# STUDIA
## UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ - BOLYAI

## STUDIA EUROPAEA
## 1-2

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# I. EUROPEAN SOCIETY: CULTURE AND POLICIES

## CHANTAL MILLON-DELSOL ET L'ÉSPRIT EUROPÉEN DE LA FIN DU XXème SIÈCLE

### VALENTIN NAUMESCU

**RÉSUMÉ.** L'article traite quelques aspects liés à l'activité scientifique et academique de la madame professeur docteur Chantal Millon-Delsol, doyen du Centre d'Études Européenes de l'Université Marne la Vallée, à l'occasion de la decernation du titre *Doctor Honoris Causa* de l'Université "Babeș-Bolyai", à la proposition de la Faculté des Études Européenes (le 25 septembre 1999).

La communauté académique vit aujourd'hui un moment de satisfaction réelle, occasionné par l'accueil parmi nous d'un nouveau collègue - le professeur et le chercheur Chantal Millon-Delsol, grand ami de la Roumanie et de la ville universitaire de Cluj.

Nous avons l'honneur de soumettre à votre attention le parcours tout à fait exceptionnel de la personnalité scientifique qu'est Madame Chantal Millon-Delsol, Doyen de la Faculté d'Etudes Européennes de l'Université de Marne la Vallée qui, sur la proposition de notre faculté, se voit décerner aujourd'hui le titre de *Doctor Honoris Causa* de l'Université Babeș-Bolyai.

Le professeur Chantal Millon-Delsol, spécialiste réputé des problèmes européens, des sciences et philosophie politiques, a parcouru pendant une période de temps relativement courte un trajet scientifique et académique impressionnant, confirmé par les treize livres parus entre 1985 et 1998, par les nombreux études et articles publiés dans des revues spécialisées du monde entier, par les communications et les conférences données, aussi bien que par son activité en tant que fondateur et coordonnateur du Centre d'Études

Européennes de l'Université de Marne la Vallée. Avant de nous arrêter sur les repères axiologiques qui soutiennent la série de travaux du professeur Millon-Delsol, nous aimerions évoquer brièvement les quelques moments de référence d'un parcours que nous considérons comme un modèle à suivre, un exemple pour la jeune génération de spécialistes de l'Europe que forme notre faculté.

En 1982, Madame Chantal Millon-Delsol obtient son doctorat en philosophie à la Sorbonne. Six ans plus tard, elle devient maître de conférences à l'Université de Paris XII et en 1993 est reçue professeur titulaire de philosophie politique à l'Université de Marne la Valleé. La même année, elle crée le Centre d'Etudes Européennes, qu'elle dirige depuis. Dans la période qui suit sa titularisation comme professeur, elle prend part à plus de 50 colloques nationaux et internationaux, oú elle donne des conférences inspirées sur des sujets d'actualité, tels: la construction européenne moderne et contemporaine, la culture et l'identité européennes, le parlamentarisme européen, le principe de la subsidiarité, l'éthique dans le système politique contemporain. Pendant ces dernières années elle s'avère ętre un observateur subtil et attentif des transformations complexes qui ont eu lieu, après 1989, au-delà du "mur de Berlin", et devient ainsi l'un des partisans les plus lucides et les plus réalistes du processus d'extension institutionnelle vers l'est du continent. La série des communications et des conférences aux titres incitants: *Mémoires nationales, mémoires européennes*, *Stéréotypes européens*, *Le relativisme comme un simulacre*, *L'identité personnelle et ses expressions culturelles*, *Tolérance et relativisme*, *La liberté dans les sociétés individualistes*, *Comparaisons culturelles entre l'Europe de l'ouest et l'Europe centrale-orientale*, *L'exigence de la diversité*, *La souveraineté nationale est-elle un concept dépassé?*, *Modernité et philosophie politique dans l'Europe Centrale et Orientale*, dénote un intéręt profond pour l'exploration des sujets majeurs qui soutiennent le discours culturel et politique sur l'Europe oú nous vivons. A lire ou à entendre le professeur Chantal Millon-Delsol, on ne peut s'ępecher de remarquer sa capacité d'analyse et de synthèse d'une acuďé hors-commun, aussi bien que son réalisme politique, son raffinement intellectuel ou les subtilités culturelles qui ravissent à proprement-parler le public avisé, et lui font mieux comprendre l'esprit męme de l'Europe.

Cependant, au delà du charme des prises de parole aux moments solennels, de la hauteur des chaires ou des tribunes, rien ne nous représente de manière plus fidèle que les livres que nous écrivons. En parlant de l'activité de recherche d'un spécialiste, aucune évaluation ne saurait passer sous silence les

livres et les idées clés qui structurent le message de l'auteur dans son domaine d'études.

Le début éditorial du professeur Millon-Delsol a lieu en 1985, lors de la parution du livre *La force occidentale*. Une année plus tard, en 1986, un deuxième livre sera publié, intitulé de manière provocatrice *La politique dénaturée*.

1991 est l'année de la parution d'un ouvrage de référence dans le domaine des sciences politiques, un ouvrage dont la notoriété a dépassé de loin les frontières de la politologie française - *Les idées politiques au XXe siècle*. Le livre, traduit en arabe et en russe, a suscité de nombreux commentaires et débats favorables dans tout le monde francophone.

Peu de temps après le succès remporté avec *Les idées politiques au XXe siécle*, le professeur Millon-Delsol attire l'attention de la critique avec un livre qui allait recevoir, en 1993, le Prix de l'Académie pour les Sciences Morales et Politiques de Paris – *L'Etat subsidiare*. Cet ouvrage qui a été déjà traduit en italien, sera également publié en roumain, aux Editions de la Faculté d'Etudes Européennes. Arrêtons-nous un peu sur ce titre, que nous considérons comme un second moment définitoire pour la carrière de chercheur de notre invitée: *L'Etat subsidiaire* s'attaque au dilemme classique de l'ingérence ou de la non-ingérence de l'Etat dans les problèmes complexes de la société, insistant, comme le précise l'auteur dans le sous-titre du livre, sur le principe de la subsidiarité en tant que «fondement de l'histoire européenne»: «L'histoire politique, économique et sociale de l'Europe en ces deux derniers siècles, note le professeur Millon-Delsol au début de son étude, se trouve largement dominée par une question majeure: celle du rôle de l'Etat. Les pays européens oscillent du libéralisme au socialisme». Elle montre par la suite que «la séduction exercée par le marxisme et le socialisme étatique sur les opinions occidentales jusqu'à ces toutes dernières années s'explique en partie par la conviction, largement partagée, qu'il n'existerait pas d'alternative au libéralisme sinon celle de l'étatisme». Quant à cette dichotomie politique traditionnelle, l'auteur déclare que «l'idée de subsidiarité s'inscrit dans cette problématique inquiète. Elle vise à dépasser l'alternative entre le libéralisme classique et le socialisme centralisateur [...], abandonne l'égalitarisme socialiste au profit de la valeur de dignité; elle abandonne l'individualisme philosophique au profit d'une société structurée et fédérée». Le plaidoyer pour la subsidiarité se transforme graduellement dans le livre en un plaidoyer contre l'Etat-providence, développé dans l'Europe de

l'après-guerre sous l'influence du keynesianisme. «L'Etat-providence représente l'adversaire principal de l'idée de subsidiarité, comme l'Etat déspotique représente l'adversaire de la démocratie». En echange, l'Etat subsidiaire harmonise la liberté d'autonomie et la justice sociale, par le développement d'une société formée d'autorités plurielles et diversifiées.

Suivant sa démarche explicative, l'auteur note: «L'idée de subsidiarité énonce une autre solution aussi dans le combat entre l'Etat-providence et l'Etat libéral – si l'on entend ici le libéralisme économique dans le sens classique du terme». Cette solution définit bien les ordo-libéraux, lorsqu'ils disent: «privatisation autant que possible, nationalisation autant que nécessaire».

Conformément à cette vision, l'avenir appartiendrait à la dispute entre l'Etat-providence contemporain, avec ses essais tardifs de réforme, et l'Etat subsidiaire, ce dernier ayant sans doute, dans la vision de l'auteur, gain de cause.

Pour consolider la crédibilité de l'idée de subsidiarité, l'auteur légitime ce principe par le biais de l'histoire, identifiant les points de rencontre entre le passé, le présent et l'avenir possible de la subsidiarité sur notre continent. Chantal Millon-Delsol précise ainsi que l'idée de subsidiarité est aussi ancienne que l'histoire de l'Europe. Elle remonte à Aristote et Thomas d'Aquin, se concrétise chez le fédéraliste Althusius, jette les bases de la doctrine sociale de l'Eglise, se voit dénaturer par les corporatismes récents et revient de manière spectaculaire dans l'Allemagne nazie.

S'attaquant toujours à un thème préféré, déjà à l'œuvre dans *L'Etat subsidiaire*, Chantal Millon-Delsol publie la même année (1992) le livre *Le principe de subsidiarité*, traduit peu de temps après en polonais, livre qui se propose d'approfondir le sujet discuté, et qui consacre l'auteur en tant que spécialiste international dans le domaine de la subsidiarité politique et administrative.

En 1993 voit le jour un nouvel ouvrage de référence au nom déjà consacré: *L'Irrévérence*, un essai qui traite de l'esprit européen, une synthèse remarquable de philosophie de la culture européene, dont le style est agréable et accessible, qui s'appuie sur des arguments solides scientifiques et emporte la conviction. En répondant à une interrogation sous-entendue, l'auteur note que la culture européenne trouve ses origines dans l'histoire biblique originelle, dans le miracle grec, l'aventure romaine, la conception chrétienne, la liberté scandinave ou germanique. Le continent apparaît, en conséquence, comme un lieu de rencontre de ces visions. Pour expliquer le titre métaphore de cet essai,

l'auteur parle de l'esprit d'insoumission, de curiosité et de rébellion de la culture européenne. «Voilà le message de Mann: si l'Européen perd son esprit critique, s'il se prosterne, il perd en même temps son identité». Le professeur Millon-Delsol propose dans ce livre en même temps une vision comparatiste et une vision intégrative des cultures nationales, soulignant un trait commun fondamental de celles-ci: «la condition humaine est universelle et c'est pourquoi tous les peuples connaissent l'économie – parce que l'homme a des besoins –, la politique – parce que l'homme vit en société –, la morale – parce que l'homme discerne un bien et un mal –, la religion – parce que l'homme sait qu'il doit nécessairement mourir. Mais chacun d'entre eux vit à sa façon l'économie, la politique, la morale et la religion, selon ses humeurs propres». L'auteur recourt, avec des accents d'humour fin, à une citation célèbre: «La pensée: affectation pour l'Anglais, fonction naturelle pour le Français, plaisir pour l'Italien, spécialité pour l'Allemand, vice chez le Russe, tourment pour l'Espagnol».

Nous allons encore choisir de la série de travaux du Professeur Chantal Millon-Delsol un livre au titre interrogatif, *La grande Europe?*, paru en 1994 et traduit en espagnol. Ce livre sonde, avec la rigueur d'une démarche scientifique appliquée, le terrain historique et culturel sur lequel se construit l'Europe institutionnelle de la fin du siècle, lançant en même temps une série de questions auxquelles seuls le temps et les générations à venir sauront répondre.

Le dernier titre que nous mentionnons dans ce bref parcours est *L'histoire des idées politiques en Europe centrale*, livre publié en 1998 et qui a reçu la même année le Prix de l'Académie de Sciences Morales et Politiques.

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J'ai essayé de donner, dans quelques mots, une synthèse des titres les plus représentatifs qui portent la signature de Madame Chantal Millon-Delsol, sans plus mentionner ses deux romans et les nombreux articles publiés dans de prestigieuses revues françaises et européennes de sciences politiques.

Au regret de ne pas avoir pu surprendre dans cette présentation que de manière sommaire la riche architecture des idées que développe l'auteur à travers ses livres, nous nous arrêtons là, non sans mentionner l'excellente relation de collaboration que Madame Millon-Delsol a eue pendant ces dernières années avec les universités de Cluj et de Bucarest, et surtout avec notre faculté, oú elle a contribué ce printemps à rendre compatible le programme d'études

européennes, et a jeté les bases d'un nouveau diplôme d'études approfondies qui deviendra fonctionnel à partir de l'année universitaire 2000/2001.

Pour conclure, nous dirons que par le doctorat honorifique, qui vous est décerné aujourd'hui, notre Université entend reconnaître et mettre en valeur une personnalité européenne, une ś uvre et une amie sincère.

Madame Chantal Millon-Delsol, soyez donc la bienvenue dans la communauté académique de l'Université Babeș-Bolyai!

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# ALCIDE DE GASPERI AND EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

## ANCA BOCA

**ABSTRACT.** An outstanding personality of the Italian political life[1], Alcide De Gasperi was through the essence of his thinking a follower of the democratic-Christian doctrine, an adherent to ecumenism and Catholic universalism, completed in time by a Europeanist conviction and federalist accents. The nuancing of De Gasperi's involvement in the fight for European integration leads to the finding of his transition from "a simple observer of a problem that did not seem to be topical for Italy to his decision of supporting European unity"[2].

His Europeanism, formed in time by beliefs, the understanding of an internal and international context, the implication in the dynamics of the institutional beginning of the new Europe, was articulated by 1948 and matured after 1950.

From a historiographic point of view, little has been written, and not always objectively or scientifically, about Alcide De Gasperi and his activity for the benefit of a united Europe; as there are few documented writings concerning the adherence of the Italian Catholics to the European ideal. The difficulty or even the impossibility, for example, to gain access to De Gasperi's personal archive has sometimes led to conventional explanations

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[1] Between 1921-1926, Alcide De Gasperi (1881-1954) was a deputy of Trentino, representing the "Partito Popolare Italiano" in the Italian Parliament; then he became president of Christian Democracy whose program he drew up – Idee Riconstruttive; and after 1945 he held the functions of minister without portfolio, foreign affairs minister and president of the Council of Ministers (10 Dec.1945 – 17 Aug. 1953).

[2] Alfredo Canavero, *De Gasperi, la democrazia cristiana italiana e le origini dell'Europa unita*, in Bollettino dell'Archivio per la storia del movimento sociale cattolico in Italia, Milano, anno XXXI maggio-agosto 1996, p. 237.

or subjective interpretations, whose prejudices have been invalidated in time by better scientifically documented studies.[3]

[3] Sergio Pistone thinks that De Gasperi followed without reserve the direction of federalism on the exhortation of Altiero Spinelli and of Movimento federalisto europeo. Moreover, he launches the hypothesis according to which De Gaspari hoped that the compact, solid majority ("salda maggioranza") guaranteed by the application of the electoral law could allow the ratification of the Treaty concerning the institution of EDC, that is the opening of a secure way towards European unification.

Other authors have reached limitative conclusions "dello spirito europeista di De Gasperi. Ilaria Poggiolini considers with scepticism that De Gasperi did not share "i fini del federalismo", although he appealed to its principles. According to him, De Gaspari was the promoter of a "europeismo necessario", with a view to reducing Europe's uncomfortable subordination to USA. Marinella Neri Gualdesi makes a clear distinction between the De Gasperi's European policy – whose content is increasingly defined after 1950 and A. Spinelli's federalism. His Europeanism was not federalist as long as he militated for the constitution of a Movimento per l'unita europea – as an alternative to Spinelli and Rossi's Movimento federalista, in spite of the "nonoccasional" confluences between the two directions. By extrapolating the historiographic preoccupations to the policy of the Italian Catholics regarding European integration – we may affirm that apologetical theses have appeared, talking about "De Gasperi, Schuman, Adenauer, uomini di stato cattolici e padri di un'Europa unita e libera"; or other tendentious ones, referring to a "Europa vaticana e clericala". It has been even suggested that De Gasperi would have adhered to the idea of European unity in order to subordinate this purpose to the Vatican's interests or in relation to the American policy. In his very articulated approach, Pietro Pastorelli places the image of the Europeanist De Gaspari within the framework of his foreign policy convictions, as well as in the geopolitical context of Italy after 1945. Pastorelli does not attribute opportunist connotations to De Gasperi's adherence to the European idea, just stating that his Europeanism gained consistency gradually, in time. At other times, starting from connections between De Gasperi's foreign policy and his personal convictions, the necessity to refer to De Gasperi's "secret history" and his "public history" is suggested (see Alfredo Canavero – *I cattolici italiani e le politiche di integrazione europea dal dopoguerra ai trattati di Roma: un primo bilancio degli studi*, in Bollettino dell'Archivio per la storia del movimento sociale cattolico in Italia, Milano, anno XXIX maggio-agosto 1994, p. 124-130; Idem – *De Gasperi, la democrazia cristiana italiana e le origini dell'Europa unita*, in Bollettino dell'Archivio per la storia del movimento sociale cattolico in Italia, Milano, anno XXXI maggio-agosto 1996, p. 237-238; Idem - *De Gasperi e l'eta del centrismo (1947-1953)*, edizioni Cinque Lune, Roma, 1984, p. 373-374).

[4] Alcide de Gasperi – born in Trento (Pieve Tesino), a province that belonged until 1918 to the Austro-Hungarian Empire; he carried out an intense political activity: in 1909 he officially entered the Consilio Comunale di Trentino, since 1911 he was a deputy in the multinational Parliament from Vienna; in 1915 he was appointed a delegate of the Comiteto statale per l'assistenza ai profughi per Boemia Occidentale e l'Austria Superiora. All this time, until the end of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, as an active member of the Trentine Catholic movement, he supported the program of autonomist claims for Trentino. In fact, under the Austro-Hungarian dominance, Trentino enjoyed a large provincial autonomy. His doctrinal polemics with the Trentine liberals focused on the idea "dell'universalit italiana" and on the concept of "conscienza nazionale positiva", that is the support of autonomist ideals which could allow the maintaining of the Italian cultural values, without overstating the value of the nation.

Consequently, we aim to analyse the European attitude of the Italian politician as it is reflected in his conception about Europe (based on his speeches and taking of positions), in De Gasperi's pragmatism of sustaining the European construction from an institutional point of view (European Defense Community – EDC -, European Political Community – EPC , Coal and Steel Economic Community –CSEC -).

In order to better understand the dimension and significance of  de Gasperi's Europeanism, the factors that have determined its crystallisation should be defined: his political experience in a multinational state – the Austro-Hungarian Empire – his ecumenism and Catholic cultural education, his appropriation of the democratic-Christian doctrine, the convergences with the European federalism.

No doubt, a certain geopolitical, geostrategical context, as well as an international climate where Italy has evolved after 1945, are added to all these elements. In fact, all these factors have represented particular notes nuancing De Gasperi's Europeanism.

Born in Trento, consequently an "uomo di frontiera"[4], De Gasperi experienced the multicultural coexistence of the various nationalities of the empire.

As a deputy in the multinational Parliament from Vienna, he pleaded for the respect of provincial autonomy, the protection of "l'universalitŕ italiana"[5], in a possible multinational institutional context of federal type. This helped him later approach the European federalist ideas and be a highly tolerant spirit. In a letter to Konrad Adenauer from 1952, referring to the interethnic coexistence of Italians and Germans from Alto - Adige, De Gasperi hoped that the "new Europe would be a bridge of communication and exchange between the two civilizations"[6].

The Catholic ecumenism and universalism[7] completed De Gasperi's European vision and laid the foundations of his cultural education. They also gave him an international, integrative and therefore non-provincial opening.

In a speech from 15 April 1950, De Gasperi stated that the surpassing of the barriers of the past, the mediation between different economic systems (liberal, dirigiste, etc.) for the purpose of achieving

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[5] Maria Garbari – *De Gasperi e il Trentino tra la fine dell'800 e il primo dopoguerra*, Luigi Reverdito Editore, Milano, 1985, p. 474.

[6] Maria Romana De Gasperi (a cura di), *De Gasperi. Scrive. Corrispondenza*, tome II, ed. Morcelliana, Brescia, 1974, p. 73.

[7] After 1929, De Gasperi started to get in touch with international life through his activity at the Vatican, where between 1933-1938 he obtained a modest post of librarian (Biblioteca Vaticana). Thus he began to be especially sensitive to foreign politics.

European unity could only be possible through a "solidarismo cristiano", seen as a universal value. In his view, Europe had to function according to democratic-Christian principles such as: social justice, freedom, a democratic system; a Europe in which "pensare da europei" should be integrated in "concetto universale del'cristianesimo"[9].

De Gasperi's activity and involvement in the problems of European integration roughly coincided with those of Italian Christian democracy whose leader he was. In fact, although among the "pan-European" (federalist, unionist, socialist) projects after 1945 were also those of democratic-Christian orientation[10], a general adherence of the Catholics and democratic-Christians to the European ideal took place especially between 1947-1956[11]. It has been estimated that the presence of the Italian democrats and in particular De Gasperi's presence conferred concreteness and dynamism to the battle for "un' Europa piú democratica e federalista"[12].

Undoubtedly, one can talk about the possible federalist articulations of De Gasperi's Europeanism. The "non-occasional" encounters with Spinelli's federalism[13], the reciprocal interactions between the policy of the Italian government and the actions of the European federalist movement or the support of European institutional projects can be arguments in this sense.

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[9] *Ibidem*, p. 87-88.

[10] Pierre Milza, Serge Berstein, *Histoire de l'Europe*, tome 5, ed. Hatier, Paris, 1992, p. 186.

[11] The Europeanist affirmations of the pope Pio XII, clearly showing that he was a supporter of united Europe; the involvement of Catholic politicians in the Italian political life after 1945 or in European institutions – are elements of the Catholic world which contributed to the development of the European idea, in parallel with the maturation of the community conscience of the European Catholics. Very little has been written about the way in which the Europeanist ideas gained ground among democratic-Christians. For Philippe Chenaux the role of Italian democratic-Christians does not appear as decisive: in fact their activity as well as De Gasperi's in the first post-war years was generally focused on internal matters, the problem of European integration being little approached or ignored. However, the creation of the so-called Nouvellles équipes internationales determined a solidarity around the idea of Europeanism between the principal Italian democratic-Christian leaders between 1947-1956. Among their "Europeanist successes" threre was the subscription for a European constituency at the 1948 elections, the adherence to the Treaty of institution of EDC and CSEC (see Alfredo Canavero – *La politica estera di un ministro degli interni Scelba, Piccioni, Martino e la politica estera italiana 1954-1955*, in Storia delle relazioni internazionali, Milano, anno VI, 1990, no. 1, Idem – *I cattolici italiani e le politiche di integrazione europea dal dopoguerra ai trattati di Roma: un primo bilancio degli studi*, in Bollettino dell'Archivio per la storia del movimento sociale cattolico in Italia, Milano, anno XXIX maggio-agosto 1994).

[12] Ludovico Gatto, *Il federalismo*, ed. Tascabili Economici Newton, Roma, 1995, p. 41.

[13] Altiero Spinelli (1907-1986), author together with E. Rossi and E. Colorni of Manifesto di Ventotene. He represented the most original and complete federalist, supranational and European position. He also was a founder of Movimento federalista europeo (1943).

Personally, he appreciated the importance of the constitutive EDC Treaty due to its provision of a project of transformation of the Community into a "federazione europea". The new European federal organism, "a large Switzerland formed by Italians, French, Germans, all pacificist, diligent and prosperous – justified its existence by the necessity of a common defense of Europe"[14]. From a conceptual and structural point of view, the reserve and scepticism regarding an "attivitŕ federativa extra-statale in Europa"[15], the idea of a federative Europe started to gain consistency after 1950 in the thinking of the Italian prime minister. The following mention should be made here: like other statesmen: Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Paul Henri Spaak, Alcide de Gasperi supported the "functionalist" strategy concerning the European integration elaborated by Jean Monnet, somehow in competition with, but without excluding the variant of Spinelli's European federalism of constitutional type[16].

A follower of an economic or even political integration of Europe, De Gasperi was the successful author of the project regarding the Treaty of CSEC, an institution that through its supranationality "opened the gates of federal Europe"[17].

De Gasperi's Europeanism manifested through conceptual approaches of substance, a complex vision about Europe, formulations of institutional strategy and an increasingly coherent argumentation of European construction.

The use of the concept of European Union reveals the transition from a superficial or subjective understanding to a mature and elaborated comprehension. In his speeches from 1949, he tried to define the European Union as a "common association, federation or union of states", a "partial substitute"[18] created on a preexisting reality, and in 1952 he insisted on the idea of supranationality (EDC, CSEC), "a solid nucleus of Europe's unity"[19].

In the first post-war years, De Gasperi reapproached the problem of state and national sovereignty frequently but with moderation. The first "was an attribute of the state, of national, sovereign, free and authoritative

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[14] Radio presentation, Rome, 5 Jan. 1952; Maria Romana De Gasperi – *De Gasperi e l'Europa*, ed. Morcelliana, Brescia, 1979, p. 130.

[15] Speech made at the Foreign Trade Institute from Rome, in the presence of the Italian delegation coming from the European Economic Congress held at Westminster on 9 June 1949, in Maria Romana De Gasperi – op. cit., p. 76.

[16] Corrado Malendrino, *Federalismo, storia, idee, modelli*, ed. Carocci, Roma, 1998, p. 115-116.

[17] Nicolae Păun, *Istoria construcţiei europene*, ed. Fundaţiei de Studii Europene, Cluj-Napoca, 1999, p. 58, 87.

[18] Maria Romana De Gasperi, *op. cit.*, p. 73, 77.

[19] *Ibidem*, p. 152.

parliaments in relation to the European Union, a "simple consultative body"[20], perception which, as we have shown above, was going to change in favour of the supranationality of European institutions.

Related to the second problem, "the Italian national conscience did not feel the wounds of the past less than France in the imposition of an unjust treaty, but however the Italians accepted the idea of a council of the united Europe"[21].

In fact, De Gasperi realized that the adherence to the idea of European integration was a solution to the difficult internal problems (the lack of raw materials, unemployment, etc.), for which "soluzioni collettive" could be found. Indeed, "Italy was willing to accept a limitation of its independence, because it sensed that it could not rebuild itself without the association of other states"[22].

The European idea was expressed by De Gasperi in a close correlation with social justice, freedom, peace and democracy, to which the Christian universal values were added – a set of democratic-Christian, cultural, federal principles, propagated with moderation and prudence towards the feeling of belonging to the European civilization community.

Consequently, De Gasperi's Europeanism is the sum of his European aspirations, of Christian feelings blended with European ones, of his ideological comprehension and positive involvement in the institutional program of the new Europe.

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[20] *Ibidem*, p. 75.
[21] Maria Romana De Gasperi, *op.cit.*, p. 82-83.
[22] Andrei Marga, *Filosofia unificării europene*, ed. Apostrof, Cluj-Napoca, p. 163.

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# ALTIERO SPINELLI E IL MANIFESTO DI VENTOTENE

## BEATRICE SEMZACONI

**ABSTRACT:** Questo saggio metterà in luce la vita e l'attività politica di Altiero Spinelli, l'autore del *Manifesto di Ventotene*, il testo fondamentale del federalismo europeo. Insisterò sul fatto che nel *Manifesto* vengono enunciati non solo i presupposti ideologici, ma anche gli strumenti costituzionali dell'unificazione europea, e si formulano due dei principi fondamentali della lotta per l'Europa. Nel mio saggio seguirò l'attività di Spinelli cominciando con la sua attività clandestina antifascista e poi con il suo arresto e la sua detenzione a Roma, Viterbo, Civitavecchia accordando un valore più grande agli anni del confino di Ventotene e alla nascita e l'attività del *Movimento Federalista Europeo*. Concluderò il mio saggio con la *Conferenza federalista di Parigi*, dopo quale, abbastanza subito, Spinelli deluso del fatto che il movimento federalista rimane un movimento di minoranze abbandona temporaneo la sua militanza politica, quale sarà ripresa più tardi, con il suo impegno nella Commissione Europea e nel Parlamento Europeo.

"Altiero Spinelli - L'hanno messo in prigione che non aveva ancora 21 anni, adesso ne ha 36. Alto, di spalle larghe, quasi atletico. Quando cammina in su e in giù (è il modo di passeggiare dei confinati, dei detenuti e delle bestie in gabbia) i suoi affiancatori faticano a tenergli dietro: ad ogni suo dietro-front fan la figura delle mezze cicche nelle esercitazioni reggimentali. E il cervello più completo che abbia incontrato al confino; conosce sette lingue e, seriamente, la matematica e la fisica, serissimamente la filosofia e l'economia. Aperto a tutte le manifestazioni artistiche. Soprattutto ha la facoltà della sintesi. Ciò che conosce gli serve di materiale di costruzione, la costruzione è sua. E il segno che distingue il creatore (o l'innovatore)dall'erudito o dal colto. E Spinelli ha la stoffa di

un fondatore di movimenti. Ciò che il movimento possa essere non lo so. Ha i difetti dell'uomo che si conosce e sa quanto vale. Ha un difetto più grande: di pensare che al principio sia l'azione. E questo un credo che è costato all'Italia e all'uomo parecchio. Come tutti gli uomini di grande ingegno Spinelli è un uomo potenzialmente pericoloso. L'ingegno è lo strumento più delicato e più micidiale concessoci da madre natura. Tende a spezzar tutti i freni. Ricordarsi che senza freno non c'è nessun capolavoro. Era comunista, è federalista. E disordinato, incurante, indisciplinato e nel contempo capace di qualsiasi adattamento. La vita più è rude e più sembra far presa su di lui. Forse più temperamento d'artista che di filosofo [...], i suoi scritti portano sempre l'impronta della sua personalità"[1].

Con queste parole è descritto Altiero Spinelli, nel 1942 del suo compagno di confino Alberto Jacometti. L' uomo "potenzialmente pericoloso" per la sua intelligenza, nacque a Roma il 31 agosto 1907 e aderisce molto giovane al Partito Comunista Italiano; nell'autunno del 1924, terminato il liceo, si inscrive alla Facoltà di Giurisprudenza dell'Università di Roma e, contemporaneamente, al gruppo universitario comunista e alla cellula della federazione giovanile comunista del quartiere Trionfale della quale, poche settimane dopo, diviene segretario. Partecipa ad azioni di pretesta antifascista, soprattutto nel suo quartiere quale era allora una delle roccaforti dell'antifascismo.

La capacità politica e organizzativa di Spinelli lo conduce a rappresentare la federazione giovanile comunista al Congresso della federazione giovanile francese a Parigi e ad essere incaricato con la funzione di segretario interregionale della gioventù comunista per l'Italia centrale. Come segretario interregionale Spinelli lascia la famiglia nell'agosto del 1926, vive con lo stipendio di partito, per poi, - dopo aver subito una condanna al confino di polizia nel 1926 - entra in clandestinità e si trasferě nel Nord Italia.

Le motivazioni del suo impegno nel partito comunista, lo spirito con cui aderisce alla dottrina marxista-leninista, le conseguenze per il suo carattere e per il suo modo di agire sono riportate in modo chiaro in un

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[1] Alberto Jacometti, *Ventotene*, Mondadori, Milano, 1946, pp. 62-63.

articolo che egli scriverà molti anni più tardi per una rivista francese.[2] Riferendosi al suo impegno comunista Spinelli scrive: "Nell'autunno del 1924, appena diciassettenne, entravo nelle file comuniste [...]

Sono diventato comunista come si diventa prete, con la consapevolezza di assumere un dovere e un diritto totali, di accettare la dura scuola dell'obbedienza e dell'abnegazione per ben apprendere l'arte ancor più dura del comando; deciso a diventare quel che il fondatore di quest'ordine aveva chiamato il <<rivoluzionario professionale>>. C'era, naturalmente, molta infatuazione giovanile in questa mia ambizione, e se la ricordo qui è solo per spiegare come mi sia successivamente accaduto che le mie meditazioni siano state sempre assai più rivolte verso i problemi del potere, della sua nascita, delle sue forme e del suo dramma, che non verso i problemi della giustizia sociale, apparendomi quest'ultima sempre essenzialmente come uno, ma solo uno, dei compiti del potere"[3].

Il 3 giugno 1927 Spinelli viene arrestato a Milano - quando è sorpreso insieme ai compagni Giovanni Parodi[4] e Arturo Vignocchi[5] in una latteria - e portato, prima, nel carcere di Milano e poi nel carcere di "Regina Coeli" a Roma, in attesa di essere processato dal Tribunale speciale[6]; la polizia fascista riteneva Spinelli individuo estremamente pericoloso, proprio per la sua intelligenza, le capacità organizzative e il potere de persuasione.

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[2]Edmondo Paolini, *Altiero Spinelli. Dalla lotta antifascista alla battaglia per la Federazione europea 1920-1948: documenti e testimonianze*, il Mulino, Bologna, 1996, p.34.

[3]Altiero Spinelli, *L'Europa non cade dal cielo*, (<<*A guisa di introduzione*>>), il Mulino, Bologna, 1960.

[4]Nei primi mesi del 1927 Parodi era segretario della Federazione provinciale comunista di Milano e svolgeva la sua attività sotto lo pseudonimo di *Gaspare*.

[5]Arturo Vignocchi era segretario interregionale per la Lombardia.

[6]Il Tribunale Speciale fu istituito a seguito dell'attentato compiuto a Bologna il 31 ottobre 1926 contro Mussolini, ma il fatto "servì - come testimonia Giorgio Amendola - come pretesto per spazzare via le ultime libertà democratiche che ancora sopravvivevano, dopo la sconfitta dell'Aventino, in quello scorcio del 1926. Furono dichiarati decaduti, anche formalmente, i deputati dell'opposizione; fu abolita la libertà di stampa e soppressi i giornali di opposizione che ancora vivacchiavano fra censura e sequestri; furono sciolti i partiti; fu istituito il Tribunale speciale, il confino di polizia; fu ristabilita la pena di morte. Si aprì così il periodo più nero della vita del nostro paese, un regime di lunga oppressione che doveva poi condurre alla guerra, alla catastrofe, alla occupazione straniera e, finalmente, concludersi con la vittoria della guerra di liberazione". (vedi la relazione su *Il tribunale speciale e l'antifascismo all'interno*, pubblicata in *Fascismo e antifascismo* (1936-1948), Feltrinelli, Milano, 1962, p.218).

Il 19 marzo 1928 se riunisce la Commissione istruttoria presso il Tribunale Speciale per la difesa dello Stato, quale Commissione pronuncia una sentenza di rinvio a giudizio per i tre condannati ("Poiché tali reati sono di competenza del Tribunale Speciale per la difesa dello Stato gl'imputati devono essere rinviati al giudizio del detto Tribunale per rispondere di tali reati"); soltanto il 6 aprile 1928 il Tribunale pronuncia la sentenza definitiva: sedici anni e otto mesi di carcere e tre anni di vigilanza speciale.

Dal rapporto della Commissione istruttoria risulta: "Nei riguardi di Spinelli dai rapporti delle autorità di PS risulta che costui è elemento pericolosissimo. Dai documenti sequestratigli si desume quale fosse la sua attività; difatti dal taccuino si rilevano indicazioni relative al movimento operaio a Milano e paesi limitrofi, il trattamento usato agli operai secondo il sistema di governo attuale ed altre notizie che servono ad illustrare la sua figura. Egli rivestiva la carica di membro della federazione giovanile comunista di Milano, e nello svolgimento della sua attività usava lo pseudonimo di <<Ulisse[7]>>"[8].

Dopo un periodo di circa un anno nel carcere di Roma, Spinelli verrà imprigionato a Lucca, dove resterà quasi 3 anni (dal 20 maggio 1928 al 9 gennaio 1931), e da dove verrà trasferito al carcere di Viterbo (dal 19 gennaio 1931 al 14 luglio 1932), per poi essere incarcerato a Civitavecchia dal 15 luglio 1932 al 24 febbraio 1937.

Nelle carcere Spinelli si dedica allo studio e alla lettura, all'approfondimento della conoscenza delle lingue, delle scienze , ma specialmente della storia e della filosofia. Inoltre, ha anche l'occasione di conoscere, legare amicizia e discutere tesi di matrice culturale diversa,

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[7]In una lettera inviata - dalla carcere di Civitavecchia, il 3 novembre 1936 - alla sorella Fiorella, Spinelli fa un ritratto di Ulisse, il cui testo completa le motivazioni della scelta del nome dell'eroe greco come pseudonimo nel periodo della clandestinità e, successivamente come titolo alla sua autobiografia, *Come ho tentato diventare saggio. Io Ulisse.* "[...] Anch'io sono appassionato dell'Iliade e dell'Odissea, ed in particolare di quest'ultima. Ulisse, o Odisseo - come è il suo vero nome - è già un uomo molto più civile degli eroi dell'Iliade. Egli è già molto padrone dei movimenti del suo animo; non si lascia come quelli trasportare dal flutto delle passioni ora al riso ora al pianto, ora alla temerarietà ora allo spavento. Non è insomma più un barbaro. L'Iliade è il poema della barbarie ellenica, l'Odissea è il poema dell'uscita della barbarie. Ma tuttavia quest'uomo, padrone di sé, non più fanciullescamente sottomesso al volere degli dei, ma che affronta con pazienza questo volere, e con ostinazione pur di venirne a capo, che perciò è già divenuto largamente padrone di sé stesso, e del suo destino, è tuttavia ancor ribollente di tutta l'energia e la eroica violenza barbarica [...]." (Cf. Edmondo Paolini, *Altiero Spinelli...,* cit., p.154).
[8]Cf. Edmondo Paolini, *Altiero Spinelli...,* cit., p.102.

con alcuni fra i principali esponenti dell'antifascismo, fra cui Umberto Terracini[9] e Leo Valiani[10].

Per l'evoluzione politica di Spinelli sono molto importanti gli anni trascorsi nel carcere di Civitavecchia; già nel carcere di Viterbo aveva cominciato la fase di ripensamento critico dell'attuazione del comunismo, fase che si maturerà nel carcere di Civitavecchia, e si concluderà poi con la sua espulsione dal partito, durante il confino di Ponza.

Il 28 gennaio 1937, scontata la pena carceraria, avrebbe dovuto essere rimesso in libertà vigilata. Ma non fu cosi, e data la sua "pericolosità", viene rinviato al confino, prima a Ponza (dal 12 marzo 1937 al 12 luglio 1939) e poi a Ventotene (dal 13 luglio 1939 al 17 agosto 1943).

A Ventotene cominciò la "vera vita" di Spinelli, dopo come lui stesso testimonia nel suo primo volume *autobiografico* **Come ho tentato di diventare saggio. Io Ulisse**.

"<<Nel mezzo del camin di nostra vita>> mi ritrovai a Ventotene, dove rimasi quattro anni, dal luglio 1939 al 17 agosto 1943, dall'età di 32 a quella di 36 anni, dall'inizio della seconda guerra mondiale alla caduta del fascismo. Quelli anni in quell'isola sono ancor oggi presenti in me con la pienezza che hanno solo i momenti ed i luoghi nei quali si compie quella misteriosa cosa che i cristiani chiamano l'elezione. Le membra *disjecta* dei sentimenti, pensieri, speranze e disperazione si ricomposero allora in un disegno nuovo, per me stesso sorprendente; la mia debolezza si converti in forza; sentii che una nuova consonanza straordinaria si andava formando fra quel che accadeva nel mondo e quel che accadeva in me; compresi che fino a quel momento ero stato simile a un feto in formazione, in attesa di esser partorito, che in quelli anni in quel luogo nacqui una seconda volta, che il mio destino fu allora segnato, che io

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[9]Umberto Terracini (1895-1983), dopo aver fondato con Gramsci e Togliatti L'<<Ordine nuovo>>, con la scissione di Livorno diviene membro della direzione e dell'esecutivo del PCI. Arrestato per comploto contro il regime fascista, nel 1928 viene condannato a ventitré anni di reclusione. Liberato alla caduta del fascismo partecipa alla guerra di liberazione.

[10]Leo Valiani - uomo politico e giornalista, è arrestato per attività antifascista nel 1928, non ancora ventenne. Arrestato di nuovo nel 1930 viene condannato a dodici anni di prigione, di cui ne sconta solo sei per amnistia. Dopo aver seguito la guerra civile spagnola come corrispondente di giornali antifascisti, emigra in Francia dove aderisce a Giustizia e Libertà. Internato nel campo di Vernet, fugge prima in Marocco e poi nel Messico. Tornato in Italia dopo la caduta del fascismo, è tra gli animatori della Resistenza come segretario del PdA e suo rappresentante nel CLNAI.

assentii ad esso e che la mia vera vita, quella che sto portando a termine, cominciò"[11].

A Ventotene Spinelli incontrò tre personaggi decisivi per la sua futura vita: **Ernesto Rossi**, **Eugenio Colorni** ed **Ursula Hirschmann**, personaggi ai quali sarà legato da una profonda amicizia. Ernesto Rossi e Eugenio Colorni diventeranno veri maestri per Spinelli: Rossi "un maestro della mente", Colorni "un maestro dell'anima". Parlando di Ernesto Rossi, Spinelli dice: "Provenendo da un'esperienza intellettuale diversa, ero arrivato anch'io alla conclusione che è l'uomo con le sue decisioni e azioni a creare le scale di valori [...]. Le conversazioni con Rossi mi scossero dal mio stato quasi sognante, facendomi sentire che non potevo più continuare a meditare su Mosé, Solone, Gesù, San Paolo, Marx, ma che dovevo decidere qui ed ora,, alla evidente vigilia del ritorno alla vita attiva, quali fossero i nostri ideali di civiltà e prepararmi ad essere loro fedele, poiché dopo la vittoria contro Hitler non sarebbe stato facile fare di essi i punti di riferimento fermi per costruire la società del dopoguerra"[12].

Cosi, nell'autobiografia, Spinelli parla di Eugenio Colorni: "Non credo che di alcun elemento specifico del pensiero che da allora guida la mia azione io possa dire che mi viene da Colorni. Ma so per certo che il mio modo di pensare non sarebbe quello che è se non avessi avuto quei due anni - dal nostro arrivo a Ventotene nel luglio '39 alla sua partenza per Melfi nell'ottobre 1941 - di quasi quotidiano dialogo dissacrante, indagante e ricostituente con lui"[13].

A Ventotene Spinelli medita profondamente intorno ai problemi della libertà e della democrazia. La lettura di vecchi articoli di Luigi Einaudi contro l'impotenza della *Società delle Nazioni* a garantire la pace e di alcuni saggi federalisti di autori inglesi (Lionel Robbins, Lord Lothian), lo fanno riflettere sul futuro dell'Europa e sul come evitare nuove e sempre più sanguinose guerre; cosi nasce in lui la convinzione della necessità della creazione di una federazione europea: "La guerra che stava tornando sulle terre d'Europa, indusse Ernesto Rossi e me a meditare più da vicino sui rapporti fra stati ed in particolare sul significato della povera *Società delle Nazioni*, di cui le democrazie erano andate cosi fiere e che

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[11] Altiero Spinelli, *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio. Io Ulisse*, il Mulino, Bologna, 1984, p. 261.
[12] *Ibidem*, p.322.
[13] *Ibidem*, p.300.

aveva cosi miseramente fallito. Scovammo cosi in un volume di scritti di Luigi Einaudi, [...] nel quale erano riprodotti alcuni suoi articoli pubblicati sul <<Corriere della Sera>> agli inizi del 1919 con lo pseudonimo di Junius. Il loro autore, che era anche lui un illuminista, aveva portato dinanzi al tribunale della ragione il progetto di *Società delle Nazioni*, l'aveva trovato del tutto inconsistente, e, rievocando la problematica costituzionale dalla quale erano nati gli Stati Uniti d'America, aveva proposto una reale federazione che unisse sotto l'impero di una legge comune i popoli che uscivano dal bagno di sangue. [...] Queste pagine erano cadute nell'indifferenza generale quando erano state scritte [...]. Ed ecco, quelle pagine non erano state scritte invano, poiché cominciarono a fruttificare nelle nostre menti"[14].

Il *Manifesto di Ventotene* fu elaborato e redatto insieme ad Ernesto Rossi[15], con la collaborazione di Eugenio Colorni[16] e qualche altro confinato - Dino Roberto, Enrico Giussani, Giorgio Braccialarghe e Arturo Buleghin - dal fascismo nell'isola di Ventotene. La nascita del Manifesto, il testo fondamentale del federalismo europeo e le condizioni politiche di quel tempo, sono descritte di Spinelli stesso nella sua autobiografia: "Nel

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[14] *Ibidem*, pp.307-308.

[15] Ernesto Rossi (1897-1967) Non ancora diciannovenne andò volontario in guerra. Di ritiro dal fronte cominciò ad accarezzare le speranze e gli obiettivi dei nazionalisti prima e dei fascisti poi. Dal 1919 al 1921 Rossi collaborò al "Popolo d'Italia", il quotidiano diretto da Mussolini. Fu precisamente in questo periodo che conobbe Gaetano Salvemini, con quale legò una grande amicizia; quest'ultimo cambiò il suo pensiero, dopo come Rossi stesso dichiara: "Se non avessi incontrato sulla mia strada al momento giusto Salvemini, che mi ripulě il cervello da tutti i sottoprodotti della passione suscitata dalla bestialità dei socialisti e dalla menzogna della propaganda governativa, sarei facilmente sdrucciolato anch'io nei Fasci da combattimento". Dopo questo incontro con Salvemini il percorso di Rossi non conobbe sviamenti né fu punteggiato dal dubbio. Rossi fu tra i fondatori di Giustizia e Libertà; pagò la sua intransigenza con una condanna del Tribunale Speciale a venti anni di carcere. Dopo nove anni la pena è commutata in confino, che sconta a Ventotene. Qui si lega di grande amicizia con Spinelli, con quale redige il Manifesto e fonda poi il Movimento federalista europeo, impegnandosi nella teoria e nell'azione federalista. Nel 1955, non condividendo l'iniziativa del Congresso del popolo europeo, promossa da Spinelli, abbandona il federalismo militante dedicandosi a numerose battaglie in difesa del liberalismo e dei diritti civili. Al suo pensiero si ispirerà il partito radicale, che Rossi contribuisce a fondare.

[16] Eugenio Colorni (1909-1944) filosofo, di famiglia ebraica, militante protagonista della lotta antifascista e della Resistenza, dirige il Centro interno socialista e il gruppo degli intellettuali e politici in esilio in Francia. Arrestato nel 1938 viene inviato al confino di Ventotene, dove conosce Altiero Spinelli e Ernesto Rossi. Trasferito nell'ottobre 1941 al confino di Melfi, fugge poco tempo prima della caduta del fascismo. Nell'agosto 1943 con Spinelli e Rossi fonda il Movimento Federalista Europeo. Dopo l'8 settembre è fra i protagonisti della Resistenza romana, e redattore capo del <<Avanti!>> clandestino. E ferito gravemente da una pattuglia fascista (28 maggio 1944) e poi morto due giorni dopo.

tetro inverno '40-'41, quando quasi tutta l'Europa continentale era stata soggiogata da Hitler, l'Italia di Mussolini ansimava al suo seguito, l'URSS stava digerendo il bottino che era riuscita ad afferrare, gli Stati Uniti erano ancora neutrali e l'Inghilterra sola resisteva, trasfigurandosi agli occhi di tutti i democratici d'Europa in loro patria ideale, proposi ad Ernesto Rossi di scrivere insieme un <<manifesto per un'Europa libera ed unita>>, e di immetterlo nei canali della clandestinità antifascista sul continente.

Sei mesi dopo, mentre gli eserciti hitleriani si riversavano sulle terre russe, passando ancora, come l'anno prima in Europa, di vittoria in vittoria, il Manifesto era pronto."[17]

Spinelli, nel suo Manifesto, andrò più avanti dalle conclusioni raggiunte dei federalisti inglesi, concependo l'Unione Europea come una vera rivoluzione politica, che richiedeva una nuova organizzazione di un movimento operante dentro, ma al di sopra dei partiti. Nel Manifesto vi sono due concezioni politiche nuove: prima è che la battaglia per la realizzazione dell'unità europea è una battaglia da fare subito e da coloro che avevano conosciuto gli orrori della guerra: "la Federazione non era presentata come un bell'ideale, cui rendere omaggio per occuparsi poi d'altro, ma come un obiettivo per la cui realizzazione bisognava agire ora, nella nostra generazione. Non si trattava di un invito a sognare, ma un invito ad operare"[18].

La seconda concezione consiste nell'affermazione che la lotta per l'unità europea avrebbe creato un nuovo spartiacque fra le correnti politiche: "La linea di divisione fra i partiti progressisti e partiti reazionari cade perciò ormai, non lungo la linea formale della maggiore o minore democrazia, del maggiore o minore socialismo da istituire, ma lungo la sostanziale nuovissima linea che separa coloro che concepiscono, come campo centrale della lotta quello antico, cioè la conquista e le forme del potere politico nazionale, e che faranno, sia pure involontariamente il gioco delle forze reazionarie, lasciando che la lava incandescente delle passioni popolari torni a solidificarsi nel vecchio stampo e che risorgano le vecchie assurdità, e quelli che vedranno come compito centrale la creazione di un solido stato internazionale, che indirizzeranno verso questo scopo le forze popolari e, anche conquistato il potere nazionale, lo

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[17] Al. Spinelli, *Come ho tentato...,* cit., p. 311.
[18] *Ibidem*, p. 312.

adopereranno in primissima linea come strumento per realizzare l'unità internazionale"[19].

Alla concezione del abolimento della "linea de divisione fra i partiti" Spinelli resterà sempre fedele, facendone l'elemento centrale della sua battaglia, fino al Progetto dell'Unione Europea del 1984. Più volte ripeteva che per la battaglia per l'Unione Europea è bisogno di tutte le forze democratiche. La coerenza con questa linea di azione politica ha messo Spinelli - più tardi - in polemica anche con Ernesto Rossi, al quale criticava la sua avversione verso le forze cattoliche, necessarie, anche queste per la battaglia federalista. Spinelli considerava che "il tema dell'unità europea non è di sinistra o di destra; l'unità non può essere fatta che con una partecipazione assai larga"[20], idee con quale è rimasto fino alla sua morte.

Dal *Manifesto* risultano anche importante 'indicazioni strategiche': di creare un Movimento Federalista Europeo e di estenderlo su scala sovranazionale. Gli autori si rendono conto che per riuscire la battaglia per la Federazione europea è necessario creare un Movimento Federalista Europeo; questa esperienza organizzativa doveva essere estesa su scala sovranazionale, perché era già intuito che anche in altri paesi europei esistessero persone che erano giunte a simili conclusioni: "Se ci sarà nei principali paesi europei un numero sufficiente di uomini che comprenderanno ciò, la vittoria sarà in breve nelle loro mani [...]. Poiché sarà l'ora di opere nuove, sarà anche l'ora di uomini nuovi, del movimento per l'Europa libera e unita!".

La prima stesura del testo del *Manifesto* è del giugno 1941. Questo testo-manoscritto è fato circolare clandestinamente; le osservazioni fate di alcuni compagni fanno essere rielaborato un secondo testo, nell'agosto dello stesso anno: "Questo Manifesto venne scritto nel giugno del 1941 e di nuovo redatto nell'agosto dello stesso anno in una seconda forma nella quale non vi furono variazioni di sostanza, ma solo una migliore disposizione della materia e quelle modifiche dettate dalla necessità di tener conto dell'ingresso dell'URSS in guerra"[21]. Questo testo dell'agosto 1941 è pubblicato - per la prima volta - a stampa nel 29 agosto 1943, a

[19]Al. Spinelli, *Il Manifesto di Ventotene*, il Mulino, Bologna, 1991
[20]Altiero Spinelli, *Diario europeo. 1970-1976*, a cura di Edmondo Paolini, il Mulino, Bologna, 1991, vol. III, p. 1314.
[21]Dalla Introduzione al Manifesto, datata 29 agosto 1943.

conclusione del convegno costitutivo del Movimento Federalista Europeo, tenuto a Milano 27 e 28 agosto.

La struttura originaria del *Manifesto* è organizzata in quattro capitoli - ***La crisi della civiltà moderna; I compiti del dopoguerra - L'unità europea; I compiti del dopoguerra - La riforma della società; La situazione rivoluzionaria: vecchie e nuove correnti*** - tre scritti da Spinelli, uno da Rossi: "Del *Manifesto* io [Spinelli] scrissi i capitoli che trattavano della crisi della civiltà europea come compito preminente del dopoguerra e del <<partito rivoluzionario>> necessario per realizzarla. Ernesto Rossi scrisse il capitolo sulla riforma della società da affrontare nel dopoguerra. Ma ne discutemmo insieme ogni paragrafo, e riconosco ancora giri di pensiero caratteristici dell'uno di noi due nelle parti scritte dall'altro"[22].

Quand'anche il testo originario è stato concepito in quattro capitoli, tuttavia i testo più diffuso e ristampato più volte è quello pubblicato a Roma clandestinamente, durante l'occupazione tedesca, con una *Introduzione* di Eugenio Colorni[23], e con una struttura ridotta a tre capitoli, con l'inserimento della prima parte del IV capitolo << ***La situazione rivoluzionaria: vecchie e nuove correnti***>> nel II capitolo << ***I compiti del dopoguerra - L'unità europea***>>; mentre la seconda parte del IV capitolo sarà inserita alla fine del III capitolo <<***I compiti del dopoguerra - La riforma della società***>>[24]. In questa presentazione del *Manifesto*, saranno aggiunti anche due saggi scritti di Spinelli durante il confino di Ventotene, poco tempo dopo la redazione del *Manifesto*. Questi due saggi sono: ***Gli Stati Uniti d'Europa e le varie tendenze politiche*** e ***Politica marxista e politica federalista***. In questi due saggi Spinelli esamino "le ideologie politiche allora dominanti - democratica, comunista e razzista - dal punto di vista della problematica federalista"[25].

Le adesioni al *Manifesto* sono poche nell'isola di Ventotene, i confinati rifiutandosi ad aderirne. Nel Continente, invece, il *Manifesto*

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[22] Al. Spinelli, *Come ho tentato...,* cit., p. 311.
[23] Per più di informazioni su questa seconda *Introduzione* al Manifesto (22 gennaio 1944) e poi anche per la prima *Introduzione* (28 agosto 1943) cfr. Edmondo Paolini, *Altiero Spinelli...,* cit., pp.328-337, dove si fanno importante osservazioni sui possibili autori della prima introduzione, più probabile essendo che questa è stata scritta da Mario Alberto Rollier o Enrico Giussani.
[24] Cf. Edmondo Paolini, *Altiero Spinelli...,* cit., p.219.
[25] Al. Spinelli, *Come ho tentato...,* cit., p. 319.

trova importanti adesioni. Per la sua diffusione nel Continente, un ruolo importante si deve attribuire a Ursula Hirschmann (la moglie di Eugenio Colorni, diventata poi, dopo la morte di Colorni, la moglie di Altiero Spinelli) e a Ada Rossi (la moglie di Ernesto Rossi). Spinelli ricorda nella sua autobiografia le prime adesioni: "A Roma e a Milano Ursula diffuse e difese fra i cospiratori giellisti e socialisti il *Manifesto*, trovò i primi aderenti, che facevano capo a Milano a Mario Alberto Rollier e a Adriano Olivetti, a Roma a Guglielmo Usellini e ai miei fratelli e sorelle Cerilo, Gigliola e Fiorella. Quando i Colorni furono trasferiti a Melfi, lei portò i nostri scritti a Manlio Rossi-Doria, Franco Venturi ed altri che erano confinati con loro nello stesso paese; mantenne il contato con noi a Ventotene tramite le mie sorelle che venivano a trovarmi; ci trasmise le lettere di adesione o, più spesso, di critiche; in collaborazione con Usellini e con Cerilo Spinelli pubblicò nel 1943 il primo numero clandestino di <<Unità Europea>>"[26].

Dell'Unità Europea vi furono in totale otto numeri pubblicati tra il maggio 1943 e il febbraio 1945. A questi numeri hanno collaborato, sotto la direzione di Mario Rollier e Guglielmo Usellini, anche Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi, Eugenio Colorni e Leone Ginsburg. In questi numeri furono affrontati i principali temi politici dell'organizzazione federale del continente. Nel primo numero, uscito grazie ad Ursula Hirschmann, sotto il titolo ***Il movimento federalista***, si afferma: "<<...Convinti che in questa dopoguerra il compito essenziale, che non può differire, è quello di creare una Federazione europea...Noi, entro ogni partito che voglia la rivoluzione e la rinascita, entro ogni gruppo di uomini coscienti della gravità della crisi, attraverso ogni patria, non profanata dal nazionalismo, per l'Europa libera e unita, combatteremo e istruiremmo. Così soltanto questa costituzione europea sarà veramente la *magna charta* della nostra rinascita, come la Costituzione americana dell'87 è la pietra angolare del loro rigoglio"[27].

Ursula Hirschmann, che si era battuta contro il sorgere del nazismo in Germania, ha un posto di primo piano nella lotta antifascista e nella Resistenza, così come nella costituzione e nell'affermazione del federalismo europeo. Fu lei, infatti, come ha testimoniato anche Spinelli,

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[26] Al. Spinelli, *Come ho tentato...,* cit., p. 316.
[27] Cfr. Edmondo Paolini, *L'idea di Europa. Nascita e sviluppi*, La Nuova Italia Editrice, Firenze, 1979, pp. 60-61.

che ha preparato e ha stampato il primo numero di <<L'Unità Europea>>, che ha organizzato la riunione clandestina dell'agosto del 1943 a Milano, fu lei che ha mantenuto i contatti con i movimenti più duri della Resistenza, attraversando più volte il confine e con i gruppi di altri paesi, e successivamente, dopo la guerra, sposata ad Altiero Spinelli, ha lavorato per il Movimento federalista europeo, essendo anche tra gli organizzatori della Conferenza Federalista di Parigi.

Nel luglio 1943 cade il governo Mussolini; un po' di tempo dopo, il 4 agosto 1943, Spinelli viene liberato e torna a Roma. Da qui si reca a Milano, dove, il 27 e 28 agosto, nel corso di una riunione in casa di Mario Alberto Rollier[28], fonda il *Movimento Federalista Europeo.* I fondatori, oltre a Spinelli ed Ernesto Rossi, sono: Giorgio Braccialarghe, Arturo Buleghin, Ursula Hirschmann, Ada Rossi, Dino Roberto, Enrico Giussani, Arialdo Banfi, Mario e Rita Rollier, Manlio Rossi Doria, Lodovico Belgiojoso, Alberto Mortara, Fiorella e Gigliola Spinelli, Leone Ginsburg, Gugliemo Jervis, Franco Venturi, Cerilo Spinelli, Guglielmo e Luisa Usellini, Vindice Cavallera, Vittorio Foa, Giangio Banfi, Lisli Carini Basso, Ugo Cristoforetti, Alberto Damiani, Giovani Gallo Granchielli, don Ernesto Gilardi, Elena Moncalvi Banfi, Guido Morpurgo Tagliabue e Bruno Quarti.[29] Forse che per taluni di loro la partecipazione al convegno sia stata casuale. Alcuni hanno partecipato un giorno solo. Prova per questa casualità è che di alcuni, almeno per quanto concerne l'azione federalista, non si è più sentito parlare.

Pure, dall'inizio del *Movimento Federalista Europeo* vengono approvati le *Tesi federaliste* scritte da Spinelli, le <<direttive de lavoro>> e la sopranazionalità del *Movimento*. Vengono prese anche qualche decisione di base, la più importante essendo quella del carattere di movimento e non di partito. Protagonista della riunioni fu Spinelli. Fu lui che pose apertamente il problema della natura del MFE: partito o movimento. La sua scelta al riguardo era nette: "In principio la posizione non era ben delineata; ora ci sono quattro principali partiti: Partito

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[28]Mario Alberto Rollier (1909-1980), tra i primi ad aderire al Manifesto di Ventotene è una delle figure più importanti del federalismo europeo: dopo la fondazione del MFE, partecipa alla Resistenza a Milano, ricoprendo ruoli decisionali. Animatore della sezione di Milano del MFE, tra gli artefici del periodico clandestino <<L'Unità Europea>>, rimane nel Movimento fino al 1955, quando Spinelli decide di lanciare il nuovo corso federalista, dopo il fallimento della Comunità europea di difesa (CED), iniziativa che Rollier non condivide.

[29]Per una ampia biografia dei partecipanti vedi Cinzia Rognomi Vercelli, *Mario Alberto Rollier: Un valdese federalista*, Jaka Book, Milano, 1991, pp. 101-110.

d'Azione, Partito Socialista, Partito comunista, resurrezione de Partito Popolare. Oggi noi non vogliamo un Partito federalista perché quasi tutti si indirizzano verso i sopra citati partiti. A noi interessa far notare che l'ideologia federalista non trova ostacoli negli altri partiti. Siamo un movimento che non entra in concorrenza con gli altri partiti, ma che chiede a tutti di far risaltare l'importanza dell'idea federalista"[30].

Le motivazioni per questa scelta vengono spiegate sul numero 5, agosto 1944 del<<l'Unità Europea>>: "Movimento - e non partito - perché, data la sua concezione rivoluzionaria, posta la sua esigenza unificatrice, svolge la sua attività su di un piano diverso, non in contrasto, ma parallelo a quello dei vari partiti che, per tradizione e per struttura, conducono la loro lotta sul piano nazionale. La disciplina quindi che il federalismo impone ai suoi aderenti non è meno impegnativa che quella di un vero e proprio partito. Il suo carattere è dunque squisitamente politico, perché, in ordine al suo obiettivo - altrimenti vasto e complesso - mira alla mobilitazione di tutte le energie capaci di operare per esso, ovunque si trovino, sotto qualsiasi bandiera progressista esse militino"[31].Un po' di tempo prima che questo articolo sia uscito nell'<<Unità Europea>>, cioè nella seconda *Introduzione* al Manifesto, introduzione scritta da Eugenio Colorni, il 22 gennaio 1944, questa idea è già presente: "il nostro Movimento non è e non vuole essere un partito politico. Cosi come si è venuto sempre più nettamente caratterizzando, esso vuole operare sui vari partiti politici e nell'interno di essi, non solo affinché l'istanza internazionalista venga accentuata, ma anche e principalmente affinché tutti i problemi della sua vita politica vengano impostati partendo da questo nuovo angolo visuale, a cui finora sono stati cosi poco avvezzi". Il fatto che il *Movimento* non si vuole un partito è giustificato con la scelta dei quasi tutti aderenti a militare in qualcuno dei partiti progressivi, potendo cosi propugnare i principi basilari di una libera Federazione europea: esercito unico federale, unità monetaria, abolizione delle barriere doganali e delle limitazioni all'emigrazione tra gli stati appartenenti alla Federazione, rappresentanza diretta dei cittadini ai consessi federali e politica estera unica.

Spinelli e gli altri federalisti che erano intorno a lui alla riunione in casa di Rollier, si rese conto che il *Movimento* non doveva rimanere solo

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[30]Cf. Cinzia Rognomi Vercelli, *Mario Alberto Rollier. Un valdese federalista*, Jaka Book, Milano, 1991, p. 90.
[31]Cf. Edmondo Paolini, *Altiero Spinelli...*, cit., p.327.

sul piano italiano, questa cosa rendendolo "provinciale", ma si deve estendere al piano sovranazionale perché "Il Movimento italiano per la Federazione Europea non potrà parlare con sufficiente autorità finché non abbia un sostegno internazionale". Cosi loro hanno già pensato a tentare "in ogni modo la convocazione in un paese neutrale di una conferenza internazionale federalista". Questa loro idee si ritrova anche nella prima *Introduzione* al Manifesto, quella del 29 agosto 1943, introduzione intorno a quale sono vari discussioni perché l'autore non si può indicare precisamente, più probabile potendo essere stata scritta da Mario Alberto Rollier o Enrico Giussani. Nella *Introduzione* è indicato che "i problemi d'Europa vanno risolti con la collaborazione di tutti gli europei. Perciò bisogna tener presente che il movimento federalista che ora sorge in Italia è ancora solo il contributo di <<europei italiani>> alla creazione di un'Europa libera e unita attraverso l'applicazione delle idee e del principio di federazione. Potrà diventare internazionale appena le circostanze lo permetteranno".

L'azione federalista sovranazionale progettata da Spinelli si concretizza dopo che esso si rifugiò in Svizzera, dove insieme ad Ernesto Rossi iniziò a cercare adesioni al loro progetto, constatando che in Svizzera "l'idea dell'unità europea, come risposta ai problemi del dopoguerra, era veramente nell'aria". Hanno trovato cosi confermata la loro previsione scritta nel *Manifesto*, che vi erano altri gruppi che credono e si battono come loro per la federazione europea. Tra i primi ad aderire al loro progetto furono Luigi Einaudi[32], Egidio Reale[33], Adriano Olivetti[34],

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[32] Luigi Einaudi (1874-1961), economista e uomo politico, docente di scienza delle finanze all'Università si Torino, oppositore del fascismo si ritira dalla vita politica fino alla fine della guerra. Deputato alla costituente, ministro, nel 1948 diviene presidente della Repubblica. Autore di numerosi scritti federalisti, è tra i primi iscritti al MFE in Svizzera, dove si è rifugiato dopo l'8 settembre. Dopo la guerra aderisce ad alcune manifestazioni federaliste, sostenendo l'azione di Rossi e Spinelli, con i quali mantiene sempre rapporti proficui.

[33] Egidio Reale (1902-1988), politico antifascista, avvocato, rifugiato in Svizzera dal 1927 al 1945, è tra i primi ad aderire al MFE. Partecipa ai convegni di Ginevra del 1944. Tra i fondatori del Partito d'azione entra poi nel Partito repubblicano, di cui fu a lungo segretario.

[34] Adriano Olivetti (1901-1960), esponente del mondo politico e culturale, industriale illuminato, ha dato con anni d'anticipo proposte di soluzione ad alcuni dei problemi attuali applicando il metodo federalista, soprattutto nel campo infranazionale, curandone anche la realizzazione concreta attraverso la creazione del Movimento Comunità. E tra i primi ad aderire al Manifesto di Ventotene, prima della caduta del fascismo e poi, dopo aver conosciuto Spinelli in Svizzera, al MFE. Dal loro rapporto di amicizia e collaborazione scaturisce anche un valido sostegno alle iniziative federaliste.

Adolfo Tino[35], Ignazio Silone[36], François Bondy[37], René Bertholet[38] e Luciano Bolis[39].

Nel 1944 sono tenuti a Ginevra tre convegni internazionali (il 31 marzo, il 29 aprile e il 20 maggio) ai quali hanno partecipato rappresentanti italiani, francesi, olandesi, un ceco, un polacco, un tedesco, un danese, uno jugoslavo e un norvegese. In queste riunioni è stata discussa *La Dichiarazione federalista internazionale dei movimenti di Resistenza*, dichiarazione che verrà alla fine portata alla ratifica definitiva dei rappresentanti dei partiti. Le riunioni a Ginevra si tengono presso l'abitazione del segretario generale del Concilio ecumenico delle Chiese, W. A. Visser't Hooft che ospita le sedute, a dispetto delle disposizioni svizzere che proibivano l'attività politica ai rifugiati. Per la riunione del 31 marzo Spinelli prepara una prima stesura della dichiarazione, quale invece risulta insoddisfacente per Ernesto Rossi, Ignazio Silone ed altri. Tenendo conto delle osservazioni, Spinelli prepara una seconda variante da presentare alla riunione del 29 aprile 1944. Anche su questa seconda redazione furono espresse opposizioni e così sarà fatta una nuova e finale redazione che verrà approvata il 20 maggio dal Comitato permanente eletto nella sessione dell'aprile e infine ratificata definitivamente nella seduta del 7 luglio 1944. Alla riunione conclusiva del 20 maggio 1944

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[35] Adolfo Tino (1900-1977), giornalista ed avvocato, esponente repubblicano, è tra i fondatori del Partito d'azione di cui coordina l'azione sia in Svizzera che a Milano durante la Resistenza.

[36] Ignazio Silone (1900-1978), scrittore, partecipa alla fondazione del PCI, dal quale esce nel 1930 per aderire al Partito socialista. Dopo l'8 settembre dall'esilio svizzero dirige il <<Centro interno>> e facilita i primi contatti di Rossi e Spinelli per preparare gli incontri sovranazionali di Ginevra. Rientrato in Italia dopo il 1945, assume cariche sia nell'UEF, sia nel MFE.

[37] François Bondy (1916), giornalista tedesco, naturalizzato svizzero, è di grande sostegno agli esponenti antifascisti rifugiati in Svizzera, tra cui Spinelli, di cui viene amico e che aiuta nella sua opera di proselitismo federalista, specie come tramite con i resistenti francesi e tedeschi

[38] René Bertholet, personalità svizzera, si lega di grande amicizia con Spinelli e Ursula Hirschmann che aiuta, durante l'esilio, a tenere contatti con esponenti della Resistenza europea.

[39] Luciano Bolis (1918-1995) è uno dei primi ad aderire al MFE in Svizzera, nel 1943, dove si era rifugiato dopo l'8 settembre e dove, con Ferdinando Schiavetti, è il rappresentante del PdA per la Svizzera tedesca. Dal 1944 è partigiano nelle formazioni di Giustizia e Libertà in Liguria. Arrestato e torturato, per timore di non resistere e rivelare importanti elementi dell'organizzazione partigiana tenta il suicidio. In fin di vita è salvato da un audace colpo di mano dei compagni. Dopo la guerra, è vicesegretario del PdA e uno dei massimi dirigenti del MFE, ricoprendo per lungo tempo la carica di vicesegretario del Movimento, accanto a Spinelli.

erano presenti tre italiani [Rossi, Spinelli, Reale], tre francesi, uno jugoslavo, un olandese, un danese e un norvegese. Anche il ceco, che aveva partecipato alle due prime riunioni ma non a quest'ultima, e quale ha dimostrato la più decisa opposizione al testo della Dichiarazione, inviò la sua adesione senza riserve. Non aderirono invece il danese e il norvegese. Venne cosè approvato il testo finale della *Dichiarazione federalista internazionale dei movimenti di Resistenza*, testo che fu spedito clandestinamente, oltre che a Milano, anche a Lione, a Roma, in Inghilterra e in Olanda, e poi pubblicato nell'Unità Europea, n. 5, luglio-agosto 1944, sia nell'edizione italiana sia in quella svizzera. L'edizione svizzera nacque proprio con lo scopo di dare una più ampia diffusione alla Dichiarazione.[40]

Questa Dichiarazione federalista avrà un grosso impatto in Francia, dove il *Comité Français pour la Fálération Európénne* (CFFE) si costituisce a Lione, su iniziativa del movimento di Resistenza France-Tireur, all'inizio del giugno 1944, riprendendo nella loro Dichiarazione i parti essenziali del documento redatto da Spinelli: "Le parti fondamentali della loro dichiarazione erano tradotte quasi alla lettera dalle Tesi di Ventotene, già adottate dal MFE a Milano. Il <<Mouvement de Libération Nationale>> della regione de Lione aveva iscritto nel suo progetto di programma la dichiarazione di Ginevra quale linea direttiva di tutta la sua visione di politica estera. Nei giorni della Liberazione l'appello all'unità federale europea da parte del MLN si poteva leggere affisso sui muri della città"[41].

Dopo le riunioni internazionale di Ginevra, Spinelli torno in Italia, il 28 settembre 1944, "non per desiderio di eroismo e di martirio, ma per un calcolo politico ben preciso", cioè per consolidare la posizione federalista del Partito d'Azione al quale aveva aderito mentre si trovava in Svizzera nel dicembre 1943 e per quale aveva deciso "a farlo diventare uno dei pilastri del movimento federalista". La sua adesione al P.d'A. non risulta essere stata accompagnata da molto entusiasmo: "Io ho deciso di aderire al Partito d'Azione - scrive in una lettera a Rollier - per quanti difetti abbia questo partito, in esso sono quasi tutti gli elementi nostri coetanei coi quali è possibile andare d'accordo politicamente"[42].

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[40]Cfr. Cinzia Rognomi Vercelli, *Mario Alberto Rollier...,* cit., p. 156.
[41]Al· Spinelli, *Come ho tentato...,* cit., p. 400.
[42]Al· Spinelli, *Come ho tentato...,* cit., p. 72.

Dal suo rientro in Italia, fino al 21 dicembre, quando ritorna in Svizzera, per partire poi per Lione e Parigi, Spinelli cerca di riorganizzare il P.d'A., elaborando un ampio Piano di Lavoro del P.d'A., con numerose osservazioni alla prospettiva federalista e diversi contributi agli sviluppi dell'iniziativa politica del Partito d'Azione. Ma l'importanza della sua militanza federalista sarà di più messa in luce dopo il suo arrivo a Parigi, dove avrà luogo la prima riunione internazionale dei federalisti.

Dunque, gli incontri di Ginevra influenzarono il <<programma>> del *Mouvement de Libération nationale* francese, che all'inizio del 1945 promosse, con la collaborazione attiva di Ursula Hirschmann e Altiero Spinelli (arrivati in missione clandestina in Francia con i nomi e passaporti falsi, intestati alla signora Antonelli, algerina e al signor Antonelli, corso) una conferenza federalista, cui parteciparono fra gli altri Albert Camus, Emmanuel Mounier, Lewis Mumford, George Orwell, André Ferrat e André Philippe, Jacques Baumel (con il pseudonimo Rossini), Henri Frenay (esponente del primo piano dell'UEF negli anni '50). La prima riunione internazionale dei federalisti europei avvenne dal 22 al 24 marzo 1945 a Parigi, in una aula della <<Maison de la chimie>>, su iniziativa del Comitato francese per la federazione europea, che già dall'agosto 1944 era in contato con il Movimento federalista europeo italiano. La conferenza internazionale di Parigi costituě un passo importante verso la costruzione dell'organizzazione federalistica in Francia, aprendo la strada all'impianto di un'organizzazione federalistica a livello europeo.

Alle riunioni di Parigi parteciparono intorno a 30-35 persone e le discussioni si svolsero intorno al rapporto generale presentato da Ferrat e al rapporto di Spinelli sulla politica dei movimenti progressisti favorevoli alla federazione europea. Al termine dei lavori venne approvata una Risoluzione redatta da Spinelli, Risoluzione che ricalcava i contenuti delle Tesi di Milano, e venne costituito un Comitato internazionale per la federazione europea, con un segretariato da quale facevano parte: Albert Camus, Jacques Baumel, André Ferrat, Gilbert Zaksas, Robert Verdier, Maurice Guerin, John Hynd, Altiero Spinelli e Willi Eichler. Tra le decisioni fu quella di rivolgersi con un manifesto a tutti i partiti e movimenti progressisti europei per invitarli a promuovere una comune azione federalista e quella di preparare un nuovo congresso federalista dove debbano partecipare i delegati e i rappresentanti dei tutti partiti

politici e dei movimenti che lottano per la realizzazione di una civilizzazione democratica europea.

Malgrado il fatto che, conclusa la Conferenza, Spinelli e Ursula Hirschmann tentarono di tenere in vita il Comitato internazionale nominato al termine dei lavori, loro trovarono sempre maggiori difficoltà: "Le riunioni erano sempre meno frequentate, ed esso poggiava tutto sul l'impegno di Ursula e mio. Prima di andarcene riuscimmo ad affidarlo a due giovani soldati, ebrei algerini, incaricati da Baumel di aiutarci, i quali, soprattutto sotto l'impulso di Ursula, si erano impegnati con entusiasmo ingenuo in quest'azione"[43].

La speranza di Spinelli di creare dietro l'idea europeista un grande movimento popolare, verrà delusa. Il movimento federalista rimane un movimento di minoranze. Molte le sigle, gli incontri e le discussioni, ma pochi i proseliti. Ancora nel 1949 il totale degli inscritti al movimento federalista raggiunge in tutto il continente appena i 225 000 membri con una punta di 75 000 in Italia e solo qualche migliaio in Belgio, Danimarca e nei paesi scandinavi. In Germania i federalisti erano intorno a 55 000, in Svizzera dove il federalismo era di casa appena 15 000. Alla fine del questo periodo movimentato, dopo il suo rientro in Italia (dopo la Conferenza di Parigi), Spinelli abbandonerà temporaneo la sua attività politica federalista, ritrovandosi solitario "ancora una volta come un lupo battuto da avversari più potenti, coperto di non poche ferite".

Con questo rinuncio alla attività politica italiana e europea si chiude un periodo importante della sua vita. La sua attività federalista non sarà invece abbandonata per sempre, ma sarà continuata più tardi, come commissario europeo e poi come membro nel Parlamento Europeo, un altro periodo veramente importante per la sua attività politica e anche per l'attuale politica europea.

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# MUTATIONS POLITIQUES AU NIVEAU DE L'ESPACE LOCAL EN ROUMANIE. ETUDE DE CAS SUR LE DEPARTEMENT D'ARAD

## MARIUS SUCIU

**RÉSUMÉ.** Le passage d'une société socialiste, presque autarchique, à une société ouverte, démocratique ne peut pas ętre imaginé sans un changement profond dans le paysage institutionnel. Après la Révolution, en Roumanie la logique de fonctionnement de celle-ci n'ont pas fortément suivi les męme ruptures.La réforme institutionnelle que d'ailleurs la réforme legislative en Roumanie peuvent ętre perçues comme des processus formels plutot que des pratiques réelles. Par ce processus on s'est soucié plutot de copier plus vite un certain modèle exterieur que de résoudre les vraies problèmes de la société. C'est au niveau local qu'on peut observer le mieux les problemes de ce processus. Cet etude se propose, donc, de formuler quelques reflexions sur les mutations institutionnelles et politiques que l'espace local subi a present, sur les lourdes consequences que ces mutations vont avoir sur la future gestion des espaces. Les reflexions reunies dans ce texte representes quelques conclusions tirees a la suite de plusieurs missions de recherche sur terrain dans le depatement d'Arad, missions qui ont pour but l'elaboration d'une etude plus ample, etude qui fait l'objet d'une these de doctorat sur les recompositions territoriales en Roumanie.

L'une des notions les plus usitées tant dans le langage quotidien que dans les études analytiques concernant l'Europe Centrale et Orientale c'est *la transition* .Si au début ce mot était porteur d'optimisme et d'espoir, aujourd'hui il est devenu porteur d'incertitude et męme d'angoisse[1]. Dans l'étude de Milaciç est mis en evidence l'erreur qui a été fait par des analystes quand ont prévu la transition comme un processus linéar est à une finalité claire: la democratisation pour l'espace est-européen dans son ensemble.Il

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[1] Une exelente étude sur la transition a été publié par Slobodan Milaciç en Revue Internationale de Politiques Comparées, vol 3, no. 1 1997, étude intitulée "*Critique de la transition uniqué*"

observe que les scientifiques sont plus interessés par les manifestations des réussites politiques que par la compréhension des difficultées démocratiques. L'auteur perçoit l'est comme "un échantillon à géometrie variable", donc comme un espace politique et économique nettement différencié. Et dans cet échantillon la Roumanie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie sont considérées comme "perdantes dans cette affaire tout comme l'hypothèse de la transition démocratique". Les facteurs qui peuvent determiner la réussite politique ne sont pas toujours perceptibles et prévisibles. La preuve de cette affirmation peut être l'évolution politique de la Roumanie d'après les élections de novembre 1996. Qui aurrait pu croire que le nouveau pouvoir politic prodémocratique et tant soutenu par l'Occident va mener la Roumanie dans la plus grave crise politique et économique d'après la Révolution. Au début de l'année 1998 le gouvernement de la Roumanie considéré à une moment donné "la seule alternative " se trouvait en impasse devant un projet de budget dont les ressurces n'existaient pas, devant une réforme echouée, et quitté tant par le partenaire du coalition (PD) que par les négociateurs de FMI qui se retiraient deçus. Et si "la seule aternative" tombe quelle sera la perspective de l'avenir? Qui seront ce qui gestioneront cette douloureuse transitions? Et vers quoi ?

Il est tout à fait claire que la transition n'est pas unique dans l'Europe de Est. *Mais est-elle unique au niveau d'une même pays? Ce ce qu'on se propose à voir: peut être "le local" le lieu de génèse des montages capables à déterminer en temps que le "tout" bouge dans la bonne direction?*

## A. *Mutations dans l'administration publique*

Après 1989, l'Etat Roumain s'est proclamé très tot à l'attachement aux principes de la décentralisation et de l'autonomie locale[2]. L'organisation administrative territoriale de Roumanie a été gardé[3] même si une association

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[2] L'article 119 de la Constitution de 21 novembre 1991 définit les principes de base de l'administration publique locale. Dans le capitre V consacré à l'administration publique en général "l'administration publique dans les unités administratives territoriales est fondée sur les principes de l'autonomie locale et sur celui de la décentralisation des services publiques. Les articles 120 et 121 prévoient l'élection des conseiller locaux et départementaux et de maires, appelés à remplacer les anciens conseils populaires. Ceux-ci ont été dissous par le décret loi no.2 du 27 décembre 1989 et des "conseils locaux du FSN (Front du Salut National)" leur avaient provisoirement substitué en attendant les élections de février 1992.

[3] Le nombre des départements (judete) a été de 58 en 1937, 38 en 1968, 40 en 1989. Depuis mai 1997, a la suite de l'ordonance guvernementale 22 le Secteur Agricol Ilfov, unité admistrative à part, reçoit le statut de département avec le centre administratif à Bucarest.

des anciens départements suprimés par le régime communiste milittent depuis 8 ans pour la restauration de l'organisation d'avant 1945. Les unités administratives territoriales conformément à la loi 69/1991 (républiée en 18 avril 1996) sont *les communes rurales* (comunele) *les villes* (orasele), *les départements* (judetele). Si les unités administratives ont gardé les anciennes appelations, en ce qui concerne les organes délibératives de celles-ci on peut remarquer des changements tant au niveau des appelations que surtout au niveau du champs de compétences. Les autorités de l'administration publique par lequelles se réalise l'autonomie locale dans les communes et les villes sont *les conseils locaux*, comme des autorités délibératives et *les maires* comme des autorités executives. Les conseils locaux et les maires sont élus par vote universel conformément à la lois 70/1991. Les conseils locaux sont composés de 11-35 membres (65 dans la capitale) en rapport direct avec la taille démographique des collectivités.

A l'échelon supérieur, on retrouve la meme dualité qu'en France: *le Préfet*, représentant de l'Etat est doublé d'un *Conseil de Département* élu, symbole des promesses d'autonomie locale. En vertu du nouveau principe de transfert des compétences aux collectivités locales, les rapports ont tendance à évoluer au profit du second. Au départ élu au deuxième degré par les conseiller locaux, le Conseil de Département l'est désormais au suffrage universel. Comme les conseils locaux, il est pluraliste et rassemble des membres des formations politiques différentes.

Sans doute, le processus de la redistribution des compétences entre le niveau central et le niveau local est très ample. Ce qui nous intéresse dans notre recherche c'est de voir quelles sont les modalités par lequelles les autorités locales exercent leurs compétences; quels sont les moyens utilisés; comment vont mobiliser ces autorités les potentialités locales autour de leur nouvelles missions; quelles seront les conséquences spatiales de ce processus de la redistribution des compétences. Pour cela on considère tout à fait utile de présenter en quelques lignes les principales compétences qui revient par la nouvelle loi de l'administration publique locale aux collectivités locales.

### 1. *Le Conseil Local*

- a l'initiative et décide dans les problèmes d'intérẹt local;
- approuve des études, des analyse prospectives, des programmes de développement socio-économique et d'aménagement du territoire;
- approuve le budget local, la construction, la gestion et l'execution de celui-ci;

- établit des impots et des taxes locales et des taxes spéciales pour des durées limitées;
- gère le domaine public et privé de la commune
- met en place des institutions et des agents économiques d'intérẹt local; décide sur la concession et sur la location des biens et services publics d'intérẹt local;
- met en place des services publics de transport local, des reseaux edilitaires; des services de salubrité et assure le bon fonctionement de ceux-ci;
- approuve les plans d'urbanisme des localités qui compose la commune et assure la réalisation de ceux-ci;
- assure les conditions necessaires pour le bon fonctionement des institutions d'enseignement, de santé, de culture, de jeunnesse;
- assure la protection de l'environement;
- assure la protection et la conservation des monuments historiques et d'architecture et des réservations naturelles;
- contribue à la réalisation des mésures de protection et d'assistance sociale;
- assure la liberté du commerce et et de la concurence loyale et encourage la libre initiative dans les conditions de la loi;
- décide l'association à d'autres autorités de l'administration publique locale ou départementale pour la réalisation de certains travaux et services d'intérẹt public; décide la collaboration avec des agents économiques du pays ou de l'étranger en vue de la réalisation des travaux d'intérẹt commun;
- décide dans la domaine de la coopération avec les communes de l'étranger

## 2. *Le Conseil de Département*

- coordonne l'activitée des conseils locaux en vue de la réalisation des services publiques d'intérẹt départemental;
- organise et dirige les services publique départamentaux et aprouve le réglement de fonctionement de celui-ci;
- assure l'assistence technique et juridique aux conseils locaux;
- analyse les propositions faites par les communes et les villes en vue de l'élaboration des études économiques prospectives;
- adopte des programmes de développement économique et social du département et suit la réalisations de ceux-ci;
- adopte le budget du département et le compte de l'achèvement de l'exercice budgetaire;
- donne les orientations générales en ce qui concerne le développement urbanistique des localités et l'aménagement du territoire;

- gère le domaine public et privé du département;
- assure la construction, l'entretien et la modernisation des routes d'intérệt départemental
- établit des impots et des taxes départementales et aussi des taxes spéciales pour des périodes limitées;
- décide la mise en place des institutions et d'agents économiques d'intérệt départemental, la concéssion ou la location des biens et des services d'intérệt départemental;
- met en place des institutions socio-culturelles et sanitaires et assure le fonctionement de celles-ci
- décide, en conformité à la loi, l'association avec d'autres autorités de l'administration publique locale ou départementales en vue de réaliser des travaux et des services d'intérệt public; la colaboration avec des agents économiques du pays et de l'étranger en vue de réaliser des actions ou des travaux d'intérệt commun.

## 3. *L'Institution du Prèfet*

A la fin de 1989 le Conseil Populaire de Département qui représentait le pouvoir centrale au niveau du département se transforme en Mairie de Département (Primaria Judetului). A la suite de la loi 69/1991, celle-ci se divise en Préfecture et Conseil de Département. L'institution du Préfet reçoit pratiquement le role du représentant de l'Etat au niveau du département, role detenu jusqu'à 1989 par le Conseil Populaire de Département. En ce qui concernes les competences accordées à cette institution le redacteurs de la lois se sont inspirés de la législation française. Comme réprésentant du guvernement en territoire, le Préfet a les compétences suivantes:

- assure la réalisation des intérệts nationaux, la respectation des lois et de l'ordre publique;
- assure le controle concernant la légalité des document administratives des autorité publiques locales et départementales;
- donne l'avis sur la nomination et la destitution des chefs des services publics décentralisées des ministères et d'autres organisme centales;
- dispose la prise des mésures adéquates pour la prévention des infractions et la défense des droits des citoyens par les institutions abilitées;
- il est responsable de la préparation et la réalisation des mésures de défense à un caractère militaire;

■ présente chaque année au gouvernement un rapport sur l'état général du développement économique, social, cultural et administratif du département et sur la réalisation du programme de gouvernement.

Auprès de l'institution du Préfet, dans chaque département fonctionne *La Commission Administrative du Département* transformée en *Le Commité Directeur Territorial* par l'ordonnance gouvernamentale 22/1997. Ce commité est composé par: le Préfet, qui detienne la fonction de Président; le souspréfet; le secrétaire générale de la Préfecture; les chefs des services publics décentralisées, les directeurs des régies autonomes. Aux travaux du Commité sont aussi invités le président du Conseil de Département; le maire de la ville chef-lieu du département; d'autres maires et les personne dont la présence est considérée nécessaire. Le Commité Directeur Territorial élabore chaque année, en concordance avec le programme du gouvernement son propre programme qui va ętre communiqué aux services publics décentralisés, aux régies autonome et aussi aux autorités de l'administration publique locale.

* * *

A partir de cette présentation on peut facilement voir que la logique institutionnelle est nouvelle. Mais ce prcocessus de création de nouvelles institutions est marqué de toute une série de problèmes qui empiète sur le bon fonctionnement de celles-ci. Un premier problème est lié à la redistribution des compétences. Prenons les cas du Conseil de Département. Męme si cette istitution a été comme symbol de l'autonomie locale il a reçu des compétences dans quelques domaines peu importantes et męme ingrats du département. Les services subordonnés au Conseil de Département ne représent que 20 % en termes de revenus/depenses des services publiques du département, la différence étant gérée par les directions déconcentrées des ministères qui sont subordonnées au Préfet. Tout cela fait que la marge de liberté et d'action des cette institution soit considérablement réduite. Aussi après presque dix ans de réforme, on constate que les compétences accordées aux collectivitées locales ne sont pas en concordance avec les capacités de celles-ci de resoudre les problèmes. En plus la rédistributions de compétenecs n'a pas été suivie d'une redistribution des ressources financières adéquate[4]. On ne peut pas parler d'une

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[4] La loi des finances publiques locales de 1994 est véhément contestée par les collectivitées locales.

vraie décentralisation administrative autant que les ressources financières sont encore fortement centralisées.

Une autre problème est provoqué par les desarticulations qui se manifestent dans l'intérieur de ces institutions entre la composante politique et la composante technique. Les entretiens que nous avons eus avec les hommes politiques qui dirigent la Préfecture, le Conseil du Département, les conseils locaux et aussi avec les responsables des directions techniques de ces institutions nous ont permis de constater que bien que les hommes politiques se sont approprié un discours impregné de principes reformistes, ils ne peuvent pas depasser le conservatorisme et l'inertie des techniciens marqués encore d'une mentalité hérité du régime précedent. Cette situation est typique pour toutes les institutions analysées, mais elle se manifeste plus fort au niveau de la Préfecture ou la plupart des responsables des services techniques sont des anciens propagandistes du PCR (Parti Communiste Roumain). Cette situation sera très difficile à resoudre parce que les personnes dynamiques des ces institutions sont partis dans le secteur privé et le recrutement des jeunes spécialistes et très difficile à cause de niveau de salaires qui est très bas dans l'administration.

La conclusion qu'on peut tirer dans cette phase de la réforme administrative c'est que la réussite de celle-ci ne peut pas ętre assurée seulement par l'afirmation des certains principes et la création des nouvelles institutions. La mise en place d'un système cohérent des articulations tant dans l'intérieur des institutions que aussi entre celles-ci est impératif nécessaire pour que les nouveaux mécanisme fonctionnent. Mais pour l'instant le tissu reste à confectionner et les collectivités qui ressent le plus fort cette contradiction sont celles qui sont situé au plus près dea citoyens, c'est à dire les communes, alors qu'elles continuent à dépendre fortement des organismes de niveau supérieur.

## B. *Les partis au niveau local*

Les instances administratives ne sont pas les seules institutions nouvelles. Dans les processus de transition se sont développés de nombreux organismes aux logiques variées. L'un de processus le plus évident après la Révolution et considéré comme preuve incontestable de l'avancée démocratique a été l'explosion des partis politiques. Ce processus a été considéré dès le départ comme logique après une longue période de compréssion par le monopartitisme totalitaire. Après 8 ans de transition, les partis sont devenus, dans l'Europe de l'Est aussi comme dans l'Europe de l'Ouest, les acteurs

principaux de la démocratie. Si au début il était relativement simple de classifier les partis en opposant les partis "neo-communistes" aux partis "anti-communiste", aujourd'hui la prestation des partis complique la vie politique, ce qui fait de plus en plus difficile l'analyse politique des partis. D'ailleurs on considère que la vraie construction démocratique dans les pays de l'est commencera avec le "post-anti-communisme"[5]. L'échec enregistré en Roumanie par les forces "anti-communiste" arrivées au pouvoir en novembre 1996 semble a marquer ce passage vers la phase "post-anti-communiste". La réalité des faits oblige l'électorat roumain de constater que les anciens critères de considérer les partis (neocommunistes-anticommunistes) ne corespondent pas aux critères de performance dans la construction démocratique. Même si cette expérience a détruite une immense quantité d'optimisme, elle pourrait contribuer à la maturation de la société civile qui plusiers années, faute de culture démocratique à confondu la liberté, déjà aquise, avec la démocratie qui ne se gagne pas, mais qui se construit.

Les partis joue un role important dans le nouvel paysage institutionnel tant au niveau central qu'au niveau local. Ce qui nous intéresse dans notre analyse concernant les partis c'est la manière dont les partis participe à la structuration de la société, à la constitution des nouveaux territoires, à la construction démocratique d'un espace local en Roumanie. Est-ce qu'il y a une autre logique de fonctionement des partis au niveau local par rapport le niveau central?

Le début de la démocratie locale en Roumanie a été déclenché par les élections locales de février 1992, organisées conformément à la loi 69/1991 de l'administration publique locale et la loi 70/1991 des élections locales. Les élections locales de 1992 signifient d'ailleurs la transformation du local d'une espace tout à fait administratif dans un espace politique, donc un espace de conflit, de confrontation des groupes aux intéręts divergents. Le niveau politique local c'est le niveau par lequel les acteur du milieu économique et social local essayent de legitimer leur pouvoir et par l'intermédiaire duquel ils essayent de promouvoir leurs intéręts, de maitriser les nouvelles enjeux créés en rapport avec l'Etat.

Au niveau du département d'Arad, comme d'ailleurs au niveau de tout le pays, la démocratisation de la vie politique a déterminé l'apparition d'un très grand nombre de formation politiques. Pendant les élections locales de 1992 et 1996 au niveau du département d'Arad se sont remarquées 17 formation politiques qui ont obtenu au moins une place de conseiller dans les conseils locaux. (Tableau 1 et 2).

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[5] S. Milaciç, *Les transitions à l'Est*, In Revue Internationale de Politiques Comparées, vol, 3, no 1, 1996, p. 36.

*Tableau 1*. Les résultats des élections locales de 1992 dans le département d'Arad. (Les chiffres absolus représentent les nombres des conseillers)

| Formation politique | Total depatement | % | Urbain | % | Rural | % | Ville d'Arad | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Forces conservatrices** | **555** | **56,1** | **72** | **46,1** | **483** | **57,9** | **13** | **41,9** |
| 1. FSN | 327 | 33,0 | 41 | 26,2 | 286 | 34,4 | 8 | 25,8 |
| 2. PDAR | 144 | 14,5 | 11 | 7,0 | 133 | 15,9 | 1 | 3,2 |
| 3. MER | 54 | 5,4 | 11 | 7,0 | 43 | 5,2 | 1 | 3,2 |
| 4. PUNR | 21 | 2,1 | 5 | 3,3 | 16 | 1,9 | 2 | 6,5 |
| 5. PR | 7 | 0,7 | 3 | 1,9 | 4 | 0,5 | 1 | 3,2 |
| 6. Autres | 2 | 0,2 | 1 | 0,7 | 1 | 0,1 | - | - |
| **Forces democratiques** | **371** | **37,5** | **70** | **44,8** | **301** | **36,1** | **17** | **54,8** |
| 1. CDR | 289 | 29,2 | 52 | 33,3 | 237 | 28,4 | 14 | 45,1 |
| 2. UDMR | 50 | 5,0 | 5 | 3,2 | 45 | 5,4 | - | |
| 3. PNL-AT | 7 | 0,8 | 2 | 1,3 | 5 | 0,6 | 2 | 6,5 |
| 4. UDSCR | 12 | 1,2 | 6 | 3,8 | 6 | 0,7 | - | |
| 5. PSDR | 2 | 0,2 | 2 | 1,3 | - | - | | |
| 6.Autres | 11 | 1,1 | 3 | 1,9 | 8 | 1,0 | 1 | 3,2 |
| **Independents** | **63** | **6,4** | **14** | **9,1** | **49** | **6,0** | **1** | **3,3** |
| **TOTAL** | 989 | 100 | 156 | 100 | 833 | 100 | 31 | 100 |

*Tableau 2.* Les résultats des élections locales de 1996 dans le département d'Arad. (Les chiffres absolus représentent les nombres des conseillers)

| Formation politique | Total depatement | % | Urbain | % | Rural | % | Ville d'Arad | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Forces conservatrices** | **443** | **45,3** | **43** | **29,4** | **400** | **48,0** | **7** | **28,0** |
| 1. PDSR | 202 | 20,6 | 22 | 15,1 | 180 | 21,7 | 3 | 12,0 |
| 2. PDAR | 105 | 10,7 | 3 | 2,1 | 102 | 12,3 | 1 | 4,0 |
| 3. MER | 43 | 4,4 | 4 | 2,7 | 39 | 4,6 | - | - |
| 4. PUNR | 44 | 4,5 | 6 | 4,1 | 38 | 4,5 | 1 | 4,0 |
| 5. PSM | 37 | 3,7 | 6 | 4,1 | 31 | 3,7 | 1 | 4,0 |
| 6. PRM | 12 | 1,2 | 2 | 1,3 | 10 | 1,2 | 1 | 4,0 |
| **Forces democratiques** | **421** | **43,0** | **64** | **43,8** | **357** | **42,8** | **15** | **60,0** |
| 1. CDR | 177 | 18,1 | 20 | 13,6 | 157 | 18,8 | 6 | 24,0 |
| 2. USD | 138 | 14,1 | 21 | 14,3 | 117 | 14,1 | 3 | 12,0 |
| 3. UDMR | 64 | 6,5 | 13 | 8,9 | 51 | 6,1 | 3 | 12,0 |
| 4. PL'93 | 31 | 3,2 | 6 | 4,1 | 25 | 3,0 | 1 | 4,0 |
| 5. PAC | 11 | 1,1 | 4 | 2,7 | 7 | 0,8 | 2 | 8,0 |
| **Autres** | **55** | **5,6** | **19** | **13,0** | **36** | **4,4** | **3** | **12,0** |
| **Independents** | **60** | **6,1** | **20** | **13,6** | **40** | **4,8** | **-** | **-** |
| **TOTAL** | 979 | 100 | 146 | 100 | 833 | 100 | 25 | 100 |

Une opération très difficile à ce moment-là en Roumanie, comme d'ailleurs dans tous les pays de l'Est est la classification idéologique des partis. C'est difficile à faire une délimitation claire entre la gauche et la droite[6]. Dans nos démarches par faciliter l'analyse, on va garder pour moment la classification devenue classique dans la littérature de spécialité : forces conservatrices (neo-communistes) et forces démocratiques (anti-communistes).

De point de vue électoral le département d'Arad à coté de deux autres dépatements du Banat constituie un territoire politiquie aux traits particuliers, étant considéré mệme dès 1990 un bastion des forces démocratiques. Si on regarde les données des tableux 1 et 2 et les documents graphiques 1, 2 et 3 on peut facilement observer la position priviligiée des forces démocratiques qui ont gagné les élections locales de 1992 dans les plus importantes circumscriptions électorales du département surtout les circumscriptions urbaines, en consolidant leur position d'une manière nette pendant les élections des 1996.

## *Document graphique no.1*



Changements du rapport de forces entres les groupes politiques au niveau du departement d'Arad (1992-1996)

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**Document graphique no.2**



**Changements du rapport de forces entres les groupes politiques au niveau du departement d'Arad (1992-1996)**

**Document graphique no.3**



**Le changement du rapport de forces entre le groupes politiques dans la ville d'Arad (1992-1996)**

Les données présentées dans ces tableaux et dans les documents graphiques concernent les nombre de conseillers, mais si on prend en compte le nombre des votes , la situation et aussi plus tranchante. (Documents graphiques 4, 5,6 et 7).

47

*Document graphique no.4*

Les resultats des elections locales de 1992 dans le
milieu rural du département d'Arad
(selon le nombre de votes)

indépendents
6%

forces
conservatrices
47%

forces
démocratiques
47%

*Document graphique no.5*

Les resultats des elections locales de 1992 dans le
milieu urbain de departement d'Arad
(selon le nombre de votes)

indépendents
4%

forces
conservatrices
29%

forces
democratiques
67%

*Document graphique no.6.*

**Les resultats des elections locales de 1996 dans le departement d'Arad (selon le nombre de votes)**

independents
5%

forces conservatrices
38%

forces democratiques
57%

*Document graphique no.7*

**Le resultat des elections locales de 1996 dans la ville d'Arad (selon le nombre de votes)**

forces démocratiques
72%

forces conservatrices
28%

Si on cherche la causalité de cette situation on va la trouver surtout au niveau du symbolique que dans l'efficacité des stratégiés. A travers l'histoire, la région du Banat s'est bien rémarquée par un ésprit identitaire très fort généré par une intéraction positive entre la population roumaine et les autres groupes éthniques (hongrois, allemands, serbes, bulgares, slovaques). La domination des habsbourgs qui a duré plusieurs siècles a permis a cette province de s'intégrer dans un système politic, administrativ et économique plus performant par rapport les autres provinces du sud et de l'est. Cette évolution a déterminé un développement différent des centres urbains et des activités économiques et culturelles et surtout au développement d'une agriculture moderne pour cette période-là. Le développement de l'agriculture a facilité la formation d'une classe paysanne aissée et avec un très fort sentiment de la propriété. Ainsi, après l'unification de 1918, la province du Banat s'inscrit dans le nouvel Etat roumain comme l'une des plus dévéloppées provinces de la Roumanie. Après 1945, dans la tentative de s'imposer aussi dans cette région, le régime communiste s'est confrontée avec la résistence d'un système de valeurs hostile à la nouvelle idéologie. Ainsi, le pouvoir communiste a été obligé de faire appel aux actions violentes (déportations, emprisonement, confiscation des fortunes). Ces tristes expériences ont eu une forte influence sur l'électorat actuel du Banat dont le vote pour les forces démocratiques peut ętre considéré surtout un protest contre une idéologie qui essaie à garder une liaison avec le passé communiste, que une option pour un certain programme ou une certaine stratégie qui semblerait plus efficace.

Sans doute, une analyse du comportement électoral d'une région avec des particularités différentes, après une absence de la démocratie depuis 50 d'années, serait tout à fait intéressante. Mais en Roumanie on ne peut pas parler d'une vraie socialisation politique de l'électorat. En Roumanie les leaders politiques locaux ne sont pas créés par la population. Ils sont créés par les groupes qui detient le pouvoir et la population va les voter. A la suite des recherches sur terrain on a pu constater que les partis ne sont pas le deteneur du pouvoir ni au niveau central ni au niveau local. En Roumanie les principaux acteurs qui partage le pouvoir sont: la technocratie industrielle, la technocratie financière et la technocratie administrative. Les partis sont seulement le symbole de la démocratie pour la population et pour l'étranger. En réalité ils sont sous le controle strict des groupes mentionnés ci-dessus, groupes qui emploient au niveau locale les partis en vue de la promotion des leurs intéręts et comme voie d'acces vers le lieu ou se construit les décisions. Toute cela vient d'expliquer la lenteur du processus

des réformes économiques et institutionnelles et l'accentuation de la bureaucratie dans l'administration. Les évolutions des dernières années ont déterminé plusieurs analystes politiques d'affirmer que l'instauration du système politique pluraliste en Roumanie ne signifie pas le changement du système de géstion de la société, mais seulement le changement du système d'élection des dirigeants[7]. Ces constats nous détérmine de nous canaliser l'attention dans les démarches futures vers d'autres aspects de la vie des partis que le vote. Quelles sont les rapports dans le cas de notre département entre les partis et les groupes déteneurs de pouvoir? Qui sont les leaders? Comment sont-ils créés? Quelle est la marge de manoeuvre des partis? Quelle est la place du local dans leurs idéologie? Quelles sont les stratégis des partis et quelles intéręts servent-elles? Quelles sont les conséquences spatiales de l'application de ces stratégies? Voilà quelques interrogations pour les démarches futures concernant l'analyse des partis.

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[7] V. Pasti, *Romania in tranzitie. Caderea in viitor*, Ed. Nemira, București, 1995. 330 p.

## ANNEXE 1

### La carte no1. La position du département d'Arad sur la carte administrative de la Roumanie



### La carte no2. La carte administrative du département d'Arad

## ANNEXE 2

Le département d'Arad en chifres

**Surface** : 7754 km2
**Population**: 480 906 d'habitants
**Densité de la population**: 62 hab/km2
**Population urbaine** : 52, 4 %; **population rurale**: 48 %
**Structure ethnique de la population**: - 80,5% - roumains
- 12,5 % hongrois
- 2,8 % gitains
- 4,2 % autres
**Natalite**: 9,5 %o; mortalité: 15,1%o,
**Sold naturel**: - 5,6 %o; (Moyenne Ro. : -1,6 %o)
**Mortalité infantile**: 15,7 %o (Moyenne Ro.: 21,2 %o)
**Communes**: - 67 communes rurales qui compend 273 de villages
- 8 communnes urbaines: - Arad (municipe) 188 000 d,habitants (75 % de la population urbaine)
- Lipova 12003
- Ineu 10594
- Curtici 9924
- Chișineu-Criș 9086
- Nădlac 8400
- Pâncota 7451
- Sebiș 6985
**Population occupée**: 218 000 - 34,8 % agriculture +silviculture
- 26,8 % industrie
- 38,4 % services
**Chomage**: 5,8 % (Moyenne Ro: 9,5 %)
**Activités industrielles**: textile, machines (vagons), alimentaire, instruments medicaux, optique , mécaique de précision, meuble, extraction de pétrol et gaz
**Agents économiques**: 15 264 - 20 % activités manufacturées
- 27 % comerce intern
- 20 % import-export
- 27 % services
- 6 % batiment
**Education**: - 425 écoles primaires
- 36 lycées
- 2 universités (l'une d'Etat et l'une privée)
**Infrastructures de transports**: - voies férées 485 km (196 km electrifiées)
- routes 2087km ( 392 km modernisées)
........ - aeroport international
**PIB/habitant**: 2830 $/hab; (Ro: 3000 $/hab)

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# THE NGO'S SOCIAL CARE IN ROMANIA[1]

## EUGEN BAICAN & FLORIN DUMA

**ABSTRACT.** The evolution of the NGO sector in Romania was a spectacular one: from almost none in 1989 to an impressive figure of approximately 44,000 in 1999. Obviously, even from this point of view, Romania is still in transition meaning that we are witness and actors in the process of passing from the false associative behavior of the communist regime to the authentic behavior of the democratic society

## INTRODUCTION

The starting point of the present paper consist of the widely accepted thesis according to which the development of volunteership and associative behavior, subsequently leading to the development of the NGO sector, is a precondition of the existence and consolidation of modern democratic society and the basis of the civil society as an essential part of modern society

Actually, this associative behavior leads to a decrease of what many prestigious sociologist, such as Jean Lecca, Henri Mendras, Raymond Boudon, call the gap between the athomised individual and the modern mass-society. More to the point the associative behavior decreases the negative impact of the disappearance of the traditional institutions for the distribution of collective values (Baican, E.; Pop, V., 1996).

Obviously, even from this point of view, Romania is still in transition meaning that we are witness and actors in the process of passing from the false associative behavior of the communist regime to the authentic behaviour of the democratic society.

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[1] This paper was presented at the "International Seminar on Social Work", May, 1999, University of Lapland, Finland.

Our purpose will be to try to answer the following questions, concerning the present state and perspectives of the NGO's social care in Romania:

1. What is the socio-economical and political context in which the birth of the NGO sector took place?
2. What was its evolution from 1990 to the present?
3. What problems do the NGO social care face and which are the perspectives?

## GENESIS OF DEMOCRATIC NGO'S SECTOR IN ROMANIA AFTER 1989

The evolution of the NGO sector in Romania was a spectacular one: from almost none in 1989 to an impressive figure of approximately 44,000 in 1999. How was such an evolution possible? Before 1989 there were no real NGO's, as we understand them now.

Given the socio-economical context of switching from a centralized to a market economy, on a background of a generalized poverty to growing non-profit sector was also confronted whit the permanence of some menthalities issues from the former regime, appearing mostly in the older population categories: fear of associations, persistence of negative connotations linked with volunteership. Thus, under the communist regime the distortion of facts by the "volunteer work" something that was, in reality, obligatory.

As there was no legal frame for the constitution of NGO's the beginning was made by reinstating of an 1924 law (Law No 21/1994) on which basis this kind of organizations, - represented from the legal point of view by associations, foundations, unions or federations -, are established. The results were quickly to follow: the highest rate of NGO's registration reached, were 300 a month, in 1990 (RAPOR,1997).

The chance of the Romanian non-profit sector immediately after 1989 was the investment made by the representatives of international and foreign organization. NGO's subsidies of foreign or international NGO's have had a positive impact in the development of the non-profit sector in Romania bringing here not only financial resources but also strategies and know-how. Unfortunately, this subsidies have not been the best possible "workshops" for learning the associative behavior due to the defensive attitude of their employees towards potentials volunteers, in order to preserve their positions and interests. The volunteer and the employee status

are closely interrelated: some volunteers may become employees where as some employees with a better financial situation may get involved as volunteers.

The Romanian society still has a strong patriarchal accent; this means that a serious development of the NGO sector must be stimulated not only from the bottom the top but also the other way around. To this purpose a series of fiscal facilities have been set up. Thus, for the NGO's we have 0 VAT quota or exemption; also, the Romanian Import Custom Taxes Agreement stipulates customs taxes exemptions for NGO's. Another interesting facility with an important impact (which we are later going to analyze) is stipulated by the Governmental Decision No 564/1992. According to it motor vehicles older than 8 years may be brought and registered in Romania when they had been donated and the beneficiary is a NGO or an association with humanity or social protection purposes.

NGO's and volunteers should be generated by the needs of the community and then the community/society should undertake and sustain them. But, in Romania at list as far as the first years after the 1989 changes are concerned, the governmental sector showed a lack of trust toward NGO's and there was little, if any, communication and partnership. As example of this lack of trust from these early years is the Romanian Sponsorship Law, which is considered inappropriated and nonstimulative by those targeted (we are going to comment upon it latter).

## EVOLUTION IN THE NGO SECTOR FROM 1990 TO PRESENT

Let's follow now the evolution of the Romanian NGO sector over the 1990 – 1999 decade. As we stressed before a decisive contribution to the development of this sector have had the international organizations that opened subsidies in Romania. Thus, at the beginning of 1991 one year after the restauration of democracy in Romania a number of 98 foreign organization operated in our country, most of which being charity organizations (CAFR, 1996). At the end of 1992, more than 25% of the NGO's were affiliated to an international or foreign organization, this out of a number of 604 investigated NGO's. The international affiliation of Romanian NGO's is more frequent to organizations in France, Great Britain, Nederland, Germany, USA, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, Austria and Hungary, in this order.

The number of NGO's increased spectacularly: by the end of 1996 there were over 13,000 organization registered, where as in December 1995

we had only 7,500. Now, there are in Romania 44,000 NGO's at a population of 22,700,000 inhabitants.

This amazing evolution must also be seen in the context of some in the context of some fiscal facilities in favor of NGO's and some custom regulations concerning imports (by these we mean the restriction upon the import of motor vehicles that have became increasingly stricter). Thus, the number of NGO's has grown, to a large extent, as a result of the interest for registering imported motor vehicles older than 8 year and exempted from import taxes. This situation had an extremely negative impact upon the population's trust in NGO's: "Metromedia Transylvania" Opinion Barometer in a poll from 1998 showed that 51% of the over eighteen population has little or very little trust in NGO's and only 22% has much and very much confidence in them. It comes out that deterioration of the populations attitude towards NGO's has appeared compared to previous year (e.g. 1996) due to increase in the number of NGO's which do not serve the purposes that define such on organization.

At the end of 1996, the national dimension of the association phenomenon reached 10.8% of the over eighteen population (CAFR, 1996). 36% out of these comes from the rural area and are part of local agricultural association; than, with a 26% ratio, come those affiliated to social services organization. If we let out the agricultural association, which can not entirely be consider as NGO's the number of person associated in the form of NGO's in social services would occupy the first place (see the graph).

**Association cathegories (%)**

The material resources of the non-profit sector provided by the population come under the form of volunteership and donation. As to what concerns the dimension of volunteership a 1996 poll shows that 33.5% of the population over eighteen has participated to different volunteer-based activities (CAFR, 1996). We have serious reason to believe that this figure is overestimated since the subjects of the inquiry have the tendency to report even minor activities. Volunteership is practiced differentially by the age groups (see the table).

| | Age group | Volunteers in that group |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | 18 - 30 | 26% |
| 2. | 31 - 40 | 23% |
| 3. | 41 - 50 | 18% |
| 4. | 51 - 60 | 17% |
| 5. | over 60 years | 16% |
| | Total | 100% |

Source: (D&V,1997)

The most important reason for association is material needs, followed, not very closely, by other needs such as: communication or professional ones. With regard to interest the leading ones are the interest of ethnic or religious allegiance, as well as professional affiliation (see the graph).

**The  most important reason for association (%)**



Source: (CAFR, 1996)

As we have point out, in 1996, there were a percentage of 33.5% volunteers in Romania. Out of this, the percentage of those involved in social care is 24%, second only to volunteers involved in religious field (see the graph).

**The percentage of volunters on activity cathegory (%)**



Source CAFR 1996

As to the distribution of volunteers on fields of activity, we have a typology of volunteer-based activities to show that the most frequent ones are those of helping and supporting the Church; taking care of persons in needs comes only in the third place (see the graph)

## Typology of volunteers activities (%)

**The percentage of donners on field of activities (%)**



Source CAFR 1996

In the matter of the legal framework, we can only point out the existence of a project for a law on volunteership that has not yet been debated in the Parliament. In its present form, the project denounces an obsolete, bureaucratic mentality and we expected it to be modified since it will, otherwise, obstruct the volunteership in Romania.

For the Romanian NGO's the means of finance is a key-issue. The sources of finance for an NGO are: donations, sponsorships, dues paid by members and subventions.

Regarding the amount and frequency of the sponsorship activities in 1996, three out of four firms made at least one sponsorship or donation. 72% of

these effectuated sponsorship only, 3% donations only, and the rest sponsorships as well as donations. Out of 2,500,000 demands for sponsorship during 1996, 44% had been accepted. 90% of sponsorships come from big firm that sponsored more frequently and at the same time in higher amounts than small firms. In 1995, the total value of sponsorships represented 1.1% of the GDP and the nongovernmental sector attracted 6% of this amount (DSSAR, 1997)

In Romania firms have more readily sponsored organization than individuals and from among the organizations those from the public sector rather than the nongovernmental ones. Regardless of the institutional frame the main fields to benefit from sponsorship and donations from the business sector of Romania have been: education, health, social care, sports, culture and art, and religion.

The most important reasons, which influenced sponsors and could influence potential sponsors to give financial support, are illustrated in the graphic bellow.

We can observe three types of motivations and, as a result, tree models of sponsorships:

a) social sponsorship – based on moral motivation (charity and sympathy to a cause ) - 32% of the firms



The most important reasons which influenced sponsors and could influence potential sponsors to give financial support

b) image sponsorship – adds value to the firm's image and this added value means profit on short and medium term; this sponsorship comes as a continuation of the publicity campaign which leads to the growth of the deductible publicity budget

c) the social responsibility of firms – sponsorship which drives of the conviction that a firm has certain social responsibilities that transcend its profitable interests (DSSAR,1997)

The next graph shows the main reasons for which firms did not make sponsorship. For 40% the nonsponsor firms the most significant reason is the actual lack of sponsorship demands. The refuse to sponsor by those firms that received demands is the lack of funds and the fact that the law on sponsorship is not stimulate. Usually, the nonsponsors are small private companies that perceive sponsorships as loses or as activities that do not generate profit due to a deficient legal framework.

**The main reason for which firm did not sponsor was...**
**(weak motivation=1/strong=5)**

If they decide to sponsor the following year 57% of the nonsponsors declare they would sponsor NGO's (see the graph).

**If they decide to sponsor the following year the nonsponsor declare they would sponsor...**



Almost two third of the total number of firms that have awarded sponsorships in 1995 or 1996 did not have any strategy (see the graphic). Firms respond to individual demand made by different organization. The decision to sponsor is rarely delegated in the exterior as well in the interior of the firm; very few firms have set up foundations specialized in sponsorship activities (2%). The decision to sponsor is taken at the top.

**Does your firm have a strategy for sponsorship?**

In connection with Romanian Law on Sponsorship (Law no 31/1994) over 80% of firms (sponsors or not) want its modification. They would like an increase in the deductible amount of the taxable income (which is now only 3%) or the correlation of this one with a decrease of the tax on profit (see the graphic bellow). Besides the facts that it is not stimulative the way in which the law is being interpreted and applied by the fiscal control authorities generate further difficulties as to the recognition of the sponsorship activities and the calculation of the deductible sums.

**Should the current law on sponsorship be modified? (% of firms)**



POINT OF SPECIAL INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENT OF NGO'S SOCIAL CARE IN ROMANIA

Let's follow now the main lines of action on the most important problems which the NGO's on social care have to face.

In a first stage the development of NGO's on social care in Romania was linked to the protection of orphan children in the context of a real mass-media program about the tragedy of this children. The Romanian public opinion reacted strongly to this over mediatisation of only one aspects of the

whole phenomenon. Only the most deplorable and catastrophic situations have been evidentiated in a manner that created an impression of generality.

Interestingly enough is the fact that on the background of catastrophic mediatisation of the children's situation in Romania, an entire networkof social services for international adoption has developed during the first years after 1989.

A second line of development for the NGO's on social care in the first five years following 1989 was that of family planning and contraception (Baican, E. 1997).

A very important aspect in the activity of the Romanian NGO's on social care is represented by the abandoned children ("street children). The reality, however, shows how little efficient the actions in this field have been; there are tens of NGO's on social care in Bucharest which declare to concern themselves with resolving this problem, but the public visibility of the phenomenon is just as big as in the previous years. The difference between Bucharest and the other cities is huge, meaning that 70% of all abandoned children are in the capital. The approach to this problem proved to be deficient. We argue this point merely by the fact  that these children choose to live in the streets rather than in the institutions that provide them decent living conditions. That is because they feel like heroes, always in the center of attention of mass media and they got used to a life style of no compulsions. So it is obvious that these NGO's should change their methods in order to really solve the problem.

Another category of social problems that constitute a main concern for the  activities of the NGO's on social care is the situation of less favored communities, especially the Romany communities mainly in the last tree or four years. This increasing attention showed to the problem comes as a consequence of the special treatment by the European Union and other international organizations. Trough the PHARE program the E.U. granted for the years 1999 – 2000, 2,000,000 Euro for programs concerning the Romany communities in our country. Another important sponsor is the Foundation for Open Society (Soros). Two major problems are the main concerns of the activities led in connection with the Romania community: on the one hand, the construction of their identity, and on the other, the solving of their socio-economical and socio-educational problems as well as the increase in compatibility between their way of life and that of the other ethnic groups. The Gypsy is not rejected due to racial reason but because of social-behavioral ones (Baican, E.; Pervain, A.,1998).

Another sector on which the social services have focused their attention during the last years is the reforming of the penitentiary system. In the last two years there has been a continuous preoccupation for the introduction of probation in the Romanian judiciary system. The humanitary association Prison Fellowship Romania Branch has been especially involved in this field (those felons that do not pose an important threat to society may execute their sentence in liberty under the surveillance of a parole officer).

The socio-medical sector also had a remarkable evolution, especially since many categories of sick people have gathered themselves in the form of NGO's whose purpose was the solving of the respective socio-medical problems. One very significant example of such an NGO is the Romanian Movement of Anonymous Alcoholics, which has already 12-15 branches through the country (very little compared with the amplitude of this phenomenon)

The social services have lately immobilized their actions towards solving the problems that arise from unemployment. The social care services are firstly concerned with the socio-professional reconversion and reorientation of unemployed persons and with the granting of material aid to those families whose period for receiving the unemployment indemnisation has expired.

## CONCLUSIONS

So, if we consider the general evolution of the Romanian society after 1989, we may conclude that, - despite the minor inadequacies shown by this analysis, - the NGO sector realized some very important progress, paralleled only by that of the mass media. The socio-economical situation and the poverty strongly influence the evolution of the NGO sector, the activities undertaken by these and the amplitude of volunteership. There are, therefore, a large number of NGO's sponsor from abroad (in 1995, 60% of all NGO – funds come from abroad).

During the last 2-3 years the governmental sector has finally learned to trust NGO's and, as a consequence, a partnership between these two sector has been established.

Along with the freedom of speech and the right to vote, the freedom of association embodies a fundamental component of the civil society. It has been observed that the civil society as well as the NGO's are suffering a maturing process, especially NGO's and social care, fact which give us hope that these NGO's will soon be able to handle social needs in a more comprehensive manner.

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# THE FIELD OF SYMBOLIC COMPUTATION

## ALINA ANDREICA

**ABSTRACT**. The paper contains an overview of symbolic computation, a field that lies between computer science and mathematics. The paper reveals the importance of symbolic computation systems and of the algorithms they rely on; a complete classification of symbolic computation systems enables a thorough understanding of the possibilities offered by existing software systems and a forecast of future evolution directions in this field.

After the early success encountered in the scientific world by the implementation of numerical algorithms for solving various problems, simultaneously with the development of artificial intelligence concepts, there appeared the necessity to develop a different style in dealing with computation problems, emphasizing their symbolic aspect. The field of symbolic computation appeared in the 60's, with the synonymous names of symbolic algebra and computer algebra.

The goal of computer algebra is to develop rigorously specified mathematical (algebraic) algorithms, and to study aspects related to their efficiency and (hard, but mostly soft) implementation. Therefore, the field of symbolic computation can be defined as a research domain situated between computer science and mathematics, which designs, analyses, implements and applies algebraic algorithms. These algorithms process algebraic objects that are exactly represented in the computer's memory.

Symbolic computations do not use numerical methods unless all other possibilities are exhausted; instead, there are studied the inefficiency sources and alternative, efficient, algebraic methods are searched for. Taking into account these considerations, together with the fact that algebraic objects are exactly represented in the computer's memory, we can conclude that during symbolic computations there are (usually) no precision losses.

Regarding the external interface, algebraic algorithms are implemented as software systems that allow inputs and outputs similar to algebraic notations; this characteristic ensures a wide range of applicability.

With a little irony, we can say that symbolic algebra deals with subjects that are "too computational" to appear as belonging to algebra and "too algebraic" to belong to "genuine" computer science. Therefore, symbolic computation is strongly connected with the fields of algebra, analysis and numerical analysis [6].

## 1. The relationships between symbolic computation and mathematical fields

*a) The relationship between symbolic computation and algebra*

Algebra offers various constructive methods and tools, from Euclid's algorithm to methods of modern algebra. Birkhoff reveals the role of modern algebra in computations; many of the concepts and results from his universal algebra create a rigorous basis for the simplification theory, very important for symbolic computations. Moreover, the new theory of domains and categories [4], which implement object oriented and abstract type concepts into symbolic computation [3], [5], rely on algebraic theories (category theory).

In 1957, Hasse appreciates that the focus of algebra relies in the process (general rules, formalisms, algorithms) of solving the equations, this point of view being slightly different of Buchberger, Loos or Lichtenberger's vision on symbolic computation.

In algebra, the primary object consists in the general rules that an algorithm relies on, whereas in symbolic computation (and in computer science, in general), the central theme is the algorithm itself, its implementation and efficiency.

*b) The relationship between symbolic computation and analysis*

In symbolic computation there are implemented algorithms that solve analysis problems, such as: integration, solving differential equations, computing elementary transcendental functions. These algorithms consist usually in implementing algebraic solutions for mathematical analysis problems (for example, Liouville type theorems) and operate on different terms and formulas, generating a symbolic output.

*c) The relationship between symbolic computation and numerical analysis*

Many symbolic computations generate formulas that will be processed by numerical procedures; for example, when integrating a rational function, the first and possibly the second integration will be symbolic and the rest – numerical. Numerical procedures are based on approximation theory, using a finite precision (for example, a numerical root of an equation can be isolated only with a certain approximation).

Compared to its numerical correspondent, a symbolic algorithm, being exact, requires a larger space of memory and a longer run time. Despite these practical inconvenients, symbolic algorithms are necessary and useful when an approximation is not suitable.

We can conclude that an algebraic algorithm will pursue exactly the mathematical specifications of the output, even if this means a loss of efficiency (for examples, counting the zeros from a Sturm sequence). Therefore, a rigorous analysis of the algorithm's efficiency becomes necessary for an adequate use of time and memory. Nevertheless, as hardware quality standards increase rapidly, many of these problems become easier to solve.

The main fields of symbolic computation, in which specific algorithms are developed, are: polynomial operations (factorization, greatest common divisor computation, polynomial remainder sequences), solving systems of equations and differential equations, sums, limits and products, differentiation, integration, computations in various algebraic domains.

## 2. Symbolic computation systems

The final, pragmatic goal of symbolic computation is to implement its algorithms into software systems to be used in various scientific fields that require mathematical computations; these systems are named symbolic computation systems (SCS). SCS assist the user in automatically obtaining symbolic results for various mathematical problems (see the enumeration above). The first attempt to use the computer for symbolic processings belongs to Kahrimanian and Nolan (around the mid '50s). Nowadays, SCS are extensively used in physics (mostly astronomy, general relativity, quantum electrodynamics), mathematics, engineering, and, in a smaller extent, in chemistry and biology.

In respect with their orientation, SCS may have general computation facilities or can be specialized on computations in a certain application field; they can have small or large dimensions.

Numerous mathematical methods and tools are systematically enough to be implemented into efficient symbolic software. Some of these instruments posses a high degree of abstractization and generated SCS that describe complex algebraic phenomena, such as group operations, implementing Lie and differential algebras, algebraic domains and categories (specialized SCS based on type theories, such as SCRATCHPAD or AXIOM). First SCS offered mainly only polynomial algebra facilities.

A research direction that strongly evolved during the last decade generated SCS capable of operating within abstract algebraic domains [2] – the systems based on the domain and category theory. This direction was initiated by SCRATCHPAD system, based on Lisp and designed by a group led by R. Jenks in the late '80s. The most famous system belonging to this family is AXIOM (R. Jenks, R. Sutor, 1992). A parallel research direction pursuing the same goal consists in extending classical SCS with operations in abstract algebraic domains [10].

R. Jenks sustained the necessity of developing a uniform vision upon symbolic computations; he introduced the class of domains with common operations and attributes, but possibly with different representations or functions [1]. Jenks, Davenport and Trager developed a specialized language for algebraic computations, based on the *domain* concept. A domain contains a set of generic operations, a representation for the data type corresponding to the domain objects, a set of functions that implement the operations according to the representation and a set of attributes for the facts that are true for any implementation of the operations. Domains are created by functors introduced for abstract (general) domains, named *categories*. For example, on the Euclidean domain category we can define the function for computing the greatest common divisor and from this category, various particular domains can be derived. The domain and category theory constitutes the theoretical base for the development of SCS that manipulate abstract domains (such as SCRATCHPAD and AXIOM).

One of the most important processes in algebraic manipulations is simplification. Any form desired by the user – from the factored one to the expanded one – must be available in the SCS.

Amongst the most widely used SCS we mention MACSYMA and REDUCE – from the "veterans" and MAPLE and MATHEMATICA – from the newer ones. Although there is a large variety of host languages and SCS that implement symbolic algorithms, a common practice is the exchange of packages. Therefore, the standardization of terminology and algorithms becomes very important in order to enable information transfers. The

difference between the user, the mathematician and the designer of a SCS cannot be very strict, since the comprehension of the system's facilities is essential for the user as well as the principles of the algorithms – for the designer. Furthermore, the algorithms must be efficient in order to generate a convenient implementation.

## 2.1. Classifications of SCS

Moses proposes [6] an interesting classification of SCS, in respect with the degree that input expressions are transformed, by borrowing terms from politics:

- *"radical" systems* – process a certain class of expressions and alter their form in order to represent them in the internal form; this internal form is the most convenient one for expression processing;
- *"left wing" systems* – appear as a reaction to the previous ones: they manipulate a large variety of expressions using tags for subexpressions, but are less powerful than the first ones;
- *"liberal" systems* – use the general representation of the expression and common simplifications but need large amounts of memory and time, therefore being inefficient;
- *"conservative" systems* – simplifications, based on Markov algorithms, are controlled by the user;
- *"catholic" systems* – use many representations for the expressions and have many possibilities of simplifications; these systems combine the simplicity of "liberal" systems, the power of the radical ones with context-sensitiveness of the conservative ones but have two major drawbacks: their dimension and organization.

A functional classification [6] of SCSs divides them into:

**1) Systems of polynomial and rational functions**, which manipulate this kind of functions. Some examples are: ALPAK (created by Brown during the '60s), PM (designed by Collins), ALTRAN (Hall and Feldman, 1975), SAC-1 (1971), ALDES (Collins and Loos), SAC-2. A few of the fields covered by these systems are: greatest common divisor computation, polynomial factorization, computing zeros of a polynomial, fraction decomposition, integration of rational functions, linear algebra, Gauss integers (including complex zeros computation), operations over fields of algebraic numbers. These algorithms are based on efficient representations and processings of polynomials, implemented in various programming languages (first SCS used Fortran).

**2) General-purpose systems** are designed to solve various types of problems, cover a large range of symbolic computation fields and, consequently, are widely used.

Their first representative is **MATHLAB-68**, designed to assist the scientists in tackling problems that involve common symbolic and numerical processings, polynomial factorization, differentiation, indefinite integration, direct and indirect Laplace transforms, solving differential equations. All computations are saved in a "working space history". An important facility of MATHLAB-68 is the possibility to be extended by the user.

MATHLAB-68 was written in LISP for the PDP-6 time-sharing system. General-purpose simplification facilities are combined with semi-numerical ones in rational simplifications. Outputs are displayed in a two-dimensional form, similar to mathematical formulas. Although MATHLAB was no longer extensively used during the '70, it influenced the design of MACSYMA, REDUCE and SCRATCHPAD.

**SYMBAL** (like FORMAC) is a command system that belongs to the "liberal" family. The goals declared by its creator, Engeli, are: generality of source system, concentrating useful information in the memory, efficiency of computations, time and memory space. The source language is an extension of ALGOL-60. SYMBAL enables rational arithmetic computations in infinite precision, contains built-in functions for differentiation and computing certain classes of integrals, Taylor series, trigonometric simplifications and outputs compatible with Algol and Fortran languages.

**FORMAC** system was developed by Sammet and Tobey in 1962; it appeared from the need to add symbolic algebraic facilities to a numerical language such as Fortran. First version of FORTRAN-FORMAC appeared in 1964 and the last version was PL/I-FORMAC, on IBM 360. IBM interrupted FORMAC experiments in the '70s, when the system was quite widely spread, in a variety of interactive systems. FORMAC routines performed simplification, substitution, differentiation, comparing and analysis of their arguments. For certain computations, FORMAC proved to be more efficient than SYMBAL but its simplification system revealed some deficiencies.

**SYCOPHANTI** system is based on unification and rewriting rules (Bergman) and uses Prolog as host language, a logic programming language that facilitates the processing of logical predicates. The system implements abstract data types and has special commands for generalized substitution and pattern matching; it provides limit computation and symbolic integration facilities.

**MATHEMATICA** [11] system is available on PC computers and was created during the '80s by a group led by S. Wolfram. MATHEMATICA is written in C and solves the following problems: numerical computations in infinite precision and symbolic computation, expression evaluation and simplification, computing sums and products, series and limits, differentiation and integration, solving (differential) equations (by symbolic or numeric methods), operations on lists, vectors and matrices, two-dimensional and three-dimensional graphics, contour and density plots.

One of MATHEMATICA's very useful facilities is the possibility to expand it with packages of notions and functions (usually, a package solves computing problems from a certain field), which would enhance the group of built-in facilities and the ones derived from the original system of packages.

**MAPLE** [7] system was created (also along the '80s) by a group formed by Bruce W. Char, Keith O. Geddes, William Morven Gentleman and Gaston H. Gonnet from the University of Waterloo, Canada. MAPLE was improved in successive versions; the latest Windows versions posses a very friendly user interface. Built-in facilities can be expanded by procedures written in Maple. The system is portable, has complex computation facilities and is accessible for various types of users, on the most commonly used types of computers.

MAPLE kernel is extremely compact (around 100 bytes) because it includes only basic facilities: interpretation, basic arithmetic operations (including polynomial ones), operations with vectors and tables, two-dimensional output displays, common simplifications, built-in functions and other functions referred in the kernel but loaded from an external library. This library contains function definitions for complex mathematical operations, such as greatest common divisor, integration, solving systems of equations.

**3) Specialized systems.** These systems appeared in the attempt to automatize algebraic computations from particular scientific fields, such as: astronomy (celestial mechanics), general relativity, quantum electrodynamics.

Astronomical computations are particular suitable to be implemented into a SCS, since most problems are modelled with Poisson series. As soon as it was noticed that systems like FORMAC or SYMBAL were not convenient and a radical approach was required, new, specialized, systems were developed.

**TRIGMAN** system is written in Fortran, on CDC-6000 series. First, it was supposed to compute only Poisson series but later, it was developed as a general-purpose system. Its computational facilities include operations with polynomial, Fourier and Poisson series and built-in functions for Fourier analysis. The user can control the degree of approximation in series' generation

and can perform trigonometric transformations. The system can generate outputs that are compatible to Fortran or Algol languages.

**CAMAL** (CAMbridge ALgebra) is a powerful system adapted to celestial mechanics and general relativity computations. The aim of using symbolic computation in general relativity is to obtain a classification for geometries described by field equations, which constitute (in the most general form), a complex system of second degree partial differential equations, depending on 10 unknown variables. Since the solutions for the field equations are difficult to obtain, one can rely on convenient approximations.

With numerous applications in other fields, CAMAL could also be considered as a general-purpose system; it contains modules for polynomial operations, Fourier series, complex exponential series and a general-purpose module.

**SHEEP** system, designed by Frick, was implemented on a PDP-10 machine; it consists of three packages written in specific machine language, which pursue some of the principles of already built SCS. The system contains routines for input-output, simplification, substitution, differentiation and is structured on three packages: a command type, user-oriented one and two for computing the Einstein tensor in various reference systems.

The most widely used systems for quantum electrodynamics are REDUCE and SCHOONSCHIP.

**REDUCE**, a very well known system, is written in LISP and can be considered as a "left-wing" system (see the classification in 2.1). First, it was designed as a command-type system for solving quantum electrodynamics problems but it soon spread as a general purpose system, capable of solving various problems Nevertheless, REDUCE's general purpose facilities had a considerable cost in the system's efficiency. Besides built-in functions, the user can define its own functions.

The system consists of a hierarchy of modules, based on an algebraic module ("on top"), whose facilities can be used in an ALGOL-type language. REDUCE was implemented on various types of machines, from IBM-360 to minicomputers and PC type microcomputers. Its extended versions contain packages for integration, greatest common divisor, solving ordinary differential equations, integral equations, real arithmetic in arbitrary precision, rare matrices.

**SMP** (Cole, Wolfram and others) performs algebraic manipulations in theoretical physics. A group led by the same S. Wolfram will create, along the '80s, the well-known MATHEMATICA system, released at the end of the decade.

In respect with their *dimension*, SCS can be classified in:

## 1) Large systems

The development of **MACSYMA** (implementation of MAC's SYmbolic Manipulator Project) began in July 1969. The system can be considered as a "catholic" one (see the classification in 2.1); it was designed in LISP by Engelman, Martin and Moses, as a general purpose system, which would not use too much computational efficiency, measured in response time and memory space). The system copes with various types of user requests, from small problems solved with built-in facilities to complex problems, for which the optimization of response time and memory space are of great interest.

In 1969, many basic symbolic algorithms were not general enough or were inefficient (for example, the factorization). Therefore, the MACSYMA group successfully focused on improving the existing algorithms and developing new directions in the development of algorithms. In fact, one of the great successes of symbolic computation is the discovery of new and efficient algorithms for various mathematical problems, such as polynomial factorization, solving systems of polynomial equations (the Gröbner basis algorithm will appear later) and integration.

In May 1972, MACSYMA was available on ARPANET in the United Stated. There were developed many MACSYMA versions, mostly on minicomputers (PDP-10, VAX-11).

**SCRATCHPAD** is also a "catholic" system, written in LISP, which accesses an important number of LISP compiled programs, initially implemented on an IBM 370/168 computer. The first SCRATCHPAD language contains a set of basic constructions, which use syntactical conventions similar to mathematical notation; these constructions can be extended by the user. By the version (II) that introduces computations in abstract algebraic domains, SCRATCHPAD initiates the new orientation of SCS based on category theory, whose most important representative is AXIOM.

The objectives in the design of the command evaluation system (in classical versions) were to obtain efficiency, and a high degree of generality and availability. The system can process not only algebraic expressions, but also logical ones and images.

SCRATCHPAD is a high level, non-procedural language, unlike MACSYMA, which is characterized by a traditional approach.

**AXIOM** is the most important SCS that operates in abstract algebraic domains. It was also created in LISP by R. Jenks and R. Sutor and afterwards extended with a new language. Like MAPLE, AXIOM consists of a kernel – but

of larger dimensions, because of its type system – and a set of modules that implement the algebraic facilities of the system and can be loaded in any moment. AXIOM modules are compiled, therefore the execution speed is increased and type tests are simplified. AXIOM is faster than MAPLE for expensive computations (for example, group theory) but slower for elementary ones. This characteristic is natural, since AXIOM was designed by pursuing *general principles*, which would make the system convenient for *all* types of symbolic computations, in various definition domains, and no particular computation was implemented independently, even if certain models would have made it more efficient (but less general) [2].

AXIOM implements the domain and category theory [8], enabling symbolic computations in various algebraic structures. Its classical symbolic facilities include: integer arithmetic in arbitrary precision, operations with rational / real numbers, and continuous fractions, elementary and special complex functions, operations with polynomials (factorization, roots, greatest common divisor), Gröbner basis, matrices and vectors, eigenvalues and eigenvectors, symbolic differentiation and integration, Laplace transforms, power series, limits, solving linear and non-linear differential equations, computations in finite fields, groups and Galois groups, tensors, Padé approximants, operations upon various types of data structures (lists, vectors, strings, etc.), rewriting rules and pattern matching, graphics.

### 2) Small systems

**MuMATH-79** system (Rich, Stotemeyer) was first implemented on INTEL-80/85 and ZILOG-80 microcomputers. The system was written in MuSIMP-79, a high level, structured language, derived from MuLISP-77 (Rich). MuSIMP syntax is influenced both by ALGOL and LISP programming languages. The system aims to respond to general purposes but its facilities are less efficient than the ones of REDUCE or MACSYMA. Another widely spread SCS on microcomputer was **DERIVE**, quite popular in the '80s.

These systems will be overpowered by MAPLE and MATHEMATICA, which nowadays dominate symbolic computations on PCs.

## 2.2. Designing symbolic computation systems

One of the most substantial difficulties that arise in developing a SCS is that the hardware is not designed for the manipulation of algebraic expressions; this drawback is compensated by powerful programming techniques and developing appropriate software. Expression representation and processing

must take into account common processing operations in order to increase efficiency.

The only SCSs that do not need software packages belong to the ANALITIK group, implemented on MIR computers (at the time, belonging to the Soviet Union). ANALITIK implemented numerical and mathematical analysis computations directly into hardware. Therefore, the computer was adapted to the language; ANALITIK is an extension of MIR programming language, designed for solving numerical problems.

At the other pole, there are the systems, much more numerous, designed by the means of a programming language. A proper choice for the host language is of outmost importance; the host language can be a widely used one, like C, Lisp, Pascal or Fortran, or a more specialized one. Once the system is created, it defines a new language syntax, which must be as "closer" to the user as possible. For example, in MATHEMATICA, the user introduces the input commands as functions depending on specific arguments, the function names being very similar to their mathematical significance: Solve, Integrate, D, Plot, etc. The mathematical objects introduced into the system have a special internal representation, in order to facilitate their manipulation (for example, in MATHEMATICA, a pre-fixed functional form). Moreover, the whole user interface must be user-friendly and as available for the user as possible; this goal is usually accomplished by using menus, toolbars and various facilities similar to other software products.

The designers of a SCS are also interested by numerical solutions for specific mathematical problems; in this case, the communication with the language that solves the numerical problems is very important. These communication aspects can usually have one of the following particularities: a numerical evaluation can be requested for symbolic results or a hybrid numerical-symbolic solution can be desired. Numerical facilities are well represented in almost all SCSs; for example, in MATHEMATICA, the user can request numerical computations for sums, products, defined integrals, solutions of equations or differential equations, numerical optimization problems.

Extremely important for the development of a SCS is to design it as an open system, which could be easily extended at any time with new facilities. In MATHEMATICA, for example, the user can always define its own packages for his specific problems; the new facilities will extend the built-in ones.

The underlying but essential base of SCS is represented by the algorithms that are implemented in order to solve various mathematical problems [1]. These algorithms must be very fast and efficient, so that the problem can be solved fast enough. But since the mathematical entities

processed by symbolic algorithms are very complex – represented with no precision losses – and the manipulation techniques that pursue various mathematical goals are also quite expensive (from the time and memory points of view), we can conclude that solving the efficiency problem for symbolic computations is much more difficult than for numerical ones. This necessity generated a strong research direction in symbolic computation, which performs efficiency studies for existing algorithms and tries to develop new and efficient algorithms, suitable to be implemented in SCSs. Therefore, due to these researches in symbolic computation, new algorithmic methods for solving mathematical problems were discovered [1].

## 3. Conclusions

Symbolic computation systems are software products that assist the user in solving automatically (on the computer) and rigorously various mathematical problems; they allow the user to obtain in a very simple way (from his point of view) exact results for all kinds of formula processings. SCSs are based on efficient algorithms, but the user does not have to be familiar with their principles, nor with the mathematical methods that solve the corresponding problems. The user interface is very friendly and, supplementary, powerful graphical facilities are offered.

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# II. EUROPEAN ECONOMY AND LAW:
## Capital, Markets, Banks

## THE GERMAN BANKING SYSTEM

### EMILIA MUNCACIU CODARCEA

**ABSTRACT.** The European Economic Integration has been a largely discussed and researched topic, because of the major problems and processes contained, of the subsidiary aspects and of the link between them.

Germany is a country that has recovered rapidly, strenghtened and become a European and world power, a force as well economically as politically. It played an important and fundamental role in the process of European Economic Integration and therefore, we cannot talk about it without taking into account the German Banking system, because it served as a modell to the European banks and because it was of extreme importance in the European Economic Integration process.

In the following I will try to present a detailed analysis of the German Banking System, structure and classification, as well in the preunification period as in the postunification period, trying to illustrate its undeniable importance when we speak about the experiences and traditions in Europe after 1945.

## 1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE GERMAN BANKING SYSTEM

Banks play a major role in the German system of finance for investment, so much that it is often characterised as being a "bank-based" system.

Banks are able to overcome the problems created by information asymmetries between savers and investors. Also, German banks are seen, in a widely held view, as playing an important role in monitoring and replacing inefficient managers of firms. For example, bank supervisory board representation may enable loans to be made on better terms by providing banks with better quality information about firms, or it may permit banks to lend more because they are in a better position to control managerial behaviour in situations of financial distress.

In the period after the Second World War, the German economy has performed an "economic miracle", in which banks had an important contribution, illustrated suggestively by Hallett (1990, p.83) in the following statement: "The banks helped to rebuild German industry ... after 1948. Firms rely extensively on loan, as against equity, finance, and the banks exercise an important monitoring role through their representatives on the Supervisory Board ... the role of the banks tends to counter <<short-termism>>, and provide a mechanism for reorganising management in good time, when a company starts running into trouble"[1].

As we can see, the close involvement of German banks with firms is seen as having the consequence that German banks are more willing to provide finance for long term investment than is the case in most other economies.

In Germany, the banking system is based on universal and specialised banks that carry various kinds of banking transactions. They are subject to supervision by the Federal Office for the Supervision of Financial Institutions ("Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen") which is exercised under the Act on the Supervision of Financial Institutions 1961 ("Kreditwesengesetz"). Section 1 of that Act contains a comprehensive list of all transactions regarded as banking transactions and all persons carrying on such transactions fall under the control of that Act and are labelled therefore as financial institutions ("Kreditinstitute").

Modern banking started in Germany in the course of the last century, and therefore the financial institutions carry all kinds of financial transactions, in a system of "universal banking". Thus, in Germany there is no legal division between commercial and investment banks, banks operating universally do the major part of banking in Germany.

There is, also, a small number of financial institutions which restrict their business to special fields, e.g. to granting loans against mortgages (Hypothekenbanken / mortgage banks) or to financing instalment purchases (Teilzahlungsbanken). However, in many cases, banks carrying on universal banking own those specialised financial institutions.

The structure of the universal and specialised banks will be examined in the following.

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[1] See Edwards, Jeremy and Fischer, Klaus: *Banks, finance and investment in Germany*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.2

## 1.1. Universal and specialised banks in the German banking system

As I mentioned before, German banks are typically universal ones. A universal bank is unambiguously one, which provides a complete range of commercial and investment banking services. It has been suggested that the definition of a universal bank should include the ability to influence non-banks through equity ownership, the exercise of proxy voting rights and supervisory board membership (see Krummel, 1980, p.35).

Therefore the structure of the German banking system looks different, depending on whether the former (wide) or the latter (narrow) definition of a universal bank is used.

However a legal definition of a universal bank in the wider sense is given by the German Banking Act[2], according to which banking business comprises:

a). The acceptance of founds from others as deposits irrespective of whether interest is paid (deposit business);

b). The granting of money loans and acceptance credits (lending business);

c). The purchase of bills of exchange and check (discount business);

d). The purchase and sale of security for the account of others (securities business);

e). The safe custody and administration of securities for the account of others (safe custody business);

f). The business specified in Section 1 of the Investment Companies Act (investment fund business);

g). The incurring of the obligation to acquire claims in respect of loans prior to their maturity;

h). The assumption of guaranties and other warranties on behalf of the others (guarantee business);

i). The performance of cashless payment and clearing operations (giro business).

It must be said, that the Banking Act forms the legal basis for supervision of banks in Germany and all enterprises which conduct any aspect of banking business as defined above are subject to it, with the exceptions of the Bundesbank, the Federal Post Office and insurance enterprises. "Any enterprise

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[2] Deutsche Bundesbank Special Series, no.2, Banking Act of the Federal Republic of Germany, August, 1986

conducting banking business is required to be licensed and supervised by both the Federal Banking Supervisory Office and the Bundesbank"[3].

As I said before, banks in Germany can be divided into a large group of universal banks and a smaller group of more specialised banks. The group of universal banks can be further on divided into 3 categories on the basis of ownership and legal form: the commercial bank sector, the savings bank sector and the credit cooperative sector. (Table 1 shows the number of banks in each of the categories used by the Bundesbank and their share in the overall volume of business for selected years in the period 1950-1988). Although building and loan associations conduct banking business according to the Banking Act, and are included in the monthly reporting banks to the Bundesbank, Table 2 is based on the definition of the German banking system, used in "The Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank and the capital finance account of the Deutsche Bundesbank , according to which building and loan associations are treated as being separate from the banking system.

The proof that German banks are typically universal ones is that all 3 categories together accounted for 79,6% for the overall volume of business in 1950, 74,9% in 1970 and 77,8% in 1988.

All banks in the commercial, savings and credit cooperative bank sectors are universal banks, because they are able to conduct the whole range of banking business as specified in the Banking Act.

The growth of universal banking in all three of these categories is a post-1945 development, since the historical origins of many of these banks, particularly in the savings bank and credit cooperative sectors, were as providers of specialised banking services rather than as universal banks. "In the savings bank sector, the traditional functions of the lowest tier - the savings banks - are implicitly defined by the special savings bank laws passed under Land (state) legislation, with which these banks must comply in addition to the Banking Act"[4]. These traditional giro-transaction facilities, providing credit to low - and middle - income house holds and fulfilling the financial requirements of the local communities, which are usually their owners. Therefore, their particular strengths and banking business reflect their traditional functions.

Also, the credit co-operative sector was intended originally to support their urban or agricultural members. But although the structure of the banking

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[3] See Edwards, Jeremy and Fischer, Klaus: *Banks, finance and investment in Germany*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.98

[4] See Edwards, Jeremy and Fischer, Klaus: *Banks, finance and investment in Germany*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.99

business of both the savings banks and the credit cooperatives reflects their traditional functions, they both conduct all forms of banking business.

Savings banks as well as banking cooperatives have themselves organised on a provincial state or national level, superior financial institutions by which they cooperate with each other and render services, which would otherwise exceed their functions or capacities.

There are also banks with significant ownership links with other banks (see Table 1).

A brief description of the main categories of the German banking system follows next.

**Table 1.** Numbers and share of volume of business[a] of various categories of German banks[b], 1950-1988

| | 1950[c] | 1960 | | 1970 | | 1977 | | 1988 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Share % | No. | Share % | No. | Share % | No. | Share % | No. | Share % |
| *Universal banks* | | | | | | | | | |
| **Commercial banks of which:** | **36.4** | **362** | **24.4** | **305** | **24.9** | **263** | **24.9** | **312** | **23.6** |
| Big banks | 19.1 | 6 | 11.3 | 6 | 10.2 | 6 | 10.4 | 6 | 8.9 |
| Regional and other commercial banks[de] | 12.8 | 108 | 10.4 | 112 | 10.7 | 109 | 10.9 | 163 | 11.4 |
| Branches of foreign banks[d] | - | 16 | - | 24 | 1.5 | 51 | 1.9 | 57 | 1.8 |
| Private bankers[e] | 4.5 | 232 | 2.7 | 163 | 2.5 | 97 | 1.7 | 86 | 1.5 |
| **Savings bank sector of which:** | **30.8** | **880** | **35.7** | **844** | **38.5** | **634** | **38.5** | **596** | **37.3** |
| Regional giro institutions | 10.8 | 13 | 13.5 | 12 | 15.6 | 12 | 16.5 | 11 | 15.6 |
| Savings bank | 20.0 | 867 | 22.2 | 832 | 22.9 | 622 | 22.0 | 585 | 21.7 |
| **Credit cooperative sector of which:** | **12.4** | **11642** | **8.6** | **7072** | **11.5** | **4817** | **14.0** | **3364** | **16.9** |
| Regional institutions of credit cooperatives | 3.7 | 19 | 2.8 | 13 | 3.8 | 11 | 4.2 | 6 | 4.6 |
| Credit cooperatives[e] | 8.7 | 11623 | 5.8 | 7059 | 7.7 | 4806 | 9.8 | 3358 | 12.3 |
| *Specialised banks* | | | | | | | | | |
| **Mortgage banks of which:** | **5.9** | **42** | **17.2** | **46** | **13.6** | **40** | **13.0** | **38** | **13.9** |
| Private mortgage banks[f] | - | 26 | 5.8 | 29 | 6.6 | 26 | 8.2 | 27 | 9.0 |
| Public mortgage banks[f] | - | 16 | 11.4 | 17 | 7.1 | 14 | 4.8 | 11 | 4.9 |
| Instalment sales financing institutions[ef] | - | 262 | 1.5 | 180 | 1.1 | 123 | 1.1 | - | - |
| Banks with special functions[f] | - | 18 | 10.2 | 17 | 8.4 | 17 | 6.5 | 16 | 6.7 |
| Postal giro and postal savings bank offices[f] | - | 15 | 2.4 | 15 | 1.9 | 15 | 2.0 | 15 | 1.5 |
| **TOTAL** | **85.5** | **13221** | **100** | **8479** | **99.9** | **5909** | **100** | **4341** | **99.9** |

*Notes*:

[a] Volume of business is the balance sheet total plus endorsement liabilities on rediscounted bills, own drawings in circulation discounted and credited to borrowers, and bills from banks' portfolios dispatched for collection prior to maturity.

[b] Banks reporting for the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics excluding the assets and liabilities of their foreign branches and building and loan associations.

[c] No figures available for numbers of banks in 1950.

[d] Branches of foreign banks included in regional and other commercial banks in 1950 and 1960.

[e] Category instalment sales financing institutions dissolved in 1986, and the 72 banks in it reclassified as regional and other commercial banks (42), private bankers (22) and credit co-operatives (8).

[f] No figures available for private and public mortgage banks, instalment sales financing institutions, and postal giro and postal savings banks in 1950

*Source*: ***Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank***, March 1961, April 1962, December 1971, August 1978; Deutsche Bundesbank (1989).

(from, Edwards, Jeremy and Fischer, Klaus: ***Banks, finance and investment in Germany***, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.100/101)

**Table 2.** The largest German banks by asset size, 1975 and 1988, DM billion

|  | Group balance sheet total at end 1975 |  | Group balance sheet total at end 1988 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deutsche Bank | 91.5 | Deutsche Bank | 305.3 |
| Dresdner Bank | 74.1 | Dresdner Bank | 231.0 |
| Westdeutsche Landesbank | 67.9 | Commerzbank | 180.4 |
| Commerzbank | 56.6 | Westdeutsche Landesbank | 171.1 |
| Bayerische Vereinsbank | 48.7 | Bayerische Vereinsbank | 162.6 |
| Bayerische Landesbank | 45.7 | Hypo-Bank | 135.2 |
| Hypo-Bank | 40.2 | DG Bank | 131.7 |
| Hessische Landesbank | 39.3 | Bayerische Landesbank | 128.0 |
| Norddeutsche Landesbank | 35.9 | Norddeutsche Landesbank | 107.8 |
| BfG | 35.1 | Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau | 97.0 |

*Sources*: For 1975 Smith (1983), Table 8.1 (a); ***The Banker***, October 1989, p.103.
(from, Edwards, Jeremy and Fischer, Klaus: ***Banks, finance and investment in Germany***, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.100/101)

### 1.1.1. Commercial Banks

As Table 1 shows, the commercial banks as a whole accounted for 36,4% of the domestic volume of business of all banks at the end of 1950, but since then their share has been considerably lower and fairly steady at around 24%-25%.

There are four classes of banks in this category. The big banks - Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank and their Berlin subsidiaries - are each stock corporations (AGs) and operate nationally through a network of local branch offices. Although they are the largest German banks in terms of balance sheet totals (see Table 2), their share in the domestic volume of banking business is not overwhelming (Table 1). They have interests in other financial institutions, particularly in private mortgage banks, because the issuing of mortgage bonds and granting of mortgage loans are restricted to mortgage banks.

The second class of commercial banks is made up of the regional and other commercial banks, which comprise all banks other than the big banks that are organised as AGs, partnerships limited by shares (KGaAs) or private companies (GmbHs).

These banks concentrate on providing universal banking services in their particular regions but some maintain system of branches which allow them to operate on a multi-regional or national basis e.g.: the Bayerische Vereinsbank, Hypo-Bank (Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank) are among the largest ten German banks. These 2 banks are permitted to operate as mortgage banks.

Another bank with an extensive branch network is the Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft (BfG), which was originally owned by trade unions and the cooperative movement, but was sold to the Aachener and Münchener insurance group in 1987. The share of this class of banks in the domestic volume of business of all banks has been fairly constant over the period 1950-1988.

As Table 1 shows, the other two classes of banks in the commercial bank group - branches of foreign banks and private banks - are not significant in the German banking system as a whole. Foreign bank branches are permitted to participate in the same range of banking activities as domestic banks. Private bankers consist of all banks organised as general partnerships (OHGs) or limited partnerships (KGs), since banks have been prohibited since 1976 from organising as sole proprietorships. The private bankers conduct all banking activities but they also tend to specialise in particular types of banking business (export finance, securities trading, industrial finance, property management or housing finance).

### 1.1.2. Savings Bank Sector

The savings banks were originally conceived not as profit-making concerns, but rather as state institutions with obligations to provide banking services to less well-off members of the community, to furnish credit on favourable terms to public authorities, and to finance local investment of benefit to the region in which the savings bank was located. In time, they have developed into universal banks, which compete with the commercial banks for most forms of banking business.

The savings bank sector has 3 tiers:

a). The lowest tier comprises *the local savings banks* (Sparkassen), which are municipal or district institutions incorporated under public law as independent equal entities. Each state (Land) has its own Savings Bank Act which specifies the structure and organisation of savings banks in that state, provides for their supervision by state authorities and imposes full liability for their debts on the founding municipality or district.

b). The second tier consists of the *state savings banks* or *central giro institutions* (Landesbanken-Girozentralen). They are incorporated under public law and are owned by its respective state government and state savings bank association which have unlimited liability for its debts.

The state savings banks serve as clearing houses for their member local savings banks, function as state bankers in their respective state and conduct banking business on an interregional and international basis. The largest state savings bank is the Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, together with the Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale, Hessische Landesbank Girozentrale and Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale.

c). The third tier is the *central savings bank*, the Deutsche Girozentrale (DGZ) which serves as the central clearing bank for the savings bank system and holds the liquidity reserves for the state savings banks. In the Bundesbank data on the German banking system, the DGZ is included with the state savings banks in the category regional giro institutions.

Although both local savings banks and state savings banks are universal banks, certain activities, such as securities trading, underwriting and international business, are more important for the latter than for the former. The local savings banks raise large amounts of funds from non-banks in the form of sight deposits and bank savings bonds, while the regional giro institutions raise relatively small sums from non-banks. The local savings banks tend to have a surplus of funds, therefore large holdings of securities, which consist to a considerable extent of bonds issued by regional giro institutions, which are the single most important source of finance for these institutions.

They also tend to concentrate on making loans to small firms, while the regional giro institutions tend to lend more to medium- and large-sized firms.

### 1.1.3. Credit Cooperative Sector

The credit cooperatives originated simply as cooperative banks providing credits for their members, but has since developed to become universal banks.

The organisation of the credit cooperative sector is similar to that of the savings bank sector. There are a large number of local credit cooperatives and larger regional banks headed by a central clearing house institution. The first tier of this section comprises *local banks organised as cooperatives*, whose members are local individuals and businesses. They contribute with provisions, which limit the share of the capital, which can be held by any individual member of a credit cooperative, with the result that the capital is almost widely held. In the event of insolvency the liability of a local credit cooperative's members usually exceeds the capital already contributed by an amount bid down in the bank's statutes (this amount varies, but is commonly equal to the capital already paid in).

The second tier consists of *regional central cooperative banks*, which are either stock corporations or registered cooperatives, owned by the local credit cooperatives.

The third tier consists in a *federal clearing house* institution, the Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank (DG Bank), which is a stock corporation, mainly owned by the regional credit cooperatives. In the Bundesbank data these two tiers are combined to form the category regional institutions of the credit cooperatives. The DG Bank is the most important in this category: it was the seventh largest German bank in terms of consolidated balance sheet assets at the end of 1988 (see Table 2). The regional central cooperative banks are much smaller than the state savings banks.

According to J. Edwards and K. Fischer, the relationship between the local credit cooperatives and the regional institutions of the credit cooperatives is similar to that between the local savings banks and the regional giro institutions. "The local credit cooperatives raise relatively large amount of funds in the form of personal savings deposits, while the regional institutions of the credit cooperatives do relatively little deposit banking business and raise the

majority of their funds by borrowing from other banks, in particular from the local credit cooperatives"[5].

The regional institutions also participate more than the local credit co-operatives in securities, foreign exchange markets, they handle investment and international transactions for their local member banks. They serve as clearing houses for the payments transactions of the local credit cooperatives.

## 1.1.4. Mortgage Banks

The mortgage banks provide a specialised range of banking services and are organised as either private or public institutions, under a special set of laws, which govern activity in this sector of the banking system. These laws generally limit mortgage banks to making long-term mortgage loans and loans to municipalities and other public authorities.

These banks fund their loans by issuing bonds backed by mortgage and municipal loans, and also by long-term deposits.

Most private mortgage banks are at least partly owned by commercial banks wishing to enter this segment of the market. In some cases the holdings of commercial banks in private mortgage banks are very large: e.g. at the end of 1989 Commerzbank owned 97% of Rheinische Hypothekenbank AG (the largest private mortgage bank), Deutsche Bank owned 93,1% of Frankfurter Hypothekenbank Frankfurt AG (data taken from J. Edwards: *Banks, finance and investment in Germany*, p.106).

## 1.1.5. Banks with Special Functions

These groups of banks with special functions comprise various public and private institutions, which have been formed to offer specialised banking services. E.g. the government-owned Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) was set up in 1948 to administer Marshall Aid funds for the reconstruction of German industry, and now it provides loan finance in a number of specialised areas, such as export, finance, finance of projects in less developed countries, environmental programmes and loans to small- and medium-sized German firms. A little, under half, of its funds comes from government loans, then from bank loans and bond issues. At the end of 1988 the KfW was the tenth largest German bank in terms of consolidated balance sheet (see Table 2). Other similar banks are Deutsche Ausgleichsbank AG, a privately owned bank, established by German industry to serve the financing needs of small- and medium-sized

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[5] See Edwards, Jeremy and Fischer, Klaus: *Banks, finance and investment in Germany*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.106

enterprises. The share of banks with special functions in the volume of domestic business of all banks has declined from 10,2% at the end of 1960 to 6,7% at the end of 1988.

## 1.2. The Degree of Concentration in the German banking system

It was often argued that the German system of universal banks with representation on supervisory boards might be very well suited to the exploitation of economies of scale and scope in information collection and in the exercise of the control rights attached to debt and equity finance. This leads to the idea that "an efficient system of investment finance may be one with strong elements of natural monopoly in which a small number of universal banks become dominant because of the economies of scale and scope that exist in information gathering and the exercise of control rights"[6].

In the following, I will try to show the extent to which such dominant universal banks do, in fact, exist in Germany, by assessing the degree of concentration in various parts of the German banking system.

## 1.2.1. Domestic Volume of Banking Business

As we have seen in Table 1, the German banking system over the period 1950-1988 was not highly concentrated. The largest three banks accounted for 19,1% of the domestic volume of business in 1950, but from 1960 onwards this share was only about 10%. Table 3 shows the share of the balance sheet total of all German banks accounted for, by the largest 5 German banks at the end of 1987. The share of the largest five German banks was 25,4%, while that of the three big banks was 17,3%. These figures suggest that although the degree of concentration in the domestic volume of business of German banks is underestimated by Table 1, the impression given by it is accurate: this is a banking system in which the 3 big banks are significant in terms of the volume of business of all banks, but not dominant.

Therefore, according to J. Edwards, the German banking system is less concentrated than is the UK system. Reading the data published in "*The Banker*" for October 1989, we notice that at the end of 1988 "the share of the largest 3 German banks in the consolidated balance sheet total of the largest 25 German banks was 30,4% while the share of the largest 5 German banks was 44,6%. By contrast, at the end of 1988 the largest three UK banks made up

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[6] See Edwards, Jeremy and Fischer, Klaus: *Banks, finance and investment in Germany*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.107

57,0% of the balance sheet total of the largest 25 UK banks, and the largest five made up 73,7%"[7].

**Table 3.** Share of largest five German banks in balance sheet total of all German banks, end 1987

| Bank | Group balance sheet total DM million | Share of all German banks' balance sheet total % |
|---|---|---|
| Deutsche Bank | 268341 | 7.3 |
| Dresdner Bank | 206938 | 5.6 |
| Commerzbank | 161731 | 4.4 |
| Westdeutsche Landesbank | 152504 | 4.1 |
| Bayerische Vereinsbank | 149663 | 4.0 |

*Source*: Own calculations based on ***Die Bank***, 11/88, pp. 645-647
(from, Edwards, Jeremy and Fischer, Klaus: ***Banks, finance and investment in Germany***, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.108)

## 1.2.2. Lending to Domestic Firms

From 1969 to 1980 the figures published by the Bundesbank for bank lending to domestic non-bank enterprises and self-employed persons excluded mortgage loans secured by housing sites, but included other housing loans and mortgage loans secured by real estate used for industrial purposes. After 1980 the exclusion of mortgage loans secured by housing sites was ended, so that the figures from that date onward included all forms of lending to domestic non-banks enterprises and self-employed persons for housing purposes, as well as mortgage loans secured by industrial real estate.

The capital finance account of the Deutsche Bundesbank divides the enterprises sector into producing enterprises and housing because housing finance involves rather different considerations from the finance of investment by producing enterprises.

Table 4 shows that the big banks' share of total bank lending to domestic non-bank enterprises and self-employed persons was larger than their share of domestic volume of bank business (the share of the big banks appears

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[7] See Edwards, Jeremy and Fischer, Klaus: ***Banks, finance and investment in Germany***, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.109

to have fallen, from 1970 to 1980, and then risen from 1980 to 1988). The shares refer also to the including or excluding mortgage loans for housing.

The main effect of the 1980 shift in the definition of bank lending to domestic non-bank enterprises and self-employed persons (from excluding mortgage loans secured by housing sites to including them) was to increase the share of the mortgage banks and lower the share of the commercial bank sector. The reason is that most commercial banks are prevented from making mortgage loans. Therefore, in 1988, the estimated share of the commercial banks in bank lending to domestic enterprises and self-employed persons, excluding mortgage loans for housing, was 33,2% of which the big banks accounted for 14,3%, the regional and other commercial banks 15,2%, foreign banks 1,3% and private bankers 2,4%.

**Table 4.** Bank lending to domestic non-bank enterprises and self-employed persons by various categories of bank, 1970, 1980 and 1988, %

|  | End 1970[a] | End 1980[a] | End 1980[b] | End 1988[b] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Commercial banks of which:** | **36.3** | **30.0** | **25.9** | **28.7** |
| Big banks | 16.0 | 12.5 | 10.5 | 12.0 |
| Regional and other commercial banks | 16.5 | 13.4 | 12.0 | 13.6 |
| Branches of foreign banks | - | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.1 |
| Private bankers | 3.8 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| **Savings bank sector of which:** | **32.3** | **35.6** | **36.9** | **34.9** |
| Regional giro institutions | 14.5 | 13.6 | 14.4 | 11.9 |
| Savings banks | 17.8 | 22.0 | 22.5 | 23.0 |
| **Credit co-operative sector of which:** | **12.7** | **17.7** | **15.3** | **15.8** |
| Regional institutions of credit co-operatives | 1.9 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 2.0 |
| Credit co-operatives | 10.8 | 15.0 | 13.1 | 13.8 |
| **Mortgage banks of which:** | **7.1** | **7.3** | **14.7** | **14.5** |
| Private mortgage banks | 4.9 | 5.9 | 8.6 | 9.4 |
| Public mortgage banks | 2.2 | 1.4 | 6.1 | 5.1 |
| Instalment sales financing institutions | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.1 | - |
| Banks with special functions | 8.1 | 5.1 | 3.6 | 4.0 |
| Postal giro and postal savings bank offices | 2.4 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.1 |
| **TOTAL** | **100.1** | **99.9** | **99.8** | **100.0** |

*Notes*:
[a] Excluding mortgage loans secured by housing sites.
[b] Including mortgage loans secured by housing sites.
*Sources*: Statistical Supplements to the ***Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank***, Series 1, Banking Statistics, Table 6, December 1971, April 1981, August 1989.
(from, Edwards, Jeremy and Fischer, Klaus: ***Banks, finance and investment in Germany***, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.110)

### 1.2.3. The Corporate Governance Role of Banks

The important role that German banks can play in corporate governance in Germany derives from their control of equity voting rights at shareholders' meetings. Banks can have a significant influence on the outcome of votes at shareholders' meetings and in particular on shareholder representation on supervisory boards. Because the vast majority of German shares are unregistered bearer ones, many shareholders, particularly private individuals, use the banks' securities deposit service for the safe custody and administration of their shares.

Before 1965 the Depotstimmrecht (deposit voting right) of banks took the form of depositors being able to authorise banks to exercise their voting rights for periods of 15 months at a time.

After 1965, a bank to which a 15-month proxy voting right has been given, must indicate to the depositors how it intends to vote on the various issues on the agenda at a particular shareholders' meeting, and ask the depositor for directions as to how the bank should exercise the proxy votes.

The proxy votes exercised by banks on behalf of shareholders are the major source of banks' ability to control the outcome of votes at shareholders' meetings. In 1988, according to Bundesbank figures[8], 53,5% of the total nominal value of German shares (excluding insurance enterprise share) was deposited with banks, and banks' own holdings were 8,1% giving a combined figure of 61,6%.

We can see that banks have the potential to exert a great deal of influence on the outcome of votes at shareholders' meetings.

Table 5 shows the distribution of deposited shares between various categories of banks in 1977 and 1988 (the 1977 figures are taken from the Report of the Commission for Fundamental Problems of the Credit Sector, or Gessler Commission, while the 1988 figures come from the Bundesbank's security deposit statistic).

More than half of the commercial banks' holdings of deposited shares were accounted for by the big bank which held 47,5% of all deposited shares in 1977 and 44,6% in 1988.

Table 6 shows the results of the investigations by the Gessler Commission into the holdings by individual banks of 10% or more of the equity of non-bank companies, including large GmbHs as well as AGs, on 31 December

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[8] Supplement to Statistical Supplements to the ***Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank***, Series 1, Banking Statistics by Category of Banks, July 1989, no. 7, p.3.

1974. The largest 10 bank holders of non-bank equity stakes of 10% or more accounted for 75,8% of the nominal value of all such bank holdings.

We notice that bank control of equity voting rights is to a large extent concentrated in the hands of the big banks. This concentration is reflected in bank representation on supervisory boards.

Table 7, taken from a report of the German Monopoly Commission, provides details of bank representation on the supervisory boards of all AGs, KGaAs and GmbHs in 1974.

The big banks had over 40% of the total bank representation in the supervisory boards of AGs, and the commercial banks as a whole accounted for 83,9%. For GmbHs, bank representation in supervisory boards was less concentrated than for AGs and therefore the concentration of bank representation on supervisory boards in the hands of the big banks was less pronounced for all companies than it was for AGs alone.

J. Edwards concludes: "The ability of banks to influence the management of AGs through control of equity voting rights and supervisory board representation is concentrated among the big banks, and more generally within the commercial bank sector"[9].

**Table 5.** Nominal value of deposits of domestic shares with banks by category of bank, end 1977 and end 1988, % of total

|  | End 1977 | End 1988 |
|---|---|---|
| **Commercial banks of which:** | **76.4** | **77.7** |
| Big banks | 47.5 | 44.6 |
| Regional and other commercial banks | 21.5 | 27.2 |
| Branches of foreign banks | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Private bankers | 7.1 | 5.7 |
| **Savings bank sector of which:** | **18.6** | **16.3** |
| Regional giro institutions | 9.0 | 7.8 |
| Savings banks | 9.6 | 8.5 |
| **Credit cooperative sector of which:** | **3.1** | **4.7** |
| Regional institutions of credit cooperatives | 0.6 | 1.6 |
| Credit cooperatives | 2.5 | 3.0 |
| **Other banks** | **1.9** | **1.3** |
| **TOTAL** | **100.0** | **100.0** |

*Note*:
[a] Figures for 1988 are for domestic shares excluding insurance enterprise shares.

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[9] See Edwards, Jeremy and Fischer, Klaus: ***Banks, finance and investment in Germany***, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.116

*Sources*: Gessler Commission and Supplement to ***Statistical Supplements to the Monthly Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank***, Series 1, July 1989, no. 7. (from, Edwards, Jeremy and Fischer, Klaus: ***Banks, finance and investment in Germany***, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.113)

**Table 6.** Ownership of non-bank companies by type of bank, 1974

| | No. of banks in survey | No. of banks with equity holdings in non-banks | Holdings in non-banks | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | | No. | Nominal value DM million | % of total nominal value |
| Big banks[a] | 6 | 6 | 87 | 1489,4 | 41.0 |
| Regional banks and other credit banks | 112 | 41 | 211 | 740,5 | 20.4 |
| Private banks | 123 | 35 | 101 | 188,7 | 5.2 |
| Regional giro institutions | 12 | 12 | 135 | 901,8 | 24.8 |
| Savings banks | 53 | 25 | 62 | 72,6 | 2.0 |
| Regional institutions of credit cooperatives | 12 | 11 | 45 | 158,8 | 4.4 |
| Banks with special functions | 18 | 8 | 21 | 80,5 | 2.2 |
| **TOTAL** | **336** | **138** | **662** | **3631,8** | **100.0** |

*Note*:
[a] Including Berlin subsidiaries.
*Source*: Gessler Commission, para. 295.
(from, Edwards, Jeremy and Fischer, Klaus: ***Banks, finance and investment in Germany***, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.115)

**Table 7**. Bank representation on supervisory boards by bank group, 1974

| | AGs | | GmbHs | | All AGs, KGaAs, GmbHs | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | No. of representatives | % | No. of representatives | % | No. of representatives | % |
| Big banks | 405 | 41.1 | 71 | 20.4 | 483 | 34.5 |
| Regional and other commercial banks | 252 | 25.6 | 55 | 15.8 | 314 | 22.4 |
| Private bankers | 170 | 17.2 | 14 | 4.0 | 185 | 13.2 |
| Regional giro institutions | 86 | 8.7 | 82 | 23.6 | 170 | 12.2 |
| Savings banks | 29 | 2.9 | 66 | 19.0 | 119 | 8.5 |
| Credit cooperative sector | 19 | 1.9 | 31 | 8.9 | 73 | 5.2 |
| Banks with special functions | 25 | 2.5 | 29 | 8.3 | 55 | 3.9 |
| **TOTAL** | **986** | **99.9** | **348** | **100.0** | **1399** | **99.9** |

## 1.2.4. Underwriting of New Share Issues

The usual procedure by which a listed AG in Germany issues shares, whether as an initial public offering or as an issue by an already listed company, involves a syndicate of banks first buying the issue from the company at a price negotiated between the company and the syndicate. Then the syndicate offers the shares to the market and bears the risk of placing the issue, whose details are arranged by the leader of the syndicate (usually the house bank of the company). All the members of the syndicate receive a fee for the risk they bear in underwriting the issue, and the leader receives an additional fee for arranging the details of the issue.

Table 8 shows the importance of various categories of banks among the 76 banks surveyed by the Gessler Commission both as participants in syndicates for new share issue by domestic firms and as leaders of such syndicates. In this period banks from the commercial bank sector dominated these syndicates.

The dominant position of the big banks, especially Deutsche Bank was most marked in the issuing syndicates for large listed AGs. Table 9 shows again the results of an investigation by the Gessler Commission into the composition of the issuing syndicates of 71 large listed AGs in 1974, 1975.

The underwriting of new share issues by domestic firms is, therefore, concentrated in the hands of the big banks, especially so far as the leadership of issuing syndicates for large listed AGs is concerned.

The report of the Gessler Commission concluded by saying that "access to these syndicates, especially those for new share issues, was not easy for other banks, even if these banks had adequate capital market-and-placement-power..."[10]

Underwriting business is subject to significant entry barriers and those banks which are members of new share issues syndicates are in a position to earn monopoly profits from their underwriting activity.

Another aspect of German banks' role as underwriters of new share issues concerns initial public offerings, when AGs first obtain a listing on the German stock market.

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[10] See Edwards, Jeremy and Fischer, Klaus: ***Banks, finance and investment in Germany***, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.118

The exclusive right of banks to apply for the admission of a new security to the primary stock market tier (the official market) is contained in Section 36 of the Stock Exchange Act. Therefore, any firm, which wishes to have its securities tested on the stock market, must submit itself to the scrutiny of a bank, which will apply for admission and organise the issue. As a consequence, banks are in a position where they can in principle ensure that only good-quality firms receive a listing on the German stock market.

J. Edwards and K. Fischer offer a detailed analysis of the period 1959-1989. The conclusion was that there has been a market change in the significance of initial public offerings in Germany in the 1980s and that German banks created an active market for initial public offerings by firms which wanted wider access to supplies of equity finance.

**Table 8.** Importance of various categories of banks in syndicates for new share issues by domestic firms, 1966 - 1975

| No. of banks in category | Category of banks | Proportion of | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Leaders of syndicates | Total no. of cases of participation in syndicates |
| 6 | Big banks[a] | 60.3 | 30.7 |
| 29 | Regional and other commercial banks | 25.1 | 32.5 |
| 28 | Private bankers | 8.6 | 27.7 |
| 13 | Regional giro institutions and DG Bank | 6.0 | 9.1 |
| | **Total** | **100.0** | **100.0** |
| | | (537 cases) | (2925 cases) |

*Note*:

[a] Including Berlin subsidiaries.

*Source*: Gessler Commission, Tables 17 and 25.

(from, Edwards, Jeremy and Fischer, Klaus: ***Banks, finance and investment in Germany***, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.117)

**Table 9.** Membership of various categories of banks in issuing syndicates of 71 large listed AGs, 1974/75, %

| No. of banks in category | Category of banks | Proportion of syndicates of 71 AGs of which bank was | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Leader | Member |
| 3 | **Big banks of which:** | **81.7** | **98.6** |
| | Deutsche Bank | 54.9 | 97.2 |
| | Dresdner Bank | 25.4 | 84.5 |
| | Commerzbank | 1.4 | 73.2 |
| 3 | **Largest regional and other commercial banks**[a] | **4.2** | **62.0** |
| 14 | **Savings bank sector** | **5.6** | **33.8** |
| 1 | **DG Bank** | **-** | **9.9** |
| 74 | **Other banks**[b] | **8.5** | **94.4** |

*Note*:

[a] Bayerische Vereinsbank, Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechsel Bank, Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft.

[b] Regional and other commercial banks and private bankers

*Source*: Gessler Commission, Table 27.

(from, Edwards, Jeremy and Fischer, Klaus: ***Banks, finance and investment in Germany***, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.118)


## CONCLUSIONS

As we have noticed in my attempt to present the German banking system, we could notice the major problems that arise when dealing with this subject.

First, Germany must be regarded in the economic and political background: the post-1945 period and the reunification period.

Secondly, Germany is a country that has recovered rapidly, strengthened and become a European, and why not, a world power, a force as well economically as politically.

Therefore, we cannot speak about European Economic Integration or Monetary Unification without taking into account the major factor that is Germany.

As we have seen, the German banking system has been relatively un-concentrated in the post-1945 period. There are 3 categories of universal banks - *the commercial banks, the savings bank sector and the credit cooperative sector*. Within each of these categories there is a large number of banks and although

many of them are rather small banks, there is no evidence that a small number of universal banks is dominant in the bank system, whether in terms of their share of the overall volume of business of German banks, or in terms of their share of total German bank lending to domestic non bank enterprises and self-employed persons.

A narrow definition of a universal bank regards banks as having the ability to influence non-banks through equity ownership, the exercise of proxy voting rights, and supervisory board membership.

We can also describe the three big banks as dominant in the German banking system.

Competition among the numerous banks in Germany is to some extent limited by region. The local savings banks and credit cooperatives operate in only a single regional market, while typically the regional and other commercial banks, the regional giro institutions and the regional institutions of the credit co-operatives operate in several regional markets. Only the big banks and a few others operate throughout Germany.

Bank control of equity voting rights and representation on company supervisory boards has been far more concentrated, with 3 big banks having a much greater share in these activities than they did in total bank lending to firms.

Furthermore, the contradiction between the significant degree of concentration in German banks' corporate governance activities and the lack of any significant degree of concentration in German bank lending to firms raises a number of questions about the hypothesis that there are economies of scope between the monitoring of management and the provision of external finance in the form of bank loans.

As we have seen, the German Banking System and especially the Deutsche Bundesbank, was of extreme significance for the European Economic Integration Process, because of its complex and yet clear structure, of the minute details and aspects it takes into account, serving thus as a modell and as a pillar for the European System of Banks.

So, when we speak about European experiences and tradition, Germany had its significant contribution that cannot be overlooked or not presented in its full complexity.

The tables and data presented in this paper are taken from the researches of important institutes (e.g. The Bundesbank's Report on 1995), as well as of important authors and economists (e.g. Jeremy Edwards and Klaus Fischer, Ross Cranston, Paul Welfens a.o.).

Of course the subject of the German banking system, as well as the European Economic Integration can be largely discussed and analysed, but I tried to present as clear and specific as possible an overview of it and hope, therefore, to have increased the interest of a further reading and research of this topic.

## ABBREVIATIONS

| AG | - | Aktiengesellschaft |
|---|---|---|
| BfG | - | Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft |
| DG Bank | - | Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank |
| DGZ | - | Deutsche Girozentrale |
| EC | | European Community |
| GmbH | - | Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung |
| GNP | - | Gross National Product |
| KfW | - | Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau |
| KG | - | Kommanditgesellschaft |
| KGaA | - | Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien |
| OHG | - | Offene Handelsgesellschaft |

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# THE CAPITAL MARKET IN THE CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITH EMPHASIS ON ROMANIA

## FLORIN DUMA

**ABSTRACT.** It is known that the Stock Exchange is one of the most important institutions of the capital market. The Stock Exchange represents the prototype of the perfect market, the place where those who offer capital (investors) meet those who demand capital (firms), where trades are made exclusively based on the supply and demand mechanism with a complete transparency of the price setting mechanism. I try here to present briefly the evolutions of the Stock Exchange Markets around Central and Eastern Europe and particularly in Romania.

In 1989 Romania changed the regime moving towards a democratic society and a free market economy, together with the other former communist countries in the region (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Baltic States, Albania and the States from ex- Yugoslavia and ex-Soviet Union). So, in this area appears from now a "new free market" - the Central East European Market - which demands reforms and CAPITAL (investments).

Thus, the rebuilding of the free market economy in Romania (as well as in the other East European countries) is a very difficult and laborious process. This transition to a market economy means reforms. The issue of property is essential in Romanian economy; any reform and restructuring implies the transfer of property – privatisation. But, at least at the same level of importance, is the need of capital (investments in this economy).

Financial capital is critical to the Central Eastern European economies' development. So, how to get this capital?

If you need money to start up a business or to extend an existent one and you have finished your own resources, there are mainly this possibilities to get it: from banks, different subsidies, mergers and in the Stock Exchange.

In the present situation in Eastern Europe getting subsidies from the state or other institutions is "a beautiful dream", unless you are a big state-owned bureaucratic and counterproductive enterprise.

Mergers could be a last solution and business people take it into account usually when there are no other possibilities.

But the most usual and realistic way in which companies can get money is borrowing from banks. But, this too, is not always easy in the area. In Romania for instance, the banking system is quite well developed; before 1989, during the socialist state economy, we couldn't speak about something like this. But after 1990 this sector has been a dynamic one and banks have appeared one by one (some owned by the state, some private and some branches of some major foreign banks like Merrill Lynch, ING Barings, Societe Generale, ABN AMRO ...)

Anyway, why is it so difficult in this case for an entrepreneur to take a loan? In the case of Romania, there are some particular answers:

- a huge inflation in these last few years:

| Year | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Inflation % | 210.4 | 256.1 | 61.7 | 27.8 | 56.9 | 130 | 40.6 |

Sources: EBRD, CAIB, EIU

- a catastrophic depreciation of the Romanian currency, "leu", to the US dollar and not with the same rhythm as the inflation:

*Average annual exchange rate, leu to dollar*

| Year | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 July |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lei to 1 USD | 24,4 | 76,4 | 308 | 760 | 1,655 | 2,033 | 3,083 | 7,168 | 8,750 | 15,780 |

Sources: EBRD, CAIB, EIU

- the bankruptcy of some private Romanian banks ("Dacia Felix" Bank, "Credit Bank", "Albina" Bank) and now the major state bank "Bancorex" is in bankruptcy;
- the legislation and political environment, which is, confuse, incoherent and little stimulative.

These answers are more or less valid for the other Central East European Countries, as well.

But we believe that the best solution for this problem (how to get financial capital) is the Stock Exchange Market. It is known that the Stock Exchange represents the prototype of the perfect market, the place where those who offer capital (investors) meet those who demand capital (firms), where trades are made exclusively based on the supply and demand mechanism with a complete transparency of the price setting mechanism. We'll try now to make a quick survey of the Stock Exchange Markets around Central and Eastern Europe and particularly in Romania.

Immediately after the 1989 changes in Central and Eastern Europe, the Stock Exchanges reopened one by one. The first was the Ljublijana Stock Exchange (Slovenia) witch reopened even in December 1989. This was followed very closely by the Budapest Stock Exchange (Hungary), in June 1990. After a year, in July 1991, the Warsaw Stock Exchange (Poland) reopened, followed by the Prague Stock Exchange (Czech Republic) in April 1993, the National Stock Exchange Lithuania, in September 1993. Sooner or later, in every capital city (and not only), from Central and Eastern Europe appeared a Stock Exchange.

Most of them reopened, because they had had a tradition. For instance, the Ljublijana Stock, Commodities and Foreign Exchange was established in 1924. Among securities listed on the Exchange, government bonds and corporate debentures dominated. The Ljublijana Stock Exchange was closed in 1941, due to World War II and then abolished in 1953. So the majority of these institutions have a history in these countries and they had functioned very well, but after the Second World War were abolished by communists (due to nationalisation of the whole economy). For almost 50 years those countries did not have one of the most important institution of a modern economy.

Trading in equities, in Romania, dates back to 1882, one year after the legal framework was ratified. With the exception of the two World Wars and the 1929-1933 economic depression the market grew to significant levels, reaching, in terms of listed securities, a number of 56 shares (oil, banks, industrial, mining, insurance and transport companies) and 77 fixed income securities in 1935. The maximum was reached in 1938, but after the end of the Second World War, in 1948 the stock market is left without any public companies due to the nationalisation of the economy by the communist regime.

Due to the slow reforms and weak determination of the authorities, the Stock Exchange in Romania reopened quite late compared to the other Central and Eastern European "colleagues". With the approval of the Parliament, in 1994, of the Securities and Stock Exchange Act (Law no. 52/1994) the legal

framework required for the establishment of a modern capital market in Romania has been laid out. The Bucharest Stock Exchange was set up following the decision of the National Securities Commission (as a self- financing and non-profit organism).

The official opening of the Bucharest Stock Exchange took place in June 23, 1995 and the trading started in November, 20 the same year, with the shares of six listed companies.

Since 1996, Romania has witnessed the development of the capital market institutions and a continuous increase in trade. During 1995 –1996 the Bucharest Stock Exchange only traded for two days a week, two hours per day. Now there are 124 traded companies out of which 21 are listed on the first tier (plus six companies which are not traded temporarily).

Almost from the beginning Bucharest Stock Exchange launched an official index: BET (Bucharest Exchange Trading), based on a basket of ten most liquid stocks listed on the first tier. It is aimed to show the market trends and to be used for derivates.

After a time, on April 1998, the Bucharest Stock Exchange created a new index, the BET-C. This broader index includes over 80 companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange, weighted by the market capitalisation of which stock. Both index BET and BET-C decreased almost all the time, even from the beginning.

Because not all the companies meet the requirements to be admitted on the Bucharest Stock Exchange, in Romania was set up an OTC market (Over The Counter Market) called RASDAQ. The model for this was the American NASDAQ Market – National Association of Securities Dealers Automatic Quotation. The RASDAQ Market is now trading the shares of more than 4,000 listed companies.

Beside these two institutions in Romania were set up a few Commodities Exchange Markets. The most important and remarkable one is the Sibiu Monetary-Financial & Commodities Exchange, founded in December 1994. It is remarkable because S.M.C.F.E. is the first commodity Exchange in Romania where futures contracts are traded. Here have been initialised several types of financial derivates; presently at the S.M.C.F.E. are traded:

- US Dollar (ROL/USD) futures contacts;
- Deutsche Mark (ROL/DEM) futures contracts;
- Italian Lira (ROL/ITL) futures contracts;
- Euro (ROL/EURO) futures contracts;
- BET Index futures contracts

The market is supervised and regulated by the National Security Commission and the professional standards of the Operators are being watched by the self-regulatory organisation National Securities House Association.

As we can see, the institutions of the capital market in Romania exists and function now, even if they were opened or reopened a bit too late. This is very important but, the problem is this prolonged decline – which is still continuing- (see the BET index evolution). The questions operators and authorities ask themselves are related to the causes of these decline and how could this be surpassed.

During the spring summer of 1997 the first impact of the Mass Privatisation Program created a boom of the market with impressive increases in prices and quantities. The holiday effect was followed by further decrease in prices and volumes. After this price normalisation, the market started slight growth, but not for long. In 1998 the Romanian stock market broke down. The BET index was down 50% in 1998, and in dollarized terms, down 64%.

It's relevant enough to say that the Bucharest Stock Exchange begun 1998 with 76 companies listed and a market capitalisation of 633 million USD and ended it with 126 companies listed and the market capitalisation of only 357 million USD !!!

Why this decline? There are many answers, both political and economical ones: the political turmoil (crises in the governmental coalition), the Russian economic crises, strikes, a series of credit downgrading by Standard and Poor's, Moody's and other credit rating agencies (which keep investors away) the bankruptcy of some major private and state banks and companies, and more recently the Kosovo war.

What are the solutions? You don't have to be Mafalda or an oracle for this. Almost everyone here knows the answers. Strong and real economic reforms, speeded up privatisation of "old" dinosaurs, an attractive and friendly environment for investors and the true commitment of authorities to do this.

The privatisation through Bucharest Stock Exchange of a certain number of key companies will be a challenge and a good moment for foreign investors or others to take advantage of this new capital market.

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# IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS

## HORIA BORA, HOREA TODORAN

**ABSTRACT.** The European Union is far from being a perfect construction. It is, nevertheless, the result of a long and difficult integration process started more than fifty years ago, aiming at a peaceful and powerful Europe able to compete with other economic forces on the world market. The introductory part of our paper presents the main steps towards the European unity that have been accomplished since the end of the first world war. We will focus on the permanent balance between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, the two fundamental approaches of the European integration process.

As we have already stated, the EU is not a perfect system; it was built by European elites and brings more advantages to these elites than to ordinary people. There is a democracy deficit we try to outline and explain in our paper. Last but not least we discuss, in the closing part of the article, another important aspect of the European Integration: the building of a European Knowledge Society and the contribution of knowledge to the integration process.

We mention that all these topics have been considered during the lectures and the workshops of the Summer School jointly organized by the Faculty of European Studies, "Babeș-Bolyai" University Cluj-Napoca and the Faculty of Education and Social Sciences, Westfaelische Wilhelms Universitaet Muenster (8-19 August 1999), on "Teaching European Studies: Approaches, Methods, Curricula".

## From Devastating Wars to a Monetary Union

The history of Europe has never been so agitated as it was in the first half of this century. Neither the Napoleonean campaigns (1806-1812) nor the Franco-Prussian war (1870) had the extent and the implications of the two world wars started in Europe and victimizing millions of people.

After the first world war a pan-European movement emerged from the stringent need of peace in Europe and as a reaction to the dim perspective of an inexorable fate that drove the money-powered Western society to dictatorship, perspective launched by Oswald Spengler in his famous book *"The Decline of the Occident"* (*Der Untergang des Abendlandes*). The economic decline of the continent and the rising of the extraeuropean

powers like USA, Japan and Soviet Russia, have led to the idea of unifying Europe in a federal structure able to re-build the continent from both economic and political point of view.

The main believes of the pan-European movement, initiated by count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, are formulated in the book "Pro-Europe" published in Wien, 1923. "According to it, the core issue was the European decay due to the obsolete political system, to the fact that the stress was laid on the clash between classes instead of on the inter-state relations, to the mixture of internal weakness and external vulnerability, following the rise of the great extra-European powers – Great Britain, Soviet Union, Japan and the United States –, federations or empires with joint resources, which generated a field of planetary forces, whereas Europe became more and more marginal because of its atomization in independent states." [3] The unity of the continent was seen as the only solution to bring peace, stability, to end conflicts and give Europe power to compete on the world level and to perpetuate its cultural heritage. A huge number of intellectuals adhered to these ideas: Paul Claudel, Thomas Mann, Reiner Maria Rilke, Albert Einstein, Sigmund Freud, José Ortega y Gasset and others.

The most concrete initiative aiming at the creation of a European federation in the period between the two world-wars was the project initiated by the French foreign affaires minister Aristide Briand (1929). He envisaged a federation supported by the Great Britain from without, to counteract the American economic expansion and to secure the peace on the continent. Briand forwarded its plan to Gustav Stresemann, the German foreign minister, during their meeting in Madrid, June 1929. Stresemann agreed on the economic advantages of the project, namely the strengthening of cooperation between the European governments, but disliked any transfer of the national sovereignty of the member states to a supra-national entity. He probably suspected that the proposal was meant to pursue the French national interest.

Briand has also forwarded its project to the General Assembly of the League of Nations, but the debates have been postponed due to the outbreak of the world economic crisis, which brought protectionist measures adopted by the states that were supposed, in the light of the proposal, to remove barriers and implement the liberalization of the international exchanges. This was the fate of Briand's project.[1]

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[1] Further information on the pan-European movement and the Briand project in [3] and [6].

After the second world-war the process of European construction has left its prehistory and has entered its modern phase. It was the British prime-minister Winston Churchill who called, during a very famous speech held in the aula of the University of Zürich (September 1946), for the *United States of Europe*. Three months later he initiated in England the *United Europe Movement* and chaired, in 1948, at Hague, the first Congress of Europe, where the participants (more than 800 persons including former ministers, members of national parliaments, economists, writers, industrialists) adopted a common position, the "message of Europeans". The document stated that it was about time for European countries to transfer certain rights or parts of their sovereignty in order to co-ordinate and develop their resources [6].

It happened three years later when the Treaty of Paris (1951) joined Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in the *European Coal and Steel Community* (ECSC). Based on the integrationist views of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, ECSC was the first European organization with a decisive supranationalist identity. The entire responsibility for the coal and steel productions of the member states has been transferred to the *High Authority*, a supranational authority constituted as an independent actor by international treaty.

The ECSC has been the basis for the creation of the *European Economic Community* (EEC or EC) establishing a common market among the same six countries (Treaty of Rome, 1957). The political process of the EC is well described by the term *"supranationality"*. However, the EC has always rested on a set of *intergovernmental bargains*, and the Single European Act of 1986, calling for the creation of a fully integrated market, is no exception to this generalization.

Since its creation, the EC has constantly developed, both in the sense of widening and deepening. New members have joined the EC: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (1973), Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986). Multiple steps towards a deeper integration have been taken: workers were granted with the right to work anywhere in the community (1968), an European Monetary System aiming at a closer monetary coordination has been created (1979), a common market has been established.

After the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the "cold war" in 1989, the integration process has speeded, with German Chancellor Helmuth Kohl and French President François Mitterand as engines. The people from the former GDR have naturally joined the EC after unifying with their brothers from FRG.

The Treaty of Maastricht (elaborated in December 1991, but signed only in February 1992) and the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) opened the way for the *monetary union* and settled the 1ˢᵗ of January 1999 as the launching of the common currency Euro for non-cash transactions. Euro notes will begin circulating from the 1ˢᵗ of January 2002. Following of the Treaty of Maastricht, the EC takes the name *European Union*. The Treaty also stated, for the first time, the principle of *subsidiarity*, it means that the EU will act at community level only when the objectives of an action can not be achieved at the Member States level or when, taking into account its importance and effects, the action can be better accomplished at EU level.

Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the EU in 1995 and Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estland, Poland and Slovenia have already started the negotiations (they do not yet fulfil the convergence criteria for the participation at the economic and monetary union, criteria set by the Treaty of Maastricht).

What is the European Union as a political regime? Is it a federation of states (Staatenbund) or a federal state (Bundesstaat)? The European Union is more than a federation of states and less than a federal state. It is a multi-level system of governance, an *integrated system of states (Staatenverbund)*. It is not only a body set up by international treaty; it is also a body which can formulate internationally valid norms itself. EU has its own budget and sources of income and does not depend solely on the contributions of Member States.

## The Democracy Deficit Problem in the EU

The European Union has been built by European political and economic elites. "The public engagement with the project remains indirect, the general affirmation of, or identity with its goals, is confused, accountability feeble."[4] As a normal consequence, public credibility, which is vital for any democratic polity, is constantly decreasing.

Politicians try to maintain their control over the decision-making processes and perpetuate the fiction that they have sufficient democratic legitimacy to decide upon the trajectory of integration. Ministers mislead audiences in the Member States preferring rhetoric to honesty. Bureaucrats in Brussels, representing the Commission are hardly democrats or pluralists.

There is a democracy deficit coming out from the weak institutional connections, from the asymmetry of EU governance. [4]

This democracy deficit, the disengagement of public from elite-driven projects, leads to a serious legitimacy problem. Legitimacy goes far beyond figures and percentage in elections; it requires a deep identification between

citizens and decision-makers. But, can we talk about an European identity to legitimate the political institutions of the EU? Can we talk about an European citizenship or an European demos as a reservoir of legitimacy required by any political body?

There are some steps towards a common identity: an EU flag, a passport or a driving license, which is better than nothing. But, it is by no means an European citizenship. Or, maybe, we can talk about a formal citizenship, rather the an active one. For instance, Maastricht confirmed the right to vote/stand as a candidate in local elections or for election to the European Parliament for any citizen, wherever they reside. But, it is still very difficult to imagine a Frenchman voting for SPD, or a German standing for the British labourists. This is the consequence of the lack of common identity between the two parties (citizen and politicians), identity that historically provides the basis of the sense of belonging to the national state.

Closing the democracy deficit is one of the main challenges that face the EU polity. Without closing the gap between political elites and citizens it is almost impossible to think of a democratic Europe. And, only a democratic and prosperous Europe is able to avoid major politic crisis on the scale of that which rocked Milosevic's Yugoslavia. After resolving its internal problems, the EU has to look again towards the East European Countries and re-start the enlargement.

## The Knowledge Society

The European Integration means more than a common market. Europeans must grow close socially, culturally and politically, having approximately the same high living conditions and life chances. An important resource for socio-economic development is *knowledge*. Efforts to accumulate resources of human capital transform countries in more or less advanced Knowledge Societies. Examples of more advanced Knowledge Societies in Europe are Germany and Great Britain, while Bulgaria, Romania and even Hungary are at the verge of becoming Knowledge Societies.[2]

What does knowledge mean in the context of knowledge societies? It has to contain a distinct quality which lies in the focus on *theoretical and scientific knowledge*. "More recent theories [..], in particular those of Daniel Bell, have elevated theoretical knowledge as the axial principle of society."[8] The decisive factor that distinguishes theoretical knowledge from other forms of knowledge is the method of obtaining it. "In the knowledge society – as the basic argument goes – the search for new knowledge is determined

by a systematically and theoretically informed method, while previous societies acquired new knowledge by unsystematic and accidental trial and error"(Matthias Wingens quoted in [1]). We just have to keep in mind the distinction between knowledge gained in research institutes and departments and casual discoveries (Newton and gravitation).

The term "knowledge society" is very much linked to the development of the *tertiary sector* in the last decades. Nowadays, any industrial production is accompanied by the appropriate services. A very good example is offered by the hardware companies like IBM, Apple, Sun, where incomes from the production and assembling of computers are outnumbered by incomes due to software-development, network management, sales and maintenance. "... in knowledge societies the production of value has shifted from mechanical production of goods towards production-oriented services like research&development (R&D), design or marketing".[1]

Another important relationship has to be mentioned: the development of nation-states towards knowledge societies is very much influenced by the advances in fields like *information and communication technologies* (ICT), by the creation of a global *information society*.

These technologies lead to an important increase in volume and content of data streams, the final result consisting in an interconnected global economy: "The most important consequence for national economies is a massive loss of their competency to macroeconomic management."[1] They also create worldwide social relations and lead to a global homogenization of cultures. The main social problem arising from the development of the ICT sector is the risk of dividing society in two social classes: those who are able to use these technologies and those who are not, "*have* and *have-nots*".

There is another question one might ask: which is the most advanced form of society: information society or knowledge society? What is the difference between the two types of society? In our opinion, the knowledge society is an information society itself, but even more than that. The information society focuses on the capability of processing and transmission of large amounts of data, which is also a very important aspect of the knowledge society, but, in this kind of modern society, the modalities of aquiring, the content and the demand for the data have at least the same importance. The concept of "information society" is not an obsolete one, it addresses a nowadays societal trend. Nevertheless, 'knowledge society' is a wider concept that better depicts the evolution of the society in the developed countries.

The term "knowledge society" can be used not only to reflect the structural changes visible in the most advanced economies, but also as a

normative framework for the member states and associated countries, which are still at the verge of these developments. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe that do not yet develop this way, but aim at integrating into the European Union, have to become knowledge societies as soon as possible. Knowledge societies are, by now, the most modern form of capitalist societies.[1]

## Conclusion

The European Integration process is a permanent balance between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, between transferring sovereignty to different supra-national authorities and cooperation on the governmental level. The European Union is an integrated system of states (Staatenverbund), a multi-level system of decision-making (regional, national, transnational, supranational and international).

Should this system allow new members to join the Union, or should it reform its structures first, and then, discuss widening? Taking into account the internal problems of the EU, especially the democracy deficit, it will probably happen the second way and even countries that have already started the integration procedures will have to wait for a decade until the process is completed.

In the meantime, Central and East European Countries have to develop constantly both in terms of socio-economic productivity and democracy.

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# LES INNOVATIONS APPORTÉES PAR LE TRAITÉ D'AMSTERDAM AUX TRAITÉS CONSTITUTIFS DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES ET DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE

## CARMEN LAZĂR

**RÉSUMÉ**. Le traité d'Amsterdam, signé le 20.10.1997 mais non entré en vigueur jusqu'à la ratification par tous les Etats membres, apporte beaucoup de changements tant aux Communautés Européennes qu'aux deux autres piliers de l'Union, les uns étant bons sans être vraiment indispensables, les autres étant "mauvais" en ce sens qu'ils ont été mal conçus et/ou rédigés. Les changements sont moins spectaculaires concernant les institutions, sauf l'extension du contrôle de la Cour de Justice, en revanche certains sont remarquables en ce qui concerne les compétences de l'Union et autres aspects liés au développement de ses piliers. Toutefois, ce qui était attendu de la part des Etats – c'est-à-dire l'amélioration du fonctionnement des institutions – a été reporté pour la prochaine éventuelle conférence de révision, une modalité malheureuse d'éviter d'affronter maintenant un problème qui, pourtant, ne cesse pas d'exister. Il est à espérer qu'un éventuel élargissement de l'Union obligera les Etats membres à accomplir une réforme nécessaire, réforme qu'ils ont refusé aujourd'hui d'accomplir.

En dépit des espoirs mis en lui, le Traité d'Amsterdam a déçu la plupart des spécialistes en droit communautaire (ou sciences politiques) ou, tout au plus, il a suscité des réactions réservées. Pour nous exprimer d'une manière plus prosaïque, "la montagne a accouché d'une souris" (ou, autrement dit, beaucoup de bruit pour rien). Bien sûr, on ne peut pas nier certains de ses mérites, loin de là, mais les réformes qui étaient vraiment nécessaires n'ont pas été accomplies. Il s'agit des réformes institutionnelles, car c'est pour elles en premier lieu qu'on a convoqué la C.I.G. de Turin (puis d'Amsterdam): on avait demandé depuis longtemps une réduction du nombre des parlementaires et de celui des commissaires, la modification de la pondération des voix au sein du Conseil, ces

changements étant considérés absolument indispensables si l'Union veut s'élargir (d'ailleurs, même si elle ne s'élargit pas, elle ne peut pas fonctionner de manière satisfaisante à 15 avec le système actuel). Or, qu'en est-il? Le nombre des membres du Parlement a été plafonné[1] - faudrait-il tirer la conclusion qu'on le considère comme moins important? – à 700 membres, mais concernant le Conseil et la Commission on a décidé ainsi: s'il y a au maximum 5 pays qui adhèrent à l'Union, le Conseil pourra établir une autre pondération des voix en son sein et, si cela se produit, la Commission aura un membre proposé par chaque Etat; ce deuxième changement est conditionné par la réalisation du premier, les Etats qui proposent aujourd'hui 2 membres n'étant disposés à y renoncer que s'ils reçoivent des garanties supplémentaires dans le cadre d'un autre système de pondération au Conseil. Si plus de 5 Etats adhèrent à l'Union, on convoquera obligatoirement une nouvelle conférence de révision au moins un an avant l'adhésion proprement dite[2] (mais quel est ce moment: celui de la signature ou de la ratification du traité d'adhésion? Et puis, en tout état de cause, on ne peut connaître à l'avance ce moment!). Donc, pas de réalisation majeure de ce point de vue.

Concernant le Conseil, on a établi que le COREPER pourra adopter des décisions de procédure dans les cas expressément prévus par le règlement intérieur du Conseil; celui-ci est obligé de faire publics les résultats du vote et la motivation de l'acte, quand il agit en tant que législateur; on a élargi la sphère de la majorité qualifiée en son sein.[3] Concernant la Commission, son président devient un vrai premier-ministre qui détermine les orientations politiques générales de l'institution, ayant aussi le droit de changer la répartition des tâches entre les commissaires en cours de mandat; autre modification importante, cette fois-ci liée aux attributions du Parlement: celui-ci devra approuver le Président de la Commission au moment de sa désignation par les Etats membres, ce qui renforce la dépendance de la Commission vis-à-vis du Parlement; d'ailleurs, les commissaires devront eux aussi être approuvés par le Président au moment de leur désignation par les Etats.[4] Concernant le Parlement, sauf ce qu'on a mentionné ci-dessus et qui représente une

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[1] M.A. Gaudissart, *Le Traité d'Amsterdam et l'avenir de l'Europe élargie* dans "L'Union Européenne et le monde après Amsterdam", p. 13-18, Ed. de l'Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 1999.

[2] M.A. Gaudissart, *Le protocole sur les institutions dans la perspective de l'élargissement de l'Union Européenne: vers un élargissement sans perspectives pour l'UE?, op. cit.*, p. 415-429.

[3] X. Mabille, *Le système de décision européen*, Dossiers du CRISP, Bruxelles, 1997, p. 6-7.

[4] M.A. Gaudissart, *Le Traité d'Amsterdam et l'avenir de l'Europe élargie*, idem; D.N. de Deuxchaisnes, "*Une réforme hésitante des institutions*, dans *Le Traité d'Amsterdam: espoirs et déceptions*, Ed. Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1998.

augmentation notable de ses attributions, on a élargi la sphère de l'avis conforme, on a supprimé la procédure de coopération introduite par l'Acte Unique, les matières qui entraient dans son champs étant incluses dans celui de la codécision (avec l'exception de la politique monétaire); la dernière est elle-même simplifiée, ce qui est un pas en avant vu qu'elle était un chef-d'oeuvre de complexité et de lourdeur; enfin, le Parlement pourra consulter le Comité économique et social, ainsi que le Comité des Régions, si le Conseil ou la Commission ne le considèrent pas nécessaire.[5] On a créé aussi un organe nouveau, le Comité des emplois et la Cour des Comptes pourra agir en annulation pour la défense de ses prérogatives.[6]

Une autre modification des traités, remarquable bien que reflétée dans des dispositions touffues et trop complexes, consiste dans le transfert des matières concernant la libre circulation des étrangers du troisième pilier – Justice et Affaires Intérieures – dans le premier – la Communauté Européenne – , c'est-à-dire leur "communautarisation".[7] Il s'agit de la suppression des contrôles aux frontières internes de l'Union, des visas, de l'immigration et du droit d'asile, ce qui reste dans le troisième pilier étant seulement la coopération policière et judiciaire proprement dite; la suppression des contrôles internes nécessitera leur augmentation aux frontières extérieures de l'Union, ce qui devra entraîner l'uniformisation des conditions d'attribution des visas et des procédures de leur attribution ou l'uniformisation des conditions d'entrée sur le territoire, l'établissement d'un visa-type et d'une liste commune des pays tiers dont les ressortissants auront besoin de visa, l'uniformisation des conditions d'attribution de l'asile politique, etc.; en ce sens les dispositions du traité – comme d'ailleurs les actes dérivés adoptés antérieurement en vertu du Traité de Maastricht – sont identiques à celles de l'Accord de Schengen, lui aussi integré à l'Union avec les dérogations existantes. Concernant le droit d'asile, un auteur a même affirmé que le protocole annexé au Traité est contraire aux réglementations internationales en la matière, ces dernières étant obligatoires pour les Etats de l'Union aussi et s'imposant donc à eux avec prééminence;[8] le Traité établit les critères d'après lesquels un seul Etat est compétent pour examiner une demande d'asile, à l'exclusion de tout autre; puis, ce droit ne s'applique pas entre les Etats membres, à l'exception des cas où un Etat viole les

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[5] X. Mabille, *op. cit.* p. 9.

[6] *Idem*, p. 10.

[7] R. Trotta, *La dimension extérieure de la circulation des personnes après Amsterdam* dans *L'Union Européenne et le monde après Amsterdam*, p. 107-141.

[8] Em. Bribosia, *Le protocole sur le droit d'asile pour les ressortissants des Etats membres de l'Union Européenne* dans *Le Traité d'Amsterdam: espoirs et déceptions*, p. 190-194.

droits fondamentaux d'une manière grave et persistante ou il entend déroger à la Convention de 1950 dans les conditions prévues par celle-ci; en principe, si un Etat décide pourtant d'examiner une demande d'asile provenant d'un citoyen d'un autre Etat membre, il en doit informer tout de suite le Conseil et partir de la présomption qu'elle est manifestement non-fondée.[9] Les conséquences de ce transfert sont: la prise des décisions d'après les procédures et les méthodes communautaires et, surtout, le contrôle de la Cour de Justice des Communautés, bien que limité par rapport à celui habituel: le recours préliminaire est exclu pour les juridictions dont les décisions sont susceptibles de toute voie d'attaque interne, pour les autres il est facultatif; les arrêts de la Cour en la matière ne peuvent plus avoir d'effet rétroactif; la Commission, le Conseil ou tout Etat membre peuvent adresser à la Cour une demande en interprétation des traités, une voie nouvelle dans le cadre du contentieux communautaire; enfin, la Cour n'aura pas de contrôle sur les mesures adoptées par les Etats concernant l'ordre public, la sécurité nationale, la moralité et la santé publiques – aspects pour lesquels ils sont habituellement compétents –, n'existant plus, cette fois-ci, de règles minimales établies au niveau communautaire.[10] Une autre disposition en la matière prévoit que les Etats pourront conclure des accords avec les tiers, ce qui signifie donc une compétence partagée.[11]

La PESC – politique extérieure et de sécurité commune – subit elle aussi des transformations: le secrétaire général du Conseil devient "haut représentant" de ce pilier, de même que le Conseil peut créer – si nécessaire – la fonction de représentant spécial; la "troďka" européenne se trouve confirmée mais avec une autre composition qu'auparavant, c'est-à-dire la présidence du Conseil, le secrétaire général du Conseil et le président de la Commission; on a élargi la sphère de la majorité qualifiée – un pas important vers la "communautarisation" de cette politique – aux actions communes, aux positions communes et aux décisions qui les applique, seule la stratégie constituant le fondement de tout cela étant adoptée à l'unanimité; pourtant, tout Etat qui invoque une "raison nationale importante" peut déclarer qu'il entend s'en prévaloir, dans ce cas on ne procède pas au vote et le Conseil peut saisir le Conseil Européen pour la résolution du problème (un pas en arrière); comme dans le premier pilier, les abstentions n'empęchent pas la formation de l'unanimité; enfin, le Conseil pourra conclure des accords avec les tiers mais au nom des Etats et non de

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[9] *Ibidem.*

[10] R. Trotta, *ibidem.*

[11] *Ibidem.*

l'Union, ce qui se déduit du fait que les accords pourront être soumis à ratification dans les Etats et de la déclaration annexée qui affirme que cela n'implique aucun transfert de compétence des Etats à l'Union (celle-ci ne recevant pas, donc, la personnalité morale).[12]

La JAI – la coopération en matière de justice et affaires intérieures – connaît plus de progrès que la PESC: on a déjà parlé du transfert de certaines matières vers le premier pilier; ce qui reste sera soumis au contrôle de la Cour de Justice, ce qui est vraiment une nouveauté bien que ce contrôle ne soit pas si complet que dans la Communauté: le recours préliminaire en interprétation ne vise pas les dispositions des traités eux-mêmes, celui en appréciation de validité ne vise pas – à part les traités, bien sûr – les conventions conclues avec les tiers par le Conseil, les Etats pouvant attribuer le droit de recours à toutes les juridictions ou seulement à celles qui statuent en dernier ressort; le recours en annulation, ouvert dans les mêmes délais et pour les mêmes motifs, ne peut pas viser les conventions; les différends entre les Etats membres, concernant l'interprétation ou l'application de tout acte adopté par le Conseil, et les différends entre les Etats et la Commission, concernant l'interprétation ou l'application des conventions, seront soumis à la Cour, dans le premier cas si le Conseil n'a pas résolu le problème dans un délai de 6 mois; bien sûr, le contrôle reste exclu pour les mesures prises par les Etats au regard de l'ordre public, la sécurité nationale, la santé et la moralité publiques. Toujours dans le cadre de la JAI, il y a le droit de veto qu'ont les Etats et qui s'exerce dans les mêmes cas et conditions que dans le cadre de la PESC; puis, en bouleversant la jurisprudence de la Cour sur l'avis donné par le Parlement Européen dans les cas prévus, on a établi que le Conseil fixerait des délais pour que le Parlement se prononce, la non-prononciation pendant ce délai donnant au Conseil le droit de décider sans l'avis requis. Enfin, ici aussi le Conseil pourra conclure des accords au nom des Etats, la négociation incombant à la Présidence et non plus à la Commission.[13]

Du point de vue des politiques communes – exclusives ou partagées – existantes dans les Communautés, le Traité opère des transformations en ce qui les concerne (en ce sens que des domaines de compétence étatique deviennent communautaires ou que des compétences implicites deviennent explicites) ou seulement leur apporte plus de précisions, ou les rassemble par rapport aux traités antérieurs où elles figuraient dans plusieurs dispositions. Ainsi, par

[12] Em. Bribosia et A. Weyembergh, *La personnalité juridique de l'Union* dans *L'Union Européenne et le monde après Amsterdam*, p. 57-60; E. Lannon, "La PESC et le processus de paix au Moyen-Orient: bilan et perspectives offertes par le Traité d'Amsterdam", op. cit., p. 259-290.

[13] S. Van Raepenbusch, *Le troisième pilier après Amsterdam et ler relations extérieures de l'Union Européenne, op. cit.*, p. 317-335.

exemple, la politique des emplois, la politique sociale, les services d'intérêt général, l'environnement, la santé, la protection des consommateurs, la politique commerciale extérieure.[14]

Une autre innovation du Traité consiste à introduire la soi-disante "coopération renforcée", ce qui signifie que les Etats qui veulent que l'Union avance au rythme des traités et ne peuvent atteindre ensemble le quorum requis en ce sens, ont le droit de travailler dans un Conseil restreint à eux seuls et dont les décisions seront applicables à eux seuls; pour cela, il faut que l'impossibilité d'adopter les décisions au sein du Conseil élargi à tous soit prouvée; d'ailleurs, c'est le Conseil élargi qui donne l'autorisation pour cette coopération, tout autre Etat pouvant y opposer un veto. La coopération – notion inappropriée, puisqu'il ne s'agit pas d'une coopération classique dans des domaines étatiques mais de l'exercice des compétences communautaires, exlusives ou partagées – peut avoir lieu tant dans les Communautés que dans les deux autres piliers, le régime juridique étant celui y correspondant; elle doit avoir lieu dans le cadre des institutions et selon les procédures habituelles pour chaque pilier, comme si on avait affaire à une Union plus restreinte (le problème, en fait, ne se pose que pour le Conseil, la Commission et le Parlement ne représentant pas les Etats et continuant, donc, à avoir la même composition); le contrôle de la Cour s'exerce toujours de la façon habituelle, selon chaque pilier. Enfin, la coopération ne peut affecter l'acquis communautaire et les objectifs des Communautés. Elle cesse soit par le ralliement des autres Etats, soit par la décision des Etats participants de revenir au sein du Conseil élargi.[15] On espère de ce genre de "coopération" qu'elle facilitera l'avancement de l'Union, les décisions qui seront prises dans son cadre pouvant avoir sur les autres Etats un effet d'entraînement (ce qui s'est passé, par exemple, avec la politique monétaire ou sociale ralliées finalement par la Grande Bretagne).

Concernant les droits des citoyens européens, le Traité a ajouté le droit d'accès aux documents du Conseil, de la Commission ou du Parlement, dans des conditions qui vont être définies par le Conseil par décision; la règle de la transparence est valable  seulement dans les Communautés mais elle agit pour les personnes morales aussi bien que pour les personnes physiques. Tout Etat a, toutefois, le droit de demander aux institutions mentionnées de ne pas communiquer aux tiers, sans son consentement, des documents émanant de

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[14] M. Fallon et H. Leclercq, *Vers une dimension nouvelle du marché plus proche du citoyen?* dans *Le Traité d'Amsterdam: espoirs et déceptions*, p. 298-323.

[15] C. Schmitter, *Coopérations renforcées et compétences externes de la Communauté Européenne* dans *L'Union Européenne et le monde après Amsterdam*, p. 77-103; H. Bribosia, *De la subsidiarité à la coopération renforcée* dans *Le Traité d'Amsterdam: espoirs et déceptions*, p. 49-76.

lui.[16] Le Traité stipule, d'autre part, que la Cour veillera au respect des droits fondamentaux par les institutions communautaires, ces droits étant toujours des "principes généraux de droit";[17] donc, ce qui diffère c'est l'introduction expresse et précise de cette obligation de la Cour, mais les droits et les libertés constituent toujours la même catégorie de sources de droit communautaire. Enfin, ce qui est très important, le Conseil pourra suspendre, pour les Etats qui violent manifestement et d'une manière persistante les droits fondamentaux de l'homme, certains droits résultant des traités, y compris celui de vote. D'ailleurs, le respect des droits fondamentaux a été introduit comme une condition expresse d'adhésion à l'Union.[18]

Nous avons essayé d'esquisser les plus importantes modifications apportées par le Traité d'Amsterdam, certaines d'entre elles étant bonnes sans être vraiment nécessaires, certaines étant en revanche "mauvaises", c'est-à-dire trop imprécises, complexes et risquant d'embarasser ceux qui seront chargés de leur mise en oeuvre. Comme on a montré en début d'article, certains changements qui étaient nécessaires n'ont pas été faits; espérons que les Etats membres auront la sagesse de renoncer à leur orgueil "souverain" et de penser plus au bon fonctionnement des institutions communautaires, sous peine de voir paralysée leur propre création.

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[16] M. Wathelet, *La Cour de Justice: acteur et objet des réformes du Traité d'Amsterdam*, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

[17] *Idem*, p. 133-134.

[18] *Ibidem*, O. de Schoutter, *Les droits fondamentaux dans le Traité d'Amsterdam*, *op. cit.*, p. 170-187.

# III. PAPERS AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE "CULTURA EUROPAEA" (PAMPLONA, OCTOBER 1999)

## MODELS OF EUROPEAN COHABITATION - DYNAMICS OF THE MAJORITY-MINORITY PROCESSES-

### CIPRIAN PĂUN

## 1. Generalities

### A) The concept of ethnic minority

Semantically the minority is the opposite of the majority, covering the area of a group of subjects having common characteristics. The minority is part of the "demos" and not a complementary or parallel structure. In the 5th century B. C. "demos" designated the Athenian community gathered in ekklesia, the folk gathering. Even so, the "demos" can be assimilated to the organism (the *organic* notion of "people"). When the term "demos" is translated by the Latin "populus" the ambiguities increase. For fifteen centuries the concept used was "populos", which means that the doctrine of the "sovereignty of the people" incorporated in our democracy is of Roman origin, and not Greek. The Roman languages bring a specific approach in the European languages. The term of "populo", as well as its equivalents in French and German, designate a singular entity whereas the English word "people" has a plural meaning, being a collective noun.[1] The discussion becomes relevant in the case of approaching the concept of "self-determination of the people" in the sense of accepting the self-determination of the minorities or just the people, understood in the unitary meaning of the word. These debates made necessary the finding of some unitary criteria for defining the minorities. The 1201 Recommendation considers the national minority as "a group of people in a state that:

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[1] Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Reinterpreted*, pp 45-46, Polirom, 1999.

- live in the territory of that state and are its citizens;
- entertain long-term, stable and permanent relations with that state;
- have distinct ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic characteristics;
- are representative enough although they are fewer in number than the rest of the population of a state or region of that state;
- are motivated by the concern to keep together that which constitutes their common identity, including their tradition, religion or language"[2].

In the paper edited by the UN, "Droit de minorities" in 1992 it is affirmed that by the term minorities it should be understand " a national, ethnic, religious and linguistic group different from other groups that are living in the same sovereign state. It follows some criteria for determining the minorities:

- The minority should be inferior by number with the rest of the population of the state in which it lives;
- The minority group should not be dominant in that state in order to benefit from the protection stipulation;
- The minority differs from the majority of the population through stable ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics ;
- The members of the minority group should be citizens of the state in which they are living in[3].

## B) Differences in approaching the ethnic minorities

Although there have been attempts to approach this socio-political category from a unitary perspective, there are substantial differences between the EU countries but also between the other European countries. We must distinguish from the very beginning between historical minorities, such as the Danish one in Germany, or the German one in France on the one hand, and the "new minorities" such as the Turkish minority in Germany, Holland, Belgium, etc. The latter has its origins in the after-war period becoming in Western Europe similar to "gastarbeiters". However, their number has substantially increased lately, they have obtained the citizenship of the respective European countries, and are fighting for the preservation of their group's values.

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[2] See Art. 1 of the *Recommendation No. 1201 of the Council of Europe*, adopted by the Parliamentary Gathering of the Council of Europe at 1st February 1993.
[3] Martian Niciu-*International Public Law*, Ed. Chemarea, Iași, 1995, vol. I, pg. 256-257.

Unlike the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the minority groups' weight in the European Occident is not very significant, with the exception of Belgium, Spain, France and Sweden.

Another characteristic resides in the atomisation of the minority groups, so that we cannot encounter them unitary within one country, but scattered all across the Western part of Europe[4].

An efficient formula of promoting the politics of the minority groups is the political lobby, while in Romania they insist on individual political representation (we refer to the small minorities, not to the significant ones, such as the Hungarian one). The system of political representation was efficiently experimented by the Swedish minority in Finland.

## C) The Legal Environment and the Constitutional Regulation

Defence of the rights of persons belonging to ethnic minorities is realised by the means of four major systems of protection. The first and perhaps the most important resides in the whole of the international regulation adopted under the care of United Nations, which instituted the principle of non-discrimination, of preserving the ethnic identity and the legal equality[5].

Besides the legislative protection, within UN operates the Subcommission for Preventing Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, a subsidiary organism of the Human Rights Commission, created in 1947. The Subcommission consists of 26 members, elected by the Commission out of the candidates designated by the UN states. The Subcommission completed a series of studies and reports and took part in the elaboration of several instruments in the field of human rights, analysed accusations regarding the infringement of human rights[6].

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[4] If, for example, the Turkish community would be reunited within only one European country, its weight would be extremely important.

[5] See the United Nations Organisation Chart (Art. 1, Par. 3) 1945, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 2, Art. 7, Art. 16, Art. 26), 1948, The Convention on Fighting against Discrimination in the Field of Education, 1964, The Convention regarding the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965, The International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (Art. 2, Art. 4, Art.14, Art. 20, Art. 24, Art. 25, Art. 26, Art. 27), The International Pact regarding the Economic, Social and Cultural rights, 1966 (Art. 2, Art. 13), The Final Helsinki Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1975 (Ch. VII, Par. 4, Ch. 3, Ch. 4), The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 1992, etc.

[6] For an extended discussion, see Thomas Burenthal and Renate Weber - *Dreptul international al drepturilor omului* (The International Law on Human Rights), pg. 59,60, ALL, Bucharest.

A second way of protecting the European minority citizens resides in the legislative system created under the heading of the European structures, the European Council, OSCE. The European Council and the European Court of Human Rights are based on the European Human Rights Convention of 1950[7]. The European trend is to regard the protection of minorities within an integrated system of human rights, while in Romania the ethnic minority is regarded autonomous from the human rights.

A third level is constituted by the bi- or multilateral treaties which can insure rights supplementary to the international provisions. Finally, a fourth setting could be constituted by the provisions of the internal legislation, particularly the internal norms. Unlike the Romanian Constitution, where specific principles referring to ethnic minorities are consecrated (Art. 6 and Art. 59, Par. 2), other European Constitutions are limited only to proclaiming the principle of non-discrimination. The Italian Constitution, for instance, proclaims in Art. 6 the principle of protecting the linguistic minorities.

## 2. Conceptual Models Approaching the Ethnic Minorities

### A) From Ethnic Autonomy to Centralism

The approach of the issues related to ethnic minorities differs, depending if the state is federal or unitary, if the minorities' weight is greater or smaller, or if the applied political philosophy is more conservative or more liberal.

From the Belgian ethnic federalism (since 1980 Belgium is divided into two "ethnic regions", Walloon and Flemish) to the French centralism, Europe faces vast approaches related to the politics of the minorities, each of them trying to represent best the social-political structure of the region. The setting-up of the European attitude towards the minorities was influenced by the communist-type critique of the nation-state, which defined the nation by its territory[8]. Ernst Gellner considered the contemporary nationalism as the result of a process of state bureaucratisation and of the too strong development of its structures[9], thus decentralisation, in the sense of

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[7] See Doina Micu, *Conținutul și limitele exercitării drepturilor omului (The Contents and the Limits of the Exercise of Human Rights),* Drepturile Omului în lumina Convenției Europene a Drepturilor Omului și Constituția din 1991 - , Centrul pentru Drepturile Omului APADOR-CH, 1998.

[8] Nergis Canefe, *Sovereignty without Nationalism, in The New World Order*, edited by Mortimer Sellers, Oxford/Washington DC.

[9] Ernst Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983.

delegating the attributions towards the autonomous communities was seen as imperative.

## B) The Basque Model

The Basque model must be integrated into the Spanish Constitutional Model, which establishes the compromise between two fundamental concepts: " the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation" and "the right to autonomy of the composing regions and the solidarity among them"[10]. Article 143 reaffirms the right of the neighbouring regions which have common "economic, cultural and historical" characteristics to constitute self-governing entities in autonomous Communities. The Parliament approves, at the request of a group of provinces or of a single province, the national autonomy Statute for each territory. The accession to autonomy was precipitated for the historical regions of Caluna, Basque Country and Galicia, in the framework of Article 151. These regions, to which Andalusia was added, by a special provision of Article 151, obtained very soon the status of autonomous community. While other regions followed a slower and somehow different process, in the framework of Article 143[11].

In the Preamble of the Spanish Constitution is promulgated the principle according to which is proclaimed the will of the Spanish nation to "protect all the Spaniards and the peoples of Spain in exercising human rights, their culture and traditions, the language and their institutions". This provision must be corroborated with Article 3 of the Constitution which institutes the Castillian as the official language on the Spanish territory (Art. 3, Par. 1), and the other Spanish languages in the autonomous regions (Art. 3, Par. 2). An agreement regarding the bilingualism acknowledged the other Spanish languages: Catallan, Euskera (the Basque language), Galician and the Valencian and Majorcan variants of Catallan[12]. What does this autonomy status mean? The Spanish constitutional Court has decided that autonomy means the possibility to make a final decision in what regards a given *competencia*[13].

The Basque Country is the land stretching along the Biscay Gulf and consists of a part of Northern Spain and of the Southwest of France. The Basque language (Euskera) is one of the few European languages which does not have an Indo-European origin. For a long time interval the Basques had been independent (they were not conquered by the Romans). The Basques

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[10] See in this respect Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution (27 December 1978).
[11] Robert Agranoff, *Evoluția Federală din Spania* (The Federal Evolution in Spain), pg 53, in ALTERA 6, an III, 1997.
[12] *Ibidem*, p. 56.
[13] *Ibidem*, p.57.

supported King Charles' group and, after being defeated, the entered under French and Spanish domination. In 1979 is formed the autonomous region of the Basque Country.

The Spanish constitutional agreements came as a continuation of the ancient inheritance of *fueros* (the privilege of tax exemption) for the autonomous Communities with *regimen foral* of the Basque Country and Navarra[14].

The Basque model is unique in Europe. It differs from the Catallan model by its political and cultural aspects. The Basque language, very minor and extraordinarily specific, cannot claim a large diffusion across Spain. Similarly, in the political sphere it cannot expect to play an important role. Thus, the Basque Country finds itself in a peripheral position. The historical and cultural options are different, the approach towards institutions as well. Even if the King of Spain is also sovereign of Biscay, he is not regarded as a heir of a national Basque institution, but as the representative of a foreign institution. The professional success of the Basques in the rest of Spain (e.g. the big Basque banks) is considered as an influential element, but also as a depersonalisation feature. The Basques regard and explain their appurtenance to Spain through a series of negative conjectures: population movements, decline of the Basque language, the influence of the Spanish cultural environment[15].

Concluding, we can say that the Basque model in particular, and the Spanish one define a concept of minority from the perspective of the autonomous communities, this approach being important both from a cultural and political point of view.

## C) The Belgian Model

After gaining its independence in 1830, the Belgian linguistic problem sharpened. The Flemish were fighting for an independent Flandern. In 1970 the three autonomous provinces were constituted: Walloon, Flandern and the special region Brussels. In 1980 Belgium becomes a federal state, encompassing the three above-mentioned provinces. We add the fact that the Flemish represent 56% of the country's population and speak the Flemish language, which is very similar to the Dutch language, 34% are Walloon and speak French, while 1% are Germans and enjoy the right to use their language in

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[14] *Ibidem*, p.58.

[15] Santiago Petschen, *Frontieres interetatiques, limites d'interpretatiion: le cas espagnol*, pp 275-276, in Nations et frontieres dans la nouvelle Europe, Editions Commplexe, 1993.

administration in the region inhabited by them. Other 9% are Turks, Moroccans, Italians, etc.

The Walloons are of Celtic origin; Julius Caesar mentions the Celts in the Northern Galia (the Belgians). During the 19th century burst out the first conflicts with the Flemish inside the new independent Belgium. The tensions multiply after the Second World War, owing to the fact that many Flemish collaborated with the German occupation army. Walloon consists of the provinces Lutlich, Luxembourg, Namur, Hennegau and the South of Brabants. The biggest towns are Mons, Charlesroi, Lutlich and Namur. In East lives a small German minority which has the right to use their language in administration. In the North of Walloon the agriculture plays an important role.

During the past, Flandern existed as a distinct entity, being formed by the Eastern and Western Flandern within the nowadays Belgium, the South of the Dutch province Seeland and the North of the French Northern Department. In 1477 Flandern enters under the Habsburg domination. In 1815, after the Congress of Vienna, Flandern will be joined to Belgium.

The current Flandern region comprises 5 provinces: the Western Flandern, the Eastern Flandern, Antwerpen, Limburg and the Northern part of Brabants. The Flandern region has a significant economic importance within today's Belgium[16].

A resolution having the character of forming a future line of action in the sense of reforming the state has recently been adopted by Vlaamse Raad. It proposes a confederalism in which each entity disposes by its own institutional independence, but mostly fiscal and financial. The resolution was received with a strong opposition by the francophone political forces. They argued that Flandern, once granted the fiscal autonomy could develop its own politics within its own regional environment. In this framework, it is argued that it would not be the case of a region, but of an independent state. A collectivity does not survive unless there exist between its members minimal rules of solidarity, particularly financial, that would allow for a reasonable cohabitation. The maintaining at the federal level of an interpersonal solidarity is the condition for the existence of the federal state, it is also stated[17]. The problems come about due to the economic situation. In an opinion survey, Walloon classified as 53rd from the perspective of its richness. In this framework, the

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[16] *Encarta Enzyclopadie- Wallonien* and *Flandern*, 1993-196, Microsoft Corporation.
[17] *Wallonie-Bruxelles au coeur de l'Europe- Unir pour Reussir - Le changement PRL FDF MCC*, p. 84.

financial transfers from the rich Flandern feed the fighting means of the Flemish nationalists.

The political solutions envisage a new investment policy reducing the social costs, a new fiscal policy of promoting the economic activity, the reduction of the production costs, research investments, increases in the export market, etc[18].

In spite of all the current trends, we tend to claim that Belgium represents the best example for the federal model of viewing the minority and the majority.

## D) A Unique Case: Linguistic Minorities in Italy

Even if there are other linguistic minorities in Europe, the approach of the Italian model is unique. The Italian Constitution purposely stipulates the state's protection of the linguistic minorities[19]. In Italy, the linguistic minorities are the groups of population which speak Sardinian, German, Greek, Albanian, Catalan, Retro-Roman. Even if their weight is not that important, the Constitution precisely stipulates their protection. Surely, in some cases the linguistic minority realities can be correlated with the ethnic ones, but not always. The Italian modality of assuming the multiculturalism has as a structure the acceptance of multilingualism and its protection as a source of spiritual richness.

## E) The French Model

The French model made itself renown in the entire Europe as a conservatory one, even centralised. The French ethnic picture shows us the composition of the population: 87% of the French have French origin, while other ethnic minorities are represented by Algerians, Italians, Moroccans, Spaniards, Portuguese. The French state does not acknowledge the existence of the origin of each minority, but regards all citizens from the perspective of the citizenship, not of the ethnicity.

A series of French dialects are spread all over France. The Britons, speaking a language of Celtic origin, launched from ancient times the idea of the "Briton movement".

Today, this movement is the modern manifestation of an ancient phenomenon, whose initiation could be found at the beginning of the 16th century, when Brittany changed its status, from an independent state to an

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[18] See *Manifeste du MCC (Mouvement des Citoyens pour Changement).*
[19] See *Art. 6 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic.*

autonomous province within the French Kingdom. Several Briton militants launched the Project for the Organisation of Brittany, which attempts to a political and institutional approach of the phenomenon - the creation of a Brittany region, including 5 departments. They wanted the setting-up of a federal-type regionalism, following the formula: "*Ammenager l'appartement Bretagne, dans l'immeuble francais, du quartier Europe*"[20].

The French approach, though very simple, is also very intransigent, being characteristic, in our opinion, to the centralised model.

## F) The Romanian Model

The Romanian Constitution of 1991 stipulates in Article 1, Paragraph 1: "Romania is a national state, sovereign and independent, unitary and indivisible". The principles of the equality among citizens and of the unity of the Romanian people are explicitly mentioned in Article 2. A special provision regarding the rights of the persons belonging to the minorities is found in Article 6. In the same Article, Paragraph 2 proclaims the non-discrimination with respect to the other Romanian citizens.

The Romanian ethnic picture is composed by 89.4% Romanians, 7.1% Hungarians, 1.8% Gypsies, 0.5% Germans, etc. By the Decision 137 of the Romanian Government (6 April 1993) was created the Council for National minorities, transformed, in 1996, in Governmental Department, its Chief having the position of State Secretary. After the elections of November 1996, the party of the Hungarian ethnics (UDMR) entered in the governmental coalition. Romania ratified the international documents regarding the minorities and is striving to apply them. A vanguard provision is found in the Constitution, which grants to the minorities the right of representation in the Parliament, even if not obtaining the minimum of votes required by the electoral threshold. Art. 59 stipulates in Par. 2: "the organisations of the citizens belonging to the national minorities that do not secure in the elections the necessary number of votes to be represented in the Parliament have the right to one Deputy place in the conditions of the Electoral Law. The citizens of a national minority can be represented by one organisation only".

The right to education in the maternal language is guaranteed by the state and is exercised to all levels[21]. In 1997 at the "Babeș-Bolyai" University of Cluj-Napoca, out of 17330 students, 81.27% were of Romanian nationality,

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[20] Herve Guillorel, *Probleme breton et mouvement breton*, pp.93,98, in POUVOIRS, Revue Francais d'Etudes Constitutionnelles et Politiques, nr 19, 1981.
[21] *See Art. 32 of the Romanian Constitution.*

18.12% were Hungarians , 0.46% were Germans and 0.16% were other nationalities[22].

Out of the UDMR's radical ideas we could mention the desire for ethnic self-determination or the setting-up of a University only with Hungarian teaching in Cluj-Napoca[23].

The main means by which UDMR tries to fulfil its goals are the cultural and territorial autonomy. These instruments, it is stressed, are not operative without the guarantee of the individual and collective rights, without the positive discrimination and without several principles specific to the European Union, such as decentralisation, subsidiarity and devolution[24]. The Law of Local Public Administration, the Law of Local Public Finance try to establish an equitable redistribution of the expenses and the minorities' representation in the public administration.

The problem of the minorities in Romania continues to be in public debate, the political options placing themselves between ethnocentrism and ethnic enclavism. However, the Romanian case is characteristic for the integratory model

## G."National Unity and Minority Rights"-The Danish Case

Article 1 of the Danish constitution provides that the constitution shall apply to all parts of the Kingdom of Denmark. This provision, which means that the Faroe Island and Greenland are parts of the Kingdom of Denmark, was inserted in 1953.

As a general rule, political parties that are not represented in the Folketing may only participate in a general election if they submit a petition supported by a number of voters corresponding to no less than 1/175 of the voters that participated in the last general election. This rule does not apply to German minority party, which has an unconditional right to participate in general election in Denmark. In 1955 the Danish government issued a declaration concerning the rights of persons belonging to the German minority in Sønderjylland. The declaration confirmed that all-Danish citizen, including those belonging to the German-speaking minority, enjoy the fundamental

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[22] See the *Centralising Report regarding the Ethnic Structure of the Students of "Babeș-Bolyai" University for the academic year 1997/1998*.

[23] See the *Project of Law regarding the National Minorities and the Autonomous Communities*, proposed by UDMR's Parliamentary Group.

[24] Marko Bela, *Aspirațiile național-politice ale minorității maghiare din Romania (The Hungarian Minority's National-Political Aspirations in Romania)*, in Doctrine Politice, Ed. Polirom, 1998.

[24] Peter Germer, *The Danish Constitution 150 Yeares*, Published by the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,1999 , pg 3,4,5.

rights that are guaranteed in the constitution. Moreover, the declaration listed a number of principles of non-discrimination regarding political, religious, social and cultural rights[25].

## 3. The Multicultural Society. Approaches and Trends

The idea of multicultural society originates from the idea that one of the fundamental human rights is to be different from a cultural point of view.

The specialised literature divides the concept of multicultural society based on the distinction between the private and public sphere. Thus, the first category is the society characterised by *equality of opportunities in the public field and multiculturalism in the private field*. This could seem to be the ideal form, an option for the future. In the public field would operate the non-discrimination of rights, while in the private sphere (religion, family structures, etc) could operate the multiculturalism. The second type of society is the one in which operates the *equality of chances in the public sphere and the monoculturalism in the private sphere*. This is the French ideal regarding the minority problem. The inequality of chances in the public field (among racial and ethnic groups) and multiculturalism in the private field represent the third form. This is the apartheid-type society, which existed in South Africa. The main idea resides in the discrimination based on national-Christian educational concepts. The fourth idea is the *inequality of chances in the private sphere (among the ethnic and racial groups) and monoculturalism in the public field*. This structure is characteristic for the American post-racial regime, when a de facto discrimination was operating at the social level. It called for the civil Rights Program, which helped to overcome the existing prejudices[26].

## 4) Conclusions

In this study we tried to offer a new approach towards both the structural elements of the fundaments of the minorities' law in Europe, and the particular aspects which raise questions and pro- and counter- arguments from the perspective of the system's efficacy. The future will show the capacity of the systems to sustain the new legal approaches from the individual perspective or their failure in the struggle with time.

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[25] Peter Germer, *The Danish Constitution 150 Yeares*, Published by the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,1999 , pg 3,4,5.
[26] John Rex, *Rasa și etnie* (Race and Ethnicity) pp. 167-168, Du Style, Bucharest, 1998.

# THE ROMANIA'S ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY PARADIGM

## CIOCOI-POP D. RAREŞ

Throughout all its history Europe was tormented by many wars. At the eve of 21ˢᵗ century we can hope for a more peaceful future. This work is concerned with the European security framework seen by a national point of view, that of Romania.

We can trace the origins of common security back in 1974 at Helsinki where CSCE (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe) was born. In spite the fact that Europe was divided in two by military blocks: NATO and WTO a common concern regarding security can be revealed.

With the cold war ended everyone would expect that the military blocks would come to an end. It happened like this only with WTO in 1991. In this condition the main role in preserving the security of Europe would have had to be taken by the CSCE. Important steps have been made, and I am referring to the institutionalization of CSCE and its change into OSCE; but the main instrument in dealing with the problem of European security became NATO.

NATO changed successively to meet the new condition after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. From a military alliance build up as a response to communist threat NATO had to change its structures and strategic concept to meet a new series of threats as ethnic war, illegal migration, instability at its borders and others.

Another dimension of the alliance's change is its enlargement toward east in spite of Russia's opposition and the danger to create a new division line in Europe.

In this conditions the southern flank became very important not only for NATO but even for Romania.

For NATO the decision from the Madrid summit to ask a small number of states to join the alliance has strengthened specially the northern flank and accentuated the disparity between the northern and the southern flank. The regions of the southern flank have a high potential for conflict that might have serious consequences for the peace and European security including the alliance.

The Mediterranean Sea is a space of interference between the strategic and security interests of Europe and USA and the Muslim Arab world which might take shape in the substitution of the old east-west ideological dispute to that cultural and economic between north and south. The south and east of the Mediterranean sea represents the main source for illegal immigration which might give rise to unwanted social movements as social discrimination, xenophobia and the violence related to it, terrorism correlated with fundamentalist movements.

For the moment the functionality of the southern flank is due to the involvement of the USA in taking responsibility for it.

As European country, Romania, is interested in maintaining the stability and security of this area that is, for the moment, highly at risk, because the prosperity of the country is linked with the freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.

From the strategic point of view Romania is a part of the southern flank, which represent a chance but also a challenge to its national security. Through active participation in solving the main situations prone to conflict in the area, it could be demonstrated the advantage for NATO to strengthen the relations with Romania and possibly to integrate her in its structures.

## *Risks and threats to East and Central European security*

The risks to southern flank security are dangerously increasing in the past years becoming harder to deal with, new problems as religious fundamentalism and inter-ethnic hatred being added to the old problems.

In this moment the stability of the southern flank is affected by various sorts of problems:

- the conflict situation from:
    - ex-Yugoslavia, specially the Kosovo issue;
    - Middle East an area where half from the arms exports are directed;
    - The latent conflict between Greece and Turkey regarding Cyprus and other several islands from Aegean Sea;
    - The Caucasus;

- The dissolution of federal structures as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and the emergence on their territory of new independent states which lack experience in the field of international relations;

- national minorities which have a state in the region:
    - Albania for the Albanians from the ex-Yugoslavia;

- Hungary for the Hungarians from: Serbia, Ukraine, Romania and Slovakia.

Minorities represent a motive for instability due to their willingness for self-determination which combined with the will to reconsider the present borders could lead to inter-state war.

The factors of risk toward the security of the region states could rise not only from international but either internal environment.

The external factors are:

- The existence in the proximity of their borders of a zone of political, social and military instability, of a potential state of conflict (open or latent).
- The development of unbalances in the strategic relations at regional and sub-regional level;
- The expansion of terrorist-extremists movements, transnational organized crime (drugs, armament radioactive materials, migration, economic criminality);
- Extremist-revisionist actions against national interests, organized on other state territory with the support of groupings that might action from inside to undermine the suzerainty, integrity and the independence of the states.

The internal factors of risk are:

-The rise and accentuation of economic unbalances;

-The amplification of economic criminality and corruption;

-The degradation of: leading system at national level, quality of products and services, environment.

## Romania as a factor of stability in the South-Eastern Europe

*Romania is a factor of stability in the Southeastern Europe as a producer of security and due to the relations with the neighbors.*

Romania is a producer of security through its geo-strategic character: first it is situated between three major areas (Central-European space, CSI region and the Balkans) and secondly it is situated at the intersection of the three major axes. And last but not least due to her internal stability, which has permitted to maintain political, military, economical and cultural relation in a high-risk zone.

The extremely active participation in the frame of PFP, as well as in peace keeping actions as IFOR, SFOR, ALBA is due to the profound motivation that drive Romania. As indicated in NATO's 1994 invitation, Romania first saw PFP as necessary but not sufficient condition for admission into the Alliance.

Second, Romania saw the PFP as the perfect instrument for the required modernization of its armed forces- to include peace keeping – through increasing its armed forces' contact with the developed NATO countries. Third, Romania saw PFP as an important means to contribute to increased stability and security on the continent. Forth, Romania saw PFP as an important means to improve relations with neighbors, given the significant and positive impact that military collaboration already had on the general bilateral relationship with Hungary.

The consequent promotion of the policies of good cooperation and good neighborhood with the states from Southeast Europe represent priorities of the Romanian foreign policy. This fact is stressed also by the fact that Romania has made bilateral agreements with all six states that tried to obtain NATO membership in the first wave.

The role of "stability pole in the region" of Romania is underlined by the participation to the trilateral agreements on common fields of interests of the region countries: Romania-Bulgaria-Turkey and Romania-Bulgaria-Greece

The participation in the frame of regional structures focused toward formation of sub-regional cooperation, with the mission to increase the security climate in the region. Here it has to be remembered:

- The Central European Initiative (CEI);
- Southeast Cooperation Initiative (SECI);
- The stability pact for Southeast Europe (Royaumont Process);
- Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC);
- Inter-Balkan Cooperation Initiative (Sophia, June 1996).

In the last years, Romania's actions, related to the participation in peacekeeping missions, have gained a new dimension. The participation to various actions for peace keeping, under ONU command, received a good international appreciation as in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR), lead by NATO or peace keeping mission (ALBA) under the leadership of OSCE based on a Security Council resolution.

In order to create a more safe and secure environment in Europe Romania sustains the process of formation of the Southeastern Europe Multinational Force for Peace. This initiative launched by Turkey in may 1997 at the Sintra summit in Portugal, apply to the frame of PFP and the concept of promoting a practical regional cooperation.

The South-eastern Europe Multinational Force for Peace will commit itself to the prevention of conflicts and other peace enforcement missions under

ONU or OSCE mandate, lead by NATO or WEU, without geographical limitations. This initiative is not directed against other state and doesn't want to create new lines of separation or Grey zones.

The security pattern in Europe is not granted. If now the leading role in assuring the security of the continent is played by NATO this situation may change. It is possible that OSCE will become the main forum to cope with Europe's security. It is also possible that Europe will embrace a USA+WEU framework to deal with these issues. But in all cases due to its strategic position and its will and need for security Romania will be an important part in the European security paradigm.

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# RETURN TO DIVERSITY
# COUNT COUDENHOVE KALERGI'S LEGACY

## CRISTINA TONEA

Today's Europe is a category not of being, but of the spirit and does not have frontiers for human values and thoughts. Bernard-Henry Levy used to say "Europe, and this cannot be repeated often enough, is not a place, but an idea."

The spirit of Europe consists in the continuous attempt of surpassing itself, in the fact that is never satisfied with its accomplishments in knowledge and material order.

Europe is not just a continent of nations in a process of possible economical-political and cultural unification and convergence. The cultural space of Europe may be seen as shaped by a set of cultural systems that provides and reproduces identities, knowledge, norms and values.

Europe possesses a demographic, historical and cultural wealth, homogenous even in its extreme diversity, which no other region in the world can claim. Also, it is unique in the density and quantity of its commercial exchanges, in the monetary order and financial equilibrium, in the considerable reserve of internal growth.

Throughout most of its history, Europe, insofar as the word has not been a merely geographical description, has referred to a plurality of separate states lacking any common institutional coordination specifically designed for this continent. Consequently, the idea of Europe is a recent phenomenon. It was not until the beginning of the nineteenth century that this idea, as a result of a new outlook on the nature and origins of Europe, came to have clear outlines.

There are three main elements in the history of the idea of Europe: the identification of Europe with liberty, with Christendom and with civilization. Also, European identity is characterized by certain political principles – democracy, freedom of opinion, constitutionalism.

The first serious projects for Europe were launched between the two world wars. Personalities like Friedrich Naumann, T.G. Masaryk, Aristide

Briand, Edouard Herriot and Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi made the most viable and avant-garde proposals for a United Europe.

Nevertheless, the principle of democracy was strengthened in Europe after the First World War and optimistic spirits could hope that war and the succeeding difficulties had made all Europeans understand the need for cooperation.

In the years of European recovery, the most influential program was the one sponsored by the founder of the Pan-European Union, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894-1972). The main characteristic of his whole argument was his firm belief that the world could be changed through political action.

Coudenhove-Kalergi had an impeccable background for working on behalf of transnational understanding. His mother was Japanese and his father was an Austrian diplomat. He spent his early, pre-war years in bilingual Bohemia, then in cosmopolitan Vienna.

The war and the collapse of Austria that followed was a shock to say the least, but in 1918 he had high hopes that Wilson's peace program and the League of Nations would secure a better, peaceful world. Both the League and the disruptions in Europe, however, soon disappointed him and he became convinced that only a politically united Europe could overcome the continent trouble.

A convinced activist, Coudenhove-Kalergi argued for the creation of a Pan-European Union as an international pressure group, in his influential *"Paneuropa"* first published in 1923.

Coudenhove-Kalergi's approach was essentially political: although he frequently used historical analogies and arguments, he did not use the past itself as a basis for his idea. He seemed to take Europe so much for granted that he never had to ask why this entity ought to be strong. He observed that the historical era of European world supremacy of the white race had been broken.

"The cause of Europe's decline is political, not biological. Europe is not dying of old age, but because its inhabitants are killing and destroying one another with the instruments of modern science... The peoples of Europe are not senile – it is only their political system that is senile. As soon as the latter has been radically changed, the complete recovery of the ailing Continent can and must ensue".

The necessary modernization of the political system of Europe would have to consist in large-scale cooperation instead of the traditional anarchy, since technical progress had made small and conflicting states obsolete. Even

the so-called European great powers were by now insufficient, as the world was about to be divided into global power fields.

Coudenhove-Kalergi knew the difficulties of defining Europe. Geographical criteria seemed immediately inappropriate, since Europe was merely the Western part of the huge Eurasian continent with no natural eastern borders. Furthermore, cultural and political definitions had been open to historical revision from the time of the ancient Greek onwards. Culturally, Europe had spread to all continents, which allowed for several new "global power fields" with roots in the same culture, but in sharp contrast to this apparent cultural success, Europe as a political entity did not exist. Paneuropa was the name given by Coudenhove-Kalergi to this aspirant political Europe to distinguish it from geographical and cultural Europe.

The Paneuropa excluded both Britain and Russia.

In Coudenhove-Kalergi's view, Britain had grown out of Europe and became a political continent in its own right, too big and powerful to be included in Paneuropa. However, relations between the two were to be based on cooperation and mutual defense guarantees, and both were to share "the European cultural task".

Coudenhove-Kalergi was much more critical towards Russia. By choosing the Bolshevik way, Russia had turned its back on the democratic principles now predominant in Europe. Also, Russia saw itself more and more as a specific Eurasian entity and as an independent global power field. Whether red or white, Russia would always seek hegemony and only through mutual cooperation would the small European countries stand a chance of resisting this pressure.

Coudenhove-Kalergi prophesied that a Russian Napoleon would arise from the revolutionary chaos and, if Europe did not unite, would push the borderline of Europe all the way back to the Rhine...

Unquestionably, Paneuropa's main function was to secure the peace: internally in Europe by creating a supranational structure based on obligatory arbitration and multilateral cooperation; and externally through a Pan-European defense alliance protecting the small European nations against threat from outside. The hope was that, in the fullness of time, a united Europe could also secure a global balance of power allowing for large-scale disarmament.

Next to security, and tied to it, the European economy was fundamental to Coudenhove-Kalergi's argument. As he saw it, economic autarky and a devastating arm race between the many small European states would keep the continent in a permanent state of crisis and prevent its recovery from the war. On the other hand, Paneuropa could render much of

the defense expenditure obsolete and promote economic growth by creating a "common market" without internal customs barriers.

Coudenhove-Kalergi obviously had to take into account then new post-war Europe with its trend towards small nation states rather then huge supranational units. Nations were not dismissed as irrelevant to Europeanness; on the contrary, all modern culture was rooted in nationhood and the principle of nationality was to be revered.

In the nineteenth century the competition between dynastic-imperial and national liberal principles had divided Europe. But the war led to a complete victory of the principles of the latter over the former.

Clearly, the potential for conflict, primarily in Eastern Europe with its many national minorities, was still very strong; and Coudenhove-Kalergi could see both the injustices of the system of borders imposed by Versailles and the protracted problems that would arise if the borders were redrawn.

To solve this dilemma, Coudenhove-Kalergi pragmatically suggested that the status-quo of postwar borderlines was to be respected, but the national minorities were to be protected by a common European "Magna Carta of Tolerance". In a wider perspective, nationality problems would be diminished by means of both economic and political integration and by the penetration of democratic principles: the bonds between citizenship and national affiliation would be lessened and borders would gradually lose their importance.

In his book *Europa erwacht* (Europe awake, 1943), Coudenhove-Kalergi in a sharp engagement with Nazi theories rejected all notions about nations being objected, naturally given entities. He dismissed all theories of consanguinity as nonsense, noticing that there were no such things as pure races in Europe. Ethnically all Europeans were cousins and any attempt to divide the white race into sub-groups were both utterly unscientific and anti-European.

In short, the concept of nation was both indeterminable and changeable.

Nations could best be compared to schools, since they were essentially spiritual communities shaped by common teachers and leaders. Few of these founding fathers had actually been nationalist, but nationalism has become a substitute religion for the bourgeoisie in its emancipation from the nobility and the church. Later, compulsory school attendance had helped to make nationalism a mass phenomenon, as the alliterate and unaware masses learned about the virtues of their own country's culture, but not about its broader international context. This led to nationalist megalomania, but true education

could highlight the common European roots of all national cultures and show that the different national schools were just branches of the same tree.

Coudenhove-Kalergi expected Paneuropa to be the program of every democrat and patriot. For small concessions of sovereignty all countries would prosper economically and obtain a lasting peace, and their national cultures would benefit from the free exchanged with all the other European schools.

Conversely, the enemies of Paneuropa would be found to the extreme left (among the Communists) and to the right (among the militarists and the chauvinists), but predominantly among those groups who were economically dependent upon customs borders and economic protectionism.

In sum, Coudenhove-Kalergi's Paneuropa was an astonishing mixture of large-scale Utopianism, potent political analysis and clear-sighted pragmatism: for instance he suggested the use of English language as a common second language in Europe, since it would be impossible to solve the rivalries between the major continental languages.

Since than Europe has been defensive and unsure of itself, torn apart by dramatic conflicts. Now she must take the initiative and define its status and position in the world.

The answer may be the United Europe which respects the identity of each member nation, which prospers through the differences between them and it is powerful through its common institutions. There's no contradiction between Europe and nation. We don't have to be afraid of the suppression of national and regional identity as a result of European integration, on the contrary, the European identity wouldn't exist without them.

The civic tradition goes European, while the cultural tradition becomes even more national (or regional) to an extent where it de-couples itself from questions of politics and becomes more a matter of culture-politics. State and society become less closely linked, and we become Euro-states citizens while still belonging to our older culture nations.

The awareness of common origins and the will to have a common future represents the premises for a united Europe – a community of peace, freedom, democracy, stability, security and welfare. All these stand on the foundation of a common spiritual and intellectual heritage.

We want a whole, united Europe, where is not the size of the countries or their economical power which are the decisive factors, but the undivided

willingness of their citizens, conscious of their past and of their common interest, moving towards each other in order to continue together.

Europe needs politicians who have chosen to fight for it, activists who will ensure its promotion in the schools, universities and business and ultimately, a movement of opinion.

It is not just a matter of explaining, though it must be explained, the advantages of the United Europe, of a great shared economic space in terms of material prosperity and social progress. It is more a matter of making everyone aware that we must include in our national feeling a second motherland called Europe, which widens our horizons, our opportunities for living, working and trading with others.

The making of Europe supposes in the first place the making of Europeans. The construction of the European society regards each of us because men make history. Everybody is faced with the challenge to participate, create and cooperate – in our own spheres of life, at our work and wherever we may be able to exert influence. We cannot just delegate the necessary spirit of enterprise and commitment to governments and administration.

Europe is not going to be fully united in the near future. But it has a chance to be less divided than in the past and if we want, the physical and psychological barriers will be much easier to surpass.

The United States of Europe is a leap into unknown, but who knows what it may become? We feel hope, gratitude for the many things that have already been achieved and grief for the signs of failure, but this is it – Europe lives with contradictions. At the end of the road we will be entitled to contemplate an endless Europe, friend and allied of the East and South, landmark of the world development.

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# EUROPE IN POST-NIHILISM ?
# BETWEEN THE SILENCE OF WORDS AND
# THE RHETORICITY OF IMAGES[*]

## MIHAIL NEAMU

**ABSTRACT.** The main argument of my essay is focused on the relation between the post-modern concept of cultural identity and our common intellectual history in Europe. Thus, I wish to begin with a short commentary on the post-modern condition of our sensibility that was changed under the impact of the cybernetic revolution of our times. Hence, I will ask myself, from a mere cultural point of view, which is the content and the meaning of EUROPE and what present identity is supposed to have. The first conclusion is that through the new globalised pattern of "media-culture" we can hardly speak about an actual European identity, since a general process of cultural homogenisation annihilated its heritage and memory. Secondly, I will mention the major consequences of the contemporary indifference towards the meaning of the question (philosophy) and regarding the mystery of redemption (theology), emphasising the fundamental risk of losing the experience of self-comprehension.

## I. STATUS QUÆSTIONIS

I will try to speak here about the cultural content of this very equivocal term which is "Europe". If actual identity is not *what* we can remember, but *who* we really are, *hic et nunc*, then some important questions are to be expressed in this respect. The crepuscular time of globalisations – first, technical and economical, and subsequently the cultural ones – incites philosophical reflection to a thorough enquiry, never enough explored: which is the specific

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idiom of the European culture facing the post-modern world? For it is the latter, taken in its planetary extension, which seems to undermine the prestige of the memory and of the authority of the European cultural tradition through a logic of subversion, which are the resources that can outline a new shape of identity for Europe, already affected by a prolonged crisis, as a response to the great challenges of "the dailiness culture"[1]? If nowadays, above religion, culture or politics, every value is negotiated by economy[2] – which vanishes all trademarks and brings indistinctiveness as a general rule –, I will try to state that unfortunately, regarding its cultural identity, Europe means today the same thing as United States or Japan, South-Korea or even China, all unified into an "electronic solitude" (G. Lovink) by the same aspirations of the *homo videns* (G. Sartori). Because for our children "in the beginning was the image", we strongly need a deep reflection on the turning point of the post-modern civilisation. Although it may sound as a hackneyed interpretation conceived not by a "wishful thinking", this paper is trying to follow more precisely the background of the cultural globalisation and the possible antibodies for its cancerous growth in our contemporary world.

## II. TOWARDS ANOTHER TOTALITARIANISM

As an argument for this *idea about Europe*, I will mention here a letter written by R. M. Rilke in 1925, a private confession that shows in a troubling way how much concerned was a poet of genius thinking to what Martin Heidegger called after him "*the Americanisation of Europe*[3]". Franz Kafka, likewise, observed in his literature the same cultural colonialism started in America beginning with the first half of the XXth century. And till today, although the "American dream" still has its poor advocates, one might hardly see major differences in the cultural regime of people from Europe and that from the United States. How did it happen?

Globalisation is a term used by politicians like an euphemism for what contemporary philosophy denotes by the concept of "nihilism". The meaning of this very complex process of cultural standardisation is closely related to that historical reign of technique which took place in Europe as a direct consequence of the metaphysical project of the modern philosophy dominated by what

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[1] J. Baudrillard, *La transparence du Mal*, Galilée, Paris, 1990.

[2] Cf. Michel Henry, *Du communisme au capitalisme. La théorie d'une catastrophe*, Paris, 1990.

[3] Martin Heidegger, *Holzwege* («Wozu Dichter?», «Die Zeit des Weltbildes»), Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1950, p. 88 *sq*; 268 sq.

Fr. Nietzsche called the *will of power*. In order to be effective, globalisation — which always has been the first dream of many religious leaders, hardly undertaken by laity in modern times — needed a physical support that could be largely spread. In the absence of the birth of technique in Europe, cultural globalisation would be condemned to remain a simple fantasy of some revolutionary intellectuals. What brings technique, for the benefit of the cultural, political and economical globalisation? In brief, modern technique — which has nothing to do with the Aristotelian *techne* — comes among ourselves with a great potential of reducing natural borders of languages. Because of its magic virtues and manipulative powers[a], technique occurs in modern times as a demiurgic challenge. Despite of the large success brought by Gutenberg's typography, which made a dash for all logocentric cultures, technique had given sign for a further determination of our sensibility. The exchange between the oral cultures and the scriptural ones was made in the same territory of the *logos* that governed both mentalities. But after only one hundred years when images began to be produced by human's machines, the entire equilibrium of our *psyche* was put under a bolded question mark. Of course, there is no communion under technique's patronage, but an easier translation of our basic intentions can be provided right through the artificial images. Images are supposed to be understood by them and, thus, a new Tower of Babel can be again raised. And, indeed, it was raised and it took the name of modernity. The bricks of this new tower (and power) dreamed by human's pride were made of images, by means of which we can easily read primary identities. Images answer in a best way to this high exiguousness of globalisation, which is the universal potential of translation.

In order to have a larger comprehension of this historical emergence, we should remind now to what extent in modern times metaphysics was looking for a definite *Weltanschauung*. This meant clarity and precision into a scientific representation of the world, which came to light by a methodical thinking on the meaning of being (*ontology*) and human's consciousness (*epistemology*). Secondly, the modern philosophy (Bacon, Descartes, and Galilei) proposed nature as a privileged reservoir for a technique of calculus dirigible by man. Basically, mathematics demanded for nature to be a source of the artefacts that, before their effective construction, had to be firstly projected (*i. e.:* imagined). Thus, *the world in itself became for human being a mere image, in order*

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[a]For some very interesting remarks concerning the birth of technique in modern times, regarding especially human's imaginary, see I. P. Culianu, *Eros et magie à la Renaissance, 1484*, Flammarion, Paris, 1984.

*that images become for man his unique world*[5]. This is one of the major features of the cultural heritage handed down by modern times. Once commenced this practice of mind in the Western Europe, it took just time to fulfil its global potential and to be exported abroad. This is why conservative Americans can accuse today European modernity because of the loss of the purity of their "genuine" culture and, conversely, the nostalgic Europeans can blame the American mass-culture for the spoil of the classical traditions of the old continent (the Judeo-Christian and Greek-Romans ones). In fact, both geographical spaces and both cultural identities have been measured in the same scale of technique's powers. Then and there, the post-modern civilisation is going to play host to the same pathological virus, the media-culture. Because, finally, "media-culture" means to transmit images — "voided, listless, blurred things, imitation of life" (R. M. Rilke) — here we can set forth the very subtle paradox of cultural modernity. Born in Europe, far as we understood that its first profile sketched out into a profoundly iconoclastic historical context[6], modern culture is plainly ending up in the nihilistic apotheosis of technocratic imaginary. Thus, one after the other, *homo religious* was replaced by *homo politicus* and, in the epoch of consummation, by *homo economicus*. Once for all, the post-modernist culture of images got its triumph because of the non-verbal communication fluency, linguistic boundaries being indifferent to such interactions.

## III. IMAGE AS "MASTER CARD"

In stead of criticising here the content of the message propagated by media-culture, which is obviously trivial and worthless, I will to draw your attention to the phenomenological level of its immanence on human's consciousness. If we take for granted the most deep analysis of the mass-media made in phenomenological terms, written by Jean-Luc Marion in his brilliant

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[5] I should add here that only the Christian philosophy of the Fathers has elaborated a perfect doctrine of the (sacred) images, in spite of their ascetic practice of an internal iconoclasm in the exercise of prayer. The apology of the sacred images preserved it the ontological dignity without cautioning any idolatry towards created things. For the Fathers images were good if they could maintain – through their effective semantics – an iconic transparency, and they were bad only if they could bring an idolatrous opacity.

[6] A hard secularisation of the aesthetical imagery came out after Renaissance's epoch as an iconoclastic religious movement (Calvin, Pascal, Kant). Cf. A. Besançon, *L'image interdite. Une historie intellectuelle de l'iconoclasme*, Arthème Fayard, Paris, 1994.

essay *La Croisée du visible*, an equivalence between nihilism and media-culture comes as a self-evidence. "If we admit – says the French philosopher – that metaphysics, from its platonic origins, has fixed the opposition between the thing in itself and its image for the benefit of the thing, and, from its nietzscheean term, it converted its benefit for the image, then we should state that *l'idole du voyeur* satisfies basically and entirely the exigencies of nihilism: nothing is in itself, everything depends on the evaluation which may ratify it or not"[7]. Hence, I am eager to say that the seductive but inflationary imagery, running sequentially, without beginning (*an-archic*) and devoid of an end, has founded before our eyes a culture of non-evenimentiality (*Altäglichkeit Perspektive*). Besides, the tyranny of artefacts-images represents not only an expression of the supremacy of mass-culture (*wertfrei*), but also a final fulfilment of nihilism, the general consecration of what T. S. Eliot called "*the dissociation of sensibility*". Artificial images are denying any principle of ontological consistency for the benefit of an illusory world – built up by means of reticular simulacra, in a perfect state of self-sufficiency. Any historical ground for a proper inter-subjectivity and a mutual awareness of our common roots is definitely lost. And if we cannot read our traditions, I ask myself, how will we be able to think our future? But the impending media-culture not only casts our humanity outward of historicity, in the (im)pure chronology of the "average everydayness" of human experience, but also refuses to think it in its essential sense of reflection on the ground of being. Nihilism expropriates our historical condition of finite human beings into a new form of collectivism subordinated to a global network of artificial images (television, Internet). As a result, a world of (science-)fiction is ready-made and the backorder of all consistency – completely ignored. In the *évum* of technocracy, the "eternal return" has found its realm of supremacy[8]. The cyberspace appears now as a virtual world where the unleashed images need no relation with an original situation. If the new criterion of being became the value of exchange (G. Vattimo), we should understand why televisual images are excepted from the exigency of a correspondence with the reality. Images are provided as a primary stuff on the market of our poor human, *zu menschliches*, dreams. Truth became a worthless, indifferent value and this is again *nihilism*. Images are inventing new "necessities" for the human being, mounting up the last form of slavery grown in the twilight zone of our modernity. Celebrating its fantasies, the "society of spectacle" (G. Debord) proposes us *to consume* but not *to assume* our worldly condition of spectators. How much expensive is the price

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[7] J. -L. Marion, *La croisée du visible*, Différence, Paris, 1991[3], p. 93.

[8] *Cf.* H. -G. Gadamer, *La philosophie herméneutique*, PUF, Épimethée, Paris, 1996, trad. Jean Grondin, p.156.

that must be paid for this strange pleasure for irresponsibility? And, If « we are what we really see », as Plotinus said, then who are we really?

I will try to follow here the main philosophical argument that pleads for a paediatric conceptual treatment of the post-modern humanity. Hence, we should regard how people became an easy prey for a mental infantilism spread by the culture of image. Speaking about technique — in its highest degree — we should mention, first, the effect of *alienation* recorded to the level of human consciousness after by the reversal of its condition from an *active* into a *passive* one. Being manufactured and shared out through industrial methods, they demand – like all narcotics – a complete abolition of life in human beings in order to win a more simplified stance: that of automata[9]. But what we have forgotten is that machines don't have a private time, nor a personal destiny. Noetic vampirism exercised by television caused also a hard collapse of our native imagination that makes us unable to avoid mimicry even in our most common gestures of life[10]. For the benefit of their research in politics, communication or gender studies, even the contemporary philosophers refuse with a strange optimism to reflect upon death, although Plato thought the wisdom as a fruit of *melete thanatou*. We behave ourselves as the children of the same tribe, mimicking one another by means of a "language of wood" that proves how nowadays "a spectacle represents the ideology *par excellence*"[11]. We are also poor children when needing, day by night and night by day, a world of fiction and, especially, entertainment, amusement, games, pastime. Thus "la colpa della televisione in questo circolo vizioso è di privilegiare – nel pensiero – melassa – gli stambi, gli eccitati, gli esagerati i ballisti. La televisione premia e promuove la stravaganza, l'abbsurdità e l'insensatezzo. Andando così a rinforzare e moltiplicare l'*homo inssipiens*"[12].

From *cogito interruptus* (U. Eco) through *esse est percipi* towards *libido vivendi* (J.-L. Marion) – it is painless to reach the loss of selfness and of the authenticity because of the exclusive exteriority in which your attention

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[9] M. Henry, *C'est moi la Vérité*, Seuil, Paris, 1996, p. 335 *sq.*

[10] As F. Fukuyama remarked (*The End of History and the Ultimate Man* [1992], Paideia, Bucharest, 1998, transl. M. Eftimiu), the post-industrial world of the XX century – through that totalitarianism of images – makes a definite and personal *intimacy* impossible. And this because one of the three faculties of the soul, the *thymos* ("desire"), the active element of any emulation and psychologically responsible for the practice of virtues (Plato, *Republic*), is sedated by the violent and frenetic game of images produced by the parallel world of technique.

[11] Guy Debord, *Societatea spectacolului*, Casa Cărții de Știință, Cluj-Napoca, 1998, trad. R. Stoenescu și C. Mihali, p. 151.

[12] G. Sartori, *Homo-Videns. Televisione e post-pensiero*, Editori Laterzo, 1998[2], p. 113.

remains directed. A very striking aspect in the "media-culture" is not only the content, but also the quantity of images that is broadcasted and which is also exceeding by far the objective competence of human intelligence. Every intellectual act of comprehension supposes a very complex metabolism, including here, in kantian terms, the synthesis of empirical or transcendental concepts and intuitions. Comprehension and, obviously, self-comprehension cannot be obtained through a continuous act of reception data from our senses. *To understand means to assume but to receive means only to consume. To understand something or somebody means to form up a selfness, which is more difficult than the selfless fact of being informed.* And this is the point we tried to stress: as Hegel stated in his "Phänomenologie des Geistes", our attitude towards things discloses our spiritual constitution. More precisely, Hegel conceived the generation of self-consciousness at the highest degree of freedom through the work of giving shape to things and not by consuming them. Thus, the consciousness surpasses its dependence on immanence or craving for sensibleness on the road to the comprehension of universality and of the very selfness. Such intentions are forbidden in the *global village* we live. The dynamics of televising images seems to be made only to facilitate what a French philosopher calls "*la fuite de soi*"[13], a result of a continuous pro-jection of the consciousness in its exteriority. Briefly said, yearning for actuality and simultaneity in its largest extension, our *ego* abandons his profound identity hidden in his interiority. Born in such a violent *concupiscentia oculorum,* the self appears as a decentered *puzzle* made up in the ever-shifting figuration of the televisual images, "a pastiche of fragments collected around nothing more than the remote control that connects it to the cable television with its 57 channels (and nothin' on)"[14].

## IV. A PHILOSOPHICAL IDEA ABOUT EUROPE

As everyone knows, the story of our European culture begins in Greece, where some eccentric men had this caprice to think Being as being in itself, to let themselves overwhelmed by the mystery of presence concealed by every being. One might call this theoretical disposition towards the existence, and indeed, there were the Greek philosophers who brought this "life-style" in the European culture. It consists in the pure possibility of being amazed and

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[13] M. Henry, *La Barbarie*, Grasset, Paris, 1987, p. 195.

[14] F. C. Bauerschmidt, *Theology after Suspicion*, http://home.apu.edu/~CTRF/papers/1997 papers/bauerschmidt.html.

not of thinking the meaning of things as coming by itself. And, moreover, we may state that European philosophy has begun its voyage on the path of thinking from the reflection on man's fundamental vocation, discovered by Greeks in front of the temple from Delphi: the necessity of self-comprehension (*gnothi seauton*). J. Patočka argued with real strength that, basically, Europe was born from Greek's care about soul as an eminent invisibility: "le souci de l'âme este entièrement intérieur. Le soin de l'âme ne veut pas former l'âme à un quelconque succès extérieur – c'est l'affaire des sophistes. Le soin de l'âme est la formation intérieure de l'âme elle-męme, sa formation en une chose une, inébranlable et, en ce sens, étante, parce qu'elle se préoccupe de la pensée"[15]. Starting with such an interest for the spiritual constitution of human being, philosophy pleaded for the virtues of the dialogue. Only such an arrangement of ideas concerning our relation towards being and towards us – allowing to human's intelligence the freedom of gaining its very homeland – could prepare the Greek philosophy for the meeting of Christianity. After Socrates' call for self-understanding, passing through the Stoical schools of philosophy (with their *logos prophorikos*), a long-lasting culture of interiority commenced with *Philosophia patrum*. The Fathers of Church achieved the Greek intuition by saying – as, for example, St. Augustine did – that human intimacy has its synonym in the *Verbum interius*, the icon of eternity placed in the core of our humanity. Being careful of the human's depths, European culture directed its major options towards the paradigm of personhood. This theological concept recognised the ontological dignity human being partakes of[16]. Then, after the medieval heritage faced the hostility of an anthropocentric paradigm in modern times, the importance of human's interiority was reminded by great philosophers as Pascal or Kierkegaard, altogether with the major poets of their epoch, challenging the "scientific" investigations of human's nature.

Nowadays, as I tried to stress above, living *dans l'ère du vide* (G. Lipovetsky), people are educated in a way that disregards totally the values of "classical culture", under the pregnant impact of "media". Christianity and Hellenism are both rejected in the deluge of postmodernity[17], and this refusal of the classical cultural "canon" comes as an immediate consequence to the

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[15] *Platon et l'Europe*. Séminaire privée du semestre d'été 1973, Verdier, Paris, 1983, trad. Erika Abrams, p. 97.

[16] D. De Rougement, *L'aventure occidentale de l'homme*, Albin Michel, Paris, 1957.

[17] See R. Brague, *Europe - la voie romaine ?*, Criterion, 1993[2], Paris, p. 179-9 sq: "Nous sommes ainsi devenues des Barbares, non plus des Barbares hellénisés, mais des Grecs barbarisés, seulement ŕ démi conscients de leur barbarie".

lost of normal "organon" of perception (philosophy put *organon* and *canon* in mutual respect). My title suggests that Europe is following a path towards the post-nihilistic epoch, a time of a complete spiritual *anaisthesia*. Etienne Gilson supposed that this state of *tedium cordis* should be understood as the proper name for atheism. Europe, if we can still call it as such, seems to become the place where no spiritual combat is welcome because "anything goes". Why do I call this *post*-nihilism? Above its variable content, even when declaimed blasphemies, *nihilism* represented first of all an *attitude*, a radical one but a consciously assumed, a mental *posture* against a traditional order of values refused only through *arguments*. But today, *every* cultural heritage is refused with the strong power of ignorance, nurtured only by "media-culture". Through its proficiency, people lost even the sense of question, of the right one. Since all this happens, I believe we strongly need nowadays a ridiculous but an inspired man like Parsifal, the person who can bring the right and the necessary question for our existential indignity. It was, again, the Greek philosophy that taught us how difficult is to put a suitable question or to find a real dilemma instead of giving "correct" responses. Abandoning its roots, including the pure passion for dialogue (*philosophy*) and comprehension (*theology*[18]), European culture will subscribe to post-nihilism with no chances for reply.

Can we find in the cultural tradition of Europe an alternative option for this prevalent disintegration of our constitutive unity of being? As a response to this enlarged crisis (that couldn't be detailed in this brief approach), one might say, as well as Edmund Husserl did: "return to the Greeks"[19] (as *zu den Sachen selbst*)! We should prefer "the silence of words" (M. Heidegger) to the rhetoricity of images. We should bring forward the virtues of the *logos* instead of the "(sub-)culture of images", but restoring this paradigm implies no resurrection of a playful intertextualism and no Alexandrine revival of the literacy. But why again, one might say, a culture of logos? Because the *logos* is what brings together (in Greek: *legein*), and leads us towards the hidden realm of our interiority. Our hermeneutical constitution belongs in a crucial way to the linguistical structures of our conscience, the *logos* being our *Lebenswelt*, the only path through our very selfness[20]. Freed from the subjection of so many superficial intentions, our conscious may

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[18] I don't believe that Christian theology is the "science of the responses", nor a mere "doctrine" that can fall into ideology, but a meditative act of thinking the consequences of the Revelation for human's destiny and for the entire being.

[19] E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences*, Paideia, Bucharest, 1998[2] (transl. A. Boboc).

[20] H.-G. Gadamer, *Vérité et méthode* [1960], Seuil, Paris, 1976.

reach the essential attention, dwelling in its utmost intimacy. Throughout the world of the *logos* we will encounter the historical strata of our identity. Throughout the world of the *logos*, which supposes an act of submitting to the "genius of the language" (H.-G. Gadamer), we can learn also the meaning of the dialogue. Starting with ourselves but ending up with the *other*, throughout the dialogue we can articulate the model of unity and of a community as an differential plenum. If Hölderlin was right, we can say that from where came the loss of a world it can also spring the chance of its redemption. In the late hour of the widespread of mass-made images, the voice of European culture, because of its dawning reverberations, may stand for us as a chance for regaining a maturity formerly declined.

# CONTEMPORARY PERCEPTIONS OF THE IDEA OF EUROPE

## SORIN POP

## Introduction

Perhaps it doesn't exist a simple and straightforward definition for what European idea means. This can be explained by its specificity, a complex combination of concepts and perceptions, often contradictory. The European idea is elusive, susceptible to change and strongly conditioned by historical evolution.

*Questions about Europe*
One of the most intriguing periods in Europe's history is the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union and incidentally the end of the Cold War has opened up the possibilities of re-connecting Western and Eastern Europe, while the progress made on the integration process within the European Union was raising the prospects of political, economic and monetary union.

Considering that, the debate related to Europe does have a sharp contemporary relevance. Thus, a series of questions may appear: Can be identified distinctive European values and a coherent, recognisable European identity? In that case, what being European means? What kind of Europe is developing for the future? How long will take for Central and Eastern Europe countries to join the EU? How does this new Europe relate to the experiences of its history? Which will be the Europe's position in the new globalized world?

Investigations into the meaning of Europe, into European values, into European identity inevitably have and continue to pose a number of conflicting questions. Is the sufficiency of shared values, culture and history strong enough to sustain a complex structure such as the EU? Or is the European Project destined to reshape the entire basis on which the nation states were built? Or perhaps is the essence of the Europe the very diversity of national and regional cultures and, therefore, the pursuit of the European identity is successless?

## Limits of Europe

Even nowadays, there is no clear sense of the boundaries of Europe. This reflects the actual political evolution in Europe, not a lack of conceptual clarity. The reason for that are the recent historical events like the revolutions in Eastern Europe, the break-up of the Soviet Union, the ending of the Cold War and the deepening of the integration process in the European Union. Moreover, Europe can be associated with a magnetic field. From this perspective, Russia, North Africa or Middle East are not external - they are just outer peripheries.

Geographically, things are rather clear: the Ural and the Caucasus Mountains are the eastern border of Europe. But from political perspective the matter is more complicated. After the end of the Cold War we can talk about different Europes, materialised in the form of "concentric circles", which describe the different spheres of influence: the EU, Central and Eastern Europe, Russia. The most interesting aspect is that we still have differentiations within these frames. For example, the EU has a core known as "le noyau dure" which consists in the most developed and advanced on the way to integration countries. More than that, the patterns of building the European Union reflect this orientation: there are strong concepts like "the Multi-speed Europe", "Europe with Variable Geometry" or "Europe a la Carte". These kind of differentiations can be mirrored also in the former Communist block, where the countries are divided in frontrunners and backmarkers, as related to the EU accession abilities and programs. In terms of security (CSCE), we can identify even a larger Europe, the so-called "Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok".

These differentiations make it possible for the EU and especially its noyau dure to generally act as Europe, although only a part of Europe belongs to the EU. This capacity of action by the EU results from a hierarchic and non-homogenous developed Europe. There's an asymmetrical relationship between West and East: whether it is industrial standards, trade policy or security, most decisions travel from West to East. The EU makes decisions that only bind its members and the Central and Eastern Europe countries have no real alternative but to adapt. At a lower level, things are the same between the leading North and the less developed South.

In conclusion, the eastern border is not a line – it is more like a gradual thinning out eastwards, and perhaps that is one of the best descriptions of the political and economic realities in nowadays Europe and we can identify cleavages within our continent, due to the same realities.

*Defining Europe*

The debate on defining Europe can be said to have evolved on two different mainstreams: on the one hand Europe related to others (the Asians, the Turks, the Russians and the Americans) who were functioning as external discriminators, and on the other hand Europe as a commonwealth of nations, an entity with shared political, social and religious values, being determined by its internal characteristics. While we move forward to the twenty-first century the past identifications of Europe – the geographical definition, the basic freedoms, the association with Christendom, the connection with culture and civilisation, are still having a contemporary relevance.

When we try to define Europe in relation to opposites a problem occurs: it's rather difficult to find a suitable "other". The realities coming out from the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union suggest that Europe can hardly look eastwards for differences in systems and values against which to define itself. This can be explained by the willingness of the former Communist countries to join the EU. Therefore, a more realistic possibility is perhaps the Muslim world from Middle East and North Africa. Currently, the situation is characterised by a combination between distance (created by the obvious cultural differences) and closeness (considering the geographic proximity and the presence of a gross contingent of Muslims in western European societies). For now, despite the acknowledged cultural and historical differences it is difficult to regard the Muslim world as a real threat to Europe in political or economic terms.

Not incidentally the main challenge to Europe  remain the economic super-powers, USA and Japan. Looking ahead, probably the most important question for Europeans is how well the European economy will perform in comparison with the economies of the USA and Japan. During the 1980s it appeared that the USA and Japan were overriding the European economies. But the signing of the Maastricht Treaty foresee a real possibility that Europe as a whole would be able to become a world economic super-power and to compete the other two giants.

This economic related definition doesn't help the issue of creating the self-identity.The USA and Japan are definitely not appropriate counter images of Europe. Nor are the rest of the countries from the Third World. Eventually they might be an object for European politics but are unlikely suitable for identity formation, considering the existence of ex-colonial ties.

Therefore, the attempt to define Europe in terms of its opposites produces no clear-cut solution. Perhaps the current absence of a significant external threat to Europe has softened the force of this kind of identity construction.

Maybe a more positive approach is to define nowadays Europe through its internal characteristics and principles. The political influence of Europe has grown in the 1990s, despite the current NATO attack of Yugoslavia, mainly driven by the Americans. The EU integration and the collapse of the Eastern Block are seen as a kind of victory for the idea of Europe. The states in the western part appear to be willing to hand over sovereignty to a supranational political structure and the states in the eastern part are eager to return to Europe. In these circumstances, the question of European identity and the existence of distinctive European values and principles take hold.

The contemporary quest for the meaning of Europe and understanding the European idea need to be set into an historical context. Thus, notions of what defined Europe changed according historical circumstances: after the French Revolution, they became linked to the basic rights and freedoms, in the age of nationalism the idea of Europe was expressed in visionary projects, while after the World War II the process of integration was regarded as a mean of rebuilding Europe. This evolution reveals that the European idea is a dynamic subject and it can encompass even opposite developments – it's enough to remind that both democracy and fascism have flourished on European soil. It should be also remembered that Europe has often served the interests of particular states, persons and interest groups.

It could be claimed that European identity is characterised by certain political principles such as democracy, freedom of opinion, human rights. It is true that such principles are operating almost in entire contemporary Europe but they can also been found in the USA, Japan, Australia or elsewhere and cannot be said to define Europe in any exclusive sense.

Moving our discussion to a philosophical level, we find that abstract notions such as self-criticism, doubt and scepticism, are advanced as being distinctively or typically European. Thus, the Europe's essence can be found in its diversity, its complexity, its lack of a single centre and its absence of uniformity. For instance, Edgar Morin argues that Europe can be defined by its contradictory and complex nature, by its "critical rationality" and its "self-criticism". According to him, European energy and dynamism consisted in a specific mix of ideas, philosophy and technology, which has generated constant reflection and self-reflection. Sverker Sorlin examines the difference between modernity and modernisation. While modernity is European and moreover is the way that Europe approached the world, modernisation, the economic and technological dynamism, is today spread far beyond Europe. In Hans Enzensberger's opinion, Europe is projected as a collection of localised societies, a plurality a forms ranged across diverse theories and models. He founded an

indefinable force that remains with the people, which is not necessary, a power to act, but a power to resist development, to resist being planned. This opinion is underlined by Anthony Smith, who discovers powerful residual strengths in the states of Europe, which are opposing homogenising.

### EU and the Idea of Europe

The European Union consists not only of the political and economic or of the institutions and laws they have created; it also involves nearly 370 million people whose ideas about each other and about their place in the world are the lifeblood of the idea of Europe.

If we consider that the concept of the West is synonymous with Europe, we might say that the world culture is for a large extent a European culture (even if much of that culture has been promoted and exported by the USA, which is itself a product of European culture). Not only was nearly every part of the world colonised at some point by one European power or another (Japan and China are among the notable exceptions), but the spread of European ideas has meant that Western culture today is defined mainly in European terms.

Many extra-Europeans think of Europe as the Old World: a relatively stable and unchanging region with a strong identity and many venerable institutions and traditions. Nothing could be further from the truth. Not only have Europeans constantly squabbled with each other and gone to war with tragic regularity and frequency, but also the balance of power within Europe has often shifted, forcing mapmakers to constantly redraw the borders between different European states. Unfortunately, this process still continues today. Therefore, in many ways, it is more accurate to think of Europe as new and dynamic rather than old and stable. In 1945, after a devastating war, the Europeans realised that they need to work more closely together to save themselves from the nationalism that had brought so much havoc, death and destruction. This was by no means the first time in the European history when the idea of integration and unity had really surfaced. But the idea of Europe remains ambiguous.

### The Development of a European Identity

One of the characteristics of a state is a sense among its residents of a common identity or citizenship. Although the European Council agreed in 1994 to promote the idea of a "people's Europe" and Maastricht Treaty contained a chapter on European citizenship, the development of a European identity cannot be forced or built by law. It ultimately lies with Europeans themselves, with how they perceive the European Union and with how quickly they can

overcome the myths, biases and misunderstandings that are the heritage of their history.

The process of changing attitude is slowly taking hold. Despite still seeing themselves primarily as citizens of particular member states, more and more western Europeans often feel a sense of common identity. As the barriers to movement within the EU are taken down, EU citizens have fewer reminders of the differences that divide them and tend to see other Europeans less as foreigners and more as partners or neighbours. Another step will come as the number of Europeans living in other EU countries will grow substantially, while the EU flag is increasingly visible throughout the Union, the "Ode to Joy" by Beethoven has been adopted as the EU anthem, the national passports have been switched to a common style EU passport, the Europeans can live and work wherever they like in the EU, they can vote and even stand for certain offices in the member states in which they live. There are still nonlegal barriers to the free movement of people (such as language) but the walls are coming down throughout the EU and are slowly being replaced by attitudes less burdened with narrow nationalism.

One of the great ironies and unanticipated consequences of European integration has been its role in giving national minorities a greater sense of their separate identity. Long unable to wrest powers of self-determination from member state governments, the minorities are reviving their separate identities as subgroups within the larger European Union.

*Central and Eastern Europe*

After the end of the World War II, Europe was divided by an "Iron Curtain". The Soviet Union transformed the countries beyond the curtain in Soviet-type societies. The end of 1980s brought the fall of the Communist Block and the return to democracy and western values for all these countries.

How is the European idea perceived in the minds of the Central and Eastern European people? Despite identifying themselves as being Europeans, they still carry a certain frustration, reminiscence from the Communist period, when the Soviet idea about Europe was a box. In this situation, the Eastern European states must recover the time they had lost, must catch up with the EU countries and join the European political, economic and military structures.

But this is a very difficult and complicated process. Therefore, the Eastern European people expect help, support and understanding from their

western counterparts. A rich and stable Europe cannot be realised without its eastern half.

## Europe – a Nation State?

Europe lacks most of the conventional features of a sovereign nation-state, including fixed boundaries, a dominant common culture, a dominant common language, a common history and shared traditions and ideals.

First, the physical and cultural boundaries of Europe are unclear. The debate is again the eastern border.

Second, few of European countries are culturally homogenous. Many have national minorities and many have also experienced major influxes of immigrants. Not only is there no dominant culture, but most Europeans shudder at the thought of their separate cultures being subordinated in any way to some kind of homogenous Euroculture.

Third, citizens of Europe speak at least 36 different languages and vigorously defend them as the symbol of their separate identities. The spread of English at least provides a way for Europeans to talk each other.

Finally, the histories of European states have overlapped for centuries as they have colonised, gone to war or formed alliances with each other. But those overlaps have served mainly to emphasise differences rather then to give the states a sense of a shared past, and European integration grew in part out of the essentially reactive idea of wanting to put an end to conflict.

The development of a European identity has been helped in some ways by the relative introversion of Western Europe since 1945. Trying to improve the way they manage their own affairs, taking more responsibility for each other and dealing with the uncertainties posed by change in the Soviet Union and then in Russia, Europeans have become more introverted and their internal preoccupations have heavily shaped their attitudes towards the rest of the world.

The dilemma of Europe and nation can be seen as being generated most fundamentally by the tension between, on the one hand, an economy becoming more and more global and on the other hand, cultural communities becoming, if not generally entrenched, then at least not able to extend infinitely. This picture is viewed as Europe being big enough to be the basis for economy and small enough to be a community and have cultural identity or the economy not being contained at the European level and cultural identity definitely not being lifted to the European level.

## Conclusions

We may assume that the idea of Europe is embedded in a combination of three related concepts: it exists some kind of European specification, the Europeans do have a European self-identity-they hold a perception of themselves as being European and we may find in European history schemes for European unity, with politics for and in the name of Europe.

In general discussion, the best description of Europe is perhaps that of "unity in diversity". Europe is a continent that contains no singular essence, that never made culture uniform, that never settled for final truths that kept questioning debating, remaining self-critical thereby generating a unique dynamism. The exploration of the idea of Europe is both a fascinating and frustrating enterprise: there's a rich reservoir of ideas linked to Europe but there's no stable core, no fixed identity, and no final answer.

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# NATIONAL IDENTITY OF ROMANIANS BY MEANS OF NATIONAL STEREOTYPES

STANA NICOLETA

## Theoretical statement

*Cultural identity and national characteristics*

Why a study about national identity when a major objective is to assume a European identity? Maybe because this kind of study helps us to be aware that "the other" is different and to accept "him/her" as "he/she" is. We should develop the relations among nations by preserving the national identity while integrating in a European identity.

The changes that took place in Central and eastern Europe with the collapse of Communism marked the beginning of the emancipation movements of ethnic communities. Also, the opening towards wider cultural spaces put in the fore-ground the intercultural communication (Radu, Ilut & Matei, 1994).

Culture refers to patterns in which the members of a society think, feel and behave. Personality refers also to patterns of thinking, feeling and behaving but with regard to the individual dimension. But any culture produces an essential personality that could be virtually found in each person, member of the respective culture (Harris,1995).

In order to understand similarities and differences across cultures, it is necessary to have a way of talking about how cultures differ and how they are similar (Gudykunst, Ting-Toomey & Nishida, 1996).

*Unity in diversity*

Comparative studies are always very fascinating as Oliver Goldsmith has stated as far back as 1760 " in all the circle of knowledge, there is not perhaps a more pleasing employment than that of comparing countries with each other". The knowledge of the development of relationships among nations by building a European community. The European community will have the mission of preserving national values and national identities.

Europeans are faced with a dilemma: unity or diversity? What should be emphasized the common elements that unify or the typical elements, characteristic for a nation, elements that differentiate? Are Europeans able to create a unitary structure by preserving nevertheless the national values?

The unity of Europe does not exclude the typological variety of its components. Salvador de Madariaga sees Europe as a whole: Europe stands out a unitary with the same clarity as any of the nations which compose it. The differences between Scandinavians and Germans, Latins and Slavs melt in a general resemblance which is more powerful than any of the differences. When looked at from another continent, the Venetian gondola and the Scottish castle seem friends and natural neighbors in the picture endowed by history and psychology with striking unity (Madariaga, 1983).

*National stereotypes*

This research focuses on the social representation of the Romanian national identity by means of positive and negative ethnic stereotypes.

Etymologically the term stereotype is derived from the Greek words "stereos", meaning solid and "typos" meaning the making of an impression or model. The word is used in printing where it refers to a solid printing mould or plate which once cast, is difficult to change. In keeping with this etymology, the term was first used by the journalist Walter Lippman in 1922 to describe judgements made about others on the basis of their ethnic group membership (Jamdt, 1995). He described stereotypes as "simplified pictures in our heads" (Askevis-Leherpeux, 1998).

Today the term can be used for any group membership and a "stereotype" is seen as a set of widely shared generalizations about the psychological characteristics of a group or class of people.

This definition is preferred as it allows for stereotypes to change, as they actually do; it permits the inclusion of both positive and negative characteristics and emphasizes that stereotypes are widely shared sets of beliefs.(Somehow when held by only a few the term hardly seems justified).

There is the general acceptance of the idea that stereotypes represent the cognitive component of attitudes held toward human groups. The fact is that stereotyping involves affective and cognitive processes in continuous mutual interaction (Mackie & Hamilton, 1993).

We are repeatedly warned to beware of generalizations, yet, paradoxically, it seems that the human mind cannot resist categorizing people and things. We love to "pigeon-hole", to make order out of a universe that frequently seems to us confusing and even chaotic.

These acts of categorization are not dangerous; the difficulty lies with the overgeneralizations and the often negative evaluations that are directed towards members of the categories. Thus, while stereotypes that are inaccurate or that carry negative evolutions are a problem, they can also make us unaware of, and keep readily available information that is important to have handy in day-to-day multicultural interactions. (Berry,Poortinga, Segall & Dasen, 1992).

Nowadays the ethnic stereotype study is part of the larger subject of the national identity. Research in the field was conducted by Katz & Braly in 1933, then follows the research coordinated by UNESCO in the '70-ies: "How the nations see each other?" and in Romania after December 1989: D. Abraham, I.Badescu, S. Chelcea (Chelcea, 1994).

I will use in my research the term "stereotype" with a positive connotation, as a national characteristic of members of a nationality.

## Methodology

I live in a multicultural community and I wanted to research the way Romanians see themselves and the way they are seen by members of the Hungarian ethnic minority. I collected my data by administering a questioner to students.

The sample consists of students from the University of Agricultural Sciences and Veterinary Medicine Cluj-Napoca.

I want to describe the autostereotypes (concerning the own group- how the Romanians describe themselves) and the heterostereotypes, too (how the Romanians are described by others- the Hungarian ethnics, in this case). 144 subjects compose the sample out of which 110 are Romanians and 34 belong to the Hungarian ethnic group. All of them are students in the 3-rd, 4-th and 5-th year of study- of an average age of 22 ″ years old.

A widely used method in national stereotypes research is the check-list method in which the scientist proposes a list of attributes. In order to avoid suggesting answers to the subjects I did not use the check-list method. An open-question questionnaire was devised instead. The subjects were asked to define the Romanian stereotype by listing the three most important good and bad features in their opinion.

## Results and conclusions

I ranked the good and bad features according to frequency (f) and to find this frequency I used the formula:

$$f = \frac{n}{N} x100$$

where: n = how many subject mentioned the feature
N = the size of the sample

After calculating I obtained the following results:

**For autostereotypes** (the Romanians seen by themselves):
*Positive autostereotypes* (good features):
Hospitality (a feature attributed by f=72.3% of students)
Intelligence (f=41.5%)
Diligence (f=27.6%)
The sense of humor (f=18.4%)
Patriotism (f=16.9%)
Honesty (f=12.3%)
Inventivity (f=9.2%)

I consider frequencies of above 9.2% significant because I used an open-question questionnaire.
Other good features were mentioned with lower frequency f<9.2%:
Kindness
Tolerance
Cheerfulness
Communicativity
Courage
Faith in God
Dignity
Modesty
Generosity
etc.
*Negative autostereotypes* (bad features):
Indifference (a feature attributed by 23% of the students)
Indecision and selfishness (f=15.3%)
Subjects to influence, low self-esteem (f=13.8%)
Naivity (f=12.3%)

The subjects mentioned other bad features, too (f<11%) as

   Dishonesty
   Incorrectness
   Conservative
   They are not united enough
   Inconsistency
   Too much alcohol

**For heterostereotypes** (the Romanians seen by the Hungarian ethnics)

  *Positive stereotypes:*

   Hospitality (f=85.7%)
   Intelligence (f=42.8%)

With a lower frequency they see the Romanians as:

   Tolerant
   With a sense of humor
   Inventive
   Courage
   Seriosity
   Patriots
   Beautiful persons

  *Negative stereotypes:*

   Indifference (f=57.1%)
   Too tolerant (f=42.8)
   Superficial (f=28.5%)

With a lower frequency they are seen as:

   Subjects of influence
   Without practical sense
   Conservative
   Bragging
   Selfish
   Not united enough

  Analyzing the data we can notice that the autostereotypes and the heterostereotypes about Romanians are very similar. The Romanian students and the Hungarian ethnic students agree concerning the main good features and the main bad features.

  If we focus on autostereotypes we can notice that the frequencies of the positive autostereotypes are bigger than the frequencies of the negative autostereotypes: this means that the Romanians agree much more in what concerns the good features than the bad features.

The studies about the national stereotypes help the understanding of the other and make people awake of differences, helping them to accept these differences. This fact highlights the importance of intercultural education. The intercultural education has, at least, two dimensions: a dimension of knowledge and a dimension of experience (Dasen, Peeregaux & Rey, 1999).

Cultural variation should be represented and transmitted in the school system in order for children to accept it in society (Berry, Poortinga, Segall & Dasen, 1992).

Intercultural education should develop international tolerance, recognition of and respect for cultural differences and encourage the youth to assimilate a multicultural identity.

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# A SISIFIC EUROPE

## CHIRIAC IULIA RAMONA

Europe lives a Sisific destiny. Sisific, because it shares the same eternal striving with Camus's hero. It is condemned to a continuous drilling of the Universe in search of truths, always unsatisfied, always trying, always questioning, never ceasing to pursue the absolute. In Europe, people create dreams, brick by brick, only to tear them down afterwards and find new textures and new combinations for their ideas.

Europe has this amazing capacity of creating values, which are fundamentally opposed, and of living and believing in them with all its energy. For instance, for hundreds of years Europe thought that it had found the happiness in believing in God, a god that was viewed as the depository of the supreme truths. But this God has proved to be a *Deus otiosus*, angry with mankind, deaf to their prayers and useless. The human inside Jesus had died and the Jesus inside God has died, too and Europe understood it and had the power to go on. Therefore, it rebelled against paternal authority and "killed" its god leaving the skies empty. Europe has decided that it would search for its truths in the skies no more; but somewhere closer, in its own soul. Rejecting God, Europe has denied the act of initial creation and assumed a creative destiny. Undertaking the demiurgic tasks, Europe leavens its own god and creates its own truths herself. Still and all, Europe's refusal to acknowledge God stands proof of the fact that the European man still leaves his life mostly as a *Homo religiosus*. This need to cling to the religious element inside him reveals, yet, another inner struggle that the European man lives: the struggle between the eternal man and the historical man. The first is the man created by God, the latter is the man created by science. *Homo religiosus* is eternal, the historical man lives his becoming (the Romanian philosopher Constantin Noica wrote that, compared to the eternal man, the scientific man is basically a "non - human"). This is how the European man lives his life, knowing that he cannot live outside history and, at the same time, trying to grasp at a crumb of eternity.

The force of the European culture lies in its ability to provoke criticism and its capacity of self-criticism. Analysis and investigation form its basis. The

European culture is a tireless, always on the go culture. The European mind wants to know its own limits and its imperfections. It is a sceptical mind. The European man has this will of pushing things beyond comprehension, of passing through all boundaries. In fact, it is Europe's destiny to lead a continuous fight with limits, always trying to exceed them, always trying to push things further, beyond rules. Hence, the tragic of its fate. Tragedy was born in Europe, the European man was his parent. A Romanian writer and philosopher, Gabriel Liiceanu, gave a splendid definition of the tragic, which is also the definition of the European soul: "If you try to overcome your limits you are punished, if you don't try to, then you are not a human being".

And Europe goes on trying to overcome its limits, knowing it will be punished and that it will reach nowhere. But, in the end, it is not the destination the one that really matters but the travel and the struggle towards it. Homo europaeus is a traveler. "A traveler is to be reverenced as such. His profession is the best symbol of our life. Going from-toward it is the history of everyone of us" (Thoreau). And when he does not travel on foot, he travels with his mind, to discover the others and, most of all, to discover himself. Only Europe has the power to admit that it cannot move mountains, but it can and will climb them at any risks, always aiming for the peaks. Europe is always willing to learn, to redefine its values, to accept it is wrong and hence destroy the utopias it itself has created.

Totalitarism is one such utopia, created by Europeans who thought they could deceive History. They thought they could promote a new type of man: the man with no self, who finds the true sense of his existence in giving up his own soul and being one with the soul of the masses. Every gesture this man does lacks any spiritual value, every action is a political act, directed to common interest (but not in Aristotle's acceptation of common good).

Totalitarian systems have functioned as a "Procust's bed", removing any trace of individuality, of *vitapropia* as Orwell called it. Due to this process of equalizing people there were no tops, the individual was swallowed up by the mass. As a consequence, man ended up alienated from himself and the world he lived in.

Totalitarian systems killed man and everything he stood for, they killed humanity and denied its civilization, that is all important moral, spiritual, ethical values that have raised man above animality.

But the wax melted away, the wings crumbled and *Homo europaeus* fell down in History's labyrinth again. This capacity of taking into consideration all possible combinations makes it an open culture. Europe proves to be a fertile soil for contradictions, a mixture of honey and venom, of sky and earth,

of man and God. Only in Europe man can be *axis mundi* and dust in the wind at the same time. He can be the center of the Universe and the measure of all things, the most beautiful creation, but he can also be a very little part of the intricate universal machine and even the lowest creature of all, disorganized and violent. Europe's man is at the same time both a Cain and an Abel.

The graphic sign specific to the European *forma mentis* is the interrogation sign. Europe asks and asks herself about everything. It refuses to take anything for granted, without a thorough examination. America's graphic sign is the exclamation sign. America is a continuous exclamation (but not in the ancient philosophers' acceptation, which considered that the origin of philosophy lies in wonder). America does not wonder! It just proclaims and exclaims: from the political rulers of Latin America who come and go in swift whirls, to the glittering and extravaganza of the games of chance. For *Homo americanus*, the game has become a substitute for destiny itself, *Homo americanus* is only a *Homo ludens*, whereas the European man still understands that the game is different from the real life, thus keeping its sacred value.

For centuries Europe has taught and bred America. Now it has come the time for Europe to be "americanized". America's present to Europe? Individualism and mass-culture. The American man is only an *axis-mundi*. Everything happens around its existence, everything is made to happen for the individual, so that the individual is free. We are condemned to be set free; we are so free that we feel like claiming our chains! We focus on the individual only and, in the end, we take a look at our "chef d'oeuvre a bunch of lonelinesses who have only one thing in common: the desire to be different! (Salvador Dali had the genius to express this utter feeling in one of his paintings entitled "Loneliness").

Apart from individualism, America spreads in Europe another "catching disease": isolationism. It is interesting, indeed, how, after tearing down all barriers that kept men separated, we are more isolated than ever. The local reigns upon the universal, and the universal has become, thanks to mass-media, a mere fiction. It is almost a wonder that one can actually be part in a revolution and then turn the TV off and go to bed. Hannah Arendt wrote that the loss of faith and transcendence in the Occident has left men inside themselves, inside the worship of their private existence.

We have torn down Berlin's wall, when are we going to destroy the cold walls inside of us?

My beloved,
Caress the cold walls!

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They are all that is left to you.
My beloved,
Caress the cold walls!
But know this: behind the cold walls
There are warm
Souls,
Crying for warm souls!

Another obstacle Europe has to face in its attempt to cling to its own values is mass-culture, pop-culture that is. But "if pop art is the painting of a soup can rather than the soup itself, pop culture is the worship of form rather than substance, homage to the superficial." (William K. Zinsser) This obsession of the wrapping, of the way a product is presented on the outside is seriously threatening Europe's values. It is the cover that counts! Nobody cares what the cover is covering. Take one of the most symbolic elements in pop culture: the Barbie doll. Glittering on the outside, empty on the inside! The accent is set on possessions and the importance of the appearance. "It is modern America in miniature, a tiny parody of our pursuit of the beautiful, the material and the trivial" (William K. Zinsser).

The European intellectual has struggled to find a way out, to find answers to such questions as: "Is the big culture threatened in its sacredness by mass culture?" or "Is mass culture genuine culture?". Such answers are very important to *Homo europaeus* since, for hundreds of years, Europe has defined itself through its culture and its civilization. Moreover, as Milan Kundera said: "In modern times, when the Medieval God has transformed into a *Deus absconditus*, religion gave its crown to culture, which became the fulfillment of the supreme values, through which the European humanity understands, defines and identifies itself".

Nowadays, the Europeans see themselves forced to enlarge the meaning of this concept. If democracy used to insure everybody's access to culture, nowadays it guarantees everybody's right to its *own* culture.

Does this reconsideration of the concept bring about the end of the genuine culture? Does it reveal the defeat of the thought? Alain Finkielkraut assures us that only when the hate towards culture becomes itself cultural the thought is defeated. Otherwise, not. Of course, it might seem impossible to us to put together one of Degas's ballerinas and a Barbie doll and call both of them cultural elements. But as open minded Europeans, always ready to take new things into consideration, we have to admit that mass culture is a reality that cannot be ignored and, moreover, a reality which has to be integrated in our culture, in order to avoid a conceptual crisis.

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Europe is love because Europe is Christian, and Christianity teaches us the love for the other and the tolerance, it teaches us how to live an unselfish life. Still and all, in the name of this love for Christ, the hatred that has destroyed and killed was possible.

Only Europe can find the roots of love both in heaven and hell, can bring the angels and the demons together through a pure and aggressive, honest and mysterious feeling. In Europe, love is at the same time "a blue flower" and an *ange dechu*. Through love, as well as through knowledge, the European soul searches for the absolute and finds its fulfillment in bringing together the opposites, in that *coincidentia oppositorum* which lies at the core of human spirit.

Europe lives through and with History. Hesse's "bamboo garden" stands proof that Europe *cannot* and *will not* live outside History. Europe's task, as an entity that lives inside History is to establish a harmony between its rhythms and the rhythms of History. There has to be a perfect match, otherwise the flow of time cannot be fluent. Europe has discovered the valuation of History and that of matter along with Jesus Christ's descend on earth. Europe's time became linear, unlike the circular flow of time in Asian cultures, and Europe learned the Heraclitian becoming and lived its destiny knowing that everything changes.

Europe experiences, at a greater level, what the individual lives at a smaller level, that is the perpetual struggle between the transcendent and the contingent, between life and death, between love and hate, between history and an out of time existence. The European man has been created after the very "face of mind" of Europe. In fact, if we were to paraphrase Kant's words "there are philosophers, philosophy does not exist", we could say that there is only Homo europaeus; Europe does not exist. In a way, this assertion can be true since there are people who share European values without being literally inside Europe. And the reverse assertion is valid, as well.

Looking back towards Europe's history and its struggle between these opposed entities, one understands that, in the end, Europe does not want to choose because it does *not* want to be anchored it one reality only, because choosing implies limitation. This perpetual attempt of redefining its values, of searching for new ones keeps it alive and supplies it with the energy it needs to create new ideas.

No matter the costs, the feeling of insecurity, the suffering of a search always taken from the beginning, we have to imagine that our Sisific Europe is happy!

# *IV. ACADEMIC EVENTS IN 1999*
## *(Faculty of European Studies)*

## I. ACORDURI DE COOPERARE

1. Acorduri interuniversitare: Westfälische Wilhelms - Universität Münster
2. Acorduri interfacultăţi/ interdepartamentale: Departamentul de Ştiinţe Politice, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
3. Programe internaţionale (alte decât cele europene): Arizona State University (SUA) – organizarea în cooperare a cursului de vară şi a programelor de antropologie; Michigan State University (SUA) – participare la programe de învăţământ la distanţă şi împreună cu Facultatea de Ştiinţe Politice a U.B.B la formarea liderilor politici

## II. INTEGRARE EUROPEANĂ

### 1. Proiecte specifice lansate prin programe

a. TEMPUS TEMPUS JEP + 1251-97 (cu un consorţiu format din următoarele universităţi: l'Université Libre de Bruxelles, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Milano, Universita degli Studi di Milano, Utrecht University, University of Pisa, Sussex European Institute)

b. SOCRATES: Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Milano, Utrecht University, Sussex European Institute, Lapland University Rovaniemi

c. PHARE

### 2. Alte programe de cooperare europeană

a. Module francofone: Université de Marne-la-Vallée, Université de Amiens

b. Programe doctorale în cotutelă: cu Université de Strasbourg II (geografie regională); cu Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster (ştiinţe politice şi sociologie); diplomă dublă de licenţă cu Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster

### 3. Cooperare regională

1. Participarea la programul CEEPUS
2. Participare la reuniuni de cooperare regională: Higher Education in European Studies: Education for Democratic Citizenship. Regional Conference for the Countries from Central and South-Eastern Europe, 26-28 September 1999, Bulgaria

### 4. Cooperare Transoceanică

1. SUA: Arizona State University, Michigan State University
2. Asia: University of Kobe (Japonia)

### 5. Evenimente interne cu participare internatională:

1. Manifestări ştiinţifice şi culturale:
   - competiţie studenţească de simulare a unui caz al Curţii Europene de Justiţie: 1999 Romanian Moot Court. European Community Law Competition, 18-21 martie 1999, Cluj-Napoca;

- Ziua Europei, 7-9 mai 1999, Cluj-Napoca
- seminar studențesc organizat împreună cu Universitatea din Münster: *Decision-Making in the European Union (with a simulation case study of the Common Agricultural Policy)*, 24 – 30 mai 1999, Cluj-Napoca;
- școala de vară organizată împreună cu Arizona State University, 4-31 iulie 1999, Cluj-Napoca;
- școala de vară organizată împreună cu Universitatea din Münster: **Teaching European Studies. Aproaches, Methods, Curricula**, 8-19 august 1999, Cluj-Napoca;
- study visit intre 25 august – 8 septembrie 1999 in Danemarca
- conferinta: Entrepreneurship and Local and Regional Development, 14-15 septembrie 1999, Cracovia
- conferinta: Ideas about Europe, 23-24 septembrie 1999, Centro de Estudios Europeos, Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona
- colocviu organizat cu Centrul Cultural Francez: Une dynamique des valeurs européennes en Roumanie?, 24-26 septembrie 1999, Cluj-Napoca
- workshop organizat împreună cu Universitatea din Münster: East-European Integration and the Contribution of Knowledge, 4-5 octombrie 1999
- seminar studențesc organizat împreună cu Universitatea din Münster: Romania – A Transition Society on its way to the European Union, 7-12 decembrie 1999, Münster

## 6. Structuri ce susțin cooperarea internațională

1. Cursuri internaționale de vară de limbă și civilizație româna: cu Arizona State University, 3-31 iulie 1999
2. CERU
3. Centre și societăți culturale, biblioteci:
   - Institutul pentru Studiul Societăților Post-Totalitare
   - Institutul de Antropologie Culturală
   - Institutul de Studii Germane
   - Biblioteca de Studii Europene
   - Biblioteca de Studii Americane

## 7. Prezențe din străinătate

1. Lectori straini: Nicholas Sellers (University of Philadelphia), Stephen Blackwell (CEP-UK), Colin Quigly (University of California), Chantal Millon-Delsol (Université de Marne la Vallée), Alain Ouvrieu (Director ESSCA-Hongrie), Miklos Vörös (University of Pecs and Chicago), Csaba Kato (University of Brno),
2. Doctoranzi
3. Studenți străini: 1998-1999: 14 Moldova, 2 Ucraina, 1 Venezuela, 1 Franța, 1 Germania, 2 Olanda (Socrates); 1999-2000: 4 Moldova, 1 Bolivia, 1 Germania
4. Visiting professor: Dezsö Benedek (University of Georgia), Konrad Gündisch (Oldenburg), Dietmar Wilske și Werner Joël (Münster)
5. Vizite în cadrul programelor de cooperare: (TEMPUS): Reinhard Meyers și Wichard Woyke (Münster), Albert Goudoever și Bart von Steenbergen

(Utrecht), Alfredo Canavero (Milano), Adrian Treacher (Sussex); Nicolae Păun, Alina Andreica, Carmen Lazar si Gheorghe Buta (Bruxelles); Andrei Marga, Horia Bora și Monca Hot (Münster); Dana Popa și Marius Suciu (Pisa); Anca Boca (Milano); Valentin Naumescu, Mircea Maniu, Gabriel Troc, Tomuletiu Sanda, Cătălina Ghitulescu și Cristina Rotar (Utrecht); Ovidiu Pecican, Nicoleta Paina și Eva Papp (Sussex); Horia Todoran (Finlanda); Florin Bota (Torino).

**8. Reprezentarea în organisme internaționale și educație:** ECSA (Pittsbourgh)

**9. Doctori Honoris Causa ai Universității "Babeș-Bolyai" Cluj,** la propunerea Facultății de Studii Europene

— Prof. Dr. H. Lanfried (preș. Conf. Rectorilor din Germania)
— Prof. Dr. Chantal Millon-Delsol (dir. Centrului de Studii Europene de la Univ. Marne la Vallé)

**10. Aplicații de studiu**

— instituții europene: Strasbourg, Luxembourg, Paris, Bruxelles (iulie 1999);
— comunități locale și regionale: Danemarca (septembrie 1999).

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