# STUDIA
# UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI

## STUDIA EUROPAEA

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# *I. RICHARD RORTY AT THE FACULTY OF EUROPEAN STUDIES*

## LAUDATIO
for **Richard Rorty**
(Stanford University, USA)
upon awarding him the title of **doctor honoris causa**
of the "Babeş-Bolyai" University

**Andrei MARGA**
**Rector**

According to the **Charter of the "Babeş-Bolyai" University (2001)**, the highest distinction of our University is awarded to *"personalities from the fields of science, culture and art, whose work enjoys worldwide recognition and appreciation"*.

In recent years this distinction was awarded to such personalities as the winner of the Nobel prize for chemistry **Paul Ernest** (Zürich), medievalists **Jacques le Goff** (Paris) and **Harald Zimmermann**, sociologists **Raymond Boudon** (Paris) and **Georg Weber** (Münster), psychologist **Ulrich Neisser** (Atlanta), chemist **Achim Müller** (Bielefeld), Romanist **Theodor Berchem** (Würzburg), historian **Moshe Idel** (Jerusalem), literary theorist **Jean Starobinsky** (Geneva), mathematician **Willy Jäger** (Heidelberg), theologian **Thomas Spidlik** (The Vatican), biologist **Franco Pedrotti** (Camerino) and to other relevant personalities of contemporary culture. The distinction was also received by world-famous philosophers like **Adriano Bausola** (Milan), **Manfred Riedel** (Erlangen), **Paul Ricoeur** (Paris), **Schlomo Avineri** (Jerusalem), essential names for the philosophy of the last decades. The Senate of the "Babeş-Bolyai" University has always believed that the university must remain faithful to the international evaluation criteria, and that its highest scientific distinction should honor the authors of contributions which enjoy international prestige.

We are delighted and excited to award today, at the proposal of the **Faculty of European Studies**, which includes the **Department of American Studies**, the title of **doctor honoris causa** of the "Babeş-Bolyai" University to

world famous philosopher **Richard Rorty** (Stanford, USA), for his original contribution to the profound renewal of philosophy and for his work of universal significance. I therefore wish Professor **Richard Rorty** a warm and heartfelt welcome to Cluj, to our University!

Quite certainly, the presence at the "Babeș-Bolyai" University of a personality who has already left his mark upon world philosophy makes us wonder about the contribution of our own university to the development of world philosophy. If we look at the long history of the Cluj University, we can say that this institution has always aspired to remain in synchrony with the spirit of the times, and that it has always had **people with good knowledge of the developments experienced by international philosophy**. But we can immediately add that within or around the Cluj University there have been personalities whose **initiatives nowadays enjoy international recognition**. For instance, the creation of the Unitarian Church is related to the city of Cluj, and it was in the framework of this very Church that a group of young New England scholars, gathered in the famous **metaphysical Club** of Boston (1871), laid the foundations of the philosophy of pragmatism. I must also mention the fact that one of the rectors of the Transylvanian colleges which preceded the Cluj University, **Alstedt** (Althesius), emigrated to America and, due to his famous *archeologia* – a system regarding the principles of knowledge and existence -, he is mentioned today in the histories of American philosophy as the founder of American philosophy along nominalist lines. The first review of comparative literature in the world was published in Cluj, under the auspices of the university that existed here at the end of the last century. At the dawn of the 20th century, it was Eugeniu Sperantia who, alongside Thomas Masaryck and somewhat in opposition to the common beliefs of the time, underlined the universal importance of pragmatist philosophy. He is considered to be the creator of the logic of interrogations – nowadays an increasingly important chapter of logics. Petru Sergescu was among those who defined the history of science as a specialized and instructive field of knowledge, after having taught mathematics and the history of mathematics at the Cluj University.

We remember these contributions of currently recognized international value, contributions belonging to scholars from within or from around the Cluj University, as today we seek to continue their example. Yet, **anyone trying to become at least familiar with the contemporary philosophical scene will find Professor Richard Rorty among the most innovative, most widely quoted and most commented upon contemporary philosophers**. Suffice to say that the famous **Humanities Citation Index**, already for the years 1990-1991, placed Rorty right after Habermas and Derrida at the top of the

citations list, ahead of many renowned philosophers. Since then, **his readership has constantly increased**. It is quite certain that today the name of Richard Rorty stands for a landmark achievement in the field of philosophy and of the humanities, whose repercussions are already manifest in the intellectual debate taking place in the United States and in numerous other countries. Harold Bloom described Richard Rorty as "*the most interesting philosopher in the world today*". In his turn, Alasdaire McIntyre, when speaking about Richard Rorty's major work, **Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature** (1980), stated that "*it is going to be a long time before a better book of this kind appears... The elegance of its style, the easy and effective deployment of historical scholarship, and, above all, the ability to distinguish the central threads of recent debate from the side-issues and to follow through their implications in an original and exciting way, combine to charm the reader as well as to engage his or her argumentative powers*". Charles Taylor, analyzing Richard Rorty's third volume in the **Philosophical Papers** series entitled **Truth and Progress** (1998), estimated that "*this volume is Rorty at his best, again and again making us see things from a new, unexpected angle, strenuously engaging with those of us who resist his startling and unsettling <<take>> on things. Convinced or not, you come away feeling that this is what philosophy ought to be doing, steadily extending the range of imaginable thoughts*". Habermas, in his vast philosophical reconstruction – for instance in **Der Philosophische Diskurs der Moderne** (1985), but also in **Nachmetaphysisches Denken** (1988) and in **Faktizität und Geltung** (1993) – considers Richard Rorty's position as representative for the renewal experienced by contemporary philosophy, being one of its essential landmarks.

Richard Rorty's work of high intellectual achievement was accomplished due to its author's remarkably **vast culture, striking competence, brilliant talent and, alongside all these, exemplary courage in assuming intellectual initiatives in front of a changed reality**. It is most likely that the starting point for his series of such initiatives was the welcome change operated in the horizon of philosophical thought. Richard Rorty had the intellectual courage and the moral authority to show that the philosophical disputes confined to terms like realism – antirealism, positivism – hermeneutics, empiricism – apriorism have become obsolete and that philosophy must change the field of interrogations, if it wants to preserve its relevance. To the dilemmas of the long tradition of philosophy he clearly preferred the apparently more simple interrogations, truer to human experience, such as: how free and open is the community we live in? how sensitive are we towards those living on the fringes of society or towards those with unorthodox ideas?

Richard Rorty made his debut in the early sixties, with an attempt to go beyond analytical philosophy. It was a time of impressive development for the American intellectual history, development owed to people like Morton White, Henry Steele Commager, John E. Smith and many others, who drew the attention to the philosophical alternative existing in American culture. **Richard Rorty cultivated pragmatism in the framework of a fruitful "discussion" with the philosophical tradition**. He took up the idea of the linguistic conditioning of any knowledge and defended the idea according to which the recognition of this conditioning puts philosophical tradition, from Descartes to Whitehead, in a defensive position and compels philosophers to elucidate meta-philosophical aspects before properly philosophizing. His anthology **The Linguistic Turn. Recent Essays in Philosophical Method** (1967) is a book of meta-philosophy that has come to be included in the reading list of most philosophy students from all over the world.

Richard Rorty's first philosophical text, derived from his meta-philosophy and entitled **The World Well Lost** (1972), opens his pragmatist philosophy, developed as an alternative to philosophical realism and idealism, but also brings about **a particular, unique style of philosophizing**. *"This style, which rests upon both scholarly erudition and literary flair* – to quote a recent commentator – *ingeniously combines critical expository analysis and illuminating historical commentary. He moves from technical argumentation to cultural comment, with ease and wit"*. The capacity to cross disciplinary borders and bring in a fresh and often unexpected outlook, the unique ease in reducing apparently distinct experiences to their underlying unity, are all features of Richard Rorty's philosophical style.

With maximum economy of expression, in fact a distinctive feature of American philosophy, Richard Rorty grouped his main writings in the volumes **Consequences of Pragmatism. Essays 1972-1980** (1980), **Contingency, Irony and Solidarity** (1989), **Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth** (1991), **Essays on Heidegger and Others** (1991), **Truth and Progress** (1998), **Achieving our Country. Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America** (1999), while his major work remains the volume **Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature** (1979). In this series of books Richard Rorty articulated the philosophy of "pragmatic relativism" or of contextualism, which includes in its structure certain "items" that have become mandatory for the student of contemporary philosophy. By this I mean, for instance, the attempt to "overcome philosophical tradition" by reinserting Dewey in the main line of philosophy and by bringing instrumentalism into a fruitful "discussion" with Heidegger's attempt to "overcome tradition", on the basis of the famous "ontological difference". I also

mean Richard Rorty's endeavor to reposition philosophy within world culture, in the framework of his program meant to dismantle the claims of "foundationalist philosophy"; his significant efforts to outline the idea of the "unhappy conscience" within pragmatism in order to establish a platform for a "decentralized" approach to history and denounce the claims to finality made by current writings; the dislocation of "representationalist philosophy" in the direction of an "anti-Cartesian and anti-Kantian revolution; the replacement of "philosophical confrontation" by "conversation"; the redefinition of pragmatism and the revival of the dialogue between American and European philosophy; the recovery of the philosophical relevance of literature, democracy, of other fields fatally left outside philosophy by the expansion of analytical stylizations; the understanding of institutions as experiments in cooperation, against their traditional perception as embodiments of ahistoric reason or order; the denunciation of objectivism in the name of a relativity offered by inter-subjectivity; the reinstatement of "solidarity" as organizing value of life and knowledge.

Richard Rorty's philosophy has increasingly been in the attention of philosophers, men of letters, politicians. It has profoundly marked the contemporary philosophical minds and has set in motion the reflection of many people. The controversy between its "pragmatic relativism" and "contextualism", on the one hand, and the "realism" and the "universalism" promoted by Hilary Putnam or Jürgen Habermas, on the other, represents a milestone in the history of world philosophy. In both the United States and Europe, Richard Rorty's philosophy is perceived as a new, superlatively elaborated expression of the powerful trend of pragmatism, and as a "humanist pragmatism", better adapted to issues of contemporary life, being structured around the idea of "copying".

**In the field of philosophy, Richard Rorty was the one who gave the clearest and most powerful example of "pragmatic contextualism"**, the one who did most to undermine the rigid separation between disciplines (whose division he interprets as an experiment), to end the dominance of one language (languages are adapted by people in various contexts), to develop a hierarchy of disciplines, realism, comprehensive generalizations. **More than anyone else, Rorty has taken important steps towards opening philosophy to the concrete problems of human liberties**. He has brought significant arguments in order to relieve the debate on democracy of interrogations regarding ultimate issues; to acknowledge the preeminence of democracy over philosophy; to favor the inter-subjective agreement to the objectivisms claiming a correspondence with things; to give priority to reforms, **to concrete compromises**, in front of pretentious generalizations; to choose in favor of problem-solving rather than in

favor of a tiresome controversy on <<truth>>; to prefer concrete analysis to philosophical pathos; to favor the practice of gradual change instead of sterile talk about the system and to release "solidarity" from the constraints of generalizing philosophies; to denounce the "bystander" attitude in favor of the conviction that processes are not yet complete and depend upon the intervention of each individual.

Any philosophy can be considered from numerous angles, starting from various questions, with different optics, in distinct contexts. **Like any major philosophy, that of Richard Rorty has become today object to such considerations. Regardless of the various ways in which it has been understood, the theoretical culture brought to bear in its development remains impressive. The amazing outlooks it manages to find on almost any topic never cease to fascinate. The correlations it discovers among interrogations and disciplines remain highly instructive. Most inspiring is also the renewal with which it challenges contemporary philosophy and mentalities. Once again, Richard Rorty has managed to liberate intellectual reflection from the constraints of theoretical systematizations and has convincingly shown that spirit is free, and that freedom is the spirit's way of being.**

**After all, what else could a self-respecting university claim for itself if not its belonging to the continuous mobility ensured by spirit?** Today, the "Babeș-Bolyai" University honors Professor Richard Rorty for having demonstrated the freedom and the presence of spirit in our time. By honoring him, the University most certainly honors itself. May Professor Richard Rorty carry on the renewal of contemporary intellectual thought, and may this University benefit from the cooperation with the distinguished Professor both in terms of its own intellectual activity and of the training of the new generations!

# REMARKS AT DEGREE CEREMONY

## RICHARD RORTY

### Mr. Rector, distinguished colleagues, ladies and gentlemen:

I am greatly honored by the award of this doctoral degree, and very grateful for my association with Babes-Bolyai University. Occasions such as this forge links in the chains that bind the universities of the world together. These ties are surely among the most important and the most beneficial of international relationships.

Whereas relations between commercial firms, and even those between national governments, are inevitably competitive, those between universities are not. It does not diminish the worth of one university if a scientific discovery is made at a neighboring university, or if a breakthrough in scholarship happens on another continent. A triumph for one university is a triumph for all. The universities of the world form a single cooperative commonwealth. In that way, they provide a model for a utopian global society. Exchanges between universities are one of the means by which the possibility of non-competitive relations between nations becomes evident, and by which utopian political hope is reinforced.

The "world of learning" is not an empty phrase. There really is such a world, and all of us academics are citizens of it. The students and the teachers of the world's universities are already members of cosmopolitan international communities. These communities include all those able to appreciate the significance of work done within some particular academic discipline. Membership in those communities is part of the moral identity—the self-conception—of those working in that field. We think of ourselves as "good physicists" or "good lawyers" or "good philosophers" just insofar as we take ourselves to be good citizens of such communities—just insofar as we see our membership in such communities as giving meaning to our lives.

It would of course be silly to pretend that students and teachers have no selfish motives, or are uninterested in prestige and fame, or never engage in contentious rivalries. It is not that we academics are especially virtuous human beings. But it is nevertheless true that we are able to appreciate the fact that what is good for one scholar or scientist is good for all, that what benefits one university benefits all universities. We all recognize that academic work is not a zero-sum game.

It is often said that scholars and scientists are distinguished by their love of truth—their devotion to getting things right, to seeing things as they really are. Because of my own rather controversial philosophical views, however, I am dubious about the term "love of truth". It is misleading because it implies that there is something out there, something non-human, called "the Truth". The term "love of truth" suggests that we scholars and scientists feel a duty to this non-human entity—a duty which is distinct from our obligations to our fellow human beings. In this way of thinking the term "the Truth" takes over some of the functions that in a religious culture are served by the term "God".

I think that it would be best to rid ourselves of all such non-human entities, and to come to believe that the only obligations human beings have are to their fellow human beings. This conviction is at the heart of my philosophical outlook. In the remainder of my remarks I shall try to make this outlook plausible, and to suggest ways in which it incorporates the anti-metaphysical spirit of recent philosophy.

Instead of saying that universities are devoted to the pursuit of truth, I would prefer to say that universities have two sets of obligations: the first is to contribute to the flourishing of the human species in general, and the second is to contribute to the flourishing of those particular human communities which are the various academic disciplines. The first set of obligations amounts to the duty to serve social justice, to provide an outlet for protest against the oppression of the weak by the strong, and especially of the poor by the rich. Ever since the French Revolution, the universities have been among the principal centers of resistance to such oppression. I hope that they always will be. Countries that have succeeded in throwing off fascist and communist tyranny typically owe this success in part to the courage of dissident students and professors. In my own country, the universities have often provided the principal sanctuary for protest against the racial and economic inequalities that still prevent the US from realizing its democratic ideals. No university is worthy of the name unless it provides such a sanctuary and unless its members are aware of, and are rendered angry by, the suffering of those who do not enjoy the privileges from which they themselves profit.

The second principal function of the universities is to permit the academic disciplines to flourish by encouraging the free exercise of the imagination. Universities should provide spaces in which anything—any scientific theory, any social institution, any political platitude, any religious or philosophical outlook, any literary tradition—can be questioned, and even mocked. For such spaces are the growing points of moral and intellectual life. This is because within their boundaries there are no rules that need be obeyed

as long as conversation is permitted to flourish. Responsibility to informed conversational partners is the *only* methodological requirement for scientific or scholarly work. Being a good citizen of those communities is the only restriction placed on the individual imagination.

The only rule that a scientific or scholarly discipline imposes, or at least the only one that *should* be imposed on workers in such fields, is that one has to listen to what others say, respond to their objections, take their views into account. In short, one has to be conversable. One is not permitted to wall oneself up within a theory or an outlook. One has to acknowledge the existence of competing opinions and perspectives, and respond to criticisms, which give voice to such competing views. One may mock anything, but one has to respond to the replies of those who are being mocked. One can proclaim anything obsolete, but one has to explain in detail the advantages of whatever it is that one proposes to put in its place. One can proclaim anything sacrosanct, but one has to explain in detail why this privilege is being claimed, and respond in detail to objections to that claim.

In speaking of imagination rather than of reason and of conversability rather than the love of truth, I am using terminology which is appropriate to my own pragmatist philosophical views. Those views make me dubious not only about the familiar claim that the first duty of the scholar or the scientist is to seek the truth, but also about the familiar idea that we have a faculty called "reason" which is capable of distinguishing between truth and error. I distrust that claim and that idea, and should like to see both become obsolete. So I have an obligation to say why I think they should be replaced, and what I think they should be replaced by.

I think that we should not use "reason" as the name of a human faculty, as an innate capacity of human beings to distinguish the true from the false. Rather, we should use this word as the name of a particular social practice, the practice of gaining assent by persuasion rather than force, words rather than blows, conversation rather than threats or promises. So I would identify rationality with what I have been calling conversability. Reason is not a link between us and reality, but rather a link between us and our fellow human beings.

To defend reason is, as I see it, simply to defend the practices which flourish better within the universities of the modern world than within any other sector of modern society—the practices of listening to and responding to questions, of hearing the other side, or taking account of objections. Philosophers of almost every persuasion—Platonist metaphysicians or Derridean deconstructionists, theists and atheists, followers of Bertrand Russell

and followers of Edmund Husserl, admirers of Jürgen Habermas and admirers of Michel Foucault—are, in this sense, defenders of reason. Unfortunately, however, we philosophers often criticize one another by saying that our philosophical opponents are *enemies* of rationality, or of truth. We have an unhappy tendency to demonize philosophers who disagree with us. We often make ourselves look ridiculous by proclaiming that the prevalence of a particular philosophical view will have vast social consequences.

William James and John Dewey, the philosophers from whom I have learned most, were often the targets of this kind of criticism. They were said to have undermined the foundations of civilization by proclaiming that truth is relative, thereby convicting themselves of irrationalism. They were said to lack the noble motive—love of wisdom— that drove Socrates and has always been taken to be definitive of philosophy. My own criticisms of the claims that reality has an intrinsic nature, and that truth consists in accurate representation of that nature, have made me subject to similar charges.

If one thinks of philosophy as the love of wisdom, and of wisdom as consisting in the grasp of truth, and of truth as the accurate representation of a natural order, an order which exists independently of human language and human history, then one will indeed see pragmatists like myself as irrationalists, people who have betrayed Socrates and are no longer worthy of the name "philosopher". But, as you know, many twentieth-century movements within philosophy have conspired to deny the existence of such a natural order. The tradition in European philosophy which stems from Nietzsche ~ a tradition now often called "post-modernism" ~ insists that there is no way things are in themselves. The pragmatic tradition in anglophone philosophy agrees, and argues that, because no description of reality is closer to reality than any other, all such descriptions are to be judged by their utility for one or another human purpose. So both traditions have both been denounced as anti-philosophical philosophies, perversely repudiating the presuppositions of their own inquiries. Both have been accused of failing to love truth.

This is not the first century in which such accusations have been levied against controversial philosophical views. But saying counter-intuitive things, and questioning the presuppositions of previous philosophers is the only means by which philosophy makes progress. The love of something that can reasonably be called "wisdom" remains intact throughout such questionings, even if the definition of the term is in the process of being changed. I think that the anti-metaphysical movements of twentieth-century philosophy have made it advisable to rethink the meaning of the word "wisdom".

I shall use "pragmatism" as the name of the resistance that many twentieth-century philosophers have shown to metaphysics, and thus to the idea that reality has an intrinsic nature. This usage is not merely American chauvinism. I use it because the chief alternative description of doubts about metaphysics--"post-modernism"--seems to me have been ruined by over-use. So "pragmatism" will be my name for the views about truth, knowledge and rationality which were common to Nietzsche and William James. These views are corollaries of the denial that there is a natural order of things, an order which exists independently of human languages and human history.

The idea that there is no such order goes back to Hegel, who defines philosophy as "its time held in thought". This definition reflects his view that the thesis of the independence of the natural order from human history engenders skeptical doubt—doubt of the kind that becomes explicit in Descartes and again in Kant. This is doubt that the human subject can ever get in touch with the object, can ever know reality as it is in itself—doubt that it can ever penetrate through the veil of ideas to what lies on the other side of that veil. Hegel's redefinition of philosophy suggests that we stop thinking of philosophy as an attempt to get in touch with the eternal, and instead think of it as an attempt to bring together the latest products of the human imagination into a coherent whole. John Dewey's pragmatism follows up on this Hegelian suggestion.

Hegel said that nobody could be a philosopher who was not first a Spinozist. I take him to have meant that nobody could hope to overcome skepticism, to transcend the gap between subject and object that Platonic other-worldliness seems to open up, unless convinced that human thought is not something distinct from reality but is instead interwoven with it. In the religious language that Hegel often indulged in, this amounts to saying that God and man are not alien to one another. Hegel thought of himself as having historicized Spinoza's account of the intimacy between the human and the divine by saying that human history was the coming into being, the Incarnation, of the Absolute.

Pragmatism follow up on Hegel's attempt to use Spinoza against Platonic other-worldliness and, more specifically, against Cartesian and Kantian skepticism about the reach of human thought. We pragmatists naturalize and secularize Hegel, while trying to preserve Hegelian historicism intact. We do so by interpreting moral and intellectual progress as a series of imaginative leaps, leaps which result in new descriptions of reality. The history of these successive descriptions is the history of the emergence of the truth about reality. There is no truth to be found outside of that history. There is no point in raising the question of whether that history reveals reality as it is in itself.

Pragmatism reaffirms Hegel's conviction that reality is what it is because the human imagination has done what it has done, and will do what it will do. To avoid skepticism, pragmatists think, we must not think of the independence of reality from thought as the independence of reality from any description of it in human language. For that way of thinking makes the Kantian fantasy of unknowable things in themselves inevitable. Instead, we must think of this independence as the fact that any given set of imaginative descriptions of things may always be displaced by another such description. The imagination of the present may always be surpassed by the imagination of the future. The essential point that Hegel made against Plato, Descartes and Kant is that human beings should measure their descriptions of the real against the descriptions that will be offered by future generations. They should not attempt to measure those descriptions against the way reality always already is, for any such attempt will lead us back to skepticism.

This is my gloss on Hegel's historicization of Spinozism, and my version of Hegel's claim that good philosophers must be Spinozists. Good philosophers are those who have ceased to be tempted by skepticism, and, more generally, by the traditional problematic of appearance and reality. I see the key to overcoming this temptation as the ability to accept the idea that no description of reality comes closer to the intrinsic nature of reality than any other. We can get along quite well without the idea that reality has an intrinsic nature, without the idea that there is a natural order of things. That is why Spinoza's famous claim that God or Nature can be described equally adequately under the attribute of thought and under the attribute of extension seems to me a great breakthrough in philosophical thinking. For this claim take us beyond the futile strife between materialists and idealists and into a new intellectual world, one in which we no longer ask "which description gets reality right?" but instead ask "what new descriptions of reality do we need in addition to those we already have?"

Spinoza's reconciliation of body and mind, matter and spirit, is accomplished with the notion of "equally valid alternative descriptions of the same reality". But that notion contains the seeds of its own destruction. For once we allow the notion of "alternative, but equally valid, descriptions, of reality" into philosophy, the very idea of the natural order is in danger. Before Spinoza it had seemed obvious that any two competing descriptions of what is going on could be compared in point of adequacy. The less adequate description could then be deemed a description of appearance, and the more adequate a description of reality. But as soon as one deploys the Spinozistic idea of equally adequate descriptions, one may wonder if one is talking about the same reality under two adequate descriptions, or rather about two different appearances of

the same reality~a reality which perhaps remains uncaught by either description. If one succumbs to this temptation, however, one begins to move from Spinoza's utterly knowable universe to Kant's unknowable thing-in-itself. For one will be tempted to say that the fact two irreconcilable descriptions can describe the same thing equally well does not show that either description captures the thing as undescribed, as it truly is in itself.

Pragmatism is, I think, the best way to resist this temptation. It is the most effective antidote to the Kantian skepticism against which Hegel set his face. The best way to avoid the Kantian idea that things have an intrinsic nature which floats free of all human language is to say that the only measure of a description is its utility for human purposes. To avoid Kant, we have to say with Hegel that the successive descriptions offered in human language are the very substance of the Absolute. The naturalistic, pragmatist, way of restating this Hegelian point is to urge that we drop the question of how things are in themselves, and instead devote oneself to the question of which descriptive vocabularies might get us what we want.

Pragmatists set aside the idea of "a natural order", the idea that a true belief is one that corresponds to this order, and the idea that perfect wisdom would consist in complete correspondence to it. Pragmatists urge that to have an order is simply to be described in a language, and that no language is any more natural than any other. Any descriptive vocabulary comprehensive enough to relate lots of the things we talk about to lots of other such things is a description of an ordered universe. But once one starts thinking in terms of equally valid descriptions, the idea that nature might have a preferred self-description begins to seem merely quaint. Nature under a description will always exhibit an order. But nature undescribed in any human language is simply the unknowable thing-in-itself~an utterly useless notion, a philosopher's plaything, a toy rather than a tool.

To sum up: the more one thinks about language, the less need there is to think about nature. The yearning for wisdom that motivated Socrates and Spinoza remains, but now the possibility arises that one may become wise by contriving a new language for human beings to speak, rather than by getting in touch with something non-human. The old idea that wisdom can be obtained only by getting aligning oneself with the natural order begins to be replaced by the new idea that it might be obtained by finding a new way to talk. This shift in the meaning of the term "wisdom" accords with the Nietzschean idea that we human beings should aim not at getting in touch with our creator, or with The Truth, but rather at self-creation. We should aim at becoming a lamp rather than a mirror.

One effect of thinking about language rather than nature is to refocus philosophers' attention. A focus on the natural sciences and to mathematics—a focus which persisted from Descartes to Kant, but which Hegel endeavored to change—was a natural consequence of the displacement, in the seventeenth century, of a religious by a scientific worldview. But from Hegel onwards it became possible for philosophers to pay as much attention to art and to politics as to science. We pragmatists have capitalized on this change by urging that we think of the language of the physical sciences as one more imaginative human creation, useful for some purposes and not for others. The description of the world in terms of atoms and the void, and of human beings in terms of cells and enzymes, is, we argue, good for technology, but useless for art and politics. Technological purposes are as valid as poetic and political purposes, but their fulfillment does not bring us closer to reality. The natural sciences have no greater or lesser a claim to truth than do any other areas of inquiry.

I have been singling out one element in Spinoza's thought—the idea of equally valid description in different languages—and suggesting that it be seen a turning-point in the history of philosophy. It is the point at which it becomes possible to stop looking backward to Plato and Democritus, and to start looking forward to Romanticism, Nietzsche, and pragmatism. But to see Spinoza's role in the history of philosophy in this way is, of course, to neglect Spinoza's own deepest conviction: that every apparent diversity will be resolved when one takes a larger view: that the more things are related to one another, the less problematic and troublesome they become, that all languages are commensurable.

Hegel was the first to suggest that contradiction rather than commensuration was at the heart of intellectual and moral progress, the means by which wisdom was attained. He was also the first to suggest that wisdom might be exemplified in the construction of a synoptic historical narrative rather than in a grasp of eternal truths. This latter suggestion seems to me more important and fruitful than the first. For it amounts to saying that philosophy should, by holding its time in thought, be responsible for keeping track of the differences between the imagination of the past and the imagination of the present. It should do so in the hope of making the future even more different from the present than the present is from the past. That, we pragmatists believe, is the hope the universities should substitute for the hope of describing reality as it is in itself. We should think of ourselves not as lovers of truth but as lovers of humanity—humanity as it may someday be.

I have offered this account of the genesis of pragmatism out of the Hegelian reaction to Kantian skepticism in order to explain why, at the beginning of my remarks, I used terms like "imagination" and "conversability"

rather than "reason" and "truth" in my account of the functions of the university. I hope to have persuaded you that pragmatism should not be condemned as irrationalistic or relativistic, but should instead be viewed as an attempt to capitalize on the gains that Hegel made.

I hope also that I have rendered plausible the idea that universities such as Babeş‑Bolyai and Stanford are better understood as places where the imagination is set free than as places in which human beings approach ever nearer to the ultimate nature of things. On the conception of the university's function that I have been putting forward, its main task is to keep the conversation of humankind going by constantly advancing imaginative suggestions about how things might be redescribed. None of these descriptions is better than its predecessors in the sense of corresponding better to the way things truly are. But they may suggest ways of making human life better than it has been in the past—ways either to diminish human suffering or to enlarge our sense of the possibilities open to our species.

# THE DECLINE OF REDEMPTIVE TRUTH AND THE RISE OF A LITERARY CULTURE: THE WAY THE WESTERN INTELLECTUALS WENT

## RICHARD RORTY

Questions such as "Does truth exist?" or "Do you believe in truth?" seem fatuous and pointless. Everybody knows that the difference between true and false beliefs is as important as that between nourishing and poisonous foods. Moreover, one of the principal achievements of recent analytic philosophy is to have shown that the ability to wield the concept of "true belief" is a necessary condition for being a user of language, and thus for being a rational agent.

Nevertheless, the question "Do you believe in truth or are you one of those frivolous postmodernists?" is often the first one that journalists ask intellectuals whom they are assigned to interview. That question now plays the role previously played by the question "Do you believe in God, or are you one of those dangerous atheists?". Literary types are frequently told that they do not love truth sufficiently. Such admonitions are delivered in the same tones in which their predecessors were reminded that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.

Obviously, the sense of the word "truth" invoked by that question is not the everyday one. Nobody is worried about a mere nominalization of the adjective "true". The question "do you believe that truth exists?" is shorthand for something like "Do you think that there is a natural terminus to inquiry, a way things really are, and that understanding what that way is will tell us what to do with ourselves?"

Those who, like myself, find themselves accused of postmodernist frivolity do not think that there is such a terminus. We think that inquiry is just another name for problem-solving, and we cannot imagine inquiry into how human beings should live, into what we should make of ourselves, coming to an end. For solutions to old problems will produce fresh problems, and so on forever. As with the individual, so with both the society and the species: each stage of maturation will overcome previous dilemmas only by creating new ones.

Problems about what to do with ourselves, what purposes to serve, differ, in this respect, from scientific problems. A complete and final unified science, a harmoniously orchestrated assemblage of scientific theories none of which will ever need to be revised, is an intelligible goal. Scientific inquiry

could, conceivably, terminate. So if a unified account of the causal relations between all spatio-temporal events were all that were meant by "truth", even the most far-out postmodernist types would have no reason to doubt truth's existence. The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question.

I shall use the term 'redemptive truth' for a set of beliefs which would end, once and for all, the process of reflection on what to do with ourselves. Redemptive truth would not consist in theories about how things interact causally, but instead would fulfill the need that religion and philosophy have attempted to satisfy. This is the need to fit everything—every thing, person, event, idea and poem ~into a single context, a context which will somehow reveal itself as natural, destined, and unique. It would be the only context that would matter for purposes of shaping our lives, because it would be the only one in which those lives appear as they truly are. To believe in redemptive truth is to believe that there is something that stands to human life as elementary physical particles stand to the four elements—something that is the reality behind the appearance, the one true description of what is going on, the final secret.

Hope that such a context can be found is one species of a larger genus. The larger genus is what Heidegger called the hope for authenticity—the hope to be one's own person rather than merely the creation of one's education or one's environment. As Heidegger emphasized, to achieve authenticity in this sense is not necessarily to *reject* one's past. It may instead be a matter of reinterpreting that past so as to make it more suitable for one's own purposes. What matters is to have seen one or more alternatives to the purposes that most people take for granted, and to have chosen among these alternatives~thereby, in some measure, creating yourself. As Harold Bloom has recently reminded us, the point of reading a great many books is to become aware of a great number of alternative purposes, and the point of *that* is to become an autonomous self. Autonomy, in this un-Kantian and distinctively Bloomian sense, is pretty much the same thing as Heideggerian authenticity.

I shall define an intellectual as someone who yearns for Bloomian autonomy, and is lucky enough to have the money and leisure to do something about it: to visit different churches or gurus, go to different theatres or museums, and, above all, to read a lot of different books. Most human beings, even those who have the requisite money and leisure, are not intellectuals. If they read books it is not because they seek redemption but either because they wish to be entertained or distracted, or because they want to become better able to carry out some antecedent purpose. They do not read books to find out what purposes to have. The intellectuals do.

Given these definitions of the terms "redemptive truth" and "intellectual", I can now state my thesis. It is that the intellectuals of the West have, since the Renaissance, progressed through three stages: they have hoped for redemption first from God, then from philosophy, and now from literature. Monotheistic religion offers hope for redemption through entering into a new relation to a supremely powerful non-human person. Belief—as in belief in the articles of a creed—may be only incidental to such a relationship. For philosophy, however, beliefs are of the essence. Redemption by philosophy is through the acquisition of a set of beliefs, which represent things in the one way they really are. Literature, finally, offers redemption through making the acquaintance of as great a variety of human beings as possible. Here again, as in religion, true belief may be of little importance.

From within a literary culture, religion and philosophy appear as literary genres. As such, they are optional. Just as an intellectual may opt to read many poems but few novels, or many novels but few poems, so he or she may read much philosophy, or much religious writing, but relatively few poems or novels. The difference between the literary intellectuals' readings of *all* these books and other readings of them is that the inhabitant of a literary culture treats books as human attempts to meet human needs, rather than as acknowledgements of the power of a being that is what it is apart from any such needs. God and Truth, are, respectively the religious and the philosophical names for that sort of being.

The transition from religion to philosophy began with the revival of Platonism in the Renaissance, the period in which humanists began asking the same questions about Christian monotheism that Socrates had asked about Hesiod's pantheon. Socrates had suggested to Euthyphro that the real question was not whether one's actions were pleasing to the gods, but rather which gods held the correct views about what actions ought to be done. When that latter question was once again taken seriously, the road lay open to Kant's conclusion that even the Holy One of the Gospels must be judged in the light of one's own conscience.

The transition from a philosophical to a literary culture began shortly after Kant, about the time that Hegel warned us that philosophy paints its gray on gray only when a form of life has grown old. That remark helped the generation of Kierkegaard and Marx realize that philosophy was never going to fill the redemptive role that Hegel himself had claimed for it. Hegel's supremely ambitious claims for philosophy almost instantly flip-flopped into their dialectical opposite. His System was no sooner published than it began to be treated as a self-consuming artifact, the reductio ad absurdum of a form of intellectual life that suddenly seemed to be on its last legs.

Since Hegel's time, the intellectuals have been losing faith in philosophy, in the idea that redemption can come in the form of true beliefs. In the literary culture which has been emerging during the last two hundred years, the question "Is it true?" has yielded pride of place to the question "What's new?" Heidegger thought that that change was a decline, a shift from serious thinking to mere gossipy curiosity. (See the discussions of *das Gerede* and *die Neugier* in sections 35-36 of Sein und Zeit.) Many fans of natural science, people who otherwise have no use for Heidegger, would agree with him on this point. On the account I am offering, however, this change is an advance. It represents a desirable replacement of bad questions like "What is Being?", "What is really real?" and "What is man?" with the sensible question "Does anybody have any new ideas about what we human beings might manage to make of themselves?"

In its pure form, undiluted by philosophy, religion is a relation to a non-human person. This relation may be one of adoring obedience, or ecstatic communion, or quiet confidence, or some combination of these. But it is only when religion has become mingled with philosophy that this non-cognitive redemptive relation to a person begins to be mediated by a creed. Only when the God of the philosophers has begun to replace the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is correct belief thought to be essential to salvation.

For religion in its uncontaminated form, argument is no more in point than is belief. To become a New Being in Christ is, Kierkegaard insisted, not the same sort of thing as being forced to grant the truth of a proposition in the course of Socratic reflection, or as the outcome of Hegelian dialectic. Insofar as religion requires belief in a proposition, it is, as Locke said, belief based on the credit of the proposer rather than belief backed by argument. But beliefs are irrelevant to the special devotion of the illiterate believer to Demeter, or to the Virgin of Guadelupe, or to the little fat god on the third altar from the left at the temple down the street. It is this irrelevance that intellectuals like St. Paul, Kierkegaard, and Karl Barth—spiritual athletes who relish the thought that their faith is a folly to the Greeks—hope to recapture.

To take the philosophical ideal of redemptive truth seriously one must believe both that the life that cannot be successfully argued for is not worth living, and that persistent argument will lead all inquirers to the same set of beliefs. Religion and literature, insofar as they are uncontaminated by philosophy, share neither of these convictions. Uncontaminated religion may be monotheistic in the sense that a community may think it essential to worship only one particular god. But the idea that there can *be* only one god, that polytheism is contrary to reason, is one that can only take hold after philosophy has convinced us that every human being's reflections must lead to the same outcome.

As I am using the terms "literature" and "literary culture", a culture which has substituted literature for both religion and philosophy finds redemption neither in a non-cognitive relation to a non-human person nor in a cognitive relation to propositions, but in non-cognitive relations to other human beings, relations mediated by human artifacts such as books and buildings, paintings and songs. These artifacts provide glimpses of alternative ways of being human. This sort of culture drops a presupposition common to religion and philosophy—that redemption must come from one's relation to something that is not just one more human creation,

Kierkegaard rightly said that philosophy began to set up itself up as a rival to religion when Socrates suggested that our self-knowledge was a knowledge of God—that we had no need of help from a non-human person, because the truth was already within us. But literature began to set itself up as a rival to philosophy when people like Cervantes and Shakespeare began to suspect that human beings were, and ought to be, so diverse that there is no point in pretending that they all carry a single truth deep in their bosoms. Santayana pointed to this seismic cultural shift in his essay "The absence of religion in Shakespeare". That essay might equally well have called "The absence of either religion or philosophy in Shakespeare" or simply "The absence of truth in Shakespeare".

I suggested earlier that "do you believe in truth?" can be given both sense and urgency if it is reformulated as "Do you think that there is a single set of beliefs which can serve a redemptive role in the lives of all human beings, which can be rationally justified to all human beings under optimal communicative conditions, and which will thus form the natural terminus of inquiry?" To answer "yes" to this reformulated question is to take philosophy as the guide of life. It is to agree with Socrates that there is a set of beliefs which is both susceptible of rational justification and such as to take rightful precedence over every other consideration in determining what to do with one's life. The premise of philosophy is that there is a way things really are—a way humanity and the rest of the universe are and always will be, independent of any merely contingent human needs and interests. Knowledge of this way is redemptive. It can therefore replace religion. The striving for Truth can take place of the search for God.

It is not clear that Homer, or even Sophocles, could have made sense of this suggestion. Before Plato dreamt them up, the constellation of ideas necessary to make sense of it were not available. But Cervantes and Shakespeare both understood Plato's suggestion and distrusted his motives. Their distrust led them to play up diversity and downplay commonality—to underline the differences between human beings rather than looking for a

common human nature. This change of emphasis weakens the grip of the Platonic assumption that all these different sorts of people should be arranged in a hierarchy, judged on the basis of their relative success at attaining a single goal. Initiatives like Cervantes' and Shakespeare's helped create a new sort of intellectual—one who does not take the availability of redemptive truth for granted, and is not much interested in whether either God or Truth exist.

This change helped create today's high culture, one to which religion and philosophy have become marginal. To be sure, there are still numerous religious intellectuals, and even more philosophical ones. But bookish youngsters in search of redemption nowadays look first to novels, plays, and poems. The sort of books which the eighteenth century thought of as marginal have become central. The authors of *Rasselas* and of *Candide* helped bring about, but could hardly have foreseen, a culture in which the most revered writers neither write nor read either sermons, or treatises on the nature of man and the universe.

For members of the literary culture, redemption is to be achieved by getting in touch with the present limits of the human imagination. That is why a literary culture is always in search of novelty, always hoping to spot what Shelley called "the shadows that futurity casts upon the present", rather than trying to escape from the temporal to the eternal. It is a premise of this culture that though the imagination has present limits, these limits are capable of being extended forever. The imagination endlessly consumes its own artifacts. It is an ever-living, ever-expanding, fire. It is as subject to time and chance as are the flies and the worms, but while it endures and preserves the memory of its past, it will continue to transcend its previous limits. Though the fear of belatedness is ever present within the literary culture, this very fear makes for an intenser blaze.

The sort of person I am calling a "literary intellectual" thinks that a life that is not lived close to the present limits of the human imagination is not worth living. For the Socratic idea of self-examination and self-knowledge, the literary intellectual substitutes the idea of enlarging the self by becoming acquainted with still more ways of being human. For the religious idea that a certain book or tradition might connect you up with a supremely powerful or supremely lovable non-human person, the literary intellectual substitutes the Bloomian thought that the more books you read, the more ways of being human you have considered, the more human you become—the less tempted by dreams of an escape from time and chance, the more convinced that we humans have nothing to rely on save one another.

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I hope that what I have said so far has given some plausibility to my thesis that the last five centuries of Western intellectual life may usefully be thought of first as progress from religion to philosophy, and then from philosophy to literature. I call it progress because I see philosophy as a transitional stage in a process of gradually increasing self-reliance. The great virtue of our new-found literary culture is that it tells young intellectuals that the only source of redemption is the human imagination, and that this fact should occasion pride rather than despair.

The idea of redemptive truth requires the conviction that a set of beliefs which can be justified to all human beings will also fill all the needs of all human beings. But that idea was an inherently unstable compromise between the masochistic urge to submit to the non-human and the need to take proper pride in our humanity. Redemptive truth is an attempt to find something which is not made by human beings but to which human beings have a special, privileged relation not shared by the animals. The intrinsic nature of things is like a god in its independence of us, and yet—so Socrates and Hegel tell us— self-knowledge will suffice to get us in touch with it. One way to see the quest for knowledge of such a quasi-divinity is as Sartre saw it: it is a futile passion, a foredoomed attempt to become a for-itself-in-itself. But it would be better to see philosophy as one our greatest imaginative achievements, on a par with the invention of the gods.

Philosophers have often described religion as a primitive and insufficiently unreflective attempt to philosophize. But, as I said earlier, a fully self-conscious literary culture would describe both religion and philosophy as relatively primitive, yet glorious, literary genres. They are genres in which it is now becoming increasingly difficult to write, but the genres which are replacing them might never have emerged had they not been read as swerves away from religion, and later as swerves away from philosophy. Religion and philosophy are not merely, from this point of view, ladders to be thrown away. Rather, they are stages in a process of maturation, a process which we should continually look back to, and recapitulate, in the hope of attaining still greater self-reliance.

In the hope of making this account of philosophy as a transitional genre more plausible, I shall say something about the two great movements in which philosophy culminated. Philosophy began to come into its own when the thinkers of the Enlightenment no longer had to hide themselves behind the sort of masks worn by Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, and were able to be openly atheistic. These masks could be dropped after the French Revolution. That event, by making it plausible that human beings might build a new heaven and a new earth, made God seem far less necessary than before.

That new-found self-reliance produced the two great metaphysical systems in which philosophy culminated. First came the metaphysics of German idealism, and second, the reaction against idealism which was materialist metaphysics, the apotheosis of the results of natural science. The first movement belongs to the past. Materialist metaphysics, however, is still with us. It is, in fact, pretty much the only version of redemptive truth presently on offer. It is philosophy's last hurrah, its last attempt to provide redemptive truth and thereby avoid being demoted to the status of a literary genre.

This is not the place to recapitulate the rise and fall of German idealism, nor to eulogize what Heidegger called "the greatness, breadth, and originality of that spiritual world." It suffices for my present purposes to say that Hegel, the most original of the idealists, believed himself to be have given the first satisfactory proof of the existence of God, and the first satisfactory solution to the traditional theological problem of evil. He was, in his own eyes, the first fully successful natural theologian—the first to reconcile Socrates with Christ by showing that the Incarnation was not an act of grace on God's part but rather a necessity. "God", Hegel said, "had to have a Son" because eternity is nothing without time, God nothing without man, Truth nothing without its historical emergence.

In Hegel's eyes, the Platonic hope of escape from the temporal to the eternal was a primitive, albeit necessary, stage of philosophical thinking—a stage that the Christian doctrine of Incarnation has helped us outgrow. Now that Kant has opened the way to seeing mind and world as interdependent, Hegel believed, we are in a position to see that philosophy can bridge the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal, just as Christ's stay on earth overcame the distinction between God and man.

Idealist metaphysics seemed both true and demonstrable to some of the best minds of the nineteenth century. Josiah Royce, for example, wrote book after book arguing that Hegel was right: simple armchair reflection on the presuppositions of common sense, exactly the sort of philosophizing that Socrates practiced and commended, will lead you to recognize the truth of pantheism as surely as reflection on geometrical diagrams will lead you to the Pythagorean Theorem. But the verdict of the literary culture on this metaphysics was nicely formulated by Kierkegaard when he said "Had Hegel written at the end of his *System of Logic* 'this was all just a thought-experiment' he would have been the greatest thinker who ever lived. As it is he is merely a buffoon."

I would rephrase Kierkegaard's point as follows: if Hegel had been able to stop thinking that he had given us redemptive truth, and claimed instead to have given us something *better* than redemptive truth—namely a way of holding all the previous products of the human imagination together in a single vision—

he would have been the first philosopher to admit that a better cultural product than philosophy had come on the market. He would have been the first philosopher to self-consciously replace philosophy with literature, just as Socrates and Plato were the first self-consciously to replace religion with philosophy. But instead Hegel presented himself as having discovered Absolute Truth, and men like Royce took him with a seriousness which now strikes us as both endearing and ludicrous. So it was left to Nietzsche, in THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY, to tell us that the premise common to Socrates and Hegel should be rejected, and that the invention of the idea of self-knowledge was a great imaginative achievement that has outlived its usefulness.

Between Hegel's time and Nietzsche's, however, there arose the second of the great philosophical movements, one which bore the same relation to Democritus and Lucretius that Hegel had borne to Parmenides and Plotinus. This was the attempt to put natural science in the place of both religion and Socratic reflection, to see empirical inquiry as providing exactly what Socrates thought it could never give us—redemptive truth.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, it had become clear that mathematics and empirical science were going to be the only areas of culture in which one might conceivably hope to get unanimous, rational agreement—the only disciplines able to provide beliefs which would not be overturned as history rolls along. They were the only sources of cumulative results, and of propositions which were plausible candidates for the status of insight into the way things are in themselves, independent of the contingencies of human history. Unified natural science still seems to many intellectuals to be the answer to Socrates' prayers.

On the other hand, pretty much everybody in the nineteenth century had come to agree with Hume that Plato's model of cognitive success—mathematics—was never going to offer us anything redemptive. Only a few flaky neo-Pythagoreans still saw mathematics has having more than practical and aesthetic interest. So nineteenth century positivists drew the moral that the only other source of rational agreement and unshakable truth, empirical science, just *had* to have a redemptive function. Since philosophy had always taught that an account which bound everything together into a coherent whole would have redemptive value, and since the collapse of idealist metaphysics had left materialism as the only possible candidate for such an account, the positivists concluded that natural science was all the philosophy we would ever need.

This project of giving redemptive status to empirical science still appeals to two sorts of present-day intellectuals. The first is the kind of philosopher who insists that natural science attains objective truth in a way that no other portion of culture does. These philosophers usually go on to claim that the natural

scientist is the paradigmatic possessor of intellectual virtues, notably the love of truth, which are scarcely to seek among literary critics. The second sort of intellectual who continues along the lines laid down by the nineteenth century positivists is the kind of scientist who announces that the latest work is in his discipline has deep philosophical implications: that advances in evolutionary biology or cognitive science, for example, do more than tell us how things work and what they are made of. They also tell us, these scientists say, something about how to live, about human nature, about what we really are. They provide, if not redemption, at least wisdom—not merely instructions on how to produce more effective tools for getting what we want but wise counsel about what we should want.

I shall take up these two groups of people separately. The problem about the attempt by philosophers to treat the empirical scientist as a paradigm of intellectual virtue is that the astrophysicists' love of truth seems no different from that of the classical philologist or the archive-oriented historian. All these people are trying hard to get something right. So, when it comes to that, are the master carpenter, the skilled accountant, and the careful surgeon. The need to get it right is central to all these people's sense of who they are, of what makes their lives worthwhile.

It is certainly the case that without people whose lives are centered around this need we should never have had much in the way of civilization. The free play of the imagination is possible only because of the substructure which literal-minded people have built. No artisans, no poets. No theoretical scientists to provide the technology of an industrialized world, few people with sufficient money to send their children off to be initiated into a literary culture. But there is no reason to take the contributions of the natural scientist to this substructure as having a moral or philosophical significance that is lacking in those of the carpenter, the accountant, and the surgeon.

John Dewey thought that the fact that the mathematical physicist enjoys greater prestige than the skilled artisan is an unfortunate legacy of the Platonic-Aristotelian distinction between eternal truths and empirical truth, the elevation of leisured contemplation above sweaty practicality. His point might be restated by saying that the prestige of the scientific theorist is an unfortunate legacy of the Socratic idea that what we can all, as a result of rational debate, agree to be true is a reflection of something more than the fact of agreement—the idea that intersubjective agreement under ideal communicative conditions is a token of correspondence to the way things really are.

The current debate among analytic philosophers about whether truth is a matter of correspondence to reality, and the parallel debate over Kuhn's denial that science is asymptotically approaching the really real, are disputes

between those who see empirical science as fulfilling at least some of Plato's hopes and those who think that those hopes should be abandoned. The former philosophers take it as a matter of unquestionable common sense that adding a brick to the edifice of knowledge is a matter of more accurately aligning thought and language with the way things really are. Their philosophical opponents take this so-called common sense to be merely what Dewey thought it: a relic of the religious hope that redemption can come from contact with something non-human and supremely powerful. To abandon the latter idea, the idea that links philosophy with religion, would mean acknowledging both the ability of scientists to add bricks to the edifice of knowledge and the practical utility of scientific theories for prediction while insisting on the irrelevance of both achievements to searches for redemption.

These debates among the analytic philosophers have little to do with the activities of the second sort of people whom I have labeled "materialist metaphysicians". These are the scientists who think that the public at large should take an interest in the latest discoveries about the genome, or cerebral localization, or child development, or quantum mechanics. Such scientists are good at dramatizing the contrast between the old scientific theories and the shiny new ones, but they are bad at explaining why we should care about the difference. They are in the same situation as critics of art and literature who are good at pointing to the differences between novels of the 1890's and those of the 1920's, or between what filled the art galleries ten years ago and what fills them now, but bad at explaining why these changes are important.

There is, however, a difference between such critics and the sort of scientists I am talking about. The former usually have the sense to avoid the mistake Clement Greenberg made—the mistake of claiming that what fills the art galleries this year is what all the ages have been leading up to, and that there is an inner logic to the history of the products of the imagination that has now reached its destined outcome. But the scientists still retain the idea that the latest product of the scientific imagination is not just an improvement on what was previously imagined, but is also closer to the intrinsic nature of things. That is why they found Kuhn's suggestion that they think of themselves as problem solvers so insulting. Their rhetoric remains "We have substituted reality for appearance!" rather than "We have solved some long-standing problems!" or "We have made it new!"

The trouble with this rhetoric is that it puts a glossy metaphysical varnish on a useful scientific product. It suggests that we have not only learned more about how to predict and control our environment and ourselves but also done something more—something of redemptive significance. But the successive achievements of modern science exhausted their philosophical significance

when they made clear that a causal account of the relations between spatio-temporal events did not require the operation of non-physical forces—when it showed us that there are no spooks.

Modern science, in short, has helped us see that if you want a metaphysics, then a materialistic metaphysics is the only one to have. But it has not given us any reason to think that we need a metaphysics. The need for metaphysics lasted only as long as the hope for redemptive truth lasted. But by the time that materialism triumphed over idealism, this hope had waned. So the reaction of most contemporary intellectuals to gee-whiz announcements of new scientific discoveries is "So what?" This reaction is not, as C. P. Snow thought, a matter of pretentious and ignorant litterateurs condescending to honest, hard-working empirical inquirers. It is the perfectly sensible reaction of someone who wants to know about ends and is offered information about means.

The literary culture's attitude toward materialist metaphysics is, and should be, something like this: whereas both Plato's and Hegel's attempts to give us something more interesting than physics were laudable attempts to find a redemptive discipline to put in the place of religion, a materialist metaphysics is just physics getting above itself. Modern science is a gloriously imaginative way of describing things, brilliantly successful for the purpose for which it was developed—namely, predicting and controlling phenomena. But it should not pretend to have the sort of redemptive power claimed by its defeated rival, idealist metaphysics.

Questions of the "So what?" sort began to be posed to scientists by intellectuals of the nineteenth century who were gradually learning, as Nietzsche was to put it, to see science through the optic of art, and art through that of life. Nietzsche's master Emerson was one such figure, and Baudelaire another. Although many of the literary intellectuals of this period thought of themselves as having transcended Romanticism, they nevertheless could agree with Schiller that the further maturation of mankind will be achieved through what Kant called "the aesthetic" rather than through what he called "the ethical". They could also endorse Shelley's claim that the great task of human emancipation from priests and tyrants could have been accomplished without "Locke, Hume, Gibbon, Voltaire and Rousseau" but that "it exceeds all imagination to conceive what would have been the moral condition of the world if neither Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Calderon, Lord Bacon nor Milton, had ever existed; if Raphael and Michael Angelo had never been born; if the Hebrew poetry had never been translated, if a revival of the study of Greek literature had never taken place, if no monuments of ancient sculpture had been handed down to us, and if the poetry and the religion of the ancient world had been extinguished together with its belief".

What Shelley said of Locke and Hume he might also have said of Galileo, Newton and Lavoisier. What each of them said was well argued, useful, and true. But the sort of truth that is the product of successful argument cannot, Shelley thought, improve our moral condition. Of Galileo's and Locke's productions we may reasonably ask "Yes, but is it true?" But there is little point, Shelley rightly thought, in asking this question about Milton. "Objectively true", in the sense of "such as to gain permanent assent from all future members of the relevant expert culture", is not a notion that will ever be useful to literary intellectuals, for the progress of the literary imagination is not a matter of accumulating *results*.

We philosophers who are accused of not having sufficient respect for objective truth—the ones whom the materialist metaphysicians like to call "postmodern relativists"—think of objectivity as intersubjectivity. So we can happily agree that scientists achieve objective truth in a way that litterateurs do not, simply because scientists are organized into expert cultures in a way that literary intellectuals should not even try to organize themselves. You can have an expert culture if you agree on what you want to get, but not if you are wondering what sort of life you ought to desire. We know what purposes scientific theories are supposed to serve. But we are not now, and never will be, in a position to say what purposes novels, poems and plays are supposed to serve. For such books continually redefine our purposes.

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So far I have said nothing about the relation of the literary culture to politics. I want to close by turning to that topic. For the quarrel between those who see the rise of the literary culture as a good thing and those who see it as a bad thing is largely a quarrel about what sort of high culture will do most to create and sustain the climate of tolerance that flourishes best in democratic societies.

Those who argue that a science-centered culture is best for this purpose set the love of truth over against hatred, passion, prejudice, superstition, and all the other forces of unreason from which Socrates and Plato claimed that philosophy could save us. But those on the other side hope are dubious about the Platonic opposition between reason and unreason. They see no need to relate the difference between tolerant conversability and stiff-necked unwillingness to hear the other side to a distinction between a higher part of ourselves that enables us to achieve redemption by getting in touch with non-human reality and another part which is merely animal.

The strong point of those who think that a proper respect for objective truth, and thus for science, is important for sustaining a climate of tolerance and good will is that argument is essential to both science and democracy. Both when choosing between alternative scientific theories and when choosing between alternative pieces of legislation, we want people to base their decisions on arguments—arguments that start from premises which can be made plausible to anyone who cares to look into the matter.

The priests rarely provided such arguments, nor do the literary intellectuals. So it is tempting to think of a preference for literature over science as a rejection of argument in favor of oracular pronouncements—a regression to something uncomfortably like the pre-philosophical, religious, stage of Western intellectual life. Seen from this perspective, the rise of a literary culture looks like the treason of the clerks.

But those of us who rejoice in the emergence of the literary culture can counter this charge by saying that although argumentation is essential for projects of social cooperation, redemption is an individual, private, matter. Just as the rise of religious toleration depended on making a distinction between the needs of society and the needs of the individual, and on saying that religion was not necessary for the former, so the literary culture asks us to disjoin political deliberation from projects of redemption. This means acknowledging that their private hopes for authenticity and autonomy should be left at home when the citizens of a democratic society foregather to deliberate about what is to be done.

Making this move amounts to saying: the only way in which science is relevant to politics is that the natural scientists provide a good example of social cooperation, of an expert culture in which argumentation flourishes. They thereby provide a model for political deliberation—a model of honesty, tolerance, and trust. This ability is a matter of procedure rather than results, which is why gangs of carpenters or teams of engineers can provide as good a model as do departments of astrophysics. The difference between reasoned agreement on how to solve a problem that has arisen in the course of constructing a house or a bridge and reasoned agreement on what physicists sometimes call "a theory of everything" is, in this context, irrelevant. For whatever the last theory of everything tells us, it will do nothing to provide either political guidance or individual redemption.

The claim I have just made may seem arrogant and dogmatic, for it is certainly the case that some results of empirical inquiry have, in the past, made a difference to our self-image. Galileo and Darwin expelled various varieties of spooks by showing the sufficiency of a materialist account. They thereby made it much easier for us to move from a religious high culture to a secular, merely

philosophical, one. So my argument on behalf of the literary culture depends on the claim that getting rid of spooks, of causal agency that does not supervene on the behavior of elementary particles, has exhausted the utility of natural science for either redemptive or political purposes.

I do not put this claim forward as a result of philosophical reasoning or insight, but merely as a prediction about the future holds in store. A similar prediction led the philosophers of the eighteenth century to think that the Christian religion had done about all that it could for the moral condition of humanity, and that it was time to put religion behind us and to put metaphysics, either idealist or materialist, in its place.

When literary intellectuals assume that natural science has nothing to offer us except an edifying example of tolerant conversability, they are doing something analogous to what the *philosophers* did when they said that even the best of the priests had nothing to offer us save edifying examples of charity and decency. Reducing science from a possible source of redemptive truth to a model of rational cooperation is the contemporary analogue of the reduction of the Gospels from a recipe for attaining eternal happiness to a compendium of sound moral advice. That was the sort of reduction that Kant and Jefferson recommended, and that liberal Protestants of the last two centuries have gradually achieved.

To put this last point another way: both the Christian religion and materialist metaphysics turned out to be self-consuming artifacts. The need for religious orthodoxy was undermined by St. Paul's insistence on the primacy of love, and by the gradual realization that a religion of love could not ask everyone to recite the same creed. The need for a metaphysics was undermined by the ability of modern science to see the human mind as an exceptionally complex nervous system and thus to see itself in pragmatic rather than metaphysical terms. Science showed us how to see empirical inquiry as the use of this extra physiological equipment to gain steadily greater mastery over the environment, rather than as a way of replacing appearance with reality. Just as the eighteenth century became able to see Christianity not as a revelation from on high but as continuous with Socratic reflection, so the twentieth century became able to see natural science not as revealing the intrinsic nature of reality but as continuous with the sort of practical problem-solving that both beavers and carpenters are good at.

To give up the idea that there is an intrinsic nature of reality to be discovered either by the priests, or the philosophers, or the scientists, is to disjoin the need for redemption from the search for universal agreement. It is to give up the search for an accurate account of human nature, and thus for a recipe for leading The Good Life for Man. Once these searches are given up,

expanding the limits of the human imagination steps forward to assume the role that obedience to the divine will played in a religious culture, and the role that discovery of what is really real played in a philosophical culture. But this substitution is no reason to give up the search for a single utopian form of political life--the Good Global Society.

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I have now said all I can to counter the suggestion that the rise of the literary culture is a relapse into irrationality, and that a proper respect for the ability of science to achieve objective truth is essential to the morale of a democratic society. But there is a related suggestion, much vaguer and harder to pin down, but perhaps no less persuasive. This is that a literary culture is *decadent*—that it lacks the healthy-mindedness and vigor common to proselytizing Christians, science-worshipping positivists, and Marxist revolutionaries. A high culture centered around literature, one that wishes not to get things right but to make things new, will, it is often said, be a culture of languid and self-involved aesthetes.

The best rebuttal to this suggestion is Oscar Wilde's "The soul of man under socialism". The message of that essay parallels those of Mill's *On Liberty* and of Rawls' *A Theory of Justice.* It is that the only point of getting rid of the priests and the kings, of setting up democratic governments, of taking from each according to her abilities and giving to each according to her needs, and of thereby creating the Good Global Society, is to make it possible for people to lead the sort of lives they prefer, as long as their doing so does not diminish the opportunities of other humans to do the same thing. As Wilde put it "Socialism itself will be of value simply because it will lead to Individualism". Part of Wilde's point is that there can be no objection to self-involved aesthetes—that is to say, people whose passion is to explore the present limits of the human imagination--as long as they do not use more than their fair share of the social product.

This claim itself, however, strikes many people as decadent. We were not, they would urge, put on this earth to enjoy ourselves, but to do the right thing. Socialism, they think, would not stir our hearts were it no more than a means to Individualism, or if the goal of proletarian revolution were merely to make it possible for everybody to become a bourgeois intellectual. This sense that human existence has some point other than pleasure is what keeps the battle between Mill and Kant alive in courses on moral philosophy, just as the sense that natural science must have some point other than practical problem-solving keeps the struggle between Kuhn and his opponents alive in courses in

philosophy of science. Mill and Kuhn—and, more generally, utilitarians and pragmatists—are still suspected of letting down the side, diminishing human dignity, reducing our noblest aspirations to self-indulgent stimulation of our favorite clusters of neurons.

The antagonism between those who think, with Schiller and Wilde, that human beings are at their best when at play, and those who think that they are at their best when they strive, seems to me at the bottom of the conflicts that have marked the rise of the literary culture. Once again, I would urge that these conflicts be seen as recapitulating those that marked the transition from religion to philosophy. In that earlier transition, the people who thought that a human life which did not strive for perfect obedience to the divine will was a relapse into animality faced off against those who thought that the ideal of such submission was unworthy of beings who could think for themselves. In the current transition, the people who think that we need to hang onto Kantian ideas like "the moral law" and "things as they are in themselves" are facing off against people who think that these ideas are symptoms of insufficient self-reliance, of a self-deceptive attempt to find dignity in the acceptance of bondage and freedom in the recognition of constraint.

The only way to resolve this sort of quarrel, it seems to me, is to say that the kinds of people to whom a utopian society would give the resources and the leisure to do their individualistic thing will include Kantian strivers as well as self-involved aesthetes, people who cannot live without religion and people who despise it, nature's metaphysicians as well as nature's pragmatists. For in this utopia, as Rawls has said, there will be no need for people to agree on the point of human existence, the good life for man, or any other topic of similar generality.

If people who heartily disagree about such issues can agree to cooperate in the functioning of the practices and institutions that have, in Wilde's words, "substituted cooperation for competition", that will suffice. The Kant vs. Mill issue, like the issue between metaphysicians and pragmatists, will seem as little worth quarreling about as will the issue between the believers and the atheists. For we humans need not agree about the Nature or the End of Man in order to help facilitate our neighbor's ability to act on her own convictions on these matters, just so long as those actions do not interfere with our freedom to act on our own convictions.

In short, just as we have, in the past few centuries, learned that the difference of opinion between the believer and the atheist does not have to be settled before the two can cooperate on communal projects, so we may learn to set aside all the differences between all the various searches for redemption

when we cooperate to build Wilde's utopia. In that utopia, the literary culture will not be the only, or even the dominant, form of high culture.

That is because there will be *no* dominant form. High culture will no longer be thought of as the place where the aim of the society as a whole is debated and decided, and where it is a matter of social concern which sort of intellectual is ruling the roost. Nor will there be much concern about the gap that yawns between popular culture, the culture of people who have never felt the need for redemption, and the high culture of the intellectuals—the people who are always wanting to be something more or different than they presently are. In utopia, the religious or philosophical need to live up to the non-human, and the need of the literary intellectuals to explore the present limits of the human imagination will be viewed as matters of taste. They will be viewed by non-intellectuals in the same relaxed, tolerant and uncomprehending way that we presently regard our neighbor's obsession with birdwatching, or macrame, or collecting hubcaps, or discovering the secrets of the Great Pyramid.

To get along in utopia, however, the literary intellectuals will have to tone down their rhetoric. Certain passages in Wilde will not bear repeating, as when he speaks of "the poets, the philosophers, the men of science, the men of culture—in a world, the real men, the me who have realized themselves, and in whom all humanity gains a partial realization". The idea that some men are more really men than others contradicts Wilde's own better wisdom, as when he says "There is no one type for man. There are as many perfections as there are imperfect men." The same words might have been written by Nietzsche, but to take them seriously we must actively forget Zarathustra's contempt for the "last men", the men who feel no need for redemption. In utopia, the literary culture will have learned not to give itself airs. It will no longer feel the temptation to make invidious and quasi-metaphysical distinctions between real and less real men.

To sum up, I am suggesting that we see the literary culture as itself a self-consuming artifact, and perhaps the last of its kind. For in utopia the intellectuals will have given up the idea that there is a standard against which the products of the human imagination can be measured other than their social utility, as this utility is judged by a maximally free, leisured and tolerant global community. They will have stopped thinking that the human imagination is getting somewhere, that there is one far off cultural event toward which all cultural creation moves. They will have given up the identification of redemption with the attainment of perfection. They will have taken fully to heart the maxim that it is the journey that matters.

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# CULTURAL POLITICS AND THE QUESTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

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## 1. Cultural politics

The term "cultural politics" is a useful description of arguments about what words to use. When we say that Frenchmen should stop referring to Germans as "Boches", or that white people should stop referring to black people as "niggers", we are practicing cultural politics. We are saying that our socio-political goals—increasing the degree of tolerance that certain groups of people have for one another, in the hope of decreasing the amount of violence and cruelty in the world—will be promoted by abandoning certain linguistic practices. Our opponents, whose socio-political goals may include the permanent subjugation of blacks by whites, or the permanent suspicion of Germany by France, practice cultural politics by insisting on using the very words we think ought to be dropped from the language.

Cultural politics is not confined to debates about hate speech. It includes debate about projects for getting rid of whole topics of discourse. It is often said, for example, that we should stop using the concepts of "race" and "caste", stop dividing the human community up by genealogical descent. The principal reason for doing so is to lessen the chances that the question "who are his or her ancestors?" will be asked. That question still arises when parents are told whom their children wish to marry, or when the merits of applicants for positions are debated. Those who urge that words like "noble blood", "mixed blood", "outcaste", "intermarriage", "untouchable", and the like should be dropped from the language argue that this would be a better world if the suitability of people as spouses or employees or officials were judged entirely on the basis of their behavior rather than partially by reference to their ancestry.

This line of thinking is sometimes countered by saying "but there really *are* inherited differences—ancestry *does* matter". The rejoinder to this reply goes something like this: there certainly are inheritable physical characteristics, but these do not correlate with any characteristics that could provide a good reason for breaking up a planned marriage, or voting for or against a candidate. We need the notion of genetic transmission for medical purposes, but not for any other purposes. So instead of talking about different races, let us just talk about different genes.

The principal argument for this proposal is that terms like "the white race" or "the Han" or "barbarian races" have played important roles in excuses for imperialist wars and colonialist oppression. Since we do not want any more of the latter, we should try to stop using such terms. There are lots of ways to divide human beings into groups, and we should find some which do not incite to violence. The whole idea that morally relevant characteristics—the sort of characteristics that might be germane to marriage plans or employment policies—are genetically transmitted is obviously nothing more than an attempt by those who have traditionally held power to preserve this power for their descendants. Talk of race is as transparent an excuse for such preservation as is talk of "noble blood".

In the case of "race", as in that of "noble blood", the question "is there such a thing?" and the question "should we talk about such a thing?" seem pretty well interchangeable. That is why we tend to classify discussion of whether to stop talking about different races as "political" rather than "scientific" or "philosophical". But there are other cases in which it seems odd to identify questions about what exists with questions about what it is desirable to discuss.

The question of whether to talk about neutrons, for example, seems a strictly scientific question. That is why people who say that physicists should never have investigated radioactivity, or speculated about the possibility of splitting the atom, are accused of confusing science with politics. It seems natural to separate the political question of whether it was good thing for humanity that scientists began to think about the possibility of atomic fission from scientific questions about the existence and properties of elementary particles.

The contrast between the case of races and that of neutrons raises the question: how do we tell when, if ever, an issue about what exists should be discussed without reference to our socio-political goals? How should we split up culture into areas to which cultural politics is relevant and areas which should be kept free of it? When is it appropriate to say: "We had *better* talk about them, because they *exist*?" and when is that remark not to the point?

I raise this latter question because it is relevant to debate about the roles that religion and philosophy should play in contemporary society. Many people think that we should stop talking about God—that God-talk, as well as talk about a higher plane of existence than that of the material world, is a bad thing. They think this for much the same reasons that they think that talk of race and caste is a bad thing. Lucretius' *Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum* has been quoted for two millennia in order to remind us that religious conviction can easily be used to excuse cruelty. Marx's claim that religion is the opiate of the people sums up the suspicion, widespread since the Enlightenment, that ecclesiastical institutions are among the principal obstacles to the formation of a global cooperative

commonwealth. Many people agree with Marx that we should try to create a world in which human beings devote all their energies to increasing human happiness in this world, rather than taking time off to think about the possibility of life after death.

To say that talk about God should be dropped because it impedes the search for human happiness is to take a pragmatic attitude toward religion that many religious believers find offensive and that some theologians think beside the point. The point, they would insist, is that God *exists*, or perhaps that human beings really *do* have immortal souls. Granted that the existence of God or of an immortal soul is controversial, that controversy should be explicitly about what exists, not about whether religious belief conduces to human happiness. First things first: ontology precedes cultural politics.

## 2. William James' view of religion

My first thesis in this lecture is that cultural politics should replace ontology. My second thesis is that the question of whether it should or not is *itself* a matter of cultural politics. The issue about whether and when to engage to ontology is one that should be resolved by asking what will most increase human happiness. Before turning to the defense of these theses, however, I want to underline the importance of such issues for philosophers who, like myself, are sympathetic to William James' pragmatism. James agreed with John Stuart Mill that the right thing to do, and a fortiori the right belief to acquire, is always the one that will do most for human happiness. So he advocated a utilitarian ethics of belief. James often comes close to saying that all questions, including questions about what exists, are questions about what will best assist our attempts to create a better world.

James' willingness to say this sort of thing has rendered him liable to accusations of intellectual perversity. For this version of pragmatism does seem to suggest that when notions like "race-mixing" and "atomic fission" are brought into the conversation, it is apposite to exclaim: "Let's not talk about that sort of thing! It's too dangerous! Let's not go there!" So James seems to countenance doing what Peirce forbade: blocking the road of inquiry, refusing to find out what the world is really like because doing so might have harmful effects on human beings.

To give a concrete example, many people have argued that psychologists should not try to find out whether skin color is correlated with intelligence, simply because of the social harm that a positive answer to this question might produce. James' view of truth seems to suggest that these people are making a good point. People who are suspicious of pragmatism, on the other hand, argue that preventing scientists from doing experiments to find out whether

intelligence is genetically transmissible is as bad as preventing them from finding out whether the atomic nucleus can be split. Surely, they say, we should separate the question of whether eugenics should be practiced, or whether parents should be encouraged to pursue inquiries into the ancestry of their children's chosen spouses, from the question of whether Europeans are, on the average, stupider than Asiatics—just as we divide the question of whether we *can* build a neutron bomb from the question of whether we *should*.

James was criticized not only for blocking the road of inquiry, and thus for being too restrictive, but also for being too permissive. That criticism was most frequently directed at "The will to believe", an essay which he said should have been titled "The right to believe". There he argued that one had a right to believe in the existence of God if that belief contributed to one's happiness, for no reason other than that very contribution. His book VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE argued that many people have experiences that they construe as awareness of the presence of God, and that this construal is perfectly reasonable, even though optional.

James recognized that how certain experiences are described is a matter of cultural conditioning. In a Buddhist culture the description of a certain experience may be couched in terms of recognition of one's Buddha-nature, in a Christian culture in terms of the acceptance of Christ as one's personal savior, and in a totally secular culture in terms of a sudden change in serotonin level. But James did not think that this variation, by itself, cast any doubt on the desirability of religious belief. He would have regretted the rise of a totally secular culture, because he thought that belief in God, defined as a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness, was likely to be an efficient tool for producing such a better universe.

Returning now to the question I raised earlier, I think that the best way for those of us who find James' pragmatism sympathetic to restate his position is to say that questions about what is too permissive and what is too restrictive are themselves questions of cultural politics. For example, the question of whether religious believers should be asked for evidence of the truth of their belief, and condemned as uneducated or irrational if they are unable to produce sufficient evidence, is a question about what sort of role we want religion to play in our society. The question of whether we should, for the sake of preserving ancient traditions, allow parents to perpetuate a caste system by dictating choices of marriage partners to their children, is the same sort of question. Such questions arise whenever new social practices are beginning to compete with old ones— when, for example, the New Science of seventeenth century Europe began to compete with the Christian churches for control of the universities, or when a traditional African culture is exposed to European ways.

The question of whether scientists should have been allowed to find out whether the atom could be split, or should be allowed to investigate the correlation of intelligence with skin color, is not a question that can be answered simply by saying "Do not block the road of inquiry!" or "Seek the truth, though the heavens fall!" any more than can the question of whether France and Germany are right to criminalize denial that the Holocaust occurred. There is much to be said on both sides. The argument for letting scientists investigate whatever they please is that the more ability to predict we can get, the better off we shall be in the long run. The argument for blocking them off from certain topics is that the short-run dangers are so great as to outweigh the chances of long-term benefit.

To say that James is basically right in his approach to truth and reality is to say that arguments about relative utility are the only ones that matter. That is why the assertion "We should be talking about it because it's real" is as useless as the sentence "We should believe it because it's true". Attributions of reality or truth are, on James' view, compliments we pay to entities or beliefs that have won their spurs, paid their way, proved themselves useful, and therefore been incorporated into accepted social practices. When these practices are being contested, it is simply not to the point to say that reality or truth is on the side of one of the contestants. Such claims are always mere table-thumping, not serious contributions to cultural politics.

Another way to put James' point is to say that truth and reality exist for the sake of social practices, rather than vice versa. This is a dark saying, but I shall attempt to make it clearer and more plausible in the course of this lecture. It is a thesis whose best defense can be found in the work of a contemporary neo-Hegelian, Robert Brandom. Brandom's writings provide the best weapons for defending a version of James' pragmatism. So much of what I have to say amounts to an exposition, or at least an appropriation, of his books.

## 3. Brandom on the ontological priority of the social

Brandom presents Heidegger as putting forward the doctrine of "the ontological primacy of the social". (Brandom, "Heidegger's categories in *Being and Time*," *The Monist* vol. 66 (1983), p. 389) This primacy consists in the fact that "all matters of authority or privilege, in particular *epistemic* authority, are matters of social practice, and not objective matters of fact." (pp. 389-390) Brandom tries to make this doctrine plausible by pointing out that society divides culture up into three areas. In the first of these the individual's authority is supreme (as when she makes sincere first-person reports of feelings or thoughts). In the second, the non-human world is supreme (as in an *experimentum crucis* in which, for example, the

litmus paper, or the DNA-analysis apparatus is allowed to determine whether the accused will be freed or punished, or whether a given scientific theory will be accepted or rejected). But there is a third area in which society does not delegate, but retains the right to decide for itself. Brandom analogizes this situation to the constitutional arrangements of the USA, according to which, as he says, "the judiciary is given the authority and responsibility to interpret the proper region of authority and responsibility of each branch [that is to say, of the executive, the legislative and the judiciary branches of government], itself included." (p. 389)

The question at issue between James and his opponents boils down to: is there an authority beyond that of society which society should acknowledge—an authority such as God, or Truth, or Reality? The strong point of those who agree with James and Brandom is the appeal to Occam's Razor: the authority attributed to these non-human entities can be explained sociologically, and this sociological explanation invokes none of the rather mysterious entities that a non-sociological explanation of assignments of authority would require.

Suppose that one accepts the thesis of the ontological primacy of the social. Then one will think that the question of the existence of God is a question of the advantages and disadvantages of using God-talk for various purposes over against alternative ways of talking. As with 'race', so with 'God'. Instead of talking about races we can, for many purposes, talk about genes. Instead of talking about God the Creator we can (as physicists do) talk about the Big Bang. For other purposes, such as providing foundations for morality, we can talk (as Kant did) about reason rather than about the divine will. When discussing the future of humanity, we can talk (as Marx did) about a secularist social utopia instead of about The Last Judgment. And so on.

Suppose, however, one does not accept the priority of the social, precisely *because* one is a religious believer, and holds that God has authority over human society, as well as over everything else. From Brandom's point of view, this is like holding that human society is subject to the authority of "reality" or of "experience" or of "truth". He would insist, I think, that all attempts to name an authority which is superior to that of society are disguised moves in the game of cultural politics. That is what they *must* be, because, on his view, it is the only game in town.

This claim to exclusivity can be made more plausible by considering what people actually have in mind when they say that God has authority over human society. They do not say this unless they have some idea of what God wants human beings to do—unless they can cite sacred scriptures, or the words of a guru, or the teachings of an ecclesiastical tradition, or something of the sort. But from the point of view of both atheists and people whose scripture or guru or tradition is different, what is purportedly said in the name of God is actually said

in the name of some interest group—some sect or church, for example. Two competing religious groups (say the Hindus and the Muslims, or the Mormons and the Catholics) will typically say that the other willfully and blasphemously refuses to submit to God's authority.

The battles between two such groups can be seen as analogous to the argument between opposing counsel, when presenting appellate briefs to the highest court. Both counsel will claim to have the authority of "the law" on their side. Alternatively, it can be analogized to the battle between two scientific theories both of which claim to be true to the "nature of reality". Brandom's point is that the appeal to God, like the appeal to "the law" or to "the way things really are" is always superfluous, since as long as there is disagreement about what the purported authority says, the idea of "authority" is out of place.[1] Only when the community decides to adopt one faith rather than another, or the court decides in favor of one side rather than another, or the scientific community in favor of one theory rather than another, does the idea of "authority" become applicable. The so-called "authority" of anything other than the community (or some person or thing or expert culture authorized by the community to make decisions in its name) is just more table-thumping.

## 4. The appeal to experience, religious and otherwise

The counter-intuitive character of Brandom's claims is in part due to the popularity of empiricism. For empiricists tell us that one can break out from under the authority of the local community by making unmediated contact with reality. This view has encouraged the idea that Europe finally got in touch with reality when scientists like Galileo had the courage to believe the evidence of their senses rather than bowing to the authority of Aristotle and the Catholic Church.

Brandom agrees with his teacher Wilfrid Sellars that the idea of getting in direct touch with reality through the senses is a confusion between relations of justification, which hold between propositions, and causal relations, which hold between events. In particular, it confuses the causal ability of certain events to produce non-inferential beliefs in certain suitably programmed organisms with a justification for holding those beliefs.

Brandom agrees with Sellars that "all awareness is a linguistic affair". On this view, creatures not programmed to use language, such as dogs and human infants, react to stimuli but are no more aware of the characteristics of things than thermostats are aware of heat and cold. So there can be no such thing as by-passing the linguistic practices of the community by using one's senses to find out

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[1] This is a point which has made repeatedly, and very persuasively, by Stanley Fish. See his book PROFESSIONAL CORRECTNESS.

how things really are, for two reasons. First: all non-inferential perceptual reports ("this is red", "this is disgusting", "this is the Body of Christ") are made in the language of one or another community, a language adapted to that community's needs. Second: the community grants authority to such reports not because it believes in a special relation between reality and human sense-organs but because it has empirical evidence that such reports are reliable.

This means that when somebody reports experiencing an object about which the community has no reason to think her a reliable reporter, her appeal to experience will fall flat. If I say that round squares are, contrary to popular opinion, possible, because I have in fact seen several such squares, nobody takes me seriously. The same goes if I come out of the forest claiming to have spotted a unicorn. If I say that I experienced God, this may or may not be taken seriously, depending on what uses of the term "God" are current in my community. If I explain to a Christian audience that personal observation has shown me that God is, contrary to popular opinion, female, that audience will just laugh. If I tell a polytheist audience that a certain god has spoken to me and informed me that he is the one true god, I shall probably expose myself to ridicule. But if I tell a Hindu audience that I have had a vision of Hanuman doing just the sort of thing that Hanuman typically does, or a Catholic audience that I have seen the Risen Christ in the sunrise on Easter Sunday, it is quite possible that I shall be viewed with respect and envy.

In short, God-reports have to live up to previous expectations, just as do reports of physical objects. They cannot, all by themselves, be used to repudiate those expectations. They are useful for this purpose only when they form part of a full-fledged, concerted, cultural-political initiative. This is what happens when a new religion or church replaces an old one. It was not the disciples' reports of an empty tomb, all by themselves that made Europe believe that God was incarnate in Christ. But in the context of St. Paul's overall public relations strategy, those reports had their effect. Analogously, it was not Galileo's report of spots moving across the face of the planet Jupiter, possibly caused by the transits of moons that overthrew the authority of the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmology. But in the context of the initiative being mounted by his fellow Copernican cultural politicians, that report had considerable importance.

I can sum up what I have been saying about appeals to experience as follows: experience gives us no way to drive a wedge between the cultural-political question of what we should talk about and the question of what really exists. For what counts as an accurate report of experience is a matter of what a community will let you get away with. Empiricism's appeal to experience is as inefficacious as appeals to the Word of God unless backed up with a predisposition on the part of a community to take such appeals seriously. So experience cannot serve us as a tribunal that will adjudicate disputes between warring cultural politicians.

## 5. The existence of God and the existence of consciousness

I can make my point about the irrelevance of religious experience to God's existence a bit more vivid by comparing the God of orthodox Western monotheism with consciousness as it is understood by Cartesian dualists. In an unphilosophical sense of the term "conscious", the existence of consciousness is indisputable. People who have just collapsed after being hit on the head, or are in a coma, lack consciousness. Normally, however, people are conscious as long as are walking and talking. But there is a special philosophical sense of the term "consciousness" in which the very existence of consciousness is in dispute.

In this sense of "consciousness", the word refers to something the absence of which is entirely compatible with walking and talking. It is what zombies lack that the rest of us possess. Zombies behave just like normal people but have no inner life. The light bulb in their brains, so to speak, never goes on. They do not feel anything, although they can answer questions about how they feel in the conventional ways, ways which have the place they do in the language game by virtue of, for example, correlations between utterances of "It hurts" and their touching hot stoves, being pricked by pins, and the like. Talking to a zombie is just like talking to anybody else, since the zombie's lack of an inner life never manifests itself by any outward and visible sign. That is why, unless neurology someday discovers the secret of non-zombiehood, we shall never know whether our nearest and dearest share our feelings, or are mere machines.

Philosophers have spent decades arguing about whether this sense of "consciousness" and this sense of "zombie" make sense. The question at issue is: can a descriptive term have a sense if its application is regulated by no public criteria? Wittgenstein thought that the answer to this question was "no". That negative answer is the upshot of the following argument:

> Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at *his* beetle.—Here it would be possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.—But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language?—If so, it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a *something*: for the box might even be empty.— No one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. (PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, I, sec. 293)

The analogues of these private beetles are what philosophers who believe in the possibility of zombies call "raw feels" or "qualia"—the sort of thing that shows 'what it is like...[e.g., to be in pain, to see something red]'. We all know

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what it is like to be in pain, these philosophers believe, but (despite their sincere avowals that they do) zombies do not. Wittgenstein would say that the word "pain" has a sense only as long as philosophers do *not* treat it as the name of something whose presence or absence swings free of all differences in environment or behavior. On his view, the philosophers who believe in "qualia" and who deploy expressions like "what it is like to be in pain" are commending a new language game. In this specifically philosophical game, we use expressions whose *only* function is to help us disjoin pain from pain-behavior. We use them to separate off the outer behavior and its neurological correlates from something that is neither a state of the body nor of the nervous system. Wittgenstein can see no point in playing this game. So he thinks that we are entitled, as he says, to "divide through" by the qualia as well as by the beetles—to treat them, as Wittgenstein says in another passage, as "a wheel that turns though nothing else moves with it" and which is therefore "not part of the mechanism". (PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, I, SEC. 271)

Philosophers of mind like Daniel Dennett and Sellars agree with Wittgenstein about this. But they are criticized by philosophers more sympathetic to Descartes: for example, David Chalmers and Thomas Nagel. The latter say that the existence of raw feels, of the experience of "what it is like…" is incontestable. They reject Sellars' and Brandom's doctrine that all awareness is a linguistic affair. There is, they say, awareness of more than we can put into words—language can point to things that it cannot describe. To think otherwise is to be a verificationist, and verificationists display what Nagel regards as an undesirable lack of "the ambition for transcendence". Nagel writes as follows: "Only a dogmatic verificationist would deny the possibility of forming objective concepts that reach beyond our current capacity to apply them. The aim of reaching *a conception of the world which does not put us at the center in any way [emphasis added]* requires the formation of such concepts." (THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE, P. 24)

Brandom's doctrine of the ontological priority of the social would, of course, only be adopted by someone who has no interest whatever in 'reaching a conception of the world that does not put us in the center in any way." Brandom, Sellars and Wittgenstein simply lack the "ambition of transcendence" that Nagel, resembling in this respect the orthodox theologians of Western monotheism, thinks it desirable to have. These theologians, in their anxiety to make God truly transcendent, separated him from the things of this world by describing him as without parts or passions, non-spatio-temporal and therefore incomparable in any respect to his creatures. They went on to insist that the fact that God's incomparability is nonetheless compatible with his making himself known to us in experience. Nagel and those who wish to preserve the special philosophical notion of consciousness as the thing that zombies lack, are doing the same sort of thing. They are trying to give sense to a descriptive term by a series of negations,

while insisting that the fact that consciousness is like nothing else in the universe is compatible with our being directly and incorribigibly aware that we are not zombies.

Both those who want to use "God" in the way that orthodox theology does, and those who want to use "consciousness" as Chalmers and Nagel do, claim that their opponents are denying the obvious. Many orthodox theologians have claimed that denial of the existence of God simply flies in the face of the common experience of mankind. Nagel thinks that philosophical views such as Dennett's "stem from an insufficiently robust sense of reality and of its independence of any particular form of human understanding." Many religious believers think that it requires considerable perversity to even imagine being an atheist. Nagel, I imagine, thinks that it requires similar perversity to become a Sellarsian psychological nominalist, or to weaken one's sense of reality to such a point that one begins seriously to maintain the ontological priority of the social.

The moral I want to draw from the analogy between God and consciousness is that the existence of either is not a matter which appeals to experience could ever resolve, any more than one can appeal to experience to determine whether or not marriage across caste or racial lines is or is not intrinsically disgusting. Cultural politics can create a society that will indeed find the latter repulsive, and cultural politics of a different sort can create one that finds such marriages unobjectionable. There is no way to show that belief in God or in qualia is more or less 'natural' than disbelief, any more than there is a way to figure out whether a sense of caste membership or race membership is more or less 'natural' than utter indifference to human blood-lines. What one side of the argument calls "natural", the other is likely to call "primitive".

Similarly, cultural politics of the sort conducted in Europe since the Enlightenment can alternately diminish or increase the obviousness of God's existence and the frequency of reports to have experienced God's presence. Cultural politics of the sort conducted within philosophy departments can diminish or increase the numbers of graduate students who find it obvious that there is such a thing as 'what it is like to be in pain', and equally obvious that some humanoids might be zombies. There are Dennett-leaning departments and Chalmers-leaning departments, and the disagreement between them is no more susceptible to neutral adjudication than is the disagreement between atheists and theists.[2]

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[2] In his THE CONSCIOUS MIND; IN SEARCH OF A FUNDAMENTAL THEORY, Chalmers discusses the analogy between consciousness (in the sense of what xombies lack) and God at pp. 186-9 and again at p. 249. At p. 187 he says that the difference is that we can explain God-talk sociologically: God was postulated as an explanation of various phenomena. Consciouness, however, is an explanandum. So the only way to account for talk about it is by saying that it its existence is obvious to all (except, mysteriously,

To say that cultural politics has the last word on these matters is to say, once again, that the questions "should we be talking about God?" "should we be speculating about zombies?" "should we take about what race people belong to?" are not posterior to the questions "does God exist?", "are there such things as distinct races within the human species?" and "could some of the humanoids in this room be zombies?" They are the same questions, for any consideration relevant to the cultural-political question is equally relevant to the ontological question, and conversely.

## 6. Brandom on the nature of existence

The view that I have been ascribing to Brandom may make it seem as if acknowledging the ontological priority of the social entails allowing existence to be ascribed to anything society finds it convenient to talk about. But this seems ridiculously counter-intuitive. Even though society might set its face against caste-talk or against God-talk, it can hardly set its face against talk of stars and animals, pains and pleasures, truth and falsehood—all the uncontroversial matters that people have talked about always and everywhere. There are, critics of the ontological priority of the social will say, limits to society's ability to talk things into or out of existence.

Brandom, James, and Sellars would agree, but they would insist that it is important to specify just what considerations set these limits. They are, I think Brandom would say, are of three sorts: (1) *transcendental* limits set by the need to talk *about* something—to refer to objects, things we can represent well or badly, rather than just making noises which, though they may change behavior, lack intentionality; (2) *practical* limits, set by the transcultural need all human beings have to distinguish between, for example, poisonous and nourishing substances, up and down, humans and beasts, true and false, male and female, pain and pleasure, and right and left; (3) *cultural* limits set by our previous social decisions—by a particular society's actually existing norms.

Brandom argues for the existence of the first sort of limit by claiming that no society can make much use of language unless it has the notion of aboutness. The cash value of speaking about objects is that one's language contains singular terms which are taken to refer to things one can be wrong about, and indeed that everybody may always get, in certain respects, wrong. By contrast, for most of the

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a few oddballs like Dennett). I would argue that "consciousness" is an artifact of Cartesian philosophy in the same way that God is an artefact of early cosmology. This is, indeed, one of the claims of my book PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE. On the view I share with Sellars and Brandom, there are no such things as "natural" explananda.

philosophers whom Brandom calls "representationalists", the concept of 'object', and indeed that of 'existent, non-fictional object', is primitive and inexplicable Representationalists think that you must grasp both in order to have any idea of what language, or mind, or rationality might be. For all of these notions must be understood in terms of the notion of accurate representation of existent objects. In contrast, Brandom's argument is that this latter notion is indeed essential, but is derived rather than primitive. The true primitives are those who make possible the application of social norms.

Here is Brandom's account of the role of the representationalist-inferentialist distinction in the history of modern philosophy:

> This semantic explanatory strategy, which takes inference as its basic concept, contrasts with one that has been dominant since the Enlightenment, which takes representation as its basic concept...The complementary theoretical semantic strategies of representationalism and inferentialism are bound by the same pair of general explanatory obligations to explicate the concept treated as primitive and to offer an account of other semantic concepts in terms of that primitive...As the inferentialist program is pursued here, the proprieties of inference that serve as semantic primitives are explicated in the pragmatics; they are implicit in the practices of giving and asking for reasons. The major explanatory challenge for inferentialists is rather to explain the representational dimension of semantic content—to construe referential relations in terms of inferential relations. (MAKING IT EXPLICIT, p. xvi)

Brandom's attempt to reverse the traditional representationalist order of explanation leads him to pose the unexpected question: "Why are there objects to be represented?" He answers this question by giving a transcendental deduction of the need to deploy singular terms if there is to be inference that makes self-conscious, explicit, use of such logical notions as "is identical with", "all", "some" and "not". (See pp. 382-383 of MAKING IT EXPLICIT for the conclusion of this deduction). He gives a similar demonstration of the necessity of taking these terms to refer to objects about which we can be right or wrong. (See pp. 592ff.) Doing things Brandom's way amounts to dropping the old skeptical, representationalist, question "How can the human mind manage to get accurate representations of reality?" in favor of such questions "Why does the human community need the notion of accurate representation of objects? Why should the question of getting in touch with reality ever have arisen? How did we ever come to see an abyss between subject and object of the sort, which the skeptic describes? How did we ever get ourselves into a position in which skeptical doubts like Descartes seemed plausible?"

For my purposes in this paper, it is important to emphasize the analogies between this change of questions and the change from a theistic to a humanistic world-view. In recent centuries, instead of asking whether God exists, people have taken to asking whether it is a good idea for us to continue talking about him, what human purposes might be served by doing so—asking, in short, what use God might be to human beings. Brandom is suggesting that philosophers, instead of asking whether we really are in touch with objects "outside the mind"—objects that are as they are regardless of what we think about them—should ask what human purposes are served by talking about these objects. We should reflect on whether talking about them was a good idea. In the course of his book he argues that it was not only a good idea but a pragmatically indispensable one. For if we had never talked of such objects, we should never have had much to say. Our language would not have developed beyond an exchange of causally efficacious grunts. Talk about objects independent of the mind was valuable because it helped the anthropoids become human, not because humans awakened to their obligation to represent such objects accurately—their obligation to "the Truth".

The "loss of the world" which idealism seemed helpless to avoid is thus not a problem for Brandom's inferentialism, since "...objectivity is a structural aspect of the social-perspectival form of conceptual contents. The permanent distinction between how things are and how they are taken to be by some interlocutor is built into the social-inferential articulation of concepts." (MAKING IT EXPLICIT, p. 597) Yet Brandom is not exactly a "realist", for that distinction is permanent only as long as we humans behave as we do—namely sapiently. This is why he can say that "the facts about having physical properties" supervene upon "the facts about seeming to have such properties." (p. 292) In the causal order which can be accurately represented once humans have initiated the practice of distinguishing causes from effects, the world comes before the practices. Yet space, time, substance and causality are what they are because human beings need to talk in certain ways to get certain things done. In the place of Kant's inexplicable transcendental constitution of the mind, Brandom substitutes practices which helped a certain biological species flourish.

Brandom often points to analogies between his inferentialism and Spinoza's. But there are, of course, obvious disanalogies. These go back to the fact that Spinoza, like Berkeley, thought that philosophy's job was to bring God and man together—to bridge the gap between the finite and the infinite by showing how human beings live and move and have their being within God. Brandom thinks that the point of philosophy is to bridge the abyss that representationalism has dug between human beings and objects, the abyss to which the epistemological skeptic constantly directs our attention.

Brandom and Spinoza are both holists, but Brandom's whole, like Hegel's, is the ongoing conversation of mankind, a conversation always subject to the contingencies that afflict finite existence. Spinoza's whole is an atemporal being that can be the object of what he called *scientia intuitiva*, the sort of direct acquaintance that makes further conversation, further inquiry, and further use of language, superfluous. This difference between Brandom and Spinoza encapsulates the difference between philosophers who see no end to the process of inquiry, and no court of appeal other than our descendants, and those who think that cultural politics cannot be the last word—that there must be what Plato hoped for, a way to rise above the contingent vagaries of conversation to a vision which transcends politics.

For Brandom, a priori philosophical inquiry into what exists is exhausted once the question "Why are there objects?" has been answered. Giving a transcendental argument for the existence of objects exhausts the capacity of philosophy to tell you what there just *has* to be. There is no further discipline called "ontology" which can tell you what singular terms we need to have in the language—whether or not we need "God" for example.

## 7. Brandom on the nature of existence

Brandom's explicit discussion of ontological inquiry is confined to a rather brief excursus in the middle of chapter 7 of MAKING IT EXPLICIT (pp. 440ff). He starts out by agreeing with Kant that existence is not a predicate, but his way of making this point is very different than Kant's. Kant distinguished between "logical" notions such as "thing" and "is identical with", which apply to both the phenomenal and the noumenal, and categories of the understanding such as "substance" and "cause" which apply only to the former. Brandom thinks that both Kant (and later Frege) erred by thinking of "thing" and "object" as what he calls "genuine sortals", and by thinking of identity as a property that can be attributed to things without specification of the sorts to which they belong. These errors make plausible the bad idea that things come in two flavors—existent and non-existent—and thereby suggest that one ought to be able to say what all the existent ones have in common. They also encourage the view that the sentence "everything is identical with itself" is more than what Wittgenstein said it was—a splendid example of a completely useless proposition. (PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, I, paragraph 216).

To get rid of these bad beliefs, Brandom thinks we have to take "thing" as always short for "thing of a certain kind" and "identical with" as always short for "identical in respect of....with". He thinks that Frege should have seen quantifiers as coming with sortal restrictions on the admissible term substituends. "For," as he says, "quantifiers quantify, they specify, at least in general terms, how many,

and how many there are depends (as Frege's remarks about playing cards [remarks in which Frege says that it matters whether it is packs, or cards, or honours that are being counted] indicate), on what one is counting—on the sortal used to identify and individuate them." (MAKING IT EXPLICIT, p. 439)

Kant's discussion of existence takes for granted that it comes in two sorts—the generic sort had both by pencils and God and the more specific, phenomenal, sort had only by the pencils and their fellow-inhabitants of space and time. Brandom responds that it comes in many sorts, as many as there are sets of what he calls canonical designators. For him, an existential commitment—a belief that something of a certain description exists—is "a particular quantificational commitment in which the vindicating commitments that determine its content are restricted to canonical designators". (p. 443) The best way to understand what Brandom means by "canonical designators" is to consider the paradigm case thereof—"egocentric spatio-temporal coordinate descriptions." (p. 445) These designators are the descriptions of spatio-temporal locations on a grid whose zero point is the place where the speaker is now. To say that a physical object exists is to say that the object in question occupies one of those points—that it occupies an address specified with reference to the coordinates of that grid.

Analogously, to say that an object has existence not physically but "in the Sherlock Holmes stories" is to choose as a set of canonical designators all and only descriptions of persons and things mentioned in those stories, or entailed by what is said in those stories. When we say that Dr. Watson's wife exists but Holmes' does not, we mean that a person mentioned in the stories can be identified with the former but that no such person can be mentioned in the latter. Again, to say that there exists a prime between 21 and 25 but no prime between 48 and 50 is to take the natural numbers as canonical designators. Each such list of designators provides an exhaustive (finite or infinite) list of things which something must be identical with if it is to exist.

The only sort of existence that Kant thought we could discuss intelligibly was physical existence, and in this area of logical space the canonical designators are, indeed, the same ones Kant picks—the niches on the spatio-temporal grid. In Kant's system, God inhabits logical space but not empirical, physical, space. So, Kant thought, the question of the existence of God is beyond our knowledge, for knowledge of existence is co-extensive with knowledge of physical existence. But somehow, he goes on to say, this question can be dealt with by "pure practical reason".

For Brandom, however, the matter is more complicated. We have lots of logical spaces at our disposal (and doubtless more to come) and we can discuss existence within any of them. We have as many such spaces as we have infinite sequences, or finite lists, of canonical designators. We can, for example, treat the sacred scriptures of a given religious tradition as we treat the Holmes stories—as

providing canonical designators that permit us to confirm or disconfirm the existence of objects, albeit not physical objects. Kant was right to think that there is no reason why existence has to be physical (for neither that of prime numbers nor that of the Baker Street Irregulars is) but he was wrong in thinking that knowledge of existence is limited to knowledge of physical existence.

This is because the question of whether or not to talk about the existence of immaterial and infinite beings is not one for transcendental philosophy but rather one to be turned over to cultural politics. An optimistic representationalist like Nagel can picture us as surrounded by possibly unknowable facts—objects for which we shall never have words entering into relations we may never understand—and a pessimistic representationalist like Kant can demure. But for an inferentialist, what counts as an object is determined by what a culture has definite descriptions of, and argument about what exists is determined by what canonical designators are in place. Yet any culture may be surpassed by another, since the human imagination may dream up many more definite descriptions and equally many lists of canonical designators. There are no "natural", transcultural, limits to this process of self-transcendence, nor does it have any predetermined goal.

When a culture wants to erect a logical space that includes, say, the gods and goddesses of the Olympian pantheon, nothing stands in its way, any more than anything stood in Conan Doyle's way when he created the list of Holmesian canonical designators. To ask, in such a culture "are there *really* gods and goddesses?" is like asking 'are there *really* natural numbers?" or "are there *really* physical objects?" The person asking such a question has to have a good reason for raising it. Such a good reason will, in the end, turn out to be a claim that the culture would be in better shape if the sort of thing in question were no longer discussed, if questions about the existence of such things were no longer taken seriously. Somebody who has doubts about the Olympians may do so, for example, because she has another pantheon to recommend (the Egyptian one, for example) or because she thinks that her culture would be better off with no pantheon at all. Ontology will, once again, boil down to cultural politics.

## 8. Two bad distinctions: literal-symbolic and sense-nonsense

Brandom's point can be clarified by comparing it with the claim, made by Tillich and other Christian theologians, that since God is Being-as-such, and not a being among others, the attempt to characterize him—or, in Brandomian language, the attempt to identify him with the help of an already available list of canonical designators—is hopeless. Tillich concluded that "Does God exist?" is a bad question—as bad, to revert to the analogy I was pursuing earlier, as "Is there *really* something it is like to be conscious?" or "Are numbers really real?".

There is no problem about giving either "what it is like to be conscious" or "God, a being without parts or passions" a place in a language-game. We have had lots of experience watching both games being played. But in neither case is there any point in raising questions about existence, because there is no neutral logical space within which discussion can proceed between people inclined to deny and people inclined to affirm existence of the relevant entity. Metaphysical questions like "Does God exist?" and "Is the spatio-temporal world real?" are undiscussable because there is no list of "neutral" canonical designators by reference to which they might be answered. That is why "existent thing", a universal as opposed to a local sortal, is only a pseudo-sortal. The very idea of a universal sortal is incoherent, for to be a sortal is to come with a set of canonical designators in tow. If discussion of God's existence or the reality of the world of common sense were to be discussable (in a way that does *not* boil down to cultural politics), we should have to have somehow transcended both God and the world so as to see them against a "neutral" background.

The fact that "Does God exist?" is a bad question suggests that a better question would be: do we want to treat one or more of the various religious traditions (with their accompanying pantheons) as a language-game to be woven together with our deliberation over moral dilemmas, our deepest hopes, and our need to be rescued from despair? Alternatively: does one or more of these religious traditions provide language we wish to use when putting together our self-image, determining what is most important to us? If we do not, we shall treat that tradition and its pantheon as offering a "mythology" rather than a religion. But within that mythology, as within the Holmes stories, there will be truth and falsity—literal truth and falsity—about existence claims. It will be true, for example, that there exists a child of Zeus and Semele but false that there is a child of Uranus and Aphrodite, true that there is a Third Person of the Godhead but false that there is a Thirteenth.

Our decision about whether to treat the religious tradition in which we were brought up as a religion or as mythology will depend on many things—for example, whether we continue to think that prayer and worship will make a difference to what happens to us, or whether we come to believe that technology will do what most of what religious believers thought only divine Providence could accomplish. But there are no criteria for when it is rational and when irrational to switch from a "myth" view of the tradition to a "religion" view or conversely. Decisions about what language-games to play, what to talk about and what not to talk about, and for what purposes, are not made on the basis of agreed-upon criteria. Cultural politics is the least norm-governed human activity. This is because it is the site of generational revolt, and thus the growing point of culture—the place where traditions, lists of canonical designators, and norms are all up for grabs at once.

The great Protestant theologian Paul Tillich believed that in a post-Enlightenment Western culture, the vision of a social democratic utopia has begun to play the role of God. It has started to be the symbol of ultimate concern for intellectuals whose ancestors cast Jesus Christ in that role. Tillich offered various arguments to the effect that that vision was an inadequate symbol, but his arguments are all of the non-criteria-governed sort that I have been putting under the heading "cultural politics". Like most recommendations of religious belief in the West since the Enlightenment, they were arguments that we shall eventually be driven to despair without specifically *religious* symbols of ultimate concern—the sort that the Enlightenment thought we could perfectly well do without. Such arguments claim, for example, that a person whose sense of what is ultimately important is framed in purely secular terms will be less successful in achieving what Tillich called 'the courage to be" than those who use Christian terms.

"Finding an adequate symbol of ultimate concern" is not an improvement on such old-fashioned phrases as "finding meaning in life", "formulating a satisfactory self-image" or "discovering what the Good is". Indeed, it is slightly worse than these, because it relies upon a distinction between the symbolic and the literal that is a relic of representationalist philosophy. Tillich thought that scientific and common-sense beliefs could have literal truth, but religious truths could have only "symbolic" truth. He thought that because he believed that the former could be considered accurate representations of reality, whereas the notion of "accuracy' was inappropriate to the latter. A Brandomian inferentialist, however, has no use for the literal-vs.-symbolic distinction. The only relevant distinction she can countenance is one between logical spaces constructed for certain purposes (e.g., that of physical science, that of mathematics, that of chess) and other logical spaces constructed for other purposes (e.g., those provided by the Platonic dialogues, the Jataka, the Holmes stories, the Christian New Testament, etc.).

Debate about the utility of these logical spaces and about the desirability or undesirability of uniting them with, or disjoining them from, one another is the substance of cultural politics. From the point of view common to Brandom and Hegel, there is nothing special about natural science (or, better, to the discourse constituted by the union of the logical space of everyday transcultural common sense with that of modern natural science) which entitles it to the term "literal truth". That term harks back to the bad Kantian idea that discourse about physical objects is the paradigm case of making truth claims, and that all other areas of discourse must be thought of as "non-cognitive". If we drop this idea, we shall have no use for what Nancy Frankenberry has called "the theology of symbolic forms"—no use of the attempt (which goes back at least to

Schleiermacher and Feuerbach) to make room for God by saying that there is something like "symbolic truth" or "imaginative truth" or "emotional truth" or "metaphorical truth" as well as "literal" truth.

Dropping these notions will lead us to drop the idea that God requires to be talked about in a special way because he is a special kind of being. For Brandom, there is no such thing as a certain kind of object demanding to be spoken of in a certain kind of language. To say that God requires to be talked about in a certain way is no more illuminating than to say that transfinite cardinal numbers, or neutrinos, demand to be talked about in a certain way. Since we wouldn't know what any of these entities were if we did not know that they were the entities talked about in these ways, the idea that they "demand" this treatment is unhelpful. It is as if we praised a poet's choice of metaphor for fitting our otherwise indescribable experience perfectly. Such praise rings hollow, simply because we cannot identify the experience without the help of the metaphor. It is as if, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, we were to exclaim with delight over the fact that a plane figure fits perfectly into its surroundings. What else, after all, *could* it do?

Like Wittgenstein, Brandom thinks that anything has a sense if you give it a sense. More consistently than Wittgenstein, he can follow up on this by saying that whatever philosophy is, it is not the detection of nonsense (pace Kant. the *Tractatus*, Carnap, and some misbegotten passages in *Philosophical Investigations*). The language-game played by theologians with the transcendental terms, or with Heideggerese, and the one played by philosophers of mind who talk about the independence of qualia from behavior and environment, is as coherent as that played with numbers or physical objects. *But the coherence of talk about X does not guarantee the discussability of the existence of X.* Talk about numbers is ideally coherent, but this coherence does not help us discuss the question of whether the numerals are names of real things. Nor does the coherence of Christian theology help us discuss the existence of God. This is not because of an ontological fact about numbers or God, but because of sociological facts about the unavailability of norms to regulate discussion.

Brandom's favorite philosopher is Hegel, and in this area the most salient difference between Kant and Hegel is that Hegel does not think philosophy can rise above the social practices of its time and judge their desirability by reference to something that is not itself an alternative social practice (past or future, real or imagined). For Hegel as for Brandom, there are no norms which are not the norms of some social practice. So when asked "Are these desirable norms?" or "Is this a good social practice?" all either can do is ask: "By reference to what encompassing social practice are we supposed to judge desirability?" or, more usefully, "By comparison to the norms of what proposed alternative social practice?"

Early in the Introduction to THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, there is a passage that anticipates what James said in "The Will to Believe" about W. K. Clifford, a philosopher who held that we have no right to believe in the existence of God, given the lack of relevant evidence. Clifford, James said, was too willing to sacrifice truth in order to be certain that he would never fall into error. Hegel wrote against the Cliffords of an earlier day as follows:

> ...if the fear of falling into error sets up a mistrust of Science, which in the absence of such scruples gets on with the work itself, and actually cognizes something, it is hard to see why we should not turn round and mistrust this very mistrust. Should this fear takes something—a great deal in fact—for granted as truth, supporting its scruples and inferences on what is itself in need of prior scrutiny to see if it is true. To be specific, it takes for granted certain ideas about cognition as an instrument and as a medium, and assumes that there is a difference between ourselves and this cognition. Above all, it presupposes that the Absolute stands on one side and cognition on the other, independent and separated from it, and yet is something real; or in other words, it presupposes that cognition which, since it is excluded from the Absolute, is surely outside of the truth as well, is nevertheless true, an assumption whereby what calls itself fear of error reveals itself rather as fear of the truth. (PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, trans. Miller, paragraph 74)

In place of the words "Science" and "cognition" in Hegel's text Brandom would, I suspect, put "conversation", This is suggested by one of the few unargued dicta to be found in MAKING IT EXPLICIT, a dictum which is also of my favorite sentences in that book: "Conversation is the great good for discursive creatures". (p. 644) If one makes this substitution, one will construe Hegel as saying, in this passage, that we should not think that there is a difference between ourselves and the discursive practices in which we are engaged, and that we should not think that those practices are a means to some end, nor that they are a medium of representation used to get something right. A fortiori, we should not think that there is a goal of inquiry which is what it is apart from those practices, and fore-knowledge of which can help us decide which practices to have.

We should rather, as Hegel says elsewhere, be content to think philosophy as its time (that is to say, our present discursive practices) held in thought (that is to say, contrasted with alternative past or proposed practices). We should stop trying to put our discursive practices within a larger context, one which forms the background of all possible social practices and which contains a

list of "neutral" canonical designators that delimit the range of the existent once and for all. If there were such a context, it would of course be the proper object of study of an expert culture charged with determining the future direction of the Conversation of Humankind. But there is no such context. So we should stop imagining that such an expert culture would be desirable.

## 9. Private and public religion

I have been arguing in this paper that we should substitute the question about the cultural desirability of God-talk for the ontological question about the existence of God. But I have said little about what discussion of the former question looks like. As I see it, the question of whether to keep on talking about God, whether to keep that logical space open, needs to be divided into two sub-questions. The first is a question about individual's right to be religious, even though unable to justify her religious beliefs to others. It might be formulated in the first person as "Have I the right to practice whatever form of religious devotion I please even though, because there is no social practice that legitimizes inferences from or to the sentences that I employ in this devotional practice, I cannot make sense of this practice to my fellow humans?" I think James gave the right answer to this question, namely "Sure". People have the same right to this sort of private devotion as they do to write poems or paint pictures that nobody else can make any sense out of. It is a feature of what we have come to think of as a desirably democratic and pluralist society that our religion is our own business—something we need not even discuss with others, much less try to justify to them, unless we feel like doing so. Such a society tries to leave as much free space as possible for individuals to develop their own sense of who they are and what their lives are for, asking only that they obey Mill's precept and extend to others the tolerance they themselves enjoy.

But such societies have, of course, been troubled by another question: What about organized religion? What about the churches? Even if one follows James' advice and ignores Clifford-like strictures against the "irrationality" of religious belief, one might still think that both Lucretius and Marx had a point. So it is possible to agree that society should grant authority to private individuals to formulate private systems of belief while still being dubious about the existence of churches. James and Mill would presumably have had no trouble agreeing that there is nothing wrong with churches unless their activities do social harm. But when it comes to deciding whether actually existing churches do in fact do such harm, things get complicated. The socio-political history of the West in the last two hundred years is spotted with controversies such as those over Jefferson's Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom, the disestablishment of the Church of

Ireland, the laicization of education in France, the Kulturkampf in Germany, the current controversy in the US over the use of public funds to support religious education, and the like.

I have nothing new or interesting to say about such issues as these, which differ from country to country and for the resolution of which it would be absurd to invoke some set of purportedly universally valid norms. All I want to claim is that debate over such concrete political questions is more fruitful than debate over the existence of God. They are the questions which remain once we dismiss appeals to religious experience as mere table-pounding, and after we have come to regard natural theology as pointless.

We shall dismiss religious experience if we follow Wittgenstein, Sellars and Brandom in thinking that there is no intermediary called "what the experience was really like" in between the altered state of the nervous system associated with the onset of the claimed experience and the resulting discursive commitments undertaken by a member of a language-using community. We shall dismiss natural theology if we see the undiscussability of God's existence not as a testimony to his superior status but as a consequence of the attempt to give him that status—a side-effect of making him so incomparably special as to be a being whose existence cannot be discussed by reference to any antecedent list of canonical designators. Inferentialist philosophy of language and mind helps us see why neither appeals to experience nor appeals to what is really out there are of any use in deciding what to talk about. To move into the intellectual world to which inferentialism gives access would be to treat questions of what language-games to play as questions of how members of a democratic societies can best balance their private responsibilities to themselves with their public responsibilities as citizens.

March 21, 2001

# II. EUROPEAN SOCIAL SPACE

## EUROPEAN IDENTITY/IDENTITIES: MAJORITY AND MINORITIES IN THE NEW EUROPE*

### ALBERT P. VAN GOUDOEVER**

One of the most pressing problems in Europe is the European identity and identities: the problem of majorities and minorities. In this contribution I will concentrate on the last issue, because the very presence of permanent minorities affect the construct of European identity. The framework for this problem is the fact that the European Union is not a federation. When discussing European developments, one should keep in mind that Europe is still in the making.

### Majorities
The notion of majorities usually is mentioned in connection with politics. Yet not many people are interested in discussing the European parliament, a consensus-type of parliament, or the Council of Europe, or the European Commission, at least not in terms of political majorities; the usual framework of comments is related to the position of nation-states. Given the low participation of the public in voting in the European elections, a minority is supporting European identity within Europe. Only in an indirect way, the majority voted for Europe, by way of the national governments. The real Europeans are an elite minority. A lack of democracy within the structure and the administrative image of the European Union are obviously the crucial explanation for the lack of public interest. So, if ever we could use a notion like 'construction' it is the European construction, the top-down construction. This construction is closely related to the problem of identity.

The symbolic proof of identity is the European passport. I am sorry to say that as such, it is not more than just a cover; since the introduction of the European passport my passport contains a great number of texts in small print referring to national history; not to European history, but to Dutch history and

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* Conference; The Euro: A New Currency for a New Millennium, Center for European studies, University of Michigan, 12 November 1999. www.umich.edu/~iinet/ces/euroconference/htm
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more specifically, to myth-oriented episodes from the glorious past. I think a symbolic chance has been missed. Moreover, many recent immigrants do not at all share that history. Their identity is different. They just have an interest in the passport, and prefer separation of formal citizenship from cultural identity.

We touch upon the essential problem of identities. Nation-states still are defending their identities in a European context. Even though the last twelve years showed a considerable loss of sovereignty by the member-states, which meant progress towards a real European Union, constitutional power still is mainly based upon the nation-state. I am sure the average referential framework for an individual in Europe is determined by national boundaries. The initiative for an European constitution is closer to the heart of the Non-Governmental Organization, the European movement, than to the heart of Bruxelles' decision-making, though a German initiative for a 'Grundrechtscharta' (Charter of Fundamental Rights) started [Footnote: Verheugen, Staatsminister BRD, 23.4.99, in: Internationale Politik 1999/6, Dokumente]. Please, remember the challenging interpretation of European cooperation in the fifties by Alan Milward (1992): the rescue of the nation-state [footnote: Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, Berkeley 1992]; recent archival research at Utrecht University confirmed that thesis by disclosing the importance of agrarian lobbies only looking for self-interest and protection, differing greatly from European rhetoric. [footnote: Johan Molegraaf, Boeren in Brussel. Nederland en het gemeenschappelijk Europees Landbouwbeleid 1958-1971 (Farmers in Bruxelles; the Netherlands and Agricultural Community Policies), Ph.D.-dissertation Utrecht 1999]. When it comes to identities, this bold thesis seems again to be true: the important bulwark of national identity is to be preserved against immigrants, and aliens. The nation-state would be shaken to its foundations as soon as it looses its decisive power upon access to its citizenship, its power over national culture, language and history. To give way to other identities, means to abandon its existential legitimization. The crucial complication is the simple fact that the identities of current alien residents are different in all respects, language, religion, education, and so on. So the nation-states cooperate with the other European countries and strengthen the economic base. In contrast, they harmonize exclusive policies towards refugees and immigrants in order to preserve the national identity. And the Europeanists, that minority elite, seem to miss the chance to demand the sacrifice of national identity. European citizenship has been invented, sure, but it is an empty case, because European citizenship depends on national citizenship of the member-states and does not exist on its own. The claim to remake Europe for economical construction to a Europe for the citizens is lip-service. Concluding on majorities, the sovereignty of nation-states and their

respective identities still is a major problem when it comes to citizenship and identities' issues.

### Minorities

The traditional debate on minorities is based upon historical and national minorities, and the minority question is mentioned when raising the Basque-problem, or the problem of Northern Ireland. Recently, especially in the nineties, more minorities showed up, as general political interest in national and minority issues grew with the emerging national successes in Eastern Europe accompanying the dismemberment of the federations. So more specific groups in Western Europe can be added to the list, like Catalans, Britons, Welshmen, and Scots. The last one recently booked considerable success in obtaining a position of autonomy. But because of the use of terrorism by only a few of those national minorities, and because of terrible civil wars even within the European continent, public attention is focused upon them as a potential danger, a imagined menace to public security, a constructed menace to the majority.

However, perhaps more important minorities can be found in Europe, which usually are not being seen as collectivities in the sense of national or religious minorities. Those groups are spread across the countries, scattered to some extent, they are not sharing a common territory or a specific historical destiny, yet their culture is particularly specific and different to the indigenous nationals. They are seen as the non-indigenous population, aliens, newcomers visibly from far away, labor-migrants. The countries of origin are located around the Mediterranean: Turkey, Maghreb-countries, and Yugoslavia. A special group came from the former colonies. Immigration was directed to North Western Europe in the sixties and seventies, and to South Europe as well since the 80's. They constitute the modern diaspora in Europe, an Islamic diaspora. Already you can see many mosques as a symbol of the presence of this diaspora.

Even though immigrants are usually not referred to as 'minorities' because of the lack of territorial unity, it should be wise to think of them in terms of minorities. During the last thirty years these groups belong to Europe's identity, a second or even third generation has been born in Europe, and in the future these groups can easily claim the status of indigenous citizens from different nationalities, exactly like in Eastern Europe. The debate we know from Eastern Europe: 'who came first' could be applicable for the situation in Western Europe in the next century.

Besides these immigrants who came to Europe for reasons of labor, still another group has to be identified: those who were seeking refuge for reasons of personal security, the refugees. Especially since the fall of the wall and the end of

communism, the number of refugees showed a sharp increase; the number rose from 170,000 (1985) to 700,000 in 1992 [Grete Brochmann, European Integration and Immigration from Third Countries, p. 31], to decline sharply to figures between 200,000 and 300,000 after the introduction of restrictive measures since 1994 [Website: Inter Governmental Consultations on Asylum, http://www.igc.ch/Default.htm]. It should be mentioned immediately, that the current debate is mixing up the labor-immigrants and refugees by attributing motives to find employment among refugees as well. Making the difference between refugees and labor-immigrants is, however, a necessity, if only for the difference in legal status. Both groups are most relevant to test European politics, to see if, or in which way Europe finds common approaches and solutions. Here, we can observe the real antagonism between majority and minority at a European scale. All member-states are involved to some extent.

### The quantitative scope of the problem

It is a problem to find reliable figures on labor-immigration, as has been complained of in the journal International Migration [footnote: International Migration vol.37, 1999 nr. 1: Trends of International Migration since 1965: What existing data reveal, by Hania Zlotnik, p.30]. Figures we have, suffer from incompleteness, as e.g. those related to gender issues, as complained by Eleonore Kofman [International Migration Review vol. 33 (1999) nr. 2, p. 289]. Suzanne Shanahan pointed to the political sensitivity of the use of categories like official racial and ethnic census figures ['Scripted debates', in: Extending citizenship, reconfiguring states, M. Hanagan and Ch. Tilly, eds., Lanham 1999, p. 79-80]. Indeed, the lack of adequate figures is restricting research as well as politics. The explanation is of course the fear of abuse of population data by ill-willing governments. This fear is still a heritage of Hitler's administration which eventually led to the holocaust. On the other hand, the moral standard is equality and non-discrimination, so do not ask for someone's nationality.

According to Saskia Sassen [footnote: Saskia Sassen, Guest and Aliens, p. 141], in 1996, 10 million non-europeans out of 383 million inhabitants in Western Europe were not citizens of the country they lived in, less than 3% of European population. Rainer Muenz estimates the figure of non-citizens at 5% [footnote: Rainer Muenz, 'Zuwanderung von Auslaendern', in: Zuwanderung nach Deutschland, p. 43]. Those figures are not impressive at all. In Germany for instance, the total number of immigrants between 1950 and 1995 was 28 million, not counting Aussiedler (German returnees), and the number of emigrants and leaving foreigners was 20 million, in balance the number of permanent immigrants in Germany was 7.1 million in 1998, 9% of the current population

[footnote: Zuwanderung nach Deutschland, pp. 14-15, 45]. This is perhaps more impressive, but still not alarming at the scale of the large German state.

Most important, however, is the fact that the greatest part of this non-indigenous population lives in great cities, often close together in degraded town areas, and can constitute up to more than 20% of the city-population, sometimes even close to 30% (e.g.: Frankfurt). Those minority groups are not left to the blunt forces of the market. In general, immigrants got quite a lot of social and economic rights, such as health care, social security, and welfare benefits; already in the seventies protection agreements were signed by the European Community with some countries of origin. Later, at the political level, local elections were often open for participation. However, immigrants did not obtain full citizenship, only parts of the full citizens' rights.Thus, citizenship was fragmented, mainly for practical reasons.

All in all, the level of social-economic integration is low, so, we may conclude that Europe has got a problem. (Muenz, op. cit., p. 43]. Even an example which offered good chances for solution, failed: in Great Britain, a great number of immigrants from the former colonies entered, who were allowed full citizenship until 1983; but social policy brought about effective segregation [Daniele Joly, 'Is multiculturalism the answer?', in: Grigoriou, Questions de minorites en Europe, p. 127]. In a rather late phase, several countries identified the problem of segregation in town and produced national programs to change course. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD in 1998, local initiatives should get more space to develop. The OECD ventilated the opinion as to the sure way to integration is the liberal access to full citizenship [footnote: Trends in International Migration, OECD Report 1998, p. 68].

No formal rights were violated as long as the immigrants had citizenship of the country of origin; however, I think the exclusion of full political rights to individuals which formed part of the community, is in itself a violation of political rights. The phenomenon of parts of the population that were excluded form full citizenship is well-known. It is a part of the process of emancipation. In the nineteenth century, workers were excluded and emancipated; in the twentieth century, women were allowed full citizenship. Now the immigrants are the next group foremancipation.

The immigrants have been rather weak in defending their interests; the majority came from very poor and underdeveloped parts of their country, and they had to start personal education and development from scratch. They did not even desire the full citizenship of the country of residence, they just wanted the passport and keep the original nationality. Looking for marriage partners in the countries of origin [footnote John Lievens, 'Family-forming Migration from Turkey and Morocco to Belgium: The Demand for Marriage Partners from the

Countries of Origin, in: International Migration Review vol. 33 (1999) no. 127, p. 717-745], and bilateral agreements between some countries of origin and the countries of residence makes dual nationality possible. In effect, integration in European society never can mean assimilation, and different identities or nationalities of immigrant-minorities should be respected.

So our first problem is why so many of those immigrants did not obtain the status of citizen and were not naturalized, the second problem is the social integration into society avoiding segregation.

The traditional approach of citizenship was either ius soli (right of soil, citizenship based upon place of birth; historically dominant in France and Great Britain) or ius sanguinis (right of blood, citizenship based upon family ties; historically dominant in Germany, Netherlands). To grant citizenship to immigrants -other than to those who were legally entitled to it because of ex-colonial status-, was a difficult matter. France demanded complete assimilation to French culture, Germany considered the German identity as sacred. The denial of citizenship to aliens was characterized by the new word denizens in sociology books. The notion denizen is a semantic contrast with the notion citizen.

The inconsistency of state behavior toward immigrants is clearlyshown by Germany. The German state-solidarity with ethnic Germans all over Europe and Central Asia (Volksdeutsche) led to a mobility of a great number of migrants which all became citizens because of their constitutional rights. The number between 1950 and 1996 was 3.6 million people [footnote: Migration der Deutschen, in: Zuwanderung nach Deutschland, p. 28). This inclusive policy made a strange contrast with the exclusion of 7.2 million of aliens, which were denied citizenship; among them were more than 2 Million Turks. These people were denizens [footnote: figures for 1995; Muenz, in: idem p., 45]. [footnote: In other countries, the next figures: France 6.4%, in the U.K. 3.3% foreign residents (1990), Grete Brochmann, European Integration and Immigration from Third Countries, p. 29].

### Harmonization

The problem of citizenship was a topic of debate for a long time, and the European approach has been evasive. Social policy, indeed, gave some rights, like health care and social security, the so-called special rights. The Maastricht treaty in 1991 centered on this fragmented interpretation of citizenship to avoid the choice between citizen and foreigner. However, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 reinforced the nationality argument, again respecting primarily the national identities of the member-nation-state. [footnote: Antje Wiener, From special to specialized rights, in: Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring States, p. 212-213].

Recent efforts to harmonize the naturalization in European countries led to reforms, which made it easier for second and third generations to become full citizens by the possibility of dual nationality but only for nationals of countries which allow one to keep the original nationality. This wavering policy led firstly to a rise, then to a decline in the number of naturalizations. The common scientific opinion concludes to a restrictive policy.

However, in May 1999, Germany decided upon a major legal breakthrough toward more naturalizations. The new law is especially relevant for the newly born generations from the year 2000: it meant the introduction of the ius soli besides the ius sanguinis [footnote: 'Promoting integration: a new citizenship law makes naturalization easier', in: Deutschland, 1999, no. 4, p. 8-9]. But in France, a new Act (1993) limited the right of soil. The harmonization led to a mixture of ius sanguinis and ius soli, and made it in Germany easier to acquire national citizenship, but in France more difficult.

Nevertheless, recent research on Turkish immigrants in Europe shows an underlying rejection of third country immigrants in policies of both the member-states as the community as a whole. [footnote: Bulent Cicekli, 'The rights of Turkish Migration in Europe under international law and EU Law', in: International Migration Review vol. 33 (1999) nr. 2, p. 347]. The current discussion should concentrate on the problem of exclusion or inclusion; future developments should not be neglected by assuming that immigration only belongs to the past.

### Policies towards refugees and illegal entrants

The policy of harmonizing policies against illegal passing of the borders succeeded in reducing the numbers in the period 1992-1995, a really restrictive policy [footnote: Horst Glatzel, 'Bilaterale Ruecknahmeuebereinkommen, multilaterale Harmonisierungspolitik', in: Angenendt p. 107]. And confronted with the sudden appearance of hundreds of thousands Bosnians, the European countries declared them to be a group of special, temporary status, different to the refugee status. Probably this policy will be a cornerstone of restrictive attitude towards refugees, according to James Hathaway [Footnote: James Hathaway, ed., Reconceiving International Refugee Law, The Hague 1997]. The Schengen agreement could not but trigger off this European cooperation: the aim of free moving across the borders meant a common policy of visa, information systems by the police, and closing the borders to illegal entrants (art. 23: send them back). The OECD is content with the harmonization of asylum policies regarding immigration, in conformity with the Schengen Treaty.

Still, the OECD concluded also that reluctance was shown to trust other countries' practices at the borders restrained a complete harmonization, several sociologists shared that conclusion [footnote: Trends in International Migration, OECD Annual Report 1998, p. 58]. In my opinion, harmonization of refugee policy should not be the ultimate goal of policies. Here as well, the problem of inclusion or exclusion should be tackled, and directed towards more inclusion, if only for humanitarian reasons. According to Rainer Bauboeck, inclusion is the norm [footnote: Rainer Bauboeck, Changing the Boundaries of Citizenship, in: From Aliens to Citizens, p. 228].

In conclusion, during the nineties the European countries came closer to each other in harmonizing policies on immigration and refugees, but the general tendency was according to the common denominator of exclusion. The essential cause is that the individual countries have been reluctant to share the identity-part of sovereignty with the Union. As a consequence, the new immigrant is met with several severe hindrances, and the resident aliens are only accepted after a long period of presence; at the same time, asylum to refugees became limited. The problem of segregation did not really enter decision-making.

### Debate

The citizenship debate gave rise to several approaches. The real value of full citizenship has been doubted because of its fragmentation and differentiation. In a recent collection of articles, a strongly relative approach was offered by trying to reduce the importance of citizenship [footnote: Extending Citizenship, reconfiguring States 1999]. Antje Wiener's analysis aims at an understanding of specific features of European citizenship and assumes citizenship to be constructed in practice particular to time, place, actors, and institutions. Citizenship is thus understood as more than a status based on rights. It is constructed as a dynamic notion. Wiener concluded that citizenship was eroded, because the immigrants were conceded nearly all privileges of the citizen. [footnote: From Special to Specialized Rights, in: Ibidem, p. 202]. She is right, her conclusion cannot be denied, but the point of a right to full citizenship is missing. Yet, symbolic and moral value is a major stake of citizenship reform, as stated by Rogers Brubaker [footnote: Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge, Mass., 1992, p.182], and University of Michigan-alumnus Charles Tilly [footnote: 'Conclusion' in: Extending Citizenship, p.256], who added: 'effective citizenship imposes strong obligations uniformly on broad categories of political participants and state agents'. Thus, even when relating the importance of citizenship by pointing out its fragmentation, it still is an important and crucial value in itself.

This author's opinion is quite simple, if inhabitants are deprived of voting rights, their most fundamental civil rights are violated, so full citizenship is necessary to emancipate the group of immigrants. This citizenship should be the European citizenship, which should prevail over national citizenship instead of the current practice. The semantic confusion of the notions of 'citizenship' and 'nationality' can then be avoided and gives more clarity for acceptance of other cultures. The real problem is not European citizenship for indigenous Europeans, but for the immigrants. The real risk of segregation should be subject to open European debates, but perhaps it is too late to change the patterns.

The demand for labor will continue in the near future. The Europeans need people for low work, illegal entrants will continue to succeed; the pressure on migration in the Maghreb countries will continue [footnote: M. Courbage, Nouveaux horizons demographiques en Mediterranee, Paris 1998]; the pressure from refugees is not coming to an end. Refugees will select Europe as a potential haven, protecting them from persecution or violence. Whatever the cause, Europe will be attractive for new groups top migrate.This means that Europe cannot ignore future developments, and go for a policy of inclusion rather than exclusion; and besides, inclusion is closer to the moral standard of respect for human rights. I think, that a real democratic Europe, supported by its immigrants participation, can contribute to a development towatrd inclusion more than the current positions allow.

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# EUROPE THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS

## ALIN FUMURESCU

*Motto: She puzzled over this for some time, but at last a bright thought stuck her. "Why, it's a looking-glass book, of course! And, if I hold it up to a glass, the words will all go the right way again."*

Carroll Lewis, Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There

A lot of pages have been written about the American construction and maybe even more about Europe. But even though the expression of the United States of Europe is still in use, nobody seems to be interested in drawing a parallel between the two constructions. Perhaps the explanation resides in the multitude of differences easy to observe: no common language, no common history, traditions or religion, any common political system and so forth. That's why the belief that if it is to be done, the European Union will be something radical different from the United Sates, so what good to draw a parallel between? This lack of interest is also due to another widespread belief – namely that the importance of Europe in the world history is to be found nowhere else but in the past. The future can't provide for her anything more but a second-hand task. "Commander of the world, she [Europe] also civilized it, imprinting all other nations, tribes and continents with her own image. (...) And insofar as we subscribe to this story, we have to prepare for the funeral oration. Europe, the mighty, the leader of the world, no longer exists; Europe, the source of inspiration for all higher cultures, has been exhausted. May she rest in peace.[1]"

The aim of this paper is to challenge this kind of beliefs. Without trying to diminish the importance of these differences between America and Europe, on the contrary emphasizing them, I will try to prove that these differences are to be perceived rather as correspondences. When you can find for each feature of the object A an opposed feature in the object B you have to question yourself is B is not merely the overturn image of A reflected in a mirror. As far as I am concern

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[1] A. Heller, , *Europe: An Epilogue?. In "The Idea of Europe - Problems of National and Transnational identity",* edited by Brian Nelson, David Roberts and Walter Veit, Berg Publishers, Inc, 1992,p.22

I'm persuaded that this is exactly the situation we have to face here. And looking at the American construction of "we", we can figure out both the difficulties of the correspondent European construction and the way to outrun them. Further more I will try to prove that if the American Revolution was rightly perceived as the embodiment of the modernity (thus its success and exported model), the future Europe can become the embodiment of the postmodernity. The solution that the Europeans are under way to find in order to resist the postmodern challenge of globalization and multiculturalism (which, as a matter of fact, can be "read" as the old platonic aporia of the One and the Multiple) can become, as the American model at his time, a model to be export worldwide.

If for America we can speak about the fortunate Revolution at the right time and in the right place, maybe the years to come will prove that Europe is the new fortunate "event" at the right time and in the right place.

The paper is divided in three parts. Part One will deal with the differences in premises seen as correspondences between the American and European constructions. Aware of the fact that the devil reside in the details I will keep however the part of the angels, being concern primarily with the big-picture and leaving aside the multitude of "technical aspects" as the economic infrastructure, the political and institutional system of the European Union, the democratic deficit, and so forth. Part two will focus on the two processes, emphasizing one again the overturn correspondences, which give us some clues regarding the final design of the Europe. Finally, I will remind briefly why America is consider to be the embodiment of the modernity and why, following the same logic, we can "read" Europe as the embodiment of the postmodernity. Most of the time I will use the general term of Europe instead of "European Community" or "European Union". Having to deal with a process, which is under way, any precise definition seems at least premature.

## Part One: The Premises

*'Who am I, then? Tell me that first, and then, if I like being that person, I'll come up: if not, I'll stay down here till I'm somebody else.'*
*Alice's adventures in Wonderland*

Looking at both of the situations it is obvious for the very beginning that in order to emerge the Americans, as Americans have had to break with the Great Britain. They have had to engage in a centrifugal movement and their distinctiveness was created by differentiation. Instead, in order to emerge, the Europeans, as Europeans have to break, so to speak, with themselves. Each state, each nation has to break with his/her own identification, with his/her history and

heritage. In a way, each European nation must become an Esau and sold her birthright, her unique identity to the Jacob of Europe. They had to engage in a <u>centripetal</u> movement and the European distinctiveness is to be creating by <u>likeliness</u>.

Speaking about evidence, even the geographical conditions point in different directions. On the one hand we have a continent, which have to be delimitate only at his extremities (North and South). On the other hand there we don't even know what we are talking about. There is no physical evidence to delimit the Europe from Asia. Only in two very brief periods had the waterway between Europe and Asia coincided with a political boundary (e.g., from 547 to 513 B.C. and from 386 to 334 B.C.) and at no stage did the distinction between the continents correspond to prevailing patterns of cultural difference.[2] Geographically, linguistically, ecclesiastically, culturally and politically, a categorical distinction between Europe and Asia could not be sustained, and nor is nowadays. The definition of Europe has become elusive; after all, the Urals, which are normally regarded as the eastern frontier of Europe, have a distinct geographic location, but are not a frontier between states.

Speaking about consequences, the problem is really a very important one. For example, Turkey becomes subject of discussion because of its geographic position astride the border between Asia and Europe. A rapport of the Commission of the European Community to the European Council, made in Lisbon, 24 June 1992, emphasize that "…the Commission believes that is neither possible nor opportune to establish now the frontiers of the EU, whose contours will be shaped over many years to come." [3]

The geographical imprecision go by pair with the linguistic diversity. The fact that in the United States the problem of multi-linguism was quasi-unexistent was without doubt a very helpful premise in the construction of the "we". The only possible linguistic challenge, the Dutches, surrounded in 1664, without fight. At the time of the restoration of Charles II, New England had a population of 50,000, Maryland 15,000 and Virginia 35,000, while there were only 10,000 white men in New Netherlands. Once created the Dutch's precedent, the fact that all the new immigrants have to adopt English as the "official" language remained self-understood. So, in the dawn of the Revolution, the unity of language was incontestable.

Thinking of Europe instead, we have to deal with at least 25 different languages, without counting the languages of the minorities, most of them with a long history in their backgrounds and an unshakeable pride of their speakers. For

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[2] A. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, London 1954, Annex

[3] *Building European Union – A documentary history and analysis*, edited by Trevor Salmon and Sir William Nicoll, Manchester University Press, 1997, p.249

the European nations, the language is more than just a useful tool. Is one of the most important element of identification and the adoption of a "Chart of minoritarian language" is only an example of the European concern with the language identity.

Many argue that the European construction will be impossible precisely because of this multi-linguism. After all, Yahve dissolved the treat of the Tower of Babel by the simple device of introducing a multiplicity of languages. Disunion and scattered power result.

Having to deal with all these differences it is no wonder if, from one side, we encounter from the beginning the expression "we, the people of the United States", and from the other, "we, the peoples". A couple of documents will be enough to demonstrate the difference. In "The Draft Declaration II on European Federation", Geneva, May 1944 we can read: "The peoples of Europe are united in their resistance to Nazi oppression"[4]. In "The Statute of the Council of Europe", London, May 1949: "Reaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples..."[5] It is worthy to note that the only document in which I could find a reference to the European People is in the speech gave at Harvard University in June 1947 by...an American – namely the Secretary of State George C. Marshall ("the remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in their economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole"[6]).

Yet, the most important "feature" of this reverse image, the key-stone which capture and carry one all these differences is to be considered the political parties-system. It give the insight of what the future building will look like and is to be found somewhere at the midway between the "bricks" and the process of construction itself. Today, any political structure is unconceivable in the absence of these constitutive "stones" which serve as regulators and intermediaries between the citizens and their governments. And once again the American construction seems to be the luckiest one. The Constitution made no reference to political parties and the founders, George Washington in particular, believed that such organizations should be avoided. Yet parties arose from the division between the followers of Hamilton and those of Madison and Jefferson. This bi-polarity was maintained through the Federalists-Antifederalists, Whigs and Democrats, Republican and Democrats.

These parties were from the beginning national not sectional. Leaving the presidency, George Washington cautioned his fellow citizens that it might "disturb our Union" if political parties should ever be organized on a geographical

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[4] op.cit. p22
[5] idem, p.38
[6] ibidem, p.28

basis – Eastern against Western or Northern against Southern – "whence designing men may endeavor to excite a belief that there is a real difference of local interests or views.[7]" He explained: "One of the expedients of party to acquire influence, within particular districts, is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of other districts[8]."

This is precisely the problem that Europeans have to face nowadays – namely, the absence of the real European parties. And this is not because of some lack of awareness regarding their importance. But even if at the start of the European integration process in the early 1950's, several scholars become Euro-party advocates and predicted a central role for party politics in the construction of an European Community, the first European elections (1979) failed to produce a transnational mobilization of political forces in Europe or coherent European-level party organizations. Only in 1992, in the Maastricht Treaty we can find the reference to the role of political parties in any EC Treaty or legislation. Article 138A of the Treaty of Maastricht stipulate: "Political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union." The power of the European Parliament had also been substantially increased after the provisions of Maastricht Treaty. For the first time the incoming Parliament would have a vote of confirmation of the Commission and could veto legislation in certain policies areas.

However, this step forward remained more or less in the same vagueness that seams to underline the entire European construction. It still remained to define, for example, what is meant by the concepts of "European parties" or by "political parties at European level"? The following answer come from the analysis of the essential elements of a European party statute, based on the reflections of Secretaries General of the ESP, EPP and ELDR. "Political parties at European level (European parties) are federative associations of national or regional parties. Member parties (as national or regional sections) must be functional in most (or in several) member states of the European Union, and be recognized as parties by the various different laws applying to political parties (or equivalent regulations) or to elections. Their deputies belong, if there are enough of them, to the same group in the European Parliament.[9]"

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[7] apud R.N. Current, T.H.Williams, F. Freidel and W.E. Brownlee, *The Essentials of American History to 1877*, edited by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, New York, 1986, p.131

[8] idem, p.131

[9] apud T.Jansen, *The European People's Party: origins and development*, St. Martin Press, New York, 1998, p.17

As we can see, this definition remains in debt to the national party system. Any attempt to build a European party starting directly from a European Level was never registered and there are few chances that it will ever be. Starting with a more realistic prospective the major national political parties began at an early stage too cooperate with the like-minded parties in the various Community countries. From the late 1940's and trough the 1950's, European' party system began to form. As the first elections to the European Parliament approached in 1979, the first formal parties federations established themselves. The Socialists formed the Confederation of Socialist Parties (CSP) in 1974, the Christian democrats the European People's Party (EPP) in 1976, the year also when the various liberal parties established the Federation of European Liberals, Democrats and Reformers (ELDR). Green Parties followed suit in 1993, with the formation of the European Federation of Green Parties. By 1994, the three larger federations had all officially become political parties, but this formal shift from federation to party had not had a major impact. The vast majority of citizens perceive that they have more in common with people from their own "nation" than with anyone from another nation. The reason lay precisely in the "bricks" mentioned before: the cultural, linguistic, territorial, historical and economic reason. The European parties still have little meaning, if any, for the European citizens.

However, there are signs of change. Faced with globalization, on the one hand, and with "europenization" on the other, individuals have difficulties to identify with the national interest. Their governments don't represent no more there private concerns. Given the fact that tasks are delegated to supranational institutions (such as the European Commission), they feel that individual governments are less able to protect their own interests. There is now room created for the individual identity to switch from the nation to the social group. Moreover, as Deirdre M. Curtin suggest, we must "begin to explore ways in which digitization can facilitate an effort of imagination transcending those of national borders and thus have potential in terms of facilitating the construction of a postnational identity.[10]" The borders are rapidly becoming irrelevant. There is now room created for the postnational idea, which is premised precisely on the separation of politics and culture, of nationality and citizenship. In the Part Two will se how the explanatory theories of the European parties replicate "in nuce" the different perspectives on the European construction. Both have to deal with the same old dichotomy between the One and the Multiple.

There are many "bricks" in the European construction which emphasize the differences. The space of this paper doesn't allow an extended analysis on different confessions, economical developments, forms of government and so on.

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[10] D.M. Curtin, *Postnational Democracy - The European Union in search of a political philosophy*, published by Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1997, p.60

One can argue that the same diversity of confessions, traditions, different policies in commerce and taxation can be find also in the colonies. However, the difference is a huge one. For Americans, this diversity was scattered in a uniform way within the thirteen colonies. It was a diversity submerged by the conscience of the unity from the very beginning. As Wollin pointed out, one of the earliest expressions of Unum's mythematics is to be found in the second Federalist by John Jay: "Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country, to one united people, a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and their customs.[11]"

By reverse, the diversity of Europe is "institutionalized" from centuries, and the differences was settled in the forms of different peoples, organized in states at least beginning with the Westphalian peace. As Alberta Sbragia emphasizes, "whereas the fifty American states are roughly similar in their institutional structures, the twelve members of the Community are not. The variation within the Community – whether measured in wealth, administrative capacity, cultural and linguistic heterogeneity, or political and institutional arrangements – is far greater than the variation within the United States.(…) Coexisting with the diversity are the very high levels of institutionalization within each member state. Even the 'poor' members of the Community have more complex and well-institutionalized political and administrative systems then most other countries have."[12]

In the US you have to scratch the Unum "surface" in order to reveal the pluribus, which lay beneath. In Europe, this process is turned upside down: you have to scratch the monadic diversity in order to discover some sort of unity.

### Part Two: The process

> "- Explain yourself!"
> "- I can't explain myself, I'm afraid, Sir", said Alice, "because I'm not myself, you see."
> "- I don't see", said the Caterpillar.
> "-I'm afraid I can't put it more clearly", Alice replied, very politely, "for I ca'n't understand myself, to begin with; and being so many different sizes in a day is very confusing." – Alice's Adventures in the Wonderland

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[11] S. Wolin, *The presence of the Past: essays on the state and the Constitution*, p.123

[12] A.M. Sbragia, *Euro-Politics - Institutions and Policymaking in the "New"opean Commnunity*, The Brooking Institution, Washington DC, 1992, p.3

When we try to compare the processes, which lead at the two political constructions, we can find again very useful the metaphor of the reflection in the mirror. Indeed, beginning with the duration of the processes we discover the same reverse features. Started in 1765 with the Stamp Act crisis, the US construction was finished less then 25 years later, with the first Congress under the new Constitution. At an historical scale this is really a very fast process. Speaking about Europe it is difficult even to point out when this construction begun.

Was it to be place in the first references made by William Penn ("An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe, by the Establishment of a European Dyet, Parliament, or Estates") in 1693 or by Abbe de Saint-Pierre in 1712 ("Memoires pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe")? [13] Or in the Richard Condenhove – Kalergi's "Pan-Europe" (1923)? Or in the "Memorandum on the Organization of a Regime of European Federal Union Addressed to Twenty Six Governments of Europe" prepared in 1930 by Aristide Briand, the French Foreign Minister for the League of Nations? And so on. Anyway, even if we consider the "official" beginning (as is widely accepted) the "Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community" (Paris, April 1951) we are still far, some fifty years later, to foresee the end of this process.[14]

The explanation can be found in the lack of a grand design from the part of the "founding fathers" of the Europe. For the "fathers" of the American Constitution the project was quite clear: a federation with a system of checking and balancing power as much as possible. All the others were details. Only the opponents, the Antifederalists, lacked a unified project – and it was logically impossible to held one – thus their failure. Looking in the mirror, on the other side of the Atlantic, the things are upside down. The aim is clear now for the Anti-Europeanists - an return to the status-quo of the state-nations – while the Pro-Europeanists lack an unified perspective – and is logically impossible to held one – thus their relative success. Nobody knew where the European process will lead and nobody knows. It is an open process with any possible outcome.

The consequences of having from the one side a "closed" process and from the other an "open" one, are also important. All the new comers in the new created United States have had to agree with a constitution already done. They were supposed to play by the rules set by the Thirty. '*Les jeux sont faites, rien ne va*

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[13] it is not without signification  that the first references at the European construction were made just after the Peace of Westphalia (16480 and the dawn of the state-nation's model, which divided the preexisting patchwork political communities in medieval Europe.

[14] For other documents regarding this matter see again *Building European Union*, op. cit., pp.3-36.

*plus'*. Instead, in Europe, every new wave of members has changed and will change the shape of the unfinished construction made by the Twelve (or the Six?).

The two pictures are indeed very different. "For Americans to begin to grasp the differences in institutional structure between the United States and the Community, they need to imagine a collective presidency composed of governors, who make the strategic decisions on the development of the constitutional and political system (the European Council); a Cabinet (the Commission) which exercises a monopoly over policy initiation as well as considerable leadership, but which is chosen by the states' governors; a very strong Senate (the Council of Ministers), comprising top political leaders chosen by the governors and having the right to amend or veto all proposals made by the cabinet; and a weak House of Representative (the European Parliament) elected by voters but having the right neither to initiate nor to veto most policy proposals."[15]

At this point it is no wonder why the explanatory theories of the European parties range from a "minimalist" view, which sees the federations as no more than transnational interest groups, to a "maximalist" view, which regards them as European levels parties. Simon Hix emphasize that the opposing conceptions of the party federations arise from differing theoretical positions in international Relations (IR) and comparative politics. "Within the pluralist paradigm of IR the federations are either transnational organizations and/or reflections of intra-states conflicts. In comparative politics, on the other hand, there are two basic models of party development: the institutional model, which concentrates on the emergence of legislative and executive party functions; and the genetic model, which concentrate on the emergence of social and political cleavages."[16] The prospective depend on where you placed yourself. On the One's side or on the side of the Multiple.

So, what is Europe, at least at this moment? An unidentified political object, answers Jacques Delors[17]. A puzzle for political scientists answers Abromeit. "It is an elusive thing escaping classification: neither a federation nor a confederation (whatever the difference between both may be), neither (solely) territorially nor sectorially defined; nor is it a mere (cooperative) addition of states. Above all – and so far there seems to be unanimity among scholars – it is not a state, nor it will ever be one."[18]

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[15] A.M. Sbragia, op.cit. p.5

[16] A.M. Sbragia, *Euro-Politics - Institutions and Policymaking in the "New"opean Commnunity*, The Brooking Institution, Washington DC, 1992, p.3

[17] see, P. Thibaud, *L'Europe, Essai d'identification*, Esprit, Nov.1991, p.47

[18] H. Abromeit – *How to democratise a multi-level, multi-dimensional politiy*, in *Political Theory and the European Union, Legitimacy, constitutional choice and citizenship*, London, 1998, p.112

It become obvious for the majority of the political scientists that, in order to understand and to project in the future this political construction, the classical tools are no longer satisfactory. Nor is the attempt to use cosmetics such as the distinction between a federal state and a "federal union of states", or explanations based on "the elasticity of EU institutions building" or on "multiflexible equilibria" enough for hidden the conceptual dead-lock in which the classical theories seem to fail when they try to describe this process.

At "official" European level, three main solutions to the constitutional problem have been debated so far: (1) the upgrading of the European Parliament to a chamber with real legislative powers; (2) the participation of the (sub-national) regions in the EU legislative process by means of a third chamber; (3) progress toward a federation modeled after the German, 'cooperative' fashion." But, as Abromeit point out again, "whatever arguments may be brought forward in favor of these solutions (and there are some at least for the first two of them), on the whole they seem inadequate to tackle the problem of multi-level, multi-dimensional decision making, even if combined with each other."[19]

It is indeed a great theoretical challenge and what we need is a different kind of Weltanschauung. The good news is that we can already see some results. A political scientist such as Dimitris N. Chryssochoon came out in 1994 with the concept of "confederal consociation", which try to strike a balance between interdependence and authority within a common framework of power. The confederal consociation represent neither a movement back to the inter-governmentalism of the 1970's, nor a leap forward to a formally amalgamated federation. Here again the image reverse in the mirror proves itself useful. We talk no more about federalism but rather about the *inverse federalism* – "a situation in which political authority tend to be diffused as much as possible to the excentric branches of the constituent units, rather than to the central institutions."[20] Attempting to deal at the same time with the One of the EU Politics and the Multiple of national politics, such cooperative interplay "suggest a transformation of the classical concept of 'self-determination' into one of 'co-determination' through the institutionalization of the principle of joint-sovereignty. (...) By dismissing an 'either/or' conception of EU politics it suggest that a functional division of jurisdictional competencies between state and international organization is compatible not only with the very idea of statehood itself, but also with further national state-building process, subnational community strengthening, and multiple identity holding." [21]

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[19] idem, p.113

[20] M.J.Tsinisizelis and D.N. Chryssochoon, *The European Union-Trends in theory and reform*, in *Political Theory and the European Union*, op.cit.,p85

[21] idem, pp.85-86

In the same stream of thought, Sbragia suggests that the option available is "to implement the political dimension of federalism without its constitutional dimension"[22]. In particular she proposes a type of "segmented federalism", allowing for a number of functionally specific treaty-based federal arrangements without being founded on a formal, constitutionally based federation. This proposal go by pairs with the new perspective about the EU citizenship as a prospect of a post-national political arrangement which "facilitates multiple membership, by both natural and legal persons, in various overlapping and strategically interacting communities on supranational, national and regional/local levels."[23]

As a matter of fact we can suppose that the system will operates on the basis of embedding the national in the European and the European in the national rather than the zero-sum language of supercession characteristic of classical federalism or state sovereignty. Facing the totalitarian danger of the One and the anarchic danger of the Multiple, the Europeans find themselves obliged to transcend somehow the classical dichotomy and direct themselves toward a place where no one before has been. Only now we can see how this journey into the mirror led us, as another Alice into the Wonderland of post-modernity.

## Part Three: Conclusions

*"Well, this is the queerest shop I ever saw!" So she went on, wondering more and more at every step, as everything turned into a tree the moment she came up to it, and she quite expected the egg to do the same.* – Through the Looking-Glass

"Thus, in the beginning all the world was America", Locke said, and he was right for sure if we read this assertion as "in the modernity all the world was/is America". The reasons why, even from the beginning, America was considered to be 'the archetype of the modern society'[24] are multiples but the main one is to be considered the management of the absence of transcendence.

Tocqueville, to start with, was fully convinced that "the discovery of America offered a thousand new paths to fortune" and " the gradual development of the equality of conditions is (...) a providential fact, and it possesses all the

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[22] A.M. Sbragia, *Thinking about the European Future. The uses of Comparison*, in *Euro-politics*, op.cit.p263

[23] T. Kostakopolou, *European Union citizenship as a model of citizenship beyond the nation state. Possibilities and limits*, in *Political Theory and the European Union*, op.cit., p.158

[24] S. Wolin, op.cit., p.80

characteristics of a Divine decree."[25] And if Descartes is the father of the modernity with his "omnibus dubitandum est", there is no wonder if "America is therefore one of the countries were the percepts of Descartes are least studies and are best applied."[26]

After all modernity is all about the refuse of any transcendence perceived as the appeal to the One and so, to the totality, together with an overwhelming confidence in the rationality both of the world and of the humankind. But this is not an enterprise risk-less. "Other dangers and other needs [than in aristocratic times] face the men of our days…The political world changes, and we must now seek new remedies for new ills." He complains in a letter dated October 26: "We belong to another era. We are to a certain extent antediluvian animals which might soon be displayed in natural history museums to show how beings once looked that loved freedom, equality and honesty."[27] He seeks in vain for a word for the new sort of oppression that threatens democratic peoples, a word that would "exactly express the whole of the conception I have formed. Such old words as 'despotism' and 'tyranny' do not fit. The thing is new, and as I cannot find a word for it I must try to define it."[28]

However, as Arendt asserts, the American Revolution managed somehow to avoid (at least for a wile) this danger and to preserve the authority without any appeal to an extra-political – and thus transcendental – source (as God, the Truth, the King and so on). Thus it's success. It is in this perspective that we must understand why Arendt denies any appeal to self-evident truths as they appear, for example, in the preamble of the Declaration of Independence. An expression such as "We hold these truths to be self-evident" is seen only as a lack of faith on the part of revolutionaries in their own actions. She must insists on the autonomy of the political realm and on the sui-generis character of politics precisely because any appeal to a transcendence is predestine to failure in the modern world. "It was the Roman principle that now was falling to pieces before the onslaught of the modern age"[29]. She believes that, without the very things that secured the ancient world (i.e. the tradition and the religion), the political authority is all we still have in order to keep alive a public space, an island of freedom and stability. The polis, as she put it, is "the space of men's free deeds and living words, which could endow life with splendor"[30].

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[25] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Oxford Press, London, 1971, pp.4-5

[26] idem, p.295

[27] Letter,Oct. 26, 1853 in the collection edited by Albert Salomon, *Alexis de Tocqueville: Autoritat und Freiheit* (Zurich, 1935) pp.300-301

[28] Tocqueville, op.cit. p. 512

[29] H. Arendt, *On Revolution*, p.114

[30] idem, p. 285

She argue that the source of power in this world-building act of foundation is the speech act itself, the declaration of the "We", and so is the source of its own authority as well. The Declaration of Independence and the practice of constitution-making "revealed all of a sudden to what extent an entirely new concept of power and authority, an entirely novel idea of what was of prime importance in the political realm had already developed in the New World, even though the inhabitants of this world spoke and thought in the terms of the Old World. "[31]

But precisely because this beginning has no anchor, nothing to hold on to ("it is as though it came from nowhere in either time and space"[32]) it must keep moving, it must keep referring to itself, denying itself, in order to keep itself into existence. "The very authority of the American Constitution resides in its inherent capacity to be amended and augmented."[33] "The principles of the separation of powers…actually provides a kind of mechanism built into the very heart of government, through which new power is constantly generated without, however being able to overgrow and expend to the detriment of other centers or sources of power."[34]

No wonder why political thinkers as Hartz or Huntington or Whiggish came all to the same conclusion – namely that "rather than drive forward new questions and new solutions, this American politics keeps recycling the originals"[35]. As Orren and Skowronck emphasize, "the 'real' changes, the 'meaningful' changes, the 'fundamental' changes will be the ones that don't happened", precisely because that from the beginning that was room created for opposing perspectives and the very idea of change was in a way institutionalized. That's why, in America, "the political conflicts can be regarded as having been less battles to define principles, than battles to determine which principle can take precedence and who decide."[36]

Armed as it was against the dangers encumbered by the absence of transcendence the New World's political construction proved itself to be right one for the New Times – the times of change. This "solution" spread worldwide, and nowadays "few – if any – old <worlds> exist except in isolated backwaters that (in

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[31] ibidem, p.166

[32] ibidem, p.206

[33] ibidem, p.202

[34] ibidem, p.150

[35] K. Orren and S. Skowronk, *In Search of Political Development*, in *The Liberal Tradition in American Politics,* eds. David Ericson and Louisa Bertch Green, p. 32

[36] L. B. Green, *The Liberal Tradition*, op.cit. p.46

the revealing cliché) <time has passed by>." [37]Till the novelty bring into the world by this change maintain it's freshness everybody expected with full confidence that the modernity will reveal some clues "about from what and into what we are changing,...that will furnish, if only illusory, a point of reference, an illuminating contrast, that will enable us to comprehend what is happening to us individually and collectively beyond the fact of change."[38] This is to say that the rationality took the place of transcendence as the unifying principle. Still, there was only one truth 'out there' and it was the task of the rational human mind to unveil it. Somewhere deep inside the nostalgia of the One keeps haunting our expectations. But, as time pass, the fact that there is nothing beyond the fact of change but another change, provoked not only disappointment but also a logical counter-reaction: the denial (or at least the dismissal) of reason and the return toward the forgotten identities. As Lyotard put it: "We have paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the One...Let us wage an war on totality, let us be witness to the unpresentable, let us activate the differences."[39] And so it was. Thus the multiculturalism, thus the quest for more and more refined identities by gender, sexual orientation and so on. Thus the reactivate of nationalism, ethnicity and so on.

The problem with the apple of knowledge is that, once you take a bite, you can't just spit it out and pretend that nothing happened. You can't just return to the old identities, as Descartes never happened. You must keep biting the apple till nothing to swallow remains in your hand. The post-modernity was born and suddenly all started to point it out even no one could tell precisely when it arises, *if* it arises. We are ourselves situate somewhere "between the modern and the post-modern world, between a world that is/has been and one that is/is becoming."[40]

Let us now take a deep breath and return once again toward the Europe. It's the time now for the big test. We have already seen that each of the features of the American political building can be discover, turned up side down, in the European construction. It's time to check if, being so, the full "object" can be find in the mirror reversed. And what the reverse of the modernity can be if not precisely the post-modernity, which keep intact all the features of the former but mixed them in a strange way?

As we have seen, the European project is to be placed somewhere between the classical federation and any international organization. As for the post-modernity nobody can tell with precision when this process begun, if it begun

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and we are not rather witness of another aborted project as many others. And just remember the terms and expressions used when we have tried to describe the New Europe: "dismissing any 'either/or' conception", "multiple identity holding", "overlapping communities". Aren't those features used to describe the post-modern world? The New Europe is hard to define. So is post-modernity. It's evolution is hard to predict. So it's post-modernity. And if the Americans has have a Constitution to return toward it and found a renew strength in it's permanent questioning where is Europe suppose to turn for the same purpose. The answer is nowhere or everywhere. There are so many European beginnings that there is no one which is so prominent so it can stay as a "point d'appui". She has to manage to survive in a different way, trying to conciliate what is impossible to conciliate. The One with the Multiple, the European Union not only with the diversity of the states-nations, but also with the multiple claims coming from the rediscovered ethnicity. So does post-modernity with the globalization and the multiculturalism.

Rephrasing Tocqueville, we can say that "Europe is therefore one of the 'countries' where the percepts of post-modernity are least studies and better applied". The simultaneity and superimposition replace sequence. The subject is decentered, dismembered and dispersed. No wonder if "the emergence of multiperspectival institutional forms were identified as a key dimension in understanding the possibility of post-modernity "[41] and Europe herself begin to be perceived as "the emergence of the first truly post-modern international form"[42].

In this respect, this 'unidentified political object' deserve to be observed with all due respect. As P. Allot emphasized, "the young European Community had something of the historical and philosophical significance of the young United States or the France of 1789"[43]. After all, maybe Europe is not so "dead" as it appeared. "We have had four self-enlightenments of the European mind since the end of Roman Empire in the West – the Carolingian renaissance of the 9th century, the 12th century renaissance centered on the University of Paris, the Italian renaissance of the 15th century and the the 18th century Enlightenment. This re-enlightenment process in Europe has occurred at three century intervals which would mean that the next one is due in the first century of the next Millenium."[44]

As Alice would say it if she was to live nowadays: Stay tune on Europe! You never know!

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[41] J.G. Ruggie, *Territorriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations*, in International Organization 47, 1, winter 1993, p.174

[42] idem, p. 140

[43] P. Allot, '*The European Community is not the true European Community*', 100 Yale L.J., 1991, pp.2485, 2494

[43] see D. M. Curtin, op. cit., p.62

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# DOING WITHOUT THE AMERICANS? THE NEW EUROPEAN RAPID REACTION FORCE AND NATO

## STEPHEN BLACKWELL[*]

The recent decision of the European Union to create a rapid Reaction Force (RRF) has raised important questions with regard to the Union's future relationship with NATO and the United States in particular. The RRF appears at first sight to add a significant new dimension to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) developed by the EU since the Maastricht agreement in 1991. The 60,000 strong military force, drawn from the armed forces of the member states and intended to be operational by 2003, promises to add real muscle to the CFSP by being able to carry out peacekeeping operations, crisis management and humanitarian operations. However, the creation of the RRF has already led to a considerable amount of political controversy among the parliaments, media and public of Western Europe. The fact that the actual geographical sphere of operations for the 'Euroforce' has been left deliberately vague is understandable given the difficulties in getting all of 'the Fifteen' to agree on this issue. It is the attitude of the United States, and the RRF's relationship with NATO, that is the most significant issue for most of those who oppose the policy of adding a military dimension to the EU's international profile.

The external policy of the EU has been recently developed in the form of the CFSP objectives agreed by the member states. The CFSP in practice involves a series of uneasy compromises and ill-defined goals as a result of the continuous bargaining process carried out by the major European institutions. The EU's official list of foreign and security policy priorities include the granting of development funds to the former Soviet republics, the Middle East and South Eastern Europe and the promotion of the 'common interests' of the EU in these areas. 'Interests' in this context can be seen as explicitly political and ideological in addition to the usual goal of developing trade networks and new markets. Thus, the political aspects of the CFSP involve a 'contribution to international peacekeeping [and] the promotion of cooperation, democracy and human rights'. The need to secure common interests involves meeting threats such as local wars in areas such as South Eastern Europe, 'weapons of mass destruction, arms trafficking, contraband nuclear material, fundamentalism and extremism'.[1]

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[1] 'What is the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union', EU Website (http://ue.eu. int/pesc/default.asp?lang=en).

What the CFSP has most obviously lacked is the practical means of protecting and promoting its interests in the external field. The EU's inability to assert itself during the Yugoslav Crises in the 1990's was a cause for deep embarrassment for the governments in Western Europe. For this reason alone many enthusiastic pro-Europeans feel that the creation of the RRF is long overdue. In addition to the squabbles between the French, Germans and British, relations between the EU and the United States over former Yugoslavia have often been characterised by mistrust and misunderstanding and even more so by poor political and military co-ordination. The decision to announce that ground troops would not be used before the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999, generally agreed to be a serious mistake that prolonged the military campaign and humanitarian crisis that resulted, was largely due to the Clinton Administration's sensitivities regarding American public opinion.[2]

Washington's unwillingness to risk the lives of its soldiers in pacifying South Eastern Europe has caused considerable private resentment among the Western Europeans. Some have serious doubts about the long-term commitment and motives of the Americans with regard to European security. The academic Ernst B. Haas, for many the 'father' of neo-functionalist explanations of European integration, has argued that the current expansion of NATO is mainly connected to an American-led bid for leadership of the post-Cold War world. Haas feels that NATO should be gradually eliminated and European institutions should take responsibility for the defence of the continent.[3] Though this view articulates the private thoughts of many pro-Europeans, in practice the recent transatlantic dialogue on European security issues has undermined this view. Late 2000 saw the first official discussions between NATO and the EU on a wide range of security issues. On September 19, 2000 a historic first meeting between the NATO Council and the EU's Political and Security Committee took place. It was followed by the announcement at the EU summit in Nice in December that the Union intended to create its own military force.

The decision to form the RRF has led to a mixed reaction: some see the force as a logical development of the EU's external policy while others lament the 'threat' to the autonomy of the EU member states ability to act independently in their foreign relations. Many overlook the fact that the projected Euroforce will be a small unit. Although approximately 60,000 troops will be involved, only a

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[2] Misha Glenny, *The Balkans, 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers* (Granta, London, 1999), pp. 634-62.

[3] Ernst B. Haas, 'Organization Theory: Remedy for Europe's Organizational Cacophony?', from Robert W. Rauchhaus (ed.), *Explaining NATO Enlargement* (Frank Cass, London, 2001), pp. 83-90.

minority of these, with the requisite air and naval support, will be in a sufficient state of readiness to be deployed at any one time. Its political effects will, however, be significant given the possibility that the new Bush Administration in the White House could increasingly distance itself from its European allies on a number of important issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict and plans for a nuclear missile defence system.[4] It should be noted that American fears about the RRF and its impact on NATO, and French attempts to manipulate the new policy to strengthen the EU's freedom of action, feature an element of rhetorical posturing. The concept of a semi-independent 'arm' of NATO is nothing new. In June 1996 a meeting of NATO ministers in Berlin agreed on the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) envisaged a process in which some alliance members would be able to pursue policies not considered to be essential to the interests of other members. The CJTF framework has not yet been implemented, though the NATO Peacekeeping operation in Bosnia can be seen as being similar in essentials.[5]

Lack of strong support from the member states and the difficulties in persuading all of them to agree on a common stance is another difficulty for the CFSP and the RRF. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty established a 'policy planning and early warning' staff drawn from the European Council Secretariat, the Member States, the Commission and the Western European Union (WEU). Recent reports suggest that the CFSP staff have so far failed to function effectively. Xavier Solana, the EU's 'high representative for foreign and security policy, argued in a confidential document leaked in January 2001 that bureaucratic obstacles to a more effective CFSP are hindering the development of common strategies. The lack of a firm direction threatens to widen the 'gap between poor effectiveness on the one hand and on the other hand the high expectations' raised by the supposedly common EU external policy towards specific issues. Chris Pattern, the British EU commissioner who is responsible for EU external relations, has expressed similar concerns. Patten, who has done much to promote the implementation of the EU's Stability Pact in South Eastern Europe, sees the RRF as an important component of the EU's policy in the region for the immediate future.[6]

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[4] Martin Woollacott, 'Like it or not, the military has its place in politics', *The Guardian* [European edition], 17 January 2001.

[5] NATO Information Service, *NATO Summit Declaration* (Brussels, June 1996).

[6] 'Solana slates EU foreign policy', *The Guardian* [European edition], 23 January 2001; Chris Patten, 'A European vision for the Balkans', NATO Official Website (http://www.nato.int/docu/2000/0002-0.5.htm).

The EU itself has admitted that 'political will' is essential for the CFSP to work and that 'it is not always easy to define interests common to the Fifteen'.[7] There are also significant objections to the view that the RRF will inevitably undermine NATO. The German General Klaus Naumann, formerly head of NATO's Military Committee, has recently argued that there is a real need for the force as it would help to 'rebalance' NATO. American technical military capabilities have surpassed those of the Europeans by such a distance that they seriously threaten the viability of practical military cooperation among the allies in battlefield situations. This lack of 'interoperability' is a technical issue but has repercussions for the complex political bargaining processes that are central to the operation of NATO.[8] Thus serious political and military investment in the RRF is seen by some as a way to *strengthen* NATO rather than undermine it. Lord Robertson, the NATO Secretary General, has also criticised the 'zero-sum game' mentality which views any gain for the Europeans as being a loss for the Americans. Robertson believes that a stronger European military capability is necessary in order to make NATO more effective in the post-Cold War world and strengthen the transatlantic alliance.[9]

It can be said that the RRF, far from being an attempt to do without the Americans, is better thought of as an attempt by the Europeans to keep up with their allies. It would be unwise to predict the eventual end of the NATO alliance as we know it at this time. The current bureaucratic jostling for position at the meeting point of NATO, the EU and the RRF represents a continuation of tensions characteristic of the Cold War period. The impact of NATO enlargement, in particular the promise of membership that has been held out to the East since 1989 (and previously), is another crucial factor that will lead to the expansion and evolution of the alliance.[10] Accession to NATO is attractive to Eastern European countries in that it solves their immediate geostrategic insecurities and is not complicated by requirements such as the *acquis communautaire*. It has been argued that in this sense the inducement of NATO membership has potentially a less divisive effect than EU enlargement.[11]

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[7]'What is the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union', EU Website, op.cit.

[8]Woollacott, op cit.

[9]'Why NATO Supports a Stronger Europe', Lord Robertson, NATO Website (http://www.nato.int/ docu/articles/2000/a001205a.htm).

[10]For an interesting discussion of the impact of Cold War 'mentalities' on current enlargement debates see Karin Fierke and Antje Wiener, 'Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlargement', European University Institute, Working Paper RSC No 99/14.

[11]Andrew Cottey, 'Central Europe Transformed: Security and Co-operation on NATO's New Frontier, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (August 1999), pp. 1-30.

The RRF, though an important development in itself, will not lead to any major divisions between the EU and the United States in the immediate future. The sheer size and technical proficiency of the American armed forces will continue to induce a 'dependency culture' among the major European states. Whether it is desirable for the EU to have a greater degree of military self-sufficiency is a question that has not been directly addressed here. However, it is likely that American policy towards issues such as the Middle East and missile defence will lead to a number of 'trade-offs' with the most important European members of NATO. The Bush Administration will most probably reluctantly accept the RRF provided that the EU respects the most immediate American security concerns. Above all, the White House will in no way allow its leadership of the Atlantic Alliance to be compromised. Like it or not, the United States and NATO will be important elements in the European security order for some time to come.

# CULTURAL IDENTITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION

## SIMONA MANEA

*"What can your nation do for you that a good credit card cannot do?"*
*(from the 'universal folklore')*
*"Insofar as [present realities] have brought us a global present*
*without a common past [they] threaten to render all traditions*
*and all particular past histories irrelevant." (Hannah Arendt)*
*"There is no such thing as human nature independent of culture" (Geertz)*

The contemporary processes of globalization in economy (given by the growing number of commercial ex-changes, by the flow of capital, or by the growing number of transnational firms ), and the growing prevalence of transnational communication flows, with the astonishing growth of new media and information technologies have made much of the world one single field of continous interaction and exchange with important consequences for the organization of the social life and culture.

In anthropology, it is considered that the individual is both the object and the subject of the cultural act, meaning that he is a cultural 'construct' but also the source ot the system of symbols in which he lives, continously changing it depending on his needs or various interests[1]. The individual's cultural identity has been bound to the community (s)he belonged to through his/her ethnical origins, religion, race, a common past and common values which (s)he considered immuable and fixed that gave coherence and cohesion to his universe. Today, the process of globalization has determined the emergence of a new and more complex reality named either *late modernity* or *recent modernity*[2] or *post-modernity.* Its complexity is given by the existence and the manifestation of an increased number of factors which act upon and influence the individual's identity, 'fluid-izing' it and making it thus impossible to encompass in a single matrix. There are voices who believe that in the new context, the notion of 'cultural indentity', in the classical way, is becoming if not irrelevant, at least secondary in inter-human

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[1] The problem of the manipulation and instrumentalization of the symbolic system of a community for political purposes in the form of nationalism is only adjacent to this paper.

[2] See H. -R Patapievici., *Problema identitatii*, in *Revista 22*, an XI, no. 11, 12, 13, March - April 2000.

relationships, and that solidarities have now other sources than the common past or tradition. The new identities are being built, thus, on other criteria. In my opinion, howerver, the reference of the individual, and in the larger sense of the community, to a common tradition still remains important and valid. What is being changed is the way this reference is done : less in conflictual and exclusive terms when faced with the cultural identity of the 'other' [3].

This paper will try to identify the specific processes of globalization, the consequences of globalization on the cultural identity of the individual and of the community, on the social structure as well as a brief evaluation of this process from the perspective of different scenarios (such as the homogenization theory, Americanization, polarization and hybridization).

Those who analyze the process of globalization in terms of the capitalist world – system and the activities of multinational companies generally assume that economic globalization creates a version of cultural globalization. In contrast, for those who see nationalism and ethnicity as resistance to globalization, contemporary culture is far from dominated by the logic of the dominant economic system. It should be noted though that all these processes interact with each other and the local cultural processes are inter-related with the national, regional, supra-regional and the global ones.

One of the undoubted effects of increased demand and mass marketing in so-called culture industries such as music and art has been the blurring of distinctions between high culture and popular culture. The democratization and the commercialization of culture has been to destroy many of the status distinctions made by the elitist Romanticism, an important problem being, thus, the way culture is defined today. The tendency is to see it as a sum of ideas distinct from actions, ignoring the recurring feedback loop between thought and action that constiues human experience. The close link that exists between practical and contemplative or imaginative activities has been denied or marginalized for a number of reasons such as the religious and philosophical belief in the superiority of thought over practical activity in the material world. The definition for this paper refers to culture as both ideas and practices that have in common the function of providing meaning and identity for social actors and which combine cognitive, expressive, and evaluative elements. In this form, culture helps the individual to understand (for example, science and religion) and act upon the world (for example, technology and prayer), it is a source of symbols (for example, national identity) and values (for example, freedom and justice) by which (s)he orientate and justify his/her actions[4].

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[3] See Zygmund Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity*, Routledge, London, 1992.
[4] Robert J. Holton, *Globalization and the Nation-State*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1998.

With the *Homo viator* of the medieval period, who ventured on different pilgrimage into distant lands and then returned with extraordinary stories of exotic beings and dangerous events, the desire to experience the 'difference' and the transgression of boundaries of his own ecumene[5] became institutionalised[6]. The oposition between 'us' and 'them' was that between culture and nature, and this opposition became also present in the anthropological approaches until the modern era. Starting with the presumption that the 'cultural manifestation' of the other is inferior to that of the European world, the opposition was not made in conflictual terms, but rather descriptive and normative when it tried to justify the European expansionist tendencies. Thus, the world as a cultural mosaic, in which every territorial entity was well-delimited did not correspond with the reality of the pre-modern period. Although the interaction between the individuals of a community with those of another was less intensive as it has become in the modern world, there were always those border communites that maintained the contact, or those travellers who brought in through their stories, the elements of other cultures. Benedict Anderson argued that in the premodern stage "the states were defined by centers, borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into one another".[7]

Modernity meant an attempt to clearly limit borders and at the same time an attempt to use culture, the symbolic systems for legitimizing the existence of ethnical communities. This was possible as a result of the spreading of printing press and of books, and of the increasing degree of literacy. The old system, based on oral culture, was replaced by one in which the written language played the main role, the result being obviously a more inclusive social space which made it possible for people to look beyond the face-to-face communities and to create those 'imagined communities'. At the same time, the process of industrialization determined the emergence of standardized social structures, and the convergence towards a single stereotype modern society[8]. The modern society represented a structural

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[5] Ulf Hannerz describes the history of the Greek concept of *oikoumene*. Initially, the term defined the world known and inhabited by the Greeks. For geographers and anthropologists, the term is equal with the one of culture. See Ulf Hannerz, *Transnational Connections*, Routledge Publications, London, 1996.

[6] The institutionalisation took the form of the travel accounts genre.

[7] Quoted in Alejandro Lugo, *Reflections on Border Theory, Culture, and the Nation*, in *Border Theory – Limits of Cultural Politics*, Scott Michaelsen si David E Johnson., (Editors), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1997, p. 50.

[8] Margaret S. Archer, *Theory, Culture and Post – Industrial Society*, in *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*, Mike Featherstone (Editor), Sage Publications, London, 1996, p. 97 – 120.

revolution, given by urbanization, pluralism and bureaucratization, and also a cultural revolution, given by the processes of rationalization, secularization, the appearence of the nuclear family and of an instrumental system of education. The new man was the result of industrialization, the product of a homogeneous process. In anthropology, the new paradigm shift led to the interpretation of culture in terms of shared patterns[9], homogenous communities from a cultural point of view, without internal inconsistencies, conflicts or contradictions, and at the same time in terms of a cultural discontinuity congruent with the political ideal of the nation-state.

Today, the cultural discontinuities, that made the world impossible to comprehend in its wholeness and diversity [just because they refered to the diversity of cultures, to the diversity of symbolic codes and to their impenetrability], are disputed for the interpretation they give to culture. With little exceptions (I am thinking of anthropologists), the common man was seen as unable to understand the variety of different universes – the mediation being necessary since the understanding was limited. Also, any interaction with the ecumenes of other communities represented a potential threat for his own systems of symbols, seen as given and fixed constructions.

Post – modernity causes a change in the vision on culture and cultural identity. The translation from the global mosaic to the global ecumene determines a relativization of discontinuities, new cultures and differences being thus continously generated[10]. Culture loses its official role and tends to become part of the private sphere. The state interfers now only in the initial phase of education, playing a more limited role in providing the individual with cultural meanings[11]. There is a request for a symbolic diversity rather than for an institutionalized one.[12] Michel Foucault explained the new reality as a state of heterotopia, meaning a disorder in which fragments of a large number of possible orders "glitter separately in the dimension [...] in such a state, things are laid, placed, arranged in sites so very different from one another that it is impossible to find a place of residence for them.".[13] The life in "the chaos of heterotopia" is a perpetual

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[9] *Border Secrets – An Introduction*, David E. Johnson si Scott Michaelsen, in Scott Michaelsen si David E Johnson., (Editors), op. cit., p. 1 – 43.

[10] Ulf Hannerz, *Meditations in the global ecumene*, in Gisli Palsson (Editor), *Beyond Boundaries – Understanding Translation and Anthropological Discourse*, Berg Publishers Limited, Oxford, 1994, p. 41– 57.

[11] Ulf Hannerz, *Transnational Connections*, Routledge Publications, London, 1996.

[12] Zygmund Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, in Mike Featherstone (Editor), op.cit., p. 143 – 169.

[13] Michel Foucault, quoted in Alejandro Lugo, op.cit, p. 49.

act of self-definition. The development and expansion of societies, their increased complexity led to an accute cultural and social differentiation, to the point at which, even for the members of the same society the only thing they retained in common was 'their humanity' (Durkheim)[14] Daniel Bell proposes a new paradigm that can ensure the cohesion of the post – modern society as well as the preservation of an inner solidarity between the members of the same community. He speaks of a return to religion, of a "new rite of incorporation", with the difference that this religion is not the result of Revelation or the privilege of a (certain) church. Jurgen Habermas refers to the spreading of a "technocratic consciousness" which results into the depolitization of the individual, an alternative to the consciousness based on cultural identity. Science and technology are in his view the new symbols that the individual takes in as part of his cultural identity, the old solidarities based on a common language, religon, race, past becoming secondary. The economist Kenichi Ohmae identifies the global corporation as the future transnational source of solidarity and collective identity, while the nation is turning into a local market.

If modernity meant the change of the oral paradigm with the written one, today the development and the use of the media technology brought about a new translation towards other symbolic modes of communication and cohesion: 'the imagined communities' are increasingly moving beyond words and the functions of the written language are taken by other signs[15] – the global ecumene is now the place of music video and of simultaneous news images everywhere. In this context, the assertion according to which the contemporary economies do not produce anymore material objects but signs and symbols [16] is perfectly valid.

The new symbols that the individuals share now, or better said, the degree to which different individuals have access or understand these symbols influence the social structure. Robert Reich considers that in the advanced societies a novel social structure can be already noticed. This

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[14] Quoted in Mike Featherstone, *Global Culture: An Introduction*, in Mike Featherstone (Editor), op.cit., p. 1– 15.

[15] The appereance of literature on video tapes, of history and science in documentary films, such as those on BBC or Discovery Channel represent only some of the practical consequences of this paradigm shift. At the same time, a new criteria of evaluation for literature, history, etc – for example, a book will be also evaluated depending on the voice on the tape, while the historical preferences will be also determined by the atractivity of the film images and the historical figures by the ability of the movie director to underline their eyes, hair cut, voice.

[16] The trend to attach more meaning to material meaning can be best noticed in the advertising industry.

consists of three main categories of people: the ones that work in the routine production services, those who work in the in-person services (such as salesmen, waiters, janitors, taxi drivers, etc) and finally, the most important category, those who work in the symbolic – analytic services (such as research scientists, bankers, lawyers, publishers, writers, university professors, etc). The latter are relatively autonomous, and no longer depend on the economic performance of other categories of people in their national contexts. "They have been gradually seceding from the rest of the nation"[17] and have built their own private habitats where they prefer to withdraw. Thus, among the three social categories, the symbolic analysts are the priviledged ones as they are the source of the symbols present in our societies.

Another new element emerging from post- modernity is that of habitats built within a society and which are closely linked to the social structures. They describe the direct and indirect networks of relationships on or beyond the national territory. Zygmund Bauman refers to them as "habitats of meaning", which can expand and contract, can overlap entirely, partially or not at all, and which are identified with either individuals or communities. The cultural process will be shaped by the way that different habitats of meaning interact. Although people may share the same habitats, in post-modernity the individual culture depends on an infinity of factors for the possibilities and the offers are unlimited. The places people have been to or lived in, the books and newspapers they read or the TV channels they watch make a difference for each individual. However, the habitats of meaning will also depend on the capabilities people have built up for understanding and coping with the other symbolic systems than their own. Now, more than ever, it is possible that individuals be 'constructed' in unique ways through the access and the living of unique experiences. "Every man is in certain respects like all other men; like some other men; like no other man" noticed Clyde Kluckhohn in an analysis of the post-modern society and of the identity of the individual in such a society.

The anthropologist Terence Turner, when talking about the varied possibilities that an individual has to built his/her indentiy, argues that the trend of the contemporary world is to create a global system of cultures, a "culture of cultures". Culture becomes thus a metaculture, a universal category that subsumes specific cultures[18]. For Turner it is a metaculture of differece, whereas for Roland Robertson it is the metaculture of modernity, based on the acknowledgement of the states (although very different) to

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[17] Quated in Gisli Palsson , Introduction: Beyond Boundaries, in Gisli Palsson, op. cit.
[18] Ulf Hannerz, op.cit.

suscribe, officially at least, to similar goals of modernity. While the metaculture of difference works from bottom – up and it is the interest field of anthropologists, the one of modernity tends to work from top – down and it is the object of inquiry for social scientists, economists, sociologists, political scientists. "The culture of cultures" entails a tendency to assert difference along somewhat standardized lines. The local and the univesal can be found in each individual, "the visible form of the local conceals the relations it has with the rest of the world". (Anthony Giddens)[19].

This relation between the global and the local in what the culture is concerns has a series of critics that have taken the form of some theories. They refer to cultural homogenization through cultural imperialism, Americanization, polarization or hybridization, as direct consequences of globalization and of increasingly interaction between most of the regions of the world. Levi – Strauss considered that the impact of globalization on the local specificity is to diminuish or to inhibate the process that generates cultural works: "[...] all true creation implies a certain deafness to the appeal of other values, even going so far as to reject them if not denying them altogether. For one can't fully enjoy the other, identifying with him, and yet at the same time remain different. When integral communication with the other is achieved completely, it spells doom for both his and my creativity"[20]. Transnational culture[21] is considered artificial, eclectic and superficial. Anthony D. Smith argues that it does not lead to tolerance but on the contrary, the intensification of the contacts and the process of globalization determines increasing competitions between states for prestige. The world will become the space of competition for the national cultures which will try to acquire a better positon for the states they belong to, and not a space of cultural integration.

A wide spread version is that homogenization means Westernization, the purpose of the global processes being to impose through cultural imperialism the values of the Western world (such as the secular thinking,

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[19] A. Giddens citat in Michael Walzer, (Editor), *Toward a Global Civil Society*, Berghahn Books, Oxford, 1995.

[20] Quated in Anthony D. King, *The Times and Spaces of Modernity (or Who Needs Post-modernism?)*, in Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash si Ronald Robertson (Editors), *Global Modernities*, Sage Publications, London, 1997, 108 – 124.

[21] Anthony D. Smith defines transnational culture as a sum of more elements, such as: effectively advertised mass commodities, some folk styles and motifs stripped of their context, some general dogmatic discourses concerned with 'human rights and values' and a standardized quantitative and scientific language of communication and evaluation, all underpinned by the new information and telcommunication systems and their computerized technologies. (Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, Penguin, London, 1991).

individualism, human rights, the Western capitalism and a profit-centered market economy) on the rest of the world. The critics both outside and inside 'the West' regard such developments as either flawed or, at best, inadequate as a basis for the good society, as they have brought about great social and economic disruptions and inequalities. The dispute between the two sides takes at times the form of irreconcilable discourses that ignore that the individual, no matter of the society he lives in, is not a passive receiver but filters the influences to which (s)he is submitted to. The individual reacts actively to any kind of factors by restructuring and adapting the new elements to his specific identity[22].

A less theoretical and more empirical approach of cultural homogenization centers on the Americanization of global culture. Herbert Schiler analyzed in the 1980s the arguments of those who tried to defend national cultures against what is called American cultural imperialism. The Americanization thesis builds on a number of key elements, such as the increasing monopoly of the United States over the essential resources for the manufacture and transmission of culture: satellite systems, information technology manufacture, news agencies, the advertising industry, television program production and export, and the film industry. Cultural homogenization, in this sense, is linked with the predominant role of the USA in the export of television, film and news information[23]. Another theme in the Americanization debate focuses on the United States' role in the diffusion of cultural patterns through the elements of material culture and social organization. In this sense, Rolald Robertson observed that although modernity emphasizes the autonomous character of the individual, this autonomy tends to be submitted to the modern forces of standardization through diffusion[24]. When George Ritzer speaks about the McDonaldization of Society, he refers not merely to the worldwide rise of the American fast food industry, but more generally to certain broader cultural traits in the economy, organization, and personal life, of which McDonald's is a

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[22] In economy this process is named "glocalization", meaning the active adaptation of the transnational firms to both the local market and culture. It si also true that is very difficult to establish the degree in which the offer creates the demand.

[23] The X-files, Dallas, and the CNN news are only some examples. In the 1980s the USA imported less than five percent of its television programmes, while countries in Europe and Latin America imported 25 per cent or more from the US alone. (Thomas M.Wilson, Hastings Donnan, *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.)

[24] Ronald Robertson, *Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central Concept*, in Mike Featherstone (Editor), op. cit., p. 15 – 30.

manifestation. Ritzer believes that the strategy of the McDonald Corporation, based on efficiency, calculability, predictability and the control of both products and personnel, represents a model of global rationalization[25]. This perspective is influenced by the weberian view of the modern world that frees itself from the personalized value-centered relationships in favour of impersonal technocratic modes of organization. However, it should be noted that the capitalist system and not the Americanization has become global and that this theory does not make any distinction between "in" a culture and "of" a culture[26]. Although they may share the elements of the same material culture, the uniqueness, the identity of an individual, when asked to define him/herself, is very rarely given by these elements, and rather by very specific ones, due to his need to be different from the others. Also, numerous aspects of capitalism such as management techniques and mass marketing are not an American invention, and the principals of Taylor's[27] scientific management have been continuously modified and innovated in other parts of the world. The sources of cultural influence with respect to the economy and to other aspects of social life are diverse rather than unitary with respect to national or regional origins.

One aspect of this multicenteredness is that for different regions other forces replace the danger of Americanization. As Appadurai points out "for the people of Irian Jaya, Indonesian may be more worrisome than Americanization, as Japanization may be for Koreans, Indianization for Sri Lankans, Vietnamization for the Cambodians, Russianization for the Armeans"[28].

The theory of polarization as a result of globalization was put forward by Benjamin Barber and Samuel Huntington. For Barber, the polarization in the new world is done around 'McWorld" and Jihad, between the forces of the global consumer capitalism[29] and those of retribalization, between the pop culture, techonology and the commercial artifice of the

[25] There is enough literature that criticizes the way the big multinational firms define rationalization. The main argument refers to the huge waste of raw materials in the production process.

[26] Bart van Steenbergen, *Towards A Global Culture: Dream or Nightmare?*, in *Inclusion and Exclusion in Contemporary European Societies*, Utrecht University Press, Utrecht, 2000.

[27] Frederick W. Taylor is the founder of scientific management.. *(The Principles of Scientific Management*, 1911). The taylorist approach refers to increasing labour productivity as well as organizing labour on the principles of rationalization and control. See Ioan Popa, Radu Filip, *Management International*, Editura Economica, Bucuresti, 1999.

[28] Quated in Robert J. Holton, *Globalization and the Nation-State*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1998.

[29] It is interesting to notice the 'suggestive' slogan Coca-Cola Romania has chosen for its advertisment: instead of the known "Drink Coca Cola" we have "Consume Coca-Cola".

Western world and the messianic religions of the rest of the world. For Huntigton, the polarization takes place between civilizations, particularly between the West and an emergent Islamic-Confucian axis. The main argument against this theory refers to the perception of cultures as closed, ermetic and homogenous systems ignoring the complex interaction and interchange between them, and the over-emphasis on the role of cultural differences in the initiation of conflicts[30].

Cultural hibridization or the creolization of culture is the theory that focuses on the existing syncretism in the global culture. This approach emphasizes the role of interactions and inter-cultural borrowings, that takes the form of flows of ideas, people and styles, in the creation of mixed cultural identities. This context favours the emergence of a new category of individuals, that Ulf Hannerz calls *cosmopolitans*[31] and *transnationals*[32], who willingly engage themselves in relationships with the individuals of other communities. The cosmopolitan shows an openess toward divergent cultural experiences, may even embrace the other culture, but does not become committed to it. In a similar way, the transnationals are those who interact with the 'other', enjoying different cultures as much as (s)he does hers/his. The cosmopolitans and the transnationals have a special status in society: although respected for their experiences they are treated with suspicion and distrust[33]. The difficulty in what the creolization theory is concern resides in establishing in what degree cultural hybridity annd syncretization can constitute a form of cultural identity and what their limits are.

In the global world, each individual/community has thus access to a multitude of resources and cultural realities, and at the same time these resources and realities insinuate themselves in the life of each person, influencing his life and body. In post – modernity it is not sufficient that the characteristic features of a certain paradigm (be it Western, American, etc) be multiply, but more important is the acknoledgement of different 'logics' that interact with each other generating new models for contemporaneity

Post –modernity and globalization should be understood, I believe, in terms of diversity, of a variey of local discourses, codes and practices and less in the terms of cultural homogenization. The transformation of the

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[30] See also Robert J. Holton, *op.cit.*
[31] Hannerz makes a distinction between cosmopolitans and other categories such as tourists, people in exile who although come in touch with other cultures, their interaction is superfecial and minimal.
[32] Transnationals are represented by different occupational categories, such as bureacrats, politicians, business people, journalists or diplomats.
[33] Ulf Hannerz, op.cit.

individual's existence, of his cultural identity into an on-going experiment with an increased number of variables means a relativization of modernity as a unique and homogenous project. However, in a world of continous dynamics, in which the changes ask for permanent re-evaluation of the symbolic systems and also for adaptation to sometimes uncomfortable situations, the ability of man to strengthen and reinforce the existing cultural barriers, to invent new ones or reinvent the ones of the past in order to meet these new challenges, should be also taken into consideration.

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# THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE EXTENSION

## ADRIAN CIPRIAN PĂUN

Before the Inter-Governmental Conference in Nice, there were not many those who were anticipating a success on the matter of extension. "The Austrian Crisis" blew up the projects of extension and institutional reforms that was long claimed by the European Council from Helsinki in December 1999. The problem of the extension of the Union on the East in year 2000 must be approached from a geopolitical point of view. We can state that the factors that are influencing the geopolitics of the Union in the year 2000 are different from those from the beginning of the nineties. In spite of France's wish to maintain the Union as a confederate system composed of some states-nations[1], we notice more and more a "de-statification of the Europe"[2] and its compatiblisation with the federal model proposed by the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fisher. The European Union is trying, trough institutional reforms to litheness the levers in order to be able to adapt to the new trend of the globalization. The influence of the conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia on the geopolitical level is consummate. The rhetoric of the external politics of the states in Center and Eastern Europe is circumscribed around two major themes: the adhering to NATO as a military security guarantee and the adhering to the European Union as a mean to ensure economical safety. Even since the "Yugoslavian crisis", the premise for a conflict between the USA and the European partners appeared. The revolt of the Europeans, more precisely of those from "the south flank of the alliance" is successfully lead by France. Moreover, the idea of a European military structure[3] is re-brought in front. How to transpose in a political plan this strategy. The most important consequence is that the management of European crisis will return to the Europeans, the support of the brother SAM getting out of the equation. Yugoslavia and Kosovo showed that the management of the military crisis it is very expensive. In this circumstances the extension of the European Union is looking for the way to obtain security in Europe in order to avoid the large expenses of the war. These costs are superior

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[1] cf. the speech of the French president Jaques Chirac addressed to the German Bundestang in November 2000, http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix_12732.htm;

[2] for more information, Saskia Sassen, *The state and the New Geography of Power* in The Ends of Globalization, Rowmam&Littlefield Pub., 2000;

[3] the results from Nice are relevant about the result of this "rebellion";

to those assigned to economical reorganization and the financial assistance destined to the extension. Then, the dangers that such an approach could provoke must be foreseen. First, the extension towards the Balkan area may generate some phenomena for which the Union must find appropriate prophylaxis. In this area, in some countries the principle according to which the state (rule of law) and democracy, and also the guarantee of the observation of the human rights must not refrain the police forces to intervene in force to annihilate de-stabilizer groups of anarchic nature.[4] Thus, one of the reasons for extension is the security of Europe. Even so, the political quotidian shows us another face of Europe. On this floor of the security of Europe there are many variances. Some of the Europeans are for populists' moves of right extreme whose program aims for internal securization through very strict migration control. These phenomena became obviously at the end of this decade.[5] In this way we can find, for the principle of securization trough extension at the European level, the alternative of internal securization. Even if this second theory is populist, because it involves the increase of internal costs for internal public order, and the external safety policy involves the directing of the communities costs for the control of the boundaries area of the aspirant countries, the practical efficiency of the first one is superior because Europe is an integrated economical-institutional circuit and not a confederate made of enclaves subjected to common economical and institutional rules. The third pillar of the Union aims to the cooperation in justice and internal affaires. The K1 article in Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty contains measures according to the principle of external securization[6]. The adoption by more and more states of the Schengen aquis opens the way towards a new European dynamic in this problem. The theory of European securization in our vision does not emerge from civilizational perspective[7], but from the long-term economical benefit perspective.

Another problem on political strategy covets the struggle for the European Parliament. Ever since 1979 the Parliament's election is directly. In the last decade there appeared strongly united groups, and the fight for political supremacy between political groups in the Parliament became tougher as the

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[4] the miner's revolt from Romania reflects the low authority of the public institutions;

[5] for details Urs Altermatt _Das Fanal von Sarajevo. Ethnonationalismus in Europa, Verlag Neue Zuercher Zeitung, Zuerich, 1996;

[6] Clive H. Church & David Phinnemore – European Union and European Community, Prentice Hall, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Canterbury, 1994; page. 384;

[7] see Samuel P. Huntington – The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon&Schuster, 1997;

role of the Parliament was growing continuously.[8] The evolution of the political parties in the East varied between continuity and change. After 1989/1990 the communist parties were disintegrated. In Eastern Europe, on this framework appeared a series of parties of social-democratic or socialist-democratic orientation (The Left Democratic Alliance –Poland, LDDP and LSDP in Lithuania, FSN in Romania, MSZP-Hungary, SDL- Slovakia, etc.). In parallel, "the democratic forces" founded the conservatory Christian-democratic parties (AWS-Poland, KDNP – Hungary, PNȚcd _Romania, KDU-CSL-Czech etc.) and liberal parties (UW- Poland, SZDSZ, FIDESZ – Hungary, PNL-Romania, ODS- Czech, etc.). Due to the fact that ecological problems were not a priority, the greens do not play a major role. A dangerous phenomenon consists by the apparition of nationalists moves founded on communist roots. The majority these parties appear on the background of hard reform measures imposed by the transition to the market economy. Most of the parties listed above are integrated in the family or European parties[9]. If we are looking just at the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, out a predicted number of maximum 726 members of the European Parliament, they will control 177 mandate according to what was established in Nice.[10] To be able to compare, the group of the social democrats, in the present legislation of the European Parliament has 180 members[11]. In this way, the votes from the East will make a difference in the establishment of the future political hierarchy in the European Parliament.

Another political reason for the extension it is the historical and cultural one. The diversity and plurality anchored on a philosophic background is characterizing Europe. It remains an extraordinary cultural mosaic. In his press conference from May 15, 1962, General de Gaulle expressed this paradox by declaring:

"Dante, Goethe, Chateaubriand belong equally to Europe as a whole, as they belong to the Italian, German and French spirit". One of the "founder parents" of the European Union was declaring in the spirit of the republican values that he defended: "We have to make Europe not just for the free nations, but also for those in the East that need our support and moral adhesion."[12] We cannot forget that Europe remains a love story, just like in mythology[13].

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[8] N. Păun, A. Păun –The History of European construction, second edition, EFES, Cluj, 2000, pp 181-201;

[9] Martina Boden-Osteuropa, Eine kleine politische Laenderkunde, Aktuell, Bonn, 1998, pp. 30-31;

[10] Curentul, December 8, 2000, pp. 9

[11] see the web site of the European Parliament, http:/www.europarl.eu.int

[12] Gerard-Francois Dumont, L'ídentite de l'Europe, Ed. C.R.D.P. 1997, pp. 81-87

[13] Carole Lager- L'Europe en quete de ses symbols, Verlag Peter Lang, Berne, 1995, pg. 125

From an historical point of view, Europe was always a space for East-West dialogue. The Roman Empire, in its social and juridical formula, contained a large part of Europe, imposing in these areas its civilization over barbarism. The unity of the catholic European space was first realized around year 800 under the rule of Charles the Great. His contemporaries called him "the parent of Europe". A few hundred years latter, the European unification under Napoleon gives a practical value to the medieval theories in this area. A. Hitler also tries, for geo-strategic reasons, the "conquest" of Europe in the name of the Realpolitik[14]. The winning formula in the history was the regional cooperation based on a French-German axis that worked well until 1990. The year 1989/1990 imposes a new situation in the European foreign policy. Then the speeches about the unity of the Europe Magna were brought forward. One of the reference speeches in this domain is Willy Brandt's at the construction of the German Bundestag in December 20, 1990[15]. In his speech "I want to see the day in which Europe becomes one", Brandt specifies that "we do not want a German Europe but an European Germany", as a connection factor between East and West. The help that Europe can offer to the Eastern and Central European states consists of the open door towards the Union, implies Brandt. The religious factor, especially the catholic one plays an important role, but not a major one, now that two orthodox countries, Romania and Bulgaria are getting ready for adhering.[16] This cultural and historical tradition of Europe is probably the best attorney for the European extension.

Another problem raised by the European public opinion is the mass migration. This can appear only as a result of political or natural catastrophe. Immigration remains at a low level, even if the citizens of some candidate countries may enter the UE countries without restrictions. The migration between UE countries represents 1,7% out of the labor force, and the extra-community one was officially 5%. A political problem appeared because of the social-democrat rule that is traditionally connected to syndicates and which find it hard to politically commit to the extension, risking to loose political support.

In the globalization era, the economical struggle does not use as instruments the politics of different tariffs or boycotts. The main fight is led towards the conquest of the markets. According to the statistics, the area aimed includes 105 millions of people with a gross domestic product of 790 billions Euro. Such a market offers large economical perspectives for the opening of the

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[14] Ladislau Gyemant, The Pre-history of the European Construction, Ed. EFSE, 1999
[15] Deutche Parlamentarismus, Bonn, 1998
[16] R. Morozzo della Rocca –L'ortodossia balcanica e l'Europa in Il fattore religioso nell'integrazione europea, Edizioni Unicopli, 1999

products made in the European Union and for primal production, using qualified, cheap, labor force.

Most of the approaches to the extension were based on short time economical considerations. The falling of the Berlin Wall was considered as the defeat of a system and a victory of Western Europe. The main beneficiaries of the liberalization of the eastern markets were western corporations, even if the political area was not yet covered.[17] The most eloquent was the French proposal to create a political and safe community, without the extension of the economical modernization. The theory has a false basis because there cannot be political stability and security without economical stability and safety[18]. Threatens and fears can be found in the area of competition, the redistribution of resources and institutional challenges[19]. The fears of the growing of the competitiveness of the eastern states comes from the existence of very cheap labor force in these areas.[20] The extension of the Union will be made by the integration of some states with a GNP per capita lower then the community one. Greece, who has become a UE member in 1981, has a GDP per capita 35% lower than the UE average. Portugal and Spain, who adhered to the UE in 1986, have a GDP per capita 31%, respectively 22% lower. So even the 15 members constitute a heterogeneous group from this perspective[21]. But the GDP of Slovenia is 32% lower than the average of the UE, which is higher than Greece's. The average GDP per capita in the associated central and Eastern Europe states, without Cyprus and Malta, is 38% of the UE average[22]. But this leads to another problem. According to the decision of the European Commission, 36% of the joint budget of the UE is used for the financing of "structural actions" in the regions in which economical development does not reach 75% of the mean of the member states. In the new order, the budgetary structure will have to be redefined. 42% of the UE community budget is used for the subsidy system in agriculture. The

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[17] We consider that Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain had liberalized their internal markets at entering the Union, with some temporary exceptions. To the associate countries the opening of the markets is required before entering the union, and there is no connection between liberalization and membership.

[18] Andras Inotai -Political and Social Arguments for and Against EU Enlargement, Hungarian Academy of sciences, Working Paper no. 101, July 1999;

[19] In our analysis we considered fears that appear in the public opinion and mass-media, and in the Regular Reports of the Commission;

[20] Greece and Portugal have salaries much lower then hose in Germany, even after a long stage in the Union.

[21] Eva Ehrlich and Gabor Revesz- The State of the Economy in Central and Eastern Europe compared with the EU's Requirements, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Working paper no. 102, august 1999, p. 21;

[22] Eurostat 2000;

agriculture enjoys a special protection from the UE, even if its contribution to the budget is only 2% and the population integrated in this field varies between 4% and 5%. The farmers in the UE countries oppose the extension because of the competition generated by lower priced products. Their fear was not materialized. As a contrast, the Union gained important sums of money out of the commerce with the East. The financing principles of the common agricultural policies (CAP) were introduced in the financial program for 2000-2006. Thus, the access to CAP of the new member states is not certain.

One of the strong pressure points for the extension represents the European food industry looking for new markets and the stabilization of the access to low prices of raw material. The population integrated in the agricultural sector in Central and Eastern Europe was of 21,1% in 1997. The higher rates were recorded in Romania (34,6%) and Poland (21,2%). Even the lowest percents of 6% in Czech and Slovakia are above the average of the European Union.[23]

The real economical growth anticipated for the year 2001 for the Central and Eastern Europe is of 4,5%, Poland leading with 5.5%.[24]

During 1993-1998 the UE exports in other areas have increased with 57% while the exports in Central and Eastern Europe increased with 157%. Anyway, the interest of the western firms in the extension does not lie just in exports. Many European companies are using the candidate states as international production sites because of the advantageous costs.[25] During 1992 and 1997 the commerce with the candidate states had a surplus of 67 billions Euro (including the commerce with CEFTA[26] that has recorded a gain of 60 billions).

The reconstruction of the UE budget in order to finance the extension can be done in three ways: through enlarging the national contributions, by freezing the present budget and redirecting the funds for extension, or both of them combined.

According to some studies the costs of the integration of the Luxembourg group (without Cyprus) would rise to 4,5 to 6,5 billions Euro per year.[27]

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[23] Quaisser, 2000;

[24] ECE (GENEF), EU-Kommission (Fruehjahrprognose 2000);

[25] Central European Free Trade Agreement includes: Czech, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia;

[26] Central European Free Trade Agreement includes: Czech, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia;

[27] Martina Kaempfe –EU-Osterweiterung:Strukturfondmittel unter Berucksichting der Verhandlungsmacht der Beitrittslaender in Wirtschaft in Wandel no.12/1999;

For the candidate countries the costs are transposed in more directions. The first consists of administrative and institutional costs for the adoption of the aquis (over 20.000 settlements of 200,000 pages), organizing the administration and the security of the borders. Another direction <mark>consists</mark> The introduction of social, security and environment standards (that would cost around 120 billions Euro) – the third direction- will increase the production costs. A final direction would be the postponing of the adhering to the monetary union due to adaptability problems.[28]

The Euro-barometer, no. 53, published in July 2000, showed that for 60% of the interviewed ones, the extension of the UE it is not a priority. Only for 27% of the Union citizens the extension is a priority, the Danish with 57% and the Greeks with 53% being in its favor. Only 20% of the Germans consider it as a priority.[29]

The way to the Europe is not easy. It takes sacrifices, economical, political and social costs. But beyond all these there is a dream, which was always postponed, of building the Europa Magna, in a peaceful basis, through political and economical cooperation and the protection of democracy. Beyond the risks[30] or the costs we must understand that our destiny, of the Europeans, is to be together, and in spite of all national differences, to learn to win together politically, economically, socially and culturally.

In a world of globalization, Europe's chance is the UNITY.

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[28] Schluesseldokument fuer Heranfuerungsstategie: Wessbuch zur Vorbereitung der assoziierten Staaten Mittel-und Osteorupas auf die Integration in den Binnenmarkt der Union, Juni, 1995;

[29] http/:www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg/epo;

[30] Jean-Yves Potel – *Enjeux et Risques d'une Union europeenne elargie*, in *Le monde Diplomatique*, February 1999;

## III. EUROPEAN ECONOMY

# THE INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

## PAINA NICOLETA DORINA

**ABSTRACT.** The interference between the organizational culture and organizational structure is one of the most important subjects that interest the firms that are competition on the world market.

The international size of the firms is much more present nowadays then ever. At the moment the globalisation is one of those subjects that determine the attention and interest of many specialists, from the most varied fields.

## 1. The internationalism and interculturalism

For any firm, presence on the international market offers him, who has apart statute. The way of approach of the reality about the business environment determines the success or failure of the firm in case.

The international size at which are reported in present the organisations, limits a pluricultural managerial perspective, given by the national cultures that are in contact.

The actual economical context at a global level, impose as a compulsory subject the extension of the firms on the extern markets. Of the numerous reasons that are at the base of the internationalism decision of the activity of the firm we mention: the saturation of the internal market, the appearance of the new markets, the insufficiency of the internal market, the end of the life cycle of the product, the foreign competition on the world market, the safety in the periods of the recession, the cheap work-forces, different kind of fiscal advantages, geographical diversification, the overtaking of the commercial barriers, the growing of the firm's prestige, national interests etc. The international presence of the firms is going on, on a definite business environment by a big cultural diversification, with national subcultures (or regional cultures), national cultures and over-national cultures; there intervenes the own culture of the firm, which is internationalising. The managers and the staff of a firm are the bearers of a

national culture and of an organization culture. In this context, the internationalisation meets an important cultural and much more correctly pluricultural aspect, given exactly by the intersection of the upside mentioned culture.

In the meaning, K Fatechi defines four cultural models, models that are overlap with steps followed by a firm in a pluricultural context. [4] These are: ethnocentrism (is prevailing the mentality of the origin country), polycentrism (or the mentality of the host country), centrocentrism (the global classic mentality) and geocentrism (or the supranational mentality).

The ethnocentric model – for the firm, the external markets are extrapolars of the internal market. According to this model, everything that is coming from the origin country it is superior comparative to what can be found abroad. This model can be founded with priority in the firms that are present on the international market by the export.

The polycentric model – according to it there are taking in consideration the cultural differences of the foreign countries (they are bending from admitting of the specific character of the foreign cultures). The firms that have such a culture are acting on an international market especially by the local branch, these ones been semi-automate (they are well "modulates" according to the culture of the host country).

The centrocentric model – according to it, the world size is approached such as a unique market. They are leaving from the premise of some similarities between nations, the aspects that are making them more different being minimized. The firms are having a centre, where are taken the strategic decisions and the branch are to put them in application.

The geocentrically model – according to it, firms "think at a global scale and act on a local plane". Firms don't have a geographically localized centre and no national component part is dominant.

At a global scale competition is more and more harsh, so without a careful and responsible approach of the realities in the present day business environment, firms are threatened with the loss of their position,
The internationalisation of the firms is a constant today and the pluricultural experience is considerable. In this context, the geocentrically approach is imposed as an answer to the situation described above. Thus nowadays takes place the process of passing from the ethnocentrically approach to the geocentrically one, made up of three stages. These identify themselves with three types of firms, namely: monolithic, pluricultural and multicultural.

The monolithic firm can be found in the firms being in the first stages of internationalisation. The industry culture is seen in the context of the national culture of the country it comes from, the intercultural elements are poorly

identified. This type of firm is successful mostly in the tolerant cultural environment or with a precarious economical basis. Their flexibility degree is extremely reduced consequently in the present conditions they maintain them and develop user and user. The pluricultural firm has taken their place, which is to be found in the multinational societies that have strong roots in the native country. In this case, the culture of native country combines with the one of the host country, having as a dominant country. The main characteristics of the pluricultural organization are:

- The relation between the organizations own culture (with strong accents in the culture of the native country) and the local culture is accomplished by assimilation. The personnel selected from the local environment assimilate the standards and the values of the dominant culture to progress in the hierarchy of the industrial unit.
- The firm is characterized by cultural dissimilarity, the personnel from the native country dominate in the most important positions, having an ethnocentrically attitude. In the same time, the importance of local personnel's integration inside the firm is acknowledged (even if it is accomplished mainly at an informal level, at the formal one being seen quite rarely).
- The identification of personnel with the organization is greater than with the monolithic firms, however the dominant feature of the foreign culture may being prejudices to the perception of the firm in the local market. The structural partial integration and the informal relationship create premises for a greater identification of the local personnel with the pluralistic firm.

As for the multicultural firms, they have the following characteristics:

- The elements of the dominant culture combine with those of the host countries;
- There are equal opportunities for all the personnel (indifferently from the native country) concerning the access to the hierarchical levels and the participation in the informal network of the firm, being applied the principle of synergy (from the cultural perspective), according to which the sum of the parts is bigger than the whole;
- There is a great degree of identification of the personnel (which is part of different cultures) with organization.

These multicultural firms can have as an example the Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), a Swedish global firm. [7] It is appreciated that this type of firm is at its beginning, the number of its adherence having grown very much in the last

years. An opposite point of view is presented in a recent work: "multinational societies carry out the print of their national origin", "the internationalisation may, in fact, emphasize the national differences, not destroy them". [2]

For a better understanding, we also present a comparison between the characteristics of the three types of firms: the monolithic firm, the pluricultural firm and the multicultural firm (see Table 1.1.)

**Table 1.1.**

Characteristics of monolithic, pluricultural and multicultural firms

| Monolithic firm | Pluricultural firm | Multicultural firm |
|---|---|---|
| Dissemination of culture by assimilation | Dissemination of culture by assimilation | Dissemination of culture by pluralism |
| Reduced integration | More emphasize integration | Full structural integration |
| Discrimination and pacification | Emphasized discrimination | Non-discrimination and harmony |
| Insufficient identification | Increased identification | Identification at a high degree |

As a conclusion, we consider the pluricultural organizations as being the contemporary ones, being regarded from the point of view of the internationalisation of human activity. However the multicultural aspects are not to be neglected, especially from the point of view "think globally and act locally". We think that the organizations of the future are the multicultural ones. Seeing the aspects presented above we underline the "pioneer's work" of multicultural firms.

In reality, the firms combine the element from the three types of firms. These firms will hold an advantage from the point of view of some elements, as for example: the organizational structure - flexible, the personnel of firm – qualified, it is the case of the firms that have a good reputation concerning the intercultural relationship (they have the attention over them more easily in comparison to other firms); creativity – a constant in firms, because of the presence of more points of view, fact that stimulates creativity; marketing – the presence and the role of local personnel makes the firm to know and to understand better the local environment where it acts, so it can adopt suitable marketing strategies.

As a result, in the management activity of the firms with international presence, the respect for the principles: creativity, flexibility and diversity determine the increasing of the competitive force of these firms.

The professor Ioan Popa points out a double "challenge" with whom the contemporary economical organizations must cope, namely: the internationalisation and respectively the cultural diversity. [7] From the point of view pf the cultural dimension, the four categories of firms identified in relation with two coordinates (the stage of the international development of the firms and the cultural approach) present the following approach (see Table 1.2.)

**Table 1.2.**

The approach of the cultural dimension

|  | The approach of the cultural dimension |
|---|---|
| **National firm** | Internal (cultural diversity in the national borders) |
| **International firm** | From the inside (the firm) towards the outside – the leaders are exiled persons, citizens of the native country who work in the host country |
| **Multinational firm** | From the outside towards the inside (the firm) – the leaders and the executive personnel are from all around the world |
| **Global firm** | From the outside towards the inside and vice versa |

Each of the four stages has its own justification. In relation to the approach of the cultural dimension there can be noticed an evolution, from an internal dimension (limited to the national space) to a global one.

## 2. Organizational culture – organizational structure

We start with a presentation of the component parts of the organizational structure seen in the context of the four types of organizational cultures identified by Trompeenars. [8]

In reality, what follows to be presented can be found in combinations. A mixture of elements, which we are going to present, characterizes the contemporary economical organizations, by their complexity. In relation to the component parts of the structural organization, the organizational cultures taken into account present a series of characteristics (see Table 2.1.).

**Table 2.1.**

A characterization of the organizational cultures in relation to
the component parts of the organizational structure

| Types of organi-zational culture. Component parts of the organizational structure | Organizational culture of the family type | Organizational culture of the affirmation or "incubator" type | Organizational culture of the pyramidal or Eiffel Tower type | Organizational culture of the project type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Work compartments** | - Basic<br>- Hierarchical and functional | - Basic and general | - Basic and general | - Organized on project |
| **Structural relations** | - Formal<br>- One sided<br>- Authority and co-operational | - Formal and informal<br>- Bilateral and mixed<br>- Authority and co-operational | - Formal<br>- Bilateral and mixed<br>- Authority | - Formal and informal<br>- Mixed and multilateral inside the project team<br>- Co-operational between the members of the project team |
| **The management norm** | - Big | - Big | - Small | - Small or big depending on the complexity and the dimension of the project |
| **Hierarchical levels of division of the authority** | - A small number of hierarchical levels<br>- Low hierarchical pyramid | - A small number of hierarchical levels<br>- Low hierarchical pyramid | - A small number of hierarchical levels<br>- High pyramid | - Matrix structure<br>- Double subordinate on functional and on the project |

Each of the four types of organizational cultures related to the dimensions of the organizational structure are characterized by:

1. The organizational culture of the family type is found mainly in the organizations where the structural relations are formal, one sided and bilateral. Inside these organizations the respect and the care towards the individuals are manifested, also being carried on an activity for their guidance. The management norm is big; as a result there is a small

number of hierarchical levels establishing a low hierarchical pyramid. The general objectives of the firm are defined at the superior level, without consulting the inferior levels. Thus, the implications of the employees in taking the decisions are smaller.

2. In organizational culture of the affirmation or "incubator" type is found mainly within the small organizations. The management norm is big, which establishes a small number of hierarchical levels (as a result appears the low hierarchical structure). The structural relations are formal as well as informal. Because of the small number of employees, in these organizations there is the best field of communication and affirmation (this feature determines its name).

3. The organizational culture of the pyramidal or Eiffel Tower type has as a first characteristic the big number of hierarchical levels owed to the small norm of management. As a result, the hierarchical pyramid is high. The structural relations are formal and informal.

4. The organizational culture of the project type is found mainly in the economical organizations with a matrix structure. In this case, there is a double subordination, namely: on one side towards the functions manager. In these organizations there are multiple structural relations: formal and informal, bilateral and mixed and multilateral among the numbers of the project team. The management norm is big or small depending on the complexity and the dimension of the projects.

If we consider the situational side of the organizational structure there is very good structure for any organization, structure that depends on some relevant situational factors. We can mention: technological factors, factors of organizational environment, the size of organization and the life cycle of the organization. [6]

If we consider two of these factors, namely: technological factors and the factors of organizational environment we can distinguish two types of organizations with their own characteristics. These are: the bureaucratic or mechanical organization and organic organization. The first ones are traditional, with a classical hierarchical structure, namely on functions, products, geographical areas (markets0, divisions, clients. The passage from this type of organization to the organic one is made by the organization with a matrix structure. The organic organizations are that before were accomplished at the level of compartments or in other ways, in the framework of the mechanical organizations. Thus appears the network structure, based on the idea that relationships are formed among some corporations, independent organizations and contractors. The relation can be vertical (between the suppliers and the beneficiaries) and horizontal (between the present and the potential competitors).

The organizational structure of the two types is thus characterized by: rigidity and bureaucracy for the bureaucratic or mechanical organizations, respectively flexibility and fluidity for the constitutional organizations.

The two types of organizations presented above, are characterized in relation to the dimensions of organizational culture proposed by Geert Hofstede. [5]

The bureaucratic or mechanical organization is characterized by: the orientation towards process, the orientation towards work, the professional identity, the closed system, the intense control and respectively the prescriptive (nominative) dominant. The organic organization is characterized by: the orientation towards results, the orientation towards employees, comprehensive identity, open system, reduced control respectively pragmatic (practical) features.

As a result, in the bureaucracy or mechanical organizations the means are emphasized and not the purposes. People are reticent at risks (they avoid them when it is possible). In their activities their effort is limited (for them the days are all alike). In these organizations there is the concern towards work and people always try to make it better. As a result, the employees affirm that they feel a strong pressure for bettering their work (here appears the phenomenon of stress at the place of work). The important decisions have taken individually by the top manager from the organization. There is no implication of the employees or of the managers at a medium level in taking the decisions. If we refer to the Managerial Grid propose by Robert Blake and Jane Mouton we are situated in the (9,1) region, namely authority – submission. This kind of leadership has the following main characteristics: the employees are considered only instruments, the relations are mainly of command respectively listening – submission, the technical and administrative problems are the only subjects of communication with the personnel, the work rhythm is intense.[1] Personal life goes on far from the job, being considered a personal affair. Hiring is based strictly on ability. People in this kind of organization are reserved and secretive. Not every individual can adapt to this kind of organization, the adaptation period for the new employees is long (it can reach an year). Inside these organizations control is intense. Costs rule everything. Sessions are programmed and implemented very strictly (punctuality is compulsory). Jokes about work and firm are rare.

Organic organization situated somehow at the opposite side. However, in reality they are not found on proportion of 100%. Moreover the degree of their manifestation varies from one organization to another. Organic organization goes towards making the results, so they want mainly to fulfil the proposed purposes (and not the means, this doesn't mean that we can apply the well-known proverb "the purpose excuse the means"). The employees from these organizations affirm that they feel comfortable in special situations, they are

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prepared to cope with risks that may appear, and they consider these not as a threat for them, but as an opportunity that must be fructified. People make maximum efforts, for them every day is a new challenge. The human resource is in the centre of the preoccupation as of organic organization (orientation towards the employees). Personal problems of the employees are considered problems of the organization (health, family, financial problems). The organization feels responsible for the well being of the employees. In the marketing conception, the success of the firm is based on two elements, namely: the prosperity of the personnel and the satisfaction of the consumer. [3] Individual decisions are extremely rare, the ones taken in groups and the ones taken by different committees prevail. The employees have a comprehensive identity; the organizational norms contain their behaviour at their job as well as at home. For hiring ability is the most important, and to this we also add in some ways the social and the family fund. At the same time, the employees in these organizations think for the future. Organic organizations are open organizations in the sense that heir own structures and their employees are open to the new comers and foreigners. It is considered that once entered in the organization everyone has to find his own place. The new employees need a short accommodation period (from a few days to 1-2 weeks). The organization it is a big family, once entered you are welcome and accepted. There is a reduced control – not a lack of control, but a control at the level of independent organizations, which form the organic organizations. Their practical character shows their obvious orientation towards the market. The perspective is on a long term, the organization considers that the satisfaction of the needs of the consumer means profit for the firm, on long term. Organic organization has a practical attitude towards ethics, especially in their relations with other organizations (suppliers, intermediaries, competition) and less in their relations with the consumers or with the public, generally, who are the judges of their presence respectively absence on the market.

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# POLITIQUES DE MARKETING TERRITORIAL DANS LES VILLES DE ROUMANIE

## DORIN CONSTANTIN DOMUTA

**ABSTRACT.** *Pour les collectivités territoriales qui veulent se «vendre» pour pouvoir attraper des investisseurs, des touristes ou simplement pour grandir leur population, le principal outil est représenté par le marketing territorial. On peut constater que les villes de Roumanie ne disposent pas des cadres conceptuels adaptés à leur situation particulière et a leurs besoins de développement. L'objectif visé ici est de montrer la nécessité d'une approche marketing dans la politique des villes roumaines et la possibilité de transposer une démarche d'entreprise au problème du développement économique des villes, en soulignant les spécificités de ce domaine particulier.*

## 1. Peut-on parler de marketing territorial en Roumanie?

Pour les collectivités territoriales qui veulent se «vendre» pour pouvoir attraper des investisseurs, des touristes ou simplement pour grandir leur population, le principal outil est représenté par le marketing territorial. Le marketing territorial relève du marketing inter organisationnel, avec beaucoup d'éléments d'originalité. Le marketing des villes évoque les actions de communication réalisées par un grand nombre de villes, les efforts de promotion qu'elles mettent en place en direction des entreprises. Pourtant, le marketing territorial ne se limite pas a développer ce type d'opération. La démarche marketing relève avant tout d'une approche approfondie de compréhension d'un marché et d'évaluation d'une offre adéquate, démarche qui permet de fixer des objectifs et de déterminer les moyens nécessaires pour les atteindre.

On peut constater que les villes de Roumanie ne disposent pas des cadres conceptuels adaptés à leur situation particulière et a leurs besoins de développement. La transposition directe des concepts du marketing classique au marketing des villes donne des résultats encore limites et insatisfaisants. Les publications sur le thème du marketing des villes sont encore quasi inexistantes.

L'analyse des concepts du marketing du développement économique des villes roumaines est, dans ces conditions, d'une grande importance. L'objectif visé ici est de montrer la nécessité d'une approche marketing dans la politique des villes roumaines et la possibilité de transposer une démarche d'entreprise au problème du développement économique des villes, en soulignant les spécificités de ce domaine particulier.

## 2 La définition du marketing territorial

Le marketing représente une démarche particulière, permettant de conquérir des marchés rentables à terme et qui suppose d'identifier et d'analyser les besoins actuels et futurs des groupes de clients potentiels, et de satisfaire ces besoins par une offre adéquate dans sa nature, dans le temps et dans l'espace[1]. Les techniques de marketing ne représentent pas l'essentiel de l'existence de la fonction marketing au sein d'une collectivité. Elles ne sont que des outils, mais leur utilisation constitue souvent le premier pas vers l'implantation du marketing, sans être une fin en soi.

Dans le marketing des villes, l'emprunt des techniques consacrés dans les marchés de la grande consommation a conduit à des grands investissements dans des efforts de communication. Pour notre part, le domaine de développement économique nous semble toutefois plus proche du domaine des marchés d'entreprises et d'organisation que du domaine des produits de large consommation. Pour assurer leur développement économique, les villes doivent s'adresser à des cibles d'entreprises pour lesquelles elles doivent emprunter les approches du marketing industriel. Entre le marketing territorial et le marketing utilisé en grande consommation il y a des différences fondamentales qui concernent notamment le comportement du consommateur[2].

Le marketing territorial est caracterise par la très grande complexité du système d'échange particulier. Cette complexité est liée notamment à la nature des partenaires d'échange et a leur fonctionnement propre dans des systèmes d'offre ou de demande qui dépassent la relation simple acheteur/vendeur à laquelle s'intéressent les approches développées dans la grande consommation et dans le milieu industriel. Dans l'application au marketing territorial, l'ensemble des éléments fondamentaux de la démarche marketing (offre, demande, concurrence, environnement) sont concernées par l'intégration de ces fondements théoriques accordant à chacun d'entre eux un contenu nouveau et adapté aux spécificités des acteurs.

L'environnement dans lequel se situe la problématique du marketing territorial est caractérisé par deux facteurs dominants, qui justifient un investissement important dans l'existence de la fonction marketing au plan local: le cadre législatif et l'environnement socio-économique.

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[1] Kotler, Philip; Saunders, John; Armstrong, Gary; Wong, Veronica – *Principiile marketingului*, Ed. Teora, București, 1998, p.17

[2] Boisdevesy, Jean-Claude – *Le marketing relationnel*, Les Editions d'Organisation, Paris, 1996, p.110

Les dernières dispositions légales roumaines ont transféré une partie des compétences de l'Etat en aménagement et développement économique auprès des collectivités territoriales[3]. Les collectivités territoriales roumaines, jusqu'alors bien souvent passives sur le plan de l'intervention économique, ont pris conscience de leur rôle à jouer et d'un enjeu essentiel à relever pour le développement de leur territoire.

Aujourd'hui, toutes les collectivités territoriales de Roumanie doivent définir des politiques économiques et intervenir comme des acteurs à part entière dans le développement local.

Le climat macroéconomique du pays et aussi l'environnement microéconomique sont des facteurs décisifs quand on choisi la stratégie de marketing[4]. L'action économique des collectivités territoriales se situe dans un environnement socio-économique de crise, de difficultés pour les entreprises, de montée du chômage et de mutations technologiques rapides. Cette situation rend le contexte local fragile et la recherche de points d'appui pour le développement particulièrement difficiles. La croissance des activités économiques locales et l'attraction d'entreprises sur leur territoire constituent à la fois des moyens de préserver l'emploi local et d'assurer des ressources fiscales, susceptibles d'être investies dans d'autres efforts pour le développement territorial.

L'acte unique européen incite à des manśuvres de développement sur le territoire européen. Les collectivités territoriales roumaines comme toutes les collectivités territoriales de l'Europe doivent chercher à tirer le meilleur profit possible de ces transformations. Le résultat est l'apparition d'un contexte très compétitif entre les collectivités territoriales pour le développement économique. L'approche marketing offre une démarche pertinente pour définir des actions à mettre en place au plan local.

## 3. La problématique du marketing territorial

Nous abordons la problématique spécifique de marketing territorial comme une analyse comparée - au sein d'un environnement complexe, caractérise par un système de contraintes et d'opportunités, des systèmes d'influence et des réseaux - entre:

- d'une part les pratiques des villes, qui cherchent à attirer des entreprises sur leur territoire et à soutenir le développement des entreprises qui y sont déjà implantées

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[3] Bold, Ion; Crăciun, Avram – *Organizarea teritoriului*, Ed. MIRTON, Timişoara, 1999, p.20

[4] Subnash, C. – *International marketing management*, PWS – KENT Publishing Compay, Boston, 1997, p.192

- d'autre part, les pratiques des entreprises qui recherchent une implantation nouvelle, ou simplement à se développer en utilisant les ressources disponibles (localement ou non)

Notre analyse de marketing territorial est fondée aussi sur les concepts proposes par l'approche du marketing inter organisationnel. Cette approche s'intéresse également aux marchés sur lesquels les deux acteurs, acheteur et vendeur, sont des organisations. Elle est fondée sur l'analyse de transactions des organisations, et non des individus, et met en évidence le caractère étroit, constant et durable de ces relations d'échange. Sur les marchés industriels, le processus de décision fait intervenir un grand nombre d'individus, aux motivations différentes, et s'appuie sur des variables à la fois psychologiques et organisationnelles. Au cours de ce processus, les deux organisations sont actives, chacune influant à un certain degré sur le comportement de l'autre. Les éléments classiques de marketing-mix sont completes par d'autres éléments (assistance au client, modifications sur mesure etc.) et sont negocies individuellement avec chacun client.

Il faut faire attention aussi aux obstacles dans la maîtrise globale des dimensions du marketing territorial auxquels peuvent se heurter les décideurs locaux roumains en raison des caractéristiques spécifiques du contexte.

Elément fondamental de la strategie marketing, l'information sur la marché de l'implantation devrait constituer un élément clé de disposition stratégique des villes. Très peu d'informations chiffrées sont à la disposition des villes pour leur permettre d'évaluer cette marché.

Une caractéristique du marché roumaine de l'implantation est que la plus grande partie des déplacements géographiques des entreprises se fait à l'intérieur du même département.

## 4. Les politiques de marketing territorial

La communication constitue l'essentiel de l'action de promotion économique en termes de moyens consacrés à la fonction[5]. Les techniques de promotion sont d'une très grande diversité et les villes ne doivent pas hésiter  les utiliser. L'observation des actions de communication souligne le sentiment d'une grande similitude des actions et renforce le constat d'une imprécision des choix de stratégie marketing des villes de Roumanie.

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[5] Dîncu, Vasile Sebastian – *Comunicarea simbolică. Arhitectura discursului publicitar*, Ed. Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1999, p.125

En termes de conception et de contenu des messages, les quelques idées utilisées systématiquement provoquent un sentiment de saturation et même de confusion. Les messages fondés sur l'esprit de l'entreprise, la technologie, le futur sont presque inévitables dans toute communication territoriale. Le thème de l'Europe est aussi mis en avant par un grand nombre de villes.

Certaines villes ont choisi d'asseoir leur communication sur la promotion massive de l'image d'une ville complète, en soulignant leurs points forts dans tous les domaines. La difficulté d'un positionnement stratégique clair est contournée de cette façon, mais pour être crédible elle en devient très coûteuse. La principale difficulté rencontrée par toutes les villes est encore de trouver l'originalité qui leur permette d'être identifiées, et de définir leur image de marque[6].

Il est naturel de rechercher les moyens d'améliorer rapidement la performance des opérations de développement économique. L'approche sur laquelle s'appuie l'effort de promotion des villes présente très vite les limites en ce qui concerne l'efficacité a terme. Inspirée des modèles de la grande consommation, cette approche est fondée exclusivement sur l'intérêt territorial. Elle se traduit par la mise en place de politiques d'aides a l'implantation et de modes d'intervention économique, ou par la diffusion de messages largement médiatises qui ne reposent pas sur la compréhension du système marketing spécifique dans sa globalité. Dans un contexte organisationnel, seule une approche fondée sur les pratiques de l'ensemble des acteurs du système offre la possibilité de développer un modèle d'action marketing efficace. L'analyse approfondie du système d'acteurs ville/entreprise et la prise en compte des comportements réels peut apporter une vision transformée du contexte marketing territorial et conduire à la mise en place d'une démarche marketing adaptée.

Le marketing est une philosophie basée sur une mise en avant de la demande par rapport à l'offre. Ceci est valide dans le cas de n'importe quel produit, donc également dans le cas du territoire[7]. Le territoire est le produit du travail des nos prédécesseurs et de nos concitoyens, mais c'est à nous d'améliorer ce produit. Le territoire est un produit dont la création et les changements sont lents donc nécessitent une planification rationnelle et prudente[8]. C'est le marketing territorial qui donne l'ensemble de la méthode pour atteindre cet objectif.

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[6] Kotler, Philip - *Managementul marketingului*, Ed. Teora, București, 1998, p.389

[7] Kotler, Philip; Saunders, John; Armstrong, Gary; Wong, Veronica – *Principiile marketingului*, Ed. Teora, București, 1998, p.653

[8] Gusti, Gustav – *Forme noi de așezare; Studii de sistematizare macroteritorială*, Ed. Tehnică, București, 1974, p. 19

La première règle de marketing est de questionner le client pour savoir ce qu'on peut offrir au marche. Les clients d'une vile sont les habitants, les entreprises et les institutions. Une ville ne doit pas être interesse seulement dans ses clients actuels, elle doit penser aussi à ses clients potentiels, ceux qu'elle veut attirer sur son territoire. Certains territoires à vocation touristique ont pour objectif de développer le tourisme et s'intéressent donc aux touristes, d'autres ciblent leurs activités sur des investisseurs, des institutions ou de nouveaux habitants. Chaque de ces groupes cible apporte de l'argent sur le territoire.

La deuxième règle est de connaître son client. Dans le cas du territoire il y a plusieurs clients. Les groupes cible les plus importants dans le cadre du marketing du territoire sont les exportateurs, les investisseurs, les producteurs, les touristes, les habitants potentiels, et les entreprises. Il faut décomposer les groupes cibles parce que, par exemple, nous ne serons pas intéressés par les touristes du monde entier, car on ne peut pas satisfaire de la même façon un Arabe et un Américain, celui qui a de l'argent et celui qui n'en a pas, une famille avec des enfants et un vieux couple[9]. Il faut opérer les choix suivant nos possibilités de l'offre.

La troisième règle est de connaître bien son territoire. Pour connaître un territoire, le marketing utilise une méthode reconnue, l'analyse des points forts et des points faibles, des opportunités et de menaces, appelée l'analyse SWOT.

La quatrième règle est de faire l'offre rencontrer la demande. Le premier pas est la connaissance du client. Ensuite, on réalise une stratégie de marketing ciblé sur les groupes de clients choisis. Le pas suivant de la stratégie de marketing du territoire concerne le choix des territoires pouvant satisfaire un segment de clients donne suivant les caractéristiques différentes. Aucun territoire ne peut avoir du succès dans le marketing avec une offre definie généralement. Nous devons donc penser pourquoi un visiteur ou un investisseur devrait-il opter pour notre territoire. Quels sont nos points spécifiques? Nous devons aller visiter des foires, distribuer de dépliants sur notre territoire ou construire un site Internet? Toutes ces questions doivent être résolues par le marketing mix.

Le marketing mix représente l'ensemble de 5 moyens devant être correctement planifiés pour chaque segment de clients: produit, accessibilité, prix, communication et personnel[10].

Le produit est dans le marketing territorial le territoire. Il faut choisir les caractéristiques spécifiques à notre territoire qui sont attractives pour le groupe de clients cible. Le produit nu est toutefois insuffisant, faute de reste des moyens du marketing mix.

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[9] Kotler, Philip - *Managementul marketingului*, Ed. Teora, Bucureşti, 1998, p.215
[10] Drăgan, I.C.; Demetrescu, M.C. - *Noul marketing în mileniul III*, Ed. Europa Nova, Bucureşti, 1998, p. 40

L'accessibilité du territoire doit être jugée convenable par les clients. L'accessibilité ne comprend pas uniquement la voirie et le transport en commun sur le territoire donné, il s'agit aussi de l'accessibilité de renseignements relatifs à l'accessibilité du territoire.

Le prix contient dans notre cas le prix de l'immobilier, de location, de force de travail, de l'information, des services et les conditions financières du territoire. C'est claire que tous les prix d'un territoire ne peuvent pas être influences par l'administration du territoire, celle-ci peut toutefois influencer la valeur des terrains en développant l'infrastructure, l'environnement etc. Elle peut utiliser les moyens financiers dont elle dispose et peut offrir des subventions suivant des critères choisis. Les possibilités sont illimitées.

La communication est un moyen important du marketing mix, car sans informer de nos avantages concurrentiels, de nos objectifs, prix et de l'accessibilité, ceux derniers n'ont pas d'utilité. On ne peut pas être modeste à ce point, il faut informer, diffuser, promouvoir. L'administration de la ville peut se servir de relations publiques – le développement des relations avec le grand public à travers des médias et de différentes activités, de la communication personnelle – utilisée lors des rencontres formelles et informelles avec les représentants importants des institutions, investisseurs etc., de la promotion – sous forme des différents documents sur le territoire, l'offre et les avantages, et enfin, de la promotion de la vente – pour améliorer la vente, à travers l'organisation des concours, à travers les réductions etc.

Le choix d'un moyen convenable au groupe cible de clients est très important: un message convenable – ce qu'on veut faire passer, un média, une période, un canal convenable pour véhiculer l'information la, ou on veut la faire passer. Les documents de promotion sont chers et dans le cas du défaut de la demande ou de manque d'intérêt du client, l'investissement réalisé sera perdu.

Pour que la stratégie réussisse, il ne faut pas négliger le personnel. Ce point concerne les employées de l'administration locale en contact quotidien avec le public lors de traitement de différentes affaires, mais aussi les habitants du territoire, qui doivent être informes de la stratégie, et même participer à sa création, affin de sa mise en pratique. La formation et l'éducation font partie indissociable du marketing. Les objectifs nouveaux et les changements ne peuvent pas être mis en place sans informer les acteurs concernes et sans les apprendre à se comporter dans une nouvelle situation. La notion de personnel comprend aussi les causes et le mode de l'association des habitants du territoire, donc des institutions, des organisations et des associations existantes pour développer le territoire donné[11]. L'administration locale peut assister la création

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[11] Bernatova, Magdalena – *Marketing territorial*, Journal communal, No 44, Banska Bystrikca, 1999, p.14-15

de ces organismes, car elles peuvent se charger des activités jusque 'ici réalisées par l'administration. Le développement du territoire peut réussir avec le concours des centres d'entrepreneurs, des incubateurs pour les jeunes entrepreneurs, des agences de développement régional, de l'association de l'hébergement etc.

L'objectif des autorités locales roumaines, dans le nouveau contexte économique, est d'améliorer l'attractivité du territoire au travail, à l'habitation, aux loisirs, au développement de l'économie, au tourisme, aux investissements, donc l'amélioration de l'image du territoire. Pour ça, elles doivent utiliser marketing territorial, pour apprendre au client potentiel les avantages concrets offerts par leur territoire pour qu'il se décide positivement de réaliser son activité sur le territoire en question.

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# LA BANCA COMMERCIALE ITALIANA, MILANO ET SA DIMENSIONE EUROPÉENNE

## ANCA STÂNGACIU

**RESUMÉ.** La démarche se propose d'analyser quelques aspects concernant la plus representative banque italienne quelle a activé pendant d'entre les deux guèrre mondiale dans les pays de l'Europe Orientale et Balcanique – Banca Commerciale Italiana, Milano. Le caractère européne mêmê mondiale de cette banque a été un consequence de sa force d'expansion économique et de sa reussie politique bancaire-industrialles.

La Banque Commerciale Itailiana a été sans dute une très prégnante présence dans le perimètre bancaire italien et européen. La banque est apparue à Milano dans un système bancaire issue de la tradition de célébres banques florentines, de Genova et de Venise qui dominaient dès XIII-ième à XV-iéme siècle. Le domaine bancaire italien, marginalisé au decurs des siècles, s`est prouvé pendant le XIX-ième siècle, fragile et traversé par beaucoup de crises, telle des années 1892-1893, extrémêment sevère autant pour le médium bancaire que pour celui socio-politique.

De l`autre coté, les besognes des investissements à lesquelles s`ajoutaient les concentrations des capitaux ont determinées le remplacement des traditionales *"case bancarie"* par la *"banca universale"*[1], une actione décisive dans le processus de développement de l'économie moderne. Le model s'est élargi dans des diverses éspace de l'Europe Occidentale de celle période là. L'idée génerale était d'implication investitionaire par la promotion d'une structure financiere extremement favorable au développement industriel.

La Banque Commerciale Italiana faisait son appariton à la suite du vide bancair, mais aussi grace à l'experience manageriale gagnée par les plus remarcables institutes de crédit d'Italie faillis le 1894: *Credito mobiliare* et *Banca Generale.* Des banquiers italiens et allemandes ont formulé, dans le contexte de telles oportunitées conjuncturales, quelques projets concernat la constitution d'une banque italienne avec une moderne configuration.

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[1] Gianni Toniolo, *Cent anni 1894-1994. La Banca Commerciale e l'economia italiana,* Banca Commerciale Italiana, Archivio Storico, Milano, Nardini editore, Fiesole, 1994, p. 24.

Le première projet rélatif à la création d'une moderne banque italienne a été initié par Otto Joel – financier italien d'origine allemande, directeur de *"Banca Generale".* On lance paralelement un program italien dont les promoteurs n'excluderaient une participation allemande de dimensiones reduites. Il était redacté, le févrieri 1894, par un consortium des banques allemandes et suisses, un première document qui proposait la fondation d'un institut bancair à Milano. Même si le document ne visait pas la création d'une banque universelle mais seulement la constitution d'un institut d'émission, il a réusi d'attirer l'attention des gouvernants et de plus, quelques officiales l'avaient consideré même *" colonialistique".* La troisième tentative de séptembre 1894 a était couronnée de succes grâce aux efforts de la Banque Bleichröder. Même si l'objectiv principal ne visait que les oppérations avantageuses, favorables à l'Etat italien, le projet n'éliminera pas à priori *" le attvità tipiche della banca mista di stampo tedesco* [2].

Vraiment, les banques allemandes, des banques à vocation universelle et des véritables instruments de développement institutionnel éuropéen ont initiés la formule de *" la banca mista "* – une *" innovatione finanziaria* [3] apparue dans le contexte de deuxième révolution industrielle. Le fonctionnement d'une banque mixte de type allemande se prouvait extremement éfficace pour une pays comme l'Italie, marque par l'industrialisation, mais incapable de grandes financements. Certainement, sa constitution comme une institution bancaire avec du capital mixt a permis à la banque de Milano d'être près de sa permanente rivale – *Credito Italiano*, une protagoniste dans le processus d'industrialisation rapide.

La Banque Commerciale Italiana, fondé le 10 octobre 1894 à Milano comme une société par actions, avec un capital de 20 millions de lires majorable à 50 millions de lires, avait tous ses actionaires, des etrangers ce qui confirmait le caracter international de celle-ci. La plus parte de ses actions, c'est-à-dire trois quarts du capital, était détenue également par 6 grands banques allemandes et le rest par des autres institutes bancaires allemandes et suisses. Crée comme une banque *"d'investimento"* avec des conotations universelles et intéresé aux grands projets industriels, la Banque Commerciale Italiana, Comit, était une résultante indiscutable de la réalité économique existente à cette époque là. Ainsi, le Comit s'est preocupé dès commencement d'une organisation moderne de son service bancaire, des opérations en compte courent à celles d`augmentation du capital, ces dernières attiront des financiers des diferentes nationalités qui ont changé le caractère prédominant allemand de la banque. Trés relevante et importante y a été la participation de l`institut bancair Banque de Paris et de Pays-Bas, qui a ouvert des raports constructives avec le marché financier français. D`autre point

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de vue, il est à remarquer l`augmentation du capital de la banque au debut du XX-ième siècle aussi par des souscriptions italiennes consistentes. En répondant aux exigenses d`une économie dévenue très dinamique, la banque s`est concomitant impliqué dans des affaires internes et dans des participations dans des sécteurs industriales des plus dynamiques de l`époque[4].

Le dépassement de la crise des années 1920-1921, la réprise de la dynamique investitionaire et, à travers de celle-ci, l`augmentation des démandes des crétits ont suposé une nouvelle implication de la Banca Commerciale Italiana dans les entreprises italiennes. En fait, pendant l`époque giolittienne, le Comit s`est averé être un point financier de référence dans le développement économique italiene.

De l`autre coté, l`initiative de gouvernement moussolinian pour stabiliser la livre – "la quota novanta" (1926-1927) – a imposé une politique déflationiste qui s'est reflétée sur les banques, tel est le cas de la Banca Commerciale Italiana. Au-déla de l'impact politique de ce phenomen sur la banque, ces qui ont dominé le début de la Banca Commerciale Italiana ont été l'ésprit universel, la vocation et son ouverture internationale, ainsi qu'en 1906 la banque procède à une expansione externe directe par la constitution de la Banca Commerciale Italo-Brasiliano di San Paolo.

L'époque d'entre les deux guerres étant une période de la liberté de mouvement des personnes, des capitaux et des marchandises a permis à la Banca Commerciale Italiana une nouvelle expansione vers l'exterieur. Après la crise bancaire de 1931, le Comit, entrée dans une nouvelle étape de son évolution, s'est reorganisé comme "una grande banca di deposito"[5].

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[4] Dans la dynamique d'industrialisation italienne, la Banca Commerciale Italiana s'est initialement impliqué dans l'industrie éléctrique (1894- le group d'Edison) – en reusisant d'inspirer beaucoup de confiance, puis dans celle sydérurgique (dès 1903 elle developpe la serie des affaires avec Terni), de l'acier et de fèr (Acciaierie e Ferriere Lombarde - Falck), l'industrie d'automobil (des raports d'affaires avec Fiat dès 1903), ou meme l'industrie cotonnier (Cotonificio Veneziano). Ainsi, dans les premiers vingt années de son activié, le Comit a concuré à la fondation de 13 société dans le secteur éléctrique, 18 dans cel mécanique, 14 dans la chimie et des autres dans l'industrie textile. Sa grande élasticité opérationelle, consequance d'un grand niveau des liquidités a permis dans l'époque d'entre les deux guerre une participation financiere d'anvergure, mêmê des interventions de "*salvataggio*": de *Fiat* à la syderurgie ou à l'autrel'industrie comme textile. (cf. Gianni Toniolo, *Cent anni 1894-1994. La Banca Commerciale e l'economia italiana,* Banca Commerciale Italiana, Archivio Storico, Milano, Nardini editore, Fiesole, 1994, p.33-36).

[5] Ibidem, p. 77.

Administrativement, la Banca Commerciale a été initialement organisée dans l'idée d'une tutelle financiere discrete et de l'assurance d'un management "perfetamente libero dal lato technico"[6].

Conformement au modèle d'organisation des societés sur actions, l'activité manageriale et opérationale de la banque était assurée par la *Direzione Centrale* dont le directeur général était le mandataire du Conseil d'Administration auprès de qui fonctionaient comme des organs d'administration et de contrôle le Conseil d'Administration, l'Asamblée Générale des Actionaires et les Comisaire des Comptes (les censeurs).

Les départements administratives de la banque (ufficii) ont exprimé par

leur structure, les caractéristiques et les particularitées de fonctionement interne et aussi la politique bancaire de l'institut, spécialement celle d'expansion externe.

La cohérence d'organisation administarative s'est mentenue jusqu'à la fin de 1931 quand, sur le fond de la crise bancaire, une réstructuration interne s'est imposé.

La *Direzione Centrale* était le département managerial central de la politique organisationel et décisionel de qui dépendait le fonctionement des autres bureax de la réseau interne ou externe. Les services internes ou adiacente à la *Direzione* étaient subdivisionées en: le secrétariat – *Segretaria Generale,* le personnel – *Ufficio del Personale,* le contontieux – *Ufficio Legale,* la comptabilité – *Contabilità centrale, Contabilità e Controllo Divise, Ufficio del Capo Contabile,* dévises *Ufficio Divise,* et la correspondance – *Corispondenza.* Le département qui a meilleur réfleté les tendances expansionistes de Comit a été le *Servicio Estero* apparu en1911 comme un "ufficio speciale estero" circonscrit à la *Segretaria Generale* transformé ulterieurement en *Stabilimenti Estero* et puis en *Servicio Controllo e Organizzatione Estero*[7].

Comit, comme une véritable " banca universale" a organisé "la rete estero" après le modèle des filiales, des affiliées, des associées et des réprésentances en opérant une distinction claire entre ces quatre compartiments structurels.

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[6] Gianni Toniolo, op. cit., p. 34.

[7] Les compartiments du départament *Servizio Estero* (*Ufficio Speciale Estero)* creés en 1911 et transformés ulteriorement dans le *Stabilimenti Estero* on été entre 1921-1932: Segreteria Estero, Controllo Estero, Ufficio Speciale Estero. En 1932, sous sa nouvelle dénominnation de *Servizio Controllo e Organizzazione Estero,* le *Servizio Estero* inclussait:Crediti e Controllo Estero, Organizzazione ed Ispettorato Estero, Relazioni Estero, Segreteria Estero. La suivante échange se développe en 1941 quand le département porte la dénominnation de *Servizio Filiali e Afiliazioni* et il a comme soubdivisionés: Sorveglianza Filiali e Afiliazioni, Crediti e Rischi Estero, Segreteria Estero, Relazioni Estere, cf. *Banca Commerciale Italiana, Archivio Storico, Collana inventari, Servizio estero e rete estera*, Milano, 1997, p. VII-XIV.

Les filiales (filiali)[8] étaient seulement "un ramo di azienda"[9] provenue de *casa madre,* sans autonomie juridique ou un patrimoine distinct ; elles deployaient des activités exclusivement pour Comit qui, à son tour, participait au capital de la filiale avec plus de moitié de son quantum.

Les affiliées (affiliazioni)[10] étaient des institutions bancaires crées par Comit dans de diférents Etats, conformement à la structure administrative interne de la banque milanaise la où la *casa madre* détenait une grande partie de leur capital et exercisait, par de différents métodes, un "controllo continuativo e diretto della gestione". Même si le contact permanent avec la *Direzione Centrale* supposait des instructions concernates la formulation de la politique bancaire et financiere en consonance avec le centre, les affiliées s'etaient jouites d'une autonomie juridique et elles pouvqient actioner, les plus souvent, en leur propre nome.

La différence de nuance d'entre les affiliées et les associées (associate)[11] réside dans le fait que les dernières, même si elles impliquent une participation majoritaire de la Banca Commerciale Italiana, quelques fois sans une influence détérminante, elles ont pourtant une sensible authnomie sous l'aspect d'un contrôl plus compact et plus limité de la banque: "alle linee generali della politica bancaria"[12]. En échange, les réprésentances (rappresentanze)[13] sont des prolongements du centre, des véritables filtres, à traverse de qui la banque conscientisait le marché externe et étudiait les marchés du travail et du capital.

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[8] Les filiales de la Banca Commerciale Italiana ont fonctionées à Londra (entre 1911-1940), à New York (1918-1940), à Istambul (1919-1945) et à Smirne (1928-1943).

[9] *Banca Commerciale Italiana, Archivio Storico, Collana inventari, Servizio estero e rete estera*, Milano, 1997, p. IV.

[10] Les 14 affiliées de la Banca Commerciale Italiana ont été: Banca Commerciale Italiana e Bulgara (1919-1944), Banca Commerciale Italiana e Greca (1929-1944), Banca Commerciale Italiana e Romena (1920-1934), Banca Commerciale Italiana (France) (1918-1940), Banca Commerciale Italiana per l'Egitto (1924-1940), Banca Ungaro-Italiana (1920-1944), Banco Italiano – Guayaquil (1923-1941), Hrvatska Banka D.D. (1928-1944), Societa Italiana di Credito Commerciale-Itabanca (1919-1934), cf. *Banca Commerciale Italiana, Archivio Storico, Collana inventari, Servizio estero e rete estera*, Milano, 1997, p. XIX-XX.

[11] Les institutes bancaires qui se sont constitués dans des associées de Comit ont été: Banca della Svizzera Italiana – Lugano (1910-1942), Banque Française et Italienne pour l'Amérique du Sud (1910-1941) - Paris, Banco Italiano [- Lima] (1919-1939), Böhmische Union-Bank – Praga (1920-1933), Bank Handlowy w Warszawie – Varşovia (1927-1935), cf. *Banca Commerciale Italiana, Archivio Storico, Collana inventari, Servizio estero e rete estera*, Milano, 1997, p. XIX.

[12] Banca Commerciale Italiana, Archivio Storico, Collana inventari, Servizio estero e rete estera, Milano, 1997, p. V.

[13] Des réprésentantes de la Banca Commerciale Italiana ont existées à: Berlin (1928-1938), Belgrad (1937-1940) et New York (1945-...).

La Banca Commerciale Italiana promovait et exerisait, au-déhors des réprésentances (una longa manus della Direzione Centrale)[14] un contrôl direct sur les dépendences, aussi au niveau de la gestion courente, de l'organisation administrative-financier, qu'au niveau de l'implication dans des interpretations avec des conotations socio-politiques. Le réseau des dépendances externe aidait à implementer les interêts bancaire-financiers du Comit, à conquerir et dominer des marchés de capital ou à soutenir l'effort financier de la banque. Au-desus des principes de politique financiere, il a été extremement importante l'existence d'une élite bancaire chez *cassa madre* qui, d'une coté, a imposé pendant le temps une ligne competitionaire dure et de l'autre coté, la formation d'un réseau des fonctionaire calitativement préparés. On peut prendre comme exemple le cas de la Banca Commerciale Italiana: dans la lettre préliminaire, à l'avant de la création de l'affiliée roumaine, envoyée par *Servizio Estero* à A Rubinstein, on souligne que la banque italienne va envoyer son propre personnel en Roumanie "pour bien mentenir le contact avec la *cassa madre* et pour modéler les services conformement aux règles du Comit"[15].

D'une manière dépendante ou indépendante de la politique de personnel de la *Direzione Centale* on s'est fait sentie la présence d'une élite locale, d'origine neitalienne, très bien conturée. D'entre les élites financieres italienes se sont rémarqués: par l'activité et capacité manageriale- Alfonso Sanseverino Vimercati, Silvio Crespi ; comme présidents – Ettore Conti, Raffaele Mattioli ; en qualité d'administrateur délégués– Otto Joel[16], Federico Weil[17], Giuseppe Toeplitz, Antonio Rossi, etc.

Le flux d'investissements en Roumanie d'entre-les deux-guerre a eu aussi des traits générales parvenues du marché international que des particularités liées de l'éspace roumain. La Banca Commerciale Italiana s'est introduite sur le marché roumain du capital industriel par des voies clasiques des placements: des participations directes sous la forme des actions et des financements d'investissemnt, des credits industriels, des effects publiques et d'escompte.

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[14] *Banca Commerciale Italiana, Archivio Storico, Collana inventari, Servizio estero e rete estera*, Milano, 1997, P. VI.

[15] AMB, Fond BCIR, d. 61/1920, f. 2.

[16] Otto Joel –citoyen allemand d'origine juive né à Danzig a été aupres de Weil le principal catalyser des interets allemands, qui ont fait prendre naissance la Banca Commerciale Italiana. Il a *été* l'artisan du puissant developpement de la banque dans l'époque giolittienne, aussi l a eu les fonctions de directeur général dans la banque milanese, réspectivement d'administrateur délégué (1908-1915).

[17] Federico Weil – citoyen allemand né dans une famille israelite d'Allemande Sud-Occidentale, a activé dans une première partie de son activité dans le cadre de la bancque francaise – Credito Mobiliare. Ulteriorement, dès 1894 il est l'un des principals promoteurs de la Banca Commerciale Italiana, dont le directeur central et administrateur délégué a été (1908-1914).

Concretement, la banque a actioné dans deux directions pour promouver sa politique bancaire et d'investissements: par des actions propres en nome de *cassa madre,* ou, indirectement, par son affiliée en Roumanie - Banca Commerciale Italiana et Romena, le réprésentant des interêts de la banque milanaise dans ce coin des Balkans.

La présence directe du Comit dans l'industrie roumaine doit être observé dans l'ensemble complex du fonctionement de son réseau bancaire externe. Les dossiers rélatives à la correspondance de la Banca Commerciale Italiana avec son affiliée en Roumanie rélève la manière de communication d'entre les multiples compartiments du système de Comit: *cassa madre* – affiliées – holdings. Dès années '20, en même temps avec son développement territoral, le Comit a concentré ses participations externe sous la forme des société de type *holding* qui assuraient le contrôl et la diréction économique d'un grande nombre d'autre sociétés nomées *subsidiaires*. Beaucoup de participations industriales dirèctes du Comit en Roumanie impliquaient des colaborations entre la Banca Commerciale Italiana et Romena et des differents holdings (par exemple la Società Internazionale di Credito Mobiliare et Immobiliare), affiliées, sociétés commerciales ou de crédit à l'interieur du system Comit.

L'implémentation dirècte de la banque milanaise dans l'industrie, dans le commerce ou le domain bancair roumain s'est fait par une politique bancaire propre ou, souvent, en corélation avec des banques autrischiennes et allemandes. Il y a une vielle tradition de colaboration de la banque lombarde avec des institutes bancaires de l'éspace autrischien-allemande, étant donée prémièrement la liaison intime de ce triangle bancair établie dès début de XIX-ième siècle. La création de Banca Commerciale Italiana, elle même a été réalisée par le soutien et l'initiative des banquiers allemands, un fait qui a détérminé une colaboration financiere étroite de deux structures. Finalement, il s'agit d'un "réseau compliqué et entrelacé des affaires"[18] établie entre de grands pouvoirs financieres de l'Europe. Ŕ l'approche de la première guerre mondiale on participait au Comit des forces bancaires allemandes, hongroises, autrischiennes, françaises et, biensur, italiennes. Ce complexe des éléments bancaires a pénétré l'Europe Centrale-Balkanique en adoptant la stratégie de créer des banques affiliées ou se cointéreser massivement dans l'industrie.

L'infiltration directe du Comit en Roumanie s'est réalisée premièrement par des participations industrials qui ont supposées soit la participation de celui-ci comme associé dans des entreprises telle: "Astra-Prima fabrică română de

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[18] Nicolae Păun, Ludovic Báthory, Constantin Ivaneş, *Capitalul italian în sistemul financiar european şi penetratia lui în economia forestiera a României (1900-1930)* în AIIA "A.D.Xenopol", Iasi, XXIII/2, 1986, p. 640.

vagoane și motoare S.A." Arad – dans l'industrie métallurgique, soit le fondement des sociétés sur actions comme a été le cas de Foresta et celui de la chaine des plasements de l'industrie forestière. La Banca Commerciale Italiana Milano ne s'est limitée pas à la possession des actions dans le domain industriel et bancaire roumain mais s'est impliquée qussi dans des amples actions de credit.

Un cas qui reflêt très pertinent la colaboration *cassa madre* des filiales ou des affiliées est celui de la *Società Italo-Rusa per il Mar Nero* de complex *Società Italiana per il Mar Nero* spécialisée dans des actions d'import-export. Les documents rélatives à cette compagnie permetent la compréhesion du concept d'autonomie ou de la dépendance vis-à-vis de la *Direzione Centrale Milano*, et aussi le mécanisme du contrôl à l'intérieur du réseau du Comit, cette fois dans la ligne commerciale.

On relève d'une manière critique, dans un raport de 12 octombrie 1921 du directeur Mario Corradino vers le directeur de la Banca Commerciale Italiana, Adolfo Rossi, des aspects rélatives à la gestion et à la comptabilité de cette société. Le fait que le raport posede l'antet de la succursale de Brăila de la Banca Commerciale Italiana e Romena denotte l'importance de celle-ci dans le comerce régional danubiano-maritim. L'inspection et la vérification de la firme a évidentié une organisation haotique avec des anomalies et des irrégularités comptables qui la placent au-desous du niveau normale de fonctionement. Concretement, il s'agit de l'ignorance du numeraire de la société, de l'administration déféctueuse du capital nonpropre par les responsables de l'agentie *Del Mar Ner Galati-Yourovsky*[19] etc.

Les conclusions de l'inspecteur italien convergent vers des appreciations concernantes le statut et la configuration de la société dans des formulations d'une incertitude évidente à partir de l'interogation si l'agentie est une simple réprésentante de Constantinopol ou une véritable filiale[20] dépendante, à l'intermède de Constantinopol, de Milano. Une telle abordation développe des situations incertes et des organisations déficitaires avec des repércursions negatives pour le système investitionaire du Comit. On met en discution d'une manière retorique et de point de vue de la philosophie mangeriale de la firme, le concept de résponsabilité administrative[21] qui impliquait même des démarches financiers au détriment de la société et des critiques rélatives à l'activité commerciale. Les implications dans le plan de l'activité commerciale sont graves parce qu'on constate l'empiètement de la ligne et des principes fixés par Milano.

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[19] Archivio Storico della Banca Commerciale Italiana (SBCI) fondo Società Italiana per il Mare Nero, cartela (cart.27), fascicola (fasc.) 1, fila 1-2

[20] ASBCI, fondo Società Italiana per il Mare Nero, cartela (cart.27), fascicola (fasc.) 1, fila 2

[21] Ibidem, f. 2.

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On amende aussi l'autonomie usée par la filiale de Galați de la *Società Del Mar Nero* qui s'est pérmis de facturer les marchandises à un prix supérieur celui précisé par Milano. En fait, la filiale devait fonctioner comme *"una semplice commissionata"*[22] sans avoir aucune initiative.

De la pérspéctive que le statut d'affilié l'implique ; il faut précisé que la Banca Commerciale Italiana, comme une *banca madre*, a imprimé à la dépendance roumaine, autant dans l'activité manageriale que dans celle liée des domaines investitionaires ou des implications financieres, les lignes générales de sa politique bancaire. En ce qui concerne les prêts qui vont être accordés, Romcomit démandait, spécialement dans le cas de grandes sommes, l'accord de *Direzione Centrale* de Milano. Comme réponse aux démandes de l'affiliée roumaine, le Comit formulait des jugements économiques et financiers, des suggéstions, des accéptations ou des refuses d'après le cas.

Au niveau informationel, le Comit et surtout la coréspondence Comit-Romcomit révéle que la réprésentance roumaine furnisait chaque fois des donées concernant les credits accordés aux diferents société commerciales – des entreprises ou des banques. De même manière on procedait aussi dans le cas des créances ou des autre titles valoriques que Romcomit posait à la disposition des tiers.

Quant à la déscentralisation, Romcomit en se rejouisait d'une partielle mais celle-ci a fonctioné bien dans le cas des entreprises forestières, là oů, chaque exploitation avait son individualité organique, en dependant de *Direzione Centrale* seulement dans la question de financement, de l'aprovisionement avec des matières prime et dans la vent des produits.

En conclusion, en peut affirmer que la déscentralisation bancaire dans la rélation *cassa madre*-affilié était valable en générale au niveau de la fonctione d'organisation et à quelques élémentes liés du patrimoine de la banque affiliée.

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[22] Ibidem, f. 2.

# E-COMMERCE – A NEW WORLD-WIDE COMMERCE

## ALINA ANDREICA*

**ABSTRACT**. The paper is dedicated to the impact of e-commerce upon our society. After presenting the importance of Internet as a new information and communication medium, consequently as a support for e-commerce, we present the main functioning principles of electronic commerce. Specialized firms offer on-line services for bill-payment, as well as credit, debit and cash transactions not only within private banking networks, but also over the Internet. In this respect, there arise particular security problems, which are being solved mainly by encryption techniques; all the software systems that assist electronic transactions implement data security procedures. We consider that in the future e-commerce will rapidly grow in importance and will become an opportunity for less developed countries to compete, with better chances, in this global economy.

## 1. Internet – a Global Medium for Electronic Activities

The global network known today as Internet was generated by two networks that appeared in the United States, beginning with the late '60s: ARPANET, initially created for the Department of Defense, and NSFNET, belonging to the National Science Foundation, and developed from the late '70s to the early '80s.

After the 1st of January 1983, when the flexible TCP/IP protocol became an official standard within ARPANET, ensuring a more efficient host connection, and after connecting ARPANET and NSFNET, Internet's growth became exponential, so that around the mid '80s, people started to refer to this independent wide area net as Internet.

The US Internet has expanded in the whole world, forming a global network, which enables a large number of users, world-wide, to access considerable amounts of information retained in special nodes of the net [And98].

In 1990, Internet comprised 3000 nets and 200,000 computers; in 1992, there were over 1 million hosts and in 1995 there existed many backbones (main nets), tens of thousands of LANs, millions of hosts and tens of millions of users [Tan97]. It was estimated that Internet's size almost doubles each year. The growth of Internet is also sustained by the integration of existing nets, such as NASA, IBM, high energy physics nets in the USA, as well as academic European

nets. Personal computers may be connected to Internet using a modem for the connection to the router of a service provider and being assigned a temporary IP address. IP references are the base of Internet computer addressing, although users may employ the more friendly alternate system of domain names [Pil94].

The categories of Internet users expanded considerably after 1990, when its traditional applications – e-mail, news groups, remote connection and execution, file transfer (see [And98], [Jal96]) – were extended with a new and much more user-friendly application mainly dedicated to knowledge acquisition within the Internet: World Wide Web. This new facility transformed the academic, governmental and commercial character of Internet by extending its accessibility to millions of non-professional users. WWW was invented by Tim Berners Lee at CERN [And98] and it strongly simplified information processes within the Internet. By means of navigation programs (or browsers, such as Mosaic, Netscape Communicator or Internet Explorer), WWW makes available sites containing Web pages with all kinds of information – texts, pictures, audio and video information – and links to other pages (usually, there is a main page with multiple links corresponding to the most important subjects the page deals with). By clicking the item associated to a link, the associated page appears. This system proved to be very useful as a thorough information provider for various fields – a genuine electronic world-wide library. A year after Mosaic was launched on the market, the number of Web servers increased from 100 to 7000 [Tan97] and this evolution tends to become even more dynamic, as WWW turns into a new information and communication system.

In fact, web navigators interpret files that are written in HTML (HyperText Markup Language), a (programming) language that enables the definition of all kind of objects available on web pages, including hyperlinks, i. e. links to other pages[1]. Usually, web page objects are only displayed, but there are also some kinds of objects which may be used in order to gather information: the forms. Form pages mainly use list controls for collecting information and are processed by specific applications, which search special databases for user entries. Therefore, this special type of web pages may be used, for remotely performing on the web, various kinds of activities, such as administrating questionnaires (for example in sociology, market testing, distance-learning evaluations, etc.), banking operations – e-banking, commercial activities – e-commerce.

Internet is a dynamic hardware and software medium that covers the whole world, enabling everyone to communicate or to share information on an equal basis. Lee Stein stresses out that "this shouldn't change, even with the

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[1] In this respect the URL (Uniform Resource Locator) addressing system, is used. URL enables an uniform addressing to all kind of resources by specifying a protocol, a server and a file / resource name.

addition of new services that enable commerce to take place in a market without walls or other boundaries".

The progress in communication technologies and the improvement in software accessibility and capabilities generated an exponential increase of Internet users. In this respect, the evolution of Internet access from 1999 to 2000 (after Nua Internet Surveys, [Bol01]) presented in figure 1 is extremely relevant. It can be noticed that, recently, in only one year, the Internet access significantly increased in all the regions of the world, from a total of 171 million people in March 1999 to 304 million people in March 2000 – a global growth of 78%.

Internet is and will remain an electronic medium in continuous expansion, which offers virtual means of performing various activities. Regarding the commercial field, we can state that the Internet, as a global electronic mean of information and communication, supports, by its particular facilities, world-wide commercial operations, at a speed that often exceeds classical procedures. Specific e-commerce aspects will be detailed in the next sections.



*Figure 1 : Global evolution of Internet access between 1999 and 2000*

## 2. E-commerce: Principles, Techniques and Examples

E-commerce is based on electronic transactions, most of them being performed over the Internet, as more and more banks integrate their services into the Internet. Such a transaction involves an exchange of goods or services for

money between two institutions and / or persons. Each transaction involves a typical sequence of steps; in this respect, a simple example refers to operating an automated teller machine (ATM), which is familiar to everyone. An ATM transaction takes place within banks' secure networks. One of the most important steps in using an ATM is security related and consists in entering the PIN code, respectively verifying it. Further on, the account balance will be checked in order to be certain that the account contains enough cash to satisfy a withdraw request. If any of the ATM transaction steps fails, the entire transaction is immediately aborted. On the contrary, an exchange transaction is a process that will be performed until completed.

Most of the electronic on-line transactions handled by specialized firms, by using specific software, are either *credit-card operations* or *bill-payments*. For example, *CheckFree Corporation* (www.checkfree.com), handles payments for major on-line services, such as AOL and CompuServe, and for major access providers such as Netcom. CheckFree Corporation handles security problems mainly by relying on more traditional means of electronic funds transfer, through telephone and modem, rather than the Internet. Other major vendors which handle digital money are: *CyberCash*, specialized in credit-card transactions over the Internet and co-founded by Bill Melton and Dan Lynch – famous names[2] in e-commerce – (www.cybercash.com), *DigiCash*, who created an experimental ecash demo currency for purchasing goods and services on certain web sites (www.digicash.com), *First Virtual Holdings* (www.fv.com), *NetBill*, *Netscape Communications* (mosaic.mcom.com) and *Open Market* (www.openmarket.com) [Lyn96]. Further on, we shall call such companies, who deal with digital money and electronic transactions, "digital money vendors" (DMVs).

The customers of DMVs, individuals and merchants, can use their services in order to **make** or, respectively, **collect payments** *by electronic means*. The most common scenario of a bill-paying service is the following:

◊ the subscriber sends payment information to the DMV by using a touchtone telephone, a personal computer (PC) and modem (integrated or not in the Internet) or a genuine Internet connection (which rises more security problems);

◊ DMV sends appropriate instructions in order to transfer funds electronically from the subscriber's checking account to the creditor. Payments are recorder on the subscriber's monthly bank statement (or

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[2] Bill Melton invented the device for sliding the credit card and, before CyberCash, founded VeriFone, a successful company which provided a simplified system for processing sales by credit-card transactions. Dan Lynch previously founded Interop, which developed into the famous NetWorld + Interop networking show and exhibition.

included in cancelled checks). Further more, if the subscriber uses a PC, a record of the transaction is kept by using the software's facilities and if the subscriber uses a telephone service, the DVM can send him a monthly statement of transactions.

Most DVMs tried to expand their services from the secured but restricted and small banking networks into the larger Internet, in order to enable efficient and flexible *credit, debit and cash transactions* [AndDea00]. The typical firm example aiming at this goal is CyberCash, which advertises itself as "providing a safe bridge between the efficient, but insecure Internet and the World's trusted banks". Obviously, handling various financial transactions over the exposed Internet rises many security problems. An electronic credit transaction method that is widely accessible to the customers comprises the use of any Web browser or server and the possibility of (free) downloading a special software module, which communicates with the DMV's servers that are in turn connected with private banking networks.

In a few details, the steps of an electronic *credit-card transaction* that is assisted by a DMV, between a merchant and a customer, are usually the following:

◊ the merchant sends an *electronic invoice* over the Web;
◊ the customer fills in the invoice, including his credit-card number;
◊ DMV's software module encrypts the credit-card field and returns the invoice to the merchant;
◊ the merchant appends his private confirmation number and the entire package, in an encrypted form, is forwarded to the DMV;
◊ DMV servers reformat and encrypt the information in banking formats and send it to the banking network, where it is treated like a normal credit-card transaction.

Besides the encryption procedures which ensure information security, it can be noticed another prudent measure: the fact that the merchant does not obtain the credit number of the customer. In fact, nor the DMV knows customers' private encryption keys.

For a *debit transaction*, a previously opened account at the DMV must exist. In order to make a purchase, the customer sends an encrypted message to the DMV, requesting the fund transfer. If the merchant has a DMV account, the transaction is finished; if not, DMV creates an account and informs the merchant that he has to use (download) the (free) specific software in order to complete the money transfer.

For *cash transactions*, a DMV does not act like a proper bank, but instead it works with banks which can indicate the cash existing in customers' bank accounts. A DMV account can be viewed as a pointer (indicator) to the money contained in a real bank account. Thus, payments are completed by "moving pointers", in the corresponding DMV accounts.

For each electronic transaction that is performed, a DMV can charge their customers with a transaction fee. Since electronic transactions became extremely popular and competition in this field is quite good (especially in the USA), one can find in this market field quite low fees (the price of an electronic transaction is comparable to the one of a postage stamp) [Lyn96].

In order to be efficient, the software architecture of a DMV must be designed to retain the minimum amount of information about each transaction, according to modern data base principles. We note that some DMVs (such as First Virtual Holdings) rely on e-mail, rather than specialized client software. In this model, for each new customer the company opens an account with a confidential identification number, which will be send, in an encrypted form, via e-mail, in each transaction.

As the Internet becomes the most popular hardware and software medium for performing electronic transactions, it is necessary to be provided and enhanced with efficient security standards. Internet transactions are mainly credit-card based, which rises the problem of a secured encryption for credit-card numbers. Yet, there is no single data security standard to shield customers' credit card numbers from fraudulent use [Lyn96].

At a software level, encryption and digital signatures used in digital money exchanges, as well as within other Internet services, are the most appropriate solutions for security problems. These issues are dealt with in the following paragraph.

### 3. The Importance of Security Aspects in Network and E-commerce Activities. Means of Performing Secured Communications and Transactions

Since first networks provided only e-mail services or hardware sharings for researchers and firm personnel, they did not rise security problems. But as computer networks became an instrument to perform banking operations, tax payments or shopping, security aspects turned to be very important [AndDea00].

In the simplest form, network security ensures that:
- curious or bad-intentioned persons can not intercept and (worse) modify messages addressed to other persons; more generally speaking, all problems regarding intercepting and faking authorized messages are solved;
- remote services are used only by authorized persons.

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Most security problems are caused by bad-intentioned persons who seek to obtain personal benefits or just to test the security mechanisms, from persons who amuse themselves trying to access protected data to professionally equipped and dedicated adversaries.

Security problems within computer networks may be classified [Tan97] in the following inter-dependent fields:

- *confidentiality* ensures information access only for authorized users and prevents unauthorized accesses;
- *authentication* enables to find the real identity of the person someone communicates with, before revealing important information;
- *integrity control* ensures information consistence;
- taking *responsibility* for messages or commercial commands and ensuring their authenticity (for example, if one of the parts in a contract later contests the initial terms, it is important that an authenticity procedure exist).

The above mentioned security aspects may also be found, in some extent, within traditional communication systems: for example, postal services must ensure integrity and confidentiality for the letters it delivers. In various cases, for example, in banking services, an original document is required, copies being rejected.

The problem in electronic communications is that the distinction between original and copies is not at all obvious. In every day life, common authentication procedures are frequently applied by recognizing human faces, voices, handwritings, but mostly signatures and seals. Manuscript fakes can be detected by graphology experts, who sometimes test even the paper type. Obviously, none of these methods may be applied for electronic messages and new solutions must be found. The most frequent software solutions for security problems comprise encryption techniques.

From manual encoding and decoding, which usually used a well-known algorithm with secret keys for a few years, cryptography passed to automatic techniques, where the algorithm complexity was no longer relevant since it is computer-executed. Modern cryptography is characterized by the automatization of classical techniques (substitution and transposition) using simple, high speed circuits, applied successively, so that an output depending on the input after a very complicated function may be obtained [Tan97].

In cryptology there appeared symmetric and non-symmetric algorithms [AndBot01]: first ones use a private key for encoding and decoding (the key exchange must be made on a secured channel) while the latter use a pair composed by a private and public key for encoding, respectively decoding – a message encoded with one key can be decoded only using its corresponding key.

The use of algorithms with public keys is more convenient, since they do not require a prior secured key exchange. Encryption keys are validated by dedicated certification authorities. Obviously, the longer the encryption key is, the more difficult – in terms of computer power and time – is to decipher an encoded message.

As e-commerce services expanded from private and secured banking networks into the more promising Internet, an extremely flexible but, on the other hand, insecure medium, it became of utmost importance to solve security problems regarding all types of financial electronic transactions (see 1). Obviously, crucial information involved in these transactions – credit-card numbers, account identification numbers, passwords, etc. – can not be send unsecured over the Net.

It is clear that conducting monetary transactions over the Internet is a much more exacting task than sharing or communicating general information, with the respect of ensuring privacy for information exchanges and security for all transactions. On the other hand, as the demand in the field of e-commerce and on-line monetary transactions increases rapidly, it is crucial that special security strategies are designed and implemented in order to assist these operations over the Internet.

General software methods of ensuring security are based on encryption techniques. Among the most famous encryption systems that were developed, we enumerate:

- DES (Data Encryption System, with an (original) 56 bits key, the first automatic encryption system), developed by IBM and adopted in 1977, by the USA government, as an official standard for non-secret information. Researches towards breaking DES, such as Diffie and Hellman's (1977), were very fruitful for the development of cryptology;
- IDEA (International Data Encryption Algorithm), created at the Federal Institute of Technology from Zürich (ETHZ) by two Swiss researchers, uses a 128 bits key and is inspired from previous encrypting methods, DES and the attempts to break DES;
- RSA algorithm, developed at MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) by Rivest, Shamir, Adelman.

The most widely used system of secured e-mail, PEM (Privacy Enhanced Mail), created by Zimmerman, uses both DES and RSA techniques. PEM includes encryption, authentification and key management; it also supports the use of certificates (digital certificates provide identification).

Some of the most important results in cryptology researches were adopted as international standards by legitimate organisms. Most of them are used within e-commerce software.

An important direction that modern cryptology evolved in develops techniques for verifying whether the communication partner is the right one and not an impostor, by using authentication protocols. This problem is very complex and requires electronic replacements for authorized signatures used on legal documents. Such a correspondent is named *digital signature* and may be, for example, a secret session key set by two communication partners. Digital signatures are also implemented with encryption algorithms [AndBot01]. They are extremely important in e-commerce since they prevent faked messages, product orders, etc.

In order to ensure secure information exchanges, in particular credit-card and cash-based transactions, several methods are currently being developed. In this respect, as *basic software procedures*, there appeared two secure communication protocols [AndBot01]: Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol (S-HTTP), a "safe" version of World Wide Web's native protocol and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), created by Netscape Communications Corporation as a secure version of the basic Internet communication protocol – TCP/IP.

In 1995, a group of Internet-related companies [Lyn96], including the well-known America OnLine, IBM and Netscape Communications, provided funding for researches regarding the unification of the two above-mentioned protocols. In this respect, a company specialized in encryption systems – Terisa Systems, a successor of RSA Data Security, Inc. – created a hybrid that was compatible with both S-HTTP and SSL protocols. This unified security protocol can support the uniform development of more secure browser software, useful in money transactions.

In order to process digital money, hardware and software means that are continuously created must adapt to the features of digital money [Lyn96]:

- *Independence*: the security of digital money must not depend on its existence in a unique physical location;
- *Security*: digital money must not be reusable, i. e. it must not be possible to spend the same digital money more than once;
- *Privacy (Untraceability)*: the privacy of digital money users ("owners") is to be assured – digital transactions must not allow tracing the relationship between a customer and his purchase;
- *Off-line Payment*: merchants who accept digital money must not be dependent on a certain connection to the network;
- *Transferability*: digital money must be transferable to others;
- *Divisibility*: a quantity of digital money has to be divisible into smaller amounts, so that the sum of the latter would lead back to the initial amount.

## 4. Conclusions and Some Predicted Evolutions of E-commerce

One can notice that gradually, we are moving into an era of "value exchange transactions", that will change our whole life. As Internet chronologically evolved from a strategic and, afterwards, professional communication network to a global information and communication medium that is accessible to everyone, both from the hardware and software points of view, we can predict that the importance of the Internet as a support of electronic transactions will also grow continuously and rapidly. We shall witness the development of companies which are specialized in secure on-line commercial transactions and, consequently, of new and more efficient software products designed to supply these types of services on the market. We can state that, together with user-interface features, the quality of security facilities provided for digital money transactions will contribute, in a great extent, to the success of these new Internet service providers.

Internet commerce also offers an alternative solution to less developed or transition economies since its global communication facilities erases geographical distances and enables people from the whole Globe to join the "new frontier". The quality of the services, mostly based on intelligent management and flexible software which can determine the adaptability to the market and to the customer needs, will prevail over certain existing infrastructures. Therefore, we consider that the chances in e-commerce of the firms coming from less developed countries are much bigger than in the classical economy.

We can imagine that the impact of the global electronic economy network [Lyn96] will increase dramatically in the near future. By excising middlemen and reducing marketing costs, producers will gain more from their products and will find ways to sell their products remotely with similar efforts. Thus, local economies, including the less developed ones, will benefit since the producers obtain better profits, and the consumers will benefit as a larger variety of products are available for them, at a lower cost.

It seems that future developments of the global electronic economy network, based on the Internet, will evolve towards the development of software intelligent agents capable of performing quick searches on the market and adapting to respond to individual preferences and regional characteristics.

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