form of government where decision-makers are chosen in office based on their technical expertise rather than on purely political grounds. While this does not completely elude political affinities or loyalties, it is minimally designed to favor research-based and informed public policies which – at least in theory – are not defined by simple and rigid ideological configurations. We can, of course, identify the pervasive influence of ideology in all aspects of our life, but it is obvious that people possessing technical expertise and scientific reputation, professionals that are not directly and completely regimented, do tend to be more open-minded than full-time career politicians. We believe this makes technocrats less ideologically bound. The output of such governments is frequently more differentiated and it tends to allow unpopular but efficient solutions (in opposition to ideological solutions which tend to be popular but inefficient). We consider that in the above studied cases, technocratic interventionism explains better the unorthodox paths taken to confront challenges than clearly defined ideological interventionism. The most common objection to technocracy engages the unrepresentative nature of technocratic governments or decision. Technocratic elite can take good decisions precisely because they ground the policy on expertise, rather than vote. This is what makes democracy

difficult to tackle. Having democratic approval every step of the way is a process of infinite complexity and costs and at the end the road we cannot even be sure the best policy was voted. On the other side, people with technical expertise can themselves be eager to hold power even if they have no special ideology. Many of the „non-ideological“ political regimes can be describe as power-elites ready to do whatever it takes in order to hold the office. This can imply reasonable policies. This pragmatic interventionism we can observe in China, Russia or even sometimes in the United States can be understood in the following manner: efficient policies are good especially because they legitimate the government to stay in office.

So, the rise of the new interventionism can be understood as a common trend in post-industrial societies where the knowledge class has an increasing importance as the previously invoked Bell states in a famous book anticipating the post-industrial society.³² This makes people with knowledge particularly needed but also legitimized to provide efficient policies. On the other side, the spectrum of a technocratic oligarchy is definitely creating anxieties.

5.2. The non-ideological nature of Ad hoc-ratic interventionism

Ad hoc-racy is the second issue we believe characteristic for the new interventionism. Ad hoc-racy is defined as the very opposite of bureaucracy. It is a form of organizational management that is flexible and informal. Ad hoc-racy is centered on individual initiative, whereas bureaucracy is centered on top-to-bottom hierarchic transmission. The Ad hoc-ratic arrangement tends to be very dynamic, adaptive and efficient but runs the risk of becoming chaotic while bureaucratic management is reputed to be slow and stagnant. This new form of leadership helps explaining new forms of governance better suited to identify and take opportunities. The important thing for bureaucracy is to follow procedures. The important thing for ad hoc-racy is to get results. The ideological approach is similarly at odds with the Ad hoc-ratic initiative: “Ad hoc-racy is not just well suited to questioning assumptions. Taking ownership of a mission to deliver some form of significant change in human behavior and

³² Daniel Bell, *The Coming of the Post-industrial Society: a venture in social forecasting*, New York: Basic Books, 1976.

or relations is central to its very core (...) Ad hoc-racy works best when those designing and innovating also deliver".³³

In our view, the cases studied above do include an Ad hoc-ratic component. This is manifest in the voluntary attitude of decision-makers that did not follow an ideological path but face an urgency to identify an ad hoc solution. When Deng Xiaoping reformed the Chinese state-control of the economy and stimulated individual initiative, it didn't matter that it operated contrary to the official ideology. It was important to change something and to get results as at that peculiar time more important than saving an ideology was saving the economy and, of course, indirectly, the power elite. This Ad hoc-ratic interventionism saved the system at the cost of ideology. We suggest this type of choice is significant for many other similar trends in contemporary governance.

6. In lieu of a conclusion

We believe that the eclipse of ideology has been followed by a continuous concern with regard to balancing efficiency and fairness. However this equilibrium is not thought to be found in ideological "recipes" but rather in a pragmatic, considerate, situational approach.

In the realm of economics, it is a well-known prophecy of Schumpeter's that capitalism cannot survive on the long run. Its demise would be a consequence of its own success, not failures. His famous *theory of creative destruction* is somehow expanded into the universe of the world economy and eventually became in 1942, *Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy*.³⁴ We believe that the twenty first's century answer to such a dilemmatic question lies in the fact that Schumpeter's motivation of business cycles and generally speaking for the evolution of the economy lies in technological progress above all. But obviously removing our focus from the social aspects involved by ideology and concentrating on issues of new products, services, production, efficiency, investments, more and more

³³ Andrew Taylor, Bill Krouwel, *Taking Care of Business: Innovation, Ethics, Sustainability*, Cluj-Napoca: Risoprint Publishing House, 2013, p. 155.

³⁴ Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy*, Routledge, London and New York, 2004, available at [<http://cnqzu.com/library/Economics/marxian%20economics/Schumpeter,%20Joseph-Capitalism,%20Socialism%20and%20Democracy.pdf>], accessed June 2017.

often even without human input, seems to be the fall into the definition of *economic pragmatism*.³⁵ To what extent this move is unavoidable for the modern world economic system this is a quest of tactical consistence.

On the political side, the new governance tends to move along similar lines towards a *political pragmatism*. While technocratic interventionism grounds its success mostly on scientific-based solutions, the Ad hoc-ratic interventionism lies in the speed of providing solutions. Both are reputed for efficiency, but both face similar objections of democratic deficit. We have tried to model the new interventionism along the lines of *Technocratic and Ad hoc-ratic* practices. This does not make us at all advocates of the *New Interventionism*. But the point we make is that the old ideological framework does not help us understand the new trends in interventionism and that a future potential social conflict will rather oppose efficient Technocratic and Ad hoc-ratic regimes to the democratic expectations of the people, than any other combination of factors.

Bibliography

1. Aggarwal, V.K., Newland, S.A. (2015), *Responding to China's Rise. US and EU Strategies*, Heidelberg: Springer.
2. Albescu, Oana; Maniu, Mircea (2017), "Sharing economy: evaluating its structural dimensions for policy design purposes", in Journal on-line *Modelling the New Europe*, June.
3. Albescu, Oana (2015), *Etica în afacerile internaționale contemporane. Practicile multinaționalelor la începutul secolului XXI*, Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut.
4. Aligică, Paul (2004), *Tranziții economice. Convorbiri cu Nicholas Spulber*, București: Humanitas.
5. Ball, Terence; Dagger, Richard; O'Neill, Daniel (2014), *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal*, Boston: Pearson, available at [<https://www.politicalavenue.com/PDF/Political%20Avenue%20-%20Political%20Ideologies%20and%20the%20Democratic%20Ideal,%209th%20Edition.pdf>].

³⁵ Valentin Cojanu, *Logica raționamentului economic*, Editura C.H. Beck, București, 2010, pp. 115-129.

6. Bell, Daniel (1976), *The Coming of the Post-industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*, New York: Basic Books.
7. Bell, Daniel (2000), *The End of Ideology*, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1962.
8. Bowles, Paul (2007), *Capitalism*, Harlow: Pearson Longman.
9. Castles, Stephen, de Haas, Hein, Miller, Mark (1993), *The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World*, London: Palgrave MacMillan, available at [<http://migrationmatters.me/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/AgeOfMigrationChapter1and.pdf>].
10. Cojanu, Valentin (2010), *Logica raționamentului economic*, București: C.H. Beck.
11. Comșa, P., Munteanu, C. (2009), "Economics and Religion – A Personalist Perspective", in *The Journal of Philosophical Economics*, vol. II, issue 2.
12. Davidson, Paul (1991), "Is probability Theory Relevant for Uncertainty? A Post-Keynesian Perspective", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 5, no. 1, available at [<http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.5.1.129>].
13. Fernandes, Sofia; Vandembroucke, Frank (2017), "Faire de l'Europe sociale une realite pour les europeens", in *Le Mot*, 31 Mai, [<http://www.institutdelors.eu/media/europesociale-fernandesvandenbroucke-lemot-mai2017.pdf?pdf=ok>].
14. Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas (1971), *The Entropy Law and the Economic Process*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
15. Habermas, Jürgen (1971), *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Boston: Beacon Press.
16. Hatton, Timothy J.; Williamson Jeffrey G. (2002), *What Fundamentals Drive World Migration?*, NBER Working Paper 9159, available at [<http://www.nber.org/papers/w9159.pdf>].
17. Hayek, F.A. (1994), *Drumul către servitute* (Romanian edition of the *Road to Serfdom*), București: Humanitas.
18. John Dewey, *The Essential Dewey*, Larry Hickman and Thomas Alexander (eds.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
19. Hobsbawm, Eric (1995), *The Age of Extremes 1914-1991*, London: Abacus, pp. 5 – 7.

20. Kiely, R. (2007), "Poverty Reduction through Liberalisation? Neo-liberalism and the Myth of Global Convergence", in *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3, July, 415-434.
21. Leeson, Robert (2000), *The Eclipse of Keynesianism*, Chippenham, Wiltshire: Palgrave MacMillan.
22. Leon, Dan (1969), *The Kibbutz. A New Way of Life*, Oxford, Edinburgh: Pergamon Press.
23. Mill, John Stuart (1994), *Utilitarismul*, București: Alternative, available at [<https://polifilosofie.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/j-s-mill-utilitarismul.pdf>].
24. Phelps, E. (2008), "Keynes had no sure cure for slumps", in *Financial Times*, November 4, available at [<https://www.ft.com/content/00a01b2e-aa87-11dd-897c-000077b07658?mhq5j=e2>].
25. Pomeranz, Kenneth (2000), *The Great Divergence. China, Europe and the Making of Modern World Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
26. Rothbart, Murray (2006), *For a New Liberty. The Libertarian Manifesto*, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, available at [https://mises.org/system/tdf/For%20a%20New%20Liberty%20The%20Libertarian%20Manifesto_3.pdf?file=1&type=document].
27. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (2004), *Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy*, London and New York: Routledge, available at [<http://cnqzu.com/library/Economics/marxian%20economics/Schumpeter,%20Joseph-Capitalism,%20Socialism%20and%20Democracy.pdf>].
28. Smith, Adam (2016), *The Wealth of Nations*, London: Simon & Brown.
29. Taylor, A., Krouwel B. (2013), *Taking Care of Business: Innovation, Ethics, Sustainability*, Cluj-Napoca: Risoprint Publishing House.
30. Weber, Max (1947), *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, Glencoe Illinois: The Free Press, available at [https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.276724/2015.276724.Max-Weber_djvu.txt].
31. Wilson, H. T. (2002), *Capitalism after Postmodernism*, Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, pp.273 - 292.
32. Yining, Li (2014), *Chinese Economy in Disequilibrium*, Springer, Heidelberg, pp. 39 - 43.

33. Zhang, Jiakun Jack (2011), *Seeking the Beijing Consensus in Asia: An Empirical Test of Soft Power*, Duke University, available at [<https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/5383/Duke%20Honors%20Thesis.pdf?sequence=1>].

THE IDEOLOGY OF ECONOMIC LIBERALISM AND THE POLITICS OF HOUSING IN ROMANIA*

Enikő Vincze**

DOI: 10.24193/subbeuropaea.2017.3.02

Published Online: 2017-09-30

Published Print: 2017-09-30

Abstract

The privatization of housing (linked to the privatization of means of production), respectively the creation of a new private housing fund, have been crucial for the emergence of capitalist property regime and market economy in Romania. The state withdrew from its position as a developer (of housing stock, but not only), however it did not remain passive, contrary, it assumed a central role in the creation of the (housing) market through modifying legislation and creating new institutions that administered this process. The article is addressing how the ideology of economic liberalism is working through housing politics as a core medium of the transformation of really existing socialism into neoliberal capitalism. In particular, it describes how – through privatization – this ideology creates material effects in the housing sector, i.e. accumulation on the one side and dispossession on the other side of the class structure. Moreover, the article insists that the housing stock's privatization after 1990 happened in relation with the housing politics of state socialism, which allowed the existence of three types of property on housing. The

* The documentation work that stands behind this article have been realized together with Simona Ciotlăuș and George Zamfir in a recent research under the project *Strengthening the Housing Justice Coalition in Romania through reframing the political claims for public housing* ran by Foundation Desire from Cluj, Romania in the period February-July 2017 and sustained by Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. More information about this project and its actions can be found here – http://www.desire-ro.eu/?page_id=3038. This article is related to another study produced under the same research, one that is describing several general characteristics of the production of the private housing stock and how these processes happened after 1990 in the city of Cluj through real estate development (manuscript, June 2017). The article was translated from Romanian to English by Noémi Magyar.

** Dr. Enikő Vincze is professor of sociology at Babeș-Bolyai University and housing activist from Cluj, Romania.

Contact: eni_personal@yahoo.com

creation of a new private housing fund was tied to post-socialist primitive accumulation resulted from the privatization of state enterprises and from the investment of profit obtained in the due process into real estate businesses. After some introductory ideas about ideologies and housing politics, the article discusses the privatization of housing and the creation of the private housing stock as central pillars of capitalist political economy. The description of some features of housing production and personal ownership of dwellings in state socialism is followed by an account on the promotion of privatization after 1990 by local-national-transnational actors using the example of the city of Cluj. The last chapter of the article concludes on the process of transformation of state socialism into neoliberal capitalism through the politics of housing sustained by the ideology of economic liberalism.

Keywords: ideology as productive practice, material effects of the ideology of economic liberalism in the housing sector, housing politics as a core factor of transforming state socialism into neoliberal capitalism

1. Ideologies, politics and "the management of housing sector" in World Bank style

Policies are not neutral problem-solving instruments (Shore and Wright, 1997), but are objectifications of politics driven by class interests and naturalized by ideologies. At their turn – starting with the definition of "the problem" – policies and politics are becoming part of the problem, i.e. of how capitalism works, by sustaining accumulation on the one side, and dispossession on the other side of class structure (Harvey, 2003).

Ideologies are not simply cultural systems or world views, but are processes that construct realities and subjects, and are functioning as battlegrounds of politics in the largest sense of the term. Dominant classes create and maintain their dominant positions not only via economic exploitation but also through productive ideologies or by ruling through hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). Ideologies are tools of justifying power regimes, while they do not only legitimize inequalities, but also work as one of the forces that reproduce the conditions of production, among them the labour power submitted to the rules of the established order (Althusser, 1970). Ideologies produce the subjects by particular discursive formations, but they also have material effects unevenly affecting different social classes (Therborn, 1999).

Ideologies embodied in politics and policies are productive practices that inform other actions, which create the frame where a political economy is functioning. In my article I am addressing how the ideology of economic liberalism is working through housing politics as a core medium of transforming really existing socialism into neoliberal capitalism. Housing politics is not only about the housing sector, but about the whole economy while embodying the interests of dominant classes. Therefore, the regulation of this domain by state apparatuses was always a core element of political economy as a whole, and in particular of both economic and social politics and policies.

Nowadays, the ideology of economic liberalism is a constitutive force of neoliberal politics of privatization that aims to solve the problem of over-accumulation experienced by capitalism since 1973 (Harvey, 2003). In Romania, a new wave of privatization of public assets and austerity measures as a thought-to-be-solution to crises were sustained by an anti-communist discursive frame and made appeal to the old (false) promise that the "efficientization of market" could not only bring economic growth but also social welfare among others to the poor. In my article I am focusing on one of the elements of economic liberalism, which is privatization, in particular on how this ideology creates material effects in the housing sector.

The regulation of the housing sector happened now only via the proceedings of some local or national actors, but at the intersection of the actions of the local, national and international or transnational institutions. Under the conditions of the development of global capitalism after the second world war, the so-called Bretton Woods international financial organizations (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) played exactly this crucial role of regulating global capitalism and to "assist" post-colonial or "underdeveloped countries" in a way that served the interests of the core countries or of the former colonial empires. They orchestrated the process of (re)producing the "underdeveloped" and "developed" countries while (re)creating uneven development (Smith, 1990) as endemic feature of capitalist world system divided among core, periphery and semi-periphery countries (Wallerstein, 1974). Nowadays these international financial institutions continue acting as instruments of global capitalism in relation with countries where really existing socialism

was dismantled: they offer them "assistance" and loans conditioned by respecting their "advices" (Vincze, 2015). But these recommendations are not technical/neutral matters, even if they are presented as such, but are informed by the ideology of economic liberalism, and they do keep reinforcing the imperative of privatization. As "emergent markets", these semi-periphery countries are supposed to continuously privatize their public assets, including public housing, transforming the whole domain of housing into a terrain of market. Among others, they are offered the model of United Kingdom under the Thatcher era, when the council houses were sold out and the right-to-buy ideology became the engine of privatization of housing as part of generalized neoliberal policymaking.

The housing policy recommendations given to World Bank "borrowers", including former socialist countries, were presented in the document entitled '*Housing: Enabling Markets to Work*' (1993) that articulates the housing policy of the World Bank as it has evolved during the 1980s and early 1990s. The document explicitly stresses: "governments are advised to abandon their earlier role as producers of housing and to adopt an enabling role of managing the housing sector as a whole," which means "to rationalize the broad regulatory framework within which the sector operates." This imperative should be reached via several instruments, continues the argument, such as: developing property rights, developing mortgage finance, rationalizing subsidies, providing infrastructure for residential land development, regulating land and housing development, organizing the building industry by creating greater competition in the building industry, and developing the institutional framework for managing the housing sector. Far from being a simple recipe implemented in each and every country receiving conditioned IMF and/ or World Bank loans, this ideology informs economic restructuring across the globe while naturalizing these actions as taken-for-granted and hiding their driving interest, which is supporting the accumulation of capital via housing development.

2. Privatization of housing and creation of the private housing stock – central pillars of capitalist political economy

In state socialist Romania, around 30% of the housing stock belonged to the public sector (70% of it being in personal property).

Nowadays, this percentage dropped to under 2% (the percentage of private property rising to more than 98%). The privatization of housing (linked to the privatization of means of production), respectively the formation of a new private housing fund, have been crucial for the emergence of capitalist property regime and market economy in Romania. This took place because – on the one hand – they restructured social relations between people and, on the other hand, they contributed to the creation of a new commodity, i.e. housing, or differently put – instead of its use value – they brought to the foreground the exchange value of housing. Therefore, I propose an understanding of privatization and of the creation of the private housing stock as central pillars of capitalist political economy that contributes to the development of the class structure specific to capitalism, and – on the one side – to capital accumulation, and on the other side to dispossession. My study's approach is marked by the emphasis placed on housing politics or on the role of the state in the transformation of state socialism based on an industrialized economy into post-industrial neoliberal capitalism.

The housing stock's privatization after 1990 happened in relation with the housing politics of state socialism. The creation of the private housing stock was tied as well to post-socialist primitive accumulation resulted from the privatization of state enterprises and from the investment of profit obtained in the due process into real estate businesses¹. The state, through its law enactment mechanisms – at national level via the normative acts emitted by the Parliament and Government, and at local level via the Local Council Decisions of the Municipality of Cluj-Napoca – played a crucial political and economic role in these processes central to the formation of capitalism in Romania.

I notice that in parallel with, but related to the transfer of ownership of the dwellings and the creation of the new stock of private dwellings, the primitive accumulation of capital through the privatization of state-owned enterprises was carried forward by subsequent investments in the real estate business. The latter process was also sustained by the state through attribution of public land and / or by granting of building permits under a

¹ In defining primitive accumulation, I rely on David Harvey who emphasizes that this did not take place in just a unique moment in the emergence of capitalism, but that, under the form of accumulation by dispossession, it is a continuous capital accumulation process at global scale. See David Harvey, *New Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

preferential regime, or at least by a deregulated urbanization shaped by a politics sustaining private investors.

Real estate development in Romania over the past almost three decades illustrates the role it played in the evolution of capitalism by the commodification of urban space, by the investment of capital in the built environment, as well as its embeddedness into an urban policy as a class politics that determines what, for whom and where it was built.² All these material factors functioned as the main sources of profit in the post-industrial and neoliberal society, being sustained and justified by the ideology of privatization, as well as by the discursive practices of fetishization of housing as commodity. The latter aspects of this phenomenon are discussed in chapter three of this article with reference to the relationship of this ideology with anti-communism, as well as in its chapter four in the context of analysing how privatization after 1990 was promoted at the intersection of local-national-transnational, but also in the concluding chapter of the study.

After 1990, privatization was encouraged as a condition for Romania's connection to global capitalism from an emerging market status and a developing country both through its pre-accession, accession and post-accession process to the European Union, and through the memorandums concluded with the Bretton Woods financial international institutions. To a great extent, privatization was ideologically justified as part of de-legitimization of communism. On the one hand, through the appeal to the need to ensure the efficiency of production as a condition of the competitiveness of goods produced on the unregulated free market actually sustained by the state. And – on the other hand – by emphasizing the need to ensure the rights, freedoms and protection of the individual against the oppressive state with its tendencies to control its private life. In fact, the privatization of state property accumulated between 1945-1990 both in the form of state-owned enterprises and in the form of a stock of

² These characteristics of capitalism from the second part of the 20th century and from the 21st century are described in details by Harvey. Connected to critical urban theory, among others he starts his analysis from the investigation of Henri Lefebvre on the role of the production of space and of urban processes in contemporary capitalism. See David Harvey, *The Urbanization of Capital: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.

public housing, as well as putting private property into the core of post-socialist ethos, were central mechanisms of the formation of capitalism, respectively of the formation of the capitalist class structure and the accumulation of capital in Romania. All this happened at a time when capitalism became global in its neoliberal form, Romania being integrated into the global capital circuit as a source of capital accumulation through privatizing state property and natural resources, as a sales market for goods produced elsewhere, but also as a source of cheap labour.

I sustain that the privatization of the old state-owned housing stock must be addressed together with the production of the new private housing fund for the following three reasons:

(1) Looking for the causes of changing of social relationships through housing, but also of the transformation of housing into commodity or of the formation of the housing market as part of the real estate market, we cannot confine ourselves to define the privatization of the old state housing stock and retrocession as the only or the most important cause of this transformation. This privatization, which is particularly characteristic of the 1990s (although it continues in the upcoming decades), is at most only one of the factors that create the necessary conditions for the formation of the housing market, namely a product (privately owned dwellings), which has the potential to become a good merchandised on the market.

The other factor in the formation of capitalist relations in the field of housing and the transformation of the dwelling into a commodity is that of the private production of a new stock of private dwellings, which contributes to the formation of the real estate market and the housing market as part of the first. The creation of the latter is sustained by the land market, by the construction market, by the real estate market and by the development of bank-credit system. All these markets are developing in Romania especially after 2000, even if regulations in this area begin to appear beforehand.

(2) The ideology of privatization and private property is manifested both in the process of transferring of dwellings from state property to private ownership, and in the process of producing a new private property fund on the one hand by individuals and on the other hand by real estate investors.

(3) The state contributes to both of the processes from above by legislating and by creating institutional conditions, even if it does it in various ways. On the one hand, directly, by transferring state property to private ownership; and indirectly, by sustaining private housing production through assigning land in concession from state property on the behalf of the new private property constructions, by using public budget for various land consolidation works or for feasibility studies sustaining private housing construction, or by other means.

On the other hand, I argue that the production of the new private housing fund should be discussed in connection with the privatization of state-owned economic units, because:

(1) Those who became majority shareholders of some of the privatized production units were mostly former managers / directors of these companies, thus having positions of leadership in the former factories as administrators of socialist property, acting in the sense of the communist regime as kind of private owners of common goods.³ After 1990, after the state-owned enterprises were transformed into business companies (*societăți comerciale*), in some cases these former administrators began to use the infrastructure, the buildings, the equipment and other assets of the former factories for the construction of dwellings. They actually invested the capital achieved through the primitive accumulation that happened via the privatization of state property into their own real estate business, which promised to bring more profit than the possible continuation of production (an example in Cluj is the construction of the Sports Hall Ensemble on the site of the former Silk Factory "Working Romania").

(2) Those who accumulate capital in other domains, at one point they invest their profit into a real estate development (for example, in Cluj, Platinia Mall Residence was built by a real estate developer as a result of the purchase and demolition of the building of the former Ursus Beer

³ According to Verdery, the right to administer, and not only ownership in the strict sense of the word was a property right. The right to administer could be established in the socialist economy because there was a need for state property to be operationalized or put into practice. There was necessary to regulate how exactly the so-called good of all people or the abstract socialist property would function in practice. See Verdery, Katherine, "Property and Politics in and After Socialism", in *Revista Română de Sociologie*, Serie nouă, Anul XIX, Nr. 1–2: 37–55, 2008.

Factory, which is a case of a developer investing capital generated by its waste industry companies into this project).

(3) Former state-owned companies from the housing sector, based on Law no. 15/1990, were reorganized as autonomous administrative companies (*societăți administrative*) or as business companies (*societăți comerciale*).⁴ Besides some new companies created by Local Council Decisions, with which the City Hall or the Local Council was associated as a shareholder, these new privatized units became the managers of the public housing stock on behalf of the Romanian state.

Last, but not least, one cannot address housing politics without observing the intrinsic links between the latter and employment politics in the process of creating and developing of a political economy of any kind. Because production needs labour force, and labour force is reproduced through consumption, respectively, among other things, through housing. The definition of the need for housing and the way this need is met at a certain point on the level of the entire population, are products of economic development and of political decisions:

(1) Socialist industrialization presupposed the construction of dwellings according to the labour force which was needed in the production process (that was largely ensured through the migration from rural to urban areas), so that the state contributed significantly (but not totally) to the provision of the needed housing stock.

(2) Capitalist production in the post-industrial and neoliberal economy - changing the occupational structure of the population and thus leading to new types of inter-urban migration or of urban-rural relationship - creates conditions for the predominance of private housing construction practices, among them also those made by the real estate developers who accumulate capital by investing into the built environment.

Therefore, it is not possible to discuss housing outside its relationship with labour. Nor because, as can be seen in all political

⁴ *Regiile autonome* are organized in strategic fields of national economy (such as weapon industry, energy, mining, natural gas, railway, post), respectively in some other domains defined by the government. State economic units, with the exception of those who are supposed to be formed as "regii autonome", will be organized under the form of shareholder societies or societies with limited responsibility, under the conditions provided by the law.

regimes, the housing structure of the city always reflects the class structure of society, or because socio-economic status and class differences are also manifested and reproduced territorially. One may conclude that the production of class inequalities in and through housing is part of the urbanization process, characteristic of modernization, and its various types, both socialist and capitalist one. The transformation of the built environment and of the population living in this environment is a long-term process of accumulation through dispossession or of passing of public goods into the hands of private individuals who use them to increase their profits while expelling the poor into peripheral territories and social positions. Accumulation through dispossession takes place in the urban-rural relationship or in the relationship between the various urban areas and ultimately in the relation between the dominant classes and the oppressed classes of the various regimes, all of which are justified by the ideologies of meritocracy and the classification of people into deserving respectively unworthy of adequate housing.

3. Housing production and personal ownership of dwellings in state socialism

During the time of the Groza and Dej governments, the socialist state was preoccupied with the production of housing through decrees which regulated the struggle against capitalist exploitation in this domain (through the nationalization of the buildings of the great capitalists regulated by Decree 92/1950).⁵ After 1965, the Romanian state drew up a series of laws which aimed at developing housing construction and regulating relations between landlords and tenants.⁶

⁵ In this sense, on the domain of housing, the following normative acts were issued: Decree 78/ 1952 regarding the standardization, allocation and use of housing spaces and the regulation of relationships between owners and renters; Decree no. 493/1954; Decree no. 524 from 1955 modifying Decree no. 92/1950; Decree no. 409/1955 regarding the transmission of goods into the property of state; Decree no. 144/1958; Decree no. 144 from 29th of March 1958 regarding the construction permits, respectively permits for reparations or demolitions, and those regarding their sale.

⁶ First of them was Law 9/1968 for the development of housing construction, selling the homes from the state fund towards the population and the construction of holiday houses in personal property. This law was repealed by Law 4/1973 on the same issue, being completed by the regulations of Law 5/1973 regarding the administration of housing fund and the

For those who believe that during the socialist period the housing stock was only or predominantly owned by the state or that the state supported only, or predominantly the production of the public housing stock and its maintenance in state property, would be surprised by the fact that Law 4/1973 pays so much attention to housing construction in the personal property of citizens, but even to the sale of dwellings constructed from centralized state investments, to citizens. Far from being merely technical procedures for housing production, the regulations of Laws 4/1973 and 5/1973 also had the role of transposing the politics of the socialist state regarding ownership on the domain of housing, even more so, they contributed to the development of the socialist property regime with some peculiarities that resulted from the way the state responded to the need for housing linked in turn with the politics of industrialization. Knowing this property ownership regime in the housing domain, which was a mixed property regime, helps us understand why the privatization occurred in this sphere just as it did after 1990, noting that this privatization is actually continuing some existing trends which existed during state socialism.

relationship between owners and renters that were put into practice by Decisions nr. 860 from the 13th of July 1973. These normative acts were playing an important role in the articulation of the concept of the Romanian Communist Party and the Romanian state about the function of housing politics in the context of launching the five year plan 1971-1975 with provisions till, which gave start to the program of multilaterally developed socialist society (*societatea socialistă multilateral dezvoltată*). The latter aimed: "the intensive growth of forces of production, the formation of an advanced economy, i.e. modern industry and agriculture, sustained by the development of science, education and culture, the increase of material and spiritual wellness of working people, the continuous improvement of relations of production and of the whole social organization." Among other, the plan defined the need to construct in urban areas a number of 522 thousand apartments. The way how housing politics was integrated into this program was defined in the preamble of Law 4/1973: "The development of national economy in an increased rhythm, the modernization of towns and working class centres, the increase of the number of workers and specialists, the continuous increase of salaries and other incomes of workers, make necessary the development of the construction of homes and the improvement of their comfort - a necessary condition for increasing the wellness of people. In order to satisfy the growing need for housing, the rhythm of constructing new houses will be increased and measures for improving their comfort will be taken, in accordance with the rhythm of the development of national economy and with the provisions of the unique national plan of socio-economic development."

From the point of view of property, housing was regulated as a domain of consumption, not of production. While in the domain of production the socialist state was seeking to install the socialist property on all means of production (even if it did not entirely exclude other types of property from this domain), in what regards housing as a sphere of consumption it maintained three types of property (state property at its turn having two sub-forms; co-operative property; and personal property). These are described in Law 4/1973 and Law 5/1973 from four points of view: of the entities that can build dwellings; from the perspective of the type of property; of housing management; and from the point of view of the relationship between the owners and the tenants of these dwellings. Thus, state socialism has defined the right to housing and regulated this right by distinguishing between:

- dwellings built from centralized government-owned investments, being in the property of the state and managed by companies subordinated to people's councils (*sfatul popular*) or other state-owned companies, which could be rented but could also be sold to citizens (via whole payment or via loans managed by House of Savings and Consignments "CEC");
- dwellings built from the funds of the state-owned companies, being in the direct administration of the companies, which could be rented by these companies for their own employees;
- dwellings built from the funds of the cooperative organizations and other public organizations with economic and social character, being hold in co-operative property, these organizations administering and renting the dwellings to their members, since the latter could also benefit from loans for the construction or purchase of personal property dwellings;
- dwellings owned by the citizens, which were built from the incomes/ economies of the population or through state loans, or which came into their personal property as a result of the purchase of dwellings from the state-owned housing stock managed by the local council companies, through full payment or "CEC" credit.

It is important to note that the state has regulated the use of dwellings in all of its details, and not only the state-owned housing, but also housing hold in the personal property of citizens. This is precisely the

difference between – on the one hand – personal ownership of the dwelling as it was understood in state socialism, and – on the other hand – between the private property of the dwelling as it was naturalized after 1990.

One may conclude that housing functioned as a field of consumption also during state socialism, through which the reproduction of the labour force was carried out, a process to which the state had a partial contribution. Faced with the challenge of providing sufficient labour force for the industries developed in the cities, but at the same time with the need to reduce the cost of housing construction as much as possible, the state found the following solutions: through housing legislation it sustained the possibility of housing construction in personal property, as well as the purchase of dwellings built from the state budget; promoted commuting from villages to cities of urban workers living in rural areas; through the systematization programs that implemented the politics of transforming villages into urban centres.

The emphasis on the systematization of villages in the 1980s was precisely the reaction to the sub-urbanization of the cities in Romania, which resulted from the discrepancy between the high investments in the industry and the lower investments in the urbanization of the cities. Housing construction has been considered to be a costly investment, while the development of industries was thought being a win-win investment. Thus, during this period, even if the state has built a lot and nationalized the bourgeois properties, the state housing fund has reached only 30% of the total housing stock, the remaining 70% of the existing housing fund being owned by the population.

4. Promotion of privatization after 1990 at the intersection of local-national-transnational level – the case of the city of Cluj

The period of "post-socialist transition" in Cluj Napoca between 1990-2004 took place under the regime of Mayor Gheorghe Funar. He was renowned and publicized mainly because of his nationalist politics. Besides its cultural-symbolic effects, this created a favourable space for capital accumulation in the hands of local entrepreneurs without completely excluding foreigners. At the local level, in the context of an ongoing making of national legislation, this meant the transfer of state capital into private capital both in the area of housing and of economic production, and as well

as the creation of two banks with local interest (*Banca Dacia Felix* and *Banca Transilvania*).

One may observe how are the Local Council Decisions functioning as instruments of political economy of housing. While transposing into local level the emerging national legislation, they contribute massively to the privatization of the public good and the state property in the broad sense of the word as mentioned above. The Funar regime was the one that, through all the administrative regulations implemented and by the lack of urban regulations, which both contributed to privatization, prepared the ground for the further development of Cluj - under neoliberal governance - as an entrepreneurial city or a "competitive city" or "magnet city".

While Funar used his several mandates in Cluj-Napoca, at national level Romania had the following governments: between 1990-1992 the National Salvation Front's three governments (FSN - Roman 1, Roman 2 and Stolojan); between 1992-1996 the government of Democratic Front of National Salvation (FDSN - Văcăroiu); between December 1996 - December 2000 three governments of the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR), consisting of the National Peasant Christian-Democrat Party, the Democratic Party, the National Liberal Party and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania; between December 2000-2004 the government of the Social Democracy Party of Romania (PDSR) transformed later into the Social Democrat Party (Năstase).

As far as housing politics is concerned, the observation that after 1990 the state was withdrawing from its position as a developer (of housing stock, but not only), was valid throughout this whole period. But the state did not remain passive, contrary, it assumed a central role in the creation of the (housing) market through modifying legislation and creating new institutions that administered this process. There were, however, nuances of the emphasis made on this approach by one government or other. During the National Salvation Front government, the sale of houses from the old state fund to its former tenants at a low price was a process that contributed to the creation of a small homeowner's capital that enabled impoverished people to survive financially in case of losing their jobs. The Democratic Front of National Salvation government drafted the housing law, which made important provisions regarding the social housing fund. Article 42 of the law, in its original version (in force since October 1996),

stipulated that "families with a net average monthly income for which social assistance is granted, increased by 10%, have access to housing to rent." Thus the law - in this variant - advocated access to social housing for the most disadvantaged social categories (or, without using this term, for the pauperized working class)⁷. Furthermore, the Romanian Democratic Convention's governments have oriented the housing politics towards the creation of the housing market, among others, through Law no. 152 of 15 July 1998 regarding the establishment of the National Housing Agency. The latter has among its attributions the construction, renting and selling of dwellings created for young people, having its field of activity also the housing construction program through mortgage "as a modern form of stimulating the construction of housing."⁸

The sustaining of privatization on national and local levels must also be seen in the context of connecting our country as an emerging market to global capitalism. On the one hand, however, we must observe that Romania's diplomatic relations with the European Union date back to the period of state socialism. Since the 1970s Romania has signed a number of agreements with the European Economic Community to facilitate commercial trade. New agreements of this kind have been put into operation starting from 1993. Romania submitted its application for membership of the European Union on June 22, 1995, and began negotiations in 2000. These ended with an EU decision in December 2004 that provided the signing the Accession Treaty in April 2005 and joining the EU on 1 January 2007. According to the Report of the Commission of the European Communities from October 2005, Romania fulfilled both the political criteria to become a Member State and the criteria of a functioning

⁷ This article was modified through Emergency Enactment nr. 57/2008 in the sense of redefining income that classifies the applicants for social housing into eligible and non-eligible. The level of income under which people were supposed to be entitled for social housing was set under the monthly medium income per person. As a result, the sphere of those who were eligible for social housing enlarged, while the production of new social homes (via construction, refurbishment or other means) was stalled. This made the local public administration, for example the City Hall and the Local Council of Cluj-Napoca, on the base of its autonomy, to introduce among the criteria of distribution of social homes ones that favoured the better-off and well educated social categories, against unemployed, less educated and pauperized working people.

⁸ More information about these programs might be read here: [<https://www.anl.ro>].

market economy. However, the UE noted the country's obligation to seriously implement its own structural reform program that "will enable it to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the EU." In the centre of this reform program, as well as of other reforms after the accession, was precisely the imperative of privatization.

On the other hand, between 1990-2004, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded several Memoranda with all the Romanian governments after 1990⁹ (Roman, Stolojan, Văcăroiu, Ciorba, Radu Vasile, Năstase). Thus, by the end of 2004, there were seven stand-by agreements signed between IMF and Romania on macroeconomic policies, all of which have conditioned the given loans on the privatization imperative. Concerning the latter, the most important act was signed in May 1999 under the second CDR government (Radu Vasile), namely PSAL I (the Private Sector Adjustment Program), followed in October 1999 by signing PSAL II (with an important chapter on *Privatization and outsourcing of large state-owned companies*). It should be noted that Traian Băsescu, a constant figure as the transportation minister in almost all of these governments, was appointed chief negotiator with the World Bank in 1999.¹⁰ In July 1999, the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the National Bank of Romania addressed a letter of intent, namely a Memorandum on behalf of the

⁹ It has to be mentioned, though, that this moment does not mark the beginning of Romania's relationships with the financial international institutions established after the Second World War. Romania became member of International Monetary Fund in 1972, and it concluded three loan agreements under Ceaușescu in 1975, 1977 and 1981. However, IMF, similar with World Bank, opened its office in Romania only in 1991.

¹⁰ Later, under the time of his presidency, Băsescu was the guarantee of the eighth agreement with IMF signed by Boc government in May 2009, more precisely with the troika formed by IMF, European Commission and World Bank. This act marked the beginnings of the austerity measures as part of the so-called reform of the state that had at its score the imperative of accelerating privatization in all domains. But till this moment, even if there were not concluded new loan agreements with these financial institutions, the "Alianța Dreptate și Adevăr" (Justice and Truth Alliance) (2004-2007) and afterwards the liberal government without the Democrat Party (2007-2008) prepared and administered the accession of Romania to the European Union, continuing the privatization of state enterprises. Further on, governments Boc 1 and Boc 2 between 2008-2012 had a yet stronger contribution to the capital accumulation of foreign and national investors in parallel with the withdrawal of the state from its developmental and social roles even more to the dramatic reduction of its contributions to social protection and to the privatization of several social and public services.

Government to the international financial institutions, requesting further support from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,¹¹ which mentions: "the economic problems of the country, namely the negative economic growth and the major fiscal deficit, are due to the structural weaknesses of the entrepreneurial and banking sector, or, in other words, the limited progress of privatization of these sectors, but also the weak corporate governance that led to excessive wage growth". Chapter IV of this Memorandum refers to the agreement with the World Bank under the PSAL on the 300 million USD loan for the privatization program, bank restructuring and losses in the public sector. *The national privatization strategy* from 2000 was developed in the spirit of these agreements, and reiterated the four major areas for accelerating the restructuring and privatization process, namely: restructuring the banking sector, privatization of state-owned companies, improvement of the business environment and mitigating the social costs of the reform.¹²

Since June 2004, the City Hall of Cluj-Napoca, except for the period when he was Romania's prime minister (2008-2012), has been conducted by Emil Boc. His name is linked not only to the development of the city in terms of its opening towards direct foreign investments, including towards real estate investments, but – on national level – also to the politics of "state reform" in a neoliberal sense. This whole period is marked by Romania's accession to the European Union (under the Tăriceanu government) and is coinciding with the crisis generated by global financial capitalism. The country's population was seriously affected by how neoliberal politics understood to "solve" crisis through austerity measures. The "saving buoy" of the international financial institutions was thrown towards the Romanian Government since 2009 in the form of new loans.¹³ But this

¹¹ *Memorandum of the Government of Romania on Economic Policies, 1999* – available here: [<https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/1999/072699.htm>].

¹² [<http://www.monitoruljuridic.ro/act/strategia-nationala-de-privatizare-din-26-octombrie-2000-pentru-anul-2000-emitent-guvernul-publicat-n-monitorul-oficial-24894.html>].

¹³ They were established by the Memorandum of Boc government from the 4th of May 2009 (signed by the troika of IMF, European Commission and World Bank), this being the eighth such an accord concluded after 1990 by Romania. Through this, IMF approved for Romania a loan for two years in the amount of 12,95 milliard euro, besides other 2 milliards received from the World Bank and 5 milliards from the European Commission. And further on by

actually was a package of conditionality that acted as instrument of neoliberal governance incorporated into the Romanian government at that time. The "economic recovery" made in the spirit of "state reform" (putting the state into the service of the market and dismantling the social state) was justified by local political discourses articulated by President Traian Băsescu and Prime Minister of Romania Emil Boc (who, before and after his career as prime minister was the mayor of Cluj). In this context, wage and pension cuts were made, prices rose, more state-owned companies were restructured, dismantling of energy subsidies led to rising the price on electricity, heat and gas, and generally speaking the living costs were rising. At the same time, the introduction of the system of copulation into public health care, the reduction of subsidies for compensated medicines, as well as the proposal for the privatization of the whole health care system was launched. Policies during this period resulted in freezing wages, blocking public sector employment, eliminating many bonuses for public employees, reducing public spending on goods and services and, implicitly, spending on social protection. At that time the Labour Code also changed, restricting the possibilities for self-organization of employees and supporting employers by generalizing fixed-term employment contracts. This resulted in the even stronger precarization of workers.¹⁴

All these policies have led to increased material and housing deprivation among the population across the country. According to EUROSTAT data for 2015, the percentage of those under 60% of the median income (or at-risk-of-poverty) was 25.4 percent (and of those with incomes below 40% compared to median income was 14.5 percent – both being slightly increasing annually since 2007, more precisely from 24.6% and 13.5% respectively). In terms of living conditions, in the same year the percentage of those who had to allocate over 40% of their wages for housekeeping was 42.6 percent; the percentage of those affected by overcrowding among workers at-risk-of-poverty was 69.1 percent (this

the ninth agreement of Romanian with IMF from March 2011, which was a stand-by agreement or preventive surveillance accord.

¹⁴ I presented more details on this phenomenon in the article "Glocalizarea neoliberalismului în România prin reforma statului și dezvoltarea antreprenorială", in *Epoca Traian Băsescu*, Florin Poenaru, Costi Rogozanu (eds.), Cluj Napoca: Editura Tact, 2014, 245-277 (English version Vincze, 2015).

indicator knowing quite high levels for those with higher incomes as well, 49.4 percent, which is a much higher share than the EU average of 14.9%); and severe housing deprivation affected 49 percent of the poor, the most severe privations being related to sanitary facilities.¹⁵

What happened at the country level after 2005, and even mostly between 2009 and 2016, namely the supremacy of governance under the aegis of the "performing and efficient state", was also carried out in the city of Cluj. The economic crisis has been used for justifying neoliberalization (extending market principles in all areas of life, including housing), while performance and efficiency of the government has begun to be measured by the extent it renounced to its social roles (for example the construction of social housing) and supported the market (including the real estate and the housing market). In 2016, Cluj was ranked on the top of "Forbes 40 Best Business Cities", being "determined by the involvement of the authorities in supporting foreign investors and attracting as many companies as possible to Cluj." On that occasion, Emil Boc, the mayor of the city said the following for "Forbes Romania": "Things are very simple. Just as in the general economy, before you consume anything, you have to produce, just like in the case of a city, to have money for social and cultural projects, first of all you need to produce financial resources. [...] Investor requirements are normal and of common sense. The more stamps, the more sources of corruption; the fewer the stamps, the more efficiency and less corruption in an administration, be it on a local or national level".¹⁶

¹⁵ Data from EUROSTAT: statistics regarding housing: [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Housing_statistics/ro]; and statistics in what regards the distribution of income and the rate of at-risk-of-poverty and social exclusion: [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Income_distribution_statistics/ro], discussed largely by Vincze, Ciotlăuș and Zamfir (2017), available here: [<http://www.criticatac.ro/29558/dupa-aproape-30-de-ani-de-masuri-propiata-imobiliara-se-impune-o-politica-antirasista-si-justa-de-locuire-publica>].

¹⁶ Information taken from [<http://www.forbes.ro/articles/forbest-best-cities-2016-locul-2-cluj- napoca-ascensiunea-continua-53906>], February 2016.

5. Transformation of state socialism into neoliberal capitalism through the politics of housing sustained by the ideology of economic liberalism

From the point of view of property, during the period of state socialism housing was regulated as an area of consumption. While in the sphere of production the state aimed to install socialist property on all means of production (even if it did not entirely exclude other types of property from this sphere either), in the domain of housing as a sphere of consumption it maintained three types of property: the state property (knowing two sub-forms), the co-operative property, and the personal property. The use of dwellings in personal property was strictly regulated by the state, even if in percentage it dominated the entire housing stock, the existence of the latter itself could not result in the transformation of housing into commodity. The latter became possible due to the two forms of housing fund privatization, through which:

(1) The state-owned housing fund became private property as a process in which the state was directly involved in remaking the relevant legislation and the setting-up of institutions managing this process (through selling apartments to people who were tenants before 1990, and by retrocession of buildings nationalized between 1945 and 1990). The sale of public dwellings which became private property following this process (and the accumulation of capital through these mechanisms) was not, however, the declared purpose of these measures, nor was it excluded from them, as it was forbidden in the case of personally owned dwellings during state socialism.

(2) Private actors produce a new housing fund for the purpose of selling them to private consumers, investing capital in this development and pursuing the goal of capital accumulation. As a result of this process, dwellings are produced as commodity, while the state sustains these processes (through housing programs that produce subsidized dwellings for certain categories of people; by expanding the urban area and the viability of the lands dedicated to the construction of new private dwellings; by concession of lands owned by the state to individuals or to commercial companies and real estate developers; by legalizing real estate activities; by legalizing and sustaining the bank credit system, etc.). In turn, the housing market as part of the real estate market could not grow without

the land market, without the financial / banking / capital market, and without the construction and real estate market.

The transformation of social relations through housing and the transformation of housing into commodity through the two processes described above, occurred in the context of the transformation of state socialism into neoliberal capitalism. Under these circumstances, primitive accumulation functioned as capital accumulation by privatizing socialist property assets. This happened during the de-industrialization of economy and the liberalization of capital flows on global stage. Even if in the early 1990s, after dismantling state socialism, there could still be plans for the transfer of state property into the property of workers, this transfer eventually happened through the transfer of private property to investors who could buy economic units in insolvency at a low price. As a result of these processes, many former workers have lost their jobs, many of them being forced to emigrate as a cheap labour force to the West, which was apparently opened to the former socialist states, and others got jobs at home at the new private companies, working for low wages. All this time, the housing politics has facilitated the introduction of urban space (including its building and land fund) into the flow of capital, therefore the investments into built environment became an important source of profit in the context of post-industrial economy (de)regulated by the neoliberal political doctrine.

In a way, post-socialist urbanization has continued the process of urbanization from the period of state socialism, but has radically changed it as regards the property regime in the housing sector. It has transformed personal ownership into private ownership, it has dropped from 30% to below 2% the percentage of public housing stock, and it has reduced the function of the state in the production of housing to a legislation-making role that sustains the formation of the housing and the financial market. While state socialism was grounded on the industrialization of the economy and cultivated the ideology of public property on the means of production, even if in the domain of housing it permitted the coexistence, and even more, the predominance of personal property, neoliberal capitalism imposes the ideology of total privatization in all areas of life and sanctions the investment into built environment or real estate development as a dominant practice for capital accumulation.

Over the last almost three decades, the creation of the (housing) market has been underpinned by the ideology of economic liberalism, with the imperative of privatization and promotion of private property at its core. It built the "fact" and insisted on it, that the housing problems in Romania are a legacy of socialism, and they will be solved by privatization, respectively by the development of an "efficient housing market". But the ideology of privatization has not only naturalized the option for home-ownership while delegitimizing public housing. It also concealed the fact that behind these processes, a series of class interests are hidden, and that buyers' efforts to pay high costs for housing are a source of profit for the real estate developers and banks (most of whom are indebted till the end of their labour career). In these processes one may recognize the fetishization of housing as commodity.¹⁷ Putting forward the features of the house-commodity that distinguishes it from other similar objects, this ideology conceals that beyond the production of the dwelling as commodity or beyond the economic relations between objects, there are social relations mediated by financial transactions, which result in capital accumulation on the side of the real estate and financial businessmen, as well as in increasing class inequalities.

As a result, the privatization of the housing stock, the creation of a new private housing fund through real estate development and the transformation of housing into commodity is a socio-economic and cultural-ideological process.

¹⁷ Some examples, taken from real estate developers' websites, can be very eloquent in this regard: "The Platina projects bring a new real estate concept to Cluj-Napoca, consisting of residential and class A office buildings, located in the most central locations, built with premium materials, offers a unique service package dedicated to the tenants." "Integrated in the urban landscape of Cluj-Napoca, the Sports Hall Residential Complex enjoys a unique position, being only a few minutes away from the city center but at the same time having the advantage of being located in a green area, in the vicinity of the Central Park and Victor Babes Park". "The Neo Park Complex from the Borhanci district has a neighbourhood where there is stream, next to the promenade and relaxation area. The on-site shopping facilities offer the majority of the facilities of the tenants." "The construction on Vaida Voievod Street, opposite the FSEGA (Economics Faculty of Babes-Bolyai University, and the luxurious Riviera Residential Complex, has direct access to Iulius Park, perfect for afternoon walks." "Grand Park Residence 'Imagine Your Future' is the place where time expands, life rhythm fades and worries disappear, the ensemble represents a phase in creating a community with facilities at the highest standards."

(1) In the due process, housing contributes to the emergence of the class structure of capitalism including the emergence of new actors on the housing market, namely the real estate developers as part of capitalist class. Moreover, housing functions as a mean of production. As such, it has a role in the creation of class inequalities or inequalities between the owner class and the working class (whose living conditions are becoming more and more distinct as both a symbol and a producer of social distances and inequalities). Furthermore, housing contributes to the stratification within the same social class according to the social status of people (school education, occupation) and their position on the labour market. It recreates the poverty of the pauperized working class since they are not sustained in their need for housing by a system of public housing that should be dedicated to categories who cannot afford an adequate housing from the housing market.

(2) Housing contributes to the production of cultural identities defined by values and meanings and associated with particular life styles. The quality and placement of the home, but as well as its degree of security produces in the dwellers the sense of belonging to particular communities well-delimited from others. Through all these processes the relationship between state-citizens-market is also built, defining the rights and obligations of each of these actors in terms of housing production and management. The ideas and practices of (re) distribution of (public and private) resources related to housing are also imposed by them and even more, generally speaking, the idea of the city, of how it has to be developed and of who has the right to belong to the city is also re-enforced.

As far as Cluj is concerned, today's estimates show that the development prospects of the city as a "competitive city"¹⁸ will also imply the development of the real estate business. Paradoxically, the "competitiveness" of the city is due to the labour force which, because it is still relatively cheap on the global labour market, attracts foreign investors.

¹⁸ It cannot be surprising, since this is the trend of the development paradigm assumed by Romania and its government, consulted by the World Bank, that the city of Cluj-Napoca in its Development Strategy 2014-2020 assumed the model of a competitive city in a relationship with the communes in the area and the region, as well as in relation with other major cities of the country. (World Bank, December 2013, [<http://www.sdtr.ro/upload/banca-mondiala/docs/Brochure%20-%20Competitive%20Cities.pdf>]).

On the other hand, the development of the IT and banking sectors attracts more and more labour force in Cluj with wages above the average ones, which, together with the re-launch of the real estate loans, sustain the illusion of demand for more expensive housing stock created by developers. In this context, neither the local government, nor private companies will be interested in subsidizing housing in a way that meets people's needs, rather than the need to increase the profits of real estate developers.

Thus, it is too likely that the decision-makers of Cluj will continue to neglect public housing as a form of housing that sustains the labour force of the poor working class with very low incomes, or only with income from social assistance rights, or only with incomes obtained from labouring in the informal economy that contributes invisibly to the welfare of the city. As a result, the public administration will continue to be the local actor of the national and global scene of neoliberal urbanism¹⁹ that re-creates exacerbated class inequalities in and through space and urban processes. Respectively, through its housing politics, it will contribute to the subordination of the development of the city to the interests of capital accumulation, being under the pressure of the cyclical crises of financial capital that is constantly seeking new investment objectives, for example the built environment. In turn, this trend becomes part of the city's marketing strategy with the aim of being competitive in terms of economic growth, while, in fact, it sustains the class of big owners of lands and buildings in the detriment of workers who are forced to spend more and more from their income on the reproduction of their labour force through housing, respectively on purchasing or renting of housing from the private market.

¹⁹ The phenomenon is analyzed in multiple geographic contexts. See, for example, Sònia Vives Miró, "Producing a 'Successful City': Neoliberal Urbanism and Gentrification in the Tourist City – The Case of Palma Majorca", in *Urban Studies Research*, Volume 2011, available at [<https://www.hindawi.com/journals/usr/2011/989676>]; Erik Swyngedouw; Frank Moulaert; Arantxa Rodriguez, "Neoliberal Urbanization in Europe: Large-Scale Urban Development Projects and the New Urban Policy", in *Antipode*, Volume 34, Issue 3, pp. 542–577, 2002; Tahl Kaminer; Robles-Duran, Miguel (eds.), *Urban Asymmetries: Studies and Projects on Neoliberal Urbanization*, Rotterdam: nai010 publishers, 2011.

Bibliography

1. Althusser, Louis (1971), "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", (translated from French by Ben Brewster) in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, New York: Monthly Review Press.
2. Gramsci, Antonio (1971), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, New York: International Publishers.
3. Harvey, David (1985), *The Urbanization of Capital: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
4. Harvey, David (2003), *New Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Kaminer, Tahl; Robles-Duran, Miguel (eds.) (2011), *Urban Asymmetries: Studies and Projects on Neoliberal Urbanization*, Rotterdam: nai010 publishers.
6. Miró Vives, Sònia (2011), "Producing a 'Successful City': Neoliberal Urbanism and Gentrification in the Tourist City – The Case of Palma Majorca", in *Urban Studies Research*, Volume 2011.
7. Shore, Criss; Wright, Susanne (eds.) (1997), *Anthropology of Policy. Critical Perspectives on Governance and Power*, London and New York: Routledge.
8. Smith, Neil (1990), *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space*, Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press.
9. Swyngedouw, Erik; Moulaert, Frank; Rodriguez, Arantxa (2002), "Neoliberal Urbanization in Europe: Large-Scale Urban Development Projects and the New Urban Policy", in *Antipode*, Volume 34, Issue 3, 542–577.
10. Therborn, Göran (1999), *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology*, London and New York: Verso.
11. Verdery, Katherine (2008), "Property and Politics in and After Socialism", in *Revista Română de Sociologie, Serie nouă, Anul XIX, Nr. 1–2*, 37–55.
12. Vincze, Enikő (2015), "Glocalization of Neoliberalism in Romania Through the Reform of the State and Entrepreneurial Development", in *Studia Europaea*, 1/2015, 125-153.

13. Vincze, Enikő; Ciotlăuș, Simona; Zamfir, George (2017), "După aproape 30 de ani de măsuri pro-piață imobiliară, se impune o POLITICĂ ANTIRASISTĂ ȘI JUSTĂ DE LOCUIRE PUBLICĂ", in *Critic Atac*, 12 May.
14. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974), *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York: Academic Press.
15. *** (1993), *Housing: Enabling Markets to Work*, World Bank, Washington D.C.
16. *** (1999), *Memorandum of the Government of Romania on Economic Policies*, signed by Traian Decebel Remeș – Ministry of Finance and Mugur Isărescu – Governor of the National Bank of Romania, [<https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/1999/072699.htm>].
17. *** (2013), *Competitive Cities. Reshaping the Economic Geographies of Romania*, World Bank.

POPULIST HYSTERIA AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC MIGRATION. THE IMPACT OF ROMANIAN MIGRATION ON THE UK LABOR MARKET

Dana Dömşödi*

DOI: 10.24193/subbeuropaea.2017.3.03

Published Online: 2017-09-30

Published Print: 2017-09-30

Abstract

This paper focuses on the impact of Eastern European economic migration on the UK labor-market, such as to offer an analysis of the British populist hysteria against Romanians in the context of the lifting of labor-market restrictions for A2 nationals in January 2014. Instead of focusing on the deconstruction of the reactionary and xenophobic populist discourse against Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants, our choice was to focus on structural determinants of economic migration and to link such an approach with a discussion of the European economic and political structures of asymmetry between states, on the one hand, and labor and capital, on the other.

Keywords: populism, economic migration, labor, asymmetry

“We asked for workers, but human beings came”
Max Frisch

Introduction

On 23 June 2016 British citizens were invited to cast their vote in the national referendum, in order to decide whether or not UK should leave the European Union, and their decision was to leave the Union. Among the points of contention between UK and EU, the social and economic situation (the problem of in-work benefits and the debate on the impact of migrant labor force on the labor market) of (Eastern) European immigrants (in UK)

* Dana Dömşödi is a PhD candidate in political theory at Sant’Anna Scuola Universitaria Superiore Pisa, in the academic program of Politics, Human Rights, and Sustainability. She has a PhD in Philosophy at Babeş-Bolyai University (2012).

Contact: dana_domsodi@yahoo.com

represented one of the major topics of disagreement. The centrality of the migration issue for the problem of the vote on Brexit appears to have marked a turning point in its recent history, if we take into account that UK was one of the member states that has advocated for the widest possible extension of EU towards the East. Historically, this decision was motivated by UK's two objectives: a weak supranational authority of the EU and the economic need for competitively priced immigrant labor force. According to Perry Anderson, "Britain has pressed not only for rapid integration of the Visegrád countries into the EU, but also for the most extensive embrace beyond it"¹, therefore the Union would evolve into a mere free-trade area, with less real supranational power of control. Such a widening of the EU would also generate enough social deregulation and institutional dilution, while "the prospect of including vast reserve armies of cheap labor in the East, exerting downward pressure on wages costs in the West, is a further bonus in this British scenario"². Clearly the motivation behind UK's initial relaxed policy towards European immigrants was motivated by the necessity for enlarging its labor force pool such as to cater the needs of an improving and more competitive economy and to encourage enterprise³. In this context, as in general, it becomes apparent that the problem of migration should be addressed as a political economy issue, meaning that the changes in the social structure that migration generates, and the impact that it has on the national economy (within a globalized⁴ capitalist system)

¹ Perry Anderson, *The New Old World*, Verso, London 2009, p. 39.

² *Ibidem*.

³ For a more comprehensive discussion about the argument that correlates change in immigration policies under the pressure of economic competitiveness see Otto Köppe, "The Leviathan of Competitiveness: How And Why do Liberal States (not) Accept Unwanted Immigration?", in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 29, no. 3, 2003, pp. 431-448; P. G. Cerny, "Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization", in *Government and Opposition*, vol. 32, no. 2, 1997, pp. 251-274.

⁴ We use here the term globalized and globalization in a simple sense, where globalization represents "the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life" (According to D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton (eds.), *Global Transformation: Politics, Economics and Culture*, Polity Press, Cambridge 1999, p. 2). We will return later to the problem of globalization and the way it shapes and it is shaped by the global mobility of labor. Then, we will discuss the particular political and economic aspects of globalization relevant for understanding the social process of migration and the way it impacts labor commodification and structurally changes it.

would necessarily acquire a political form of social elaboration. Our treatment of economic migration will be inside a paradigm that situates this phenomenon in the larger context of political economy such as to crystallize into a refutation of populist, hence unscientific argument against migration and hatred against (economic migrants). But, even if the political tension created by migration appears at a supra-national EU level with the force to break monetary and trade alliances, its roots are primarily to be found in the particular deadlock of the European nation states that are torn between the structural necessity for large pools (as cheap as possible) of labor force (especially in the post-recession context) and the internal functioning of the process of political representation, namely the need to satisfy the political demands of the citizens that constitute the basis of their electorate. We will address this situation later in detail, suffice to say for now that the dialectical relation between migration, the state and the native population surpasses the limits of the labor market structure, although the subjective internalization - by native and immigrants alike - of its structure takes a specific form of social stratification and political practice. The working hypothesis of our paper is that the populist backlash in UK against Eastern European economic migration is merely the symptom and a form of political instrumentation of a non-materialist and non-historical understanding of the structural causes of labor mobility at a global level. Moreover, populist reaction in UK against migration and immigrants is merely the ideological externalization of deeper structural social and political objective contradiction, inside the European deadlock of labor and maximization of profit extraction.

The Romanians are coming!

On the 1st of January 2014 UK's labor market restrictions imposed to Bulgaria and Romania were lifted. These restrictions were imposed on these two countries immediately after they joined the EU in 2007, with the purpose of reducing and controlling the migration flux towards UK. The restrictions regarded the limited access to benefits and the necessity to obtain a valid work permit. This change has triggered a major public debate (heated and frequently fueled by nationalist and anti-EU widespread attitudes combined with racial and xenophobic stereotyping of Romanians and Bulgarians) around economic considerations connected to

the impact of A2 immigrants upon the labor market, and the political implications that such a change might bring about⁵. The focus of this article regards the re-situating of the issue of Eastern European economic migration into the larger context of European economic and political asymmetries, overdetermined by social contradictions and economic dependence, can help surmount the ideological and reactionary-idealist populist discourse upon the issue of economic migration. Our choice to focus on this moment is motivated by a strange disparity, or incongruity, between the small actual number of Romanians and Bulgarians living and working in the UK in 2014, and the disproportionate political and social reaction directed against these two groups of immigrants. The A2 potential migration to UK was presented as an imminent invasion, with press and politicians present in the airport on the 1st of January 2014 to await the possible 'invaders'. This gesture was a proof in itself of the political and social gravity of migration issues in UK. However, the data seems to tell a different story, one that challenges the perceived high gravity and significance of A2 migration in UK. In 2013 UK was ranked second (after Germany) with a total number of new immigrants of 526 thousand, while Italy was ranked fourth with 307.5 thousand new immigrants. Regarding UK, The Office of National Statistics (ONS) estimates that in 2014 were 8.4 million people (13% of the total population) born abroad residing in UK, out of which around 3 million have EU citizenship⁶. After the lifting of labor market restrictions for EU2 nationals ONS estimated that in 2014 there were 128 thousand Romanians immigrants in UK, while it also

⁵ *The Romanians are Coming!* is the title of a documentary aired by the BBC in February 2015. The documentary follows the story of three Romanian immigrants in UK and has stirred different reactions and it is centered on the perspective of the immigrants themselves that narrate their story of the arrival in UK and the reasons that pushed them to come. The Romanian community in Bristol has issued a joint statement saying that it finds the documentary "humiliating" and "offensive". This documentary was but one of the media events dedicated to Romanians and Bulgarians. In 2013, UK wanted also to start a campaign in Romania in order to discourage migration from the Carpathians. The campaign was never launched because it suffered a backlash from the part of the international community and European media that have cataloged the initiative negatively as racist and disrespectful.

⁶ Data available in the EUROSTAT database regarding Population and Population change sectors and can be consulted here: [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Population_and_population_change_statistics]. The numbers presented here coincide with the official numbers on the site.

counted around 53 thousand Bulgarians⁷. We will look in more detail at the data available later in this article, but enough to say for now that the heterogeneity and the magnitude of migration in the UK seems to confirm Steven Vertovec's term of "super-diversity", connected to the diversity of social, national and economic backgrounds of the immigrants residing in UK – this argument thus adding to the apparent irrational character of the public hysteria directed against Bulgarians and Romanians. As Vertovec puts it "new, small, and scattered, multiple-origin, trans-nationally connected, socioeconomically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants"⁸ now form a part of the complex British labor force and society – a diversified pool of foreign labor force, of which the A2 nationals are but a small fraction. Below (Figure 1) we have a graphic representation of the distribution of European migrant population in UK according to nationality.




Figure 1. European migration in UK, decomposition by nationality.

Source: CEP Analysis of Labor Force Survey

⁷ According to the official ONS statistics. The data is available here: [<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/migration1/migration-statistics-quarterly-report/february-2015/sty-bulgarian-and-romanian-migration-to-the-uk.html>], accessed July 2017.

⁸ Steven Vertovec, "Super-Diversity and Its Implications", in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 30(6), 2007, p. 1024.

The invasive character of Romanian migration has been purposely sold to British citizens via media coverage, right-wing xenophobic political discourses and a general climate that aimed to criminalize poverty and depict Romania's and Bulgaria's economic retard as a cause for alarm. For example, a quantitative big-data methodologically based research regarding the media coverage of Romania and Bulgaria in 2013, conducted by The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, shows the biased and negative media coverage of the countries mentioned above. Their findings permit us to advance a first argument in favor of the political instrumentation of the migration debate regarding A2 migration into UK (a hypothesis that we will further explore in our paper). In the year previous to the 2014 Romanian and Bulgarian migration "hysteria", the report shows that tabloid press mainly discussed "crime and anti-social behavior", using verbs such as "flood and flock" (the demeaning intention is completely transparent). The report also focused on a type of pattern called "collocation"⁹, that corroborated with analysis of differential usage of target words like "Romanian" or "Bulgarian", allowed corpus linguists to "attach extra-information called meta-data to parts of the corpus"¹⁰, and enabled them to manage the significant amount of utterances of target words like "Immigrant", "Romanian", or "Bulgarian". The results of the study showed a different portrayal of Romanian and Bulgarian when considered separately, migration being the situation in which most often the two terms appear together, but also that "Romanians were more frequently linked to criminality and economic poverty, compared to Bulgaria and Bulgarians. References to gangs, crime, and economic hardship, such as 'sleeping rough' were associated with mentions of Romanians"¹¹.

⁹ Collocation refers to the scientific and research related relevance of certain signifiers/words that appear together in a context/situation where intention is a more likely cause than mere coincidence, and thus their collocation acquires a particular meaning. For an extended discussion of collocation see John Sinclair, *Corpus, Concordance, Collocation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

¹⁰ "Report: Bulgarians & Romanians in the British National Press. 1 December 2012 – 1 December 2013", in *Compass. The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford*, August 2014, p. 5, available at [http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Report-Bulgarians_Romanians_Press_0.pdf], accessed August 2017.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 20.

However, it is our hypothesis that the spike in migration debate in 2014, occasioned by the lifting of labor market restriction for A2 nationals, cannot be interpreted as a mere popular backlash against Eastern Europeans (we are convinced that such a narrow angle of interpretation will ultimately rend this debate unintelligible and put it to rest unresolved) - as the data and the numbers do not corroborate the invasion version, nor the mass labor market displacement of native workers by Romanians and Bulgarians. We contend that there were other factors and causes at play that fueled the migration debate, and used the anti-Romanian and anti-Bulgarian momentum to externalize their contradictions and unresolved character, by pushing for a political scapegoat that should hold the bag filled with deeper, structural elements that indeed had and have the force to break the labor consensus and the political stability built on top of it. It is our understanding that the backlash against Eastern European (A2 nationals, mainly) immigrants in 2014 should be understood as a symptom of the deeper, structural crisis of labor in UK, that manifests doubly as an economic crisis in the post-recession labor market landscape, with higher levels of labor flexibility, precarity, and insecurity, and a political representation crisis depicting historical low levels of labor unionization within a general context of Labor Parties' inability to defend and advance the rights and the interests of the British workforce. Moreover, the years following the economic crisis have trapped UK in what it is called the "productivity puzzle", an issue rarely discussed in relation with Eastern European migration, but one which we retain significant as labor force dynamics is determined also by macro-economic factors, inasmuch as crisis and contradiction at a macro-level will result in tension and conflict on the labor market.

The productivity puzzle and labor flexibility

Apparently, UK has not managed to recover the levels of labor productivity - defined as "the quantity of goods and services produced per unit of labor input"¹² - prior to the recession although capital inputs in production, technical efficiency in combining capital and labor, and the

¹² According to the definition offered by Alina Barnett, Sandra Batten, Adrian Chiu, Jeremy Franklin, and Maria Sebastla-Barrlel, "The UK Productivity Puzzle", in *Quarterly Bulletin Bank of England*, Q2, 2014, p. 115.

degree of intensity in utilizing labor and capital has returned to levels normal for non-crisis periods. The report issued in 2014 by the Bank of England's members from the Monetary Analysis Directorate states that "since the onset of the 2007-08 financial crisis, labor productivity in the United Kingdom has been exceptionally weak; while labor productivity - measured by whole-economy output per hour worked - started to improve in 2013 alongside the recovery in output that was taking place at this time, it is still some 16 percent below the level implied by a simple continuation of its pre-crisis trend"¹³. The level of unemployment had not risen, as firms tend to retain workers in crisis periods, because firing them could later result in higher costs of re-employment, as the demand for labor increases in economic periods of growth. But, as Toby Nangle argues, labor hoarding does not offer a way out of the productivity puzzle, as "after a sharp downturn that was not matched by a spike in unemployment, employment growth has been exceptionally strong during a period of relatively modest economic growth – suggesting that labor hoarding does not provide all the answers to UK's productivity puzzle"¹⁴. However, the social cost of labor was high as the increased flexibility of real wages - partially caused by the decline in labor unionization - allowed firms to play on their spare capacity and shift the cost of the crisis on the shoulders of the workforce (blue and middle-white collars alike). The economic recession has caught labor in an inferior bargaining position, left to bear the costs of its low productivity. Pessoa and Van Reen also speak of a "large fall in real wages associated with an increase in the cost of capital"¹⁵, but caught as they are in a cyclical explanation of the productivity puzzle, remain confident that the problems created by this unbalanced ratio between capital and labor will return to normal as demand for services and goods will pick up the pace. The second perspective (remaining also within the neoclassical model of political economy) on the productivity puzzle points to larger, deeper structural

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ Toby Nangle, "Does the Productivity Puzzle Pose a Threat to Investors' Goldilocks Environment?", in *Productivity Viewpoint Multi-Asset*, August 2015, p. 2.

¹⁵ João Paulo Pessoa and John Van Reen, "Decoupling of Wage Growth and Productivity Growth? Myth and Reality?", in *CEP Discussion Paper*, No. 1246, 2013, available at [<http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1246.pdf>], accessed July 2017.

causes that could explain the disruption of economic capacity through inefficient allocation of resources or under-investment.

The discussion about the productivity puzzle becomes relevant for the issue of migration when it is placed in the context of labor market flexibility in the UK and the manner in which employers can set the level of wages and adjust the workforce composition taking advantage of this flexibility and the available immigrant labor force pool. As Devlin et al argue, “the flexibility of the UK labor market implies the UK might be more able than other countries to adapt swiftly to labor supply shocks that result from immigration; however, the same lower level of regulation could allow migrants to undercut native workers by agreeing to work for a lower wage”¹⁶. In our opinion, this low regulation and high flexibilization of the labor market increases the levels of threat perception of the native population regarding immigrants. In this context, migration is perceived as being yet another factor that tips the balance in the favor of employers. The impact on non-EEA migration on the wage bargaining power workers has been stressed also by Alex Bryson who argued that in the post recession low productivity period “the probability of a pay freeze or cut for the largest non-managerial occupational group in the last pay settlement rose with the proportion of non-EEA national employed by the workplace”¹⁷. Bryson also states that the impact of EEA migrants on wage cuts and freezes was statistically irrelevant. This argument that brings us back to the question of migration hysteria directed against Romanians and Bulgarians and its empirically unfounded character. Moreover, when we will discuss the impact of A2 migration upon the labor market, and connect this argument with the recent report on migration occasioned by the Brexit debate, it will become clear that anti-immigration widespread attitudes cannot be sustained by the data about natives' job displacement by A2 nationals, nor by significant wage cuts, but rather by individual and

¹⁶ Ciaran Devlin, Olivia Bolt, Dhiren Patel, David Harding, Ishtiaq Hussain, “Impacts of migration on UK native employment: An analytical review of the evidence”, in *Occasional Paper 109*, Home Office. Department for Business Innovation & Skills, March 2014, p. 15, available at [<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/mar/uk-ho-res-migration-effect.pdf>], accessed June 2017.

¹⁷ Alex Bryson, “The UK's Productivity Puzzle”, *IZA Discussion Paper No. 9097*, June 2015, p. 50, available at [<https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/111549/1/dp9097.pdf>], accessed June 2017.

collective system of distorted/constructed non-materialist based representations about them. Where from and why such types of representation? We will try to answer this question after looking at the data and integrating into our analysis our necessary bodies of theory. After presenting this general tableau of the complex and contradictory social elaboration of the A2 migration problem, we will proceed now by looking at the data and its elaboration.

Data analysis and assessment of the impact of Eastern European migration on the UK labor market

In January 2015 the population of EU numbered 508. 2 million people (out of which 242.3 million people are also part of the general EU labor force - total number of employed and unemployed), 1.3 million people more than the year before¹⁸. More than half of the total population (54%) resides in Germany, Italy, France and UK. Regarding migration, EUROSTAT data shows that “the contribution of net migration plus statistical adjustment to total population growth in the EU-28 has exceeded the share of natural increase since 1992, peaking in 2003 (95% of the total population growth), decreasing to 58% in 2009 and returning to its peak of 95% again in 2013. The share of net migration in total population change was 85.5% in 2014”¹⁹. Regarding EU's labor market share of immigrants (both EU nationals and non-EU), in 2014 there were approximately 15.2 million people working in a member state of the EU of which he or she was not a citizen. The composition of this migrant labor force is 7.3 million EU citizens and 7.9 million without EU citizenship. Taking into consideration the total magnitude of the EU labor-force (242.3 million), the quota of migrating labor force is around 7% of the total²⁰. This number alone should be sufficient to refute the case of “invasion”. According to statistics there were 28.09 million UK nationals working in UK in 2015, whereas the labor

¹⁸ Data available in the EUROSTAT database regarding population and population change sectors and can be consulted here: [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Population_and_population_change_statistics], accessed June 2017.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ Data regarding foreign workers in EU is available here: [[http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Labour_market_and_Labour_force_survey_\(LFS\)_statistics#Labour_force_in_the_EU](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Labour_market_and_Labour_force_survey_(LFS)_statistics#Labour_force_in_the_EU)], accessed July 2017.

market share of non-UK born workers was around 3.22 million. The migrant labor force is composed of 1.20 million non-EU migrants and 2.02 million EU migrants²¹. In the case of the UK the employment rate of foreign citizens was higher than that of nationals (77.9%), although consistently the level of wages was lower, a situation similar to that of other 17 member states. Romanians occupy a significant place among the European community of economic migrants given that “they are ranked first in the EU region concerning their number as mobile workers”²², scattered in different proportions around Europe (1.081 million in Italy, 728 thousand in Spain, 245 thousand in Germany, to give just the most relevant examples). However, in order for the data to be significant it is necessary to situate it in a historical context. The table given below (Figure 2) shows the evolution of non-European and European non-national on the UK labor market from 1997 to 2015, showing indeed the Europeanization of migration into UK in the recent years, however an ulterior decomposition according to nationality of this European labor force will show that the number of Romanians present in UK is one of the lowest among other Eastern European counterparts.




Figure 2. European and Non-European non-nationals working on the UK labor market. Source: Statistical Bulletin: *UK Labor Market*, November 2015

²¹ According to the “UK Labor Market: November 2015”, in the *Office for National Statistics* (ONS), p. 19, available at [<https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/uklabourmarket/2015-11-11>], accessed June 2017. Manuela Sofia Stănculescu and Victoria Stoiciu, *The Impact of Economic Crisis on the Romanian Workforce*, București: Paideia, 2012, p. 12.

²² Manuela Sofia Stănculescu and Victoria Stoiciu, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

The nineties marked a turning point as the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe liberated a great number of people from the restrictions to travel and migrate abroad. Therefore, between 1990-2000 migration to Britain increased, especially after 2004 with the A8 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) countries' access to the UK labor market, experts calling this inflow migration "utterly unprecedented in the country's history, dwarfing the scale of anything that went before"²³. During the recession economic migration fell to one fifth. For the year ending in September 2015, the general net migration was 323.000, while net migration for UK citizens was -40.000. Regarding EU2 nationals, net migration was 172.000²⁴. Currently there are 3.34 million non-UK national working in UK, out of which 2.15 million are EU citizens. The total number²⁵ of Bulgarians and Romanians working in the UK as late as May 2016 is 232 thousand, whereas the accumulated number of A8 national working in UK is 974 thousand²⁶. Thus we have, using the criteria of nationality 2.6 million migrants in UK, while by country of birth 4.3 million migrants. In 2014 the number of EU2 nationals in UK barely surpassed the 200 thousand benchmark, while, for example, the number of Polish immigrants stood at approximately 800 thousand. The relevance of this comparison lies in determining impact on the labor market of the previous EU8 nationals migration to UK and see if we can establish a relation of causality, or at least, correlation with the

²³ "A Summary History of Migration to UK", in *Briefing Paper 6.1, Migration Watch UK*, p. 7 available at [https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/pdfs/BP6_1.pdf], accessed May 2017.

²⁴ According to "Net Migration Statistics", in *Migration Watch UK*, available at [<http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/statistics-net-migration-statistics>], accessed May 2017.

²⁵ There are three methodological categories when presenting the number regarding migration, namely employed, unemployed, inactive. Starting from this, the employment rate (16-64) is calculated by: working-age employed/working-age population; unemployment rate (16+): unemployed/employed + unemployed; inactivity rate (16-64): working-age inactive/working-age population. In addition, we must differentiate between nationality and country of birth when discussing migration.

²⁶ The numbers quoted in the text are taken from the statistical bulletin, "UK Labour Market: May 2016. Estimates of Employment, Unemployment, Economic Inactivity and Other Employment Related Statistics for UK", in *Office for National Statistics (ONS)*, 18 May 2016, available at [<http://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/uklabourmarket/may2016#toc>], accessed May 2017.

violent racist, nationalist and xenophobic reactions observable in the UK after the lifting of labor market restrictions in January 2014 for the EU2 nationals. Below we have a graphic that presents the evolution of immigration to UK concerning A2, A8, and total European immigration to UK ranging from 1991 to 2016 (Figure 3). Again, the data reveals the relative small size of A2 migration in relation to A8 migration history and magnitude.




Figure 3. Total EU, EU2, EU8 immigration to UK, Source: ONS

Since 1993 the employment rate for migrants has been lower than that of UK-born individuals, although in the recent years the difference has narrowed for men. The professional clustering of immigrants shows that “male migrants are concentrated in the two lowest paid occupational categories (elementary and processing categories) and in one of the highest occupational categories (professional), while female migrants are more concentrated in professional jobs, elementary, and personal service work”²⁷. Taking out the professional job sectors, we can also say that in the lower sectors of the economy, immigrant labor is also marked by the gender difference, showing different professional trajectories for men and women. The data relative to the employment rates for migrants in UK show that “since 2008 the employment rate of male migrants (79 % for 2014) has been similar to that of UK-born males (77% in 2014), while those of female migrants (69% in 2014) has remained lower than that of UK-born females

²⁷ Cinzia Rienzo, “Characteristics and Outcomes of Migrants in the UK Labour Market”, in *Compas. The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford*, 01/01/2016, p. 2.

(72% for 2014)”²⁸. It also relevant to note that the employment rate for A8 male migrants is the highest (90%), the same for goes for females (75%). However, there is a downside to this high rate of employment and it has do with the mismatch between skills and job performed. Data shows that “specific groups of foreign born workers (recent migrants from the A8 countries) are know to be frequently employed in jobs that do not correspond with their education and skills”²⁹, therefore allowing us to deduce that at least on the short or medium term migration represents for a specific group of migrants a downward mobility on the labor market. For instance, in 2014, data showed that recent migrant tend to concentrate in the low skilled sectors, such as manufacture of food products (14% share of the total employment in the sector), accommodation (11%), manufacture or domestic personnel (11%)³⁰. Moreover, even their average earnings per months seems to distinguish them among the general migrant population as having “the lowest average wages among different groups of migrants considered”³¹. Looking at this, a first question comes to mind, namely is there an Eastern European penalty? If yes, how much of this penalty can be culturally codified?

Labor-penalty - hidden cost of economic migration

The hypothesis of “labor penalty” presupposes the existence of an asymmetric labor market, where natives and immigrant workers are hierarchically distributed, a place where economic relations become socially significant. The concept of '(migrant) labor penalty' captures what Bonefeld describes as the “process of inversion of the social relations into seemingly self-moving economic forces”³². In this sense, we are speaking about a labor penalty that cannot merely by codified in ethnic or national terms, but is rather determined by the global process of socialization of the

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 3

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 5

³⁰ *Idem*, “Migrants in the UK Labor Market: An Overview”, in *Compas. The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford*, December 1, 2017, available at [<http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/migrants-uk-labour-market-overview>], accessed June 2017.

³¹ *Idem*, “Characteristics and Outcomes of Migrants ...”, p. 8.

³² Werner Bonefeld, “Negative Dialectics and the Critique of Economic Objectivity”, in *History of Human Sciences*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2016, pp. 62-63.

commodification of labor and the form it assumes when dealing specifically with migrant labor. As we have seen in the sub-section connected with the presentation and analysis of data regarding Eastern European migration to UK, most of the A2 nationals are still concentrated in the primary labor intensive sectors of the economy, and more than a third of the total Eastern European migration occupies the same position. A magnitude that is relevant only in comparison to the relatively small number of indigenous workers situated in the same condition. Rather than being the exception, this inferiority of position on the labor market is the norm in what concerns migrant laborers in host societies. The analysis of this situation can start from the classical theoretical models of the "dual labor market". The problem of labor penalty is connected to the theory of the split labor market and the inferior position that immigrants tend to occupy on the foreign labor markets. For example, describing the jobs, Piore argues that "they tend to be unskilled, generally, but not always low paying, and to carry and connote inferior social status; highly personalistic relationship between supervisor and subordinate"³³. From this introductory description we can immediately deduce that the "migration penalty" does not only signify a specific labor market position, but we can also assert the existence of a "social penalty" associated with the position occupied by migrants on the labor market. Moreover, the emphasis on the personalistic, quasi-authoritarian relationship between employer and employed also denoted the existence and the interference of non-economic factors in the work relation, a situation that is in blunt contradiction with the norm among modern, civilized, purely economic work contractual relations.

When we look at skill interaction on the labor market, data seems to sustain the thesis that migrants complement natives, doing jobs that the latter are not willing, or qualified themselves to do, thus reinforcing the hypothesis of a dual labor market. Moreover, immigrants and native-born workers are not close substitutes. On average existing migrants are closer substitutes for new migrants. Given the complementarity of skills the less skilled workers are closer substitutes for immigrants than the highly skilled, so any pressures from increased competition for jobs is more likely to be found among the group of low skilled laborers. Manacorda et al.

³³ Michael J. Piore, *Birds of Passage. Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 17.

discussed this “imperfect substitution between natives and migrants”, arguing that “the rise in immigration experienced in Britain over the last decade does seem to have affected the wage structure; it seems that immigration depresses the earnings of immigrants relative to native-born, suggesting imperfect substitution between natives and immigrants in production”³⁴. This situation complicates further the dynamics of labor market competition, because there is not only the major division between natives and migrants, but there is also the internal pressure and tension inside the migrant community itself. Also the available data also suggests that “there is no evidence that EU migrants affect the labor market performance of native born workers”³⁵, because of the imperfect skill substitution between native and migrants mentioned above. However, at the level of low skilled labor, in the lower sectors of the labor market, there is a higher degree of skill substitution between the two categories of workers, therefore increased job competition and higher levels of threat perception.

Globalized connected structures of asymmetry

The key issue in the debate of cultural-political-economic transformation is a problem of degree, namely the establishing of a turning point, where accumulated quantitative changes may result in a qualitative difference. And this is a case in point of how transnational migrant practices explain how certain migration related practices can come to “modify the value systems and everyday social life of people across entire regions”³⁶. Of course, this is also a site of tension, given the propensity of host society towards the reproduction of their systems of values, of the *status quo*, an immobility rooted in the security and predictability that a certain configuration of social forces and social value confer, and the

³⁴ Marco Manacorda, Alan Manning, Jonathan Wadsworth, “The Impact of Immigration on the Structure of Male Wages. Theory and Evidence from Britain”, in *CEP Discussion Paper No. 754*, October, 2006, available at [<http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0754.pdf>], accessed May 2017.

³⁵ “Immigration and the UK Labor Market: The Latest Evidence From Economic Research”, in *Center of Economic Performance London School of Economics & Political Science*, June, 2012, p. 4.

³⁶ Steven Vertovec, “Migrant Transnationalism and Modes of Transformation”, in *International Migration Review*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2004, p. 973.

inestimable force of change that migration sets in motion within and through every individual migrant.

However, it is our hypothesis that transnationalism as a model of analysis cannot by itself shed light on the deeper structural causes of migration processes and migration related conflicts, as it focuses more on the phenomenology of already existent and established migration process (although its theoretical strength in explaining the process of the reproduction of migration is indisputable), and not on the origin and global causes of labor mobility. This limitation justifies our choice to integrate and combine the theory of transnational migration practices with a theory of globalization that complements the transnational approach with a historical and structural dimension. Critical theories of globalization serve the broader scope of investigating the global divisions of labor, and the economic and power asymmetries between states, of which they are expression of. For instance, Kees van der Pijl connects transnationalism with globalization starting from the “general determinants of capitalist development”, namely the way in which labor mobility and capital mobility is determined by the process of commodification and the process of socialization³⁷. The first process refers to the expansion at a global level of the market relations and the commodification of goods and human beings alike. The global process of commodification precedes, historically and abstractly, the creation of transnational labor networks, practices, communities. The second process refers to the manner in which the logic of commodity is socially elaborated and diffused in a manner that changes the social function of knowledge, technology and intersubjective interactions, such as to mold them to fit the form imposed by market relations. Pijl's account of the processes of commodification and socialization is profoundly indebted to the (Neo)Marxist tradition. Moreover, as we will see later, Pijl also develops a transnational theory of class formation that seeks to explain the international structures of power, allegiance and capital, highly relevant for understanding labor mobility and its determinants.

The origin of the structural relation between migration and globalization resides in the unequal economic and social development

³⁷ Kees van der Pijl, *Transnational Classes and International Relations*, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, p. 9.

between states, and the differences in the price of labor between peripheric and core countries. As Robert Wade bluntly puts it “migration is a function of inequality”³⁸, determining poor low skilled and high skilled workers to migrate to better conditions of living, even if “migration/refugee/asylum is the single most emotional, most atavistic issue in Western politics; polls show that more than two thirds of respondents agree that there should be fewer foreigners living in their country”³⁹. The issue of inequality affects not only the international relations between states, but also the social structure of a certain state, as social and economic inequality configure the (class) structure of a certain society. In the case of UK, Wade notes that “its income distribution grew more unequal more quickly than even the United States during the 1980's, and it is now the most unequal of the big European countries”⁴⁰. This structural inequality has a long lasting impact on the interaction between the native population and the migrant one. The migrants are perceived as a threat, even if, and in some cases, especially because their market integration has proven successful, a situation particularly true about those natives that have an unsecured labor market position themselves. Our hypothesis about the existent correlation between threat perception/negative attitude towards immigrants and (security) of labor market position of natives is also corroborated by a study that aimed to asses the relationship between labor market policies and attitudes of natives towards immigrants. Careja et al. have asserted that “the less secure a person's labor market position is (blue-collar or unemployed), the less he or she would agree that migrants can contribute to the economy and the more he or she would perceive threats”⁴¹. The relevance of this connection resides in fact that it helps to refute the idea of a purely arbitrary originating anti-migration attitudes, and the fact that they can be more often than not traced back to an objective social condition that triggers them. As we will see, the labor market structure of Western economy tends to be a conflict generating one, whilst its efficiency and profitability comes

³⁸ Robert Hunter Wade, “Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality?”, in *World Development Journal*, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2004, p. 583

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 578.

⁴¹ Romana Careja and Hans-Jurgen Andreß, “Needed but Not Liked - The Impact of Labor Market Policies on Natives' Opinion About Immigrants”, in *International Migration Review*, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2013, p. 391.

at the price of fostering antagonist relation between indigenous and migrant workers.

One of the most tenuous issues in the theory of the globalization of migration⁴² is that the global migration processes and trajectories seem to enforce the “asymmetric nature of the globalization processes in general” as it has become evident that “migrants from an increasingly diverse array of (non)-European-origin countries are concentrating in a shrinking pool of prime destination countries”⁴³, therefore displaying a skewed pattern. This allows us to theorize that some regions of the world-economy have mainly become exporters of labor, whereas a small sample of Western countries has become the place of the concentration of capital, with high levels of productivity. However, the predicament of peripheral sending countries cannot be merely resolved through the export of (cheap) labor force abroad, thus keeping in check unemployment rates and possible political tensions resulting from this at home, but they are also, in a globalized capitalist system, caught in what Arghiri Emmanuel, in his classical study about inequality and trade, has defined as the paradigm of an “unequal exchange” understood as “the (unfair) exchange between a large amount of their (under/semi-developed countries) national labor for a smaller amount of foreign labor”⁴⁴. The differences in incomes among states are also a result of an asymmetrical global distribution of capital and resources. In this context, the tendency of non-equalization of wages is a direct consequence of this unequal exchange, that make it so as “the notion of the subsistence minimum is sufficiently elastic for no tendency to automatic equalization downward to be possible, and national frontiers sufficiently tight for equalization through international competition among the workers to be quite out of the question”⁴⁵. From this perspective, borders seem also to exist in order to keep systems of inequality and (under)development intact.

⁴² The globalization of migration can be defined as “the global diffusion of migration experiences and a concomitant level of equalization of access to international migration”. See Mathias Czaika and Hein de Haas, “The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More Migratory?”, in *International Migration Review*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2014, p. 288.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. 283.

⁴⁴ Emmanuel Arghiri, *Unequal Exchange. A Study of the Imperialism of Trade*, London: NLB Press, 1972, p. xxxi.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 60.

The globalization of migration reflects the asymmetric nature of the globalization of labor market and the world economy in general, while also conditioning what Nicholas van Hear and Ninna Nyberg Sorensen call the “migration development nexus”. Although the question of the relationship between economic development and migration has received extensive attention in migration studies, the “classic theoretical accounts still ignore the substantial balancing role played by international migration in the economic development of Europe”⁴⁶, a role fulfilled under the circumstances of an efficient use of capital and its subsequent spatial concentration in certain countries or regions. The argument of migration/development nexus is four-fold: 1) unequal (under)development generates migration; 2) in the context of “increasing labor precariousness and social exclusion” immigrants contribute to economic development in the receiving countries; 3) for the sending countries, emigrants' contribution (remittances, networks, health care, insurances, etc.) is essential for the socioeconomic stability; 4) a model of alternative (fairer) of social transformation in the sending countries can downsize the magnitude of migration⁴⁷. Our choice to focus on the issue of asymmetry, rather than simply on the general trends of global migration is motivated by the scope of our paper, namely to identify and problematize the structural and interpersonal, the objective and the subjective causes of migration related conflicts and the subsequent populist backlash, and the issue of asymmetry helps us to shed some light on the matter from a supra-structural perspective. Moreover, this pattern of global asymmetry of migration flows and its underlying tendencies are the primary causes behind the constitution of dual labor markets and of the social inferior connotation associated with job performed by migrants. Unfortunately, the continuous unidirectional character of migration flows attests that the issue of underdevelopment remains unresolved at a global level, while inside the EU has the force of questioning the principles and the result of the process of European integration of poor states.

⁴⁶ Douglas S. Massey, “Economic Development and International Migration in Comparative Perspective”, in *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 14, No. 3, September, 1988, p. 383.

⁴⁷ Raul Delgado Wise, Humberto Marquez Covarrubias, Ruben Puentes, “Reframing the Debate on Migration, Development, and Human Rights: Fundamental Elements”, in *Working Paper, International Network of Migration and Development*, October 2010, pp. 17-18.

As we have stated previously, the circulation of labor cannot be understood separately from the axes of development North/South and West/East as the analysis of the circulation patterns proves the existence of power relations and the concentration of capital on one side of the divide. Moreover, this asymmetric pattern of globalized migration does not naturally spring out of the expansion of communication networks or technological change, but it is rather the outcome of “political and economic shifts”. As Richard Florida argues, globalization has changed the economic playing field, but it has not leveled it and the world has remained invariably spiky, with most economic activities concentrated in a relatively low number of countries⁴⁸. However, there is another factor that needs to be taken into account when discussing the emigration from “poor” countries to Western rich and civilized countries, namely that, as research shows “emigration rates from really poor countries are very low, while they are much higher out of moderately poor countries”⁴⁹, a possible explanation of this paradox being that in the early stages of industrialization, the structural and demographic changes generate more outward migration, that in later stages. This appears to have been also the case of Romania and other Eastern European countries that have experienced massive waves of migration *after* the modernization, privatization and the replacement of older technologies of production during the decade after the fall of communism and through the integration into the European capitalist system.

As the previous analysis of our reports regarding the impact of migration on the UK economy have showed, these impacts seems to have been mainly positive, thus leaving unexplained the discursive violence and the political and social negative reception of the role of migrants. At this point, the theory of the asymmetric globalization of migration can come to our aid in clarifying the origin of this paradox. Among the contributing factors to this alarmist vision about migration we can identify the

⁴⁸ Richard Florida, “The World Is Spiky: Globalization Has Changed the Economic Field, But It has Not Leveled It”, in *The Atlantic*, October, 2005, pp. 48-51, available at [<https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/images/issues/200510/world-is-spiky.pdf>], accessed June 2017.

⁴⁹ Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “What Fundamentals Drive World Migration?”, in George J. Borjas and Jeff Crisp (eds.), *Poverty, International Migration and Asylum*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2005, p. 18.

transformation of global tendencies that can offer a partial explanation to this phenomenon. The liberalization of the circulation of people from the post-colonial South combined with the fall of communism in the East of Europe has contributed to the creation of a “greater awareness of growing disparities in life chances between rich and poor countries”⁵⁰, bringing to the fore on the both sides of the globe the imbalance between countries, regions and communities, also generating “further differentiation of migrants in terms of ethnic and class backgrounds”⁵¹. The globalization of migration, the circulation of capital and people give rise to forms that span out of the asymmetry discussed above, such as the creation of what Kees van Der Pijl calls “the transnational capitalist class”, but also of a “transnational class of mobile labor”. The process of transnational formation of class denotes the “growth of social forces and the discovery of a route to maintaining and reinforcing the hegemony of a ruling class in post-war Europe that allows going beyond the reliance on the mobilization of national unity”⁵². The role of transnational ruling classes, in Kijl's opinion, is to maintain and reproduce the “comprehensive control” it has over the process of capital accumulation and on the labor relations.

Corroborating this hypothesis and situating the issue of migration within the theory of globalization, Nicholas Hear stresses the importance of taking into account the class dimension/issue that the migration process entails and is shaped by, given that “international migration requires the accumulation or possession of amounts of economic, social, cultural, and other forms of capital in various combinations”⁵³. The macro theory of the inequality of economic development between states must be complemented by an analysis of the asymmetric social structure within the confines of

⁵⁰ Ninna Nyberg Sorensen, Nicholas van Hear, Poul Engberg-Pedersen, “Migration, Development and Conflict: State-of-the-Art Overview”, in Nicholas van Hear and Ninna Nyberg Sorensen (eds.), *The Migration-Development Nexus*, (eds.), International Organization of Migration (IOM) and United Nations (UN), 2003, p. 8, available at [http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_dev_nexus.pdf], accessed June 2017.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

⁵² Kees van der Pijl, Otto Holman, “Structure and Process in Transnational European Business”, in Alan W. Carfuny and Magnus Ryner (eds.), *A Ruined Fortress? Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe*, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003, p. 76.

⁵³ Nicholas van Hear, “Reconsidering Migration and Class”, in *International Migration Review*, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2014, p. 111.

each state. Migrant labor (and herein resides its particularity) traverses various regimes of asymmetry and comes to occupy a specific position in the host and sending countries as a direct effect of this particularity. The social position (s)he manages to secure in the labor market is but the first observable phenomenon of the general tendencies presented above as pertaining to transnational globalist logic. It is our interpretation that the asymmetric structure of Western labor markets is merely the manifestation within a nationally determined context of the larger patterns of asymmetry discussed above.

Conclusions

As the data, the theories and the arguments put forward in this paper have shown that the issue of economic migration cannot be separated from a larger reflection on the contradictions of the global political economy of labor and the significant differences of economic development between states. In this context, it becomes apparent that the populist backlash against migration (in UK) is rooted in the national and supra-national deadlocks and contradiction of labor and capital. Focusing merely on the deconstruction of populist discourse starting from a neoliberal perspective of human rights, albeit valid and legitimate deconstruction, does not advance our understanding of the social conflict generated by migration in both sending and receiving countries, nor does it point to the structural causes of economic migration social related conflicts. What we have tried to demonstrate in our paper is that a reflection on economic migration must take into account the global political and social asymmetries between states and capital concentration and distribution, and, the (trans)national conflicts that appear at the level of mixed labor forces, which themselves are overdetermined by the global trend of labor flexibilization and decline of unionization, resulting in a historical observable and objective trend of power loss on the side of labor.

Bibliography

1. Anderson, Perry (2009), *The New Old World*, London: Verso.
2. Barnett, Alina et. al (2014), "The UK Productivity Puzzle", in *Quarterly Bulletin Bank of England*, Q2.

3. Bonefeld, Werner (2016), "Negative Dialectics and the Critique of Economic Objectivity", in *History of Human Sciences*, Vol. 29, No. 2.
4. Bryson, Alex (2015), "The UK's Productivity Puzzle", in *IZA Discussion Paper NO. 9097*, June.
5. Careja, Romana and Andreß, Hans-Jürgen (2013), "Needed but Not Liked - The Impact of Labor Market Policies on Natives' Opinion About Immigrants", in *International Migration Review*, Vol. 47, No. 2.
6. Cerny, P. G., (1997), "Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization", in *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 251-274.
7. Czaika, Mathias and de Haas, Hein (2014), *The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More Migratory?*, in *International Migration Review*, Vol. 48, No. 2
8. Devlin, Ciaran et. all, (March 2014), "Impact of Migration on UK Native Employment: An Analytical Review of the Evidence", *Occasional Paper 109*, Home Office. Department for Business Innovation & Skills.
9. Emmanuel, Arghiri (1972), *Unequal Exchange. A Study of the Imperialism of Trade*, London: NLB Press.
10. Florida, Richard (2005), "The World Is Spiky: Globalization Has Changed the Economic Field, But It has Not Levelled It", in *The Atlantic*, October.
11. Hatton, Timothy J. and Williamson, Jeffrey G. (2005), "What Fundamentals Drive World Migration?", in George J. Borjas and Jeff Crisp (eds.), *Poverty, International Migration and Asylum*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
12. Van Hear, Nicholas (2014), "Reconsidering Migration and Class", in *International Migration Review*, Vol. 48, No. 1.
13. Held David et. al. (1999), *Global Transformation: Politics, Economics and Culture*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
14. Köppe, Otto (2003), "The Leviathan of Competitiveness: How And Why do Liberal States (not) Accept Unwanted Immigration?", in *The Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 431-448.
15. Manacorda, Marco et. al. (2007), "The Impact of Immigration on the Structure of Male Wages. Theory and Evidence from Britain", *CEP Discussion Paper NO. 754*.

16. Massey, Douglas S. (1998), "Economic Development and International Migration in Comparative Perspective", in *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 14, No. 3, September.
17. Nangle, Toby (2015), "Does the Productivity Puzzle Pose a Threat to Investors' Goldilocks Environment?", in *Productivity Viewpoint Multi-Asset*, August.
18. Van der Pijl, Kees (1998), *Transnational Classes and International Relations*, London and New York: Routledge.
19. Van der Pijl, Kees, Holman, Otto (2003), "Structure and Process in Transnational European Business", in Alan W. Carfuny and Magnus Ryner (eds.), *A Ruined Fortress? Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe*, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
20. Piore, Michael J. (1979), *Birds of passage. Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
21. Rienzo, Cinzia (2016), "Characteristics and Outcomes of Migrants in the UK Labour Market", in *Compas. The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford*, January.
22. Sinclair, John (1991), *Corpus, Concordance, Collocation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
23. Sørensen, Nyberg, Ninna, et. al, (2003), "Migration, Development and Conflict: State of the Art Overview", in Nicholas van Hear and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen (eds.), *The Migration-Development Nexus*, published by the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and United Nations (UN).
24. Stănculescu, Manuela, Sofia and Stoiciu, Victoria (2012), *The Impact of Economic Crisis on the Romanian Workforce*, București: Paideia.
25. Vertovec, Steven (2004), "Migrant Transnationalism and Modes of Transformation", in *International Migration Review*, Vol. 38, No. 3.
26. Vertovec, Steven (2007), "Super-Diversity and Its Implications", in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 30.
27. Wade, Robert, Hunter (2004), "Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality?", in *World Development Journal*, Vol. 32, No. 4.
28. Wise, Delgado, Raul, et. al. (2010), "Reframing the Debate on Migration, Development, and Human Rights: Fundamental Elements", in *Working Paper, International Network of Migration and Development*, October.

TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME. AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

Lucian T. Butaru*

DOI: 10.24193/subbeuropaea.2017.3.04

Published Online: 2017-09-30

Published Print: 2017-09-30

Abstract

Contemporary research endeavors and discussions addressing the issue of Universal Basic Income are usually concerned with the ethics, economic feasibility, and social necessity of its introduction. I believe that these approaches suffer most often due to their focus on an insufficiently extensive period of time, which does not aid in the elimination of the reluctance observed concerning their futuristic and utopian character. Accordingly, I propose the use of an analytical framework developed by evolutionary anthropologists, with the help of which we can better observe the inadequacy, unjustified and potentially dangerous limitations that cultural bias still imposes on economic activities. The central thesis of this article is that all signs indicate that we are moving into a fourth evolutionary stage of civilization, and the radical nature of the changes taking place in infrastructure, structure and superstructure will inevitably force a shift in the surviving elements of the old system, especially pertaining to the relations of production and relations of distribution. According to this approach, one can better observe that proposals such as the Universal Basic Income are more realistic (and necessary) than what the dystopias that still structure the mainstream political and economic imaginary would allow us to believe.

Keywords: universal basic income (UBI), evolutionist anthropology, mode of production, automatization, motivation, work, value, ideology

* Lucian T. Butaru is PhD Lecturer in the Department of European Studies and Governance at Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj, Romania.
Contact: lucian.t.butaru@gmail.com

Introduction

The article aims to frame the new discourse regarding the Universal Basic Income within the other transformations that accompany it, starting from the premise that the materialist conceptual framework proposed by evolutionary anthropologists is best suitable to make such a complex puzzle intelligible. This framework allows for the opportunity to fully assess the magnitude of social change by ordering the series of events by duration and depth and thus allowing a more appropriate orientation through the over-crowded areas of knowledge where all variations steer the eye, similar to the abundance of commercial advertisement in a metropolis. At the same time, materialistic relativism, not unlike the cultural one, questions the metaphysics of human nature which governs political economy, thus providing a more neutral framework for analysis, whereby *effective reality* (and its compatible alternatives) can emerge more clearly from within the jungle of more or less utopian discourses, which describe and change the world all at the same time.

Although from the standpoint of methodology, the matter of unilinear¹ evolution and progress may seem to be obsolete, as well as oversaturated by Eurocentrism, the issue of progress can be analyzed from the viewpoint of the relationship between technological advances and the social and political changes that favor them. The comparative method, in which the various socio-political and economic systems resulting from technological revolutions are compared, can be used as a reference for the evolution of the different ways in which a system manages to store, distribute and put into operation the energy extracted from a natural environment.² In other words, it is useful to observe how human energy is complemented, augmented or replaced with every such moment of "fundamental historical discontinuity, in an irreversible form"³. Evolutionists viewed these moments of discontinuity as universal stages of

¹ Julian Haynes Steward, *Theory of Culture Change: The Methodology of Multilinear Evolution*, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1990, p. 11.

² *Idem*, *Basin-plateau Aboriginal Sociopolitical Groups*, Smithsonian Institution. Bureau of American Ethnology. Bulletin 120, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1997, p. 260.

³ Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, Malden, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 34.

evolution or as specific “modes of production”⁴. Moreover, even finding their universality can be proven to be useful in order to draw as many lessons as possible from the comparison between the past and the present. We can explain the universalization of a mode of production either in a materialistic manner,⁵ or in a culturalistic manner, as a result of diffusion by way of trade, cultural exchanges, migration or war. But this bears lesser importance. What is in fact important is the realization that these historical discontinuities are not only irreversible but also global, with merely a few unaffected cultural enclaves left behind.

The three classical stages of civilization

From this perspective, we can approach the three classic stages proposed by evolutionist thinkers from the standpoint of the technological revolutions that have significantly affected the ability to extract and use energy.⁶ These stages were rather uninspiringly named primitivism, barbarism, civilization – with their strong axiological connotation and the definitive aspect of their descriptions discouraging their subsequent use. (1) There are no historical documents for the first stage, still, early anthropologists have had access to numerous cultural enclaves made up of relatively isolated populations, which were minimally affected by global economy and politics. And, beyond their many shortcomings,⁷ their speculations are quite plausible regarding the historically undocumented distant past. At this stage, it seems that social relations, from the system of duties to the sources of prestige, religion and political organization were centered around the clan. In other words, we are dealing with small communities, which were adapted to a technological

⁴ Eric Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2010, p. 75.

⁵ See, for example, David Landes' explanation on the expansion of the industrial mode of production by subjugating the states that have not adopted it, as well as its introduction by those governments that have tried to maintain or modify the power ratio in their favor: David S. Landes, *The Unbound Prometheus. Technological change and industrial development in Western Europe from 1750 to present*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 41.

⁶ In describing the stages, I will use the outline synthesized by Leslie A. White, *The Science of crops. A Study of Man and Civilization*, New York: Grove Press, 1949, pp. 368-385.

⁷ See the critique of “conjectural history” by Radcliffe-Brown, among others: A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Structură și funcție în societatea primitivă*, Iași: Polirom, 2000, pp. 58-85.

system based on hunting, fishing and gathering. The main energy source was human energy. Plants and animals were their only resource for the energy renewal of this mode of production, and this resource was not controlled. (2) With the control of these resources through agriculture and domestication came the second mode of production, which can be seen as an Agricultural Revolution. This mode of production still depends very much on human energy, amplified by various instruments or assisted by various forms of natural energy put to work. In addition, the emergence of surpluses favors long-term orientation and a certain degree of complexity in organization and planning. This mode of production has reached its energy efficiency in China in the 1st millennium BC., and if we were to take into account the size of the cities, landmarks, or engineered structures, the production and accumulation of wealth, we see that there had been no tremendous improvements up until the 18th century. We do not necessarily speak of stagnation, but of the fact that the efficiency of technological objects is slow, gradual and, inevitably, limited. Only a critical mass of discoveries that rethink how to extract and use energy are able to create a break in the rhythm that deserves to be treated as a level rupture or as a new stage. The technological system that domesticated the animals, favored also the domestication of man. By making possible the accumulation of resources, this technological system has not only changed the size of communities but also altered social systems, favoring social relationships (from the system of duties, to the sources of prestige, religion and political organization) centered around obedience-possession. (3) With the Revolution of Resource Extraction or the Industrial Revolution from the beginning of the 19th century, a new disruption of rhythm can be observed, which deserves to be treated as a separate stage.

Academic consensus is overwhelming regarding the existence of a rupture in rhythm that produced the capitalist world. The differences in approaches result from the nuances that scholars adhered to: When did the first signs emerge? When did it reach a critical mass? Or how many industrial revolutions have taken place in the meantime? I believe that the chronology proposed by Eric Hobsbawm is the most useful in order to understand the phenomenon. It links the birth of the new world to the emergence of a critical mass in the implementation of innovations that have reconciled the new industrial production capacities with the new transport

capacities (1760-1840).⁸ In other words, the bedrocks of the new technology were the coal, the steam engine, the railroad and the factory system based on investment in means of production. I believe that further innovations that have enabled the diversification and efficient use of the storable and transportable sources of energy (oil, gas, bio-fuel, hydrogen, uranium, etc.), and the new industries born on this occasion, are not worth considering as successive revolutions but rather as an acceleration and fulfillment of the same technological system. The same is true with regard to the standardization of production (e.g.: the production line) or distribution (e.g.: the tea bag), which created the consumption driven economy.⁹

The central element of this technological system that produced a fundamental historical discontinuity, in an irreversible form, was investment in means of production. This type of investment favored a significant replacement of the human energy consumed in the production process. Physical work was assisted by machines in many of the activities as well as completely replaced in certain situations (for simple, accurate and recurrent tasks). Of course, both in Marx's time¹⁰ and nowadays there still were numerous enclaves built into the system that survive the competition with technology-intensive factories, by squeezing the most of cheap locally available labor, while delaying the acceleration of the transformation process. The importance of this adaptive strategy (the continuous investment in means of production) is given by the violence with which it ultimately succeeds in removing those who do not follow its logic and cannot keep up.

This adaptive strategy has made capital the central element that structures the social system and the ideological system, for it has, firstly, taken as prisoners both the owner and the worker, and secondly, society itself, by favoring "objectual relations between persons and social relations between objects"¹¹ – in the sense that, due to competition and the specter of bankruptcy, it favored an outlook on the person who takes into account

⁸ Eric Hobsbawm, *Era revoluției (11789-1848)*, Chișinău: Cartier, 2002, pp. 37-39, p. 56.

⁹ *Idem*, *Era imperiului (1875-1914)*, Chișinău: Arc, 2002, p. 73.

¹⁰ Karl Marx, *Capitalul*, vol. I, in Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, *Opere*, Vol. 23, București: Editura Politică, 1966, pp. 468-489.

¹¹ Marx, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

only the aspect of resource,¹² convenience and cost; while the goods, through the anarchic mode through which they circulate and sell, communicate with one another and with people,¹³ thus mediating (by way of their price) the necessity of various human activities or various types of organizing and making more efficient certain activities, starting from the maximum-acceptable amount of work crystallized within the final product. As a result of the fact that the equivalence of various commodities by their price favored the equivalence of various types of activities, this mode of production generalized an egalitarian view, which had begun to manifest a long time ago – with trade and political philosophy educating wider and wider segments of society. Hence, capitalism gradually undermined many of the old hierarchies in social relations (from the system of duties, to the sources of prestige, religion and political organization), favoring only the reproduction of those inequalities that were based on the accumulation and transfer of capital. Moreover, opportunities for social mobility and the necessity of spatial mobility, generated by the volatility of economic activities, have favored the emergence of more intimate kinships. The nuclear family becomes the standard, while the more complex kinships, which have survived in rural areas, begin to be referred to as the “extended family”.

Of course, not all transitions were equally radical. For example, the property system after the Industrial Revolution continues (and modifies) the one in the previous stage – to the same degree that the system of kinship after the Agrarian Revolution resembles (and differs) from the previous one. And, of course, on a small, temporal and local scale, the requirements imposed by the technological system have been moderated, transformed and distorted by the ideological or social system. Also, some processes have begun in a certain period, but they did not become widespread until the next stage, which made some thinkers seem more prophetic than others. Thus, just as trade, the banks, and the finances of the pre-capitalist era have proclaimed the emergence of the new system, the same way, as far back as during the time of Marx, “the machine” (which

¹² Martin Heidegger claims that technology is responsible for structuring the gaze that sees only in terms of resources, may it be in nature or human. Martin Heidegger, “Întrebare privitoare la tehnică”, in *Originea operei de artă*, București: Univers, 1982, pp. 106-146.

¹³ Marx, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

has consistently drew the value of work out of the finished products) has opened a path into the future, heralding the end of this system, which will be brought forth by automation.

A Fourth Stage?

From the standpoint of the evolutionary stages, we can look at automation from a different perspective. This is where one can best notice the usefulness of the comparative view of the stages within the evolutionary narrative. Whether we go on with the story, describing the beginning of a new stage, whether we use it and then abandon it, the schematic nature and simplification introduced by evolutionists allow us to better learn the lessons of the past – to the extent that the simplifications are in line with the real situations described.

The obvious signs of pressure that the new technological system puts on the social system, and upon the ideological one, have come prematurely into the Western world. Since the second half of last century, the process that had begun centuries ago to make agricultural labor unnecessary has reached unsuspected levels, and today 2% of the population manages to produce all that can be sold in this sector.¹⁴ The population surplus from agriculture had been initially swayed into industry and then services. In the same timeframe, the acceleration of old types of automation, superimposed on what Eric Hobsbawm euphemistically calls the “international division of labor” (i.e. the fleeing of capital to cheaper labor areas for activities that still needed intensive work)¹⁵, made useless much of the industrial labor force in the West, pushing it towards the service sector:

“while the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy experienced rapid de-industrialization (reducing the share of their manufacturing employment in 1970-90 from 38.7 to 22.5 percent; from 25.9 to 17.5 percent; from 27.3 to 21.8 percent, respectively), Japan and Germany

¹⁴ N. V., “Difference Engine: Luddite legacy”, *The Economist*, (November 4, 2011), [<http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/11/artificial-intelligence>], accessed July 2017.

¹⁵ Hobsbawm, *Era extremelor. O istorie a secolului XX*, Chişinău: Editura Cartier, 1999, pp. 430-432.

*reduced their share of manufacturing labor force moderately: from 26.0 to 23.6 percent in the case of Japan, and from 38.6 percent to a still rather high level of 32.2 percent in 1987 in the case of Germany. Canada and France occupy an intermediate position, reducing manufacturing employment from 19.7 percent (in 1971) to 14.9 percent, and from 27.7 to 21.3 percent, respectively.*¹⁶

Services have remained the last bastion for most Westerners, forced to have a positive market-sanctioned activity in order to live, or for those who consider work to be an activity that offers dignity¹⁷ or gives meaning to human life. On the other hand, if we take anthropologist David Graeber seriously, many of the jobs created in the service sector do not offer too much dignity or sense, or even social utility. Many of these jobs exist to sell products for which there is no natural demand, and many of them only solve the problems created by the fact that those who still have real jobs work too much.¹⁸

I do not know how much worth it would have to precisely place the moment when the new technological innovations have entered or will come into synergy so that we can talk about a level break.

Looking at the past, we will understand that certain processes are difficult to predict. For example, cultural predispositions subsumed to the “spirit of capitalism” can be encountered centuries before the Industrial Revolution, favored by urbanization, commerce and, if we believe Max Weber, even religion; while the “spirit of technology” has been strong enough since the 16th and 17th centuries to elicit riots and laws against the use of machines that made some workers obsolete.¹⁹

If we look at the lovers of statistics and prognoses or the futurists of the last century, we can see that, after the 1970s, and especially after the 1990s, there is more and more talk about the tertiary sector (services), the quaternary sector (activities built around the newest digital technologies,

¹⁶ Castels, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

¹⁷ André Gorz, “On the Difference Between Society and Community, and Why Basic Income Cannot by Itself Confer Full Membership of Either”, in Parijs, *Arguing for Basic Income. Ethical Foundations for a Radical Reform*, London: Verso, 1992, p. 184.

¹⁸ David Graeber, *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology*, Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, p. 81.

¹⁹ Marx, *op. cit.*, p. 437.

that are difficult to label), the post-industrial society addressed by Allain Touraine (1969) and Daniell Bell (1974), about the third or fourth industrial revolution, while Alvin Toffler's and Isaac Asimov's best-sellers have made the elites from all over the world wonder. Beyond seeking the sensational by the researchers and popularizers who produced the new labels, it is very likely for the socio-economic reality to have gone through a significant transformation.

The main suspect responsible for the emerging disorder is digital technology – computers and communications. Digital technology has impressed and continues to impress through the pace at which innovation is taking place, as compared to the rest of the economic activities. The “Law” formulated in 1965 by the co-founder of Intel, Gordon Moore, continues to be valid today. Every 18 months, the number of components in an integrated circuit is doubled, on a similar surface and at a price that is constantly decreasing. According to Andrew McAfee (et al.), the magnitude and dynamics of these technological changes are similar to those seen at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.²⁰ According to Jürgen Schmidhuber, one of the early developers of Artificial Intelligence, the new thing that is happening (because of the exponential growth of the computing power since 1941) is not just another Industrial Revolution.²¹ Beyond being the most dynamic sector in terms of innovation and beyond producing the most spectacular examples of social mobility,²² this type of activity seems to irreversibly transform all others. And we are not referring only to the obvious productive activities. From socializing to entertainment, education and research, nothing remains unaffected. And the most interesting part is that what is affected is not each aspect in

²⁰ Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, *The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies*, New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014; George Westerman, Didier Bonnet & Andrew McAfee, *Leading Digital: Turning Technology into Business Transformation*, Boston and Massachusetts: Harvard Business Review Press, 2014.

²¹ Artificial Intelligence A.I., “Artificial Intelligence(AI) Is Making Financial Jobs and Banks Obsolete!”, in *Youtube*, [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QzA6xxMkMhY>], accessed May 2017.

²² Kate Vinton, “Meet The 183 Tech Billionaires Who Own \$1 Trillion Of The World's Wealth”, in *Forbes*, 2017, [<https://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2017/03/20/richest-tech-billionaires-2017/#5a9f46254c46>], accessed July 2017.

particular, but all at once, for we have to do with a change of state in its entirety, which alters the climate of the whole system. For example, virtual social networks make possible a dispersing of the pressure of conformism as great as the one that had taken place within the transition from the traditional community to the urban social network or the urban-rural one, because the norms, principles and even the truth of a community depend not only on what that particular truth can do, but also on what that truth is allowed to do. And the social sanctions, though potentially ingenious and painful, will be predominantly virtual in such a network of more or less anonymous individuals.

If we take the taxonomy of the neo-evolutionist anthropologist Marvin Harris as a reference point, apart from relations of production, we can see that the entire line of systems that delineate the cultural levels of infrastructure-structure-superstructure is affected.²³ Even the outline proposed by Leslie White, which focuses on the energy source that connects the system to the natural environment (which maximizes the abstract understanding of society or culture), seems to confirm its heuristic value: we can see the critical moment in which electricity irreversibly becomes the primary source that sets the new civilization into motion. At the end of the 19th century, electricity was already announced as a type of “general purpose technology”²⁴ that could be embedded in many technological products, and optimizing them. And the Digital Revolution and its products, which depend on electricity and can be embedded in most technological products, have produced a viral expansion of this form of energy, becoming a kind of a technological “meme”,²⁵ that assists and, increasingly, mediates the conversion of other known forms of energy. It is probably a process of simplification whereby an element needed for a component will tend to become universal, replacing the competing elements when the savings on operational costs in skills and knowledge

²³ Marvin Harris, *Cultural Materialism. The Struggle for a Science of Culture*, New York: Random House, 1979, pp. 52-64.

²⁴ Erik Brynjolfsson, “The Key to Growth? Race with the Machines”, in *TED*, 2013, [https://www.ted.com/talks/erik_brynjolfsson_the_key_to_growth_race_em_with_em_the_machines], accessed June 2017.

²⁵ Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 192.

can offset any particular inefficiencies. Now it is embedded not only in most of the technological products but also in the metaphors that mediate our understanding and explanation of the world. This form of energy, although well integrated into the old system,²⁶ comes to integrate the current system within itself. Thus, we are able to address the rationality of the new ecological discourses and the cascade of public and private investment in innovations that capture the so-called “alternative” sources of energy from a different perspective: they are feasible, optimizable and, above all, fit into the new standard.

We can speak with certainty, at least in terms of technology, about a Digital Revolution powered by electricity and, if we consider all social consequences, we may very well venture into witnessing the beginning of a fundamental historical discontinuity, in an irreversible form.

Probably the most spectacular change is currently in progress and concerns work as such. Unlike the previous industrial revolutions in which machines, beyond the temporary social damages that have provoked, have in fact increased the worker's productivity, robotization within the digital age can replace it in most fields.²⁷ According to Jeremy Rifkin, 75% of existing jobs in industrialized countries require only relatively simple and repetitive tasks.²⁸ According to the statistical calculations made by Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, 43% of all existing jobs in the US are in the process of transformation or risk being replaced by robots.²⁹ This is not just talking about industrial robots that have become more adaptable and cheaper in time (by as much as 10% per year), which removes skilled workers from production lines, but a series of sensor systems that monitor and optimize processes from agriculture to services, a whole range of simple applications that mediate purchases and transactions of all kinds, or Artificial Intelligence, which already thins the ranks of the middle

²⁶ The phenomenon is most often described as the Second Industrial Revolution.

²⁷ Willem Buijer *apud* Kif Leswing, “Citi’s Chief Economist Recommends a Universal Basic Income”, in *Futurism*, August 22, 2015, [<https://futurism.com/citis-chief-economist-recommends-a-universal-basic-income>], accessed July 2017.

²⁸ Jeremy Rifkin, *The End of Work. The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era*, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995, p. 5.

²⁹ Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, vol. 114, North-Holland, 2017, pp. 254-280.

management, which already relieves corporations of the burden of analysts (from the discovery of trends and fraud patterns or market opportunities, problem or disease diagnostics, to data mining in the field of law), or which are already replacing even IT employees who detect bugs in software or that detail and translate certain specifications of the programming language. The appendixes of the study conducted by Frey and Osborne outline all the jobs taken into account, depending on the likelihood of their automation. And drivers and cashiers are not the worst off, though the image of Google's driverless car or Amazon's cashier-free store have already entered the imagination of the era. Instead, bank employees have already received the bad news: 30% of jobs will disappear in the next eight years.³⁰ If we want to understand how dramatic the situation is for those who thought they are part of the upper class, it is worth considering the childish arrogance of new technology developers (Kai-fu Lee, for example) who believe that the use of man for numerical analysis was a momentary act of improvisation.³¹

In other words, unlike the "primitive" automation based on mechanics, digital automation, although starting from the same fundamental principles, is not limited to replacing accuracy, speed and muscle strength, but also most of the attributes of the human mind which could easily enter the economic circuit because they could be quantified without too much difficulty in working hours, with relatively predictable productivity. From this point of view, it is possible that the fact that the number of unemployed will become unbearable³² will be the smallest problem, if the problem is solved by the development of intuition, creativity and all those emotionally-cognitive skills that provide a competitive advantage to man. When most of the staff in the organizational chart will be composed of "poets", we will see even more clearly the arbitrariness and the unpredictability of the system. A critical mass of

³⁰ Matt Egan, "30% of Bank Jobs are Under Threat", in *CNN Money*, April 4, 2016, [<http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/04/investing/bank-jobs-dying-automation-citigroup/index.html>], accessed May 2017.

³¹ Artificial Intelligence A.I., "Half of All Jobs Will Be Replaced by Artificial Intelligence (AI) in 10 Years, AI Expert Kai-Fu Lee", *Youtube*, May 18 2017, min. 11:20, [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Pc4HhhW0Xo>], accessed July 2017.

³² Jeremy Rifkin has been alerting people since the 1990s concerning the fact that 800 million human beings are now unemployed or underemployed in the world (Rifkin, *op. cit.*, p. XV).

economic issues will no longer be economic, because they can no longer be calculated and planned to a sufficient degree to allow for a strategic and adaptive behavior. It is hard to say when the critical mass of transformation will be reached, which will definitively decouple the price, salary and profit from the amount of human work crystallized in the product, but we are not far off from that point. Although the principle of scarcity that structures the subconscious of political economy, plus the ethics and the cult of labor are some kind of survivals of the pre-capitalist period, the rest of the current ideological system discourages taking these issues too seriously across the social spectrum (with the exception of the marginal and excluded). Let us give an edifying example: watch how, with every technological revolution, the following argument loses its power: “The one who is unwilling to work will not eat”³³: you do not toil in the fields, you do not eat; you do not destroy your health in industry, you do not eat; you are not available at the office eight hours a day, you do not eat; you are not creative and popular (on YouTube, for example), you do not eat.³⁴

It is possible for the elites to heave a sigh of relief when the arguments of the poor lose weight as the blackmail capacity due to the necessity of their work decreases. And this has already been seen in the West in the last few decades, when the precariousness of work left social-democracy in the offside. However, to a similar extent, the justification of wealth or even income discrepancies is becoming an exercise in intellectual

³³ We are not interested in the possible meanings that theology can attribute to this phrase – as found in Paul’s second epistle to the Thessalonians (3:10) – but rather in its daily use in the justifications of social conservatism.

³⁴ I have reached these conclusions independently, however, as I have later found out, James Livingston beat me to it by a month’s time. Moreover, in the same manner in which I have recycled and developed older ideas, it is highly probable that he has done so as well. Although his starting point is an ethical and philosophical one, in the Hegelian tradition, while mine is a political and economic one, in the Machiavellian tradition, we have reached similar interpretations regarding the politics of labor. Thus, with both of us starting from Marx’s theory of value, we have reached similar speculations that would not be appealing to Marxists as far as the detachment of labor from the product is concerned, and the arbitrariness that follows, with referring to the incompatibility of the old cult of labor with present conditions, and, the most interesting aspect of the coincidence, namely, the fact that we have both used the biblical quote. The text can be found here: James Livingston, “Why Work? Breaking the Spell of the Protestant Ethic”, *The Baffler*, nr. 35, June 2017, [<https://thebaffler.com/salvos/why-work-livingston>], accessed June 2017.

acrobatics, because it is quite difficult to revolt if you were overtaxed after winning the lottery. Creativity plays an important role, but no further rationalization can hide the fact that the accumulation of capital seems less and less like the prolonged ascesis of labor, and more and more the way in which celebrity fame is born: the luck of having developed skills that were overvalued at a particular time, the luck of getting into the good neighborhood (for example, in a real-estate investment or a career plan), the luck of finding the fortunate marriage between a product and the market segment that can put you into a position of quasi-monopoly,³⁵ the luck of getting public attention for various reasons, etc. Just as the noble elite have lost some of its privileges as soon as it no longer justified its military utility, it is possible for the capitalist elite to follow suit as it can no longer justify its economic utility. The commanding heights of the economy start to resemble more and more a casino, which is most clearly reflected in the recurrence of replacing the term “investment” with that of “betting”. Those who lose finance the winners, and as long as the house has a profit (that is, the mass of consumers get better and cheaper products, and have the means to buy them), the system has a chance to survive, but the winners of this system have lost the aura that former masters had.

On the other hand, while still ignoring the social effects of the new technical unemployment, it is worth considering its effect on aggregate demand. We do not need to be Marxists, or Keynesians, to understand that, as in the case of classical economic crises (irrespective of their causes), the general decline in purchasing power produces a downward spiral in the economy. And robots do not usually buy goods³⁶ and the small, slow and conservative market of the rich is dependent of the great market of ordinary people in terms of optimization, efficiency and testing the bleeding edge technology. If we look at economy from the standpoint of technology, we can replace the popular “trickle-down” slogan with a new one: “trickle-up”.³⁷ And if those who lost jobs due to automation in all

³⁵ How to Start a Startup, “Lecture 5 – Competition is for Losers (Peter Thiel)”, *Youtube*, 2014, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5_0dVHMpJlo], accessed June 2017.

³⁶ N. V., *loc. cit.*

³⁷ For example, we can generally refer to the latest technological revolutions in their entirety, with their innovations born out of the necessity (and funded by the possibility) of making it accessible for (and then manage) a huge mass of consumers. If we want to give a simple and

sectors of the economy will not be compensated (at a satisfactory pace) by some activities considered sufficiently useful by those who will still have an income to pay for them, the economic crisis will become a reality. Optimistic conservatives reassure us that we will learn to commodify new relational activities, satisfying needs that we never thought could exist. For example, a significant demand for used underwear³⁸ has recently flourished, and there are not enough altruistic people to satisfy this demand in a sharing economy. The pessimistic progressives say that this time is different. Those who are most panicked are the ones who have read the study conducted by the McKinsey Global Institute.³⁹ The study estimates “that about half of the activities that people are paid almost \$15 trillion to do in the global economy have the potential to be automated by adapting currently demonstrated technology”⁴⁰. In order to understand the magnitude of the guillotine that will annually cut aggregate demand, it is enough to look at how small the decrease of the world GDP has been during the crisis from which we are hardly recovering: \$3 trillion.⁴¹

If we take into account social effects as well, it may be worthwhile to take a look at the successful nightmares of the time, recurrently revealed in two of Hollywood's most popular forms: the genocidal Malthusian version, full of guilt, projected upon on Artificial Intelligence, in which

particular example, we can choose products such as the mobile phones for the rich, which in 2017 have had the technical specifications of an expensive, mass-produced mobile phone from 2016. See Android Central, “The Billionaire's Phone: Vertu Constellation, 2017 Review”, *Youtube*, [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uDeNMG9yrhc>], accessed April 2017.

³⁸ Kashmiri Gander, “Selling Used Underwear Online Becomes Money-Maker as Some Pairs for Go for as Much as 5000\$”, *The Independent*, 29 September 2016, [<http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/love-sex/selling-underwear-online-findom-men-who-pay-for-pants-orange-is-the-new-black-sofia-gray-a7336786.html>], accessed July 2017.

³⁹ Kevin Mieszala, “Do We Need A Universal Basic Income? – Charles Murray & Andy Stern”, *Youtube*, [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UIYQdHi8S-s>], accessed June 2017.

⁴⁰ Executive Briefing McKinsey Global Institute, “What's Now and Next in Analytics, AI, and Automation”, *McKinsey & Company*, [<http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/digital-disruption/whats-now-and-next-in-analytics-ai-and-automation#section3>], accessed May 2017.

⁴¹ Mark Adelson, “The Deeper Causes of the Financial Crisis: Mortgages Alone Cannot Explain It”, *The Journal Portfolio Management*, Spring 2013, p. 17.

robots will exterminate the population surplus; and the insurrectionary version, in which the gated communities always get penetrated by the zombie masses.

However, irrespective of the real or imaginary magnitude of the near future, it would appear that the enlightened segment of today's elites seems to be inclined to favor a risk-reducing approach by accepting a transformation of survivals from the age of scarcity still present within the social system. Changes in commodity production and the accumulation of wealth appear to favor a more relaxed outlook on the general draconian motivation system that, in addition to causing unnecessary suffering, can have opposite effects in a system that favors creativity-focused activities. In addition, the blurring of economic and cultural demarcations can also generate empathy, not just false class consciousness, when the suffering of individuals with whom they can identify becomes visible. Thus, the elites have recently started to speak the same language in Silicon Valley,⁴² at the World Economic Forum,⁴³ the United Nation OHCHR⁴⁴ and increasingly in the politically and economically well-connected academic world⁴⁵ or in the alternative spaces that popularize "outside of the box" ideas. Outside of the box means, in fact, the inside of the new system, in which the idea of Universal Basic Income seems to become the piece that allows us to better understand the big puzzle. Very briefly, the new discourse starts from the idea that giving a minimum amount of money unconditionally, universally and regularly will solve most of the urgent problems we are currently facing, acting as a buffer that somewhat mitigates economic failures and

⁴² Chris Weller, "8 High-profile Entrepreneurs who Have Endorsed Universal Basic Income", in *Business Insider*, Nov. 9, 2016, [<http://www.businessinsider.com/entrepreneurs-endorsing-universal-basic-income-2016-11/#tim-oreilly-7>], accessed May 2017.

⁴³ Klaus Schwab, "The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What it Means, How to Respond", in *The World Economic Forum*, 2016, [<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond>], accessed April 2017.

⁴⁴ The High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Basic Income Possible Solution to Human Rights Problem of Poverty", in *OHCHR*, 23 June 2017, [http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/UniversalBasicIncomeReport.aspx?platform=hootsuite&utm_content=buffer62751&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer], accessed June 2017.

⁴⁵ See Lucian T. Butaru, "Beyond or Besides Neoliberalism? The Political Economy of Universal Basic Income", *Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai. Studia Europaea*, LX, 1, 2015.

social suffering. And the force of this approach lays in its simplicity, which can effectively overcome the old approaches, avoiding bureaucratism, paternalism, taxpayer suspicion, the demotivation of the social services beneficiary and, among other things, the future apocalypse of the consumer economy. For quieting tempers, the approach is often presented as “a possible middle road between socialism and capitalism”⁴⁶. And just in case, those who are mainly cited as the supporters of Universal Basic Income are those for whom even a middle road to socialism would be unacceptable: Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, Charles Murray, etc.

The new consensus that seems to form, the shape it assumes and the arguments set in motion can create the impression of a global PR product: “A Universal Basic Income: An Idea Whose Time Has Come”. We should not neglect neither the penetrating power of simple ideas, nor the impact created by their redundancy; alongside the concerted efforts of certain platforms or networks of intellectuals such as BIEN, which have been promoting this solution for the past several decades.⁴⁷

However, there is something more here. This idea began to emerge independently and recurrently for the past 200 years.⁴⁸ Those who produced it ignored each other most of the time, while the political mainstream ignored them all. However, most often, ideas are not born out of nothing. In retrospect, we can see that the inhumane, efficient and, at the same time, defective system, which caused Marx to sense that there is a problem in the continued decline of the value that work injects in the price of goods and hence to question its conditions of possibility, it has led others to intuit an elegant solution by its simplicity. And now it is increasingly clear that the time is right for this idea, regardless of how it will be formulated on a case by case basis. Just as, after hundreds of years of

⁴⁶ Mark Walker, *Free Money for All: A Basic Income Guarantee Solution for the Twenty-First Century*, London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 3.

⁴⁷ ***, “About BIEN”, *Basic Income European Network*, [<http://basicincome.org/about-bien/#overview>], accessed May 2017.

⁴⁸ John Cunliffe, Guido Erreygers (eds.), *The Origins of Universal Grants: An Anthology of Historical Writings on Basic Capital and Basic Income*, London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. XIII. To my shameful ignorance, I have also produced a version of the story, believing that I discovered something substantial: Lucian Butaru, “Criza economică văzută din afara economiei”, in *CriticAtac*, August 1, 2011, [<http://www.criticatac.ro/9025/criza-economica-vazuta-din-exteriorul-economiei>].

ideological battles, gender equality came into the forefront during the very time when unpaid domestic work lost some of its necessity, it is highly possible that now, when human labor crystallized in commodities decreases exponentially, a decent means of survival to be permanently detached from the price attached to the labor force. If the threshold of decency will be conceived and maintained in correlation with social needs that are perceived to be objective, the UBI will diminish to an acceptable level the anxiety and the humiliation produced by the hard relationships of dependence within the family, the community and especially at the workplace, offering a negotiating power that will redefine the acceptable individual autonomy, and everything that derives from it. Probably, we will not see a fulfillment of social equality, nor that of equality of opportunity, in fact. Even establishing the level of decency will be a source of ongoing negotiations and struggles. The Left will still want more, and the Right will find plenty of reasons pertaining to efficiency or the loss of lovely traditions in order to maintain privileges, and possibly keep costs down.

Conclusions

All these issues demonstrate that the proposals concerning the UBI have nothing to do with utopia.

First, it is a solution to the contradiction that occurred within the integration of technological, social and ideological systems that emerged with the revolution produced by digital automation. And with each occurrence of a fundamental historical discontinuity, in an irreversible form, the contradictions were resolved by reformulating social relationships and redefining the foundations of the ideological consensus. This was done with or without bloodshed, on a case by case basis. In whichever way, in the end they have occurred.

Secondly, unlike the common projections, from anarcho-communism to anarcho-liberalism, plus the statist alternatives of the left and the right concerning the economic policy of social relations, UBI does not (naively, even unconsciously) entail an end to history, a final victory of the ideological battle, followed by a technocratic / mutualistic administration of the afterlife.

And, lastly, social changes produced by UBI will maintain the familiarity of managing certain relationships, a familiarity to which some have gotten attached. Thus, even if the de facto detachment of labor from price and that of survival from the social utility of work will be finally formalized politically and economically for everyone, the widely shared illusion that almost everything can be measured and equated will continue to produce useful effects. On the one hand, the desire that some feel in their comparison with others will still be fully satisfied. Self-esteem, pride and, for some, even the meaning of life can be fed not only with love, fame, but also by figures, reinforced by privileges and open doors. However, neither of this social feedbacks are necessarily reliable, legitimate or straight through and through. On the other hand, the waste management function will be met with great elegance. As long as it manages to limit, without riots, the number of those who want to see how far a piano can fly,⁴⁹ of those who cannot eat anything but truffles or those who do not feel fulfilled if their toilet bowl is not made of gold, etc., we will not be needing courts to judge the undermining of the national economy when someone gathers an unusual amount of toilet paper, nor will we need any political party meetings to decide the optimal amount of dildos for the current year.

And this approach may eliminate the need to resort to metaphysics to postulate a type of human nature, be it bad or good. It suffices to note that history has documented enough examples in this regard. Thus, a number of pitfalls can be avoided, and, especially, the power struggle be diminished a bit, which while it did not increase in ferocity, it has become more dangerous due to the technological means it can instrumentalize. A political economy that measures the public success of an activity and prevents the waste of resources through the market, beyond the fact that it is more positivist, it starts to become sufficiently secular to allow those who do not believe in it to live their lives according to their own values, and for others to provide sufficient motivation to drive things further. In any case, this is a future projection that leaves all doors open.

(translated from Romanian by Juliánna Köpeczi)

⁴⁹ Richard E. Meyer, "How Far Can a Piano Fly?", *Los Angeles Times*, July, 9, 1999, [<http://www.latimes.com/columnists/la-na-c1-catapult-19960609-t-story.html>], accessed July 2017.

Bibliography

1. Adelson, Mark (2013), "The Deeper Causes of the Financial Crisis: Mortgages Alone Cannot Explain It", *The Journal Portfolio Management*, Spring.
2. Android Central (2017), "The Billionaire's Phone: Vertu Constellation, 2017. Review", *Youtube*, April 8, [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uDeNMG9yrhc>].
3. Artificial Intelligence A.I., "Artificial Intelligence (AI) Is Making Financial Jobs and Banks Obsolete!", *Youtube*, May 17, [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QzA6xxMkMhY>].
4. Artificial Intelligence A.I. (2017), "Half of All Jobs Will Be Replaced by Artificial Intelligence (AI) in 10 Years, AI Expert Kai-Fu Lee", *Youtube*, May 18, [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Pc4HhhW0Xo>].
5. Brynjolfsson, Erik (2013), "The Key to Growth? Race with the Machines", in *TED*, [https://www.ted.com/talks/erik_brynjolfsson_the_key_to_growth_race_em_with_em_the_machines].
6. Butaru, Lucian T. (2015), "Beyond or Besides Neoliberalism? The Political Economy of Universal Basic Income", *Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai. Studia Europaea*, LX, 1.
7. Butaru, Lucian T. (2011), "Criza economică văzută din afara economiei", în *CriticAtac*, August 1, [<http://www.criticatac.ro/9025/criza-economica-vazuta-din-exteriorul-economiei>].
8. Castells, Manuel (2010), *The Rise of the Network Society*, Wiley-Blackwell.
9. Cunliffe, John & Erreygers Guido (eds.) (2004), *The Origins of Universal Grants: An Anthology of Historical Writings on Basic Capital and Basic Income*, Palgrave Macmillan.
10. Dawkins, Richard (1989), *The Selfish Gene*, Oxford University Press.
11. Egan, Matt (2016), "30% of Bank Jobs are Under Threat", in *CNN Money*, April 4, [<http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/04/investing/bank-jobs-dying-automation-citigroup/index.html>].
12. Executive Briefing McKinsey Global Institute (2017), "What's now and next in analytics, AI, and automation", *McKinsey & Company*, May, [<http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/digital-disruption/whats-now-and-next-in-analytics-ai-and-automation>].

13. Frey, Benedikt & Osborne, Michael A. (2017), *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, vol. 114, North-Holland.
14. Gander, Kashmira (2016), "Selling Used Underwear Online Becomes Money-Maker as Some Pairs for Go for as Much as 5000\$", *The Independent*, September 29, [<http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/love-sex/selling-underwear-online-findom-men-who-pay-for-pants-orange-is-the-new-black-sofia-gray-a7336786.html>].
15. Gorz, André (1992), "On the Difference between Society and Community, and why Basic Income Cannot by Itself Confer Full Membership of Either", in Parijs, *Arguing for Basic Income. Ethical Foundations for a Radical Reform*, London: Verso.
16. Graeber, David (2004), *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology*, Prickly Paradigm Press.
17. Harris, Marvin (1979), *Cultural Materialism. The Struggle for a Science of Culture*, Random House.
18. Heidegger, Martin (1982), "Întrebare privitoare la tehnică", în *Originea operei de artă*, Univers.
19. How to Start a Startup (2014), "Lecture 5 – Competition is for Losers (Peter Thiel)", *Youtube*, October 7, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5_0dVHMpJlo]
20. Hobsbawm, Eric (2002), *Era revoluției (11789-1848)*, Cartier.
21. Hobsbawm, Eric (2002), *Era imperiului (1875-1914)*, Arc.
22. Hobsbawm, Eric (1999), *Era extremelor. O istorie a secolului XX*, Cartier.
23. Kevin Mieszala (2017), "Do We Need A Universal Basic Income? – Charles Murray & Andy Stern", *Youtube*, Mai 20, [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UIYQdHi8S-s>].
24. Landes, David S. (2003), *The Unbound Prometheus. Technological change and industrial development in Western Europe from 1750 to present*, Cambridge University Press.
25. Leswing, Kif (2015), "Citi's Chief Economist Recommends a Universal Basic Income", in *Futurism*, August 22, [<https://futurism.com/citis-chief-economist-recommends-a-universal-basic-income>].
26. Livingston, James (2017), "Why Work? Breaking the Spell of the Protestant Ethic", *The Baffler*, no. 35, June, [<https://thebaffler.com/salvos/why-work-livingston>].

27. Marx, Karl (1966), *Capitalul*, volumul I, în Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, *Opere*, Vol. 23, Editura Politică.
28. McAfee, Andrew & Brynjolfsson, Erik (2014), *The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies*, W. W. Norton & Company.
29. Meyer, Richard E. (1999), "How Far Can a Piano Fly?", *Los Angeles Times*, July 9, [<http://www.latimes.com/columnists/la-na-c1-catapult-19960609-t-story.html>].
30. Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. (2000), *Structură și funcție în societatea primitivă*, Polirom.
31. Rifkin, Jeremy (1995), *The End of Work. The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era*, G. P. Putnam's Sons.
32. Schwab, Klaus (2016), "The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What it Means, How to Respond", *The World Economic Forum*, [<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond>].
33. Steward, Julian Haynes (1990), *Theory of Culture Change: The Methodology of Multilinear Evolution*, University of Illinois Press.
34. Steward, Julian Haynes (1997), *Basin-plateau Aboriginal Sociopolitical Groups*, University of Utah Press.
35. The High Commissioner for Human Rights (2017), "Basic Income Possible Solution to Human Rights Problem of Poverty", *OHCHR*, June 23, [<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/UniversalBasicIncomeReport.aspx>].
36. V., N. (2011), "Difference Engine: Luddite legacy", *The Economist*, (November 4), [<http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/11/artificial-intelligence>].
37. Vinton, Kate (2017), "Meet The 183 Tech Billionaires Who Own \$1 Trillion Of The World's Wealth", in *Forbes*, [<https://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2017/03/20/richest-tech-billionaires-2017/#5a9f46254c46>].
38. Walker, Mark (2016), *Free Money for All: A Basic Income Guarantee Solution for the Twenty-First Century*, Palgrave Macmillan.
39. Weller, Chris (2016), "8 High-profile Entrepreneurs who Have Endorsed Universal Basic Income", in *Business Insider*, November 9, [<http://www.businessinsider.com/entrepreneurs-endorsing-universal-basic-income-2016-11/#tim-oreilly-7>].

40. Westerman, George; Bonnet, Didier & McAfee, Andrew (2014), *Leading Digital: Turning Technology into Business Transformation*, Harvard Business Review Press.
41. White, Leslie A. (1949), *The Science of Culture. A Study of Man and Civilization*, Grove Press.
42. Wolf, Eric R. (2010), *Europe and the People Without History*, University of California Press.

QU'EST-CE QUE LE NÉO-POPULISME? QUELQUES
EXPLIQUATIONS FACTUELLES POUR UN ÉCLAIRCISSEMENT
THÉORIQUE

Sergiu Mișcoiu*

DOI: 10.24193/subbeuropaea.2017.3.05

Published Online: 2017-09-30

Published Print: 2017-09-30

Title in English: *What is Neo-Populism? Factual Contributions for Theoretical Advancements*

Abstract

In defining the specificity of neo-populism, numerous theoretical attempts have been leading to rather unsatisfactory results. In this article, instead of trying to abstractly define neo-populism, by using a wide range of examples, I will propose a series of empirical delineations that will contribute to a theoretical clarification of the specificity of neo-populism in relation to its 'mother-concept' – populism.

Keywords: people, populism, neopopulism, elites, representation

L'un des aspects qui ne fait pas unanimité au sein de la littérature est l'existence du néo-populisme. C'est aussi le dernier aspect que nous allons aborder ici. Il est question de savoir si le néo-populisme est un phénomène à part, ayant des caractéristiques spécifiques, une variante « mise à jour » du populisme « classique » ou, puisque les différences entre le populisme et le néo-populisme sont tellement infimes, un terme sans valeur scientifique. Dans la catégorie des adeptes de cette dernière variante, on trouve plutôt des historiens et des philosophes qui sont avides de démontrer l'atemporalité des phénomènes sociaux, mais aussi des politistes, comme Daniele Albertazzi et Duncan McDonnell, qui préfèrent

* Sergiu Mișcoiu is PhD Habil. Associate Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of European Studies and the Director of the Centre for International Relations of the Babeș-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca.

Contact: miscoiu.sergiu@ubbcluj.ro

parler du « populisme du XXI^e siècle » et non pas du néo-populisme¹, ou des économistes, comme Luis Pazos, qui invoque les caractéristiques permanentes du populisme depuis le début du XIX^e siècle jusqu'à aujourd'hui². Pour choisir entre ces deux options, il faudrait synthétiser les traits des « populismes avancés » et les comparer aux caractéristiques des populismes historiques, comme dans le tableau ci-dessous :

	<i>Critère de la comparaison</i>	Traits du « populisme historique »	Traits du « populisme avancé »
1	<i>Identité populaire</i>	Constitution du peuple	Bricolage identitaire
2	<i>Rapport du populisme au passé</i>	Sacralisation du passé glorieux	Récupération du passé, mais « cap sur l'avenir »
3	<i>Mission</i>	Rédemption des masses, transcendantalisme	Accommodation, banalité réformiste
4	<i>Cohérence</i>	Essentialisme, ancrage doctrinaire	Hétérogénéité, inter-thématisme
5	<i>Rapport du peuple au leader</i>	Admiration, fidélité	« Copinage », loyauté conditionnée
6	<i>Dominante communicationnelle</i>	Rapports directs, mais à sens unique	Rapports indirects, mais à double sens
7	<i>Logique du populisme au pouvoir</i>	Consensualisme	« Polémisme »
8	<i>Durée des effets</i>	Persistance temporelle	Précarité temporelle

1. Pour ce qui est de l'identité populaire, « le populisme classique est plutôt « constitutiviste », au sens où il s'agit, dans la plupart des cas, d'une apparition concomitante du peuple, comme sujet politique, et du populisme, comme courant politique. C'est bien le cas du bonapartisme, qui se manifeste dès l'organisation des premières élections présidentielles au suffrage universel, du péronisme, qui survient au moment de

¹ Daniele Albertazzi et Duncan O'Donnell, « Conclusion: Populism and Twenty-First Century Western European Democracy » in Daniele Albertazzi et Duncan O'Donnell (dir.), *Twenty-first Century Populism. The Spectre of Western European Democracy*, Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 217-223.

² Luis Pazos, *O rezinho populista*, São Paulo: Ed. Inconfidentes, 1988, notamment pp. 6-13.

l'émancipation des masses ouvrières et paysannes, du nassérisme, qui a inauguré la participation populaire à la prise des décisions politiques en Egypte ou, plus récemment, des populismes d'Evo Morales en Bolivie, dont nous avons parlé ci-dessus, ou de Rafael Correa en Equateur ; ce dernier se targue d'avoir « refondé le Peuple », notamment à travers sa réforme constitutionnelle de 2008³.

Le populisme avancé repose moins sur un acte fondateur, moins sur une identification initiale et consistante du peuple et davantage sur un rassemblement identitaire ad-hoc des individus, des groupes et des classes sociales, des idées et des tendances politiques, des minorités ethniques ou des intérêts de caste, des passions, des goûts et des dispositions des individus. On ne pense pas à donner une identité au peuple, mais à composer d'une manière crédible avec les identifications présentes ou passées. C'est le cas des nouveaux populismes de l'Europe occidentale, où la tradition politique démocratique laissait très peu de place aux ambitions fondatrices ou refondatrices et obligeait les populistes de synthétiser les multiples références identitaires des masses populaires. La Forza Italia de Silvio Berlusconi en est un exemple, puisque son effort de rassembler les classes moyennes et les classes populaires, en leur offrant l'illusion du pragmatisme, du modernisme, du progressisme, mais aussi du respect des valeurs nationales et du « peuple réel » a permis, à plusieurs reprises l'identification d'une majorité des Italiens aux promesses politiques du « Cavaliere »⁴.

2. Le passéisme est un ingrédient important de tous les populismes classiques ; il s'agit, à la fois, d'un marqueur de l'identification du mouvement ou du leader populiste avec les « combats historiques » du

³ A la différence du vénézuélien Hugo Chavez ou du bolivien Evo Morales, Correa a reçu une éducation « occidentale » élitiste et pose plutôt en « titan avant-gardiste » qu'en « everyday man ». Sa Constitution de 2008 lui donne la possibilité de contrôler les institutions par des « conseils citoyens » nommés et par la tutelle présidentielle sur la Banque Centrale. V. Pedro Dutour, « Ecuador's labyrinth of nebulous ambiguity », [http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/ecuadors_labyrinth_of_nebulous_ambiguity] (consulté le 12 juillet 2017).

⁴ Pour une analyse des fondements du berlusconisme, v. Phil Edwards, « The Right in Power », *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 10, n° 2, 2005, pp. 225-243.

peuple et d'un front ouvert contre les ennemis du présent, qui « ne s'élèvent pas aux très hauts standards moraux imposés par les ancêtres »⁵.

La glorification du passé national et de la contribution populaire à la création, à l'unification et à l'indépendance du pays ont constamment alimenté le populisme réactionnaire aux Etats-Unis, comme nous l'avons vu dans la première partie, aussi bien que le bonapartisme en France ou le national-populisme du Maréchal Pilsudski en Pologne. Dans les années vingt, ce dernier a inscrit les victoires antibolchéviques qu'il a remportées dans la panoplie des guerres héroïques du peuple polonais et a agité le danger immédiat des complots et des insurrections afin de s'assurer l'appui populaire pour son coup d'Etat de 1926⁶.

Dans le cas du populisme avancé, bien que les références au passé ne fassent pas défaut, la tendance dominante est l'orientation prospective vers le changement, les réformes et le balayage de l'establishment élitiste, présenté comme voulant préserver ses privilèges historiques « acquis sur le dos du peuple ». Plus les masses visées par les discours populistes sont mécontentes des gouvernants qui se réclament de la tradition, plus le discours tourné vers l'avenir l'emporte sur celui dirigé vers le passé⁷. Au Pays-Bas, au début des années 2000, Pim Fortuyn et, plus récemment, Gert Wilders ont réalisé des percées politiques importantes tout s'étayant sur des discours « progressistes, mais populaires ». Reprenant pragmatiquement les thématiques préoccupantes de l'insécurité, de l'immigration et de la défense des valeurs démocratiques (dont la laïcité), les populistes hollandais se sont tournés contre les « dérives multiculturaloïdes », l'islamisation, la « dictature soft des eurocrates » et

⁵ Formule utilisée par le Président tchèque, Vaclav Klaus, dans une interview accordée le 19 février 2009 à un journaliste de la chaîne Euronews, dans laquelle il justifiait ses réticences devant la promulgation de la loi de ratification du Traité de Lisbonne.

⁶ V. Joseph Pilsudski, *Du révolutionnaire au chef d'Etat : 1893-1935. Pages choisies des dix volumes des « Œuvres, discours, ordres »*, Paris: Société française d'éditions littéraires et techniques, 1935, notamment pp. 235-261.

⁷ Hans-Georg Betz est l'un des chercheurs qui vont dans la même direction. Selon lui, la plupart des partis radicaux-populistes de droite soutiennent la reconsidération des statuquos socioéconomique et socioculturel. V. Hans-Georg Betz, Steffan Immerfall (dir.), *The New Politics of the Right. Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies*, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998.

«l'hyper-taxalisme »⁸. Même si le thème du retour aux « valeurs judéo-chrétiennes » n'a pas manqué (notamment dans le cas de Wilders), la dimension prospective l'emporte sur l'exaltation d'un passé trop marqué par « les compromis et le défaitisme »⁹.

3. Plus profond que le message du populisme avancé, le discours des populismes classiques incorpore une dimension transcendantale ; il promet de changer le monde, en portant les masses au-delà de ce qu'elles ont été jusqu'à présent, de transformer la société par une série d'actes rédempteurs. Le populisme classique est marqué donc par une « religiosité civile », qui inclut la promesse plus ou moins explicite du dépassement de la condition éphémère de la vie humaine par la participation à un corps politique et moral soudé – le Peuple. Ce fut le cas de la solidarisation populaire des Colombiens autour de Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, dans les années 1930-1940. Radical dans ses propos et défenseur des ouvriers et des paysans, ce fin orateur a été le premier populiste colombien qui a ouvertement combattu les oligarchies et la stratification sociale traditionnelle du pays, en promettant au peuple une « transformation radicale » et une « autre destinée historique ». Ses discours, notamment ceux pour la campagne présidentielle de 1946, témoignent d'une volonté de quasi-refondation du peuple colombien qui pourrait dépasser sa condition mondialement marginale par un saut historique en avant¹⁰. Assassiné en 1948, Gaitán a fini par devenir la figure emblématique de l'héroïsme

⁸ V. l'article « Far-right politician makes gains toward becoming next Dutch prime minister » dans le *National Post* du 5 mars 2010.

⁹ Pour une analyse discursive du populisme néerlandais, v. Oana Crăciun, « The New Populism. An analysis of the Political Discourse of Front National and Lijst Pim Fortuyn » in Sergiu Mișcoiu, Oana Crăciun, Nicoleta Colopelnic, *Radicalism, Populism, ..., op. cit.*, pp. 31-69.

¹⁰ Gaitán s'est frayé un chemin en politique en se positionnant à la lisière du système des partis traditionnels, même s'il fut, à plusieurs reprises, l'un des leaders du Parti Libéral. Il a rejeté la domination des élites en leur opposant le « Peuple » qui était, selon lui, en pleine métamorphose. Il n'a pas hésité de parler de la « transcendance du Peuple » et des relations « mutuellement transformatrices » qu'il entretenait avec celui-ci. V. Herbert Braun, *The Assassination of Gaitán: Public Life and Urban Violence in Colombia*, Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, notamment pp. 82-87

populaire et des combats pour l'émancipation politique et sociale des plus démunis.

Ces traits ne caractérisent pas le populisme avancé. Plus ancrés dans la réalité quotidienne, les nouveaux populistes se contentent d'imputer à leurs adversaires l'absence ou l'excès des réformes et de spéculer le mécontentement populaire sans promettre pour autant la purification ou la rédemption du peuple. Cette attitude correspond à ce que Michel Maffesoli appelle la condition postmoderne, caractérisée par la grégarité et l'abandon des idéaux rationnels et vouée à une permanente accommodation aux réalités du présent¹¹. Loin de viser l'émancipation du menu peuple et sans se prétendre rédempteur, le populisme avancé fait des promesses plus « terrestres » : nettoyer le monde politique, réduire les taxes et les impôts, renforcer le pouvoir référendaire des citoyens, désenclaver les régions pauvres, redonner la dignité aux personnes âgées, aider l'insertion des jeunes, passer les corrompus par des tribunaux populaires, limiter les vagues d'immigration, etc. C'est le cas, en Suisse, de la très médiatisée Union Démocratique du Centre qui a élargi les bases électorales traditionnelles du conservatisme par la radicalisation et la vulgarisation de son message politique¹². Outre sa « crispation » à l'égard de l'islam, l'UDC défend le droit à l'usage presque illimité du référendum pour consulter les citoyens à propos de la temporisation des naturalisations, du renforcement des droits de la police, du maintien de la souveraineté et de la neutralité du pays, du rejet des unions de type PACS, etc. Dans un pays où les institutions au niveau confédéral ont moins de pouvoirs que les cantons, le populisme de l'UDC passe aussi par la défense « rousseauiste » des petites communautés et de leur droit de déterminer leur propre gestion. Il n'y a donc rien d'eschatologique dans le discours de l'UDC, même si les tactiques utilisées par cette formation et les moyens par lesquels elle s'exprime sont typiquement populistes.

¹¹ Maffesoli considérait déjà dans les années 1980 que nous avons passé de la modernité dominée par la raison à la postmodernité dominée par les affects, de l'individu à la personne, de la politique à la gestion, du projet à l'accommodation, etc. V. Michel Maffesoli, *Le temps des tribus. Le déclin de l'individualisme dans la société postmoderne*, Paris: La Table Ronde, 2000, pp. 101 et suivantes.

¹² Pour une analyse de l'UDC et notamment de son leader le plus important, Christophe Blocher, v. Matthias Ackeret, *Le principe Blocher : manuel de direction*, Schaffhouse: Meier, 2007.

Qui plus est, le populisme avancé peut permettre la particularisation thématique du message qui constitue l'objet des campagnes référendaires en fonction d'autres critères que celui strictement communautaire-territorial. C'est le cas de la mobilisation des pétitionnaires aux Etats-Unis, étudié par Elisabeth Gerber, où, paradoxalement, ce sont plutôt les groupes des divers lobbies qui arrivent à rassembler les citoyens au nom de la démocratie participative pour défendre des intérêts qui sont plutôt ceux des bien-détestées élites¹³. Sans avoir d'autre objectif que celui de mobiliser ponctuellement les individus afin de presser les décideurs politiques (parfois, juste pour imposer des nuances particulières dans certains projets de loi débattus par les législatifs locaux), les pratiquants du populisme avancé assume généralement la versatilité comme une profession de foi.

4. Tandis que le populisme classique est, du point de vue de la cohérence, plutôt essentialiste et dogmatique, le populisme avancé se caractérise par une hétérogénéité extrême des thématiques abordées et par une approche « légère » de celles-ci. Malgré la variété des tendances historiques et contextuelles, l'encre à droite des populismes classiques leur imprime une certaine stabilité réalisée autour des valeurs traditionnelles et religieuses – famille, église, travail, nation, etc. En même temps, le populisme classique repose sur l'affichage d'un nombre restreint de thèmes-phare – l'ordre et le passé glorieux, pour Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, l'unité et la paix, pour Joseph Pilsudski, la justice et l'ordre, pour Juan Perón. Ces thèmes sont perçus par leurs porteurs non pas seulement comme des marqueurs politiques temporaires, mais comme la

¹³ « These expensive campaigns have led some critics to suspect that wealthy interests are using direct legislation to buy favorable policy at the ballot box. They fear that, despite the efforts of the Populist and Progressive reformers, the balance between citizen and economic interests has shifted too far in the direction of the economic interests. According to this view, direct legislation has paradoxically become a powerful instrument of wealthy interest groups rather than a popular balance against these groups (...) From this perspective, the *populist paradox*—the alleged transformation of direct legislation from a tool of regular citizens to a tool of special interests—undermines the promise of popular policy making at the ballot box. », Elisabeth R. Gerber, *The Populist Paradox. Interest Group Influence and the Paradox of Direct Legislation*, Princeton: University Press, 1999, pp. 5-6.

substance même de leur action politique, sans laquelle leur présence en politique serait sans objet.

Les populistes avancés se forment des idées notamment en fonction de la demande qui existe à un certain moment donné. Ayant peu de repères inébranlables, ils s'adaptent aux thèmes exigés par l'opinion publique et changent de direction avec celle-ci. Ségolène Royal, candidate du Parti Socialiste à la Présidence de la République française en 2007, en est un exemple. Dans un effort de faire le plein des voix de la gauche et du centre, Royal a ajouté aux sujets traditionnels du PS des thèmes de droite, comme l'identité nationale et la sécurité et a volontairement embrassé une stratégie marquée par la suivie et la reprise des sujets prisés par l'opinion publique¹⁴. Le corolaire de cette stratégie a été le contournement des réponses et des attitudes décisives à l'égard des thèmes susceptibles soit de diviser le public dans deux groupes sensiblement égaux, soit de faire basculer l'opinion durant la campagne électorale¹⁵. Le populisme avancé a ainsi une dimension suiviste, qui, comme dans le cas de Ségolène Royal, n'est pas pour autant une garantie du succès électoral.

5. Pour ce qui est de la relation entre le leader charismatique et les masses, le populisme traditionnel impose des limites « naturelles » entre les deux : le leader est forcément issu des classes supérieures, éduqué, riche et ayant une certaine aisance dans les relations avec le « monde d'en-haut ». Etant lui-même émancipé, il émancipera les masses ; mais les distances seront toujours gardées et c'est parce qu'il est différent tant par rapport à

¹⁴ V. la préface à la nouvelle édition du livre de Pierre-André Taguieff, *L'illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogies à l'ère démocratique*, Paris, Champs. Flammarion, 2007, pp. 9-66. V. également Sergiu Mișcoiu, « Citoyenneté et identité nationale : les limites du retour gauche-droite en France lors de l'élection présidentielle de 2007 » dans Sergiu Mișcoiu, Chantal Delsol, Bertrand Alliot (dir.), *Identités politiques et dynamiques partisanes en France*, Cluj: EFES, 2009, pp. 201-218.

¹⁵ L'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union Européenne en est un exemple. Selon les sondages, l'électorat du centre et de la droite, que Royal voulait conquérir, y était défavorable, tandis que l'électorat de gauche, que Royal voulait garder, y était plutôt favorable. Par conséquent, la candidate socialiste n'a pas assumé une position précise à cet égard et a ouvertement assumé la position selon laquelle elle penserait et ferait ce que le peuple, consulté par référendum, déciderait. V. le débat face-à-face entre Nicolas Sarkozy et Ségolène Royal diffusé en direct sur TF1, [<http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=4671674330407207456#>] (consulté le 14 juin 2017).

ses compères (qui, eux, dédaignent le peuple) que par rapport au peuple (qu'il aime bien et qu'il veut apprivoiser, éduquer, civiliser) qu'il a le droit et le devoir de porter le drapeau de celui-ci. Cette attitude est identifiable, par exemple, chez Getúlio Vargas au Brésil, dans les années 1930, qui se targuait d'avoir illuminé le peuple et d'avoir édifié, avec le peuple ainsi illuminé, l'Etat Nouveau¹⁶.

Les populistes néophytes sont plutôt « issus du peuple » (ou donnent l'impression de l'être), proches des gens simples et ayant des goûts et des préférences similaires à ceux de leurs électeurs. Plutôt camarades ou même « copains », le nouveau populiste et son électeur se connaissent et se reconnaissent à travers des repères verbaux, gestuels et comportementaux, qui peuvent être ouverts, affectueux, familiaux ou, si besoin, triviaux ou vulgaires (marqueurs de la communauté de valeurs et de conduites). Mais comme toute relation précaire, la relation du populiste avec son électorat peut se déchirer facilement. La loyauté de l'électorat est conditionnée soit par les résultats, soit par un effet de mode ou de surexposition médiatique, soit par l'apparition d'un compétiteur plus avenant. Le captage des voix de Jean-Marie Le Pen par Nicolas Sarkozy lors de la présidentielle 2007 et « le retour de la copie à l'original »¹⁷ pour les élections régionales de 2010 s'encadrent bien dans ce cas de figure. Sûr d'avoir « enterré l'extrême droite » en lui raflant les voix par le biais du suremploi de ses thèmes favoris (insécurité-immigration-chômage)¹⁸, Sarkozy n'a pas correctement pesé la précarité de l'appui populaire dont il avait bénéficié et semble ne pas avoir bien compris le caractère conditionné de la confiance accordée par les Français. Dans le populisme avancé, on peut parler plus d'une nécessité permanente de fidéliser des groupes censés constituer le peuple, toujours avec des résultats incertains, que d'une fidélité solidement enracinée.

¹⁶ Pour une analyse pertinente du gétulisme, v. Karl Loewenstein, *Brazil Under Vargas*, New York: Russell & Russell, 1973.

¹⁷ V. l'article de Simon Petite, « L'original et la copie » paru dans *Le Courrier* du 27 mars 2010, p. 3.

¹⁸ V. l'article « Le Front national est de nouveau dans le jeu » paru dans *Le Monde* du 14 mars 2010, p. 9

6. Grands orateurs, les populistes classiques mobilisaient les masses par leur éloquence et par leur stature dominante. A la différence de leurs adversaires, les populistes n'hésitaient pas de sillonner les foules et de leur parler, le moment du discours étant parfois unique, solennel et « fondateur ». Les réactions des participants aux meetings étaient surtout sous la forme des ovations et des applaudissements et très rarement sous la forme des interventions ou des commentaires. Des frères Gracchus, dans l'antiquité romaine, à Raul Victor Haya de la Torre, dans le Pérou de l'entre-deux-guerres, les populistes historiques ont été des tribuns ayant le pouvoir – qualifié parfois de magique – de catalyser la volonté et l'action des foules à travers les paroles.

A l'époque des moyens de communication de masse, le populisme avancé est moins un « tribunisme » qu'un « relationnisme ». Même si la pratique des « bains de foule » demeure symboliquement importante, les populistes d'aujourd'hui ont plus besoin de se faire voir et connaître sur les écrans des télévisions et sur internet que de se sillonner le pays d'un bout à l'autre¹⁹. Ceci se traduit aussi par une relative baisse de l'importance des qualités rhétoriques des leaders populistes, puisque les différences trop marquées par rapport aux foules pourraient les éloigner de celles-ci. Anciens maires de Bucarest, respectivement de Sofia, Traian Băsescu et Boïko Borisov ne sont points des orateurs « haut de gamme » et préfèrent le « parler simple et populaire ». Le nombre de mots utilisés est limité et, comme certains analystes le montrent, les erreurs d'expression sont très présentes²⁰. Un élément caractéristique du populisme avancé est la disponibilité affichée des hommes politiques d'écouter et de suivre le « Peuple ». Ce dernier paraît ne plus se contenter de s'exprimer à travers les élections ou les mouvements associatifs et exige des rapports dialogiques avec ses candidats, qui « répondent » par la mise en place des structures

¹⁹ Guy Hermet parle à juste titre de « télépopulisme » et de « cyberpopulisme ». V. Guy Hermet, *Les populismes dans le monde contemporain*, Paris: Fayard, 2001, pp. 400-459.

²⁰ Pour un passage en revue du vocabulaire et de la manière de s'adresser aux citoyens du Président Băsescu, v. l'article de Cătălin Tolontan, « Cele 27353 de cuvinte ale Președintelui Basescu », disponible sur son blog [<http://www.tolo.ro/2009/08/06/cele-27-353-de-cuvinte-ale-lui-traian-basescu>] (consulté le 14 juillet 2017).

assurant les « débats participatifs », comme dans le cas de Ségolène Royal²¹. C'est en échangeant en permanence avec le peuple que le leader populiste moderne peaufine son enracinement politique et électoral.

7. Si nous comparons les logiques politiques dominantes des mouvements populistes classiques une fois leurs leaders arrivés au pouvoir, nous constatons que leurs efforts se concentrent sur la mise en place et le maintien du consensus politique et, plus généralement, du consensus sociétal. Dans l'Allemagne fraîchement unifiée, Otto von Bismarck a habilement imposé le consensus autour des réformes sociales, en jouant sur les divisions des libéraux et des conservateurs auxquels il a opposé les intérêts du peuple²². Comme nous l'avons vu ci-dessus, Mustapha Kemal a procédé d'une manière similaire, certes, dans un contexte sensiblement différent. La carte du consensus a profité aux populistes paternalistes notamment puisque les valeurs jugées consensuelles étaient susceptibles d'être plébiscitées par le peuple et d'affaiblir l'opposition.

Au contraire, la logique dominante des populistes avancés qui ont conquis le pouvoir est celle du dissensus et de la rupture permanente. Cette évolution par rapport au populisme classique est déterminée par l'intensification du rythme événementiel à l'époque de la société médiatique, rythme qui oblige les gouvernants à réagir en temps réel à l'ensemble des changements environnants, d'où le besoin d'une délimitation permanente des camps, des alliés et des adversaires. Réglée à l'heure de la planète, la montre des populistes au pouvoir ne cesse de compter les moments qui restent jusqu'aux prochaines élections, jusqu'aux prochains débats, jusqu'aux prochaines émissions télévisées ou jusqu'au prochain « tchat » en ligne avec les internautes. Or, comme les repères sont forcément flous, il a toujours besoin de marquer ses différences, de montrer les coupables, d'ouvrir un nouveau front. Silvio Berlusconi, Premier

²¹ Pour une analyse pertinente des « débats participatifs », v. Loïc Blondiaux, « La démocratie participative, sous conditions et malgré tout. Un plaidoyer paradoxal en faveur de l'innovation démocratique » in *Mouvements*, n° 50, 2007.

²² Le consensus bismarckien a été un modèle pour le paternalisme à inflexions populistes. V. Olivier Giraud, « Le cas de l'Allemagne: la protection sociale entre tensions et consensus » in *Mouvements*, n° 14, 2001.

Ministre flamboyant de l'Italie et hyper-patron des médias italiennes, est l'exemple du nouveau populiste qui est toujours à la recherche d'un autre prétexte pour inaugurer un nouveau champ de bataille contre l'opposition, les syndicats, les « ringards » ou les « intellectualistes »²³. D'autres leaders populistes, comme l'ancien Président ukrainien Viktor Iouchtchenko, concentrent leur tir sur une personne ou sur une faction particulière, qui présente l'avantage d'être en fonction pour une période plus longue (en l'occurrence, la cible était son Premier Ministre, Iulia Timochenko). N'étant donc plus à l'abri des contestations permanentes, le nouveau populiste ne se permet plus le luxe du consensus ; il suit la rupture qu'il espère contrôler et tourner à son avantage²⁴.

8. Enfin, une dernière différence majeure entre le populisme classique et le populisme avancé est la durée de leurs processus d'agrégation et de leurs effets. Alors que l'émergence d'un leader populiste, la constitution de son mouvement et l'ensemble des phénomènes liés à sa présence au premier plan de la vie politique s'étendent sur plusieurs décennies et les effets à long terme de cette présence sur un demi-siècle, le populisme avancé est beaucoup plus éphémère. Dans le cas des populismes extrémistes, cette précarité est partiellement due au tollé ouvert que ses résultats parfois spectaculaires suscitent de la part des autres partis, de la société civile et de la communauté internationale²⁵. Pour les populismes systémiques et « modérés », la brièveté est due plutôt aux rythmes accélérés

²³ Vu les changements engendrés par le berlusconisme, certains analystes avancent même l'idée d'un passage à la « néo-politique ». V. Pierre Musso, « Le phénomène Berlusconi : ni populisme ni vidéocratie, mais néo-politique » in *Hermès*, n° 42, 2005, pp. 172-180.

²⁴ Nous avons analysé ailleurs les mécanismes de fonctionnement de la logique dissensualiste et ses effets sur les institutions dans le cas particulier de la Roumanie postcommuniste. V. Sergiu Mișcoiu, « Între retorica consensului și practica rupturii. Efectele oscilațiilor strategice asupra percepției publice față de Parlamentul României » in Sergiu Gherghina (dir.), *Cine decide? Partide, reprezentanți și politici în Parlamentul României și cel European*, Iași: Institutul European, 2010, pp. 91-106.

²⁵ Les cordons sanitaires organisés contre le Vlaams Blok en Belgique, contre Le Front National en France, contre le Parti National Britannique au Royaume Uni, contre Le Parti du Progrès en Norvège ou contre le Parti du Peuple au Danemark soulignent cette idée. Ce fut moins le cas du FPÖ de Jorg Haider qui, associé au gouvernement de Wolfgang Schüssel, en 1999, a déterminé l'isolement international de l'Autriche et a fini par se diviser au début des années 2000.

des vies politiques contemporaines qui exigent une succession rapide de changements de nature à bousculer les stratégies à long et à moyen terme. De surcroît, il s'agit d'une incapacité (caractéristique, par ailleurs, à d'autres partis contemporains) d'offrir aux citoyens une identification stable au projet politique avancé par le mouvement en question.

L'émergence du Tea Party aux Etats-Unis est sans doute une marque de cette précarité temporelle du populisme avancé. Cette tendance « populaire-conservatrice » apparue principalement (mais pas uniquement) au sein du Parti Républicain en 2009 a repris symboliquement l'appellation du mouvement des colons américains révoltés contre le niveau des taxes imposées par la Métropole britannique (1773, le Boston Tea Party)²⁶. En se revendiquant d'une tradition liée directement aux Pères Fondateurs, le Tea Party soutient surtout la détaxation, la liberté des collectivités locales et la réduction des dépenses budgétaires. Mais, à la différence des mouvements populistes classiques, le Tea Party est, en fait, un assemblage politique outrancièrement hétéroclite. Etant plutôt une concertation de plates-formes locales, ce mouvement n'a pas un système hiérarchique de direction et préfère soutenir des « formateurs d'opinion » et des notables ou challengers locaux, dont les idées ont plus ou moins une tendance conservatrice. Au sein du mouvement, cohabitent les WASP qui flirtent avec le racisme et notamment l'islamophobie et les tribuns Africains-Américains, tel le commentateur et homme d'affaires géorgien Herman Cain, candidat annoncé à la primaire républicaine pour l'élection présidentielle de 2012. Du point de vue électoral, le Tea Party a servi d'abord comme épouvantail pour les élections à mi-mandat de novembre 2010²⁷. Victorieux dans une série de primaires qui les opposaient à des républicains sortants et « du système », les candidats soutenus par le Tea Party, à quelques exceptions

²⁶ Outre l'appellation, le Tea Party a adopté le drapeau américain ayant treize étoiles rangées en cercles et la chiffre « II » au milieu, symbolisant une seconde révolution américaine. Pour plus de détails concernant l'emploi du symbolisme révolutionnaire par le Tea Party, v. Jill Lepore, *The Whites of Their Eyes: The Tea Party's Revolution and the Battle over American History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.

²⁷ V. Denis Lacorne, « Tea Party, une vague de fond », in *Le Monde*, 19 octobre 2010, p. 22. V. aussi le livre bien documenté de Scott Rasmussen et Doug Schoen, *Mad As Hell: How the Tea Party Movement Is Fundamentally Remaking Our Two-Party System*, New York: Harper, 2010, qui pêche quand même par une surévaluation très évidente du poids du Tea Party sur le système politique américain.

près²⁸, ont remporté des résultats modestes et ont réussi uniquement à faire mobiliser les démocrates et les républicains modérés pour leur faire barrage. Tirillé entre les propos «réguliers» des notables déjà en place, qui ont parfois durci leurs discours afin d'obtenir le soutien de ce mouvement et les nouveaux stars qui n'ont pas hésité à présenter des propos ultra-radicaux²⁹, le Tea Party a certainement influencé le débat public, mais, faute d'élus et surtout d'une convergence doctrinale et organisationnelle, il aura peu de chances à peser sur le sort de l'élection présidentielle de 2012 autrement qu'en mettant en difficulté la direction du Parti Républicain. Une fois la crise économique passée, il est donc probable que le Tea Party s'aligne aux règles de l'establishment, même si certains de ses anciens ténors garderont les accents d'une rhétorique traditionnellement populiste.

Pour conclure, cette comparaison nous permet de comprendre que le populisme classique et le populisme avancé ont des éléments fondamentaux communs – l'appel au « Peuple », l'organisation autour d'un leader charismatique, l'anti-élitisme ; mais aussi des éléments dissimilaires, que nous avons synthétisés dans les huit points présentés ci-dessus. On peut donc répondre à la question de l'existence du néo-populisme en avançant l'idée que, vu la comparaison d'en-haut, les éléments qui différencient les deux sont suffisamment importants pour faire du néo-populisme non pas nécessairement une idéologie à part, mais un courant fortement renouvelé et adapté à l'intérieur de la famille plus large du populisme.

Bibliographie

1. Akeret, Matthias (2007), *Le principe Blocher : manuel de direction*, Schaffhouse: Meier.
2. Albertazzi, Daniele; O'Donnell, Duncan (2008), « Introduction » in Daniele Albertazzi et Duncan O'Donnell (dir.), *Twenty-first Century Populism. The Spectre of Western European Democracy*, Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan.

²⁸ Comme l'une des figures les plus médiatisée du Tea Party, Marco Rubio, qui a été élu comme sénateur de la Floride ou comme des sortants républicains, tels le sénateur de la Caroline du Sud, Jim DeMint, qui a rejoint le mouvement afin de se faire réélire.

²⁹ C'est notamment le cas de Christine O'Donnell, candidate républicaine dans le Delaware soutenue par la Tea Party, qui n'a pas hésité à remettre en cause la contraception, la science moderne ou toute forme d'assistance sociale.

3. Ardit, Benjamin, « Populism as an Internal Periphery of Democratic Politics » in Francisco Panizza (dir.) (2005), *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, London: Verso.
4. Betz, Hans-Georg; Immerfall, Steffan (dir.) (1998), *The New Politics of the Right. Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies*, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
5. Braun, Herbert (1985), *The Assassination of Gaitán : Public Life and Urban Violence in Colombia*, Madison, Wisconsin.
6. Gerber, Elisabeth R. (1999), *The Populist Paradox. Interest Group Influence and the Paradox of Direct Legislation*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
7. Greskovits, Béla (1998), *The Political Economy of Protest and Patience: East European and Latin American Transformations Compared*, Budapest: CEU Press.
8. Hermet, Guy (2001), *Les populismes dans le monde contemporain*, Paris: Fayard.
9. Hermet, Guy (2007), *L'hiver de la démocratie ou le nouveau régime*, Paris: Armand Colin.
10. Ionescu, Ghiță (1969), « Eastern Europe », in Ghiță Ionescu, Ernst Gellner (dir.), *Populism, Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
11. Laclau, Ernesto (2008), *La raison populiste*, Paris: Seuil.
12. Loewenstein, Karl (1973), *Brazil Under Vargas*, New York: Russell & Russell.
13. Mișcoiu, Sergiu (2005), *Le Front National et ses répercussions sur l'échiquier politique français*, Cluj-Napoca: Efes.
14. Mișcoiu, Sergiu (2008), « Citoyenneté et identité nationale: les limites du retour gauche-droite en France lors de l'élection présidentielle de 2007 » dans Sergiu Mișcoiu, Chantal Delsol, Bertrand Alliot (dir.), *Identités politiques et dynamiques partisanes en France*, Cluj: Efes.
15. Mișcoiu, Sergiu (2010), « Între retorica consensului și practica rupturii. Efectele oscilațiilor strategice asupra percepției publice față de Parlamentul României » in Sergiu Gherghina (coord.), *Cine decide? Partide, reprezentanți și politici în Parlamentul României și cel European*, Iași: Institutul European.

16. Mișcoiu, Sergiu; Crăciun, Oana; Colopelnic, Nicoleta (2008), *Radicalism, Populism, Interventionism. Three Approaches Based on Discourse Theory*, Cluj: Efes.
17. Mișcoiu, Sergiu (2010), « Introducere » in Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Mișcoiu (dir.), *Partide și personalități populiste în România post-comunistă*, Iași: Institutul European.
18. Mudde, Cas (2002), « In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People: Populisms in Eastern Europe » in Yves Mény, Yves Surel (dir.), *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan.
19. Musso, Pierre (2005), « Le phénomène Berlusconi : ni populisme ni vidéocratie, mais néo-politique » in *Hermès*, no 42.
20. Pazos, Luis (1988), *O rezinho populista*, Sao Paulo: Ed. Inconfidentes.
21. Pilsudski, Joseph (1935), *Du révolutionnaire au chef d'Etat: 1893-1935. Pages choisies des dix volumes des « Œuvres, discours, ordres »*, Paris: Société française d'éditions littéraires et techniques
22. Rasmussen, Scott; Schoen, Doug (2010), *Mad As Hell: How the Tea Party Movement Is Fundamentally Remaking Our Two-Party System*, New York: Harper.
23. Shafir, Michael (2008), « From Historical to 'Dialectical' Populism: The Case of Post-Communist Romania » in *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. 50, n° 3-4.
24. Taguieff, Pierre-André (2007), *L'illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogies à l'ère démocratique*, Paris: Champs, Flammarion.

POPULISM AND LEADERSHIP: IS THERE ANYTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN?

Sorina Soare*

DOI: 10.24193/subbeuropaea.2017.3.06

Published Online: 2017-09-30

Published Print: 2017-09-30

Abstract

The literature on populism tends to consider dominant leaders as a characteristic feature of populist parties across time and space. However, we know very little about what the populist leadership is about. In this context, this article aims to contribute to a relatively unexplored arena of populist studies, which is what is special about the populist political leadership in an increasingly personalised politics. In the attempt to bridge the literature on populism and personalization of politics, the article argues that populist leadership mirrors the nucleus of the populist discourse. The centrality of the party leader translates in most cases into the emphasis on the unmediated, hence un-institutionalized, genuine democracy that populist parties tend to preach. Because of the veneration of the people, populist leadership is not primarily about communicational skill and (technical) competence but also – first and foremost – a continuously demonstrated trust. Hence the populist leadership is about the mutual pursuit of the people's interests. Populist leaders must demonstrate by both word and personal example that they are from the people, like the people.

Keywords: populism, parties, leadership, people, personalisation

Intimately linked to democracy, political parties are multifaceted objects of research. Since the late 1950s, the literature has conceived the transformation of Western European parties into electoral agencies in parallel to the strengthening of the party leader's organisational power.

* Sorina Soare is Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the University of Florence. She holds a PhD in political science from the Université libre de Bruxelles.

Contact: ssoare@unifi.it

Implicit in Kirchheimer's 1966 interpretation¹, the professionalization of the party organisation was to be explicitly developed by Panebianco² in relation to the diffusion of the electoral-professional party with its increased appeal to the electorate and the pre-eminence of personalised leadership.³ Although the focus of cartel party theory was mainly linked to the relation between parties and state, Katz and Mair's⁴ concept also placed emphasis on an increasingly professional and technocratic party, "focused less on differences in policy and more (...) on the provision of spectacle, image and theatre".⁵ These transformations changed scholars' views on the relationship between citizens (voters) and political parties.⁶ Within a process of the individualisation of social life⁷, contemporary politics was to be encompassed as a personalised arena "in which the political weight of the individual actor in the political process increases over time, while the centrality of the political group (i.e., political party) declines"⁸.

Behind this process of the personalisation of politics, there is a major paradox.⁹ On the one hand, governmental agenda have progressively become more and more complex. On the other, leader-centred politics dismisses the comfort of the division of labour assured by a variety of co-

¹ Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of Western European Party Systems", in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966, pp.177-200.

² Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 264.

³ Jonathan Hopkin and Caterina Paolucci, "The Business Firm Model of Party Organisation: Cases from Spain and Italy", in *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 35, no 3, 1999, p. 308.

⁴ Richard Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party", in *Party Politics*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1995.

⁵ Richard Katz and Peter Mair, "The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement", in *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 7, no 4, p. 755.

⁶ Lauri Karvonen, *The Personalisation of Politics. A Study of Parliamentary Democracies*, Colchester: ECPR Press, 2010, p. 1.

⁷ Among others see Zygmunt Bauman, *The Individualized Society*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001.

⁸ Gideon Rahat and Tamir Shaefer, "The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel, 1949–2003", in *Political Communication*, vol. 24, no 1, 2007, p. 65.

⁹ Albert Mabilleau, "La personnalisation du Pouvoir dans les gouvernements démocratiques", in *Revue française de science politique*, vol. 10, no. 1, 1960, pp. 39-65.

ordinated institutions.¹⁰ This undeniable paradox is counterbalanced by a major advantage in terms of accountability. The personalisation of politics is a direct consequence of the increased emphasis contemporary democracies lay on the “duty” of the citizenry (voters) to demand an account of the performance of elected offices. Hence, the personalization of politics enables voters to maintain or sanction their relationship with those in elected office in the light of this account in a simplified, clearer manner.

The literature on populist parties, a related field of research, tends to consider dominant leaders as a characteristic feature of populist parties across time and space.¹¹ Only a few texts question this prevailing interpretation.¹² From the point of view of the dimension at hand, most of the literature focuses on how populist leaders portray themselves and how they perform in public, while very limited research is conducted from the demand-side perspective.¹³ This is far from being an issue of detail. As McDonnell rightly stresses¹⁴, the “charismatic” leadership associated with populism does not fit within the Weberian definition, which holds that “what is alone important is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, by his ‘followers’ or ‘disciples’”¹⁵. Moreover, there is limited research on the precise organisational leverages populist leaders have at their disposal in order to assess the strength of their leadership.¹⁶ This is consistent with the literature review provided by Heinisch and Mazzoleni in the introduction to their seminal volume on populist parties’ organization: “Western European populist parties have

¹⁰ Mabileau, *op. cit.*

¹¹ Paul Taggart, *Populism*, Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000; Yves Mény and Yves Surel (eds.), *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, New York: Palgrave, 2002; Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (eds.), *Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western European Democracy*, London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

¹² Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Populism and Political Leadership”, in R. A. W. Rhodes and Paul ‘t Hart (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 376–388; Duncan McDonnell, “Populist Leaders and Coterie Charisma”, in *Political Studies*, vol. 64, no. 3, 2016, pp. 719-733.

¹³ McDonnell, *op. cit.*

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 719.

¹⁵ Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978, p. 242 quoted by McDonnell, *op. cit.*, p. 719.

¹⁶ Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni (eds.), *Understand Populist Party Organization: The Radical Right in Western Europe*, New York: Palgrave, 2016.

been more or less implicitly framed as ‘charismatic parties’ with centralized leadership, a strong loyalty to the leader to ensure party cohesion, feeble organization, and a tiny bureaucratic apparatus”¹⁷. Despite the abundance of studies on populist parties’ general features, we know very little about their leadership and this is striking, considering that their leaders are among the most well-known faces of contemporary European politics. Kriesi summarizes the general features of the populist leaders¹⁸: “the monolithic conception of the populist leader (...) corresponds to the monolithic conception of the people”. But in most cases, Heinisch and Mazzoleni’s statement, quoted above, can be easily adapted to populist leadership, considering that (Western) European populist parties have been more or less implicitly framed as the political organization of their leader, with a hierarchical structure and centralized decision-making.

Considering these caveats, it is important, however, that there is a widespread assessment that populist leaders are the driving forces of their parties. In this context, scholars like Zanatta¹⁹ have compared populism to a sort of “secular religion”, with its own prophet acting not in the name of God but of “the people”. In a similar vein, populist leaders have been compared to contemporary *tribuni plebis*, claiming the legitimate right to intervene in cases in which the community of the genuine people is unfairly menaced by rapacious élites.²⁰ The bottom line is that populist leaders are supposed to play a strategic role in the relationship with the electorate by signalling that they are not beholden to mainstream political interests: in other words, that they are not corruptible or unduly influenced by “the enemy” of the people. However, most literature on the topic is based on what Mudde critically assesses as “received wisdom”²¹. In other

¹⁷ Heinisch and Mazzoleni, *op. cit.*

¹⁸ Hans Kriesi, “The Populist Challenge”, in *West European Politics*, vol. 37, no. 2, 2014, pp. 361-378.

¹⁹ Loris Zanatta, “Il populismo, sul nucleo forte di un’ideologia debole”, in *Polis*, vol. XVI, 2001, pp. 263-292.

²⁰ Sorina Soare, “Hit by Populism: Democracy in Ruins”, in *Southeastern Europe*, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 25 – 55.

²¹ Cas Mudde, “The Study of Populist Radical Right Parties: Towards a Fourth Wave”, in *CREX Working Papers*, 2017, available at [<https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/publications/c-rex-working-paper-series/Cas%20Mudde:%20The%20Study%20of%20Populist%20Radical%20Right%20Parties.pdf>], accessed July 2017.

words, there is relatively little systematic research on topics that go beyond the general features of populist parties, namely their discourses. Although this article does not make use of new data, it aims to contribute to a relatively unexplored arena of populist studies, which is what is special about the populist political leadership in an increasingly personalised politics²².

If we take into account the literature on the personalisation of politics, there might be a couple of interesting points to add to the current knowledge. It is the intention of this paper to bridge the two literatures. The starting point is that, while the personalisation of politics has been described as the destination point of complex evolutions in contemporary democracies, the relevance of leadership in the populist politics can be considered an *ab origine* element. I hence argue that personalised politics is, above all, a birth sign in the case of populism. Rather than the result of external stimuli or of an adaptation to a progressive personalization of its main competitors, as in the case of the general phenomenon identified by the literature, in my understanding, populist leadership ought to be seen as the transposition of the “populist verb” (the thin-ideology) into a “populist actor” (the party public figure). My assumption is that populist leadership mirrors the nucleus of the populist discourse, which is the veneration of the people as “the source of sovereignty, above all representation”²³. I fully acknowledge that the same authority (the people) is praised by democracy too and, as such, by all the mainstream parties. Still, as Pasquino notes, the definition of democracy goes beyond a simple etymological reference to the “power of the people” as in the case of the populist discourse; democracy refers to “the people” as citizens with rights and duties or, in other words, to the power of sovereignty exercised within the constitutionally codified limits and forms.²⁴ Populist parties claim to restore the genuine authority of the people by diminishing or cancelling the distortions generated by

²² Nicole Bolleyer, *New Parties in Old Party Systems: Persistence and Decline in Seventeen Democracies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; Mudde and Kaltwasser, *op. cit.*; McDonnell, *op. cit.*; Heinisch and Mazzoleni, *op. cit.*

²³ Zanatta, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

²⁴ Gianfranco Pasquino, “Populism and Democracy,” in Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (eds), *Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western European Democracy*, London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 15-16.

institutional and procedural mechanisms.²⁵ The centrality of the party leader translates in most cases into the emphasis on the unmediated, hence un-institutionalized, genuine democracy populist parties tend to preach. This means that leaderless populism is not impossible; on the contrary, it is part of the documented empirical evidence of the most recent literature.²⁶ However, in an increasingly personalised politics, personalised populist leadership seems to be the norm. Still, this does not mean that populist leadership is just one among many others. It has its peculiarity, which is the content of its public discourses. Because of the veneration of the people, populist leadership is not primarily about communicational skill and (technical) competence but also – first and foremost – a continuously demonstrated trust. Hence the populist leadership is about the mutual pursuit of the people's interests. Populist leaders must demonstrate by both word and personal example that they are from the people, like the people.

In order to grasp the peculiar position of populist leaders in the populist politics, we shall first provide a general overview of the features of contemporary leadership in order to be able to compare the general assumptions of the literature with the specific cases of populist leadership in the literature, a topic covered in the second section. In the following section, I shall provide a synthetic, empirical analysis of populist leaders. I shall conclude this analysis with several general remarks.

The importance of leadership in contemporary politics

The role and the features of (political) leadership have been an established topic of research for centuries. This is hardly surprising considering that leadership is as old as humankind.²⁷ However, the conceptual frontiers of leadership remain porous and rather vague. Leadership refers to the most varied areas, ranging from sport teams to school classes, from professional to political arenas.²⁸ In order to grasp the complexity of the concept, a brief overview of its etymology is particularly

²⁵ Yves Mény, "La costitutiva ambiguità del populismo", in *Filosofia politica*, vol. XVIII, no. 3, p. 361.

²⁶ Mudde and Kaltwasser, *op. cit.*

²⁷ Jean Blondel, *Political Leadership. Towards a General Analysis*, London: Sage Publications, 1987, p. 1.

²⁸ Blondel, *op. cit.*

useful. Drawing upon the etymological reconstruction of Regalia²⁹, the word leadership derives from the English verb “to lead” with meanings such as to control, to be in charge of or in command of, to go with one by holding them physically in order to show the direction, etc. As rightly illustrated by Regalia³⁰, the verb “to lead” implies both a physical and an emotional dimension of motion towards a physical direction or an idea, a goal. The same complexity is echoed by the ancient Greek verb ἄγω (ago) and the noun ἀγῶγός (agonos) whose meaning is particularly important for the most recent declinations of the concept. I refer once again to Regalia’s interpretation: ἀγῶγός is not only the person that guides but also the person able to seduce, an appealing person as one might say today, a person that stimulates and requires obedience.³¹

It is since Weber's famous writings on the concept of charismatic leadership at the beginning of the 20th century that the concept receives a renewed attention. On this ground, the literature agreed the leadership is an issue of power, although not any kind of power: a legitimate power³², a hierarchical³³ and, last but not least, a relational one³⁴. Without neglecting the complexity of the issue and the different nuances in Weber’s writings³⁵, the literature agrees that, for Weber the concept of the charismatic leader is linked foremost to a strong personal appeal and extraordinary qualities, particularly relevant in time of crisis. According to the German sociologist, charismatic leadership is strongly dependent on the followership; if the leadership fails to benefit his or her followers, it is most likely that his charisma will disappear.³⁶ This relational aspect continues to be central to the literature. Leadership is described not only in terms of skills, competences and qualities used to mobilise followers but also in connection with a mutual exchange of trust and loyalty. This line of interpretation can be traced back to Burns’ seminal book on leadership. Burns defines

²⁹ Marta Regalia, “La leadership: concetto, concezioni e rappresentazioni”, in *Rivista italiana di scienza politica*, vol. XLII, no. 3, 2012, pp. 385-398.

³⁰ Regalia, *op. cit.*, p. 385-386.

³¹ Regalia, *op. cit.*

³² Luciano Cavalli, *Il capo carismatico*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1981, p. 24.

³³ Blondel, *op. cit.*

³⁴ Weber, *op. cit.*

³⁵ Cavalli, *op. cit.*

³⁶ Weber, *op. cit.*

leadership as being “inseparable from followers’ needs and goals”³⁷. Hence leadership is not only about the personal attributes of the leader but about a so-called mutual pursuit of interest that connects the perceptions and expectations of both leaders and followers.³⁸ I conclude with Gardner’s observation: leaders are “persons who, by word and/or personal example, markedly influence the behaviours, thoughts, and/or feelings of a significant number of their fellow human beings”³⁹.

In addition to these general considerations, according to students of contemporary democracies there is an ongoing process of personalisation of politics in our societies. The search for “charismatic leaders” has become a routine operation in contemporary politics. This process is commonly referred to as “candidate-centred politics”, “personalization”, “leaderisation” or even “presidentialisation” of politics.⁴⁰ Although not fully overlapping, these processes have been explained as direct consequences of intertwined factors: the internationalization/Europeanisation of domestic politics, the changing dynamics of mass communications and recent technological innovations, the erosion of traditional cleavage-based politics and organisational changes within parties, the increased individualization of social life. The gist of the story is that (charismatic) political leaders have become increasingly visible and, instead than a story of party politics, contemporary politics has become the arena of leader-based politics within what Manin called an audience democracy⁴¹. This process has impacted upon both the supply-side (the institutional arena) and the demand-side (voters and supporters). In relation to the supply side, Poguntke and

³⁷ James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership*, New York: Harper & Row, 1976, p. 19.

³⁸ Edwin P. Hollander, “Relating Leadership to Active Followership”, in Richard A. Couto (ed.), *Reflections on Leadership*, Lanham: University Press of America, 2007, pp. 57-66.

³⁹ H. Gardner, *Leading Minds: An Anatomy of Leadership*, New York: Basic Books, 1995, p. 8 quoted by Hollander, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

⁴⁰ See among others: Martin Wattenberg, *The Rise of Candidate-Centered Politics*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987; David Swanson and Paolo Mancini, *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and Their Consequences*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996; Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb (eds.), *The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; Karvonen, *op. cit.*

⁴¹ Bernard Manin, *Principles of Representative Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Webb⁴² have associated the increasing power resources of leadership with major autonomy within the party (coupled with an increased role for the political executive) and an increasingly leadership-centred electoral process. Their interpretation has been included in a progressive trend towards 'presidentialised' executive politics, although numerous conceptual and empirical criticisms and cautious interpretations have been developed since then.⁴³ On the demand-side, the visibility of the leaders has influenced the way in which voters, members and/or supporters perceive and evaluate their leaders. The literature has documented a relatively important shift in voters' interests from issues to specific candidates. Moreover, voters and supporters tend to apply cognitive frameworks usually employed in everyday life to the evaluation of political leaders to the extent that the "symbolic closeness to the masses has become a necessary condition for emergence and electoral success of a political leadership"⁴⁴. As with the relational dimension of the charismatic leadership, contemporary politics is less about what the leader is and more about what people perceive the leader to be. Leaders, then, tend to speak, dress and behave like common voters: their language is less sophisticated, their dress code is more relaxed and they let themselves be seen in the most mundane aspects of their lives (i.e. they go to supermarket queuing to buy fruit and vegetables, go to pub, ride bicycles instead of official cars, exhibit their attendance of football matches and music concerts, they publicly sing popular songs or play music instruments, etc.).

The literature agrees that the personal characteristics of leaders, or more specifically their perception among their followers, is important in explaining voting behaviour.⁴⁵ Intuitively, voters' preferences for candidates are guided by their perception of the candidates as competent, honest and trustworthy persons. However, electoral dynamics across Europe and the United States seem to show a different picture. The

⁴² Poguntke and Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁴³ Keith Dowding, "The Prime Ministerialisation of the British Prime Minister", in *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. n. 3, 2013, pp. 617-635.

⁴⁴ Diego Grazia, "The personalization of politics in Western democracies: Causes and consequences on leader-follower relationships", in *The Leadership Quarterly*, vol. 22, no. 4, 2011, pp. 697-709.

⁴⁵ Mauro Barisione, *L'immagine del leader. Quanto conta per gli elettori?*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006.

perception of skilfulness and trustworthiness is filtered by the increased demand of identification between leaders and followers (voters and/or supporters) to the point that the ideal candidate looks more and more like a person whom the voter can understand and speak with. In an outstanding attempt to explain this deviation from the intuitive rationale behind electoral behaviour, Garzia⁴⁶ emphasises the so-called lowering effect of television and new media, which has brought leaders to the level of their audience. One caveat ought to be mentioned. Contemporary politics is influenced by the role played by professionals in marketing candidates and programmes. Candidates' images and content are "packaged" according to the preferences of the voters.⁴⁷ This means, concretely, that the frontier between popular and populist sometimes becomes blurred. The extensive use of political marketing to shape voters' perceptions and their personal abilities to act as empathic public communicator have led some to consider that popular politicians like Tony Blair, Nicolas Sarkozy or Matteo Renzi are part of the populist pantheon. However, as rightly observed by Mudde and Kaltwasser⁴⁸, all these leaders occasionally behaved opportunistically, but their support for political pluralism as well as membership of the establishment prevented full exploitation of a Manichean vision of the society and radical critique of the establishment. By referring to the Ancient philosophy, it is possible to consider these politicians not as populists, but good rhetoricians, able to understand "what is possibly persuasive" not only in terms of good arguments and solid proofs but also in emotional terms⁴⁹.

Although perceptions of honesty and trustfulness remain central in guiding voters' choices, additional personal skills of leaders are also taken into account. Almost compulsorily, leaders and successful candidates are supposed to be in possession of communicative and expressive capacities. These elements have been part of the rhetorician's toolbox since the Ancient Greeks and, most notably, cannot be understood as attempts to

⁴⁶ Garzia, *op. cit.*

⁴⁷ Donatella Campus, *L'antipolitica al governo. De Gaulle, Reagan, Berlusconi*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007.

⁴⁸ Kaltwasser and Mudde, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

⁴⁹ Salvatore Di Piazza, "Fiducia ed argomentazione. Una prospettiva aristotelica", in *Rivista italiana di filosofia del linguaggio*, vol. 6, no.3, 2012, pp. 41-52.

outwit the audience or to manipulate it. In direct connection with this short digression, the similarity-attraction paradigm, analysed among others by Caprara and Zimbardo⁵⁰, provides an updated explanatory framework for clarifying how voters are attracted to candidates who are similar, rather than dissimilar. To illustrate this paradigm, one can cite Silvio Berlusconi's strategic investment in building a similarity based on proximity with Italian voters. In 2001, he mailed his personal biography to every single family in Italy in the form of 128-page book describes him as the personification of the 'Italian dream'. Despite different corruption scandals, his excellent skills as a public communicator, as well as his control over the media, made him a politician whom a high percentage of electorate felt they could trust. The history of Berlusconi's political career is less about what the leader is in terms of objective criteria's (for example, the number of legal cases and judgements), but about what his voters perceive Berlusconi to be. Caprara and Zimbardo⁵¹ synthesize what appears to be an apparently illogical behaviour: "we want to trust competent leaders, but we also want to like them personally, and this is easier when they are perceived as essentially similar to us". Note that in this context the traditional role of parties in connecting the state and the citizenry progressively almost vanished into thin air. The once party-based democracy evolved towards an increasingly "partyless democracy"⁵² compensated for by a person-based capacity to bring people together (in parties or in elections) in order to achieve control of the government and shape policies.

While modern political democracy is usually understood as party-based democracy, contemporary democracy is increasingly becoming a person-based democracy. In this context, the personalization of politics should also be seen as the process by which the political weight of party leaders and candidates increases over time not only within the political process as a whole but also within the parties they represent. In respect of

⁵⁰ Gian Vittorio Caprara and Philip G. Zimbardo, "Personalizing Politics", in *The American Psychologist*, vol. 59, 2004, pp. 581–594 quoted by Garzia, *op. cit.*, 706.

⁵¹ Caprara and Zimbardo, *op. cit.*, p. 590 quoted by Garzia, *op. cit.*, p. 706.

⁵² Peter Mair, "Partyless Democracy. Solving the Paradox of New Labour?", *New Left Review*, no. 2, 2000, available at [<https://newleftreview.org/II/2/peter-mair-partyless-democracy>], accessed June 2017.

party politics, the process of personalisation has been associated with a favourable opportunity structure for party leaders to accumulate power.⁵³ The role played by contemporary party leaders has progressively expanded, as illustrated by the increased control of the party leader on the party in public office. Within the party, a strong leadership has also been associated with the broadening of the leadership selectorate⁵⁴. Outside the party, a strong leadership goes hand in hand with targeted media coverage and an increased role in influencing electoral dynamics in terms of voters' preferences.

The importance of leadership in populist politics

Despite persistent doubts regarding its conceptual solidity, scholars, experts, politicians, and journalists tend to rely regularly on the term "populism" to describe a wide plethora of political phenomena, which have built their political platforms on a rather vaguely defined moral and ethical struggle between "the people" and a wide range of internal and external menaces. Not surprisingly, when dealing with populism, the main challenge refers to the difficulty in assessing what populism is. Most frequently, scholars identify different chronological periods of populism(s), with significant variations both in the form and in the intensity of their manifestation. In order to define populism, different conceptual approaches have been debated and fine-tuned, among which are populism as an ideology, a discourse or a strategy.⁵⁵ Accordingly, these scholars point to different features of populism, in which various kinds of extremisms, criticisms and anti-isms in general cohabitate.

One line of analysis frames populism as a "thin-centred ideology" considering that "it expresses a distinct and internally coherent map of the political, but thin in its focus on broad normative principles and ontological

⁵³ Poguntke and Webb, *op. cit.*

⁵⁴ Jean-Benoit Pilet and William Cross (eds.), *The Selection of Political Party Leaders in Contemporary Parliamentary Democracies. A Comparative Study*, London: Routledge, 2014.

⁵⁵ See Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski, "Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda", in *Weatherhead Working Paper Series*, No. 13-0004, 2013, available at [<https://scholar.harvard.edu/gidron/publications/varieties-populism-literature-review-and-research-agenda>], accessed July 2017.

matters rather than the detail of the policy”⁵⁶. Consequently, scholars like Tarchi⁵⁷, Albertazzi and McDonnell⁵⁸, and Mudde⁵⁹ agree that populism’s mental framework depicts society as separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite”. Accordingly, populism pervades traditional ideological frontiers and blends with both left and right-wing features, the direction and its intensity depending upon the socio-political context within which the populist parties mobilize.⁶⁰ On this basis, references to the pure people, the corrupt elite and the general will are considered the necessary and sufficient conditions for classifying a phenomenon as populist.⁶¹ Seen as a specific mental framework, scholars focus for the most part on partisan texts, with relatively limited focus on the organizational dimension. However, as illustrated by Mudde⁶², this is less an issue of lack of interest and more a consequence of the literature’s focus over the last decades on reinforcing the conceptual solidity of populism.

As illustrated by Gidron and Bonikowski’s⁶³ extremely useful reconstruction of the varieties of populism, there is also a group of scholars that tend to focus on the discursive dimension. The Manichean depiction of a moral and ethical clash between the people and élites provides the frame of reference of a specific interpretation of the political world.⁶⁴ This part of the literature uses the binary division as a very feature of the political dimension in which there are important variations in time (and in degrees) and between political actors. Those who define populism as a discursive approach include in their interpretational frame the role of a strong and flamboyant leader whose hold on the electorate is built upon seductive

⁵⁶ Ben Stanley, “The Thin Ideology of Populism”, in *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol. 13, no. 1, 2008, p. 102.

⁵⁷ Marco Tarchi, *Italia populista. Dal qualunquismo a Beppe Grillo*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2015.

⁵⁸ Albertazzi and McDonnell, *op. cit.*

⁵⁹ Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist”, in *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 39, no. 4, 2004, pp. 542-563.

⁶⁰ Mudde and Kaltwasser, *op. cit.*

⁶¹ Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “The Responses of Populism to Dahl’s Democratic Dilemmas”, in *Political Studies*, vol. 62, no. 3, 2014, p. 479.

⁶² Mudde 2017, *op. cit.*

⁶³ Gidron and Bonikowski, *op. cit.*

⁶⁴ Kirk Hawkins, *Venezuela’s Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

narrative about the exploitation of the common people by the establishment. On this point, as Mudde and Kaltwasser point out⁶⁵, those who defend a discursive approach consider that, at least under specific historical circumstances, populist discourse is not a narration promoted by the political leader, but instead the leader becomes the very vehicle for a demand of populism manifest within the society.

Following Gidron and Bonikowski⁶⁶, populism is also encompassed as a strategic opportunity for mass mobilization. Weyland provides the most authoritative definition of populism as a political strategy with a focus on the organizational dimension. Accordingly, populism is defined as a “political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, un-institutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers”⁶⁷. The relevance of the content of the *forma mentis* is downgraded in favor of the flamboyant leadership. Weyland’s definition echoes the context of reference, which is Latin America, and the recurrent electoral exploits of political entrepreneurs who are able to mobilize different social groups around the denunciation of the corrupt establishment.⁶⁸ Without neglecting the argumentative dimension, a related interpretation can be found in Taggart⁶⁹, according to which populist parties are intimately connected with a centralized organization and a strong leadership. Mény and Surel⁷⁰ describe charismatic leadership as being both a source of unity for the party and the basis of the success achieved by populist mobilizations.

Historically speaking, the first documented forms of populism, the Russian Narodnik movement and the American Farmers, are characterized by the absence of a strong leadership.⁷¹ However, during the same period, a French form of populism developed in strong synergy with the personal

⁶⁵ Mudde and Kaltwasser, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

⁶⁶ Gidron and Bonikowski, *op. cit.*

⁶⁷ Kurt Weyland, “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics”, in *Comparative Politics*, 2011, vol. 34, no. 1, p. 14.

⁶⁸ Mudde and Kaltwasser, *op. cit.*, p. 378.

⁶⁹ Taggart, *op. cit.*

⁷⁰ Mény and Surel, *op. cit.*

⁷¹ Guy Hermet, *Les populismes dans le monde. Une histoire sociologique. XIXe-XXe siècle*, Paris: Fayard, 2001.

ascent of a leader, General Georges Boulanger.⁷² With the new century, it was not only the content of the different forms of populism that proliferated in Latin America and Europe progressively that mutated but the features too. Most 20th century forms of populisms have been described as being strongly dependent on the figure of the leader. This is the case with the populist tribunes of Juan Domingo Perón or Getulio Vargas in Brazil.⁷³ Similarly, the dominant leadership of Guglielmo Giannini in the case of Everyman's Front in Italy or Pierre Poujade's Union for the Defence of Tradesmen and Artisans have been quoted as prototypes of a personalized populism. The magnetism of the leaders has been used as a recurrent explanation for the rapid success of different forms of populism in other continents, as detailed by Mudde and Kaltwasser.⁷⁴ In most of the cases documented by the literature until the 1990s, the presence of strong leadership was associated with feeble organizations and underdeveloped bureaucratic apparatus. The symbiosis between dominant leaders and feebly institutionalized populist parties was further associated with the limited possibility these parties had of surviving without their leaders. Leaders' transitions were considered to be lethal moments in the life of populist parties. However, with the new century the empirical evidence has rapidly fine-tuned. The symbiosis between Jörg Haider and Austrian Freedom party (FPÖ) and the founding of the Alliance for the Future of Austria in 2005 as a splinter of the FPÖ, led by Haider himself, did not compromise the electoral viability of the FPÖ. Despite continuity in terms of strong leadership, Heinz-Christian Strache's chairmanship differs from the model of Haider.⁷⁵ Continuous changes at in the direction of the party have been documented in the case of the Slovak National Party.⁷⁶ The replacement of Umberto Bossi as leader of the Northern League, first with a triumvirate and then with the younger Matteo Salvini, has not been very

⁷² *Ibidem*.

⁷³ *Ibidem*

⁷⁴ Mudde and Kaltwasser, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

⁷⁵ Reinhard Heinisch, "The Austrian Freedom Party: Organizational Development and Leadership Change", in Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni (eds.), *Understand Populist Party Organization: The Radical Right in Western Europe*, New York: Palgrave, 2016, pp. 19-48.

⁷⁶ Sorina Soare, "Io sono (come) voi! Alla ricerca della mobilitazione elettorale: leader e partiti populistici nell'Europa postcomunista", in *Società Mutamento Politica. Rivista italiana di sociologia*, vol. 8, no. 15, 2017, pp. 353-378.

traumatic either.⁷⁷ Marine Le Pen succeeded her father in leading Front National and, despite a rearrangement of the public discourse, maintained familial model of autocratic leadership within a highly centralized hierarchical party organization.⁷⁸ There are numerous other cases that document the fact that, despite the existence of a dominant leader, even a founding leader, most populist parties outlive their leaders.⁷⁹

In the end, populist parties regularly have a surname. It is Le Pen's Front National, Strache's FPÖ, Savini's Northern League, etc. Yet not all leaders are particularly dominant. The origins of the parties are particularly useful in understanding how and why some of these parties outlive their leaders. Bolleyer⁸⁰ provides us with a brilliant argument on this point. Not all populist political entrepreneurs are equally able to consolidate an electoral base in the longer term; in a brilliant demonstration, Bolleyer lays emphasis on the long-term implications of the party origins, with direct consequences on the orientations of founding leaders and the formation of a lasting party infrastructure (2013). Moreover, as Heinisch and Mazzoleni remind us⁸¹, not all those who were perceived to be party leaders - Philip Dewinter for the Flemish Interest Party - were effectively leader of the party. The same applies in the case of Dan Diaconescu in the case of the People's Party Dan Diaconescu.⁸²

Drawing on the literature, it is possible to identify the different degrees of relevance of the party leadership to populist parties. This ranges from the top importance in the case of the political strategy approach through to a relevant although not compulsory role in the schemes of analysis endorsed by the discourse-based and thin-ideology approaches.

⁷⁷ Duncan McDonnell and Davide Vampa, "The Italian Lega Nord", in Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni (eds.), *Understand Populist Party Organization: The Radical Right in Western Europe*, New York: Palgrave, 2016, pp. 105-130.

⁷⁸ Gilles Ivaldi and Maria Elisabetta Lanzone, "The French Front National: Organizational Change and Adaptation from Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen", in Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni (eds.), *Understand Populist Party Organization: The Radical Right in Western Europe*, New York: Palgrave, 2016, pp. 131-158.

⁷⁹ Mudde and Kaltwasser, *op. cit.*, p.382. Bolleyer, *op. cit.*

⁸⁰ Bolleyer, *op. cit.*

⁸¹ Heinisch and Mazzoleni, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

⁸² Sergiu Gherghina and Sorina Soare, "From TV to Parliament: The Successful Birth and Progressive Death of a Personal Party. The Case of the People's Party Dan Diaconescu", in *Politologický časopis/Czech Journal of Political Science*, vol. 2, 2017, pp. 201-220.

Beyond the hierarchical dimension (leadership comes first vs. populism comes first), there is another subtle difference. For the discourse-based and thin-ideology approaches, strong (charismatic) leadership is a current but not a defining attribute of populist parties. In other words, leaderless populist parties are as possible as are populist parties with less dominant leaderships, as the case of Pia Kjærsgaard, co-founder of the Danish People's Party.⁸³

Populism in real life: leaders above parties?

If we put together the two literatures, the one on the personalization of politics and the other on populism, it is possible to draw some interesting observations. Let me start from the general trends documented by the literature on personalization, in particular in relation to voters' perception of the leaders. As briefly described above, empirical research since the 1960s has demonstrated that ideal leaders are perceived as trustworthy, honest and competent. However, due to the increasingly minimized distances between politicians and voters in a mediatized politics, preferences are more and more shaped by a so-called perception of ordinariness. Personalized politics is hence about politicians that are of the people and like the people.⁸⁴ In this context, communication skills have become very important. As briefly mentioned above, this is not only about eloquence and public-speaking, but also about expressive, empathic and relational capacities.⁸⁵ Contemporary leaders are required to be good rhetoricians, and this is not an issue strictly of communication skills but is more about the application of the traditional understanding of the means of persuasion: the perception of the speaker as credible, the emotions of the audience and, last but not least, the argument *per se*.⁸⁶

Where do the populist leaders fit in this general portrayal? A short descriptive part is necessary. Based on the existing literature, it is possible to observe that populist leaders are men for the most part, aged over 40 and

⁸³ Mudde and Kaltwasser, *op. cit.*; Tarchi, *op. cit.*

⁸⁴ Stanley Renshon, *The Clinton Presidency: Campaigning, Governing and the Psychology of Leadership*, Boulder: Westview, 1995, p. 2001 quoted by Garzia, *op. cit.*, p. 701.

⁸⁵ Frank Esser and Jesper Strömbäck (eds.), *Mediatization of Politics. Understanding the Transformation of Western Democracies*, London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

⁸⁶ Di Piazza, *op. cit.*

with relatively long political experience.⁸⁷ From this point of view, populist leaders look strikingly like mainstream leaders.⁸⁸ At this level, the peculiarity of the populist leaders comes from their selection in elections with a limited degree of competitiveness and low levels of participation.⁸⁹

If we refer to how populist leaders depict themselves, the literature on the personalization of politics becomes particularly useful. As already stated, the very position of the populist leaders in the public arena is filtered by the “appeal to ‘the people’ against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society”⁹⁰. Since populist leaders constantly refer to the natural unity and virtuousness of their people, their claimed ordinariness is a logical consequence. In line with the assumptions of the literature on the personalization of politics, populist leaders portray themselves as being part of the people and like the people. The populist leaders are first and foremost representatives of the people they worship in public speeches.

But is it really a distinctive feature in a personalized politics that has demonstrated that ordinary men, politicians that succeed in identifying with their public, tend to dominate contemporary politics?

The answer is “Yes, they are!”, although with some nuances. The difference is related to the fact that the ordinariness of the populist leaders is fundamentally shaped by the populist thin-ideology. Populist leaders exhibit a double ordinariness: a positive one, the result of their belonging to the common people and a negative one, the consequence of their publicly-preached opposition to the mainstream élites. Moreover, while in the literature on the personalization of politics this ordinariness is essentially due to a process of adaptation to an exogenous stimulus, which is the lowering effect of the media and new social media, in the populist case it is first and foremost a synchronization with the declared goal of giving power back to the ordinary people. At the same level, not only do populist leaders claim to be listening, understanding and voicing the will of the people, but, because of their similarity with the people, they also dress, speak, eat and

⁸⁷ Soare, 2017, *op. cit.*

⁸⁸ Cross and Pilet, *op. cit.*

⁸⁹ Cross and Pilet, *op. cit.*; Heinisch and Mazzoleni, *op. cit.*

⁹⁰ Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy”, in *Political Studies*, vol. 47, no 1, 1999, p. 3.

behave like the people. Note that this does not cancel distinguishing elements like the Wilders platinum blond hair or Siderov's casual leather jackets.

The ordinariness of populist leadership is functional to another fundamental element: his trustfulness. Populist leaders apply a basic principle of transitivity:

Populist leaders are part of the common people
(= *Populist leaders are like the common people*)
Common people can be trusted.

Populist leaders are trustful.

The same mechanisms of transitivity make them likeable and understandable. However, as documented by the literature on the voting behavior, political leaders are also evaluated based on their competence. This is where the populist leaders' extraordinariness comes from. This is how populist leaders succeed in keeping the balance between the ordinariness of the constituents and their exhibited extraordinariness.⁹¹ The populist leader's competence is less an issue of technicalities and more the capacity to say what people are thinking, to see through the machinations of the elites and to be able to formulate understandable solutions to the problems that the élites in power tend to depict as complex and intractable.⁹² The extraordinariness of the populist leaders is connected with the prevalent metaphor of them being "saviors" of the people, endowed with extraordinary qualities, purifiers of a perverted democracy controlled by corrupt elite, providers of immediate solutions for bringing the scepter of the *volonté générale* back into place.

The peculiarity of the populist leader is hence the ability to balance ordinariness and extraordinariness: "there is no doubt that a leader must show uncommon qualities in the eyes of his followers in order to secure their trust but, at the same time, a populist leader must never make the mistake of showing himself made of different ingredients compared to the common man; instead, his foremost ability should be precisely that of

⁹¹ Taggart, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

⁹² Albertazzi and McDonnell, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

suggesting to his followers that, in the end, he is like them, and still to know how to make a more appropriate use of the gifts that each member of the people potentially has"⁹³. This extraordinariness is also the source of the control over the organization of the party. "Thus the loyalty to the leader equals loyalty to the people. As a result, those within the party who disagree with the leader tend to be swiftly branded as traitors and added to the list of the 'enemies of the people'"⁹⁴. McDonnell's⁹⁵ analysis has fine-tuned the compliance with an authoritarian *Führerprinzip* in the management of these parties. The differences identified in three leaderships, termed "charismatic" by different scholars, Silvio Berlusconi of the People of Freedom, Christoph Blocher of the Swiss People's Party and Umberto Bossi of the Northern League, are particularly useful on this point. Not only is "charisma" not a compulsory feature of the relationship between populist leaders and their parties' representatives and members, but also there is significant variance across cases. McDonnell (2016) clearly demonstrates that Bossi tended to be considered to possess unique and extraordinary powers, the very basis of an unconditional acceptance of his personal authority and emotional commitment. In the case of Berlusconi, McDonnell⁹⁶ finds less evidence in favor of an emotional commitment, coupled with an emphasis on Berlusconi's unique qualities. However, Berlusconi's authority is encompassed as being a continuation of a personal party⁹⁷. Finally, Blocher is considered to be the weakest case of coterie charisma, his unique qualities are stated by his followers, however his authority is not unconditionally accepted⁹⁸.

The description of the ideal populist leader cannot avoid the issue of integrity, a major proof of genuineness, of non-contamination from the corrupted politics. Integrity can be understood as a direct consequence of them being outsiders, challenging politics "as usual"⁹⁹. In 2016, Geert Wilders was found guilty of hate speech, committed two years earlier in

⁹³ Tarchi, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁹⁵ McDonnell, *op. cit.*

⁹⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁹⁷ Duncan McDonnell, "Silvio Berlusconi's Personal Parties: From Forza Italia to the Popolo Della Libertà", in *Political Studies*, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 217–233.

⁹⁸ McDonnell 2016, *op. cit.*

⁹⁹ Canovan, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

the guise of a specific question asked to a rally: “Do you more or fewer Moroccans in the Netherlands”¹⁰⁰. His comments after the guilty verdict are particularly relevant for the position of Wilders in relation to the mainstream politics. He openly accused “the judges of convicting ‘half of the Netherlands’ - a reference to research commissioned by the PVV which found 43% of the Dutch public believe the country has a problem with Moroccans”¹⁰¹. It is thus important for populist leader to exhibit their non-belonging to the mainstream politics. They can do it by simply emphasizing the fact that they come from outside politics. They can do it by stressing that their way of doing politics is different because they are essentially entrepreneurs like Silvio Berlusconi and Dan Diaconescu, journalists like Volen Siderov, or academics like Pablo Iglesias and Pim Fortuyn. However, some of them are not without political experience. This is the case with Geert Wilders, whose experience in the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy was used as proof of his resistance to the system. In opposition to the VVD on the Turkish accession to the EU, Wilders had left the VVD and founded a new party. All in all, because they are outsiders, populist leaders claim to be able to say loudly what the (common) people think about essential questions (i.e. immigration, EU, globalization, etc) while the cosmopolitan elite hide behind technical discourses and political correctness. Their non-belonging to the “political system” is also used as a proof of non-corruption. However, various judicial scandals have stained major populist leaders. In July 2017, Umberto Bossi was sentenced to two years and six months in jail following a trial for defrauding the State of 56 million euros¹⁰². Ján Slota, former chairman of the Slovak national party, was found guilty of attempting to bribe a second party into not calling the police after a car accident in 2016¹⁰³. In 2017, Marine Le Pen was

¹⁰⁰ “Netherlands Trial: Geert Wilders Guilty of Incitement”, 9 December 2016, available at [<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38260377>], accessed July 2017.

¹⁰¹ “Netherlands Trial: Geert Wilders Guilty of Incitement...”.

¹⁰² “Bossi, Belsito convicted in fraud case. Former leader gets two years, six months”, 24 July 2017, available at [http://www.ansa.it/english/news/politics/2017/07/24/bossi-belsito-convicted-in-fraud-case_92eb3fc3-87ed-4124-a20f-9e423bee2cb1.html], accessed June 2017.

¹⁰³ “Ex-SNS chair Slota sentenced for bribery but still has right of appeal. He attempted to bribe a second party into not calling the police after a car accident in 2016”, 4 May 2017, available at [<https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20524948/ex-sns-chair-slota-sentenced-for-bribery-but-still-has-right-of-appeal.html>], accessed June 2017.

charged with misusing EU funds to pay her party's parliamentary assistants¹⁰⁴.

Conclusions: is anything really new under the sun?

While the success of populist leaders cannot be isolated from the general trend towards strong party leaders and direct communication between the party leadership and supporters, in the case of populism, personalized leadership cannot be considered a defining attribute.¹⁰⁵ Although it might seem to lack coherence, I fully agree with the observation that populism is "particularly liable to the politics of personality"¹⁰⁶. This means that the "degree" of populism and the different interpretations of the compulsory features of the thin-ideology of populism (the references to the pure people, the corrupt elite and the general will) are interpreted and re-shaped by the personality of the leaders. The leadership explains the chameleon-like nature of populism. It can hence be demonstrated easily that the populism is not only context-dependent, but also leader-bound. A very eloquent example that speaks to this point is provided by the detailed analysis of the FPÖ provided by Heinisch.¹⁰⁷ In line with the assumption introduced in the first pages of this article, there is a logical sequence that has to be taken into account when analyzing populism. First comes the ideational framework and then the relationship of the political actor (the leader) with the party and more in general the constituents. This is important because, beyond differences of personality, of political cultural and context-peculiarities, leaders that are labeled as populist have to fit first within the *forma mentis* that considers society to be separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups. Their political entrepreneurship is fully dependent on the credibility of this Manichean discourse. This is the territory on which it is possible to identify the frontier between popular leaders and populist ones.

¹⁰⁴ "Marine Le Pen Charged with Alleged EU Funds Misuse", 30 June 2017, available at [<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/30/marine-le-pen-charged-alleged-eu-funds-misuse>], accessed June 2017.

¹⁰⁵ Mudde and Kaltwasser, *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁶ Taggart, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

¹⁰⁷ Heinisch, *op. cit.*

Finally yet importantly, in this unfinished attempt to draw an ideal portrayal of populist leadership, there is an important congruence with general trends in contemporary party politics. There is, indeed, general agreement in the comparative literature that populism is context-dependent. An increasingly personalized (hence mediatized) politics has most probably had an impact upon populist leadership. Marine Le Pen's highly professionalized electoral campaigns are an element in favor of this synchronization. Similarly, the communicational skills that used to be the trademark of the populist leaders have become a basic requirement of any relevant politician. In my understanding, the difference lays in the narrative and the relationship with the followers/voters. Populist leadership is dependent on the populist content of their discourses. Before being a party chairman (with the extraordinary characteristics required), the populist leader is the spokesperson of the *vox populi* and as such has to constantly demonstrate - with gestures, official positions and narratives - the sameness with the people. It is hence fundamental to make the voters see in them their own reflection, what common voters like in themselves and the others. As already mentioned, there is however an *ex negativo* element: populist leaders constantly show what they are by emphasizing what they are not. They regularly narrate the differences with the corrupt, cosmopolitan, indifferent elites and they do it via both linguistic and non-linguistic signs. Populist leaders have a performative political identity because they use much more instruments than conventional political (spoken) language (i.e. party programmes, policy positions, etc.). The exhibition of their difference requires not only language (i.e. simple and simplistic) but also bodily aspects of language (i.e. gestures, voice). Moreover, the populist leadership credibility is strongly dependent on their personal features and the way these personal features are presented to the others. The ethos, the character of the speaker (and this is true for any speaker), is more powerful than his/her arguments: this is why he/she is trustworthy and his/her arguments are perceived as good arguments. It does not work the other way around.¹⁰⁸ This point is, however, not new. Already noted by Aristotle in the 4th century BC: "We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and

¹⁰⁸ Di Piazza, *op. cit.*

opinions are divided [...]. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses"¹⁰⁹. Yet these features are not just descriptions, passive characteristics, they became part of a political action. That means that the moment the populist leaders say *I'm (like) you!* that means they become in a credible and trustful way the personification of the people, the genuine source of democratic legitimacy. This is the populist *forma mentis* direct effect on leadership: all the narratives, gestures and signs work in this way. The populist discourse *ex ante* determines what populist leaders are and their political performance succeeds only if they act convincingly as part of the people. In other words, less than a credibility based on rational arguments and demonstrated proofs, populist leaders are trusted because of their (narrated and perceived) characteristics. Hence the more voters and followers see the leaders as being similar to themselves, the more credible he/she becomes and, in direct consequence, the more credible his/her arguments become.

Bibliography

Books and chapters:

1. Albertazzi, Daniele and Duncan McDonnell (eds.) (2008), *Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western European Democracy*, London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
2. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, available at [<http://rhetoric.eserver.org/aristotle/rhet1-2.html>].
3. Barisione, Mauro (2006), *L'immagine del leader. Quanto conta per gli elettori?*, Bologna: Il Mulino.
4. Bauman Zygmunt (2001), *The individualized Society*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

¹⁰⁹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1356a 5-12, available at [<http://rhetoric.eserver.org/aristotle/rhet1-2.html>], accessed July 2017.

5. Blondel, Jean (1987), *Political Leadership. Towards a General Analysis*, London: Sage Publications.
6. Bolleyer, Nicole (2013), *New Parties in Old Party Systems: Persistence and Decline in Seventeen Democracies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
7. Burns, James MacGregor (1978), *Leadership*, New York: Harper & Row.
8. Campus, Donatella (2007), *L'antipolitica al governo. De Gaulle, Reagan, Berlusconi*, Bologna: Il Mulino.
9. Cavalli, Luciano (1981), *Il capo carismatico*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1981.
10. Esser, Frank and Jesper Strömbäck (eds.) (2015), *Mediatization of Politics. Understanding the Transformation of Western Democracies*, London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
11. Gardner, H. (1995), *Leading Minds: An Anatomy of Leadership*, New York: Basic Books.
12. Hawkins Kirk (2010), *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Heinisch, Reinhard and Oscar Mazzoleni (eds.) (2016), *Understand Populist Party Organization: The Radical Right in Western Europe*, New York: Palgrave, 2016.
14. Heinisch, Reinhard (2016), "The Austrian Freedom Party: Organizational Development and Leadership Change", in Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni (eds.), *Understand Populist Party Organization: The Radical Right in Western Europe*, New York: Palgrave, 19-48.
15. Hermet, Guy (2001), *Les populismes dans le monde. Une histoire sociologique. XIXe-XXe siècle*, Paris: Fayard.
16. Hollandee, Edwin P. (2007), "Relating Leadership to active followership", in Richard A. Couto (ed.), *Reflections on leadership*, Lanham: University Press of America, 57-66.
17. Hopkin, Jonathan and Caterina Paolucci (1999), "The Business Firm Model of Party Organisation: Cases from Spain and Italy", in *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 35, no. 3, 307-339.
18. Ivaldi, Gilles and Maria Elisabetta Lanzone (2016), "The French Front National: Organizational Change and Adaptation from Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen", in Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar

- Mazzoleni (eds.), *Understand Populist Party Organization: The Radical Right in Western Europe*, New York: Palgrave, 131-158.
19. Karvonen, Lauri (2010), *The Personalisation of Politics. A Study of Parliamentary Democracies*, Colchester: ECPR Press.
 20. Kirchheimer, Otto (1966), "The Transformation of Western European Party Systems", in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 177-200.
 21. Manin, Bernard (1997), *Principles of Representative Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 22. McDonnell, Duncan and Davide Vampa (2016), "The Italian Lega Nord", in Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni (eds.), *Understand Populist Party Organization: The Radical Right in Western Europe*, New York: Palgrave, 105-130.
 23. Mény, Yves and Yves Surel (eds.) (2002), *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, New York: Palgrave.
 24. Mudde Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2014), "Populism and Political Leadership", in R. A. W. Rhodes and Paul 't Hart (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 376–388.
 25. Panebianco, Angelo (1988), *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 26. Pasquino, Gianfranco (2008), "Populism and Democracy", in Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (eds), *Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western European Democracy*, London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 15-29.
 27. Pilet, Jean-Benoit and William Cross (eds.) (2014), *The Selection of Political Party Leaders in Contemporary Parliamentary Democracies. A Comparative Study*, London: Routledge.
 28. Poguntke, Thomas and Paul Webb (eds.) (2005), *The presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 29. Renshon, Stanley (2001), *The Clinton Presidency: Campaigning, Governing and the Psychology of Leadership*, Boulder: Westview.
 30. Soare, Cristina (2017), "Io sono (come) voi! Alla ricerca della mobilitazione elettorale: leader e partiti populistici nell'Europa

postcomunista", in *Società Mutamento Politica. Rivista italiana di sociologia*, vol. 8, no. 15, 353-378.

31. Stanley, Ben (2008), "The Thin Ideology of Populism", in *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol. 13, no. 1, 95-110.
32. Swanson, David and Paolo Mancini (1996), *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and Their Consequences*, Westport, CT: Praeger.
33. Taggart, Paul (2000) *Populism*, Buckingham: Open University Press.
34. Tarchi, Marco (2015) *Italia populista. Dal qualunquismo a Beppe Grillo*, Bologna: Il Mulino.
35. Wattenberg, Martin (1987), *The Rise of Candidate-Centered Politics*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
36. Weber, Max (1978), *Economy and Society*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Articles in Scientific Journals and Working Papers:

1. Canovan, Margaret (1999), "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy", in *Political Studies*, vol. 47, no. 1, 2-16.
2. Caprara Gian Vittorio and Philip G. Zimbardo (2004), "Personalizing Politics", in *The American Psychologist*, vol. 59, 581-594.
3. Di Piazza, Salvatore (2012), "Fiducia ed argomentazione. Una prospettiva aristotelica", in *Rivista italiana di filosofia del linguaggio*, vol. 6, no.3, 41-52.
4. Dowding, Keith (2013), "The Prime Ministerialisation of the British Prime Minister", in *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. n. 3, 617-635.
5. Gherghina, Sergiu and Sorina Soare (2017), "From TV to Parliament: The Successful Birth and Progressive Death of a Personal Party The Case of the People's Party Dan Diaconescu", in *Politologický časopis/Czech Journal of Political Science*, vol. 2, 201-220.
6. Grazia, Diego (2011), "The Personalization of Politics in Western Democracies: Causes and Consequences on Leader-Follower Relationships", in *The Leadership Quarterly*, vol. 22, no. 4, 697-709.
7. Katz Richard and Peter Mair (1995), "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party", in *Party Politics*, vol. 1, no. 1, 5-28.

8. Katz Richard and Peter Mair (2009), "The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement", in *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 7, no. 4, 753-766.
9. Kriesi, Hans (2014), "The Populist Challenge", in *West European Politics*, vol. 37, no. 2, 361-378.
10. Mabileau, Albert (1960), "La personnalisation du Pouvoir dans les gouvernements démocratiques", in *Revue française de science politique*, vol. 10, no. 1, 39-65.
11. Mair, Peter(2000), "Partyless Democracy. Solving the Paradox of New Labour?", in *New Left Review*, no. 2, 2000, available at [<https://newleftreview.org/II/2/peter-mair-partyless-democracy>].
12. McDonnell, Duncan (2013), "Silvio Berlusconi's Personal Parties: From Forza Italia to the Popolo Della Libertà", in *Political Studies*, vol. 61, no. 1, 217-233.
13. McDonnell, Duncan (2016), "Populist Leaders and Coterie Charisma", in *Political Studies*, vol. 64, no. 3, 719-733.
14. Mény, Yes (2004), "La costitutiva ambiguità del populismo", in *Filosofia politica*, vol. XVIII, no. 3, 359-376.
15. Mudde, Cas (2004), "The Populist Zeitgeist", in *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 39, no. 4, 2004, 542-563.
16. Mudde, Cas (2017), "The Study of Populist Radical Right Parties: Towards a Fourth Wave", in *CREX Working Papers*.
17. Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski (2013), "Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda", in *Weatherhead Working Paper Series*, No. 13-0004, available at [<https://scholar.harvard.edu/gidron/publications/varieties-populism-literature-review-and-research-agenda>].
18. Rahat Gideon and Tamir Shaefer (2007), "The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel, 1949-2003", in *Political Communication*, vol. 24, no. 1, 65-80.
19. Regalia, Marta (2012), "La leadership: concetto, concezioni e rappresentazioni", in *Rivista italiana di scienza politica*, vol. XLII, no. 3, 385-398.
20. Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal (2014), "The Responses of Populism to Dahl's Democratic Dilemmas", in *Political Studies*, vol. 62, no. 3, 470-487.

21. Soare, Sorina (2015), "Hit by Populism: Democracy in Ruins", in *Southeastern Europe*, vol. 38, no. 1, 25 – 55.
22. Weyland, Kurt (2011), "Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics", in *Comparative Politics*, vol. 34, no. 1, 1-22.
23. Zanatta, Loris (2001), "Il populismo, sul nucleo forte di un'ideologia debole", in *Polis*, vol. XVI, 2001, 263–292.

Electronic sources:

1. "Bossi, Belsito convicted in fraud case. Former leader gets two years, six months", 24 July 2017, available at [http://www.nsa.it/english/news/politics/2017/07/24/bossi-belsito-convicted-in-fraud-case_92eb3fc3-87ed-4124-a20f-9e423bee2cb1.html]
2. "Ex-SNS chair Slota sentenced for bribery but still has right of appeal. He attempted to bribe a second party into not calling the police after a car accident in 2016", 4 May 2017, available at <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20524948/ex-sns-chair-slota-sentenced-for-bribery-but-still-has-right-of-appeal.html>.
3. "Marine Le Pen charged with alleged EU funds misuse", 30 June 2017, available at [<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/6/30/marine-le-pen-charged-alleged-eu-funds-misuse/>].
4. "Netherlands Trial: Geert Wilders Guilty of Incitement", 9 December 2016, available at [<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38260377>].

RADICALISM AND MODERNITY

Mikołaj Rakusa-Suszczewski*

DOI: 10.24193/subbeuropaea.2017.3.07

Published Online: 2017-09-30

Published Print: 2017-09-30

Abstract

In contemporary debates on social radicalism there is a predominant belief that it carries with it serious threats to the public sphere, similar to all manifestations of extremism and other attitudes that challenge and question the liberal basis of the social order. The persistent and almost obsessive identification of radicalism with populism and religious fundamentalism, and in general with danger to the social order, seems to confirm this tendency. Meanwhile, the alternative subject literature indicates how much this way of thinking is ideologized and aligned with conservatism in thought, casting a blind eye to the complex motives of the radical subject. We refer here to various applications of radicalism as a philosophical, psychological and social predicament, which prompts the revision of abusive and simplified interpretations. We also assume that radicalism, as properly understood, can be interpreted as a kind of peculiar fever emerging out of the piling up of possibilities brought about by modernity. Radicalism is a disquieting state of mind, which appears not so strongly in a risk society as in a society of infinite opportunities¹.

Keywords: radicalism, social movements, democracy, modernity

Introduction

What is radicalism? The difficulty in explaining its essence arises from the dialectical relationships that combine the etymology of the term with the historical and cultural contexts in which radicalism appears. Other

* Dr. Mikołaj Rakusa-Suszczewski is sociologist and philosopher of politics. He is a lecturer in Centre for Europe at the University of Warsaw.

Contact: m.rakusa-suszczewski@uw.edu.pl

¹ This article is largely based on my book entitled *Cień Radykalizmu; pojęcie radykalizmu w świetle teorii ruchów społecznych*, published by ASPRA, Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2016.

factors, such as gender, language, ideology, or nationality², as well as a certain tendency to associate radicalism with a magnitude of images and epithets (e.g., fundamentalism, extremism, terrorism, revolution, utopianism, perversion, dogmatism, reaction, etc.), may also complicate the meaning of the term. These numerous contexts with which radicalism is associated preclude any attempts to rationally explain this notion and the phenomena, which thus remains either illegible or incomplete. Although the literature on the subject presented below is rarely successful in grasping the more universal and substantive features of radicalism, it at least makes it possible to see clearly how often this term is abused.

We distinguish here three mainstream currents of thinking about radicalism. These streams are intertwined and take into account only the most essential and characteristic features of radicalism. *Firstly*, we distinguish the trend whereby radicalism evokes itself as an intellectual and philosophical attitude; as an ideological or spiritual form of being in the world. *Secondly*, we can see a trend in which radicalism lies above all in the psychological qualities and make-up of a person, both those belonging to his or her individually constituted personality and those born in response to external factors. *Finally*, we can point to a third wave of socio-political reflection, which interprets radicalism as an endless need to fight for another world, a difficult (pointed or destructive) dispute over the public sphere and the principles of politics, preserving the spaces of coexistence. Radicalism is here a phenomenon that has its own social logic. This review takes into account only those titles where the notion of radicalism appears *expressis verbis* and remains the chief object of examination, and not, as is often the case, only as an adjective describing other phenomena, e.g. “radical modernity”, the “radical right” or “radical sociology”. We also do not examine here the specificity of radicalism resulting from the national, ethnic or cultural contexts, as that is a completely separate phenomenon and obviously deserving of a separate study.

² Paul McLaughlin, *Radicalism. A Philosophical Study*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 8.

Spiritual radicalism

The most distinctive feature of the first category of interpretations devoted to radicalism is their passionate attachment to the very foundations of human life, to the primordial desires of man. The exciting promise of their fulfilment is connected with the hope for a great discovery of the roots [*radix*] of human life. This metaphor – so deeply ingrained in European culture – indicates something extremely precious, very close to and perhaps even indistinguishable from nature, but in the end invisible. Radicalism in this sense sets out an uneasy path to the deepest sources of humanity. How much joy Friedrich Nietzsche must have had when his daring intellectual project – especially his epistemological critique, wherein democracy, liberalism and egalitarianism were identified with human fall and cultural decadence – was described as the efflorescence of “aristocratic radicalism”³.

We mention the German thinker here not in order to approve the reviews of his work, but to point out that many who followed his path of extreme scepticism, “cognitive revolt” against and even negation of the commonly used meanings and rules of ethics and politics, can hardly be called radicals in the conventional sense of the word. Their radicalism in thinking and contemplating the world was essentially leading to what Gaston Bachelard described as an “epistemological rupture” [fr. *rupture épistémologique*] which, according to Razmiga Keucheyan, is the essence of radical thinking, intellectual or philosophical radicalism in general⁴. The essence of such radicalism is, first of all, the dissension of what *is*, and, secondly, the description of reality in terms totally different from those used in common language, what serves to attain a more thorough understanding. Walter Benjamin defines these radical categories of thinking as “extreme types” [niem. *extreme typen*], in opposition to the “ideal types”. The former above all make the roots of human life more accessible.

³ Bruce Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990, p. 189.

⁴ Razmig Keucheyan, “Qu’est-ce qu’une pensée radical? Aspects du radicalisme épistémique” 2010 [<http://www.journaldumauss.net/?Qu-est-ce-qu-une-pensee-radicale>], accessed July 2017.

According to Helmuth Plessner, who introduced some important remarks on radicalism in his book *The limits of community*, this view may lead to a Manichaeian image of reality⁵. In general, Plessner considers the axiological severity of the radical *état d'esprit* as dangerous for man and social life. The uniqueness of his approach lies in his broad understanding of the sources and consequences of radicalism, understood simultaneously as anthropological and religious, intellectual and emotional, national and socio-political phenomena. The German thinker assumes that radicalism leads to a constant tearing down, resulting from the lack of acceptance of the state of affairs, filled with violence and superficiality, as well as from the need to affirm the sublime "invisible community". Radicalism is powered by great and complete views, or as Plessner writes: "The thesis of radicalism is the ruthlessness, its perspective - is infinity, its pathos - is enthusiasm, its temperament - the ardour"⁶. Radicalism is a form of "spiritual poisoning" marked by a sense of deprivation, so very significant for, in particular, weak people. Plessner's categories of "blood radicalism" (related to *Gemeinschaft des Blute*) and "matter radicalism" (respectively related to *Gemeinschaft der Sache*), which are essentially the echo and commentary of the famous distinction between community and association articulated by Ferdinand Tönnies, constitute, in our view, an original and rare attempt to interpret radicalism not only as a phenomenon which refers to reformist (liberal and leftist) attitudes, but also to consider it as a complex mood that might haunt anyone⁷.

An outstanding American social activist and spiritual leader of counter-cultural movements, Saul Alinsky, at no point in his somewhat journalistic book *Reveille for Radicals* uses the term "radicalism"⁸. Instead, he consistently and consequently uses the term "radical", so as to emphasize the subjective stance of the radical towards the world. Alinsky's portrait of a radical is not only an archetypical example of a radical personality understood as a reformer and humanist, but also an "ideal type" of a

⁵ Helmuth Plessner, *The Limits of Community: A Critique of Social Radicalism*, Amherst, NY: Humanity Books 1999.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

⁷ Cf.: Mikołaj Rakusa-Suszczewski, "Radykalizm, podmiotowość i sfera publiczna w refleksji Helmutha Plessnera", in *Folia Sociologica*, nr 47, 2013, pp. 17-37.

⁸ Saul D. Alinsky, *Reveille for Radicals*, Chicago: Chicago University Press 1946. Cf.: Saul Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals*. New York: Random House, Inc., 1971.

radical temper, with its intellectual and philosophical inclinations, which – as he assumes – actually do not exist in pure form⁹. This radicalism, in the same way as in Plessner's work, expresses a Manichean rupture, which results from constant questioning of the *modus vivendi*, and leads to a belief that anticipating a better world is possible. According to Alinsky a radical believes fiercely in what he or she says and puts the value of the common good above his/her own interests. Its distinctive feature is faith in man, respect for individuals, and a belief in a healthier world where people can materialize their inexhaustible potential. Alinsky defends the humans' souls and fights with the evils of this world: wars, fear, misery, and dehumanizing and thoughtless rationalization. He does not succumb to appearances and always looks for the paramount things – the very essence of existing problems. This is a way for a radical to express his/her sincerity and in particular "youth" - courage, simplicity and naivety. As Alinsky argues, a radical fights not only for political and economic freedom, but also for social freedom. This is why (s)he strives for decent living conditions and human rights, equal rights of minorities, universal education, and for the special value of work, social planning, and self-organization. A radical struggles with the privileges of the few, with the caste system and hypocrisy, so essential – as Alinsky argues – for the liberals. Saul Alinsky delivers an example of radicalism understood as a leftist attitude rooted in the universalist view of human affairs, still strong in the present times (especially in Anglo-Saxon cultures).

Egon Bittner, in his attempt to conceptualize radicalism, sees in it above all reflective and prophetic attitudes¹⁰. Although the ideal type of this social behaviour expresses a reluctance toward routines and the common-sense imagination, as well as a need for their critical revision and even rejection, radicalism incarnates a stance based on reflection close to scientific critique. By its nature, it is an attitude typical of the few who are able to bear the weight of a dispute over history, or what Bittner calls "radical historiography", and who can coherently argue for the creation of a new world. Because radicalism contains uncompromising prophecies, in the end it becomes scientific and quasi-religious at the same time. It is in its

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 30.

¹⁰ Egon Bittner, "Radicalism and the Organization of Radical Movements", in *American Sociological Review*, no. 6, vol. 28, 1963, p. 932.

courageous visions that radicalism reveals the root(s) of all things. Yet this leads to a paradox: the inevitable confrontation with the rules of the public sphere forces radicalism into a schematic rigor based on a single and independent principle – it reinforces the discipline and extremist elements necessary to preserve the purity of one's own identity. Radicalism appears here again as ideological zealotry, but in practice it remains fragile, because – as Bittner argues – preserving such cohesion is impossible in the long run¹¹. We already have this knowledge from ancient tragedies. In his thesis Bittner reiterated this in another text from 1968, stressing that radicalism has its own value-rational functionality and it cannot be reduced to emotional states, as for example Adorno assumes¹². Radical ideology appears on the margins of social life, and therefore it is linked to radical social movements¹³. Radicalism often triggers mechanisms similar to those that occur in sects (susceptibility to the influence of charismatic leaders, a strong sense of differentness, self-control, purity of belief, fidelity to heroic ideals, etc.).

In 2008 Tormey, in the latest edition of the *Encyclopedia of Macmillan*, states that radicalism can only be understood in a particular cultural and historical context¹⁴. What seems to be radical in one place and time is simply not in another. It is therefore impossible to explain this attitude in terms of a specific ideology or the essence of things. It is basically devoid of essence. At the same time, the author introduces an interesting distinction between modern and postmodern radicalism, which, in spite of everything, suggests that a kind of reflective and moral attitude towards the world characterizes the radical. While modern radicalism is characterized by certainty and faith in a better world, postmodern radicalism is sinking into scepticism. The abandonment or loss of this certainty deprives contemporary radicalism of its social power to transform the world – it is rather a source of anxiety. This interpretation may lead to

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 934.

¹² Egon Bittner, "Radicalism", in D. E. Stills (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, New York: Macmillan, 1968, p. 294.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 295.

¹⁴ Simon Tormey, "Radicalism", in W.A. Darity Jr. (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. vol. 7, Farmington Hills: Macmillan Reference, 2008, pp. 48-51.

the conclusion that fragility and lack of orthodoxy are indeed constitutive; the certainty of the roots is replaced by a melancholy and longings.

In concluding this section it is worth mentioning Paul McLaughlin's monograph: *Radicalism; A Philosophical Study*, where radicalism is treated as a predominant category of political and philosophical thought, analysed through its semantic meanings – its connotations, etymology, and history¹⁵. The interpretation of its various political forms leads him to some ahistorical conclusions, wherein radicalism reveals its humanistic essence and attachment to the idea of progress.

Psychological Radicalism

The second mainstream that still has repercussions for the interpretations of radicalism and related phenomena (such as extremism and terrorism) refers to psychological categories. The power of this paradigmatic optic is based on the conviction that human action is rooted in the dark layers of the psyche, as equally inaccessible and invisible as the human roots. Psychology, so fundamentally linked to modern philosophical reflection, stigmatized the thinking concerning radicalism at the beginning of the twentieth century. This approach consisted of revealing radicalism as a process – as a *radicalization*. In 1906, James E. Shea introduced one of the first psychological conceptions of radicalism as a deep and complex attitude¹⁶. He distinguished between 'old' and 'new' radicalism, anticipating the interpretation of the above-mentioned Simon Tormey. Principality and unambiguity were incarnations of old radicalism, while he identified the new with feverish visions of progress, devoid of any idealism and style. This description of the new radicalism must have been testimony of a profoundly conservative reluctance toward a creeping world, marked by haste, credulity, superficiality, and an almost anarchic disregard for any principles. James Shea stated that the new radicalism had a childish nature, and introduced a common view that this state of mind was infantile and based on irrational sources.

¹⁵ Paul McLaughlin, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ James E. Shea, "Radicalism and Reform", in *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association*, vol. 3, 1906, pp. 158-168.

Albert Wolfe therefore found that radicalism has its psychological motives and is a complex reaction to particular incentives¹⁷. Man is stimulated by anxiety, discomfort, and helplessness about the surrounding reality, but what ultimately determines radicalism is the adaptation related to *sublimation* and *empowerment* – as Wolfe explains in his psychoanalytic language. *Repression* does not allow the emergence of radicalism. Customs and temperament influence the directions of sublimation. In its most ephemeral form, radicalism can also take a “symbolic” form. But radicalism, as a response to incentives and obstacles, is capable of generating a reformatory social movement only through empowerment¹⁸. It is for this reason that radicalism is a feature of the few, who, both in addition to and similar to intellectuals, can be stimulated by other incentives such as curiosity, inquisitiveness, ingenuity, ambition, the need for social innovation, competition, or self-expression. In other words, radicalism flows from both a psychological anxiety as well as from a psychologically-conditioned need to reconstruct the world.

The notion of radicalism introduced by Thomas William Root is socially authorized and context-dependent. It usually refers to those who challenge the traditional ideas of society and destroy the comfort of a conventional life¹⁹. It is in a collision with the public sphere, which causes emotional disturbances in a radical, including disorder and disease. Root argues, however, that a radical is not a neurasthenic, but through his/her simultaneous superiority and inferiority complexes often turns into an aggressive and assertive egoist. Root argued that such characteristics are usually attributed to the so-called intelligentsia, as well as to Jewish and proletarian intellectuals. In its essence, radicalism is the product of a tension between the social majority and the *few*, either left- or right-wing. Solomon Diamond expanded this interdependence between the public sphere and radicalism, and argued that radicalism was a form of a tension-reducing defence against the common introversion of the mass societies²⁰.

¹⁷ Albert Benedict Wolfe, “The Motivation of Radicalism”, in *Psychological Review*, vol. XXVIII (4), 1921, pp. 279-300.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 295.

¹⁹ Thomas Root William, “The Psychology of Radicalism”, in *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, vol. 19(4), 1925, pp. 341-356.

²⁰ Salomon Diamond, *A Study of the Influence of Political Radicalism on Personality Development*. *Archives of Psychology*, New York: Columbia University, 1936.

Yet according to Root the negative opinion of radicalism was unjust. It is rather a creative, innovative and noble predilection.

In his analysis, Elary Francis Reed perceived radicalism primarily as irrational and unreflective passions of the "popular mind"²¹. Reed locates their sources in blocked emotions, defence mechanisms and, within the needs for compensation and self-purification, in the strong identification with the disadvantaged as well as in the moral motives which turn radicalism into a rational action.

The quoted texts from the beginning of the century show not only the growing interest in psychological interpretations aimed at explaining the individual and social actions of people, but also a newly-established belief that the drives of the social processes are irrational. These psychological inquiries largely framed the interpretation of radicalism and related phenomena as something that escapes political pragmatism, is incompatible with reason, and therefore dangerous, vicious, and/or leading to evil. This is the way radicalism was described by Horace Kallen²². Although it originally provided impetus for institutional change and its message was democratic, humanitarian, and pacifist, the then-contemporary radicalization was based on complicated and destructive complexes: hatred and detriment. Indeed, radicalism began to manifest itself more in behaviour than in reflection. This kind of fervour and resentment equally characterized diverse ideologies, and the word "radical" became the "ugly name" of a serious imbalance.

The studies on authoritarianism, which is still very often identified with radicalism, deliver significant examples of such a psychological approach. The book by Theodor Adorno and his associates on *Authoritarian Personality* is probably the best such example²³. Among the works highlighting the psychological dimensions of radicalism, Eugene H.

²¹ Francis E. Reed, "Psychic mechanisms and social radicalism", in *The Journal of Social Forces*, vol. 2(1), 1923, cf.: Francis E. Reed, *Treatment of Social Radicalism: Its Psychological and Social Aspects*, Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1922.

²² Horace M. Kallen, "Radicalism", in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934, pp. 51-54.

²³ Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York: Harper and Row, 1950.

Methvin's *The Rise of Radicalism* deserves attention²⁴. The American writer attributes insanity, hatred, conspiratorial thinking and tyrannical inclinations to all forms of political radicalism. In his gallery of radical personalities we can find Robespierre, Babeuf, Chernyshevsky, Marx, Lenin, Hitler, Mussolini, etc. Violence is intertwined here with cataclysm, and their sources are educational difficulties and conflicts with the father, expressed in the language of psychoanalysis. Methvin's book was one of the many commentaries on the rapidly-changing societies in the 1960s.

We should mention here another outstanding research work from this period, i.e. the work of Rothman and Lichter who described, in *The Roots of Radicalism*, the phenomenon of the American and European (especially German) student movements and the new left movements²⁵. Their work was the result of sociological analysis and complementary studies rooted in the traditions of psychoanalysis, ego psychology, and in the object relationship theory. Their study was focused on cultural, social and political changes (related to the development of the civil rights movement and the war in Vietnam) that brought about an unprecedented ideological crisis in America. The publication emphasized the key role of the Jewish (ethnic and religious) minority, with its "marginal" position in the social structure and its reluctance toward oppressive establishments. They argue that these changes created a special generational mood for the expression of hidden fantasies, usually controlled and under repression in a multidimensional system of bourgeois education forming the superego. They claim, in fact, that the sources of radicalism are related to the dissemination of the democratic culture of narcissistic individualism, which rejects traditional principles in favour of the unfettered development of the ego. The main consequence of this process, associated with radicalization, was the decreasing capacity of man to sublimate erotic impulses and aggression, and thus the gradual destruction of the whole system of meanings that have created culture. This gradual radicalization, which Richter and Rothman associated with the new left movement, meant, above all, an ever greater sense of being torn between the need for power and

²⁴ Eugene H. Methvin, *The Rise of Radicalism: The Social Psychology of Messianic Extremism*, Arlington: Arlington House Productions, 1973.

²⁵ Stanley Rothman, Robert S. Lichter, *Roots of Radicalism: Jews, Christians, and the Left*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996.

gratification and the fear of losing control; between the quest for autonomy and the dream of perishing in a new meaningful order (this was especially true of radicals of non-Jewish origin). In this context, the notion of “inverse authoritarianism” seems to play an important role and turns this work into an overt polemic with Adorno.

Socio-political radicalism

In the third wave, radicalism is a synonym for a reformist political stance; hence its primary kinship with enlightenment. The English Whigs at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries made the most important intellectual contribution to the popularization of radicalism, understood as a liberal and democratic attitude. Although they were strongly influenced by the French Jacobins, their radical social reform project excluded any violence. Among them, the most recognized innovator of the new political system was Jeremy Bentham, the author of the political pamphlet *Radicalism not Dangerous*, prepared in 1819 and published in 1843²⁶. In it the philosopher refers to critical and widespread views on radicalism as the alleged source of all evil, absurd and noxious ideas, and destructive machinations that the British public – gripped by fearsome images of the bloody revolution in France – was willing to attribute to the English radicals. Meanwhile, he believed that radicalism was the only way to overcome the real pathologies and social injustices, thus it potentially incarnated the necessary political and moral changes. In his political project, radical transformations were linked in particular to the fundamental reform of the electoral system, consisting of annual, equal, universal, and secret elections. Some of Bentham's ideas were known to the public from his earlier publications (such as the *Plan of Parliamentary Reform*), referring to the writings of John Cartwright (which were scrupulously described by Élie Halévy²⁷. The most important thing for us, however, is that Bentham identified radicalism with peaceful reform.

In his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* from 1844 [*Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie*], Karl Marx opposed the reformist and liberal

²⁶ Jeremy Bentham, “Radicalism Not Dangerous”, in Browning, J. (ed.), *Works of Jeremy Bentham*, Edinburgh: W. Tait; London: Simpkin, Marshall, 1843, pp. 599-622.

²⁷ Elie Halévy, *La formation du radicalisme philosophique. L'évolution de la doctrine utilitaire de 1789 à 1815*, Paris: PUF, 1995.

interpretation of radicalism, arguing for a new, more categorical form of social criticism, with its ultimate and convenient instrument: revolution²⁸. Each of these thinkers – Bentham and Marx – set forth distinct and different strategies for being radical: peaceful and militant – enlightened and romantic. Radicalism, understood as an insight into the roots of things, that is – according to Marx – “reaching” the man himself, indicates not only the need for an uncompromising struggle against every cause of his subjugation or humiliation. Marx injects into radicalism an ideal of non-mediation, which has become so characteristic of at least some left-wing projects of direct democracy, where this “reaching” turns into the empowerment of social actors at all costs, or even – symbolically – at the price of abolishing the sacred institution of the family. It is no accident that the principal figure of the new left – Herbert Marcuse, in his book *Eros and Civilization* saw the condition of “radical subjectivity” in sexual liberation²⁹, and Agnès Heller, the prominent neo-Marxist thinker called, in her project “radical ethics”, for not only the individual concern for one's neighbour (soliciting for freedom, happiness and perfection), but also for the ultimate abolition of all asymmetries in the public sphere resulting from the dogmas of obedience and subordination³⁰. In Marx's view, radicalism is a project of the defetishization of human life, that is, of liberating man of all unnecessary objects interfering with his contact with others and himself.

According to McCormack, an honest reflection on radicalism in the post-war period had completely disappeared³¹. The title of her paper (*The Motivation of Radicals*) might seem to again point to psychological interpretations, but in fact it was a call for a more sociological approach that would go beyond the unjust and naive tendency to see only personal disorders and extremist leanings in radicalism; i.e. an appeal to abandon Freud for Marx. According to McCormack, there were no manifest and convincing characteristics of radicalism that could be derived from the psychological interpretations of Gordon Allport, Henry T. Moore, John

²⁸ Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

²⁹ Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.

³⁰ Agnès Heller, *A Radical Philosophy*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.

³¹ Thelma H. McCormack, “The Motivation of Radicals”, in *American Journal of Sociology*, no. 56, 1950, pp. 17-24.

Flügel, Joel Rinald and Harold Laswell³². She argued, referring to Krout's and Stagner's as well as to Newcomb's alternative analysis that those who question the accepted principles act according to their place in the social structure, in relation to the objective historical situation, and also because of positive identification with particular values. Therefore it is necessary to analyse the problem of radicalism not in isolation, but in relation to political opportunities and the dynamics of social movements.

In 1955 Seymour Lipset for the first time used the concept of radicalism to refer to right-wing political extremism³³. The term "right-wing radicalism" has fallen on fertile ground in America, traditionally sceptical of feverish reformist ambitions. As Lipset pointed out, radicalism in age of McCarthy was expressed not only in the pursuit of far-reaching institutional change, but also in the desire to exclude those who threatened the values and interests of "real Americans". Lipset attributed the emergence of such right-wing radicalism to so-called *status politics*, distinguishing it from *class politics*. While the latter refers to economic interests and develops in times of economic instability into a need for reform, 'status politics' develops in times of prosperity, when frustration can arise out of a sense of one's insufficiently strong economic or social position. According to Lipset, this leads to resentment, and consequently to radicalism.

Among the works devoted to the issue of radicalism, two collections are worthy of attention. Seweryn Bialer, together with Sophie Sluzar, edited one of the most interesting and extensive collections of texts on this topic, entitled *Radicalism in the Contemporary Age*³⁴. Based on numerous articles by prominent intellectuals (Nisbet, Kołakowski, Raskin, Brzezinski) a complex image of radicalism emerges, one which goes far beyond a simple association of radicalism with left-wing attitudes. Its voluminous sources (Vol. I), visions of the future (Vol. II), as well as the strategies and influence that radicalism exerts on both the spiritual condition of modern man and

³² *Ibidem*, pp. 18-19.

³³ Seymour Lipset, "The Sources of the Radical Right", in *The Radical Right, The New American Right Expanded and Updated*, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company. Inc., 1963, pp. 259-377.

³⁴ Seweryn Bialer, Sophia Sluzar (eds.), *Radicalism in the Contemporary Age*, Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1977.

the political and social situation (Vol. III) were widely discussed. Equally ambitious, and quite similar in terms of its form, was the publication: *What is Radical Politics Today*, edited in 2009 by Jonathan Pugh³⁵. This book is a collection of various responses to the question of what constitutes radical politics. Prominent intellectuals (e.g. Bauman, Furedi, Soy and Mouffe) present different visions of modern radical politics (Part I), new forms of radical politics (Part II), its relation to diversities and differences (Part III), as well the visions of the State (Part IV) resulting from a radical stance, here essentially understood as a leftist attitude.

The notion of radicalism may be “contaminated” for various reasons, however the lack of its clarity encourages us to take into account all these heterogeneous contexts and consider their importance. Social science has done a great deal in this regard, pointing to many relationships that combine radicalism with social structure and class representation, political circumstances, culture, nationality, religion, and even gender. These issues cannot be entirely ignored, as we know from Helmuth Plessner. Here we draw attention only to titles in English, with full and humbling awareness that the literature of the subject in other languages may be equally rich. At least since the early 1960s there has been an ongoing and extensive debate about whether radicalism is a feature of excluded, discriminated, and marginal groups, or whether it is more of a middle class phenomenon. These are more reflections on the determinants of radicalism than an analysis of the very concept, but they provoke us to ask important questions. Christopher Lasch, in his 1965 work *The New Radicalism in America 1889-1963*, argues that radicalism is the work of intellectuals who revolted against the middle class that gave birth to them³⁶. Similarly Frank Parkin, in his analysis of the 1968 British anti-nuclear movement, *Middle Class Radicalism*³⁷, and Robert Johnston in his book, *The Radical Middle Class* focus their attention on middle class sources of radicalism³⁸. Among the publications highlighting the structure of

³⁵ Jonathan Pugh (ed.), *What is Radical Politics Today*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

³⁶ Christopher Lasch, *The New Radicalism in America 1889-1963: The Intellectual as a Social Type*, University of Michigan: Vintage, 1967.

³⁷ Frank Parkin, *Middle Class Radicalism: The Social Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968.

³⁸ Robert D. Johnstone, *The Radical Middle Class: Populist Democracy and the Question of Capitalism in Progressive Era Portland, Oregon*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.

political circumstances, including the cultural determinants of radicalism, worth mentioning is the book by Colin J. Beck entitled *Radicals, Revolutionaries, and Terrorists*, wherein the author not only describes the numerous connections between the phenomena listed in the title, the ways of organizing radical movements, and the dynamics of their development, but also presents interesting reflections on the very notion of radicalism³⁹. Among the works that exemplify the link between radicalism and religion, alongside the aforementioned books by Lichter and Rothman, worthy of mention is the work by Christiane Timmerman et. al., *Faith-based Radicalism*⁴⁰. The relationship between race and radicalism is taken into consideration by, among others, Abram Lincoln Harris in the book *Race, Radicalism, and Reform*⁴¹. An interesting issue is related to the “gender” of radicalism, which, if identified with violence, is one of the central themes of feminist critique, but when understood more sensitively, it grows to an essential feature of this critique, hence the term “radical feminism”. In all these approaches, radicalism is embedded in various social contexts that multiply its meaning.

At the end of this brief review of the socio-political narratives of radicalism, we should also refer the theories of social movements, which have continuously reflected on this subject. In assessing their significance and usefulness, we will confine ourselves to the most important representatives of three main currents that have established the main directions in the interpretation of social movements and radicalism. The first of them, which emerged at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries and lasted until the 1960s, linked the concept of radicalism with the dysfunctions of mass society, the irrational violence of crowds, and the unpredictability of marginalized groups. A wide range of works should be included here, from the *Psychology of the Crowd* (1895) by Gustav Le Bon, through to the books of collective behaviour theorists, such as *The True Believer* (1951) by Eric Hoffer, *The Politics of Mass Society* (1959) by William

³⁹ Colin J. Beck, *Radicals, Revolutionaries, and Terrorists*, Cambridge: John Wiley & Sons, 2015.

⁴⁰ Christiane Timmerman, Dirk Hutsebaut, Sara Mels, Walter Nonneman (eds.), *Faith-based Radicalism: Christianity, Islam, and Judaism between Constructive Activism and Destructive Fanaticism*, Brussels: Peter Lang, 2007.

⁴¹ Abram L. Harris, *Race, Radicalism, and Reform: Selected Papers of Abram L. Harris*, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1989.

Kornhauser, and the *Theory of Collective Behavior* (1963) by Neil Smelser, as well as the texts of relative deprivation theorists, such as Ted Gurr, the author of *Why Men Rebel* (1962)⁴².

In the 1970s an alternative concept of social movements emerged, according to which radicalism was not based on psychological dysfunctions, but was the result of rational actions related to fundamental social, cultural and economic changes. Radicalism was interpreted as a manifestation of the rational mobilization of social resources, i.e., a justified and organized response to objective dysfunctions in social structures. Mayer Zald and John McCarthy, the authors of the famous article *Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory* (1977), played a great role in shaping this paradigm. Charles Tilly's book *From Mobilization to Revolution* (1978) contributed to the development of the theory of political circumstances, which highlighted the importance of the context of social unrest, including the environment, for radicalism⁴³.

Finally, in the 1980s and 1990s the cultural paradigm of social movement studies opened up new perspectives in the thinking about radicalism. The strategic importance of language and semantic structures has been exposed by proponents of frame alignment theories, such as William Gamson and David Snow, co-authors of the widely discussed publication, *Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation* (1986). European scholars have established the notion of "new social movements", highlighting issues of identity struggle in the debate about radicalism. Alain Touraine, Alberto Melucci and Manuel Castells – the author of *The Power of Identity* (1997) – played a key role here. The cultural theories, illustrated for example by the work *The Passionate Politics* (2001) of Jasper, Goodwin and Polletta, address subjective needs, moral dilemmas, and in particular the emotions of social movement activists, and

⁴² Cf.: Gustav Le Bon, *Psychology of the Crowd*, Southampton: Sparkling Books Ltd, 2009; Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*, New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2002; William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*, New York: The Free Press, 1959; Neil Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior*, New York: The Free Press, 1963. Gurr Ted Robert, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.

⁴³ John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, „Resource mobilization and Social Movement“, in *American Journal of Sociology*, no. 82, 1977, pp. 1112-1141; Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, New York: Random House, 1978.

thus demonstrate innumerable imponderables connected with radicalism⁴⁴. It was thanks to such a diversity of interpretations that Craig Calhoun could publish his book, *The Roots of Radicalism*, wherein he considers radicalism as a necessary intellectual and social power performing its role since at least from the beginning of the nineteenth century⁴⁵.

Conventional Radicalism *versus* Substantive Radicalism

The works mentioned here should be a necessary reference in any research about radicalism, which is conventionally interpreted as purely an intensification of extremes. The definitional problems surrounding this unclear and rich concept appear over and over again. It is a challenge which rarely yields satisfactory results. Perhaps the best evidence of the confusion that arises around the phenomenon of radicalism is the fact that it can now describe both the terrifying actions of Islamic extremists and the peaceful protests of the progressive left. It is difficult not to notice that the social movements behind these actions vary in almost every way. What really connects them is not the exaggeration and recourse to violence, but the special moods and predilections of the subjects of radicalism, which, as modernity progresses, are becoming increasingly more evident.

We find it inspiring that an anticipation of such a complex nature of radical attitudes can be found in the work of the aforementioned German thinker Helmuth Plessner. Although the sociologist presents radicalism as a threat to mankind and the public sphere, there is a delicate depth in this interpretation, which does not permit it to be thought of in terms of ordinary and vulgar extremism, or as an inclination to exaggerated actions and unwarranted violence. I presented a detailed criticism of this interpretation in my book: *Cień radykalizmu*; thus here I will present here only some basic conclusions, which not only yield insights into the complex predilections of the radical subject, but also make it possible to understand

⁴⁴ Cf.: David A. Snow, Burke E. Rocheford, Steven K. Worden, Rober D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation", in *American Sociological Review*, no. 51(4), 1986, pp. 546–581 ; Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, Francesca Polletta, *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.

⁴⁵ Cf.: Craig Calhoun, *The Roots of Radicalism: Tradition, the Public Sphere and Early Nineteenth Century Social Movements*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012.

why they are coming to life in the age of late modernity, or – as Anthony Giddens puts it – in times of the radicalisation of modernity⁴⁶. The substantive radicalism that I present here is at the same time a synthesis of the alternative and more “benevolent” interpretations that I referred to in the first part of this article.

First, radicalism can be a matter of description and evaluation only in the context of a particular understanding of the subject and public sphere. This also implies the need for an interdisciplinary approach, also proven by Plessner himself. It is not just about the more or less liberal or conservative images of the world that constantly alter the boundaries of radicalism, but about more detailed philosophical anthropology, psychological premises, social ontology or simply about the philosophy of life. The critique of social radicalism presented by the German thinker would look entirely different if - in place of the premise of the “decentred position of the subject”, i.e. Plessner’s belief about subject’s ontological fragility and his thesis that the public sphere should hence be a space of hygiene where people can feel secure – we put an active subject looking for opportunities to compete (ἀγών), as is presented for instance in the work of Hannah Arendt.

Secondly, radicalism is characterized by a simultaneous sense of deficit (i.e. insufficiency), aroused hopes, and grief. Plessner reveals the indirectly obvious truth that a radical is in a conversation with reality, common knowledge, and common sense. Radically disposed people do not agree on the boundaries delineating the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) generated in the process of socialization. In the wavering consciousness of a radical, this socially created and legitimated consensus is an artificial, unreflective set of superstitions, the only positive function of which is that they give psychic comfort, or the illusion of a coherent vision of the world. A radical’s thoughts and feelings obsessively confirm the defects and infirmities, as well as fuel longings, expectations and a sense of grief. Conservative and romantic radicalism, which incorporates the need for rooting and restitution of the foundations, proclaims the possibility and even the necessity of regeneration of the values abandoned sometime in an unspecified past – a kind of “resurrection”. However, because this past is foggy and frequently located metaphorically in times of an imaginary

⁴⁶ Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, John Wiley & Sons, 2013.

“golden age”, it remains unclear where and what it is, hence radicalism ultimately touches upon the mystery of human origins. It finds, in the past exclusively, a very generalized possibility of revising human fate. The pretensions of such a radical will never be satisfied, which in the end results in a never-ending grief. On the other hand, enlightened radicalism, anticipating and directed toward the future, reveals a man lost in his search for the fleeing absolute. While there can be progress, the enlightened radical becomes more and more conscious of the ever-present but never-attainable perfection. The magnitude of the radical expectations stimulates the will to power and excitement, but at the same time it gives rise to a puzzling impression of failure, accompanied by increasingly perplexing feelings of the escaping world and wasted opportunities. This radicalism has a tendency to exacerbate, it dogmatically puts everything on the shelf of novelty, but ultimately it does not win because the project of radical reconstruction never reaches the goal. Enlightened radicalism is also accompanied by feelings of grief.

Third, radicalism is associated with a tendency to take risks. Hence it is not a synonym for destruction. It signifies rather the need to break the domination of the artificial and idiosyncratic orders permanently incorporated into the language and group interests. Radicalism means the need for innovation, and thus openness to what is “foreign” or “peculiar”, as opposed to what is “native”. Radicalism thus takes on a cognitive significance and transforms it into an experience which Charles Taylor would describe as *epiphanic* – one that reveals an inaccessible truth that only sometimes shines through. It is a conscious effort to search for “borderline situations” and experience them for cognitive purposes. The radical imagination, the attention focused on extreme (i.e. “terminal”, “foreign”) expressions of human behaviour becomes then the best way to know and experience reality – the basis of philosophical, sociological or political inquiry⁴⁷. In this sense radicalism has always been the direction of the intellectual and artistic avant-garde, which deliberately abandon the conventional and socially-generated images of the world for what is cutting and unique. Such radicalism assumes that reality can be understood by what is outside the borders. Manichaeism and dualism, which according to Plessner portray the suspicious mind of a radical, can thus lead

⁴⁷ Razmig Keucheyan, *op. cit.*

paradoxically to openness. Radicalism tames the strangeness, but at the same time like a stranger "(...) shatters the rock on which the security of daily life rests"⁴⁸. Only in this way can man penetrate into the spaces of the mysterious and unknown. Radicalism, contrary to what Plessner assumes, does not proclaim a faith in the "healing power of extremes"⁴⁹. This kind of attitude is characterized by extremism, which presumably in Plessner's understanding is the same. It is difficult however to imagine that the search for the root(s) could be accompanied by certainty and absolute conviction about one's reasoning. Radicalism is rather fraught with risks and is inherently related to uncertainty, in the same way as all inquiries are risky and uncertain. Radicalism is an experience of constant coercion; an experience related to the search for the escaping basis. What seems to be the backbone of the radical mind changes over time only into the next clue, the next trace.

Fourth, radicalism is a feature of people in the 'liminal phase', or to use Victor Turner's formulation – of people in the phase of transition, suspension, and uncertainty⁵⁰. Plessner emphasizes that radicalism is a feature of weak (lower and working classes): excluded, disappointed and awaiting⁵¹. The impressions of alienation and ineptitude, of being stripped and marked by scarcity, may indicate the identity dilemmas of the radical, who does not accept the world and is feverishly looking for his or her place. Radicalism is a characteristic of people not only dissatisfied with their place in the world, but also of those who are in a state of passage and waiting; of people who for various reasons are in suspension. Thus, for example, the tendency toward radicalism – as Plessner points out – is biologically characteristic of the young, and especially of the progressive youths, who feel the chains, remain in the eternal generational conflict; stripped of unwavering trust and full of the need for love; but without acceptance of the cold, calculating, scepticism, pathos, and alleged progress. Let us add to Plessner's comments that these features are present

⁴⁸ Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodernity and its Discontents*, New York: New York University Press, 1997, p. 10.

⁴⁹ Helmuth Plessner, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁵⁰ Victor Turner, "Liminality and Communitas", in *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*, Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969 pp. 94-113.

⁵¹ Helmuth Plessner, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

in their most complete form in the middle class. The middle class is the most radical social class, in the sense that radicalism means not only increased reflectivity but also a sense of deficit, aroused hopes, a constant sense of inadequacy, the need for innovation, openness to what is foreign, and the willingness to risks. We therefore formulate a proposal that contradicts the common conviction that the middle class is an essential source of stability and equilibrium in liberal democracies. On the contrary, the middle class is the most abundant field of tentativeness and trial-and-error, the environment of risk, initiative, and experimentation. The well-educated, with good salaries, are those aware of the quality of their lives, are most likely to seek, determined, and prepared for sudden twists. The middle class, traditionally regarded as the embodiment of a healthy society, is today becoming a major actor experiencing the uncertainty of modern times. It is not just the economic dangers that make the middle class shrink – it is getting either richer or declassed – but rather that through education and cultural capital it becomes aware of the fragility and conventional nature of the most important narratives of social life. The middle class is particularly exposed to both reactionary and emancipatory trends, and thus it is the social strata where radicalism, as properly understood, can thrive. It is no coincidence – as sociologists point out – that the new social movements which are the source of social radicalism are usually born within the middle classes⁵².

Conclusions: the radicalization of modernity and radicalism

It is necessary to rethink the idea of radicalism and restore its original meaning, as it appears not only in Bentham's work but also in many other interpretations referred to in the first part of this article. In short, it may be encapsulated as the attitude of an outspoken reformer. The criticism offered of Plessner's concept makes it possible to see a number of other predilections of a radical "mind set". In modernity this radicalism is awakened in a particular way – it expresses and creates itself at one and the same time. This connection can be better seen and understood through the concept of "double-edged modernity" formulated by Anthony Giddens⁵³.

⁵² Cf.: Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics", in *Social Research*, no. 52, 1985, pp. 817-868.

⁵³ Anthony Giddens, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

Modernity, as the British sociologist writes, is becoming radicalized – it intensifies and dissipates social and institutional relationships, multiplies information and brings about continuous diversification. Perforce, modernity constantly revises the existing conventions – shifting the traditions and leading to different manifestations of disembedding. The extent and speed of changes, the institutional multidimensionality of modernity, and its randomness bring enormous opportunities, but also widespread risks.

In our understanding, this “radicalizing of modernity” increases the radical tendencies and the value of radicalism understood as a set of complex spiritual, psychological and social inclinations. We can witness it in the uncertain expectations, anticipations, openness and hopes of the middle class. Although the radical entity suffers from grief, the modern subject of Giddens bases his or her activity on trust in the correctness of the principles and the credibility of particular individuals. In both cases the subject feels a fundamental lack of a basis and certainty (disembedding) and therefore experiences a paramount deficit and anxiety. In the end, we should add that what the sociologist calls “reflexivity” – that subjects need to stay in touch with the foundations of their own actions, together with the factors of reform and reproduction – not only incarnates the strategy of living in modernity, but also the very essence of radicalism, i.e. applying criticism in the constant process of searching for the roots (*radix*) of life. Giddens himself identifies “radical engagement” as a form of dealing with risk and a way for new embedding⁵⁴.

Bibliography

Books:

1. Adorno, W. Theodor; Frenkel-Brunswik, Else; Levinson, Daniel; J., Sanford, R. Nevitt (1950), *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York: Harper and Row.
2. Alinsky, Saul (1946), *Reveille for Radicals*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

⁵⁴ Giddens, Anthony. *The Consequences of Modernity...*, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

3. Alinsky, Saul (1971), *Rules for Radicals*, New York: Random House, Inc.
4. Bauman, Zygmunt (1997), *Postmodernity and its Discontents*, New York: New York University Press.
5. Beck, J. Colin (2015), *Radicals, Revolutionaries, and Terrorists*, Cambridge: John Wiley & Sons.
6. Calhoun, Craig (2012), *The Roots of Radicalism: Tradition, the Public Sphere and Early Nineteenth Century Social Movements*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
7. Detwiler, Bruce (1990), *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
8. Diamond, Salomon (1936), *A study of the Influence of Political Radicalism on Personality Development. Archives of Psychology*, New York: Ph. D., Columbia University.
9. Giddens, Anthony (2013), *The Consequences of Modernity*, John Wiley & Sons.
10. Goodwin, Jeff; Jasper, James; Polletta, Francesca (2001), *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
11. Gurr R. Ted (1970), *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
12. Halévy, Elie (1995), *La formation du radicalisme philosophique, L'évolution de la doctrine utilitaire de 1789 à 1815*, Paris: PUF.
13. Harris, L. Abram (1988), *Race, Radicalism, and Reform: Selected Papers of Abram L. Harris*. Transaction Publishers.
14. Heller, Agnés (1984), *A Radical Philosophy*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
15. Hoffer, Eric (2002), *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*, New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics.
16. Johnstone, D. Robert (2003), *The Radical Middle Class: Populist Democracy and the Question of Capitalism in Progressive Era Portland, Oregon*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
17. Kornhauser, William (1959), *The Politics of Mass Society*, New York: The Free Press.
18. Lasch, Christopher (1967), *The New Radicalism in America 1889-1963: The Intellectual as a Social Type*, University of Michigan: Vintage.
19. Le Bon, Gustav (2009), *Psychology of the Crowd*, Sparkling Books.

20. Marcuse, Herbert (1966), *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, Boston: Beacon Press.
21. Marx, Karl (1970), *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
22. McLaughlin, Paul (2012), *Radicalism. A Philosophical Study*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
23. Methvin, H. Eugene (1973), *The Rise of Radicalism: The Social Psychology of Messianic Extremism*, Arlington: Arlington House Productions.
24. Parkin, Frank (1968), *Middle Class Radicalism: The Social Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
25. Plessner, Helmuth (1999), *The Limits of Community: A Critique of Social Radicalism*, Amherst, NY: Humanity Books.
26. Rakusa-Suszczewski Mikołaj (2016), *Cień Radykalizmu; pojęcie radykalizmu w świetle teorii ruchów społecznych*, Warsaw: ASPRA & Centrum Europejskie UW.
27. Reed, E. Francis (1922), *Treatment of Social Radicalism: Its Psychological and Social Aspects*, Madison: University of Wisconsin.
28. Rothman, Stanley; Lichter, Robert (1996), *Roots of Radicalism: Jews, Christians, and the Left*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
29. Smelser Neil (1963), *Theory of Collective Behavior*, New York: The Free Press.
30. Tilly Charles (1978), *From Mobilization to Revolution*, New York: Random House.

Studies within volumes:

1. Bentham, Jeremy (1843), "Radicalism Not Dangerous", in: Browning, J. (ed.), *Works of Jeremy Bentham*, Edinburgh: W. Tait; London: Simpkin, Marshall.
1. Bialer, Seweryn; Sluzar, Sophia (eds.) (1977), *Radicalism in the Contemporary Age*, Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.
2. Bittner, Egon (1968), "Radicalism" in Stills, D. E. (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, New York: Macmillan.
3. Kallen, M. Horace (1934), "Radicalism", in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, New York: The Macmillan Company, vol. 1.

4. Lipset, Seymour (1963), "The Sources of the Radical Right", in Daniel Bell (ed.), *The Radical Right, The New American Right Expanded and Updated*, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company. Inc..
5. Pugh, Jonathan (ed.), (2009), *What is Radical Politics Today*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
6. Timmerman, Christiane; Hutsebaut, Dirk; Mels, Sara; Nonneman, Walter (eds.), (2007), *Faith-based Radicalism: Christianity, Islam, and Judaism Between Constructive Activism and Destructive Fanaticism*. Bruksela: Peter Lang.
7. Tormey, Simon (2008), "Radicalism", in Darity Jr., W.A. (ed.) *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.*, vol. 7, Farmington Hills: Macmillan Reference.
8. Turner, Victor (1969), "Liminality and Communitas", in *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*, Chicago: Aldine Publishing.

Studies in periodicals:

1. Bittner, Egon (1963), "Radicalism and the organization of radical movements", in *American Sociological Review*, no. 6, vol. 28.
2. McCarthy D. John, Zald N. Mayer (1977), „Resource mobilization and Social Movement”, in *American Journal of Sociology*, no. 82.
3. McCormack, H. Thelma (1950), "The Motivation of Radicals", in *American Journal of Sociology*, no. 56.
4. Offe, Claus (1985), "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics", in *Social Research*, no. 52.
5. Rakusa-Suszczewski, Mikołaj (2013), "Radykalizm, podmiotowość i sfera publiczna w refleksji Helmutha Plessnera", in *Folia Sociologica*, nr 47.
6. Reed, Ellery, Francis, "Psychic mechanisms and social radicalism", *The Journal of Social Forces*, 1923, vol. 2 (1).
7. Root, W. Thomas (1925), "The Psychology of Radicalism", in *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, vol. 19(4).
8. Shea, E. James (1906), "Radicalism and Reform", in *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association*, vol. 3.
9. Wolfe, B. Albert (1921), "The motivation of radicalism", in *Psychological Review*, vol. XXVIII (4).

Electronic materials:

1. Keuchyan Razmig (2010), "Qu'est-ce qu'une pensée radical? Aspects du radicalism épistémique", [<http://www.journaldumauss.net/?Qu-est-ce-qu-une-pensee-radicale>], accessed: 17.07.2017.

**ROMANIAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT:
BETWEEN REPOLITICIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT
OF THE STATUS-QUO (2012-2017)**

Victoria Stoiciu*

DOI: 10.24193/subbeuropaea.2017.3.08

Published Online: 2017-09-30

Published Print: 2017-09-30

Abstract

The article states that the social movement that emerged in Romania in 2012 is part of the global anti-austerity movement. It proposes the movement's analysis in the key of Karl Polanyi's theory of double movement, portraying it as a counter-movement opposing the third way of marketization, which involves commodification through dispossession of access to water, land, air and other free public goods. The article shows how the movement, which started as an anti-system protest articulated a series of claims that contested the post-communist consensus and revealed some fundamental conflicts of the society, obscured and mystified by the dominant power structures. It demonstrates that the social movement's anti-system agenda had a powerful repoliticization potential and announced a new discursive regime challenging the hegemonic discourse, which uses depoliticization tactics for maintaining the existing power structures. The article describes how in parallel to the anti-system discourse the social movement accommodated an anti-governmental narrative that became dominant in the most recent protests of 2017, diminishing the repoliticization and, thus, the emancipatory potential of the movement.

Keywords: social movements, austerity, depoliticization, anti-system discourse, emancipation

* Victoria Stoiciu holds an MA degree from the National School of Administration and Political Sciences in Bucharest and is currently a PhD student at Babes Bolyai University's Faculty of European Studies. She works as a Policy Officer at the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation office in Romania.

Contact: victoria.stoiciu@gmail.com

Introduction

Starting with 2012, Romania experienced a wave of protests, combined with civic activism in-between the protest periods. This context enables some researchers to speak about the emergence of a social movement¹.

Since 2012, when people went out to protest against a draft law that aimed to privatize the health care system, different political events have triggered repeated street demonstrations: in 2013, the draft law giving green light to cyanide exploitation of country's gold resources, in 2014 the poor organization of the presidential elections, in 2015 the refusal of the President to promulgate a law that would limit the illegal logging, in 2016 a fire incident in a Bucharest night club and, finally, in 2017 an emergency ordinance issued by the Government that would soften the anti-corruption legislation. Despite the variety of the issues that triggered the civic unrest, the protests have in common a number of characteristics that create continuity between them: heterogeneous ideological composition, horizontal structure and absence of leaders, informal and diffuse networks for mobilization (#UnitiSalvam, #CoruptiaUcide, #Rezist). These characteristics can be found in all the protests that took place in Romania starting with 2012; however, one can also distinguish important differences between the protests, evolving over the time.

Our hypothesis is that the social movement that emerged in Romania starting with 2012 began as an anti-system protest, but over the years has abandoned its anti-system character and turned into an anti-government protest. By anti-system and anti-governmental character we understand not only a set of claims, but complex ideological constructions, that determine the manner in which the public discontent is formulated. We also state that the anti-system character had a much higher potential of repoliticizing the political sphere than the anti-governmental protest has.

¹ Clara Volintiru, *Romania's Recent Protests Have Become a Social Movement Calling for the Dignity of the People in the Face of an Unaccountable Government*, 20 March, 2012; Michael Burawoy, "Times of Turmoil: Emerging Visions from Three Years of *Global Dialogue*", Paper presented at the Third ISA Conference of the Council of National Associations, May 13-16, 2013 at Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey, [<http://burawoy.berkeley.edu/Global%20Sociology/Times%20of%20Turmoil.pdf>], accessed June 2017 .

The aim of this article is to analyze the way in which the ideological dimension of the protest was articulated and its impact on the emancipatory potential of the social movement.

Romanian social movement as part of the global anti-austerity movement

There are two dominant theoretical approaches in the social movements' literature, each emphasizing different characteristics of the collective action. The first approach is enrooted in Charles Tilly theory of resource mobilization that describes the social movements as being the rational behavior of collective actors which aim to consolidate their position at the political level by mobilizing different resources, including violence, if needed.² From this perspective, the social movements are formed by rational actors, engaging in strategic political battles and using for that organizational, informational, financial, social resources. The absence of these resources blocks the collective action and makes it irrelevant, if not impossible.

A second theoretical approach, whose main exponent is Alain Touraine, understands the social movements as actions undertaken by dominated actors, who challenge the existing order in an attempt to appropriate the 'historicity' control³. The social movement is the action through which dominated, protesting actors define their identity (on whose behalf they are mobilizing), recognize the social nature of the opponent (who is both dominant and in power) and claims to manage or monitor the major orientations of collective life – this is what Touraine calls the historicity of society. What is essential to the social movements is the idea that by aiming at the control of historicity, the social movement, through its conflictual action, produces the whole of society, transforms it and structures it⁴.

² Charles Tilly and Richard Tilly, *The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930*, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1975.

³ Alain Touraine, *The Post-Industrial Society*, New York: Random House, 1971.

⁴ Michel Wieviorka, "Alain Touraine and the Concept of Social Movement", Intervention at *ISA World Congress of Sociology*, Yokohama, July 2014, [<https://wieviorka.hypotheses.org/318>], accessed July 2017.

The two orientations are not necessarily mutually exclusive: one could state that the first one emphasizes the goal, while the second prioritizes the significance, the meaning. However, the second approach offers richer and more complex possibilities of analysis, contrary to the functionalist approach of resources mobilizations, because it does not focus exclusively on political opportunities and access channels, but also on social and economic context in which the social movement emerges⁵.

It must be noticed that the type of analysis that transcends the framework of the nation state and focuses on the structural characteristics of the intersection between economic, political and social factors, between capitalism and democracy is quasi-absent from the study of social movements. Some attempts in this direction can be identified, however. The new social movements' studies include in the analysis the socio-economic transformations and the transition from the material production of the Fordist economy to the immaterial production of the post-Second World War economies that alleviates the class cleavages and makes possible a new type of demands, different from the socio-economic claims of the past and enrooted in post-materialistic values⁶. Therefore, a trans disciplinary approach that goes beyond the classical social movements study and includes elements of political economy, political theory, political philosophy and political sociology can offer a much richer analysis and a more complex understanding of the social movement.

For investigating the social movement that emerged in Romania after 2012 I propose to start from the Karl Polanyi's works, which offers the framework for a macro-analysis that can be used for social movement study⁷. The key notions proposed by Polanyi when referring to economy and markets is the concept of separation as opposed to embeddedness. Polanyi argues that in pre-capitalist times markets were embedded in social relations, the self-regulating market being nonexistent – the production and distribution of goods were encapsulated in social institutions. The capitalism and the promoters of *laissez faire* have reverted this relationship: the economic relations have not only been released from the "girdle" of

⁵ Donatella della Porta, *Social Movements in Times of Austerity*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015.

⁶ Alain Touraine, *op. cit.*

⁷ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Boston: Beacon Press, 2001 [1944].

social relations, but they try to subordinate the social norms to the market logic. Faced with this trend that involves the commodification of labor, nature, money (called fictions commodities), the society tends to protect itself – for Polanyi, and the experience of commodification is deeply traumatizing, more profound and immediate than the exploitation. This is how we are arriving to the double movement theory – the counter movement of the society which is defending itself appears as a reaction to the market expansion. The struggle is a central element of Polanyi's theory – not the class struggle, like for Marxists, but the opposition between the forces that support the commodification and those who oppose it, seeking more social protection. Social movements are key actors of this struggle, although the counter movement can rely on a wider spectrum of actors, such as political parties and even the state itself.

The Romanian social movement can be, thus, understood in the larger framework of the anti-austerity movements that emerged in the world following the 2008 economic crisis. Starting from Polanyi's work, the sociologist Michael Burawoy develops the theory of the three marketization waves⁸. What we currently face, starting with 1970 is nothing than the third wave of marketization, commonly known as neoliberalism, which is just another name for the *laissez faire* ideology. If the first wave of marketization (1850-192) commodified the labor and the second (1920-1970) commodified the money, the third wave of marketization (1970 – until now) consists in the commodification of nature and life, putting in danger the existence of entire communities or species. The third way of marketization involves commodification through dispossession of access to land, water, and air as well as to free public education and open public knowledge. It is de-regulation and dispossession -- the conditions of expanded commodification rather than commodification itself -- that generate social movements, according to Burawoy.

Burawoy argues that the first marketization wave is national at its origin and triggers local reactions, such as workers movements, obtaining extensive labor rights; the second wave has international origins (the gold standard and the international trade) and triggered national reactions, with

⁸ Michael Burawoy, "Third-Wave Sociology and the End of Pure Science", in *The American Sociologist*, Fall/Winter 2005, [http://burawoy.berkeley.edu/PS/TAS1/third_wave.pdf], accessed June 2017.

the states trying to protect the society from the devastating effects of the international trade through protectionism and through more social protection (public pension system, social protection, social rights). The third wave of marketization has international origins and triggers global reactions – although the opposition can be organized at local or national level, it must reach the global dimension of the problem in order to be solved. These are what Wieviorka calls global movements – their demands include a global vision, often receive support from transnational networks and open new negotiating areas at the global level, going beyond the national states⁹.

From this perspective, the movement that emerged in Romania in 2012 can be described as part of the global anti-austerity movement¹⁰. The protest started in January 2012 and was triggered by the Government's intention to privatize the health care system, as part of the anti-austerity measures and structural reforms implemented starting with 2009. A set of crushing austerity measures was applied in 2010 – public-sector wages were cut by 25 percent; social security benefits by 15 percent; and VAT increased from 19 percent to 24 percent. The austerity measures had negative social consequences, including persistently high unemployment, a low employment rate and a low sense of wellbeing among the population¹¹. Of all public-sector jobs lost in Europe in 2010, 21 percent were lost in Romania¹². The protests, as other anti-austerity movements, expressed the dissatisfaction of the population with the commodification that started soon after 1989, being at the core of the economic transition from a planned to a market economy and which reached its pick in the crisis years (2009-2012). In 2009-2012 an unprecedented attack on the social and labor rights took place – the Labor Code was amended and the labor relations

⁹ Michel Wieviorka (ed.), *Un Autre Monde; Contestations, Dérives et Surprises dans l'Anti-mondialisation*, Paris: Balland, 2003b.

¹⁰ Cătălin Augustin Stoica and Vintilă Mihăilescu "2012. Romania's Winter of Discontent", in *Global Dialogue* 3.1.

¹¹ Victoria Stoiciu, "Austerity and Structural Reforms in Romania", in *International Policy Analysis*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012.

¹² Dragan Plavšić, "The Romanian Protests. Why Have Hundreds of Thousands of Romanians Taken to the Streets this Month Against a Nominally Center-Left Government?", in *Jacobin*, 02.22.2017, [<https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/02/romania-protests-corruption-psd-iohannis-austerity/>], accessed February 2017.

flexibilized, the social assistance legislation was changed with the state reducing its role in poverty eradication, the trade unions were deprived of their powers. The free market logic penetrated in spheres which were until then protected by a set of social relations whose formal expression was the legal framework. The process was not specific to Romania, but was a global one – similar measures have been undertaken on other countries, like Greece, Italy, Portugal or Spain, triggering similar popular unrest.

The demands of the Romanian protests reveal a similarity in messages and claims with movements like Indignados or Occupy - they denounce the deep injustices of the society, unequal distribution of power, resources, and privileges¹³. Whenever they oppose to the exploitation of gold resources by a multinational corporation, with huge ecological risks, to the privatization of public health care or to the indifference and abuses of authorities that made possible the fire incident, there is always another level of claims that goes beyond these specific demands – it is a criticism towards the system as a whole, a contestation of the very premises of the social contract concluded between ordinary citizens and elites. Hence, the specific issues were subordinated to a wider dissatisfaction with “politics as usual” and with the negative externalities produced by these politics, such as ecological risks, regulatory capture, human rights abuses. These problems are local, they emerge in the specific context of post-communist Romania, but in the same time they have a strong global dimension, being very similar, sometimes identical with problems faced in other places. This is why we see alliances with groups from other countries, such as anti-mining activists from Chile, Greece, or Germany. Moreover, the solutions these problems require are not only local or national – they require European/global regulations, be it in the area of cyanide use or budgetary deficit targets.

Therefore, we state that similarly to other anti-austerity protests, the Romanian demonstrations were not so much about austerity in itself, but about politics in general, being driven by a general distrust in established political institutions and by deep-seated notions of skepticism and

¹³ Victoria Stoiciu, “The Romanian Autumn 2013 and the Return of Politics. Protest Against Mining Projects and Fracking in Romania: Actors and Discourses”, in *Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft*, No. 01/2016.

discomfort at the way political decisions are made¹⁴. The Romanian protests did not express the dissatisfaction with one particular political party, institution or leader, but a critique towards the political system as such. *All political parties are the same misery* is the a recurring slogan in almost all the protests that took place since 2012, with few exceptions, the most notable being the protest from February 2017, when the anti-system discourse was replaced with the dissatisfaction against one institution and one party – the Government, formed by the Social-Democratic Party (PSD). Further on, we argue that this reflects more than a simple change in the protests’ target – as we will show, it reflects a deep ideological transformation that began already in 2013 demonstrations.

From anti-system to anti-government protests – 2012-2017

The Romanian social movement that emerged in 2012 was characterized from the very beginning by a high ideological heterogeneity. Liberals, leftists, nationalists, ecologists and even extreme right groups stranded together against a political establishment whose outcome was the abuse of power, legislation in favor of a privileged minority and an irresponsible exploitation of country’s (natural) resources¹⁵. Each group attending the protests articulated the dissatisfaction in its own language, although the triggering factor was the same for everybody – a draft law in favor of a multinational company, allowing the exploitation of gold resources and involving ecological risks in 2013, the poor organization of the vote outside Romania, limiting the right to vote in 2014, the illegal logging and the failure of the political class to stop it in the summer of 2015, the public authorities’ negligence and corruption, leading to a fire incident that ended up with the dead of more than 60 persons in the fall of 2015 and, finally, the abuse of power for protecting some corrupt politicians in February 2017. For the liberals, for example, each of the above mentioned issues represented an abuse against the rule of law principles, a sign of discretionary and corrupt governance. For nationalists, it was the country’s national interest that was always put in danger by “selling the country to the foreigners”. The leftists groups emphasized the structural deficiencies

¹⁴ Mary Kaldor, Sabine Selchow (eds.), *Subterranean Politics in Europe*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

¹⁵ Victoria Stoiciu, “The Romanian Autumn 2013 and the Return of Politics...”.

of the capitalism, leading to disproportionate power of the capital over the citizens and the absence of social justice. For ecologists, at stake was the protection of the environment. Although in some cases the issue that triggered the popular discontent was not necessarily offering the premises for narrating it in nationalist, ecologist or other ideological groups' terms – for example, the protests over the fire incident in November 2015, that had nothing to do with the ecologists' agenda – those groups were still attending the popular gathering, because each time the protest's demands were going beyond their immediate claims and were translated in more general, global requirements. What was at stake in every protest was the opposition against the political establishment as a whole, against the political system in place. This anti-system narrative was not diluting, nor was it diminishing the ideological heterogeneity of the protests, but made the co-existence of different ideological groups possible.

In parallel with this opposition to the entire political system, one could observe already starting with 2013 an alternative narrative of the protests, which tried to frame the protests as being merely anti-governmental and directed against the governing party, PSD. This narrative was present in every protest, cutting across the ideological divides; the anti-system discourse and the anti-governmental one became the social movement's main cleavage. Although the two narratives coexisted in every protest, in some cases the anti-system one was more powerful (2013, 2015) and in others the anti-governmental message dominated (2014). In 2017, this tension ended up with a total elimination of the anti-system discourse. If in previous protests slogans like "All political parties have cut the forests", "The entire political class is guilty" "We went into the street not for changing the government, but for changing the system" coexisted with slogans directed against one single political party or against the government, in 2017 the street was overwhelmingly voicing only messages demanding the resignation of the government and blaming the PSD leaders.

The abandoning of the anti-system narrative in 2017 was also evident from the change of the protest's location – in previous protests, the crowd was gathering in University Square, a place with a strong symbolism. Although no public institution is located in the University Square, the place is symbolizing the past opposition against the communist

regime – thus, not against a specific institution or party, but against the system as a whole. Sometimes, the protesters organized marches throughout the city, stopping in front of different public institutions – Government, Parliament, and Presidential Administration; none of the three state powers was exempted from the contestation of the protesters. However, in February 2017 the protesters only gathered together in Victoriei Square, where the Government’s building is located. Moreover, if in 2012 or 2013 all the political figures who tried to attend the protests have been pushed away and rejected by the crowd, in 2017 the president Iohannis was warmly received amongst the protesters, whom he declared as being “his Romanians”, edifying the alliance between a part of the system and the street.

The abandoning of the anti-system narrative in 2017 might not be the final destination of the Romanian social movement, the history of which is still work in progress. However, the transformation marked a powerful change in the protests’ nature and agenda. I argue here that contrary to the anti-government discourse, the anti-system narrative had the potential of re-politicizing the political space in Romania, bringing more democracy and thus having a higher emancipation potential.

The repoliticization potential of the Romanian social movement

As in many other post-communist countries, the Romanian political sphere was marked by depoliticization – a narrowing of the boundaries of democratic politics, a dislocation of the politics from the political institutions. Depoliticization has been a topic of interest in sociology, political science, and development studies for many decades, hence there is a wide, cross disciplinary literature on depoliticization, starting with Carl Schmitt and Marcuse and ending up with the work of Rancière, Žižek, Burnham, Hay, etc.

In spite the variety of definitions and theories, depoliticization is used to capture a democratic condition in which genuine contestation and conflicting claims about the world are perceived to be no longer apparent. Rancière distinguish between archi-politics, para-politics and meta-politics as specific forms of depoliticization¹⁶. Žižek adds to this triangle the ultra-

¹⁶ Jacques Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

politics and the post-politics¹⁷. For Peter Burnham, depoliticization is a form of statecraft whereby the political character of decision-making is removed from elected government¹⁸. For Colin Hay, whose work has been perhaps the most influential in this strand of the depoliticization literature, depoliticisation involves moving an issue from the governmental sphere to the public sphere or from the public sphere to the private sphere or from the private sphere to the realm of necessity¹⁹. Hay argues that issues can be politicized, with increasing intensity, if they are promoted from the realm of necessity to the private sphere, from the private to the public sphere, from the public sphere to the government sphere. Depoliticization operates in analogous fashion - only in reverse. Hay's definition of depoliticization overlaps with Andreas Schedler's description of anti-politics, a term used sometimes for depoliticization and that is the tendency to abolish politics by replacing the politics' rationality with another rationality - replacing collective problems with self-regulating orders (for example market), or contingency with necessity (for example, TINA – there is no alternative) or plurality with uniformity ("the people" of populists)²⁰.

For better understanding the depoliticization, an incursion into what politics is necessary, since depoliticization is precisely the reverse of the politics, the evacuation of politics from its *locus*. Many authors, among which Rancière, Mouffe, Laclau etc distinguish between *la politique* and *le politique*, between the institutionalized politics - defined as the state-centered interpretation and representation of political affairs and the real, genuine politics, defined as the sphere of authentic political/democratic engagement between individuals. For Chantal Mouffe, the political is the dimension of antagonism constitutive of human societies, while politics is the set of practices through which an order is created²¹. For Rancière, *le politique* is the disruption of the police order, which is the exercise of power

¹⁷ Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, London: Verso, 1999.

¹⁸ Peter Burnham, "New Labour and the Politics of Depoliticisation", in *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, No. 3, pp. 127–149, 2001.

¹⁹ Colin Hay, *Why We Hate Politics*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2013.

²⁰ Andreas Schedler, (ed.), *The End of Politics? Explorations into Modern Antipolitics*, London and New York: Macmillan and St Martin's, 1996.

²¹ Chantal Mouffe, *On the Political*, London: Routledge, 2005.

that is depoliticizing by its essence²². “Real politics” is not only different, but also opposes and disrupts the police order (*la police*), which encapsulates the institutionalized forms of doing politics and prescribes our reality in the realm of perception itself. *Le politique* introduces a disruption in this order as its essence is the manifestation of dissensus, as the “presence of two worlds in one”²³. Critical scholars like Hay, Laclau and Mouffe all speak of politicization, and thus conflict, as essential to democratization. The notion of antagonism and conflict seems essential to politics – the politics occurs anywhere or over any issue that does not concern only one single individual and is not determined by fate, natural order or necessity- politics being the capacity for agency and deliberation in situations of genuine collective or social choice²⁴.

What happened in Romania and in other post-communist countries after 1989 was a process of depoliticization by which a number of fundamental conflicts, occurring as a result of the economic transition, have been de-politicized. The transition from state socialism to a market economy triggered a series of new cleavages and conflicts, such as the cleavage between rural and urban, between poor and rich, between losers and winners of the transition. The de-industrialization, the privatization and restructuring of the former state companies produced huge numbers of unemployed people, who were left behind by the new economic system and had to migrate to the Western European Union countries in search of a better life or to remain at home, working in agriculture, mostly subsistence agriculture that correlates with high levels of poverty. The result is a poverty rate that is the highest in EU and that affects almost half of the country’s population (40%, according to Eurostat). Others have opted out for the solution of early retirement, encouraged by the state as a solution for preventing the rise in unemployment, which created millions of citizens able to work, but inactive and, as a rule, confronted with poverty, since the pensions’ level is very low. On the other hand, the transition created privileged groups – while about 500,000 people in the country have a pension of 90 euros per month, people who were employees of the army, police, diplomats, judges and prosecutors, all together accounting for about

²² Jacques Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics”, in *Theory and Event*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2001.

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ Colin Hay, *Why We Hate Politics*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2013.

160.000 persons have significantly higher pensions, so called “special” - the average pension for the ex-military is around 700 Euros, and 1400 Euros for the civilians²⁵. The inequality is the highest in European Union and has increased even in the years of strong economic growth.

All those issues and the societal conflicts lying behind them have been constantly obscured – by excluding them from the public and political agenda they have been depoliticized. In Romania, the depoliticization took several forms. The first manner of depoliticization was the privatization of the problems – the problems lost their collective dimensions and have been transformed into private issues. Poverty, social marginalization, unemployment were not acknowledged as being a collective problem, requiring a collective answer - the individuals have been made the only ones responsible for their success and failure. Instead, collective problems have been replaced with self-regulating orders – the free market laws, which dictate the rules of the game. In the same time, the contingency has been replaced with necessity – the free market and the capitalism were perceived as being the only alternative to the old, planned economy and, hence, justifying all the sacrifices and negative externalities, such as unemployment or social exclusion.

Instead, the political agenda has been populated with pseudo-conflicts, such as the hard inheritance of the communist past, allegedly responsible for the country’s backwardness. By blaming the communist regime, the source of the present problems’ has been evacuated in a past that can only be condemned, and not changed, thus becoming a fatality, a necessity.

Next to the pseudo-problems, the real problems included on the public agenda have been depoliticized by the way they have been framed. A relevant example of this is the corruption problem, which increasingly gained in importance after 2005. The corruption was presented as being the unethical behavior of some politicians or public servants, without being put into connection with post-communist privatizations, society’s structure and capitalist logic. In the same time, the anti-corruption fight focused almost exclusively on corruption in public institutions and neglected the

²⁵ Claudiu Crăciun, “Romania’s Second Democratic Transition”, in *International Policy Analysis*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Department for Central and Eastern Europe, January, 2017.

corruption in the private sector, by this inducing the idea that politics is dirty and immoral, and the state is inefficient and corrupt. While corruption represents an endemic problem in Romania, explaining it in purely ethical terms, detached from the political economy of transition is a way of depoliticising the problem. This depoliticization discourse was perfectly consistent with the neoliberal dogma, insistently promoted in post-communist Romania and becoming an all-encompassing discursive and performative doctrine after 1989.

What the social movement's anti-system narrative succeeded was an attempt to depoliticize the political space by challenging the post-communist consensus that obscured the conflicts cutting across the society and by making the social antagonisms visible. In Rancière's terms, the invisible became visible and the unsayable was said loud voice. A long series of problems kept quiet for more than two decades have been expressed in the protests that started in 2012 – the commodification of the environment, the huge social cost of some public policies and public investments, the deficiencies of the development model followed by Romania, the asymmetry between the privileged few and the vast majority. The specific demands – such an opposition to a mining project or to illegal logging – have been absorbed into global demands, challenging the very premises of the post-communist consensus. In each protest, the particular problem that triggered the popular mobilization was only the pretext for articulating a deeper and more general discontent, referring to the social contract of the transition, to the fundamentals of the system as such. As Žižek affirms, a popular uprising starts becoming political when the particular demand “starts to function as a metaphoric condensation of the global (universal) opposition against Them, those in power, so that the protest is no longer just about that demand, but about the universal dimension that resonates in that particular demand”²⁶.

By abandoning the anti-system discourse, the 2017 protests abandoned also the articulation of the discontent in global and in the same time radical terms. The criticism of the protesters was focused on political class corruption, without going further on and questioning the structural conditions that facilitate the corruption or pointing out the social problems associated to it. Rather the opposite, the anticorruption narrative

²⁶ Slavoj Žižek, *op. cit.*

formulated during the protests was consistent with the dominant discourse that depoliticize the corruption issue by detaching it from the political economy of the transition and explaining it by the unethical behavior of the political elite, the country's political culture, the inheritance of the communist past. According to this narrative, PSD that is the successor of the former Communist Party is the most corrupt party due to its link with the past. "PSD, the red plague", a recurrent slogan of the protests, illustrates the central assumptions of this narrative: the communist inheritance (corruption), incarnated by a political party (PSD) is a dangerous disease that spreads inside the political body. The source of the problem is being externalized – it is not a wrong social arrangement or an unfair social contract, to which the injustice is intrinsic and that, such being the case, must be changed, but it is an external factor (the communist ideology, the communist past) that impedes the fulfillment of the post-communist social contract.

The disruptive character of the previous anti-system protests was obscured by the anti-governmental narrative, entangled in the dominant good governance and neoliberal discourse. As a result, none of the latent social conflicts expressed by the previous protests have been made visible, nor did the protest seek new ways of framing the existing problems, by envisaging their collective dimension and their contingency. While the previous anti-system protests created a new democratic dynamic that disclosed some of the fundamental antagonisms of the Romanian society and created a dynamic that disrupted the distribution of the sensible²⁷, the anti-governmental protests only has strengthen the dominant discourse.

By not accomplishing the politicization potential of the previous protests, the social movement that emerged in Romania in 2012 diminished also its emancipation potential. Despite some differences in understanding the nature of depoliticization, there seems to be a consensus among different authors in understanding it as a tactics deployed by political actors to maintain the status quo of existing power relations. Tactics of depoliticization try "to conceal the contingency of reality, sew the gaps in hegemonic discourses and channel dislocations in such a way that

²⁷Jacques Rancière, *Le Partage du Sensible: Esthétique et Politique*, Paris : La Fabrique-Éditions, 2000.

fundamental social structures remain untouched”²⁸. As Wilson and Swyngedouw summarize the positions of Mouffe, Rancière, and Žižek, Mouffe is concerned with the post-political as the repression of antagonism, Rancière with post-democracy as the disavowal of equality, and Žižek with post-politics as the foreclosure. Following these different understandings, different political projects for repoliticization are envisaged - Mouffe pledges for a repoliticization of the division between Left and Right, and a radical democracy of agonistic pluralism; for Rancière the political moment consists above all in the act of revoking the law of birth and wealth and in the attempt to build a common world on the basis of that sole contingency; for Žižek, for whom the depoliticized economy is the “fundamental fantasy” of postmodern politics, a properly political act would necessarily entail the repoliticization of the economy²⁹. Whatever the political projects that arise from these definitions are, the re-politicization is recognized as the main and only way towards more equality, more democracy and emancipation. Hence, by abandoning the anti-system character and turning into an anti-governmental protest, the Romanian protests from 2017 missed their repoliticization potential, and diminished their emancipatory character.

Final remarks

We have shown how the marginalization of the anti-system discourse and prevalence of the anti-governmental narrative in the most recent protests diminished the repoliticization potential and thus, the emancipatory character of the social movement that occurred in Romania in 2012. Instead of promoting an emancipatory agenda, the anti-governmental narrative only reinforces the existing power relations, by articulating the claims and demands of the protesters in the vocabulary of the hegemonic discourse that legitimizes the existing power structures. As Gramsci observed, the hegemony does not exclude resistance – by contrary,

²⁸Benjamin Stephan, Delf Rothe and Chrus Methmann, “Third Side of the Coin: Hegemony and Governmentality in Global Climate Politics”, in Johannes Stripple, Harriet Bulkeley (eds.), *Governing the Climate. New Approaches to Rationality, Power and Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

²⁹ Japhy Wilson, Erik Swyngedouw, *The Post-Political and Its Discontents. Spaces of Depoliticisation, Spectres of Radical Politics*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2014.

it can incorporate attempts of resistance by depriving them of their force and transforming them into a reinforcement of status-quo³⁰.

However, there is no evidence that the prevalence of the anti-governmental discourse over the anti-system discourse is the final outcome of the Romanian social movement. According to Karl Polanyi's theory, which offers the key analytical tools for this article, different types of movements compete to win support from some of the same social groups. Polanyi admits that the counter-movement that opposes the embedding of social relations into market strengthens broad political coalitions mobilized around a particular goal that can be emancipatory or not. Sometimes, the counter-movement can take reactionary and oppressive forms, as it was the case of the fascism in Germany in 1930, which in Polanyi's view is, next to social-democracy, a form by which the society tried to protect itself against the marketization. Despite its incontestable merits of creating an analytical framework that connects the social movements study with a broader economic and political dynamics' analysis, Polanyi's theory does not explain the social movements' ideological orientation, neither their emancipatory or reactionary character. Polanyi only intended to demonstrate the thesis that the origins of the cataclysm of world wars, the Great Depression, and fascism lay in the utopian endeavor of economic liberalism to set up a self-regulating market system. This is the weakness, but also the strength of Polanyi's theory – similarly to Marxist theory, he understands the capitalist crisis as objective phenomena, as macro-structures' and system's failure, but contrary to Marxism he introduces into the analysis elements of inter-subjectivity, in which the individuals play the role of the agent and are not simple tools of dialectical processes. As Burawoy correctly point out referring to the contemporary counter-movements, there is no guarantee that even if they achieve their, they will seek the expansion rather than contraction of freedoms³¹.

The manner in which the social movement's ideology will be articulated depend on some combination of specifically local factors, the relative strength of different actors and their political skills. The history of the Romanian social movement is still on-going, so the movement is open

³⁰ Antonio Gramsci (Buttigieg, Joseph A, ed.), *Prison Notebooks*, New York City: Columbia University Press, 1992.

³¹ Michael Burawoy, "Third-Wave Sociology ...".

to further transformation that will constitute, in its turn, subject for new research and analysis.

Bibliography

1. Badiou, Alain (2010), *Communist Hypothesis*, London: Verso.
2. Buden, Boris (2009), *Zone des Übergangs (The Zone of Transition. On the End of Post-Communism)*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
3. Burawoy, Michael (2005), "Third-Wave Sociology and the End of Pure Science", in *The American Sociologist*, Fall/Winter 2005
4. Burawoy, Michael (2013), *Times of Turmoil: Emerging Visions from Three Years of Global Dialogue*, Paper presented at the Third ISA Conference of the Council of National Associations, May 13-16, 2013 at Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey.
5. Burnham, Peter (2001), "New Labour and the politics of depoliticisation" in *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, 3: 127–149.
6. Della Porta, Donatella (2015), *Social Movements in Times of Austerity*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
7. Crouch, Collin (2004), *Post-Democracy*, Cambridge: Polity Press
8. Cerny, Philip G. (2008), "Embedding Neoliberalism: The Evolution of a Hegemonic Paradigm", in *The Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy*, Vol. 2, No. 1.
9. Craciun, Claudiu (2017) *Romania's Second Democratic Transition*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Department for Central and Eastern Europe, 2017.
10. Gramsci, Antonio; Buttigieg, Joseph A, ed., (1992), *Prison Notebooks*, New York City: Columbia University Press.
11. Hay, Colin (2013), *Why We Hate Politics*, New York: John Wiley & Sons.
12. Kaldor, Mary; Selchow, Sabine, eds. (2015), *Subterranean Politics in Europe*, Palgrave Macmillan.
13. Laclau, Ernesto; Mouffe, Chantal (2001), *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy – Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, 2nd ed., London & New York: Verso.

14. Marchart, Olivier (2007), *Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
15. Margarit, Diana (2016) "The Days We Don't Give in- the Romanian Social Movements Between 2012 and 2015", on *Eastblog*, [<http://eastblog.univie.ac.at/2016/01/13/the-days-we-dont-give-in-the-romanian-social-movements-between-2012-and-2015>], 13 January 2016.
16. Mouffe, Chantal (2005), *On the Political*, London: Routledge.
17. Plavšić, Dragan (2017), *The Romanian Protests. Why Have Hundreds of Thousands of Romanians Taken to the Streets this Month Against a Nominally Center-Left Government?* <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/02/romania-protests-corruption-psd-iohannis-austerity/>, 22 February 2017.
18. Polanyi, Karl (2001), *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Boston: Beacon Press.
19. Rancière, Jacques (2000), *Le Partage du Sensible: Esthétique et Politique*, Paris: La Fabrique-Éditions.
20. Rancière, Jacques (2001), "Ten Theses on Politics", in *Theory and Event*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1–21.
21. Rancière, Jacques (2010a), *Chronicles of Consensual Times*, London: Continuum.
22. Schedler, Adreas ed., (1996), *The End of Politics? Explorations into Modern Antipolitics*, London and New York: Macmillan and St Martin's.
23. Stephan, Benjamin; Rothe, Delf; Methmann, Chrus (2014), "Third Side of the Coin: Hegemony and Governmentality in Global Climate Politics" in: Johannes Strippel and Harriet Bulkeley, eds. *Governing the Climate. New Approaches to Rationality, Power and Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
24. Stoica, Catalin Augustin; Mihailescu, Vintila (2012), "2012. Romania's Winter of Discontent", in *Global Dialogue* 3.1
25. Stoiciu, Victoria (2012), *Austerity and Structural Reforms in Romania*. International Policy Analysis, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
26. Stoiciu, Victoria (2016), "The Romanian Autumn 2013 and the Return of Politics. Protest Against Mining Projects and Fracking in

- Romania: Actors and Discourses”, in *Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft*, No. 01/2016.
27. Tilly, Charles; Tilly, Richard (1975) *The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930*, Harvard: Harvard University Press.
 28. Touraine, Alain (1971), *The Post Industrial Society*, New York: Random House.
 29. Volintiru, Clara (2012), *Romania's Recent Protests Have Become a Social Movement Calling for the Dignity of the People in the Face of an Unaccountable Government*, [<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/03/20/romania-protests>], 20 March 2012.
 30. Wieviorka, Michel (2014) *Alain Touraine and the concept of social movement*, Intervention at ISA World Congress of Sociology, Yokohama, July 2014.
 31. Wilson, Japhy; Swyngedouw, Erik (2014), *The Post-Political and Its Discontents. Spaces of Depoliticisation, Spectres of Radical Politics*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd.
 32. Žižek, Slavoj (1991), *For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor*, London: Verso.
 33. Žižek, Slavoj (1999), *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, London: Verso.

LA LOGIQUE DE LA DISSIMULATION. CLAUDE LEFORT ET LE QUESTIONNEMENT DE L'IDÉOLOGIE

Codrin Tăut*

DOI: 10.24193/subbeuropaea.2017.3.09

Published Online: 2017-09-30

Published Print: 2017-09-30

Title in English: *The Logic of Concealment. Claude Lefort and the Questioning of Ideology*

Abstract

The main purpose of this article is to bring out the meaning of Lefort's theory of ideology. Criticizing the current line of interpretation, we will try to emphasize two crucial aspects. The first one is that, in Lefort's system of thought, the ideological function cannot be separated from the general mechanism of the symbolic institution of society. Consequently, the legitimacy of democratic regimes is not incongruous with the logic of ideology.

Keywords: distorted representation, ideology critique, imaginary, Lefort, symbolic institution

Introduction

Comme bien d'autres concepts, la notion d'idéologie est passée par une série d'altérations de son noyau originel. En premier lieu, il s'agit d'un processus de *déplacement topographique*. À l'origine, le lieu d'élection du dispositif idéologique était l'engrenage juridico-politique, tandis qu'aujourd'hui cette position privilégiée semble s'être effacée. Nos nomenclateurs enregistrent des divers types d'attitude idéologique, qui n'ont rien à voir, au moins à première vue, avec l'espace politique. Au déplacement topographique s'ajoute le *processus de morcellement*. Pour les Jeunes Hégéliens, l'idéologie était toujours le synonyme d'un système

* Codrin Tăut est attaché au département Recherche-Méthodologie, Bibliothèque Centrale Universitaire "Carol I", Bucarest, Roumanie .
Contact: tautcodrin@yahoo.fr

dominant et de domination. Par contre, en ce moment, on accepte spontanément qu'il existe une pluralité d'idéologies, sans un point focal ou hégémonique. Le déplacement topographique et le morcellement sont suivis par une *mise en visibilité* du concept. Quelle qu'ait été la formulation spécifique, l'idéologie a toujours été liée à un certain régime de pénombre, à un non conscient, tandis qu'une bonne partie des théories contemporaines opèrent avec une notion d'idéologie sans régions d'obscurité: l'idéologie s'exprime en plein jour, s'inscrit sans médiation à la surface des pensées ou des actions. En fin, le quatrième déplacement, et peut-être le plus important, est la *normalisation de l'idéologie*. Cela veut dire deux choses : a) que les idéologies ne sont pas nécessairement des structures pathologiques et b) qu'il est impossible, voire inutile, à concevoir un programme global visant à dépasser l'idéologie. Plutôt il faudrait articuler une pédagogie minimaliste qui ne vise plus des effets révolutionnaires, mais seulement l'aménagement du bon sens.

À partir de ces quatre transformations s'est constituée une stratégie théorique qui accepte le caractère fluide, contradictoire, sans substance précise de l'idéologie, et qui se lance dans des analyses empiriques de détail, pour cartographier les diverses manifestations de ce phénomène. Une excellente illustration de cette direction est la démarche morphologique de Michael Freeden.

Cet article se propose d'examiner la contribution de Claude Lefort à la théorie de l'idéologie, contribution qui s'inscrit dans une direction différente qui refuse d'évacuer la dimension dissimulatrice de l'engrenage idéologique. Le spécifique de cette ligne de pensée que Lefort partage avec d'autres auteurs, tels Ernesto Laclau ou Slavoj Žižek, est de transformer le régime de fonctionnement de la dissimulation : celle-ci ne cache plus une réalité préconstituée, comme c'était le cas dans le marxisme classique, mais voile la contingence originaire de toute institution socio-politique. L'article assume deux objectifs : il s'agit, en premier lieu, de reconstruire les lignes directrices de la théorie lefortienne de l'idéologie et deuxièmement de penser les rapports que l'idéologie entretient avec la démocratie. En ce qui concerne ce dernier aspect, l'hypothèse centrale qui sera développée au cours de notre argumentation est que, contrairement à l'interprétation courante, la démocratie, dans le sens spécifique que Lefort donne à ce

terme, n'est pas un régime imperméable à l'idéologie; tout au contraire, l'opération idéologique est un élément constitutif de la démocratie.

Théorie des régimes politiques

Figure intellectuelle plutôt marginale, par rapport aux maîtres-penseurs français de la deuxième moitié du vingtième siècle, Claude Lefort commence à être progressivement reconnu seulement après 1990. En 1993, en France, apparaît une première collection d'études consacrées à son travail¹. À cette première démarche critique s'ajoutent deux monographies, publiées par Hugues Poltier², qui retracent en détail son parcours biographique et intellectuel. Récemment, en 2006, est apparu un premier livre en anglais³, suivi ensuite par d'autres exercices interprétatifs⁴.

Le portrait de Lefort qui se dégage de ces études est celle d'un intellectuel qui s'est débarrassé très tôt du marxisme, pour en devenir un intransigeant adversaire du totalitarisme, et tout cela à une époque où une grande partie de l'intelligentsia française était encore sous le charme du communisme. Antimarxiste et antitotalitaire, Claude Lefort est célébré aujourd'hui comme l'un des plus fervents partisans des principes et des valeurs démocratiques.

Si le profil du militant pour la cause démocratique est convaincant, la cohérence de la théorie politique lefortienne est plus difficile à surprendre. Auteur d'une œuvre dénuée de principes de systématisation, Claude Lefort oblige le lecteur à une fatigante vigilance interprétative : presque tous les concepts importants de ses démarches explicatives sont introduits sans aucune préparation préalable, et, d'un texte à l'autre, les ambiguïtés et les interrogations sans réponse se multiplient. C'est peut-être pour cela que les interprètes de l'œuvre lefortienne sont, parfois, contraints de recourir à l'exercice de la paraphrase ou de la simplification brutale, qui

¹ Claude Habib; Claude Mouchard (eds.), *La Démocratie à l'œuvre. Autour de Claude Lefort*, Paris: Esprit, 1993.

² Hugues Poltier, *La Découverte du politique*, Paris: Michalon, 1997 ; Hugues Poltier, *Passion du politique. La Pensée de Claude Lefort*, Genève: Labor et Fides, 1998.

³ Bernard Flynn, *The Philosophy of Claude Lefort. Interpreting the Political*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2006.

⁴ Martin Plot (ed.), *Claude Lefort, Thinker of the Political*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

s'enroulent autour de deux *locus communis*⁵ reprises dans presque chaque reconstruction théorique de Lefort. Le premier affirme que notre condition politique est définitivement marquée par la *dissolution des repères de la certitude*, expression qui veut dire que tout exercice du pouvoir se déroule sans aucune garantie transcendante, tandis que le deuxième énonce la thèse complémentaire selon laquelle en démocratie *le lieu du pouvoir est vide*.

Selon une lecture de base, sans nuances, la théorie politique de Lefort peut être réduite à ces cinq thèses fondamentales :

1. Notre condition politique actuelle peut être éclaircie en suivant le processus de la désincorporation de la société.
2. Comme l'a déjà admirablement démontré Ernst Kantorowicz dans *Les Deux corps du roi*⁶ la première modernité politique s'est constituée autour d'un principe hérité de la théologie politique médiévale, principe selon laquelle le royaume ou l'État est un corps mystique où le souverain est la tête.
3. Ce principe, qui assure l'homogénéité de la société, est désaffecté par l'apparition de la démocratie. D'une part, la démocratie procède à une pulvérisation du corps unique : le sujet politique privilégié n'est plus le souverain mais une multitude (le Peuple). D'autre part, la démocratie détruit le fondement théologique de la légitimation basée sur la transcendance divine, ouvrant ainsi un espace de conflictualité perpétuelle entre les acteurs politiques.
4. Cette nouvelle condition politique où il n'y a plus une autorité transcendante, où tout est voué au débat, ou même au conflit, est expérimentée comme une véritable crise. C'est ainsi que les régimes totalitaires se donnent comme tâche de ressouder les pièces déchirées de la société : le Parti, l'État et le Peuple sont condensés dans un tout fonctionnel, guidé cette fois non par des principes théologiques mais par une nécessité historique.
5. La démocratie refait surface démontrant une fois de plus qu'il est impossible d'instituer un centre unique et indiscutable du pouvoir.

⁵ Oliver Marchart, *Gândirea politică postfundamentalistă. Diferența politică la Nancy, Lefort, Badiou și Laclau*, Cluj-Napoca: Idea Design&Print, 2011, p 83.

⁶ Ernst Kantorowicz, *Les Deux Corps du roi*, Paris: Gallimard, 1989.

L'une des présuppositions de Lefort est qu'au-delà des segmentations introduites par les diverses disciplines réunies sous le nom de sciences sociales, il y aurait une forme d'expérience primordiale du social qui est la condition de toute distinction ultérieure.

(...) en tranchant entre ce qui est de l'ordre de l'économie, de la politique, du juridique, du religieux, pour y repérer les signes de systèmes spécifiques, on oublierait que nous ne parvenons jamais à une telle distinction analytique que parce que nous possédons par-devers nous l'idée d'une dimensionnalité originaire du social et qu'elle se donne avec celle de sa forme originaire, de sa forme politique.⁷

En ce point, le lecteur peut détecter l'influence de Maurice Merleau-Ponty. En bon disciple⁸, Lefort adopte une méthodologie spécifique à l'enquête phénoménologique, qui met l'accent sur les expériences de sens qui se donnent avant toute approche scientifique. Pour le dire autrement, avant d'avoir une perspective scientifique sur la société, on a déjà une expérience du social en tant qu'acteurs. Sans doute il est moins évident que cette expérience, antérieure à l'approche scientifique, peut fonctionner comme un cadre pour la démarche savante. Pour le moment il n'est point nécessaire d'attacher trop d'importance à cette ambiguïté. Il est suffisant de remarquer la décision de Lefort d'abandonner l'approche positiviste en faveur d'une perspective philosophique qui essaie de déterminer les cadres générales du fonctionnement de la société. Cette structure générale est constituée de trois éléments. En premier lieu, il s'agit d'un dispositif de répartition des acteurs et de leurs relations.

(...) il n'y a pas d'éléments ou des structures élémentaires, pas d'entités (classes ou segments de classes), pas de rapports sociaux, ni de déterminations économiques ou techniques, pas de dimension de l'espace social qui préexisteraient à leur mise en forme.⁹

⁷ Claude Lefort, « Permanence du Théologico-Politique? » in *Essais sur le politique*, Paris : Seuil, 1986, p. 257.

⁸ Gilles Labelle, « Maurice Merleau-Ponty et la genèse de la philosophie politique de Claude Lefort », in *Politique et Sociétés*, vol. 22, nr.3, 2003, pp.9-44.

⁹ Claude Lefort, « La question de la démocratie », in *op. cit.*, p.20.

En outre, il s'agit d'un mécanisme qui assure l'intelligibilité à l'intérieur du monde social.

*Mise en sens, car l'espace social se déploie comme espace d'intelligibilité, s'articulant suivant un monde singulier de discrimination du réel et de l'imaginaire, du vrai et du faux, du juste et de l'injuste, du licite et de l'interdit, du normal et du pathologique.*¹⁰

Et finalement, le troisième élément fonctionne comme un miroir, permettant à la société d'avoir une certaine représentation d'elle-même.

*Mise en scène, car cet espace contient une quasi-représentation de lui-même dans sa constitution aristocratique, monarchique ou despotique, démocratique ou totalitaire.*¹¹

L'articulation de ces trois mécanismes, la *mise en forme*, la *mise en sens* et la *mise en scène*, permet à Lefort de distinguer trois types de diagramme politique. Comme on l'a déjà noté, au début de notre article, le premier type, exemplifié par le « regimen » médiéval ou par la structure de l'État de la première modernité, s'est constitué à partir du double positionnement de la souveraineté, à la fois transcendante et immanente.

*Le prince était un médiateur entre les hommes et les dieux, ou bien, sous l'effet de la sécularisation et de la laïcisation de l'activité politique, un médiateur entre les hommes et ces instances transcendantes que figuraient la souveraine Justice et la souveraine Raison.*¹²

Le totalitarisme, le deuxième type de régime politique, détruit la transcendance et interrompt la circulation entre l'intérieur et l'extérieur de la société.

¹⁰ *Ibidem.*

¹¹ *Ibidem.*

¹² *Ibidem*, p.26.

Une logique de l'identification est mise en œuvre, commandée par la représentation d'un pouvoir incarnateur. Le prolétariat ne fait qu'un avec le peuple, le Parti avec le prolétariat, le bureau politique et egocrate, enfin, avec le Parti.¹³

En fin, le troisième type, le régime démocratique, est plus difficile à saisir, car l'usage que fait Lefort de ce terme dépasse de loin la compréhension usuelle. On a déjà noté, au début de notre article, que l'un des concepts clefs de Lefort c'est la notion de désincorporation. Le processus de désincorporation de la société ne signifie pas seulement la disparition de la souveraineté monarchique, mais, en plus, le détachement du Pouvoir de la Loi et du Savoir.

Dès lors que le pouvoir cesse de manifester le principe de génération et d'organisation d'un corps social, dès lors qu'il cesse de condenser en lui les vertus dérivées d'une raison et d'une justice transcendante, le droit et le savoir s'affirment, vis-à-vis de lui, dans une extériorité, dans une irréductibilité nouvelles.¹⁴

Le lieu vide du pouvoir

Le processus de détachement n'est qu'un versant, un deuxième aspect vise la transformation du pouvoir dans un lieu inoccupable.

Le lieu du pouvoir devient un lieu vide. Inutile d'insister sur le détail du dispositif institutionnel. L'essentiel est qu'il est interdit aux gouvernants de s'approprier, de s'incorporer le pouvoir. Son exercice est soumis à la procédure d'une remise en jeu périodique. Il se fait en terme d'une compétition règle, dont les conditions sont préservées d'une façon permanente. Ce phénomène implique une institutionnalisation du conflit. Vide, inoccupable –tel qu'aucun individu ni aucun groupe ne peut lui être consubstantiel-, le lieu du pouvoir s'avère infigurable.¹⁵

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 22.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p.27.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

À première vue l'expression lieu vide du pouvoir n'est qu'un ornement stylistique qui s'ajoute à une réalité très connue, celle du procéduralisme démocratique qui, au moins en apparence, interdit tout monopole du pouvoir. Mais, l'ambition théorique de Lefort est d'aller plus loin. La conséquence directe de la transformation du pouvoir dans un lieu vide est qu'il devient impossible de donner une représentation positive à la société

Aussi bien ne faut-il pas confondre l'idée que le pouvoir n'appartient à personne et celle qui désigne un lieu vide. La première peut être formulée par les acteurs politiques l'autre non. (...) l'indication d'un lieu vide va de pair avec celle d'une société sans détermination positive, irreprésentable dans la figure d'une communauté.¹⁶

Comment penser une société sans détermination positive ? Sans doute, il existe déjà un discours bien naïf, qui a la tendance d'équivaloir les moments politiques importants, telles les élections ou les grands débats publics, avec une authentique remise en question générale et généralisée des fondements de la société. Quand même, il suffit d'examiner empiriquement ces moments privilégiés pour en conclure que les débats ou les élections produisent, dans le meilleur de cas, seulement une sorte de rectification infinitésimale des structures politiques, qui sont protégées par une forte inertie institutionnelle. En outre il semble bien difficile, voire impossible de dériver le principe de l'indétermination du processus de désincorporation. Sans discuter ici la validité de la thèse du détachement du Savoir de la Loi et du Pouvoir, on peut quand même conclure que la vocation des champs juridiques ou scientifiques est d'assurer la certitude et la stabilité institutionnelle.

Pour surmonter ces difficultés il faut redessiner l'espace de notre analyse. Notre hypothèse est que les opérateurs conceptuels de Lefort discutés jusqu'ici tels : *le lieu vide du pouvoir, société sans détermination positive, l'incertitude* ne sont ni des figures de l'expérience collective, ni des éléments constitutifs d'un prétendu régime politique.

¹⁶ Claude Lefort, « Permanence du Théologico-Politique? », in *Essais sur...*, p.266.

Le symbolique, l'imaginaire et l'idéologie

La notion de symbolique est entourée par une ambiguïté sémantique¹⁷. Dans certains de ses textes, Lefort identifie le symbolique avec une sorte de matrice générale de sens, tandis que dans d'autres cas, cette notion est l'équivalent du politique. L'absence d'une définition ou d'un usage systémique de ce concept peut conduire à une identification spontanée de la position de Lefort avec les théories socio-anthropologiques de l'imaginaire. Aujourd'hui, il est presque un lieu commun qu'une analyse approfondie de la vie politique ne peut pas se dérouler seulement sur un terrain purement instrumental et faire économie de l'examen des structures symboliques de la représentation qui assurent ou supplémentent les mécanismes de la légitimité. Sans doute, le positionnement théorique décrit ci-dessous n'est pas tout à fait étranger à la perspective de Lefort, mais quand même, il y a une divergence significative.

La plupart des analyses de l'espace symbolique spécifique au domaine politique l'interprètent comme une dimension secondaire par rapport à la réalité. Et cela dans un double sens: secondaire dans l'ordre chronologique (il y a d'abord la réalité et seulement *après cela* sa représentation), mais aussi secondaire par ordre d'importance (la rationalité est considérée comme fonction normale, alors que le symbolique n'est qu'une structure fossile, quelque chose qui n'a pas pu être rationalisé). Pour le dire autrement, les approches de l'imaginaire sont des théories dualistes. Par contraste, pour Lefort cette dualité n'existe pas, le symbolique institue, il ne reflète pas, il ne représente pas une réalité préconstituée. Mais c'est précisément cette position qui peut engendrer une confusion. Sans une analyse détaillée le lecteur pourrait identifier la position de Lefort avec un déterminisme symbolique. Pour dissiper cette possible mécompréhension il est nécessaire d'aller plus loin dans l'interprétation.

La notion lefortienne du symbolique est marquée par l'héritage des théories de Pierre Clastres¹⁸ qui a essayé de démontrer que les sociétés

¹⁷ Warren Breckman, "Lefort and the Symbolic Dimension" in *Constellations*, vol. 19, nr.1, 2012, p 30-36; Hugues Poltier, *Passion du politique. La pensée de Claude Lefort*, Genève: Labor et Fides, 1998, p. 184.

¹⁸ Samuel Moyn, "Claude Lefort, Political Anthropology, and Symbolic Division" in *Constellations* vol.19, nr.1, 2012, pp. 37-50.

archaïques ne sont pas dépourvues de l'histoire, de l'économie ou des structures politiques, comme l'affirmait le marxisme vulgaire de l'époque. Le minimalisme institutionnel des « primitives » n'est pas un déficit mais une stratégie d'empêcher le pouvoir de se stabiliser dans des structures hiérarchiques. Par exemple, quand les clans ou les tribus de l'Amérique latine se font la guerre, il ne s'agit pas d'une manifestation de la volonté de dominer, mais d'un mécanisme qui limite l'accumulation de la richesse¹⁹ et qui empêche que le pouvoir se détache de la société en occupant une position de survol. La position de Clastres qui nous intéresse ici peut être résumée en deux points :

- 1) En contraste avec le marxisme, pour l'anthropologue français, c'est la politique (la question du pouvoir) et non pas l'économie qui structure les sociétés.
- 2) Cette dimension politique n'est pas réductible à une instance antérieure. C'est elle qui assure le partage de diverses fonctions sociales.

Claude Lefort reprit et déplace ce schéma général. Suivant Pierre Clastres, Lefort pense que le pouvoir est une instance symbolique, c'est-à-dire irréductible à une autre réalité, mais, en même temps, celui-ci ne représente plus l'élément qui doit être domestiqué, mais plutôt l'opérateur de non-coïncidence de la société avec elle-même.

Maintenant on peut récapituler les traits spécifiques de la notion lefortienne du symbolique. En premier lieu, on l'a déjà noté le symbolique n'est pas une traduction, une interprétation, voire une distorsion d'une réalité antérieure. Le symbolique s'institue en même temps que la réalité empirique, en lui assurant la cohérence et l'intelligibilité. Mais cela ne veut pas dire que le symbolique fabrique la réalité. Deuxièmement, le symbolique dans l'acception de Lefort comporte deux dimensions : d'une part, il s'agit d'un diagramme général de sens, qui réunit la différenciation des éléments sociaux et leurs rapports, de l'autre part, la dimension symbolique empêche une structuration complète et positive de la société. Dans d'autres mots, le symbolique est, en même temps, l'élément qui assure et qui empêche la formation d'une identité complète et positive de la société.

¹⁹ Pierre Clastres, *L'archéologie de la violence. La guerre dans les sociétés primitives*, Paris: Aube, 1997.

Avec cette définition ou description du symbolique on est encore loin de d'une compréhension complète de cette notion. Pour avancer dans notre exposition il est nécessaire d'examiner la théorie de Lefort concernant la fonction de l'idéologie.

La première partie du principal texte consacré à la question de l'idéologie, intitulé « Esquisse d'une genèse de l'idéologie dans les sociétés modernes »²⁰, articule une critique du marxisme. Selon Lefort, l'erreur de Marx aurait été l'encrage de la fonction idéologique dans distinction réalité/illusion. Pour le réalisme marxiste idéologie ne peut fonctionner que comme un écran qui dissimule la véritable nature des relations sociales. Par exemple, l'idéologie universaliste de la bourgeoisie ne fait que masquer les relations antagonistes avec le prolétariat. La lutte entre les deux classes représente le terrain objectif, tandis que la représentation d'une société politique universelle et sans divisions internes est le complément fictif mais nécessaire pour renforcer la bourgeoisie dans sa fonction de classe dirigeante/dominante. Ainsi, en « réalité », la société est traversée par des rapports de domination et d'antagonisme, alors que dans la représentation idéologique celle-ci apparaît comme un ordre complet et harmonieux dans lequel les relations de pouvoir ont été abolies. La critique de Lefort ne questionne pas l'existence de certaines structures de domination, mais la prétention de Marx de trouver une réalité empirique derrière la représentation idéologique. Dans cette optique la critique de l'idéologie opérée par Marx aboutit à une annulation de l'instance symbolique.

*(...) ce qui se trouve nié, c'est l'articulation de la division avec la pensée de la division, une pensée qui ne saurait se déduire de celle-ci, puisqu'elle est impliquée dans la définition des termes. Ce qui se trouve nie, c'est l'ordre du symbolique, l'idée d'un système d'oppositions en vertu duquel des figures sociales sont identifiables et articulables les unes par rapport aux autres.*²¹

La critique de Marx doit être prise dans toute sa radicalité. Le noyau hégélien de la théorie marxiste conserve l'idée du retour de l'individu au

²⁰ Claude Lefort, « Esquisse d'une genèse de l'idéologie dans les sociétés modernes », in *Les formes de l'histoire*, Paris: Gallimard, 1978, pp. 478-568.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 499.

sein d'une totalité indifférenciée. Mais, comme nous l'avons déjà discuté, au centre de la théorie politique de Lefort c'est exactement cette impossibilité de mettre en place une totalité. Mais si l'idéologie ne peut être attachée à une réalité préexistante, la seule possibilité qui reste ouverte, pour Lefort, est de la mettre en contact avec le mécanisme symbolique. La fonction symbolique est « équipée » avec des dispositifs de sécurité ayant comme rôle de masquer la contingence. Ainsi, à l'exception des moments de rupture ou d'une crise sociale profonde, l'ordre social avec ses divisions et son réseau de stratification semble être nécessaire et naturel. Il importe peu en ce moment de l'argumentation si « la nécessité et la naturalisation » sont des effets d'une autorité divine, ou d'une autorité laïque et rationnelle. Le point important est que le symbolique ne peut jamais apparaître et se manifester sans une distorsion constitutive.

En tant que instituant, le discours est privé du savoir de l'institution ; mais en tant qu'il est occupé à conjurer la menace que font peser sur lui les effets en retour de cette épreuve, la manifestation d'un écart entre l'être et le discours, il se fait activement négateur de l'institution du social ; il est le discours de l'occultation dans lequel les repères symboliques sont convertis en déterminations naturelles.²²

Chez Lefort, le fonctionnement du symbolique comporte un double mouvement. D'une part, il y a le moment de l'institution quand est amorcé le mécanisme de la mise en place de l'ordre sociale et, de l'autre part, l'instant de l'effacement de l'institution derrière une image naturalisante. Pour bien distinguer les deux moments, Lefort désigne le second mouvement comme fonction de l'imaginaire. Mais la possibilité de distinguer entre les deux aspects, institution symbolique et occultation imaginaire, est historique. Dans les sociétés archaïques, gouvernées par des structures mythiques ou par des dispositifs théologico-politiques, il était impossible de faire une distinction entre le symbolique et l'imaginaire, parce que le processus d'institution était absorbé par la transcendance, il était assigné à une instance située dans un au-delà. La distinction symbolique/imaginaire commence à s'entrevoir seulement dans la modernité, quand la force de la transcendance entre en déclin. C'est

²² *Ibidem*, p. 503.

précisément à partir de ce moment, lorsque le monde humain est réduit à ses limites immanentes, que les contours de l'institution deviennent visibles en tant que éléments contingents. Il faut ajouter à cela que, dans la modernité, le processus d'occultation de la contingence est repris par l'idéologie.

(...) l'idéologie s'ordonne en raison d'un principe d'occultation qui ne tient pas à son ouvrage : elle marque un repli du discours social sur lui-même, à la faveur duquel se trouvent élidés toutes les signes qui sont susceptibles de démanteler la certitude de l'être du social – signes de créativité historique, de ce qui n'a pas de nom, de ce qui se disjoint au travers des aventures dispersée de la socialisation – signes de ce qui rend une société ou l'humanité comme telle, étrange pour elle-même.²³

Selon Lefort, l'institution symbolique fournit un ensemble de relations entre les éléments sociaux et un espace de représentation, c'est-à-dire la matrice identitaire de la société. Mais, le processus de construction symbolique de l'identité produit des effets d'aliénation, parce que la représentation symbolique de la société est située en dehors de la société empirique. C'est pour cela que le mécanisme de l'institution symbolique se trouve dans un perpétuel état d'insécurité ontologique: à tout moment le symbolique est susceptible de trahir sa propre contingence. Cette situation justifie la présence du dispositif de stabilisation imaginaire, dont la fonction principale est justement de masquer la contingence du symbolique. Dans les sociétés archaïques ou traditionnelles, la fonction imaginaire prend la forme de récit mythique ou de l'imaginaire du théologico-politique. L'institution de la société est garantie par la transcendance qui absorbe et neutralise les signes de la contingence. Les sociétés modernes annulent la légitimité théologique sans évacuer la transcendance. L'État, la Patrie, la Souveraineté, la Nation, le Peuple ou l'Individu sont des opérateurs qui neutralisent la contingence. Ces exemples nous suggèrent que la distinction entre le symbolique et l'imaginaire ne peut être qu'analytique. Les deux termes ne définissent ni des zones distinctes, ni des fonctions autonomes, ils sont des phases interdépendantes d'une même opération d'institution.

²³ *Ibidem*, pp. 513-514.

Deux aspects importants méritent d'être soulignés ici. En premier lieu, pour être efficiente et fonctionnelle, toute institution a besoin d'un certain degré de routinisation. C'est ainsi que l'idéologie, ou l'opération de l'imaginaire, est une distorsion nécessaire. Sans ce mécanisme de fixation de l'idéologie, il serait impossible d'instituer une société. En outre, dans les textes de Lefort, il y a une suggestion tacite concernant l'ordre chronologique de succession, où le symbolique serait l'étape première, tandis que l'imaginaire est la phase seconde. Quand même, le rapport entre les deux instances ne peut prendre la forme d'une succession chronologique, mais plutôt l'aspect d'une limitation réciproque. L'idéologie ou l'imaginaire interrompt la créativité du symbolique et le solidifie dans des structures fonctionnelles; à son tour, la contingence de l'intuition symbolique met en crise la structure de l'idéologie.

Une fois la décrit le fonctionnement du mécanisme de l'institution symbolique il faut maintenant passer à la question de la critique de l'idéologie. Quelles sont donc, pour Lefort, les conditions d'une telle critique? En premier lieu, on l'a déjà discuté ci-dessous, il existe une précondition d'ordre historique, la critique de l'idéologie n'est pas possible qu'en commençant avec la modernité, quand les fonctions de l'imaginaire et du symbolique devient distinctes. Mais au-delà de cet aspect préliminaire, la structure interne de la critique reste dans l'ambiguïté. Selon Lefort la critique de l'idéologie suppose :

(...) que l'institution de l'espace social se soit rendue sensible à elle-même, de telle manière que le discours instituant ne puisse effacer ses traces sous l'opération de l'imaginaire; ou, en d'autres termes, elle suppose que la division sociale et l'historicité en soient venues à faire question de telle manière que l'ouvrage de l'occultation demeure soumis à leurs effets, qu'il laisse apparaître dans ses échecs, dans la tentative continuée de les corriger, à travers ses discordances, ce que nous sommes présent en droit de nommer le réel, pour marquer qu'il s'agit de cela même qui dénonce l'impossibilité du recouvrement.²⁴

Le passage cité réduit la critique de l'idéologie à un simple prolongement logique d'un processus historique. Il s'agit à peu près, d'un

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 503-504.

trajet similaire parcouru par la raison historique chez Hegel, ou si on préfère un rapprochement plus anecdotique, d'un mouvement similaire à la petite mythologie d'Auguste Comte, qui attribuait à l'esprit positif la capacité de dissoudre les illusions théologiques ou métaphysiques.

L'effacement presque automatique de l'idéologie n'est qu'un premier aspect problématique, s'ajoute ici la question de l'instance qui observe la dissolution de l'idéologie. Est-ce qu'il s'agit d'un sujet épistémique ou d'un sujet politique ? Quelle est l'échelle de sa constitution : il s'agit d'une échelle individuelle ou collective ? En plus, il faut interroger le processus qui conduit à la dissolution de l'idéologie : est-ce qu'il s'agit d'une contradiction ou bien d'un autre type d'obstacle qui érode les opérations de l'imaginaire ?

Pour répondre à ces difficultés l'un des interprètes de Lefort a trouvé une solution facile, mais problématique. Dans la section consacrée à l'examen de cette question Bernard Flynn détecte une inadéquation entre l'expérience, comprise phénoménologiquement comme surface de manifestement spontanée de la vérité, et l'idéologie qui distord ou perturbe le fonctionnement normal de l'expérience. «The invisible ideology of modernity is an imaginary projection of familiarity, which would have us turn away from experience»²⁵.

Le problème est qu'une telle explication rend inutile tout débat sur l'idéologie: il suffit d'appeler au bon sens empiriste ou cartésien pour constater et corriger la distorsion. Sans doute, il ne faudrait oublier que la position, erronée selon nous, de Flynn trouve un terrain fertile dans l'ambiguïté théorique de Lefort qui, d'une part, essaie de penser les conséquences politiques de l'installation de la contingence et, de l'autre, limite le jeu de cette contingence, l'inscrivant dans des constructions plus sûres telles les notions de régime politique ou d'expérience.

Pour avancer dans notre enquête il faut établir en quoi consiste ce «réel» dont Lefort attribue le mystérieux pouvoir de «dénoncer l'impossibilité de recouvrement idéologique». La seule hypothèse valide, qui nous empêcherait de retomber dans des apories insolubles, est que la notion du réel, dont il est question ici, est similaire dans son usage avec le

²⁵ Bernard Flynn, *The Philosophy of Claude Lefort. Interpreting the Political*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2006, p. 193.

concept de « Réel » de Jacques Lacan²⁶. Il ne s'agit ici d'opérer un rapprochement forcé en conjecturant tout simplement que la triade: symbolique, imaginaire et réel de Lefort ne serait que l'application, dans le domaine politique²⁷, de la même triade théorisée par Lacan. Quand même, les incongruités qui séparent les deux auteurs n'empêchent pas l'existence d'une analogie fonctionnelle. On sait que, chez Lacan, l'un des traits du Réel est qu'il résiste à la symbolisation (Il n'est pas question ici d'établir si le Réel c'est l'autre nom de l'évènement traumatique ou bien la figure de l'impossible). De la même manière, chez Lefort, le réel n'est pas une simple instance empirique qui vient de contredire la vérité de l'expérience, comme semble le croire Flynn, mais précisément ce qui rend impossible l'opération de recouvrement idéologique.

La conséquence directe est que les formations idéologiques ne sont pas en contradiction ni avec la réalité empirique, ni avec une prétendue expérience première de la vérité. La *distorsion* idéologique devient visible non pas en tant qu'opposition logique, mais comme impossibilité de fixer des références ultimes en dehors de tout questionnement. C'est précisément cette impossibilité qui explique l'existence de l'incertitude dans les démocraties, et non pas le mécanisme institutionnel de remise en question périodique du pouvoir politique.

(...) *ni l'Etat, ni le peuple, ni la nation ne figurent des réalités substantielles. Leur représentation est elle-même dans la dépendance d'un*

²⁶ Les références à la psychanalyse lacanienne sont presque absentes chez Lefort à l'exception d'une communication tenue devant la Société Française de Psychanalyse, le 3 octobre 1982. Voir Claude Lefort, « Le Mythe de l'Un dans le Fantasme et dans la Réalité Politique », in *Psychanalystes: Revue du Collège de Psychanalystes*, nr. 9, 1983, pp. 43-87. Malgré l'absence des références directes Lefort a maintenu un rapport intellectuel constant avec Lacan: «Après avoir lu mon livre sur Machiavel, Lacan se plaisait à trouver chez ce dernier une anticipation de ses analyses et particulièrement de ses propos sur le Nom du père.» in *op. cit*, p. 42.

²⁷ Pour une discussion approfondie concernant le rapport entre Lacan et Lefort voir: Slavoj Žižek, "The Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis in Yugoslavia: An Interview with Éric Laurent [1985]" in Rex Butler and Scott Stephens (eds.), *Interrogating the Real*, New York: Continuum, 2005, p. 21; Yannis Stavrakakis, *Lacan & Political*, London & New-York: Routledge, 1999.

*discours politique et d'une élaboration sociologique et historique toujours liée au débat idéologique.*²⁸

Conclusions

Nous pouvons maintenant repenser le rapport entre l'idéologie et la démocratie. La démocratie, dans le sens proposé par Lefort, n'est pas un régime politique où le lieu du pouvoir reste à jamais vide -ça serait la définition d'une anarchie perpétuelle, mais un dispositif qui produit un écartement entre les opérateurs notionnels de la politique et leurs référents empiriques. Par exemple, il est impossible de trouver une correspondance empirique pour la notion d'égalité. L'égalité des chances ou de genre, l'égalité devant la loi ou l'égalité sociale ne sont que des fixations partielles et temporaires, qui peuvent être remises en question. Le rôle spécifique de l'idéologie est de dissimuler cet écart et de donner l'illusion d'une adéquation ultime, naturelle, entre les concepts politiques et leurs référents concrets.

La conséquence directe de cette conceptualisation de l'idéologie comme mécanisme de dissimulation de la contingence (du politique) est la politisation de l'opération critique. La critique de l'idéologie ne peut plus simplement consister dans la simple reprise énonciative de la ligne argumentative tracée ci-dessous, mais dans la reconfiguration de la sémantique politique. Cela n'est pas simplement un geste interprétatif, mais plutôt une attitude militante visant à réordonner l'espace politique.

Bibliographie

1. Breckman, Warren (2012), "Lefort and the Symbolic Dimension" in *Constellations*, vol. 19, nr.1, 2012, p. 30-36.
2. Clastres, Pierre (1997), *L'archéologie de la violence. La guerre dans les sociétés primitives*, Paris: Aube.
3. Flynn, Bernard (2006), *The Philosophy of Claude Lefort. Interpreting the Political*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
4. Habib, Claude; Mouchard, Claude (eds.), *La Démocratie à l'œuvre. Autour de Claude Lefort*, Paris: Esprit, 1993.
5. Kantorowicz, Ernst (1989), *Les Deux Corps du roi*, Paris: Gallimard.

²⁸ Claude Lefort, « La question de la démocratie », in *Essais sur...*, Paris : Seuil, 1986, p.28.

6. Labelle, Gilles (2003), « Maurice Merleau-Ponty et la genèse de la philosophie politique de Claude Lefort », in *Politique et Sociétés*, vol. 22, nr. 3, 9-44.
7. Lefort, Claude (1978), *Les formes de l'histoire*, Paris: Gallimard.
8. Lefort, Claude (1983), « Le Mythe de l'Un dans le Fantasma et dans la Réalité Politique », in *Psychanalystes: Revue du College de Psychanalystes*, nr. 9, 43-87.
9. Lefort, Claude (1986), *Essais sur le politique*, Paris: Seuil.
10. Marchart, Oliver (2011), *Gândirea politică postfundamentalistă. Diferența politică la Nancy, Lefort, Badiou și Laclau*, Cluj-Napoca: Idea Design&Print.
11. Moyn, Samuel (2012), "Claude Lefort, Political Anthropology, and Symbolic Division," in *Constellations*, vol.19, nr.1, 37-50.
12. Plot, Martin (ed.) (2013), *Claude Lefort, Thinker of the Political*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
13. Poltier, Hugues (1997), *La Découverte du politique*, Paris: Michalon.
14. Poltier, Hugues (1998), *Passion du politique. La Pensée de Claude Lefort*, Genève: Labor et Fides.
15. Stavrakakis, Yannis (1999), *Lacan&Political*, London & New-York: Routledge.
16. Žižek, Slavoj (1985/2005) "The Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis in Yugoslavia: An Interview with Éric Laurent" in Rex Butler and Scott Stephens (eds.), *Interrogating the Real*, New York: Continuum, 2005.

HOW TO LOOK AT NEOLIBERALISM. REVISITING ADORNO'S SOCIAL PHYSIOGNOMY

Ciprian Bogdan*

DOI: 10.24193/subbeuropaea.2017.3.10

Published Online: 2017-09-30

Published Print: 2017-09-30

Abstract

Against the widespread view that Adorno remains stuck in an antiquated way of approaching ideology as expression of social totality, the present article tries to recuperate Adorno's dialectical legacy in the context of contemporary neoliberalism. One central point made by Adorno - though usually missed by interpreters - is that ideology operates according to the Hegelian "negation of negation". We believe that this basic insight can be applied not only to liberal capitalism (19th century) and monopoly capitalism (20th century), but also to neoliberalism, thus shedding a new light even on contemporary phenomena like fake news or the proliferation of dystopian political scenarios as in the case of Trump or Brexit campaigns.

Keywords: ideology, critique of ideology, negation of negation, neoliberalism

"Intolerance of ambiguity"

From one of the main sources of inspiration for 1968 German student protests, Adorno, the critical philosopher, quickly turned into a "reactionary", an "elitist" who obstinately resisted the enthusiasm for a radical political revolution.¹ Ironically enough, there was a similar reaction

* Ciprian Bogdan is a PhD Lecturer with the Department of International Relations and German Studies, Faculty of European Studies at Babes-Bolyai University.
Contact: bogdanciprian@euro.ubbcluj.ro

¹ Though he was sensitive to certain issues raised by the students, Adorno refused to join them because of the visceral attitude demanding immediate action against capitalism without realizing that such an approach was perfectly compatible with the abstract, mediated character of the system they so harshly criticized. As we know, there are also two highly embarrassing moments in this story: the first one in which Adorno called the police

towards Adorno coming this time from intellectuals themselves denouncing, on the contrary, the tiresome Hegelian and Marxist legacy spread all over his texts.

So, what is the source of this strange consensus? Why is so hard to accommodate Adorno with these political and intellectual movements? As a matter of interpretive principle, when consensuses such as these come into being, there is always a repressive moment stemming from an "intolerance of ambiguity". Hasn't been Adorno's position often perceived as irritatingly ambivalent, not Marxist enough (for the students) and not anti-Marxist enough (for the intellectuals)? This strange alliance between Marxist and non-Marxists in marginalizing Adorno comes, however, with an ironical twist by confirming instead Adorno's own account of how ideology works as a mechanism designed to evacuate ambiguity while reproducing it in the very consensus between two seemingly incompatible positions. Instead of operating locally, this strange consensus itself should prove, in a sense, that ideology works *globally*, that behind rhetorical differences, what we find is often an insidious homogeneity induced by an ideology expressing "social totality". And what an irritating word, "totality", with its bombastic undertone in line with the Hegelian and Marxist belief of mastering the complexity of the whole of society.² Though he champions "nonidentity", Adorno insists, in the same time, to squeeze in an antiquated concept that bears all the nasty meanings of a "metanarrative" (Lyotard).

to free the Institute for Social Research from the rebellious students; and the second one in which three women students interrupted one of Adorno's courses by showing their breasts and scattering flower petals over his head. For a wide view on the evolution of the concept of "totality" in Western Marxism, see, Martin Jay, *Marxism and Totality. The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to Habermas*, Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press. Concerning Adorno, Jay pp. 274-275.

² For a broad view on the evolution of the concept of "totality" in Western Marxism, see, Martin Jay, *Marxism and Totality. The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to Habermas*, Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984. Jay criticizes Adorno's approach which lacks any (positive) reference to an intersubjectively constituted social totality. No wonder that, for Jay, Habermas seems better suited for proposing an adequate view on the topic. See *Ibidem*, pp. 274-275.

Instead of connecting nonidentity to “communicative action”, “language-games”, “discourse” etc.³ (the philosophical fetishes produced by the “linguistic turn”), Adorno seems to live in the past by stubbornly clinging to the idea of a social totality expressed in an ideology permeating almost all cultural productions. Ambiguity, once again.

Unsurprisingly, this has been the source of another consensus: the most recurrent criticism coming from post-structuralists (Lyotard or Rorty)⁴ and critical theorists alike (Habermas, Albrecht Wellmer, Seyla Benhabib)⁵ has been that Adorno's critique of social totality leaves no room for particular forms of progress or resistance. Everything is engulfed in an undifferentiated mass of social manipulation. Adorno's position seems clearly self-defeating: this almost irresistible advance of ideology in contemporary society denies the very essence of a critical theorist's job description, emancipatory criticism itself. How can you criticize society when ideology seemingly permeates almost every social aspect? What gives you the possibility to envision a better future while living inside an almost impenetrable totality? Adorno's emphatically pessimistic statements haven't been helpful either for they seem to confirm the existence of a nihilistic undertone running through his texts: “we are pretty much doomed, all we can do is at least to be aware of it!”

The present paper tries to challenge this widely shared perception. Though to be fair, this kind of criticism leveled down against Adorno is not entirely misplaced being, to some extent, rooted in his own ambivalent understanding of “monopoly capitalism” emerging in 20th century both as an quasi-irresistible spread of social domination *and* as an antagonistic

³ Fredric Jameson believes that Adorno is marginalized during the 1970's by structuralism and poststructuralism because of the Marxist legacy in which totality has a central role to play. See Fredric Jameson, *Late Marxism: Adorno, Or, the Persistence of the Dialectic*, London and New York: Verso, 1990, p. 9, pp. 14-15.

⁴ See Jean-François Lyotard, “Adorno as the Devil”, *Telos*, 19, Spring, 1974. Or: Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 56-57.

⁵ Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Twelve Lectures*, Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 1987, pp. 112-114, pp. 118-119, pp. 126-130. Albrecht Wellmer, *Zur Dialektik von Moderne und Postmoderne. Vernunftkritik nach Adorno*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985, pp. 28-29, pp. 41-42, p. 76. Seyla Benhabib, “The Critique of Instrumental Reason”, in Slavoj Žižek (ed.), *Mapping Ideology*, London and New York: Verso, 1994. pp. 85-87.

reality riven by contradictions that can still generate social change.⁶ As expected, the critics have, once again, evacuated ambivalence by retaining only the former part and repressing the latter. From this narrow perspective, Adorno seems largely unhelpful in providing some explanation for the “neoliberal” turn of capitalism. How can be a “turn”, after all, considering that neoliberalism should be viewed simply as an extension of monopoly capitalism, its latest expression? But this interpretation wholly misses the *spirit* of Adorno's own *dialectical* approach. As an observation, most interpreters, benevolent and critical alike, tend to tackle Adorno's texts by usually ignoring or downplaying the dialectical reversals of a specific social totality choosing instead an analytic approach that focuses on Adorno's “basic” philosophical structure (gravitating around concepts such as “identity-thinking”, “instrumental rationality”, “culture industry”, “fetishism”, “mimesis”, “nonidentity”, “utopia” etc.) which, if necessary, is backed with concrete, historical examples. But this is something that Adorno always wanted to avoid because it would mean regressing to a traditional approach in which theory seemed to be divorced from historical evolution. Abstract concepts make sense only by relating them to the dialectics of a specific social totality without entirely reducing them to such a totality.

So, our intention is to activate the *spirit* of Adorno's dialectical legacy in order to tackle the way contemporary neoliberalism operates and, thus, reject the usual criticism that the project of “negative dialectics” is a theoretical dead end with cynicism or mystical quietism⁷ looming over it. We can break the spell of ideological totality not by going back to some local “narratives” (Lyotard) or to a Kantian “ideal speech situation” (Habermas), but only through the dialectical method of turning totality against itself.⁸ In other words, the cracks within any social totality, in spite

⁶ See Adrian Wilding, “Pied Pipers and Polymaths: Adorno's Critique of Praxisism”, in John Holloway, Fernando Matamoros and Sergio Tischler (eds.), *Negativity and Revolution. Adorno and Political Activism*, London: Pluto Press, 2009, pp. 33-35.

⁷ Wellmer, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

⁸ Theodor W. Adorno, “Introduction”, in Theodor W. Adorno, Hans Albert, Ralf Dahrendorf, Jürgen Habermas, Harald Pilot, Karl R. Popper (eds.), *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, London and Edinburgh: Heinemann, 1976: “Totality is not an affirmative but rather a critical category. Dialectical critique seeks to salvage or help to establish what

of sometimes a massive ideological effort to hide them away, allows a critical theorist to explain dialectical change towards another type of society (usually a more controlled one), but also to point towards the possibility of a real future emancipation. Since no social totality has been free from contradictions or antagonisms and no ideological mechanism can entirely mask them, otherwise dialectics itself would become meaningless,⁹ the space for critical gestures might become narrower, but not totally covered by ideological mystifications. So, let's not despair, things don't necessarily have to turn ugly, though they usually do.

Critique of ideology as social physiognomy

One of Adorno's main theoretical tasks is to reinvigorate the Marxist legacy of critique of ideology by implicitly denouncing the widespread vulgar interpretations that mechanically identify economy as the cause for any social distortion. Instead of *immediately* turning to economic base as to some sort of Holy Grail, Adorno and Horkheimer point to another, more philosophical problem lying at the heart of critique of ideology: the tendency of universal concepts to homogenize or engulf particular objects developed to its fullest in the capitalist compulsion of reducing objects to abstract commodities. The ideological trick used by "identity-thinking" is as simple as it is effective: since the "nonidentity" between concepts and reality remains constitutive, all ideology can do is to assert their identity by masking or *negating* their difference. But isn't this formulation a clear reiteration of Hegel's famous "negation of negation"? In Adorno's own formulation: "to equate the negation of negation with positivity is the quintessence of identification; it is the formal principle in its purest form".¹⁰ It is worth remembering, however, that in Adorno's view, Hegel is a much more ambivalent thinker. He does not only discover and endorse the ideological principle of double negation fueling his bombastic Absolute Spirit, but offers through "determinate negation" also the remedy for the problem he himself created. Against the self-referential twist of double negation that engulfs any opposition in an abstract synthesis, Hegel's

does not obey totality, what opposes it or what first forms itself as the potential of a not yet existent individuation" (p. 12).

⁹ Wilding, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

¹⁰ Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 158.

determinate negation allows us to critically address a concrete social context while obliquely pointing towards future possibilities of emancipation. Adorno, however, makes a more daring move than restricting this ambivalence to Hegelian philosophy alone, he extrapolates it to the whole 19th century liberal capitalism. Isn't Enlightenment and its political outcome, the bourgeois order generated by the French Revolution, marked by a similar ambivalence between, on one hand, the negation of the old, feudal order imbued with superstitions of some unquestionable authority (Hegel's determinate negation) and, on the other, the negation of this negation operated by the bourgeois ideology that ends up in eternalizing its own social order (Hegel's Prussian state as an embodiment of the Absolute Spirit)? From this point of view, 19th century liberal ideology perfectly embodies what Marx called "false consciousness", an illusion added to social reality that should obscure the fact that "liberty, equality and fraternity" are not universal principles as long as economic inequality allows only the bourgeois to enjoy them while the working class is doomed to survive. Moreover, this *gap* between the brutal economic exploitation and the rosy ideology of the bourgeois order offers Marx the possibility to expose the way capitalism works and even predict a future revolution. In other words, he can see *beneath* the ideological surface at the very heart of the system by describing its historical "laws" based on exploitation and *compare* them with the existing ideological claims of equality and freedom. But what happens when this gap is no longer visible because "infrastructure has become its own superstructure"?¹¹

For Adorno, 20th century "monopoly capitalism" or what Friedrich Pollock calls "state capitalism" no longer plays by the (usual Marxist) rules: you cannot *directly* compare the base with the superstructure simply because the distance between the two has been obscured. In the context of the newly emerged "culture industry", ideology no longer constitutes a false consciousness added to a flawed social reality since reality itself has become almost entirely ideological - "a real abstraction", as Marx would put it. Interestingly enough, Hegel is the one who managed to anticipate this evolution when presciently describing the Absolute Spirit in terms of a *systemic totality* that would become reality a hundred years later in 20th

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 267-268.

century capitalism.¹² So, the question is: what happens to the critique in the context of a much more opaque capitalist reality in which ideology becomes almost ubiquitous? For one thing, in contrast with the usual Marxist approach, the new critical theorist should be aware that the ideological operation no longer *explicitly* follows Hegel's double negation that still allowed grasping the contradictions running through social reality despite ideological manipulations (for instance, the sharp class division that could not be hidden away). So, the core of the new ideological formula is the attempt to erase all its traces, to *mask double negation itself* and turn it into a full-blown *double affirmation* (or in Hegel's jargon, into a "synthesis"). It is by no means an accident that Adorno relates the new ideology to a *caricature* of Nietzsche's imperative "Become what you are!" since both fascism and consumerism urge us to be authentic, to express our innermost being (of course, that of a racist or a compulsive buyer).¹³ The message seems pretty clear: "don't fight 'nature' (as 19th century still did), embrace what you are because it is pretty much all you have!" And "nature" is, of course, a mask for the collective power: the call for subjective activism is nothing but an attempt to confirm the individual submission to the community.

Moreover, Adorno thinks that the spread of "real abstraction" (that Marx still associated with "commodity fetishism") to the whole of society is strictly correlative to the generalization of *cynicism*.¹⁴ As such, the Nazi propaganda should not be understood as an effort to make people *really* believe in its crazy racial mythology - everybody knew, to some level, that it was "propaganda", a conscious manipulative device - but rather to induce a "mimetic" submission *as if* they do believe in it.¹⁵ No wonder that such a twisted ideological context requires a renewed and more refined critical approach than the traditional Marxist one. Adorno calls it "social physiognomy". Though the term "physiognomy" is quite fashionable in the first half of 20th century being deployed by psychoanalysts such as

¹² Theodor W. Adorno, *Hegel. Three Studies*, Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 1993, p. 10.

¹³ See, for instance, Theodor W. Adorno, *Soziologische Schriften I. Gesammelte Schriften 8*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997, p. 476.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 465-466.

¹⁵ The twisted subtleties of contemporary cynicism are further developed by Peter Sloterdijk and Slavoj Žižek.

Sándor Ferenczi or Siegfried Bernfeld¹⁶ or by a speculative philosopher such as Oswald Spengler in his gloomy reflections about the West, most probably, Adorno borrows the term from Walter Benjamin who analyses “the surrealist ‘face’ of metropolitan Paris to reveal its impact on subjective experience”¹⁷. But as in the case of the traditional physiognomical approach that interprets facial expressions as indications of the character of a person, Adorno’s social physiognomy wants to decipher the faces of the new form of capitalism in order to have a glimpse into its *total* character. The critical theorist can no longer enjoy the privileged status of taking the red pill and have *direct* access to the functioning of capitalist Matrix. In a society in which the gap between infrastructure and superstructure becomes fuzzier, in which social mediation captures almost everything even our innermost spontaneous gestures and emotions, the critical theorist should start not from the depth of the system, but from its *surface* for even the tinniest of things (from “innocent” gestures to movies, radio speeches or advertising etc) can now be a symptom of the way social totality reproduces itself. Choosing between the red and blue pill is no longer a clear cut option since the choosing itself is tainted by ideology. There is, however, an obvious ironical undertone in applying social physiognomy to monopoly capitalism. After all, how can we talk about social “physiognomy” in a capitalist society that wants to erase the individual traces of human physiognomy by colonizing almost every inch of bodily impulses? Or even worse, how is it possible to use a term that comes dangerously close to a view that understands society as an *organism* with racism waiting just around the corner? No doubt, Adorno’s point is exactly the opposite, namely to indicate the twisted dialectical reversal in which the body gets repressed whenever ideology hails it. Isn’t fascism an ideological expression of the capitalist attempt to hide its systemic, highly abstract character under organic metaphors and, thus, to create the illusion of immediacy and biological connections in an almost totally mediated world? Though both “organism” and “system” imply the same tendency to integrate particular elements in a totality, capitalism is not an organism, but

¹⁶ Susan Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics. Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute*, New York and London: The Free Press, 1977, p. 176.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

a system.¹⁸ Or perhaps more accurately put, capitalism constitutes an *abstract body* in which contradictions are no longer directly visible like an open wound, but only indirectly through small, sometimes almost invisible symptoms spread all over its surface. As such, the task of a dialectician is not to bluntly apply totality to individual things, but to accept that “the societal essence which shapes appearances, appears in them and conceals itself in them”.¹⁹ And, thus, to direct physiognomy towards “what is silenced”²⁰ by giving voice to those individual things that have been repressed in the name of abstractions.

Bye, bye, liberalism!

One key point of consensus among the members of the Institute for Social Research led by Max Horkheimer is Friedrich Pollock's idea of the emergence of a different type of capitalism than the liberal one - described by Marx in 19th century - and in which the state intervenes heavily in the economic sphere. For Pollock, “state capitalism” constitutes “the successor of private capitalism, that the state assumes important functions of the private capitalist, that profit interests still play a significant role, and that it is not socialism”²¹. In state or monopoly capitalism, the free market collapses into politics. The state drastically regulates economy and its class relations. So, “if free trade, enterprise, and freedom to sell one's labor-power – in short, the exchange market – are becoming a thing of the past, then the critique of the emergent social and political order can no longer take the form of the critique of political economy”.²²

That being said, the question we have to answer is: how can we accommodate Pollock's description with Adorno's dialectical approach? Are we able to reconstruct (even though in a highly simplified manner) the whole process of going from liberalism to statism by using the dialectical trick of double negation as our guiding line? Let's start with the 19th century

¹⁸ Adorno, “Introduction”, in Theodor W. Adorno, Hans Albert, Ralf Dahrendorf, Jürgen Habermas, Harald Pilot, Karl R. Popper (eds.), *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, p. 37.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 36-37.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 36.

²¹ Pollock *apud* Seyla Benhabib, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

²² Seyla Benhabib, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

liberalism by covering three interrelated dimensions. As we know from the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, modernity comes with the promise to liberate the *individual* from the dark *collective* forces based on superstition and authority, but instead of assuming this determinate negation to the fullest, modernity ends up in negating this negation by hypostatizing rationality in an absolute, non-questionable authority. But can't we find a similar logic operating at the level of *class* relations as well? The bourgeois class negates the old hierarchical order in the name of equality and liberty only to negate this negation once again when trying to hide away the existence of a new social hierarchy with bourgeoisie at the top while the working class relegated at the bottom of it. And at a closer look, we can even apply this dialectical move to the relationship between the *state* and the *market*. As a bourgeois creation, the free market comes, in a sense, with the liberating message of rejecting the social and political control over economic processes.²³ What is usually missed, however, is the dialectical follow-up since the "freedom" of the market is itself negated by the ideology of an "impartial" and "minimal" state masking the fact that a liberal state is "neutral" only in the sense of neutralizing all those who reject the bourgeois market.²⁴

Adorno allows us to interpret the emergence of state capitalism at the end of 19th century in the same dialectical vein. But there is a new twist to it: instead of presenting itself in a full-blown manner, double negation becomes low-profile and operates only at an *implicit* level. Trying to evacuate any traces of negativity, the new ideology is like a parody of Zarathustra's double yes to life²⁵ perfectly captured by the positivistic

²³ Adorno, *Soziologische Schriften I...*, p. 381: Adorno says that history is a history of monopolies. So, we might add that the emergence of economic competition constitutes an emancipatory, though still ambivalent (because it also generates a new form of exploitation, this time against the working class) moment in this social evolution.

²⁴ When approaching 19th century liberalism, Adorno seems to mostly agree with Marx's analysis of capitalism including here the idea that the state is simply an extension of the economic interests of the bourgeoisie. See, for instance, Adorno, *Soziologische Schriften I...*, p. 385.

²⁵ The ideological caricature of Zarathustra's double affirmation of life seems pretty transparent if look at passages in which the affirmation of the existing reality is shamelessly reiterated behind the mask of neutrality and objectivity: "Ideology is split between the photographing of brute existence and the blatant lie about its meaning, a lie which is not articulated directly but drummed in by suggestion. The mere cynical reiteration of the real is

gesture of affirming only the “facts” that confirm the (positivist) *theory* while in the background, of course, still *negating* the other ones, all those “irrational” or “utopian” “facts” that do not fit into the accepted theoretical framework.²⁶ The marriage between capitalism and the state with all its techno-scientific capabilities generates an unprecedented social control over individuals. That is why, in a specific dialectical move in which double negation remains at work, Adorno asserts that the *liquidation* of the (bourgeois) subject is realized through its social *totalization*.²⁷ Once society has taken over the individual, society itself becomes subjectivized as proven, for instance, by the ideological effect of the “jargon of authenticity” which bombastically hails individual choices only to *mask* the powerlessness of the individual²⁸ in a capitalist society in which everything depends on arbitrary *decisions*.²⁹ No longer an expression of the rebellion against social constraints, the individual becomes instead an abstract, mediated reality (the first affirmation) who tends to almost automatically confirm society's abstraction (the second affirmation). And the same thing can be noticed in the sphere of class relations. The proletariat that allowed Marx to dream about a global revolution is liquidated through its extension to the whole of society: because of the *systemic* nature of capitalism, everyone, in a sense, becomes a proletarian, bourgeois and workers alike.³⁰

enough to demonstrate its divinity.” Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002, p. 118.

²⁶ Adorno, “Introduction”, in Theodor W. Adorno, Hans Albert, Ralf Dahrendorf, Jürgen Habermas, Harald Pilot, Karl R. Popper (eds.), *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, p. 16, p. 21, p. 50.

²⁷ Actually, this move expresses the way second negation negates the subject only by masking this under the guise of expanding the subject to the whole of society. The subject is liquidated when society itself is subjectivized and transformed in a place of unaccountable, arbitrary decisions.

²⁸ Adorno, *The Jargon of Authenticity*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, pp. 72-73.

²⁹ The social spread of paranoia is a symptom of this subjectivizing process of society. See Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, pp. 156-157.

³⁰ Adorno, *Soziologische Schriften I...*, p. 380, p. 386. There are two points to be made in understanding why Adorno would imply this kind of social evolution: the *first* one has to do with the erosion of the 19th century difference between *theory* (as an expression of a bourgeois status) and *practice* (as something that belongs to the workers) once society enters into the stage of monopoly capitalism. Adorno notices that the tension between theory and practice is liquidated only to be replaced by an ideology that hails action (see, for instance,

Though class division remains an “objective” reality, bourgeoisie no longer controls the system and turns into a *function* for its reproduction. The market suffers the same fate by disappearing once it is globalized: the commodity form that used to be present only in the economic sphere (19th century) extends to the whole of society (20th century). The political monopoly over economic activities are not meant to limit capitalism, but to expand it by trying to commodify everything left untouched by 19th century capitalism, from individual consciousness, emotions or gestures to cultural creations.

Hello, neoliberalism!

Adorno died in 1969, ten years before Margaret Thatcher would rise to power in Britain signaling the birth of neoliberal “revolution”. We can only imagine what a shocking spectacle would have been for Adorno to witness the alliance between Thatcher and Reagan in promoting their aggressive “return” to classic liberalism and dismantle the economic and social monopoly of the state. Given this late mutation in capitalism, all we can do is to invoke Adorno's “spirit” and try to dialectically decipher the faces of this new social reality. So, let's initiate the ritual of this medium session and begin, of course, with the skeptics.

There are numerous accounts of how to tackle neoliberalism due, in part, to the ghostly character of the phenomenon itself.³¹ For a Marxist theoretician like David Harvey, neoliberalism constitutes the political attempt of addressing *structural* problems within capitalism that is meant “to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the

Adorno, *Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft I. Ohne Leitbild. Gesammelte Schriften 10. 1*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997, pp. 23-24). Thus, we might safely add that the emasculation of the proletariat comes only through the generalization of “pseudo-activity” to the entire society. In monopoly capitalism, everyone seems to work, even intellectuals perform a rather repetitive activity of assembling “stereotypes” that resembles the boring work in a factory. The *second* point is that the new form of capitalism is about the “monopoly” of the state over economy and its individuals. The power of the state transforms everyone into an underdog, thus, in a sense, reproducing the working class status from 19th century.

³¹ See Ciprian Bogdan, “Politics but not too much. Neoliberalism as infra-ideology”, in Sergiu Mișcoiu, Valentin Naumescu (eds.), *What is Left From the Left-Right Cleavage? A Comparative Perspective*, București: Editura Institutului de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale, 2015.

power of economic elites".³² As a justifying mechanism for the capitalist order, neoliberalism comes with the promise of emancipating the "individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade".³³ Jürgen Habermas shifts, however, the focus from the structural problems of capitalism to those that are specific to a differentiated modernity. Neoliberalism is simply an attempt of economic and political systems to "colonize" "the lifeworld" by replacing "communicative action" which impregnates socialization and identity building with systemic imperatives (individualism, profit etc.) driven by instrumental rationality.³⁴ By contrast, Stuart Hall focuses on the way Thatcherism has managed to win the *cultural* battle in Great Britain and to replace the social-democratic "common sense" (Gramsci) centered on "egalitarian and collectivist attitudes" with one advocating "a more competitive individualistic market-driven, entrepreneurial, profit-oriented outlook".³⁵ In a rather similar vein, Pierre Bourdieu explains the neoliberal success in terms of a cultural battle fought by various organizations (newspapers, institutions, think tanks etc.) to transform a "pure mathematical fiction" that, in fact, undermines the very conditions of social reproduction (education, unions, families etc.) into a "self-evident" reality that would free individuals from the tyranny of the state.³⁶ Last but not least, Michel Foucault tries to move away from the usual understanding of neoliberalism as an *ideological* mechanism and associate it with specific "*practices of power*". From this perspective, neoliberalism radicalizes 19th century liberal practices: instead of defining itself as a force meant to limit government intervention in the economic market (the classical *laissez-faire*),

³² David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 19.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 2.

³⁴ Timo Jütten, "Habermas and Markets", *Constellations*, vol. 20, 4, 2013, available at [http://repository.essex.ac.uk/10834/1/Habermas_and_Markets_-_Academia-libre.pdf], accessed July 2017.

³⁵ Stuart Hall, Alan O'Shea, *Common-Sense Neoliberalism*, [https://www.lwbooks.co.uk/sites/default/files/s55_02hall_oshea.pdf], p. 11, accessed August 2014.

³⁶ Pierre Bourdieu, *Acts of Resistance. Against the New Myths of our Time*, Cambridge, Oxford: Polity Press, 1998, p. 66, pp. 94-95.

neoliberalism goes much further by evaluating the entire society, including the state, according to the economic standards of the market.³⁷

So, what would be Adorno's position in this spectrum of "leftist" accounts of neoliberalism? Though sharing a strong affinity with the Marxist approach, Adorno would most probably not endorse Harvey's idea of an economic base (capitalism) that simply triggers changes in the political superstructure (neoliberalism). Since 20th century capitalism is already a systemic totality, the base and superstructure are already profoundly enmeshed. Thus, *the central difference brought by Adorno in this debate resides in viewing neoliberalism as a dialectical expression of contemporary social totality*. That would be the reason why the dream of saving an untainted lifeworld (Habermas), a social-democratic consensus (Bourdieu, Hall) or a larger space for individual resistance (Foucault) means to be in denial: these spaces are not "outside" capitalist totality, but already mediated by it.³⁸ When dialectically looking at neoliberalism, we should notice right away the "neo" attached to liberalism, a supplement that fits, to some extent, Hegel's point on *Aufhebung* as both preservation and overcoming of the previous historical phase by the new one. What is different, however, from the Hegelian narrative is that neoliberalism does not simply preserve and overcome liberalism as its preceding stage. Neoliberalism absorbs and radicalizes liberalism only as a reaction to its previous stage, monopoly capitalism. Otherwise put, neoliberalism "goes back" to liberalism only as a way to *negate* the previous stage of capitalism in which the state is the central social force. Such a dialectical approach should make us reluctant to a comparative analysis between liberalism and neoliberalism by counting their ideological similarities and differences because, again, the real problem lies not in the relationship between neoliberalism and liberalism, but in that between neoliberalism and monopoly capitalism. So, if the answer does not reside in counting particular ideological features, we should look at a deeper level, at the very mechanism that allows ideology to reproduce itself in a specific social

³⁷ Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 239-313.

³⁸ In a similar way, Moishe Postone relates capitalism to a systemic totality that finds its exemplary model in Hegel's Absolute Spirit. See Moishe Postone, *History and Heteronomy. Critical Essays*, Tokyo: UTCP Booklet 12, 2009.

totality. Remember that, for Adorno, monopoly capitalism negates 19th century liberalism, or that double positivity (as the ideological mechanism of monopoly capitalism) negates double negation (the ideological mechanism of liberalism). From this perspective, neoliberalism does the same thing, it negates monopoly capitalism, thus, reviving double negation *against* the double positivity of monopoly capitalism. However, by making double negation *explicit* again is in no way a return to 19th century liberalism. Adorno would surely say that the end result of this dialectical process is not less ideology, but more since capitalism is fatally programmed to increase control and domination by turning everything into abstractions. Compared with 20th century ideology that tries to deny all traces of negativity, neoliberalism dialectically reverses this process, *it brings negativity once again to the surface, but instead of using it to criticize the existing social order (as in liberalism), it ends up legitimizing it.* If there is a central feature of neoliberalism, that would be the attempt to eliminate the emancipatory content of *determinate negation* and transform it into a tool for justifying the *status-quo*.

As Bourdieu and others have noticed, one of the basic gestures of neoliberalism is to naturalize social competition between individuals.³⁹ Thus, if in 19th century liberalism, competition could still retain an emancipatory side by rejecting social dogmatism in the economic sphere, paradoxically, in neoliberal capitalism competition seems to vanish in its very expansion to the whole of society. Because there is no external limit (like the state), the entire society being transformed into a huge enterprise of producing social athletes, the *negation* induced by competition does nothing, but to confirm the functioning of social order. Ironically, the monopolistic tendency of 20th century capitalism comes back under the guise of a new type of monopoly, that of a competition that wants to *exclude* any other possible form of social relationship (such as altruism, generosity, equality etc.). If we switch the focus on class relations, there is a similar dialectic at work. While in monopoly capitalism, the proletariat is liquidated because everyone, in a sense, becomes a worker, a simple piece in a huge system, it seems that in neoliberalism everyone should turn into a

³⁹ Bourdieu, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

bourgeois.⁴⁰ Shouldn't we all become entrepreneurs ready to come up with creative solutions to the challenges addressed by the market? Shouldn't workers themselves get accustomed with flexibility and risks and forget about doing the same repetitive work all their life? Isn't everyone's destiny to be engaged in "lifelong learning", so that we can adapt to the existing uncertainties?⁴¹ The irony is, of course, that the bourgeois type itself (that once symbolized the promise of emancipation from feudal hierarchy) has disappeared in the generalized *uncertainty* of our contemporary "risk society" (Ulrich Beck).⁴² This doesn't mean, of course, that everyone experiences the same level of uncertainty: the distribution along class lines, as Adorno continuously reminds us, stays in place as an "objective" reality in systemic capitalism.⁴³ "Subjectively" speaking, however, capitalism no longer makes distinctions between classes, *everybody* has to align itself to the new ideological imperative of being flexible. And when everybody is a risk-taker, the system itself is no longer at risk, it has absorbed the energy of negating reality into its own reproduction. This kind of "strategy" is also visible at another level. Once neoliberal capitalism has managed to impose itself, the economic monopoly that used to be the privilege of the state disappears by being globalized, it becomes transformed, we might say, into a monopoly of multinational corporations engaged in the *parody* of a global competition. The masking of monopoly under the guise of global

⁴⁰ Interestingly enough, Adorno also anticipates this ideological mystification (that becomes widespread in neoliberalism) in which some part of the proletariat views itself as middle-class: "The institutional and psychological structure, which in 1930 Kracauer diagnosed as a culture of employees, deluded the celluloid-collar proletariat, who were threatened by the immediacy of losing their jobs. It deluded them into believing that they were something special. Through this delusion the superstructure make them toe the bourgeois line, while in the meantime, thanks to a lasting market boom, that superstructure has become the universal ideology of a society which mistakes itself for a unified middle class". Adorno, *The Jargon of Authenticity*, pp. 19-20.

⁴¹ Moreover, if monopoly capitalism is based on a generalized "pseudo-activity", neoliberalism seems to be working on a widespread pseudo-intellectual thinking. This can be easily explained by considering the contemporary development towards a "speculative" capitalism which combines several factors: the economic impact of service sector, market speculations and virtual technologies.

⁴² See Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society – Towards a New Modernity*, London: Sage, 1992. For Adorno and Horkheimer, the bourgeois concept of "risk" is already anticipated by the adventurous behavior of Odysseus. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 48.

⁴³ Adorno, *Soziologische Schriften I...*, p. 15.

competition is visible not only because, usually, the small economic actors end up in being swallowed by the big ones, or that the latter are more competitive than the former because of their know-how to use tax avoidance,⁴⁴ or that prices are often settled through secret negotiations between the big actors, but also because the state itself becomes a guarantor against the bankruptcy of banks and corporations since they are “too big to fail”.⁴⁵ At this point, we can see how capitalism has evolved from one in which the state has monopoly over economy to a really globalized system in which the state itself looks like a corporation obsessed with austerity in order to avoid default, with privatization as a way to externalize costs or, most of all, with securing the big economic players against bankruptcy. To put it dialectically, the parody of global competition (the first negation) is constantly negated by the intervention of a state that itself parodies the corporate model (second negation).⁴⁶

But what about a “superstructural” phenomenon like postmodernism or post-structuralism? How does it fit into the broader picture? Shouldn't Adorno have become one of the darlings of this new

⁴⁴ See, for instance, “Corporate tax avoidance by multinational firms”, in *Library of the European Parliament*, 23/09/2013, available at [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130574/LDM_BRI%282013%29130574_REV1_EN.pdf], accessed July 2017.

⁴⁵ The financial crisis from 2007-2008 that emerged in the private banking sector was stopped only by state intervention that ended up paying the debts of the private sector. The basic slogan behind this intervention was that the banks were “too big to fail”. See Mark Blyth, *Austerity. The History of a Dangerous Idea*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

⁴⁶ This is, no doubt, a very sketchy manner to describe what happens at the level of global capitalism. A much more detailed analysis would be needed. All we intend to do is follow Adorno's basic point about a systemic capitalist society: the extraction of surplus value from the work of the proletariat (Marx) is part of a larger social tendency to reduce particular objects to abstractions (commodities). Capitalism is both an economic and ideological system in which profitability rates go hand in hand with abstractization and domination of (internal and external) nature. So, capitalism as a self-referential mechanism can reproduce only by pushing forward this tendency to commodify every inch of reality. The move from monopoly capitalism to neoliberal capitalism is the expansion of commodification to the global level in which the state seems no longer capable to remain the central actor being limited to a specific territory, by comparison, multinational corporations are much better equipped for globalization in virtue of their capacity to transcend territories and adapt to local contexts.

wave considering his unrelentless effort to save “nonidentity” from the grip of “identity-thinking”? Well, not really. Despite sharing certain similarities (including their love of art), there is a fundamental difference in their critical approaches. Adorno would surely say that postmodernism continues to be in denial by ignoring the elephant in the room: capitalism itself. After all, isn't the postmodern mantra of “difference”, “differance”, “diferend”, “heterogeneity” etc. strangely attuned to the flexibility and fragmentation induced by contemporary capitalism looking for profit? While both Adorno and postmodernists engage in a fierce critique of identity/totality, the latter end up in denying the very existence of such a (capitalist) totality: the critique is lacking an object. In dialectical terms, the negation of (capitalist) totality is itself negated by the fact that totality turns out to be nothing but a “grand narrative” that covers the irreducible heterogeneity of human “language-games”. Or as Keyser Söze, the evil character from *Unusual suspects* played by Kevin Spacey, would sum up the paradox: “the greatest trick the devil ever pulled was to convince the world he didn't exist”.

Another strange irony haunts, however, all this postmodern critique against “metanarratives”. What should have been a devastating charge against any oppressive totality and objectivity ends up in justifying pretty much everything by simply labeling it as “alternative”. This strategy is perfectly encapsulated in Kellyanne Conway's cynical smile at an American television when disarmingly rejected clear video footage by claiming that there were “alternative facts” that still proved the contrary, namely that Donald Trump's crowd size at his inauguration day had been bigger than his predecessor's. “Leftist” relativism gone mainstream and right-wing (let's not forget about “alternative right”). But Conway's reaction also signals a change in the *cynical* package of contemporary ideology. As Adorno and Horkheimer brilliantly point out, the fascist ideology is not about the revenge of some irrational, instinctive forces repressed by Enlightenment, but exactly the opposite, the resurgence of a cynical, manipulative rationality that knows all too well that its racial mythology is fake and still acting as if it's true. So, what it is really new? Instead of covering the fake through a huge propaganda apparatus by securing *monopoly* over information (culture industry, fascism or stalinism), contemporary ideology seems to transform cynicism itself into a *critical*

gesture against the “system”, “elites” or whatever. “You can show us as many 'facts' as you want, but there are 'alternative realities' that you cannot repress!” In other words, contemporary capitalism no longer reproduces itself by inhibiting “alternatives”, but, on the contrary, by multiplying them to the point that the fake almost completely obscures the real ones.

From (positive) utopia to (Trump's) dystopia and beyond

The fact that George Orwell's dystopian novel, *1984*, has known lately a spectacular comeback should not be interpreted solely as a symptom for the prescient manner in which he described the manipulation of language, strangely resonating with the recent production of “fake news”, but, maybe more importantly, for the negative reaction that utopian thinking triggers in contemporary society. What if one of the major signs of neoliberal ideology is the repression of the utopian horizon? Before elaborating further on this, we shouldn't forget, however, that, for Adorno, one of the basic illusions of “culture industry” or totalitarian propaganda consists in promising a paradise that is always delayed.⁴⁷

From an instrument of criticizing domination (that shows us that there is a better world), utopia becomes a tool for its reproduction: “if you are obedient enough, you'll get your reward ... eventually!” So, to be clear, for Adorno, the problem is not with utopia as such, but with “positive utopia” that projects some future social paradise only by mimicking the ideological imperatives of the existing domination. As the reflex of *indirectly* pointing towards a better reality, “negative utopia” is the only one that allows us to preserve the critical function of utopia and resist giving in to the *status-quo*.

⁴⁷ “The culture industry endlessly cheats its consumers out of what it endlessly promises.” Or: “This principle requires that while all needs should be presented to individuals as capable of fulfillment by the culture industry, they should be so set up in advance that individuals experience themselves through their needs only as eternal consumers, as the culture industry's object. [...] The culture industry presents that same everyday world as paradise. Escape, like elopement, is destined from the first to lead back to its starting point. Entertainment fosters the resignation which seeks to forget itself in entertainment”. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 111, p. 113.

But what about neoliberalism? Where should we look for the source of the unprecedented appetite for dystopian scenarios in our society?⁴⁸ To remain faithful to Adorno means to take his dialectics seriously and point out that neoliberalism makes its way only by *negating* the utopian character of monopoly capitalism. Instead of promising an alternative utopia that should *confirm* the existing social reality, neoliberalism seems to propose an alternative dystopia *against* an already dystopian social reality. Otherwise put, if monopoly capitalism claims that “reality is utopian, so, utopia is the only alternative!”, in neoliberalism, the basic ideological formula would be something like: “reality is *not* utopian, so, there is *no* alternative to dystopia!” And Trump seems to be the epitome for this self-legitimizing process of neoliberalism. What is striking about “making America great again” is the relationship between the post-apocalyptic shape of contemporary American society in which everything seems to collapse (the so-called “American carnage”)⁴⁹ and the promise of a brighter future that looks more like a sublimated dystopia driven by fear and the urge to build “walls” for stopping Mexican “rapists” or “drug dealers” coming into the country. The discourse elaborated by Brexiteers seems to operate in a similar fashion. While they deplore the current state of Britain that is invaded by immigrants and European regulations, they promise a rather chilling future in which deregulations and tax cuts would make Britain some sort of paradise, but only for the wealthy. This by no means implies that the above mentioned ideological mechanism is restricted to “exotic” figures like Trump or Brexiteers. It can be easily detected in the way the politics of austerity has been imposed at European level. The German discourse about the Greek debt remains symptomatic for the neoliberal approach. The underlying message of the divide between “responsible” Germans and “irresponsible” Greeks seems to be that the world is a scary, risky place in which (Southern) people tend to behave irresponsibly and the only alternative is to impose strict, austerity measures to limit the

⁴⁸ A short list of dystopian movies should tell us something about the current ideological “mood”: *Mad Max* (1979), *Blade Runner* (1982), *Total Recall* (1990), *Gattaca* (1997), *Matrix* (1999), *Minority Report* (2002), *V for Vendetta* (2005), *Children of Men* (2006), *The Hunger Games* (2012), *Elysium* (2013).

⁴⁹ Donald Trump, *Inaugural Address*, Friday, January 20, 2017, available at [<https://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural-address>], accessed July 2017.

damage. So, to put it crudely, the neoliberal “paradise” is a dystopia in which you might have a good life only because many others are failing. The critical function of dystopia (that Orwell still used against totalitarian utopias) tends to almost automatically legitimize dystopia itself, the only *real* alternative to the existing (dystopian) reality.

What is left after (briefly) exploring this topsy-turvy world of neoliberalism? What should be the task of a critical theorist in this capitalist stage? As we have tried to indicate, Adorno can still provide us with useful critical insights and tools despite moving into a new form of capitalism. If Adorno tries to make Marxist critique better equipped for catching up with the “cunning” of monopoly capitalist ideology, neoliberalism comes with a new strategy of concealing its contradictions. Instead of hiding these tensions, neoliberalism makes them visible by naturalizing them. Thus, the ideological concealment operates now in the very gesture of unveiling the cracks within the system. How else can we understand the paradoxical situation in which, on one hand, contemporary media unashamedly exhibits human suffering provoked by economic inequality while, on the other, even a modest change like taxing corporate profit is fiercely labeled as left-wing radicalism? In this new ideological context, the main task of a critical theorist is no longer to indicate the mechanisms that conceal negativity and create the illusion of a totally transparent reality, but to uncover the *parodical* side of most contemporary *critical* gestures that simply justify the existing social reality. If in neoliberal capitalism, the critical gesture is disconnected from the promise of emancipation with the future being depicted as even bleaker than the present, a renewed critical alertness is required to shed light on today’s opacity and reification by still pointing to the possibility of having a better world.

Bibliography

1. Adorno, Theodor W. (1976), “Introduction”, in Theodor W. Adorno, Hans Albert, Ralf Dahrendorf, Jürgen Habermas, Harald Pilot, Karl R. Popper (eds.), *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, London and Edinburgh: Heinemann.
2. Adorno, Theodor W. (2002), *Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
3. Adorno, Theodor W. (1993), *Hegel. Three Studies*, Cambridge and

- London: The MIT Press.
4. Adorno, Theodor W. (1997) *Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft I. Ohne Leitbild. Gesammelte Schriften 10. 1*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
 5. Adorno, Theodor W. (2004), *Negative Dialectics*, London and New York: Routledge.
 6. Adorno, Theodor W. (1997), *Soziologische Schriften I. Gesammelte Schriften 8*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
 7. Adorno, Theodor W. (1973), *The Jargon of Authenticity*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
 8. Beck, Ulrich (1992), *Risk Society – Towards a New Modernity*, London: Sage.
 9. Benhabib, Seyla (1994), “The Critique of Instrumental Reason”, in Slavoj Žižek (ed.), *Mapping Ideology*, London and New York: Verso.
 10. Blyth, Mark (2013), *Austerity. The History of a Dangerous Idea*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
 11. Bogdan, Ciprian (2015), “Politics but not too much. Neoliberalism as infra-ideology”, in Sergiu Mișcoiu, Valentin Naumescu (eds.), *What is Left From the Left-Right Cleavage? A Comparative Perspective*, București: Editura Institutului de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale.
 12. Bourdieu, Pierre (1998), *Acts of Resistance. Against the New Myths of our Time*, Cambridge, Oxford: Polity Press.
 13. “Corporate tax avoidance by multinational firms”, in *Library of the European Parliament*, 23/09/2013, available at [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130574/LDM_BRI%282013%29130574_REV1_EN.pdf].
 14. Foucault, Michel (2008), *The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
 15. Habermas, Jürgen (1987), *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Twelve Lectures*, Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press.
 16. Hall, Stuart, O’Shea, Alan, *Common-Sense Neoliberalism*, [https://www.lwbooks.co.uk/sites/default/files/s55_02hall_oshea.pdf].
 17. Jay, Martin, *Marxism and Totality. The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to Habermas* (1984), Berkeley: University of California Press.
 18. Jütten, Timo, “Habermas and Markets”, *Constellations*, vol. 20, 4,

- 2013, available at [http://repository.essex.ac.uk/10834/1/Habermas_and_Markets_-_Academia-libre.pdf].
19. Lyotard, Jean-François (1974), "Adorno as the Devil", *Telos*, 19, Spring.
 20. Postone, Moishe (2009), *History and Heteronomy. Critical Essays*, Tokyo: UTCP Booklet 12.
 21. Rorty, Richard (1989), *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
 22. Buck-Morss, Susan (1977), *The Origin of Negative Dialectics. Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute*, New York and London: The Free Press.
 23. Wellmer, Albrecht (1985), *Zur Dialektik von Moderne und Postmoderne. Vernunftkritik nach Adorno*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
 24. Wilding, Adrian (2009), "Pied Pipers and Polymaths: Adorno's Critique of Praxisism", in John Holloway, Fernando Matamoros and Sergio Tischler (eds.), *Negativity and Revolution. Adorno and Political Activism*, London: Pluto Press.

IDEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTIONS AND SOCIOLOGICAL (MIS)UNDERSTANDINGS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THE CASE OF 'TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY'

Șerban Văetiși*

DOI: 10.24193/subbeuropaea.2017.3.11

Published Online: 2017-09-30

Published Print: 2017-09-30

Abstract

The article investigates the various formulas and constructions expressing and contributing to the evolution of 'Transatlantic community' as regional transcontinental set of relationships; political and discursive construction of shared principles, values, and strategies; and social/sociological reality. The suggested analysis provides a critical reappraisal of some of its fundamental elements of definition, ideology, political structure and social-historical complexity, while attempting to contrast between the systemic and intrasystemic views of community. The interpretation reveals the necessity to ask ourselves whether there exist something like a 'Transatlantic community' that can be defined in sociological sense, and, secondly, to question the uses and limits of a sociology of international relations as sociology of transatlantic community. The article concludes on some mutations at the level of sociological epistemology, that would ultimately reposition a legitimate focus on Transatlantic community, beyond its critical histories, supra-political reality, restrictive policies, and Manichaeian ideology.

Keywords: Transatlantic community, Sociology of International Relations, community, ideology, Transatlanticism, political discourse

1. Preamble

At the end of a seminar in Regional Communities, held within the Transatlantic Studies MA Program at Babeș-Bolyai University, some years ago, one of my students asked why Africa was not regarded as part of the

* Șerban Văetiși is a PhD Lecturer with the Department of International Relations and German Studies, Faculty of European Studies at Babeș-Bolyai University.
Contact: serban.vaetisi@euro.ubbcluj.ro

Transatlantic geopolitical area, and why the focus of those Transatlantic studies was, after all, on North America and Western Europe, while disproportionately neglecting the other Atlantic regions such as Africa, but also South and Central America.

Surely, *Transatlantic* is not a geographical concept; it is a political geographical reality defined (primarily) politically, not (mainly) geographically. It refers to specific historical-political relationships, socio-political ideals and ideologies which can be clearly (re)contextualized within a restrictive series of connections linking only two selected regions on the both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. It implies the idea of a shared set of geopolitical principles and geostrategic and economic interests, expressed at the level of such organizations as NATO (signed in 1949) or the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) proposed agreement, within which such recognized values as democracy, security, freedom, individual rights, free trade are presupposed, and repeatedly invoked in referring to a transcontinental region structured on the North American and Western European pillars¹.

But, in a more profound sense, any interpretation has, nevertheless, to consider (or reconsider) Africa and Latin America as part of the same Transatlantic background, ethos, political economy, set of international relations and legal history. And this reappraisal is a direct suggestion towards reviewing the idea of Atlantic (or Transatlantic) region in a more critical sense². Let's think only about such historical evolutions with

¹ One of the first versions of a 'Trans/Atlantic World' as political-historical concept in this sense was set forth by Walter Lippman in 1917. Surely, its roots can be identified in the historical relations between the British/United Kingdom and North America.

² This was seen, for example, as an 'incongruity' between the politically-ideologically defined *Atlantic community* and the geographically-culturally defined *Atlantic world*. This discordance is not innocent, it is suggested by some authors, since it hides some critical histories of the region: "I want to broaden our transatlantic scope by including Africa. Very briefly, I want to suggest that the 'Atlantic community', a phrase derived from political studies that assumes common interests, needs to be embedded in the 'Atlantic world', which has been explored in cultural studies to evoke a shared history – although shared differently – in transatlantic relations of slavery, colonialism, and imperialism." (David Chidester, "Atlantic Community, Atlantic World: Anti-Americanism between Europe and Africa", in *The Journal of American History*, no. 2(93), 2006, pp. 432-433). This idea is expressed, for example, in the African diasporic, 'alternative' transatlantic community (see Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic. Modernity and Double Consciousness*, Verso, 1993).

enduring impacts as the Transatlantic slave trade and their economic rationale and involvement in the constitution of Western capitalism; or the African American contribution to American civil rights, that shaped the American principles of freedom and democracy, promoted thereafter in the entire world etc. All such examples suggest that the non-Western *African* component of the notion of "Transatlantic" is not only legitimate and, historically speaking, easy to be demonstrated as rightfully integrated within, but also that we cannot talk, in this case, about an immutable, unquestionable, "essential" concept of *Transatlantic*, out of any relativization and criticism.

The Transatlantic region – be it taken in the narrow (but typical) sense of North American-West European transcontinental region, or in the less usual (and critical) acceptance of the entire geohistorical and geopolitical Atlantic region, Africa and Latin America included – is usually referred to as *community*. I think that exploring especially this last, less frequently questioned term, i.e. „community“, one would better understand not only the concept of Atlantic or Transatlantic community, with its critical histories, but also the contours of *a critical sociology of international relations* in/of this transcontinental geopolitical region, and subsequently the critique of its ideology.

2. Towards a socio-anthropological perspective of international communities

Theoretically and methodologically, such social disciplines as sociology and socio-cultural anthropology founded themselves as the research of typical objects of study, among which, community. Let me refer further in this article to this defining aspect of social epistemology as a *reappraisal in the sociology of international relations*, through critically reassessing the notion of *Transatlantic community*. I reasonably consider that only after clarifying the issues of such a community one may properly talk about its sociology.

The first level of this clarification would probably have to address *the scope* of such a sociology. Even if one may accept the rationale of rejecting the micro-geographical and local socio-anthropological perspectives when interpreting *global* politics, it is expected that the social and sociological perspectives on *local* events would always return to inform

(politically, ideologically, methodologically, theoretically, and not lastly conceptually-terminologically) topics of international relations. As Anthony Giddens has already noticed: “while international relations specializes in the study of the ‘outside’ context of states, sociologists have failed to come to terms conceptually with fundamental factors which make the societies they analyze ‘societies’ at all”³, suggesting that the focus on *social local dimension* of international relations is imperative for understanding backgrounds, interests and processes, otherwise very difficult to be formulated as sociological concepts.

A second level of this reassessment would have to address, then, the *historical and chronological dimensions* of ‘international relations’ as historical sociology. As George Lawson noticed, it is indispensable to adopt a historical perspective on international evolutions, if we want to understand “the importance of time and place variation – the idea that development has both temporal and spatial dimensions that need to be both theoretically and empirically problematized.”⁴ In this sense, historical sociology “can add value to the study of International Relations”⁵ having the “capacity to debunk taken-for-granted assumptions about central concepts”⁶.

Finally, a third level of analysis would need to interrogate the concepts themselves, more exactly *what social realities* do ‘Atlantic/transatlantic’ and ‘community’ cover when they are utilized in this expression.

Obviously, I cannot address extensively, within the limits of this article, all these important reevaluative points, but I will thoroughly take into consideration these critical perspectives, while emphasizing mostly this third level of reappraisal, as focusing on the notions of ‘Transatlantic’ and ‘community’.

I started the discussion by questioning the term Transatlantic but let’s take a step further and see what realities are determined by this adjectival concept: area, region, countries, hemisphere (i.e. local-geographical terms), on one hand, and community (i.e. a fundamental

³ Anthony Giddens, *Social Theory and Modern Sociology*, Stanford University Press, 1987, p. 33.

⁴ George Lawson, “The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations”, in *International Studies Review*, no. 8(3), 2006, p. 37.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 38.

socio-anthropological term), on the other hand. Following the abovementioned observations, let's admit, primarily, that we cannot repudiate the *local and historical* perspectives when talking about Transatlantic realities; and then, that our *sociological* perspective, will need to take into consideration more nuanced and complex social-local realities.

Thus, it may be suggested, ultimately, that if we do talk about a Transatlantic *community*, then probably we need to talk about a *sociology* of the Transatlantic community; and subsequently, that this sociology (a sociology of international relations, after all) is/should be inherently *critical*. In the next sections I critically investigate the theoretical and ideological senses of „Transatlantic community“ as relevant expression in scholarly and political major discourses, and then, in the conclusive part, I briefly discuss the current crisis of Transatlantic relations from the perspective of these reconsiderations and the recent political evolutions.

3. 'Transatlantic community' reconsidered

Community is a broad topic in sociology. It “involves a number of different elements: for example, shared values, participation in a shared way of life, identification with the group and mutual recognition”⁷. This participation is typically viewed as occurring within a delimited microgeographical territory, such as a neighborhood or a city, where the sociological group can be identified. The sense of ‘Transatlantic community’ would suggest, thus, either a (i) *metaphorical* sociological reality⁸, since we cannot identify a “shared way of life” at the level of such an immense geographical area, or would refer to something closer to the meaning of a (ii) *cosmopolitan community*, focusing its definition on ‘common values’ shared by distant and heterogeneous groups of people or nations. Gerard Delanty perceives this second meaning as being “produced in the mixing of the local and global, the chief characteristic of which is a form of community that is not limited by space or by time”⁹. Relevantly, then, Delanty sees this community “beyond society”, suggesting somehow

⁷ Andrew Mason, *Community, Solidarity and Belonging: Levels of Community and their Normative Significance*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 19.

⁸ Michael Vlahos, “The Atlantic Community: A Grand Illusion”, in *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, no. 1(38), 1991, pp. 187-201.

⁹ Gerard Delanty, *Community* (2nd ed.), New York: Routledge, 2010, p. 119.

that it shouldn't be treated as a 'classical' subject of sociology, but rather as a topic of a-territorial, non-local, transnational, global reality. The fundamental principle of cohesion that would keep alive such a community would be, then, a 'global consciousness' that "empowers the local, opening it up to new dimensions"¹⁰. In another sense, 'Transatlantic community' is then, probably, closer to the meaning of (iii) *international community*, that would be constituted by elements of cohesion that are ideologically and strategically driven¹¹, by principles of unity that are repeatedly reaffirmed¹², in an *institutional sense*, as norms or rules of a *regional political/economic/military organization* (such, as, typically for this case, NATO).

In a collection of studies edited by Marco Mariano under the title *Defining the Atlantic Community. Culture, Intellectuals, and Policies in the Mid-Twentieth Century*, the editor provides in the Introduction some definitory aspects of the Transatlantic community as academic and political notion: its political and cultural construct, overlapping with "the West"; its „convenient narrative device"; the negative ways (in opposition to the Soviet, or communist world) and the positive ways (around some common grounds, shared by North America and Western Europe) of defining and constructing it; and the "rhetorical device aimed at legitimizing [the] interests and policies" of a geopolitical region conceptualized in the 'naturally' cohesive sense of community¹³.

Relevantly, Mariano notices, in the end, how "[t]he protean character and vague contours of this idea account for both its ubiquity in public discourse and the relative lack of scholarly interest in its definition"¹⁴. With this, it turns out the necessity (a) to ask ourselves whether there exist something like a Transatlantic community that can be defined in sociological sense, and, secondly, (b) to question the premises, utility, limits and perils of a sociology of international relations as sociology of transatlantic community.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 132-133.

¹¹ Otto Hieronymi, Chiara Jasson, "The Foundations of the Expanding Atlantic Community", in *Foresight*, no. 4(6), 2004, pp. 232-236.

¹² Kurt Volker, "Reaffirming Transatlantic Unity", in *Policy Review*, April-May 2012, 109-118.

¹³ Marco Mariano, ed., *Defining the Atlantic Community. Culture, Intellectuals, and Policies in the Mid-Twentieth Century*, Routledge, 2010, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 1.

For that matter let me suggest the following *method*: searching for and typologizing the uses of the notion of 'Transatlantic/Atlantic community' in scholar articles and media-political discourses, since the end of World War Two and, then, focusing on its uses on the past decades, in the idea of investigating their socio-political contexts, references and events for a further qualitative analysis on the meanings involved and realities invoked.

4. Political-ideological constructions

The expression is firstly conceptualized as a theme of concerted analysis in academic journals in early 1960s. The prestigious journal *International Organization* dedicates its volume 17 (number 3 in 1963) to the topic of "The Atlantic Community: Progress and Prospects". The ten articles – collected and edited by Francisc Wilcox, official in the United States Department of State¹⁵ and Henry Field Haviland Jr., foreign policy expert, – clearly let us see how political concepts and strategies mature into discursive and ideological formulas, that eventually end up to describe geopolitical realities:

*"Although the United States has explored many avenues to peace since the Second World War, including the United Nations and various other international organizations, it continues to regard cooperation among the Atlantic states as the core of democratic strength in the world. President Kennedy, in his July 4, 1962, address, called the Atlantic group 'a nucleus for the eventual union of all free men'. Today voices are raised to argue that there is greater need and greater opportunity than ever before to build a stronger 'Atlantic Community', not only as a bulwark against aggression but as an aid to positive development and progress."*¹⁶

In the journal issue, the role played by major Western states implied within (France, Germany, Great Britain, the US), but also the position taken

¹⁵ Francisc Wilcox was chief of staff of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from 1947 to 1951; during these years the Committee contributed to United States' involvement in the creation of NATO and the Marshall Plan.

¹⁶ Francisc Wilcox, Henry Field Haviland Jr., "Foreword", in *International Organization*, no.3 (17), (The Atlantic Community: Progress and Prospects), 1963, p.v.

by neutral and the communist states in relation to the existence and functioning of such a community are analyzed, together with the evaluation of some military, economic, political and legal aspects, viewed in the perspective of such geopolitical processes as integration, partnership or conflict. Overall, the idea of “building a political community”¹⁷ is repeatedly invoked, in a form of a “concert of free nations”¹⁸, “strategic Atlantic alliance”¹⁹ or the preoccupation with the “future of the Atlantic community”²⁰.

Certainly, the political foundational role of the Trans/Atlantic community is echoed in the more recent decades, with the concerns of an era dominated not by Cold War fears anymore, but by terrorist threats and by preoccupations with expanding the influence of this community beyond its original boundaries. In the speech given by the United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on April 23, 1997, titled “The Transatlantic Community: Peaceful, Democratic, and Undivided”, focusing on the goals of the US’s policy and their plan for the enlargement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) it is highlighted that

*“NATO defines a community of interest that both preceded and outlasted the Cold War. That is why the United States, a united Germany, and our other allies decided to preserve the alliance after the Berlin Wall fell”, and that „the fundamental goal of our policy [...] is to build – for the very first time – a peaceful, democratic, and undivided transatlantic community, [and] to extend eastward the peace and prosperity that western Europe has enjoyed for the last 50 years.”*²¹

In the same vein, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Günter Verheugen (between 1999 and 2004) commented that

¹⁷ Henry Field Haviland Jr., “Building a Political Community”, in *International Organization*, pp. 733-752.

¹⁸ J.W. Fulbright, “A Concert of Free Nations”, in *International Organization*, pp. 787-803.

¹⁹ Robert Bowie, “Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance”, in *International Organization*, pp. 709-732.

²⁰ Lauris Norstad, “The Future of the Atlantic Community”, in *International Organization*, pp. 804-812.

²¹ Madeleine Albright, “The Transatlantic Community: Peaceful, Democratic, and Undivided”, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, March-April 1997, Issue 3(8), pp. 1-2.

*"[t]he overall political benefits from an enlarged EU will be enormous. First and foremost, the enlargement process is vital for securing political stability, democracy, and respect of human rights on the European continent as a whole. We are creating a transatlantic community of democratic nations - defending our common values on a global scale"*²²

acknowledging the global significance and impact of a political community constructed with these goals.

George Robertson, the tenth Secretary General of the NATO (between 1999 and 2004), talks, in this sense, about "NATO and the Transatlantic community" as about a "continuous creation":

*"The Atlantic Community that was born in these crucial years after World War Two more than survived the end of the Cold War. It prospers. Its features are firmly entrenched in today's Europe (...) It has been said that two revolutions were necessary to make the Atlantic Community possible. For the United States, one revolution lay in abandoning the tradition of isolationism. For Western Europe, its revolution meant burying the divisions of the past and creating a new association of nations. But completion of this community required a third revolution. This was the 'velvet revolution' in Central and Eastern Europe, which swept away the Cold War dividing lines and which since then has led several countries from Central and Europe into NATO. Extending the Atlantic Community throughout all of Europe, while simultaneously preparing this Community to face new security challenges comprises 'the Second Act' of the Atlantic Community. And although the completion of this project will fall to future generations, it is clear that NATO will play a central role in this Second Act, just as it did in the First. The Alliance remains the cornerstone of the Atlantic Community."*²³

²² Günter Verheugen, "A Bigger EU Will Be Good For America, Too", in *European Affairs*, no. 4(1), 2000.

²³ George (Lord) Robertson, "NATO and the Transatlantic Community: The 'Continuous Creation'", in *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, no. S1(1), 2003, p. 7.

These ideas were already summarized in a joint statement by U. S. President George W. Bush and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder on a 'Transatlantic vision for the 21st century' in 2001:

*"At the beginning of the 21st century, we reaffirm our common commitment to the lasting principles which are at the basis of the Transatlantic community of values - freedom, democracy and human rights. On this basis, we are resolved to strengthen and further develop the partnership between the United States of America and Europe. In the age of globalization we want to give it a new quality. We agree that our cooperation within the Atlantic Alliance continues to be of decisive importance for the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region and that this includes an adequate military presence of the United States in Europe."*²⁴

These references to both officially established organizations illustrating at institutional level the idea of 'Transatlantic community', such as NATO, and the principles driving the political and strategic relations between USA and Europe, as 'community relationships', can be systematized, with their main formulas, as follows:

Figure 1. Political constructions of Transatlantic Community²⁵

year	title/formula	purpose/rationale
1941	<i>Atlantic Charter</i>	defined the Allied goals for the post-war world
1947	<i>European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan)</i>	an American initiative to help rebuild Western European economies after the end of World War II
1949	<i>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)</i>	a system of collective defense whereby its member states agree to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party

²⁴ George Bush, Gerhard Schroeder, "Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder on a Transatlantic Vision for the 21st Century", Office of the White Press Secretary, 29 March 2001.

²⁵ This is a selection of some of the most relevant evolutions or representative formulas in the political-institutional maturation of Transatlantic community (brief informative notes based on encyclopedia entries).

year	title/formula	purpose/rationale
1949-1989	<i>Western World</i> (<i>Cold World</i> <i>context expression</i>)	during the Cold War, the West ('The First World'), was composed of NATO members and other countries aligned with the United States
1961	<i>Atlantic Council</i>	a think tank providing a forum for international political, business, and intellectual leaders, managing programs related to international security and global economic prosperity in the Transatlantic region
1972	<i>German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)</i>	a nonpartisan American public policy think tank and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North America and Europe
1991	<i>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</i>	a post-Cold War NATO institution created to improve relations between NATO and non-NATO countries in Europe and those parts of Asia on the European periphery
1997	<i>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</i>	successor of the <i>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</i>
2007	<i>Transatlantic Economic Council</i>	a council based on an agreement set up between the United States and European Union to direct economic cooperation between the two economies
2007	<i>Atlantic Community</i> (<i>think tank</i>)	a German-American project to apply Internet communicated ideas to Transatlantic foreign policy strategy
pro-posed	<i>Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership</i>	a proposed free trade agreement between the European Union and the United States, with the aim of promoting multilateral economic growth

Even if the references are dominated by NATO, which is evidently the most important catalyst of this community, the other formulas are still invoked and some, although old, are still regarded as having an enduring technical relevance, as in the case of *The Atlantic Charter*, or cultural significance, as in the case of the *Western World*. Nevertheless, as the *discursive content* of the abovementioned statements clearly shows, the strategic and ideological backgrounds of these messages are equally

important in maintaining the community relationships alive and in building further strategies and relations.

The discourse analysis of these statements reveals a set of principles that can be easily summarized, since they are repeatedly mentioned in the majority of political speeches and official positions, expressing the grounds of commitment to and cooperation in (principally) NATO, and, by extension, the Transatlantic community. These messages are either received by general public as ‘strategic’, ‘technical’ speech, or as a discourse that cannot communicate something new beyond the already-established frameworks and terminology. From a political perspective this may generate disinterest (amplifying the already noticed general political apathy in the West) and, as interpretation, it may reveal the artificiality or at least the crisis of a political construction defined as community, that would probably need some references to the social aspects of the presupposed communal values and bonds.

Figure 2. Strategic and ideological principles of the Transatlantic Community²⁶

statement/expression	principle invoked
<i>‘union of all free men’</i> (Wilcox and Haviland, 1963); <i>‘the lasting principles which are at the basis of the Transatlantic community of values – freedom (...)’</i> (Bush and Schroeder, 2001)	freedom
<i>‘bulwark against aggression’</i> (Wilcox and Haviland, 1963); <i>‘to face new security challenges’</i> (Robertson, 2003); <i>importance for the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region</i> (Bush and Schroeder, 2001);	security
<i>‘vital for securing political stability (...)’</i> (Verheugen, 2000)	stability
<i>‘aid to positive development and progress’</i> (Wilcox and Haviland, 1963)	development, economic support
<i>‘to extend eastward the peace and prosperity’; ‘extending the Atlantic Community throughout all of Europe’</i> (Albright, 1997)	expansion

²⁶ These entries summarize ideas from the statements cited above (Wilcox and Haviland, 1963; Albright, 1997; Verheugen, 2000; Bush and Schroeder, 2001; and Robertson, 2003). These principles can be found in many other similar discourses, official statements or positions explaining the rationales and characteristics of Transatlantic community.

statement/expression	principle invoked
<i>'to extend eastward the peace and prosperity', 'a peaceful ... transatlantic community'</i> (Albright, 1997)	peace
<i>'core of democratic strength in the world</i> (Wilcox and Haviland, 1963); <i>'a (...) democratic (...) transatlantic community'</i> (Albright, 1997); <i>'the lasting principles which are at the basis of the Transatlantic community of values – (...) democracy...'</i> (Bush and Schroeder, 2001); <i>'vital for securing (...) democracy (...)'</i> (Verheugen, 2000)	democracy
<i>'vital for securing (...) respect of human rights'</i> (Verheugen, 2000); <i>'the lasting principles which are at the basis of the Transatlantic community of values – (...) human rights'</i> (Bush and Schroeder, 2001)	human rights
<i>'a (...) undivided transatlantic community'</i> (Albright, 1997)	unity
<i>'a new association of nations'</i> (Robertson, 2003); <i>to strengthen and further develop the partnership between the United States of America and Europe</i> (Bush & Schroeder, 2001)	collaboration, partnership

Beyond these political principles and constructions, in recent scholar articles relating to the topic of 'Transatlantic community' one may find some more complex ideas, adopting a more profound perspective on these concepts, integrating critical views, and tending to be more sophisticated, as type of analysis, than the plain political messages.

5. Scholarly critical analyses

Daniel T. Rodgers describes the “North Atlantic economy” “in which similar developments typical of modern industrial societies and the exchange of goods, capital, management, and production techniques provided several common links between the US and Europe”²⁷ as follows: “Late-nineteenth-century Essen, Manchester, Lille and Pittsburgh were not merely similar phenomena, not merely parallel independent developments. They were all part of the furiously expanding world market... What struck those who traversed the industrial regions of the Old and the New Worlds was not their difference but their extraordinary sameness”²⁸. This historical

²⁷ Quoted in Mariano, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

²⁸ Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 44.

reference opens a paradigm of shared or common *social* and *social-economic* characteristics of the Transatlantic community before its political conceptualization and strategic foundation. The 'Atlantic system'²⁹ is expressed in its basic contours in this retrospective social histories of industrialism, capitalism, urbanization, modernization, within which one may recognize the Transatlantic ecumene and ties already in the 19th century.

What is overlooked in this general perspective on the North American-Western European socio-economic region as a system, is its actual social interaction at the level of intrasystemic communities. The Atlantic world is frequently regarded, in this view, as a functional capitalist system (like a century before, when it could be conceived as a functional colonial system or a functional slave trade system), which generated progress and prosperity at the level of nations and states, but neglecting the actual social lives of those who contributed to the functioning of these systems. Nevertheless, these neglected actors are the historical, *basic* Transatlantic communities: mostly European immigrants to North America (but also Africans to both Americas) which were gradually overshadowed, as the perspective deliberately shifted from social problems to economic and political success, and from social diversity of the Transatlantic world to the homogeneous principles of Transatlantic suprapolitical community.

In this sense, in the same collective book, David Ellwood "situates the conceptualization of the Atlantic community within the context of American geopolitical *grand narratives* and compares its effectiveness with that of the Marshall Plan as a vehicle of US 'soft power' in Europe throughout the postwar years"³⁰. This is only a continuation of other grand narratives that dominated the American history and the American political mindset, suggests Ellwood: from *Manifest Destiny* to George W. Bush's post-September 11 denunciation of the "axis of evil"³¹. This interpretation is relevant, since it evokes, primarily, how American foreign relations developed strategies of continuing expansion, influence and preeminence

²⁹ Hans-Jürgen Puhle, "Trajectories of Western Modernization Around the Atlantic," in Horst Pietschmann, ed., *Atlantic History: History of the Atlantic System 1580–1830*, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002, pp. 545-556.

³⁰ Mariano, *op. cit.*, p. 8, italics mine.

³¹ David Ellwood, "What Winning Stories Teach: The Marshall Plan and Atlanticism as Enduring Narratives", in Mariano, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-112.

at the global level (which, over the entire twentieth century also implied the role played by popular culture), and, secondly, how the magnificence in scale and importance of these international and global involvements overshadowed the local national problems at the level of society and communities, conferring them secondary significance in comparison with the 'all important' 'global' 'Transatlantic' community, rhetorically presented as an American success.

This critical evaluation is appropriately mastered in Ronald Steel's contribution "How Europe Became Atlantic. Walter Lippmann and the New Geography of the Atlantic Community" to Mariano's collection. Reviewing what Lippmann had defined in 1917 as the "Atlantic world", Steel points out "the very vagueness of the concept – an artificial 'community' divided by thousands of miles; split into a congeries of different tongues, customs, and identities; and stitched together over decades of changing political and military circumstances"³². "For its advocates", continues Steel, "'community' is the description of a common civilization with ancient roots, loyalties, traditions, tongues, and faiths – an entity both natural and inevitable. For its critics, however, the concept is largely rhetoric: a mask for American hegemony over Europe and a cold war cliché that conceals political realities. The concept, however it is approached, is one based not only on ideas and cultures, but also on power and interests"³³. Ronald Steel further accuses the incongruent abundance of discursive elements called in its ideological construction, as hegemonic unit, that somehow attempted to compensate the abovementioned vagueness of its socio-political reality: "the 'Atlantic world' became the amorphous, multiethnic, multicultural, territorially unlimited Free World. Although this concept was geographically delineated, it was defined in cultural-ideological terms that ignored traditional boundaries and blurred its political identity. During the Cold War, the self-defined and geographically flexible Free World ultimately became the American imperial terrain following the demise of Europe as a major global actor"³⁴.

³² Ronald Steel, "How Europe Became Atlantic: Walter Lippmann and the New Geography of the Atlantic Community", in Mariano, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

³³ *Ibidem*.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

In an article written back in 1991 Michael Vlahos emphasized and argued the notion of Transatlantic community as a grand illusion. In the logic of deconstructing American grand narratives, illustrated by Ellwood above, Vlahos puts forward the argument of “two separate culture areas”, North America and Europe that cannot constitute themselves an actual community. The political intentions are not enough, subsequently suggests Vlahos, for setting up a transcontinental union defined as community. There was needed another element for staging a technical relationship as fraternal community, and this was the *common* enemy or threat: “The Atlantic Community as myth drew its power from three premises: United States leadership, the Soviet threat, and mutuality of European and American interests. It has been argued here that a fourth premise – cultural fraternity – was inspired propaganda, a way of weaving the three core assumptions into a single popular image that was, essentially, politically inarguable. That embracing image of cultural fraternity has been hard put to persevere without the Soviet threat. Ultimately, the Manichaeic Soviet premise inspired the assumption both of inevitable United States leadership and of an indivisible transatlantic ‘interest’.”³⁵ Interestingly, this interpretation was confirmed by the political evolutions after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, when the Soviet enemy was discursively replaced by the terrorist threat.

The tragical events offered new impetus for not only involving in political-military typical actions, but also for reaffirming the belonging to the same community, as socio-metaphorical expression of a set of values or principles among which peace, freedom, democracy and stability. In the following fragment, one may replace ‘Soviet’ with ‘terrorist’ without changing essentially too much: “The Soviet threat, however, created a sense of even deeper, submagma fusing of European and American interests. The Soviet threat, and its barbarian mask shaped from European ideas, gave force to the belief that the preservation of civilization itself was America's fundamental mutual interest. From this premise it was but a step to the erection above ground of a great, colorful proscenium of cultural fraternity. This transformed the urgent need of the historical moment (which, after all,

³⁵ Vlahos, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

lasted forty years) into an instant legacy of shared values, habits, and goals.”³⁶

For that matter many authors, over the last decades, asked themselves whether the Transatlantic community shouldn't had been conceptualized as a community of interests rather than a community of values. The first issue of March 2010 of the renowned scholarly periodical *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* collects several articles emerging from a series of international conferences dedicated to this subject. Barbara Zanchetta, in the summarizing Introduction to the journal issue asks directly this question, while indicating even a potential conflict behind a relationship otherwise internationally presented as collaborative and fraternal: “are the United States and Europe inherently related and linked by a stable and enduring sense of community, or is there, notwithstanding their close historical and cultural ties, an inevitable conflict between the interests of these two important poles of the international system?”³⁷ Her conclusion, nevertheless, acknowledges an inevitably enduring relationship, while suggesting a relativization of the very notions of conflict and community: “But, if the Transatlantic relationship is founded more on values and shared principles than on contingent interests, then the Old and New Worlds will remain intrinsically linked to each other. Conflict and community may, therefore, simply be different faces of the same coin”³⁸.

All these critical reevaluations of ‘Transatlantic community’ are synthesized in the next table.

Figure 3. Scholarly critical analyses of Transatlantic Community³⁹

critical idea on Transatlantic community	interpretation: Transatlantic community playing a role in, or influencing...
expanding world market	capitalist expansion
form of soft power	geopolitical grand narratives

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ Barbara Zanchetta, „Introduction: Community of Values or Conflict of Interests? Transatlantic Relations in Perspective”, in *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, no. 1(8), 2010, p. 1.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 4

³⁹ These entries summarize ideas from analyses cited above (Vlahos, 1991; Ellwood, 1998; Rodgers, 1998; Steel, 1998; Puhle, 2002; Zanchetta, 2010). These interpretations can be found in many other similar analyses, over the last decades.

critical idea on Transatlantic community	<i>interpretation: Transatlantic community playing a role in, or influencing...</i>
vagueness of the concept	American hegemony
artificial community	continuing some Cold War clichés
amorphous, multiethnic, multicultural territory	ignoring traditional boundaries; blurring political identities
demise of Europe as a major global actor	the American imperial terrain
Transatlantic community as myth	the very semantism of 'community'
a community built despite incompatible cultural backgrounds	the political interests behind a relationship presented as fraternal community
an oppositional community built against some enemies or threats	the presentation of external threats as menaces to the pre-defined community's principles play an important cohesive role, in the absence of actual forms of community cohesion
the civilization itself	the arguments for political and military interventions in the name of preserving the civilization
community of values or community of interests	in presenting the (national, political) interests as emerging from common (international, supra-political) values
community hiding an inherent or potential conflict	in emphasizing the collaborative, fraternal aspects of community over the conflictual nature of some relations of community members
community and conflict – different faces of the same coin	in maintaining an ambiguous relations between what bonds and what separates, and an ambiguous position on conflict, which manipulates the sense of community

Each of these critical aspects, indicated by various theorists, can be further analyzed in terms of their social-historical reality. And this is necessary, because the same Transatlantic community and its geopolitical model (the West), as center of 'capitalist expansion', can be seen as center of slavery, colonialism, exploitation, and injustice. And furthermore, because 'exploitation' or 'injustice' are, unfortunately, not limited to 'historical times', but are practices that continued in the postcolonial periphery of the

West or in the lower-class neighborhoods of the Western cities throughout the whole 20th century.

Similarly, and taking now another entry of the table above, what can be viewed as 'blurring political identities' is an aspect that long time constituted an impediment for former slaves, immigrant minorities or subaltern groups to forge an identity with political relevance, beyond the national state or other hegemonic systems (of class, race or gender). Since in the midst of a multicultural society, as the American society is, officially driven by multiculturalist ideologies and affirmative action policies, racial minorities still struggle for equal rights, respect and honest recognition of slavery and segregation⁴⁰, then we have to ask ourselves whether the whole suprapolitical reality can be so easily conceptualized as community... And this is not only about the ongoing discrimination of minorities or the still vivid legacy of slavery and colonialism in the US and Western Europe, but also about the way in which new ideas or new members (such as alternative economic or social systems, alternative political forces or recent immigrants) are restricted or rejected their possible contribution or participation to this community of values and citizens⁴¹.

In the vein of this kind of critical analysis, the notions and interpretations summarized in the last table may further constitute the conceptual terminology for developing a direct criticism to not only the construction of 'Transatlantic community' (i.e. as deconstruction), but also to its evolution and recent crises (i.e. as changing viewpoints on a concept that can be reconceptualized from a renewed sociological perspective).

⁴⁰ It was noticed that racial hatred, violence in big cities, police brutality and gun massacres driven by hostility against minority groups has increased in America over the past years (see, for example, Henry A. Giroux, *America at War with Itself*, City Lights Publishers, 2016) and has escalated in the context of the nationalist and xenophobic messages delivered during the presidential campaign and after the election of the new American president.

⁴¹ The Syrian crisis demonstrated how exclusivist is the idea of 'European values', since the majority of European states and Europeans manifested hostility against receiving refugees.

6. *Addendum* after Brexit and the election of Donald Trump: Transatlanticism and globalization (including some new sociological perspectives)

The ideology behind the construction and affirmation of Transatlantic Community (which can be labeled, for simplification, Transatlanticism) is not a simple one, and is not unquestionable, for sure, as we have already seen. It is composed by a corpus of multi-layered discourses and political-historical evolutions spanning more than one century, and impacting the entire world and international politics. I attempted to cover the relevant political statements and the critical reconsiderations that addressed the evolution of Transatlantic community as (purported) ideological construct and (more often, unquestioned and misunderstood) sociological reality. Beyond any criticism, which, as I attempted to suggest, ranges from exclusivism to expansionism, passing through centuries of social discrimination and economic exploitation (despite the affirmative geopolitical values stated in the contemporary official discourses about 'democracy', 'freedom', 'fraternity' or 'peace'), the limits of this ideology can be probably, better perceived in the context of post-Cold War globalization.

Globalization was one of the major frameworks and, to some extent, goals, which shaped the evolution of Transatlantic community over the past decades. In fact, the transatlantic economic area was the main agent (and, in retrospective, main beneficiary) of globalization. Nevertheless the political and cultural elites, the national security agencies and economic companies in the West realized recently that, in some way, globalization "has gone too far"⁴². This was a moment when a new generation of politicians opposed globalization, after decades of praise in favor of it, and a new electorate began asking more and more seriously about the benefits that globalization bring for them, as individuals, families and communities.

⁴² Dani Rodrik, *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?*, Institutue for International Economics, 1997. This idea is not only about the economic and social aspects of globalization (as in Rodrik's focus), but also, as a range of various analyses indicated since, about security concerns, immigration issues, the crisis of global institutions, the emergence of non-Western/alternative economies and financial bodies, and the enduring local insurgent communities that resist globalization and the paths that the West configured for it.

In this context, USA voted for Donald Trump and UK decided to leave EU, and these elections were immediately regarded as symptoms of national and international crises. In both countries, these popular decisions also exposed the generalized indifference to (and some explicit reactions against) international alliances and supranational organizations, the idea of 'Transatlantic community' included.

Surely, European Union and the United States began a process of detachment some years before the election of Donald Trump and the Britons' decision to exit from the EU⁴³. In fact, concerns (and analyses) about US's military and economic disengagement from Europe were expressed already during the Obama presidency and before the Brexit referendum⁴⁴. Thus, these two symbolic moments (Brexit and the election of Donald Trump) can be regarded as symptoms of a diagnosis which can be, largely, characterized as a process already occurring at the level of both political elites' and general public's awareness, and that can be described with such terms as: mistrust, apathy, or negative perception of an international collaboration seen too bureaucratic, or technical, or strategic, or artificial etc., i.e. not really evolving from or impacting the real life of citizens.

This last idea is relevant in the context of this analysis, since this public reaction is also one of the major form of resistance against and criticism brought to globalization. But let's do not confuse between the two, because globalization was never described as community in political sense, but the Transatlantic area was. And this is, as I suggest in this article, one of its major critical aspect.

A recent 'turning point' in Transatlantic relations was occasioned by two major political events occurring in May 2017: the NATO summit in Brussels and the G-7 meeting in Italy. Both events gave opportunity to

⁴³ For example, TTIP was suspended in 2016 (partially due to public reactions), before the American presidential elections.

⁴⁴ See for example: "U.S. Disengagement from Europe Would Be a Major Setback", written by (that time) German president Joachim Gauck for *Washington Post* (October 6, 2015). As for Brexit, it can be seen not only as a one state withdrawal from the EU, but also as an expression of lack of interest of an important 'member of community' for common organization. This propension toward 'autonomy' may be recently noticed in the case of EU and other individual European states, in relation with NATO but also with other American and even EU partnerships.

media, general public and political leaders to find more exactly and know better the new American president's position on a series of topics on which he was mostly ambiguous or controversial before. With these occasions, European leaders, more notably Angela Merkel, reacted in ways that, according to many analysts, confirmed the cooling of relations between Europe and the US that were revealed during Donald Trump's presidential campaign. At the end of the G-7 summit, *New York Times* summarized this rupture as follows: "Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, Europe's most influential leader, has concluded, after three days of trans-Atlantic meetings, that the United States of President Trump is not the reliable partner her country and the Continent have automatically depended on in the past. Clearly disappointed with Mr. Trump's positions on NATO, Russia, climate change and trade, Ms. Merkel said in Munich on Sunday that traditional alliances were no longer as steadfast as they once were and that Europe should pay more attention to its own interests 'and really take our fate into our own hands'."⁴⁵ In the same press article the American newspaper connects this Transatlantic crisis to Brexit, by noticing: "Ms. Merkel, also spoke of Britain's decision to leave the European Union, which means the bloc will lose its second-largest economy and one of its two nuclear powers. Britain's departure will also weaken trans-Atlantic ties and leave the Continent more exposed than before"⁴⁶. This kind of media commentaries dominated the international news over the past year and expressed a political crisis which epitomized longer and more profound *social* crises, in both Europe and America (from the effects of austerity measures to racial riots, and from immigrant issues to the rise of nationalism), which couldn't be addressed by the simple and triumphant notions of military collaboration or community.

In this sense, analysts noticed that the controversy regarding the future of NATO and European Defense⁴⁷ is not the only problematic aspect, but the other issues should also constitute equally important problems to

⁴⁵ Alison Smale, Steven Erlanger, "Merkel, After Discordant G-7 Meeting, Is Looking Past Trump", in *New York Times*, May 28, 2017, [https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/28/world/europe/angela-merkel-trump-alliances-g7-leaders.html?_r=1], accessed September 2017.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁷ European Commission, Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence, June 7, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-defence_en.pdf].

be approached and attempted to be solved. As one analysis written on the Transatlantic relations after Brexit concludes: "in order to reinvigorate the Western Alliance, it is essential for the US and the EU to find new ways of enhancing their collaboration on *all* issues"⁴⁸, social issues included. In this context, Transatlanticism in the 21st century would most likely redefine itself towards reconsidering its societal background, recognizing thus that what is labeled 'Western principles' or 'cooperation', or what is instrumentalized as a desire to 'help' others and 'implement' good values and practices abroad (i.e. common notions of Western foreign affairs and NATO ideology) has to return to its social reality (i.e. to something which is built, at least to an equal extent, on social bases, as it is on military-strategic ones). In other words, the crisis of Transatlanticism is probably equally due to political events, decisions or evolutions in Europe and America, as it is due to a crisis of its very social reality and evolution, which is complex and increasingly shaped by global (i.e. not only Western) connections and influences. Therefore, I wouldn't equate the *crisis* of Transatlanticism with the *crisis* of globalization, either. As I implied in the article, the global developments and tendencies, on the contrary, may help a geopolitical project reposition itself towards capturing suggestions arriving from below (i.e. reactions of actual communities living within the geopolitical territory⁴⁹) and from abroad (i.e. non-Western socio-political models that may help understand better the functioning and survival of such a suprapolitical community).

In this sense I conclude by suggesting the critical role that a renewed social/sociological perspective on 'Transatlantic community' may have, beyond the limitations, exclusions and misunderstandings on which it was constructed before. With this new approach, both political leaders and general public would more likely understand better why and how, for example, the condition of immigrants or urban minorities, the Muslim or Latino cultures, or the criticism of neoliberal or expansionist policies may

⁴⁸ Arnault Barichella, "Transatlantic Relations after Brexit", in *European Issues*, no. 409, October 31, 2016, [<https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0409-transatlantic-relations-after-brexit>], italics mine, accessed September 2017.

⁴⁹ For this demonstration, see my article "Global Development and Local Communities: Toward a Post-Developmental Paradigm of Transatlantic Studies", in *Modelling the New Europe*, vol. 11, 2014, pp. 138-157.

contribute to a renewal of something that can still be called 'Transatlantic community'.

From a theoretical point of view (and returning now to our initial observation about the deliberate rejection of African and Latin American participation to the 'Transatlantic ethos'), the contribution of non-Western scholars and paradigms may be equally relevant. The critical suggestions put forward by Latin American or African authors, who conceptualized differently the historical evolution, socio-political history and political epistemology of the Transatlantic area, assuming non-Western and non-hegemonic perspectives of alterity, postcoloniality, postslavery and minority identity etc., have to be revalued (and not only for the sake of multiculturalism)⁵⁰. These fresh perspectives not only may reanimate the discussion about and re-question the political reality and effectiveness of 'Transatlantic community', but also can refocus the social reality of what rather emphatically was named 'community'.

One basic suggestion of these writings is that the critical historical legacies and moral problems of the relationship between the hegemonic West and the rest of the world are increasingly more visible and problematic. And one basic lesson is that we cannot talk about these problems without inquiring the real people who were caught in and recreate the political relations and projects. We can understand now that any approach of the crisis should probably return to the historical and social reality, meaning the social basis, the social structures and the social relations on which the West did and does function. And this is sociology (in a broader sense: critical history, political economy and cultural anthropology included). Even if not strictly a sociology of international relations, for sure, but a sociology (which is possible and necessary) of *real communities* (i.e. not 'artificial', as the Transatlantic community is increasingly more often perceived by both political and intellectual leaders and average citizens), with their actual problems. A sociology that may contribute to better understanding not only unexpected political evolutions

⁵⁰ These studies proposed and imposed new critical terminology including such notions as subalternity, decoloniality, postdevelopment, afrodiasporic imagination, pluritopic hermeneutics or epistemic disobedience, in writings by such authors as Gayatri Spivak, Paul Gilroy, Arturo Escobar, Walter D. Mignolo or Sylvia Marcos.

and contemporary crises, but also to approach more suitably what is still called 'Transatlantic community'.

Even if the crisis of Transatlantic community was already largely documented and researched⁵¹, the common current position regarding the crisis is seemingly still dominated by uncertainty and hesitation. There are still voices who deny any crisis, and others who only start to recognize it; then, there are voices who still believe that things would return somehow, untroubled into their old shapes, and voices who continue to talk about Transatlantic community with the triumphant words of the 1990s.

Apart from these general considerations, with the help of these last authors, both Western and non-Western, I would lastly return to what I argued throughout the article: the crisis of the transatlantic community may be insightfully revealed and understood (in the idea of its future reconsideration and salvation) through its discursive circulation and insistence on *community* in the case of a suprapolitical organization (with a military-strategic core), which has very *little connections and actual references to society*, to how people live and how they can be part of something too generously called 'community'. The electoral preference for populist, nationalist and isolationist politics can be seen as a reaction to this missed political project, that can be more suitably reconsidered, I ultimately point out, by insisting more on a micro-political sociological (not international supra-political) perspective, as already some postcolonial authors and social researchers suggested.

Bibliography

1. Albright, Madeleine (1997), "The Transatlantic Community: Peaceful, Democratic, and Undivided", U.S. Department of State Dispatch, March-April 1997, no. 3(8), 1-2.

⁵¹ Works preoccupied by this crisis and the rupture between North America and Western Europe began to be published a decade ago (i.e. after the financial crisis and the implementation of austerity measures, and the reconfiguration of security concerns as reaction to the continuous terrorist threats). See for example, Sven Steinmo, Jeffrey Kopstein, eds., *Growing Apart?: America and Europe in the 21st Century*, Cambridge University Press, 2007; Jeffrey J. Anderson, G. John Ikenberry, Thomas Risse, eds. *The End of the West?: Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order*, Cornell University Press, 2008, or, more recently, Serena Simoni, *Understanding Transatlantic Relations: Whither the West?*, Routledge, 2015.

2. Anderson, Jeffrey J.; Ikenberry, G. John; Risse, Thomas, eds. (2008), *The End of the West?: Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order*, Cornell University Press.
3. Barichella, Arnault (2016), "Transatlantic Relations after Brexit", in *European Issues*, no. 409, October 31, [<https://www.robertschuman.eu/en/european-issues/0409-transatlantic-relations-after-brexit>].
4. Bowie, Robert R. (1963), "Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance", in *International Organization*, no. 3 (17), 709-732.
5. Bush, George; Schroeder, Gerhard (2001), "Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder on a Transatlantic Vision for the 21st Century", Office of the White Press Secretary, 29 March 2001.
6. Chidester, David (2006), "Atlantic Community, Atlantic World: Anti-Americanism between Europe and Africa", in *The Journal of American History*, no. 2(93), 432-436.
7. Delanty, Gerard (2010), *Community*, Routledge.
8. Ellwood, David (2010), "What Winning Stories Teach: The Marshall Plan and Atlanticism as Enduring Narratives", in Marco Mariano, ed., *Defining the Atlantic Community*, Routledge, 111-131.
9. European Commission (2017), Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence, June 7, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-defence_en.pdf].
10. Fulbright, J.W. (1963), "A Concert of Free Nations", *International Organization*, no. 3 (17), 787-803.
11. Gauck, Joachim (2015), "U.S. Disengagement from Europe Would Be a Major Setback", *Washington Post*, October 6, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/germanys-president-us-disengagement-from-europe-would-be-a-major-setback/2015/10/06/9c61ba0c-6c42-11e5-b31c-d80d62b53e28_story.html?utm_term=.11d2b1397e51].
12. Giddens, Anthony (1987), *Social Theory and Modern Sociology*, Stanford University Press.
13. Gilroy, Paul (1993), *The Black Atlantic. Modernity and Double Consciousness*, Verso.

14. Giroux, Henry A. (2016), *America at War with Itself*, City Lights Publishers.
15. Haviland Jr., Henry Field (1963), "Building a Political Community", in *International Organization*, no. 3 (17), 733-752.
16. Hieronymi, Otto; Jasson, Chiara (2004), "The Foundations of the Expanding Atlantic Community", in *Foresight*, no. 4(6), 232-236.
17. Lawson, George (2006), "The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations", in *International Studies Review*, no. 8(3), 397-423.
18. Mariano, Marco, ed. (2010), *Defining the Atlantic Community. Culture, Intellectuals, and Policies in the Mid-Twentieth Century*, Routledge.
19. Mason, Andrew (2003), *Community, Solidarity and Belonging: Levels of Community and their Normative Significance*, Cambridge Univ. Press.
20. Norstad, Lauris (1963), "The Future of the Atlantic Community", in *International Organization*, no. 3 (17), 804-812.
21. Puhle, Hans-Jürgen (2002), "Trajectories of Western Modernization Around the Atlantic", in Horst Pietschmann, ed., *Atlantic History: History of the Atlantic System 1580-1830*, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 545-556.
22. Robertson, George (Lord) (2003), "NATO and the Transatlantic Community: The 'Continuous Creation'", in *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, no. 1(1), 1-7.
23. Rodgers, Daniel T. (1998), *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
24. Rodrik, Dani (1997), *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?*, Institutue for International Economics.
25. Simoni, Serena (2015), *Understanding Transatlantic Relations: Whither the West?*, Routledge.
26. Smale, Alison; Erlanger, Steven (2017), "Merkel, After Discordant G-7 Meeting, Is Looking Past Trump", in *New York Times*, May 28, [https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/28/world/europe/angela-merkel-trump-alliances-g7-leaders.html?_r=1].
27. Steel, Ronald (2010), "How Europe Became Atlantic: Walter Lippmann and the New Geography of the Atlantic Community", in Marco Mariano, ed., *Defining the Atlantic Community*, Routledge, 13-27.

28. Steinmo, Sven; Kopstein, Jeffrey eds. (2007), *Growing Apart?: America and Europe in the 21st Century*, Cambridge University Press.
29. Văetiși, Șerban (2014), "Global Development and Local Communities: Toward a Post-Developmental Paradigm of Transatlantic Studies", in *Modelling the New Europe*, vol. 11, 138-157.
30. Verheugen, Günter (2000), "A Bigger EU Will Be Good For America, Too", *European Affairs*, no. 4(1), n.p.
31. Vlahos, Michael (1991), "The Atlantic Community: A Grand Illusion", in *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, no. 1(38), 187-201.
32. Volker, Kurt (2012), "Reaffirming Transatlantic Unity", in *Policy Review*, April-May 2012, 109-118.
33. Wilcox, Francisc; Haviland Jr., Henry Field (1963), "Foreword", in *International Organization*, no. 3 (17), v-vi.
34. Zanchetta, Barbara (2010), „Introduction: Community of Values or Conflict of Interests? Transatlantic Relations in Perspective”, in *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, no. 1(8), 1-5.

THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER BREXIT

Martin Dahl*, Yelyzaveta Skomorokhova**

DOI: 10.24193/subbeuropaea.2017.3.12

Published Online: 2017-09-30

Published Print: 2017-09-30

Abstract

This article is an analysis of the consequences of Britain's withdrawal from the European Union. The outcome of the referendum held in the UK in 2016 will bring about significant changes to the European Union and to the relations between states. This article reviews how Brexit will affect the balance between the countries that will remain in the European Union. The study consists of six parts. It starts with the introduction. Subsequently, it presents a category of balance of power as the foundation for the functioning of the European Union, the role of UK in European Union, the reasons for referendum in 2016 and shows the consequences of Brexit for European countries. The study ends with the summary of the most important conclusions.

Keywords: Referendum in UK, Brexit, Balance of Power, European Integration

Introduction

The referendum campaign in the United Kingdom, which launched the procedure for its exit from the European Union, was an unprecedented event. Following the historic East Enlargement of the European Union in 2004, thanks to which the countries of the former Socialist countries became part of the European family of nations, it seemed that the liberal approach in international relations based on values would be the driving force

* Dr. Martin Dahl is an Assistant Professor at the Lazarski University in Warsaw, Faculty of Economics and Management, Department of International Relations.

Contact: m.dahl@lazarski.edu.pl

** Yelyzaveta Skomorokhova is a MA student in International Relations at the Lazarski University in Warsaw, Faculty of Economics and Management

Contact: el.skomorokhova@gmail.com

behind the process of European Integration. However, the events that took place at the end of the first decade of the 21st century have quickly revised this approach. Challenged by numerous of issues and crises, the European Union member states have increasingly begun to focus on its own interests, pushing European solidarity to the background. Excessive debt and the risk of bankruptcy of such countries as Greece, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus and Ireland have led to the biggest crisis in the European Union since its inception¹. Many factors and facts suggest that Europe is going to lose its importance internationally, while the Asia-Pacific region is turning to the center of current international relations². The changes also apply to the relations within the European Union itself. The growing number of problems is increasing nationalist and isolationist tendencies in Europe, which was reflected in the outcome of the UK referendum. In addition, the debt crisis in Southern Europe has, on the one hand, underscored the weakness of their economies and the lack of competitiveness in the global market, on the other hand, has strengthened the position of the Federal Republic of Germany as a political and economic leader in Europe³. In addition, the immigration crisis of 2015 has highlighted the divisions in Western Europe and Eastern Europe. The scale of existing challenges and problems often pushes individual European Union states into self-contained solutions, but the paradox of the situation is that only a united Europe can meet the challenges that emerged at the beginning of the 21st century. Politicians in Europe are looking for effective solutions to emerging problems, but their final shape is currently difficult to predict.

At present, the key challenges for the EU Member States are the negotiations with Great Britain and the development of a new balance of power between the Member States. The UK's exit from the European Union will consolidate Germany's position in Europe, but on the other side it will increase the fears of German dominance in Europe. Within European Union Great Britain was a natural counterweight to German power. Also

¹ Martin Dahl, *Niemiecki model społecznej gospodarki rynkowej jako wzór dla polskich przemian systemowych po 1989 roku*, Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, 2015, pp. 252-253.

² Agata Ziętek, "Region Azji i Pacyfiku", in Marek Pietraś (ed.), *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 2007, p. 259.

³ Krzysztof Garczewski, "Niemcy w stosunkach międzynarodowych na tle kryzysu gospodarczego w Unii Europejskiej", in Marian Guzek (ed.), *Ekonomia i polityka w kryzysie. Kierunki zmian w teoriach*, Warszawa: Uczelnia Łazarskiego i ISPPAN, 2012, pp. 333-343.

for Germany to leave the European Union by the United Kingdom is not a favorable situation. Great Britain is a major outlet for German goods and the UK government in the European Union has been Germany's ally in liberalizing numerous laws or cutting back on expensive European agricultural policy. All these factors cause that after Brexit the European Union will become another organization, while the Member States will be forced to develop new relations with the United Kingdom and one another. This article is an evaluation of consequences and an attempt to analyze the balance of power in the European Union after Brexit.

The balance of power as the Foundation for the functioning of the European Union

European integration should be understood as a set of processes and phenomena aimed at creating a community based on similar cultural heritage and economic, political and social cooperation.⁴ The characteristic feature of European integration is that it began with economic integration in only one field of the economy⁵, and then extended to other areas of the economy and to the political and social sphere. Primarily, The European Union is an economic community but also a political, social, legal and cultural one. The balance of power plays a key role in the relationship between the states, which should be understood as a constant pursuit of consensus and the search for a compromise between the various countries of the European Union.

The concept of balance of power is quite commonly used in research of international relations. The earliest mention of this term has already occurred in the early seventeenth century. Initially, the category of balance of power was primarily concerned with measuring military power and was a mean of guaranteeing peace in Europe. The pursuit of a peaceful balancing of potentials between states was manifested in the policy of alliances, the rise of the importance of diplomacy, and the appointment of

⁴ Józef M. Fiszer, *Unia Europejska a Polska – dziś i jutro*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 1994, p. 22.

⁵ Ewa Latoszek, *Integracja europejska. Mechanizmy i wyzwania*, Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 2007, p. 63.

institutions regulating disputes⁶. Over the years, the concept of equilibrium has evolved towards a model that also includes variables such as wealth, natural resources, commercial potential, decision center interests, and national aspirations⁷.

Today, the balance of power in international relations is analyzed primarily in the context of the category of international system. From this perspective, its aim is to maintain and safeguard the stability of all processes in international politics. In the opinion of Thomas Pawłuszko, there is no universal concept of balance of power in the science of international relations. In practice, this means that for the purposes of this analysis, we can assume that the balance of power is a state of relations between states in which there is a relative ordering of potentials (military, political or economic one). This should provide states with a non-conflicting implementation of their own political interests. However, it should be borne in mind that this balance doesn't ensure equality of status for all actors⁸.

The position of a certain country in the European Union is determined by its ability to exert effective, and therefore also in accordance with its interests, influence on European Union policies, and its ability to influence the decision-making process⁹. The traditional determinants of a country's ability to influence other countries in the European Union include: country size, demographic potential, quality of human capital, economic and military power, and geopolitical situation¹⁰. The key to realizing one's own interests is active participation in decision-making institutions, including openness to opponents' arguments, ability to work out consensus and conclude coalitions¹¹. However, it should be

⁶ William C. Wohlforth, Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney, William L. Brenner, "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History", in *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.13, Issue 2, 2007, pp. 155-185.

⁷ Tomasz Pawłuszko, *Równowaga sił jako kategoria analityczna w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, available at [www.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.pl], accessed May 2017.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ Mikołaj Dowgielewicz, "Pozycja Polski w Unii Europejskiej po wejściu w życie Traktatu z Lizbony", in *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, nr 2(LXIII), 2010, p. 7.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

¹¹ Józef M. Fiszer, "Polityczne i społeczno-ekonomiczne aspekty wprowadzenia euro w Polsce", in *Studia Polityczne*, no. 24, 2009, p. 126.

remembered that the position of a given European Union country is not a fixed category, but dynamic, changing in time under the influence of political, economic and social processes¹².

The balance of interests in the European Union is guaranteed by the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009. Treaty provisions introduce an institutional balance, understood on the one hand as a classic tribunal of power - the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, and, on the other, the balancing of transnational and state interests within the European Union. The activities of the EU institutions should be characterized by the harmonious implementation of the principles of democracy, economic efficiency and justice as adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon. This was due to the growing problem of democratic deficit in the European Union, a reluctance to strengthen the position of the European Commission, and an ambivalent attitude towards the judicial activity of the EU Court of Justice¹³.

More than eight years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, it can be said that the provisions contained therein did not protect the European Union from the threat of differences in national interests and the disparities resulting from their potential. It clearly shows such events as the debt crisis of euro zone countries or the immigration crisis after 2015¹⁴. The difficulties faced by the European Union, for many populists and extremists, have been a convenient pretext to raise objections, whether it is about the hegemonic tendencies, as in Germany, or the lack of solidarity, in relation to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Falsely drawn conclusions and inadequate assessment of the problems encountered by the European Union in the second decade of the 21st century have led to a delicate balance between the states provoking at the same time isolationist tendencies. This in turn led to a referendum campaign in Britain, the

¹² Jan Borkowski, "Nowe cele i zadania polskiej polityki integracyjnej po przystąpieniu do Unii Europejskiej", in J.M. Fiszer (ed.), *Polska polityka integracyjna po przystąpieniu do Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa: ISPPAN, 2006, p. 145.

¹³ Dominique Ritleng (ed.), *Independence and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

¹⁴ Martin Dahl, "The European Immigration Crisis and Its Consequences for the Federal Republic of Germany: Political, Social and Economic Aspects", in *Studia Polityczne*, no. 4/44, 2016, pp. 241-262.

radicalization of the attitudes of numerous political circles, and the drift of some Eastern European states towards authoritarian regimes.

The Role of United Kingdom in the European Union

The European Union, which till Brexit consisted of 28 full member states, has always promoted the equality and unique importance of each of the participant. However, has it always been done on practice?

Despite the fact that Britain is quite isolated from other countries on the continent due to its geographical location, the United Kingdom was always one of the most important players not only in the European Union, but in the whole world in general. The sixth largest economy in the world; the fifth largest military power in the world; the second largest net contributor to the European Union's budget. The United Kingdom's population was as 12,8% percent of the whole population of the European Union (for 2015), and it had 73 seats in European Parliament, which is one of the largest indicators among all countries in the European Union.

Historically, from the very beginning of the seventeenth century, the United Kingdom was only growing and expanding all over the world. With time, Britain had colonies on each continent and in each ocean. Such a political and military power of country undoubtedly shaped the attitude of the British politicians and its citizens towards the position of Britain in the world politics. As a result, Britain put a considerable amount of efforts towards reaching the high level of importance within the European Union along with such countries as France, Germany and Italy after the decline of the United Kingdom's power in the beginning of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, for the former empire being constrained and limited by the Union's laws meant a loss of its power and influence. It resulted in difficult relations between the United Kingdom and the European Union over the span of the last 45 years.

Thus, from the very beginning of the history of the European Union the United Kingdom has always had uneasy relations with it. Winston Churchill, who called for the creation of a "United States of Europe" highlighted in 1953 that Britain would always be supportive but would remain independent in such a unity. He notably said "We are with Europe but not of it". It seems that his prediction was absolutely true.

The first difficulty occurred in 1967, when Charles de Gaulle, the 18th President of France, said “non” towards the British application to join the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the European Union. His “non” became the symbol of the French position towards Britain for many years afterwards.

Finally, the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community, but only in 1973, 15 years later after the Treaty of Rome was signed. The reasons for the accession were, unlike in case of France and Germany, primarily economic. Moreover, the United Kingdom has never signed up to the Monetary Union and Schengen Agreement. It illustrates the extent to which the United Kingdom was always ready to be the part of continental Europe and to share the common borders.

In 1975, just 2 years after the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community, the question of its necessity arised for the first time. At that time the nation held a referendum “Do you think the UK should stay in the European Community (Common Market)?”. The outcome was that “just over 67% of voters supported the Labor government's campaign to stay in the EEC, or Common Market, despite several cabinet ministers having come out in favor of British withdrawal”¹⁵. After the time of voting till the 1984 relations between two sides were quite peaceful, without any escalations. In 1984, tensions between the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community started to develop again. Margaret Thatcher at the summit in Fontainebleau said “We are not asking the Community or anyone else for money. We are simply asking to have our own money back”¹⁶. During 80s, the United Kingdom was relatively poor country in the Union, but stepped on the course to become the biggest net contributor to the Europe’s budget.

The United Kingdom has been always the member of the European Union with the most special exceptions. Taking into account sometimes partial participation of the United Kingdom in common European policies, such as monetary policy and Schengen area, nevertheless, the United Kingdom played a crucial role in the European Union’s foreign and

¹⁵ Richard Nelsson, *Archive: how the Guardian reported the 1975 EEC referendum*, 2015, available at [<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/from-the-archive-blog/2015/jun/05/referendum-eec-europe-1975>], accessed April 2017.

¹⁶ “Britain’s 40 year relationship with the EU”, in *The Telegraph*, 16 July, 2016.

security policies. It was the United Kingdom the one who pushed towards the negotiations between E3+3, which includes China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States on the one side, and Iran on another side concerning the Iranian nuclear program. Furthermore, as Will Straw claims in his article "Why Is Britain Running Away from Europe?", "Britain was instrumental in pushing for a European External Action Service. In difficult circumstances, Commission Vice-President Catherine Ashton helped to shape that institution"¹⁷. Indeed, Catherine Ashton, who served as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy at the time of creating the European External Action Service, was the one responsible for creating the structure of the new powerful European organization. Even during the very early period of the establishment of the institution mentioned above, the world has already observed an enormous efforts from the European External Action Service in order to reduce the destructive consequences of the earthquake in Haiti in January of 2010. Lutz Guellner, Ms Ashton's Spokesman, declared that "it's the first time in such a situation that we have brought all these various actors together. I wouldn't call it the first act of the External Action Service, because that doesn't exist yet, but this has never been done before"¹⁸.

Another aspect in terms of the role of the United Kingdom in the European Union is that after the biggest enlargement of the European Union in 2004, which included Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, the first country who opened its labor market for the workers from new countries of the Union was the United Kingdom. Despite the significant benefits for the British economy, such policy after a while resulted in the division of the population in two opposite teams – "for" and "against" the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union, Brexit. Negative consequences of the opened labor market were one of the main arguments "for" Brexit. Indeed, as Oliver Hawkins writes in his "Migration Statistics" about labor force in the United Kingdom, in 2015 "around 3.16 million

¹⁷ Will Straw, "Why Is Britain Running Away from Europe?", in *Spiegel Online*, 28.02.2014, [<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/will-straw-essay-on-the-role-of-britain-in-the-european-union-a-956230.html>], accessed April 2017.

¹⁸ Andrew Rettman, "EU foreign relations chief tests new powers in earthquake response", in *EUobserver*, 14.01.2010, available at <https://euobserver.com/foreign/29266>, accessed April 2017.

people who were nationals of other EU countries living in the UK”¹⁹. Ultimately, fear of the immigration was driving force of the leaving campaign during the referendum.

The United Kingdom started to lose its power steadily within the European Union starting from 2010. According to the numbers given by Vote Watch Europe, in the period from 2009 to 2011 Britain lost the biggest amount of votes in the European Council than throughout the whole history of relations between the European Union and the United Kingdom.

The reasons for the referendum in the UK in 2016

After the announcement of the results of the referendum on 24 of June of 2016 everyone who was to some extent aware of its political background started to comment on the reasons of an issue. Generally, they can be limited to: Euroscepticism, racism, inaccurate and ambiguous Leave campaign, and simple protest against contemporary policies. While some of them are quite up to the point, these reasons are still not enough to discuss the problem to its fullest.

Angus Campbell in his book *The American Voter* provides a graphic explanation to the structure of reasons which might affect peoples’ political choices. This scheme is usually called as “funnel of causality”²⁰. Not only historical, social and economic reasons are crucial, but also influence of family, friends, and media should be considered. Moreover, latter is might be the most important in terms of people’s trust towards the European Union.

A survey of 2015 made by European Commission “Public Opinion in the European Union” clearly shows that the image of the European Union although stays mostly positive (41% for September of 2015), but the percentage of those who see it as ‘total negative’ also raised slightly (from 15% in 2006 to 19% in 2015). If consider only results of the United Kingdom’s respondents, the outcome was following: 32% of respondents claimed they see the European Union as “total positive”, 37% of respondents – “neutral”, 28% of respondents – “total negative”. The main conclusion which might be drawn from these results is that overall mood of

¹⁹ Oliver Hawkins, *Migration Statistics*, London: House of Commons Library, 2017, p. 23.

²⁰ Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, Donald Stokes, *The American Voter*, New York: Wiley, 1960.

the population of Britain was always on the edge. One weighty argument could change the outcome of the entire referendum and the whole future of the European Union.

Starting already from 2013, when the Prime-Minister of the United Kingdom David Cameron proposed to hold the referendum in the nearest future, till the end of 2017 to be precise, the ground for it started to form. In November of 2015 David Cameron delivered his famous speech on Europe. He argued that the future of Britain as a member of the European Union is only possible after certain reforms, including economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty, and immigration²¹. In addition, he highlighted that an in-out referendum will be held till the end of 2017, as he promised before. Promises were made.

For the time of the referendum in June of 2016, proponents of the UK's withdrawal from the Union loudly claimed a number of advantages for Britain and its citizens in case of such scenario. They highlighted that the United Kingdom as a member of the European Union was losing its power and importance on political arena dramatically. Generally, these advantages included but were not limited to:

- leaving the Union would allow the United Kingdom to diversify its international links regardless of what Europe thinks about it;
- "too many of Britain's laws are made overseas by dictates passed down from Brussels and rulings upheld by the European Court of Justice. UK courts must become sovereign again"²²;
- the British Parliament will gain its independence and importance right after the Brexit again. As it turned out, arguments were strong enough to persuade more than 17 million voters (51,9% of the total amount of voters) to support the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union.

²¹ David Cameron, *Prime Minister's speech on Europe*, 10.11.2015, available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-on-europe>, accessed May 2017.

²² Ben Riley-Smith, "Leave or Remain in the EU? The arguments for and against Brexit", in *The Telegraph*, 20.06.2016.

Consequences of Brexit referendum – new balance of power in European Union

At this moment, the consequences of Brexit are very difficult to estimate, as they largely depend on the final outcome of the negotiations between the European Union and Great Britain. If there is a positive and satisfactory agreement for both parties, significant turbulence is not expected. Great Britain would then be able to establish relations with European Union states in the shape of the states of the European Economic Area. Situation will look completely different in case of “hard” Brexit (without agreement between the parties), which automatically means an output of the UK from the EU after two years from the submission of the application for leave of the EU by the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom was from the very beginning a "difficult" partner in the European Community. The UK's attitude to the European Union has always been more instrumental than in other Member States, which was reflected in the refusal to join the euro zone or the Schengen zone. Taking in a referendum decision about leaving the European Union means a completely new situation for both sides - The United Kingdom and the rest of the European Union. One should agree with Almut Moeller, who in early June 2016 stated that the first consequence of the referendum on leaving the UK from the European Union would be a period of uncertainty that could last for years²³.

If we discuss the results of the British referendum, first of all, we think about economic, political and social consequences. Leaving the European Union by the United Kingdom means losing the second largest net payer to the EU budget and the country with the third largest population in the EU. That will shift the balance between states. The withdrawal of a country of such great potential means, on the one hand, changes in the structure of the European budget and, on the other, a new distribution of power in decision-making process at the EU forum.

In 2015, the amount that Germany paid to the European Union budget was 14.3 billion euros, the United Kingdom - 11.5 billion euros, and

²³ Almut Möller, *Die EU ohne Großbritannien: Politische Folgefragen*, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2016, available at [<http://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/brexit/228804/politische-folgen>], accessed May 2017.

the third largest net payer - France - paid 5.5 billion euros²⁴. In the case of hard Brexit, this means that in the years 2019-2020 only Germany will have additional costs to the European Union's budget of EUR 4.5 billion per year. In addition, the absence of Great Britain in the European Union means the dissolution of a coalition of states consisting of Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and the Baltic states, which advocates redistribution of funds at European level. These countries had a population exceeding the threshold of 35%, which, according to the Lisbon Treaty, allows the blocking of decisions within the European Union²⁵. Brexit means that Germany loses an important partner who has been a supporter of liberal economic policies and budget discipline in European Union. British pragmatism was particularly valued by German politicians who frequently collaborated with politicians in the UK within areas such as subsidy reduction, free trade, the restriction of monopoly practices, and the development of digitization. Lack of British support in European institutions will weaken Germany's position as a supporter of the liberal course in economic policy, but will strengthen the position of Southern European states in favor of loosening fiscal discipline and increasing public spending.

Also for Great Britain, parting with the European Union will be neither an easy undertaking nor a beneficial one. European Union countries are the largest recipient of UK exports - over 40% of UK goods and services are targeted at European countries. In addition, the UK was a backdrop for the financial sector of the European Union. Over one third of financial transactions in the European Union take place via the UK financial sector²⁶. Nevertheless, it cannot be forgotten that Great Britain is the largest importer of goods from the continent, which is particularly important for companies from Germany. According to Clemens Fuesta, President of the *Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitut Ifo*, Germany after Great Britain will be the second biggest loss of the Brexit. In the long run, the German economy is

²⁴ Hendrik Kafsack, "EU-Haushalt: Deutschland überweist das meiste Geld an Brüssel", in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8.08.2016.

²⁵ Klaus Köster, "Deutschland ohne Briten", in *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, 28.03.2017.

²⁶ Marcus Theurer, *Mögliche wirtschaftliche Folgen des Brexit*, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2016, available at [<https://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/brexit/228809/wirtschaftliche-folgen>], accessed May 2017.

likely to lose as much as 3% of its economic performance, because UK has always been the biggest trade partner for Europe's third largest economy. German companies export to UK goods and services worth more than 120 billion euros per year. That means that about 750,000 jobs in Germany depend on exports to the United Kingdom. In this situation, Brexit can mean trade hindrances, increased bureaucracy, and longer delivery terms, which in turn will lead to higher costs. The consequence may be a decline in trade, mainly in the automotive industry, but also in the pharmaceutical and chemical industries²⁷. Only the German financial sector will probably benefit from Brexit, because most financial institutions active on European market are likely to move to this country.

Economic – against other countries – Germany's position and potential will be strengthened. However, it should be borne in mind that such reinforcement is not in Germany's interest. On the one hand, this will raise fears of German domination in Europe, and, on the other hand, it will imply the need for it to assume greater responsibility for European policy. Also in financial terms.

All these factors show how strong and deep are the economic connections between the United Kingdom and Europe, and why economic issues of Brexit are the subject of numerous analyzes. However, it should be noted that most economists, first of all, point to the negative consequences of leaving the European Union by Great Britain. According to the British employers' association, CBI, Brexit can cost Britain even 100 billion £ and the loss of even a million jobs by the end of the second decade of the 21st century²⁸. PwC estimates that, as a result of the Brexit, UK's GDP to 2020 may be lower than 3% to even 5.5%²⁹. Even less optimistic are forecasts done by the German Bertelsmann Foundation, according to which Brexit can cost the UK a loss of wellbeing of up to 300 billion euros in the long run³⁰. However, it should be stressed, that not only the United Kingdom, but also all EU Member States, will suffer economic losses.

²⁷ Carla Neuhaus, Tilmann Warnecke, Marcus Grabitz, "Was der Brexit für uns bedeutet", in *Der Tagesspiegel*, 24.06.2016.

²⁸ CBI, available at [www.cbi.org.uk], accessed May 2017.

²⁹ *Leaving the EU: Implications for the UK economy*, PwC Report, March 2016, p. 3.

³⁰ Marcus Theurer, *op. cit.*

Therefore, it is expected that economic negotiations will be a fundamental issue during the talks.

If we want to analyze the consequences of Britain's departure from the European Union at political level, it is expected that the role of France within EU will be strengthened. Where the European Union leaves one of the two nuclear powers that are a permanent member of the UN Security Council, France will remain the only military force in the European Union with nuclear weapons. This, in turn, means that the state will have a greater impact on European security policy. In addition, it will be possible to have a greater impact on the policy pursued by Germany. Already in 2012, French President François Hollande spoke in favor of strengthening European security and defense cooperation, increasing investment in new jobs, and harmonizing tax law. It is expected that the new pro-European president of France, Emmanuel Macron, will continue the policy.

The outcome of the referendum in the UK also made European politicians aware of the necessity of taking the necessary reforms. The difficulty in implementing them lies in the fact that the majority of the old EU Member States think that European problems can be solved by deepening of the European integration process, while the countries centered around the Visegrad Group think that the cause of many problems is the excessive role of national states in the European forum. Britain's position in this area was closer to the countries of Central Europe. The departure of the United Kingdom means that, in situations of divergent views among the European Union countries, the European Union grouping of two or more speeds will be strengthened. The implementation of this scenario means that the Eastern European states will be marginalized in the European forum. On the one hand, they oppose deepening the process of European integration, and, on the other, they are the biggest beneficiaries of EU funding. In the situation of the emergence of a two-speed Europe, these countries will probably have less influence on the decisions taken by the states in favor of closer cooperation. In addition to the Visegrad Group countries, Brexit means uncertainty about the fate of many of their citizens living in the UK³¹.

³¹ Claire Demesmay, Stefan Meister, Jana Puglierin, Julian Rappold, Henning Riecke, Eberhard Sandschneider, Gereon Schuch, *Der Brexit und das EU-Machtgefüge*, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V., available at [www.dgap.org], accessed May 2017.

Conclusions

In conclusion, it can be said that the highest price for Brexit is likely to be paid paradoxically by the United Kingdom, although all EU Member States will lose during the process. This is the price that European nations will have to pay for succumbing to populism and the temptation of isolationism as a way to tackle Europe's problems.

The fundamental consequence of Britain's decision to leave the European Union will be the loss of its influence on Europe's policies, but also in the world. In a globalized world, the power of individual European states depends on the degree of their influence on decisions taken in the European Union. This also applies to the UK. In addition, the United Kingdom, after leaving the European Union, will be forced to deal with the escalating separatist processes in its own country. Contrary to British politicians' announcements, Brexit means restricting Britain's role internationally.

Another Brexit losses seem to be the Visegrad Group countries, whose societies have in a similar level succumbed to populist and nationalist slogans. National-conservative governments in these states have seen in the United Kingdom an ally hampering the process of deepening European integration. In the situation of Britain's departure from the European Union and in the absence of a revision of their European policies, we can expect that those countries will be marginalized in the European forum.

Germany can also be counted among the losers of the Brexit because this state, with the departure of Great Britain, will lose a valuable ally in matters of economic liberalism. From the European Union countries, Germany will also bear the largest costs associated with Brexit, but in general, comparing to other European countries, its strength and potential in the European Union will increase. However, this is not a welcome scenario for German politicians, because despite the growing importance of this state in the European Union, Germany is forced to lead even more cautious and restrained policies towards its partners in Europe.

Brexit seems to be beneficial in some points to Southern European countries, who can expect more tolerance of their ideas for solving economic and social problems if the European Union countries decide to keep the EU budget unchanged after Brexit.

The outcome of the referendum seems to be the most favorable for France, as it offers the opportunity to rebuild the role and importance of this country in the European Union. In the situation of leaving the European structures by Great Britain and numerous Eurosceptic governments in the east of the European Union, France, in cooperation with Germany, can again become the driving force of the European Union and thus have a greater impact on the course of European integration.

Bibliography

1. Borkowski, Jan (2006), "Nowe cele i zadania polskiej polityki integracyjnej po przystąpieniu do Unii Europejskiej", in Fiszer Józef M. (ed.), *Polska polityka integracyjna po przystąpieniu do Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa: ISPPAN.
2. Cameron, David (2015), *Prime Minister's speech on Europe*, [<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-on-europe>], accessed May 2017.
3. Campbell, Angus; Converse, Philip; Miller, Warren; Stokes, Donald, (1960), *The American Voter*, New York: Wiley.
4. CBI, [www.cbi.org.uk], accessed May 2017.
5. Dahl, Martin (2016), "The European Immigration Crisis and Its Consequences for the Federal Republic of Germany: Political, Social and Economic Aspects", in *Studia Polityczne*, No. 4/44.
6. Dahl, Martin (2015), *Niemiecki model społecznej gospodarki rynkowej jako wzór dla polskich przemian systemowych po 1989 roku*, Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA.
7. Demesmay, Claire; Meister, Stefan; Puglierin, Jana; Rappold, Julian; Riecke, Henning; Sandschneider, Eberhard; Schuch, Gereon, *Der Brexit und das EU-Machtgefüge*, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V., [www.dgap.org], accessed May 2017.
8. Dowgielewicz, Mikołaj (2010), "Pozycja Polski w Unii Europejskiej po wejściu w życie Traktatu z Lizbony", in *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, nr 2(LXIII), 2010.
9. Fiszer, Józef M. (2009), "Polityczne i społeczno-ekonomiczne aspekty wprowadzenia euro w Polsce", in *Studia Polityczne*, No. 24.
10. Fiszer, Józef M. (1994), *Unia Europejska a Polska – dziś i jutro*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.

11. Garczewski Krzysztof (2012), "Niemcy w stosunkach międzynarodowych na tle kryzysu gospodarczego w Unii Europejskiej", in Marian Guzek (ed.), *Ekonomia i polityka w kryzysie. Kierunki zmian w teoriach*, Warszawa: Uczelnia Łazarskiego i ISPPAN.
12. Hawkins Oliver (2017), *Migration Statistics*, London: House of Commons Library.
13. Kafsack Hendrik, "EU-Haushalt: Deutschland überweist das meiste Geld an Brüssel", in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8.08.2016.
14. Köster Klaus, "Deutschland ohne Briten", in *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, 28.03.2017.
15. Latoszek, Ewa (2007), *Integracja europejska. Mechanizmy i wyzwania*, Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza.
16. *Leaving the EU: Implications for the UK economy (2016)*, PwC Raport.
17. Möller, Almut (2016), *Die EU ohne Großbritannien: Politische Folgefragen*, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, [<http://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/brexit/228804/politische-folgen>], accessed May 2017.
18. Nelsson, Richard (2015), "Archive: how the Guardian reported the 1975 EEC referendum", [<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/from-the-archive-blog/2015/jun/05/referendum-eec-europe-1975>], accessed April 2017.
19. Neuhaus, Carla, Warnecke Tilmann, Grabitz Marcus, "Was der Brexit für uns bedeutet", in *Der Tagesspiegel*, 24.06.2016.
20. Pawłuszko, Tomasz (2008), "Równowaga sił jako kategoria analityczna w stosunkach międzynarodowych", [www.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.pl], accessed May 2017.
21. Rettman, Andrew (2010), "EU foreign relations chief tests new powers in earthquake response", in *EUobserver*, [<https://euobserver.com/foreign/29266>], accessed April 2017.
22. Riley-Smith Ben, "Leave or Remain in the EU? The arguments for and against Brexit", in *The Telegraph*, 20.06.2016.
23. Rittleng, Dominique (2016), *Independence and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

24. Straw, Will (2014), "Why Is Britain Running Away from Europe?", in *Spiegel Online*, [<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/will-straw-essay-on-the-role-of-britain-in-the-european-union-a-956230.html>], accessed April 2017.
25. Theurer, Marcus (2016), *Mögliche wirtschaftliche Folgen des Brexit*, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, [<https://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/brexit/228809/wirtschaftliche-folgen>], accessed May 2017.
26. Wohlforth William C., Little Richard, Kaufman Stuart J., Kang David, Jones Charles A., Tin-Bor Hui Victoria, Eckstein Arthur, Deudney Daniel, Brenner William L. (2007), "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History", in *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.13, Issue 2.
27. Ziętek Agata (2007), "Region Azji i Pacyfiku", in Marek Pietraś (ed.), *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS.
28. ***, "Britain's 40 year relationship with the EU", in *The Telegraph*, 16 July 2016, [<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/16/britains-40-year-relationship-with-the-eu/>]

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CHINA: ON THE CHALLENGES OF THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Ana Pantea*

DOI: 10.24193/subbeuropaea.2017.3.13

Published Online: 2017-09-30

Published Print: 2017-09-30

Abstract

China and the EU are both skilful and pragmatic powers which shape their foreign policies in different manners, according to their principles. In the case of PRC, we can notice primordially domestic priorities like the need to sustain economic growth and to cover political legitimacy. In recent years, its foreign policy has been challenged by the need to manage the consequences of its own success, which have come as a response of new demands for securing global stability. The EU strategy states that the engagement with China will be “principled, practical and pragmatic”, staying true to its interests and values. As such, the present article discusses the challenges of EU-China partnership as it has to respond to the interferences of national, European and global interests.

Keywords: foreign policy, strategic partnership, global stability, national interests, security

Introduction

In the last years, more and more focus has been shown upon long-term partnerships in both economic and military ties between the EU and PRC. In order to understand the directions toward China is moving in terms of cooperation with the European Union, this paper will try to understand what the major challenges are encountered by China in establishing a strategic partnership with the EU.

China is seeking solutions in order to promote stability and equilibrium; as such it moves the attention from the speed of its development towards the quality of manufactured goods. Guidelines and

* Ana Pantea is a PhD lecturer at the Department of International Relations and German Studies within the Faculty of European Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University.
Contact: anapantea@ubbcluj.ro

objectives referring to the most expansionist state in the world in terms of economy and culture have been already drawn and the social-economic implications have been closely analysed. Efforts are being concentrated to keep China's strategic position as a permanently developing country and also to consolidate its influence in the world, even if some official statements are expressing proposals to impose a global hegemony.

Another aspect to be observed is the authorities' decision expressed in their long-term strategies that funds are required in fields like education, healthcare system, social security and employment stability, but also for agriculture, water resources, public transportation and environment protection. The last two are of most urgency due to the problems encountered on a daily basis by locals' in their living standards. Poverty and urban development is still in the top of their priorities mainly because it is time and financially consuming.

Increasing the regional GDP both through huge investments in capital and energy consuming industries, may be possible if proper policies formulation and implementation is being decided, but we need to keep in mind that some imbalances in China's economic growth may cause serious issues globally.

The background

Considering strictly the European Union-China relation, it manifests itself as a stability and safety policy for the EU as a genuine economic structure. As Strategic Partners, they increasingly cooperate in key international and regional issues. To be more specific, the EU is also China's biggest trading partner, while China is the second largest trading partner for the EU. The trade and investment relationship is an essential source of wealth, jobs, development and innovation for both sides.¹

In terms of social partnership, Europe's approach to the Chinese value system is rooted in the past. The Peoples Republic of China is now a global player: decisions taken in Beijing are shaping one way or another all EU's pressing global concerns, among which climate change, nuclear proliferation, or rebuilding economic stability are just few to highlight, but

¹ See Hans Dietmar Schweisgut, "The European Union and China: Global Partners with Global Responsibilities", in *European Union: EU Relations with China*, [http://eeas.europa.eu/china/index_en.htm], accessed April 2017.

in the same time, China's strictly and closely observed economic and industrial policies strongly affect the EU as an economic organism. Yet the EU continues to treat China as the emerging power it used to be, rather than the global force it has become.²

Despite the current situation the global sphere is dealing with, it has been noticed that a new imperative has emerged for China, one that is stepping it forward to a much more active posture despite economic, social and political undercurrents domestically. It is necessary to underline some of the key assumptions that are often made regarding China's sea power, the reasons behind this assumption making it sometimes irrelevant, and the background in which sea power is being concerned.

The belief of China being the dominant power in Asia is based on the assumption that its continued and rapid economic rise will continue in the same manner as in the last decade. Such a belief derives force from the projection that a fundamental strategic reestablishment of the Asian continent is inescapable, and that it will be necessary and perhaps even desirable to concede to China significant "strategic space"³.

The People's Republic of China managed to formulate its main concerns in all the held summits in regard to its relation to the European Union in an extremely synthetic, pragmatic and clear manner, overcoming any emotional interventions based on cultural differences or perceptions. When it comes to concrete facts, we consider as a relevant example the fact that EU is the main trading partner of China, tightening relations becoming more and more prominent. The European Union is fully committed to further develop its trading relations with China, but on a natural way, it wants to ensure that China plays fairly, respecting intellectual property rights on one hand, and meets its WTO obligations, on the other.⁴

All negotiations regarding future cooperation are based upon the progressive liberalisation of investments and elimination of imposed

² John Fox, François Godement, *A Power Audit of EU-China Relations*, 2009, [http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR12_-_A_POWER_AUDIT_OF_EU-CHINA_RELATIONS.pdf], accessed April 2017.

³ P. Dibb, J. Lee, "Why China Will Not Become the Dominant Power in Asia", in *Security Challenges*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2014, pp. 1-21, [<http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Documents/SC10-3DibbLee.pdf>], accessed September 2017.

⁴ European Commission, Trade. Countries and Regions. China, [ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/], accessed May 2017.

barriers for investors to access each other's market. This cooperation should provide simplicity and security in terms of legal premises from which investors of both sides can benefit. "By securing predictable long-term access to EU and Chinese markets respectively and providing for strong protection to investors and their investments" we can trace the track of future developments and agreements implemented on the desired global level from a strong economy's point of view.

In the last few years, the Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister's agenda was filled with priorities like the necessity of the country to focus on strengthening its relations with the other strong actors, encouraging positive interactions and a fruitful development. Discussions with Russia and the United States are still central for China, representing strong realizations for the country and its future cooperation.

Today's challenges

Relying merely on linear prognostications about the future, we cannot ignore the implications of China's economic, social and national brittleness, its improvable friendship with major actors or allies in the region, as well as the considerable military deficiencies and challenges faced by the People's Liberation Army. It is a permanent obstacle faced by the government until now, planning for a more balanced coercion and contribution to the military operations, so necessary to be kept under a critical eye. Some challenges have been already identified by some authors and the elaboration on some of them is required in order to establish some pillars of orientation in the current research.

It is assumed by some skeptics that China has already approached the apogee of its power and what comes next is its economy encountering serious structural impediments and demographic barriers to growth. This phenomenon can be considered to have important implications for the contingency costs forgone of ever-increasing deterrence expenditure in a technological arms race against other global powers, which Beijing may lose. This approach will try to illustrate a China in which worsening domestic dilemmas will remain the government's highest priority. Consequently, formulating such concerns will take up an increasing share of economic resources and national wealth. On the other hand, China's 12th Five-Year Plan puts emphasis on some crucial social implications like

resource saving, care for the environment, combating effects of global warming and climate changes, as well as green industry promotion.

Although, it is obvious that the Communist Party leadership will also struggle to take control over growing popular discontent, which may end up having serious implications upon its well-functioning. This powerful rising country needs to dedicate effort and time in regaining its friends in Asia. Although China's world view of itself is shaped by strong historic impulses of a hierarchic order with itself at the apex, very few countries in the region, appear willing to concede to China the status of the dominant power. Indeed, it is more likely that countries such as the United States, Japan and India will concert together—either directly or indirectly—against an increasingly aggressive China.⁵

EU-China Strategic Partnership

In several recently elaborated programmes, objectives regarding the political objectives of China in its relation to the EU have been underlined. Strategic partnerships for peace, economic growth, civilization and reforms are only some of the key points developed in bilateral cooperation plans for the following ten years with major focus on combating terrorism and rejection of Taiwan claims for independence.⁶ The so-called “partnership for peace” shows China’s intention to collaborate with the EU in order to develop peacefully in a tormented world by accepting and respecting reciprocal interests for building a more stronger, just and equitable international relations.

Partnership for economic growth tries to facilitate trade on the international market in an organized, agreed way in order to improve living standards and assure access to specific goods. A win-win relationship will conduct to the arousal of an open global economy, diminishing corruption and other barriers more or less visible, but unfortunately so present in both societies.

By combining both eastern and western values and norms, EU and China will experience another phase of globalization but will also offer an example of responsiveness without a forced “uniformization” of which

⁵ *Ibidem.*

⁶ Dan Tomozei, *Diplomația Panda*, Iași: Junimea, 2014, p. 210.

sceptical voices are so frightened. This may represent the basics of a “partnership for civilization”.⁷

Another challenge formulated in future objectives resides in China’s readiness of playing in the same team with the EU by renewing current reforms, turning them into more comprehensive and applicable ones, but also its openness to “share reform dividends, jointly improve the ability of reform and governance, and actively participate in the formulation and reform of the rules of global governance”.⁸

China’s historical experience taught her that human rights protection, economic equilibrium and counter-terrorism are crucial for a functional trustworthy state and “believes that these issues should be properly handled through dialogue in the spirit of equality and mutual respect.”⁹ Similar efforts need to be made in each EU member state.

Even though the issue of cultural differences is still a sensitive one, our world needs to be conducted by rational leaders who overcome egos, personal satisfactions and insufficiencies. Cooperation on the political level can be maintained by transparent dialogues and prominent guidelines in policies formulation, strengthening also in this regard the EU-China relations.

In terms of geostrategic positioning and defence, China pressures to some extent the European Union to lift its arm embargo, on one hand, and to vehemently “oppose Taiwan’s independence, support peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and China’s peaceful reunification and handle Taiwan-related questions with caution”,¹⁰ on the other. Even if the latter is hard to be applied due to the fact that it should avoid any human interaction, it can be limited, in China’s opinion, to daily activities without political and significant economic implications and definitely ban any weapon or military equipment trading activities.

⁷ ***, “China-EU partnerships focus on peace, growth, reform, civilization”, in *European Dialogue*, 2014, [<http://www.eurodialogue.eu/ChinaEU%20partnerships%20focus%20on%20peace,%20growth,%20reform,%20civilization>], accessed May 2017.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

Besides climate change, energy security, financial and trade relations, public health and pandemics, political stability and security,¹¹ environment protection has a strong influence in China's future development. After 2003, the European Union agreed with China upon a strategic partnership covering three layers, technical cooperation for mutual interest, continuous dialogue for economy and politics, and daily activity exchanges. These can be covered with sufficient respect for established policies when it comes to defence, economic development and obedience to the "non-interference principle".¹²

Conclusion

There are still different paths in which proper policies and agreements on implementation are required. China still needs to face several challenges for establishing a strategic partnership. Sustaining economic growth, assuring a significant level of political legitimacy, citizen's trust and green technological industries, are just a few to spotlight in the following years. Responsiveness from both China and EU is imperative in this glance.

The European Union's concerns regarding the China include lack of transparency, specific industrial policies and non-tariff measures, intervention from government in shaping the economic structure and lack of protection for intellectual property rights.¹³

Even though some issues like climate change, energy security, financial and trade relations, political stability and social acceptance are big areas in which improvements and discussions are required, China plays an important role in establishing some implementation rules and directions in collaboration with the European Union as an institutionalist construct, and its member states as parts of bilateral negotiations.

Furthermore, the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation places strong emphasis on bilateral relation with China stating that "Negotiating and concluding such a comprehensive EU-China Investment Agreement will convey both sides' joint commitment towards stronger

¹¹ Etienne Reuter, Jing Men, *China-EU. Green Cooperation*, Singapore, Hackensack: World Scientific, 2014, p. 25.

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 27-28.

¹³ European Commission, *op. cit.*

cooperation as well as their willingness to envisage broader ambitions including, once the conditions are right, towards a deep and comprehensive FTA, as a longer term perspective".¹⁴ It is known by both players that standing on the same side may be laborious and effortful but good things come with small steps.

The "Chinese dream" represents a junction of both government political ambitions and the realistic needs of people and by promoting green cooperation, the strategic partnership will bring greater benefits for political leaders as well as to their citizens.

Bibliography

1. Brzezinski, Zbigniew (2001), *The Geostrategic Triad: Living with China, Europe and Russia*, Washington: Center for Strategic and international Studies.
2. Cheung, Frederick Hok-ming; Lai, Ming-chiu (1999), *Politics and Religion in Ancient and Medieval Europe and China*, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.
3. Dibb, P.; Lee, J., "Why China Will Not Become the Dominant Power in Asia", in *Security Challenges*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2014, pp. 1-21, [<http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Documents/SC10-3DibbLee.pdf>], accessed May 2017.
4. Edmonds, Richard-Louis (2002), *China and Europe since 1978: A European Perspective*, New York: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.
5. European Commission (2015), *Trade in Goods with China*, [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113366.pdf], accessed March 2017.
6. European Commission (2017), *Countries and Regions. China*, [<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/>], accessed March 2017.
7. European Union (2005), *EU-China Relations: A Maturing Partnership*, [<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:r14207>], accessed March 2017.

¹⁴ European Commission, *op. cit.*

8. European Union (2015), *EU-China Summit Joint Statement. The Way Forward After Forty Years of EU-China Cooperation*, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/18540/eu-china-summit-2015-joint-statement_en], accessed July 2017.
9. Fox, John; Godement, François, *A Power Audit of EU-China Relations*, 2009, [http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR12_-_A_POWER_AUDIT_OF_EU-CHINA_RELATIONS.pdf], accessed April 2017.
10. Reuter, Etienne; Men, Jing (2011), *China-EU. Green Cooperation*, Singapore, Hackensack: World Scientific, pp. 25-37.
11. Sutter, Robert G. (2008), *Chinese Foreign Relations Maryland*, Lanham, Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
12. Tomozei, Dan (2014), *Diplomația Panda. Despre România, China și Republica Moldova*, Iași: Junimea.
13. Van der Putten, Frans-Paul; Shulong, Chu (2011), *China, Europe and International Security: Interests, Roles and Prospects*, New York: Routledge.
14. Vogt, Roland (2012), *Europe and China*, Hong-Kong: Hong-Kong University Press.
15. ***, "China-EU partnerships focus on peace, growth, reform, civilization" in *European Dialogue*, 2014, [<http://www.euromdialogue.eu/China-EU%20partnerships%20focus%20on%20peace,%20growth,%20reform,%20civilization>], accessed May 2017.

CALL FOR PAPERS

Since 1996, the academic journal *Studia Europaea*, issued by the Faculty of European Studies, has been representing an open arena for promoting research endeavours. The journal is refereed by international specialists and officially acknowledged by the Romanian National University Research Council (CNCSIS). *Studia Europaea* is covered by several prestigious databases, such as ProQuest CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, ProQuest CSA Sociological Abstracts or Central and Eastern European Online Library (CEEOL). Each article is reviewed by two independent academics in a “double-blind” system. Senior as well as junior academics from Europe and from the United States have found in *Studia Europaea* a way of expressing their preoccupations by publishing academic articles that have focused on the European experience and perspectives in various fields of social science.

By launching the Call for Papers, *Studia Europaea* is prepared to receive articles that will be grouped in six sections:

- **“History, International Relations, and Political Science”** - welcomes articles that stress the European perspective of world politics and the analysis of the European political developments.
- **“European Economy and European Information Society”** - invites articles that include analyses and comments concerning the most relevant aspects of the European economy and information technology.
- **“European Community and Business Law”** - brings together articles that refer to the European states and the European Communities and their judicial and institutional organisation, as well as facets of business regulation.
- **“European Culture, Philosophy, and Anthropology”** - will concentrate on the cross-cultural European experience, with an emphasis on relations with other cultural areas, such as Asia or the Americas.

- **“Forum”** - open for the BA and MA students in the fields mentioned above.
- **“Book Review”** - welcomes critical reviews of the latest books related to the fields listed above.

Guidelines for authors

(see <http://www.euro.ubbcluj.ro/studia/guide.htm>)

Papers should be written in English, French, German, Italian or Spanish and should count ten to fifteen pages. A five to eight row abstract, five key-words (both written in English), as well as a ten row bio note about the author(s), including the contact details (at least, the e-mail address) should accompany the paper. For the articles written in languages other than English, the authors should also provide the title of the article in English.

Authors should comply with the following editing requirements:

1. Page setup:

- Paper Size: A4 (metric) paper (29.7 cm X 21 cm)
- Paper Orientation: Portrait
- Margins: Top & Bottom: 4.8 cm, Left & Right: 4 cm
- Header & Footer: 4.5 cm, different on first page and different on odd and even pages

2. Fonts: use Palatino Linotype and follow the sizes specified below:

- 9 pt for Footnotes,
- 10 pt Header & Footer and Table captions
- 11 pt for the Main text
- 11 pt (*italic*) for Abstract
- **12 pt (bold) for Author(s) name and section titles**
- **14 pt (bold), SMALL CAPS, for the Title of the paper**

3. Authors are required to use **footnotes**, as following:

For books: Author(s): First name Last name, *Title*, Place of publication: Publisher, Year, Page.

e.g.: Sergiu Mișcoiu, *Le Front National et ses repercussions sur l'échiquier politique français*, Cluj-Napoca: EFES, 2005, p. 7.

For studies within a volume: Author(s): First name Last name, "The title of the study", in Editor(s): first name last name (ed.), *The title of the volume*, Place of publication: Publisher, Year, Page.

e.g.: Laura Herta Gongola, "Modelul societății informaționale. O abordare sociologică", in Horea Todoran (ed.), *Societatea informațională europeană*, Cluj-Napoca: EFES, 2005, p 57.

For studies in periodicals: Author(s): First name Last name, "The title of the study" in *Title of the periodical*, Number, Volume (optional), Year, Pages.

e.g.: Laura Herta Gongola, "An Interpretation of Romanian-Yugoslav Relations according to Frederick H. Hartmann's Cardinal Principles" in *Studia Europaea* no. 2-3, 2005, pp. 107-120.

For electronic materials: Author(s): First name Last name, *The title of the study* Year (if applicable) [complete web address], Date consulted.

e.g.: E. D. Hirsch, Joseph F. Katt, James Trefil, *The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy*, 2002 [<http://www.bartleby.com/59/17/postindustri.html>], 20 January 2005.

4. Authors are required to use **bibliography**, numbered and in alphabetical order, as following:

Bibliography

< For books: Author(s): Last name, First name, (Year), *Title*, Place of publication: Publisher

e.g.: Mișcoiu, Sergiu (2005), *Le Front National et ses repercussions sur l'échiquier politique français*, Cluj-Napoca: EFES

Johnson, Pierre; Kranzenstein, Rashela (1995), *From the First Empire to the Second*, Boston: Rufus Publ.

< For studies within a volume: Author(s): Last name, First name, (Year), "The title of the study", in Editor(s): last name, first name (ed.), *The title of the volume*, Place of publication: Publisher, Pages

Herta Gongola, Laura (2005), "Modelul societății informaționale.O abordare sociologică", in Todoran, Horea (ed.), *Societatea informațională europeană*, Cluj-Napoca: EFES, 36-57

Martin, François; Morley, Frank (1983), "Spaces of Belonging" in Horowitz, Stanley; Kocsis, Ibolya (eds.), *Identity, Belonging, and Social Behaviour*, London: Identitas, 78-114

< For studies in periodicals: Author(s): Last name, First name (Year), "The title of the study" in *Title of the periodical*, Number, Volume (optional), Pages

Herta Gongola, Laura (2005), "An Interpretation of Romanian-Yugoslav Relations according to Frederick H. Hartmann's Cardinal Principles" in *Studia Europaea*, no. 2-3, 107-120

Mișcoiu, Sergiu; Tătărâm, Marina (2004), "Sur les avancées timides et les promesses risquées de la révision constitutionnelle roumaine" in *Politeia*, no. 5, 35-45

< For electronic materials: Author(s): Last name, First name (Year) (if applicable), *The title of the study* [complete web address], Date consulted

Hirsch, E. D.; Katt, Joseph F.; Trefil, James (2002), *The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy* [<http://www.bartleby.com/59/17/postindustri.html>], 20 January 2005

Marketing Glossary Dictionary

[<http://www.marketingpower.com/mg-dictionary-view2464.php>], 19 January 2005

Submitted papers should be sent either by regular mail
(accompanied by a CD) to:

Studia Europaea

Faculty of European Studies,

1, Em de Martonne St.,

Cluj-Napoca,

Romania

or by e-mail to the Executive Editor-in-Chief:

Dr. Sergiu Mişcoiu, miscoiu@yahoo.com

The Editorial Staff is looking forward to receiving your papers four times per year: **before the 1st of February, before the 1st of May, before the 1st of July and before the 1st of October.** *Studia Europaea* is thankful for the interest you show in this *Call for Papers* and hopes for a future collaboration.