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**LA CREATION DE LA COUR PENALE AFRICAINE :
DEFIS ET PERSPECTIVES D'UNE JUSTICE
ALTERNATIVE A LA COUR PENALE
INTERNATIONALE**

**THE CREATION OF THE AFRICAN CRIMINAL COURT:
CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES OF AN ALTERNATIVE JUSTICE
TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT**

Nickson Bondo Museka, Faustin Mwilambwe Kalombola*

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Abstract

The creation of the future African Criminal Court (ACC) was envisaged by the African Union (AU) as the African states' collective response to the "politicization" of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Eight years following its signature, the Maloba Protocol has never obtained the fifteen ratifications required to spearhead the operationalisation of the ACC. This article attempts to address two fundamental questions: - what are the challenges hindering the creation of the CCA? - and how effective will the CCA be in trying Africans for crimes they have committed on their own soil? It reveals, on the one hand obstacles that hinder the implementation of the Malabo protocol; and on the other hand, challenges that could hamper the CCA's effectiveness as soon as it becomes operational.

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La création de la future Cour Pénale Africaine (CPA) a été envisagée par l'Union Africaine (UA) comme une réponse collective des États africains à la « politisation » de la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI). Huit ans après sa signature, le protocole de Malabo qui crée la CPA n'a jamais obtenu les quinze ratifications requises pour rendre opérationnelle cette juridiction pénale africaine. Cet article tente de répondre à deux questions fondamentales celles de savoir : - quels sont les défis liés à la création de la CPA ? - et à quel point la CPA sera-t-elle efficace pour juger les africains pour les crimes qu'ils ont commis sur leur propre sol ? Il révèle, d'une part les obstacles qui obstruent l'entrée en vigueur du protocole de Malabo ; et d'autre part, les défis qui pourraient entraver l'efficacité de la CPA dès son opérationnalisation.

Key-words: African Criminal Court, International Criminal Court, international law, African Union, Pan-African justice.

1. INTRODUCTION

La création d'une Cour Pénale Africaine (CPA) a été envisagée par les Chefs d'État et de gouvernement ainsi que plusieurs observateurs, activistes des droits de l'homme et analystes africains comme une réponse à la « politisation » et « l'instrumentalisation » de la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI) par les puissances occidentales. Près de vingt ans après l'entrée en vigueur du statut de Rome de 1998 auquel plus de cent vingt états du monde dont trente-deux états africains ont adhéré, plusieurs voix s'élèvent pour dénoncer la « politisation » de la CPI. Pour ce faire, les États membres de l'UA envisagent le retrait soit collectif, soit individuel de cette juridiction pénale internationale, et la création d'une CPA comme une solution alternative à la « politisation » ou « l'instrumentalisation » de la CPI. Lors d'un sommet extraordinaire de l'Union Africaine (UA) tenue le 23 octobre 2013, les États membres de l'UA avaient menacé de se retirer collectivement du statut de Rome¹. Cependant, ce processus du retrait collectif ou individuel tarde à se matérialiser, ou semble tout simplement avoir échoué.

Plusieurs études antérieures que nous avons consultées focalisent leurs analyses sur la genèse et l'évolution de la justice pénale ayant conduit à la

¹ Benedict Abrahamson Chigara et Matthew Chidebe Nwankwo, "To be or not to be? The African Union and its Member States Parties' Participation as High Contracting States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)" in *Nordic Journal of Human Rights*, Vol.33, Issue 3, Routledge Taylor and Francis, 2015, pp.245-268. <https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rnhr20> consulté le 15 avril 2023.

création de la CPI; ainsi que la « politisation » ou « instrumentalisation » comme défi majeur qu'éprouve cette juridiction pénale internationale à promouvoir une justice transitionnelle efficace et équitable. Peu d'études scientifiques analysent les défis du retrait collectif ou individuel des états africains comme réponse à la « politisation » ou « l'instrumentalisation » de la CPI; et dans quelle mesure, si jamais elle devenait opérationnelle, la CPA sera-t-elle efficace à mettre fin à l'impunité et promouvoir une justice transitionnelle. Cet article vise à combler ce gap dans la littérature.

De ce qui précède, les questions fondamentales auxquelles cet article tente de répondre sont celles de savoir : - Pourquoi le processus de la création de la CPA tarde-t-il à se matérialiser ? - et à quels sont CPA sera-t-elle efficace pour juger les africains pour les crimes qu'ils ont commis sur leur propre sol ? En répondant à ces deux questions, cet article vise à démontrer l'incapacité de leaders africains à se retirer individuellement ou collectivement du statut de Rome créant la CPI; et à explorer les défis majeurs qui pourraient entraver l'efficacité de la CPA à mettre fin à l'impunité dès son opérationnalisation. Il est subdivisé en quatre sections incluant l'introduction, le processus de la création de la CPA, et les défis majeurs liés à l'efficacité de la future CPA, et la conclusion.

2. LE PROCESSUS DE LA CREATION DE LA COUR PENALE AFRICAINE

L'éventualité de la création de la CPA a été évoquée plusieurs fois par l'UA comme une réponse à la politisation présumée de la CPI. Plusieurs griefs ont motivé cette idée de la création d'une CPA afin de juger les africains pour les crimes qu'ils ont commis sur leur propre sol. Pour Max Du Plessis, la majorité des leaders Africains considèrent la CPI comme un outil hégémonique de l'Occident ou une institution qui cible ou encourage une discrimination contre l'Afrique². De même, les leaders africains s'insurgent contre le fait que la CPI ait procédé à des enquêtes afin de juger un Président de la République en exercice alors que son pays n'est pas Partie au statut de Rome³. Pour ce faire, l'UA accuse le Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU d'avoir ignoré la demande des leaders africains de retirer la plainte formulée par ce dernier contre les présidents africains en exercice afin de privilégier la paix au détriment de la justice⁴.

² Max Du Plessis, *The International Criminal Court that Africa wants*, Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria: South Africa, 2010, pp.13-18, <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Mono172.pdf> consulté le 20 mars 2023.

³ Ibid

⁴ Max Du Plessis, *opcit.*, pp.13-18

En outre, les leaders africains dénoncent le fait que le Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU utilise une politique de deux poids, deux mesures en référant le cas des Africains en général, et du Soudan en particulier, alors qu'il refuse de faire la même chose en ce qui concerne, par exemple, le Gaza⁵. N'ayant pas trouvé gain de cause à leurs revendications, les leaders africains s'étaient réunis à travers un sommet de l'UA à Kampala (Ouganda), pour évoquer l'éventualité de la création d'une CPA comme réponse à toutes ces critiques formulées contre la CPI.

La première étape du processus de la création de la CPA a été amorcée avec l'adoption d'un nouveau protocole relatif au statut de la Cour Africaine de Justice et des Droits de l'Homme (CAJDH) par les Etats membres de l'UA en 2008 à El Cheikh (Egypte). L'objectif de ce nouveau protocole était d'élargir les compétences de la Cour africaine et d'intégrer les crimes internationaux graves dans son système pénal⁶. En dépit du fait que le Protocole de 2008 n'est pas encore entre en vigueur, les leaders africains avaient adopté le 27 juin 2014 un autre Protocole à Malabo. Comme le Protocole de El Cheikh, le Protocole de Malabo étend ses compétences à des crimes relevant du droit international et des crimes transnationaux. Ainsi, si le protocole de Malabo entre en vigueur, la CAJDH aura compétence pour juger les 14 crimes notamment les crimes de génocide, crimes contre l'humanité, crimes de guerre, crime de changement anticonstitutionnel de gouvernement, piraterie, terrorisme, mercenariat, corruption, blanchiment d'argent, traite des personnes, trafic de drogue, trafic des déchets dangereux, l'exploitation illicite des ressources naturelles et le crime d'agression⁷.

Partant de ce qui précède, il sied donc de déduire qu'à travers le protocole de Malabo, l'UA veut, premièrement, mettre sur pieds la section de droit pénal international de la CAJDH qui servira de cour pénale régionale africaine, opérant d'une manière similaire à la CPI, mais dans un périmètre

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Union Africaine, *Protocol portant amendement du Protocol relatif au Statut de la Cour africaine de justice et des droits de l'Homme*, Malabo, 2014, p. 4. https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36398-treaty-0045_-_protocol_on_amendments_to_the_protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights_f.pdf consulté le 14 avril 2023.

⁷ Amnesty international, *Malabo Protocol: Legal and institutional implications of the merged and expanded African court*, 2016. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr01/6137/2017/en/> consulté le 14 mai 2023.

géographique étroitement défini, et sur une liste massivement élargie de crimes⁸. Deuxièmement, l'UA voudrait installer une justice pénale régionale par le biais de la chambre criminelle de la CAJDH du 1^{er} juillet 2008⁹. Troisièmement, à travers son article 46a bis, le Protocol de Malabo, confère une immunité aux Chefs d'État et tout autre haut représentant de l'État durant leur mandat, y compris pour les crimes de génocide, des crimes de guerre et crimes contre l'humanité¹⁰.

Par ailleurs, si jamais installée, la CPA sera une fusion entre la CAJDH et la Cour de justice de l'UA dotée de trois sections, notamment affaires générales, droits de l'homme et droit pénal international¹¹. Par rapport à la saisine, seuls le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'UA et le bureau du procureur général sont habilités à soumettre les cas des violations des crimes internationaux relevant de la compétence de la CPA tels que décrits dans les sections et paragraphes précédents. En outre, l'article 3 du protocole de Malabo prévoit que les communautés économiques régionales africaines, les États membres de l'UA, et les organisations internationales reconnues par l'UA peuvent également saisir la CPA¹².

En analysant la structure et la compétence juridictionnelle de la future CPA, elle ressemble à celle de la CPI car elle détient une compétence juridiction en matière des violations graves des droits de l'homme et droit de justice. En d'autres termes, la CPA ne pourra pas statuer sur les cas des crimes déjà instruits par la CPI, notamment la République Centre-africaine, la Cote d'Ivoire, la RDC, la Lybie, le Kenya et le Soudan. En dépit de plusieurs étapes franchies, l'idée de la création de la CPA peine à se matérialiser. Le Protocol de la CAJDH était adopté, d'il y a vingt ans passés, mais seuls 30 États africains sur 54 l'ont ratifié. En plus, la CAJDH n'avait pas de compétence pénale. A travers le protocole de Malabo de 2014, les leaders africains ont convenu de donner à la CAJDH la compétence en matière pénale pour juger les crimes internationaux tels que énumérés supra. Néanmoins, le protocole de Malabo ne s'est jamais matérialisé. Plusieurs défis pourraient se poser quant au fonctionnement efficace de la CPA si jamais le Protocol de Malabo entrait en vigueur.

⁸ Idem, p. 4

⁹ Ademola Abass., "The Proposed International Criminal Jurisdiction for the African Court: Some Problematical Aspects" dans *Netherlands International Law Review*, vol. 60, 2013, pp. 27-50.

¹⁰ Union Africaine, *op. cit.*

¹¹ Ibid, pp.4-6

¹² Ibid pp 4-6

En réponse à ce qu'ils considèrent comme la politisation ou l'instrumentalisation de la CPI, les leaders ont adopté à la fois la stratégie du retrait individuel et collectif. La stratégie du retrait collectif de l'UA est un document à travers lequel les États africains formulent les différents griefs et revendications contre la CPI et son fonctionnement. Plus particulièrement, à travers ce document, les leaders Africains s'insurgent contre le fait que la Cour ne cible que les Africains, le non-respect des immunités des Chefs d'États, la suspension des poursuites contre les dirigeants Soudanais et Kenyans. Adopté au cours d'un Sommet de l'UA, la stratégie du « retrait collectif » comporte également une étude des procédures nationales de retrait individuel éventuel d'États membres de l'UA. A travers la « stratégie du retrait collectif », les États africains ont fait part de leur intention de quitter collectivement le Statut de Rome de la CPI.

Cependant, le retrait collectif ne peut pas être juridiquement possible en droit international en tant donné que chaque Etat membre avait ratifié individuellement le Statut de Rome. Par conséquent, les États africains ne peuvent pas se retirer collectivement. Le défi majeur par rapport à la stratégie du retrait collectif est que les États africains ont individuellement signé et ratifié le statut de Rome. A cet effet, le retrait collectif ne peut donc pas être acceptable du point de vue juridique. Etant donné que chaque Etat africain a ratifié individuellement et séparément le statut de Rome dans leurs lois nationales, l'UA se retrouverait juridiquement incapable de réclamer un retrait collectif de tous ses États membres.

Alors que le retrait individuel est juridiquement possible, celui-ci peine à se matérialiser. Les États africains sont incapables de se retirer individuellement. Sur l'ensemble des Chefs d'États africains, seul le Président Burundais Pierre Nkurunziza avait réussi à tirer officiellement son pays du statut de Rome. Plusieurs autres Chefs d'État ont, du moins jusqu'à présent, tenté mais échoué de retirer leurs États du statut de Rome. Le Kenya, par exemple, n'a jusqu'à présent pas matérialisé son plan de se retirer de la CPI. La même chose pour la Gambie qui avait fait marche arrière après que l'ancien président Yaya Jammeh ait été démis de ses fonctions.

En Afrique du Sud, les intentions de l'ex-président Jacob Zuma étaient restées lettres mortes, car conformément à l'arrêt de la haute cour, la prérogative de se retirer des instruments internationaux est exclusivement réservée au Parlement, et non au Président de la République. En Ouganda, le Président Yoweri Museveni et son gouvernement s'étaient juste contentés de

menacer de se retirer du statut de Rome, mais n'ont pas encore donné suite en termes des démarches formelles et officielles par rapport à ses intentions. En Zambie, le Président de la République avait organisé des consultations populaires au cours desquelles sa population s'était prononcée avec une majorité écrasante de 93% des participants en faveur du non-retrait de la CPI. Il sied donc d'arguer que les Etats africains sont incapables de se retirer soit individuellement, soit collectivement. La stratégie du retrait collectif semble tout simplement servir de moyen de pression des leaders africains sur la CPI.

3. DÉFIS ET PERSPECTIVES DE LA FUTURE CPA

Si jamais devenue fonctionnelle, la CPA pourrait faire face à plusieurs défis qui vont entraver l'efficacité à mettre fin à l'impunité pour les crimes commis par les africains sur leur propre sol, notamment le financement de la cour, les immunités diplomatiques des Chefs d'États africains, la compétence juridictionnelle de la cour, et le conflit de compétence des juridictions entre la CPA et la CPI.

3.1. *Financement de la future CPA*

Le tout premier défi auquel se butera la future CPA est lié à son financement. Les Chefs d'États africains sont prompts à prendre des engagements pour créer les institutions sous régionales et régionales qu'ils n'ont ni la capacité, moins encore la volonté de financer. Il sied de rappeler que la plupart des juridictions pénales internationales ad hoc et spéciales qui ont existé en Afrique n'ont pas été financés entièrement par les Africains eux-mêmes, mais avec l'appui de la communauté internationale en générale, et plus particulièrement par les mêmes occidentaux qui financent la CPI. A commencer par le procès de de l'ancien président tchadien Hissène Habré¹³ organisé par l'UA n'était pas financé par les africains eux-mêmes, mais par les occidentaux.

¹³ Sur le parcours de Hissène Habré, v. Benoît Bavouset, « Hissène Habré (1942-2021) : de l'ascension sociale aux crimes contre l'humanité », In : Sergiu Mișcoiu, Jean-Michel De Waele et Andreea Bianca Urs (dir.), *Maquisards, rebelles, insurgés... politiques. Le devenir des chefs de guerre africains*, Cluj-Napoca, Casa Cartii de Stiinta, coll. « Afrika », 2023, pp. 19-36 ; Sergiu Mișcoiu, Jean-Michel De Waele, « Introduction. Du maquisard au politique – quelques pistes pour appréhender des trajectoires complexes et sinueuses », In : Sergiu Mișcoiu, Jean-Michel De Waele et Andreea Bianca Urs (dir.), *Maquisards, rebelles, insurgés... politiques. Le devenir des chefs de guerre africains*, Cluj-Napoca, Casa Cartii de Stiinta, coll. « Afrika », 2023, pp. 7-18.

Le procès était organisé par l'UA à travers la création des Chambres africaines extraordinaires au sein des juridictions sénégalaises pour la poursuite des crimes internationaux commis au Tchad durant la période du 7 juin 1982 au 1^{er} décembre 1990.¹⁴

Le procès de Habré était décidé le 22 août 2012 aux termes de l'Accord conclu entre le gouvernement du Sénégal et la Commission de l'UA. L'initiative fut adoptée à travers la Décision 127 (VII) prise par chefs d'État et de gouvernement de l'UA, lors de la Conférence sur « le procès Hissène Habré et l'Union africaine », tenue à Banjul, en juillet 2006¹⁵. A cet effet la Conférence avait décidé « de considérer le dossier Hissène Habré comme *le dossier de l'Union africaine* » et de mandater « la République du Sénégal de poursuivre et de faire juger, *au nom de l'Afrique*, Hissène Habré par une juridiction sénégalaise compétente avec les garanties d'un procès juste »¹⁶.

Alors que le procès de Habré fut la première juridiction pénale internationale mise sur pied par l'UA, il fut financé en grande partie par les occidentaux que les africains eux-mêmes. Comme argué par Mutoy Mubiala, le procès de Hissène Habré établissait une compétence régionale » « *Regional Jurisdiction* ») qui attribuait à l'UA le pouvoir de juger les auteurs présumés des crimes de guerre, crimes de génocide, les crimes contre l'humanité, les assassinats politiques, les actes de terrorisme, ainsi que les activités subversives telles que prévus aux dispositions précitées de l'Acte constitutif de l'UA¹⁷. Faute d'organe judiciaire dûment établi, l'UA avait délégué cette compétence à un État membre, en l'occurrence le Sénégal, pour juger les crimes graves commis au Tchad¹⁸.

Le Gouvernement sénégalais avait réclamé 5.6 milliards de Francs CFC, soit 27 millions d'euros pour organiser, pendant une période maximale, le procès de Habré exilé à Dakar depuis 1990¹⁹. Cependant, lors d'une table ronde qui avait eu lieu mercredi 24 novembre à Dakar, l'UA et les donateurs internationaux n'avaient promis de ne mobiliser que 8,570 millions d'euros. De

¹⁴ Mutoy Mubiala. "Chronique de Droit Pénal de l'Union Africaine. Vers une justice pénale régionale en Afrique" dans *revue internationale de droit pénal*, 2012, vol 83, pp. 547-557

¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 557

¹⁶ Ibid p. 577

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 557

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 577

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 557

ces 8,570 millions d'euros, l'UA avait promis de mobiliser 1 million de dollars américains (USD), soit 2 milliards de FCFA, environ 2 millions d'Euros pour le Tchad, 500.000 euros pour l'Allemagne, 1 million d'euros pour la Belgique, 300.000 euros pour la France, 100.000 Euros pour Luxembourg, 1 million d'euros pour le Pays-Bas. Le représentant de l'UA, le Béninois Robert Dossou, avait indiqué que ces fonds devront être gérés par le bureau des Nations unies pour les services d'appui aux projets »²⁰. Alors que les donateurs occidentaux avaient honoré leurs parts d'engagements financiers, tel n'était pas les cas avec leaders africains.

Le non-respect des dirigeants africains vis-à-vis de leurs engagements finances en vue de promouvoir une justice pénale internationale était également constaté à travers les tribunaux pénaux internationaux ad hoc et spéciaux sur le Rwanda, la Sierra-Leone et le Liberia, pour ne citer que ça. Comme argué dans les sections précédentes, le Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU avait pris une résolution créant le Tribunal Pénal pour le Rwanda comme juridiction pénale international hybride avec une chambre nationale base à Kigali, et une chambre internationale base à Arusha, en Tanzanie mais dont le Bureau du Procureur était base à Kigali²¹.

Alors que ce tribunal était créé le 08 novembre 1994 par le Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU par sa résolution 955 pour juger les crimes de génocide commis par les africains sur le sol africain, la plus grande partie des contributions financières, si pas toute la facture était payée par le Fond de l'ONU. Tel argué par Richard Vokes, le TPI sur le Rwanda a couté plus de 2 milliards d'euros venant en grande partie de l'ONU. Le budget du TPI sur le Rwanda s'élevait à plus de 96 millions de dollars USD et étaient entièrement payés par le fond de l'ONU. De tous les états africains, seul le l'Égypte avait montré la volonté de contribuer financièrement au budget du TPI sur le Rwanda²².

Le manque des contributions financières des États africains à la justice pénale internationale s'était également observé lors de la création du tribunal pénal spécial sur la Sierra-Léone. Le Tribunal spécial pour la Sierra-Leone était créé par le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU à travers la résolution 1315 (2000) du 14 août 2000 pour juger Charles Taylor et les membres du Front Uni pour la

²⁰ Ibid, p. 577

²¹ Judi Rever, *Rwanda, l'éloge du sang*. Paris: Max Milo, 2020, pp.10-18

²² Richard Vokes, "The Arusha tribunal: whose justice" in *Anthropology Today*, vol 18, issue5, 2002

Révolution (FUR) responsables des violations du droit humanitaire entrant dans la catégorie des crimes de guerre et les crimes contre l'humanité commis en Sierra-Léone (Journal Officiel de l'Union Européenne, 2007).²³ De tous les pays africains, seul le Nigeria avait apporté sa contribution financière. Le tribunal spécial sur la Sierra-Leone était plus financé par les contributions volontaires de bailleurs de fonds tels le Canada, les États-Unis, les Pays-Bas et le Royaume-Uni.²⁴ Cette expérience est également vécue même au niveau de l'UA en tant qu'organisation continentale.

Tel que démontré dans la littérature et à travers les faits sur terrain, l'UA dépend largement des donateurs internationaux pour son fonctionnement que sur les contributions financières de ses États membres²⁵. Comme, révélé par Ulf Engel, les budgets de l'UA depuis 2002 à 2018 dépendent largement des donateurs internationaux. Depuis son établissement en 2000, l'UA est butée aux problèmes financiers dus au manque de contributions de ses États membres comme ceci était le cas avec l'OUA²⁶. Les contributions financières annuelles des États membres de l'UA sont prévues à l'Acte Constitutif de l'UA de 2000, paragraphe 21 et la Charte de l'OUA de 1963, paragraphe 23.²⁷ Alors que la plupart d'États membres de l'UA ne payent pas régulièrement leurs contributions, ceux qui payent le font soit en retard, soit payent juste une partie et non la totalité²⁸. Seulement, 67 pourcents au total étaient collectés à travers les contributions financières annuelles des États membres; 30 sur 54 États membres de l'UA payent leurs contributions financières annuelles soit en retard, soit en partie²⁹.

²³ Journal Officiel de l'Union Européenne, Résolution du Parlement européen du 6 septembre 2007 sur le financement du tribunal spécial pour la Sierra Leone, p. 6

²⁴ Dittrich Vivianne E., " La Cour spéciale pour la Sierra Leone et la portée de son héritage" dans *Études internationales*, vol.45, no1, 2004, p. 88. <https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/ei/2014-v45-n1-ei01412/1025118ar.pdf> accédé le 20 avril 2023

²⁵ Sergiu Mișcoiu, Dan Petrica, "The New EU-Africa Relations' Strategy: Soft Power or Neoliberalist Power?", In: Adebowale Akande (ed.), *Politics Between Nations. Contributions to International Relation*, Springer, Cham., 2023, pp. 539-560.

²⁶ Ulf Engel, "The Finances of the African Union (AU)", dans Ulf Engel et Frank Mattheis (ed.), *The Finances of Regional Organisations in the Global South: Follow the Money*. London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, 2020, pp. 19-34

²⁷ Union Africaine, Acte Constitutif, paragraphe 21, 2000. https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutive_act_french-1.pdf accédé le 30 mai 2023.

²⁸ Ulf Engel, op.cit.

²⁹ Union Africaine, op.cit.

Les mêmes difficultés financières sont expérimentées à travers plusieurs organisations sous-régionales auxquelles les États membres de l'UA sont simultanément membres. Tel que démontré par plusieurs analystes, la multiplicité d'organisations sous-régionales auxquelles les États africains appartiennent au même moment explique le manque de paiements, paiements tardifs ou partiels des contributions financières annuelles par ces derniers.³⁰ La majorité d'États africains disposent des budgets modiques qui les rendent incapables de payer de manière régulière, totale et dans le meilleur délai leurs contributions financières annuelles requises à la fois à l'UA et aux plusieurs autres organisations régionales et sous-régionales dont ils sont membres³¹.

Étant donné que la plupart d'États africains ont plus d'intérêts économiques, politiques et sécuritaires dans plusieurs autres organisations sous-régionales explique le non-respect de leurs engagements pris vis-à-vis de l'UA. Étant donné la multiplicité d'organisations sous-régionales dont ils sont membres, les États africains se sentent obligés de payer leurs contributions financières annuelles de manière régulière, totale et dans le meilleur délai à certaines organisations sous-régionales au détriment des autres, et ce dépendamment de leurs priorités, intérêts économiques, politiques ou stratégiques. Le non-respect d'engagements financiers était également démontré par le manque de contribution financière à l'acquisition du building qui abrite le siège de l'organisation, et celui du Conseil de paix et sécurité qui ont été donné respectivement par la Chine et l'Union Européenne³².

Partant de tout ce qui précède, il y a donc lieu de conclure que les leaders africains se limitent à leur slogan « des solutions africaines aux problèmes africains », mais ils manquent de volonté politique d'en payer les coûts financiers. Pourtant, la justice pénale internationale que les leaders africains aspirent à promouvoir à travers la CPA nécessite beaucoup de fonds qui sont

³⁰ Nickson Museka Bondo. «The Finances of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Regions (ICGLR)», in Ulf Engel et Frank Mattheis (ed.). *The Finances of Regional Organisations in the Global South: Follow the Money*. London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, 2020, pp. 63-78

³¹ Nickson Museka Bondo, " Transregional Conflicts in the Great Lakes Region", in Ulf Engel (ed.) *Africa's Transregional Conflicts*, Comparativ, 2018, pp. 26-48 <https://doi.org/10.26014/j.comp.2018.06.02> accédé le 20 mai 2022

³² Alphonse Ntumba Luaba. Communiqué de Presse du panel d'experts qui accompagne la Présidence en exercice de la République Démocratique du Congo à l'Union Africaine, 30 novembre 2021.

au-delà du budget de l'UA. Le coût des différents procès qui ont eu lieu depuis la création de cette juridiction pénale internationale coutent jusqu'à 20 millions de dollars, soit 14 pour cent du budget annuel total de l'UA³³. A titre d'exemple, le procès de l'ancien président Libérien Charles Taylor à la CPI a couté 50 millions de dollars.

Comme au Liberia, le Tribunal pénal international pour la Sierra-Léone (TPIS) avait atteint 16 millions de dollars, tandis que le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda (TPIR) disposait d'un budget de 130 millions de dollars 2010 avec 800 employés³⁴. Cependant, comme indiqué supra, le coût total du TPIR est arrivé jusqu'à 2 millions de dollars³⁵. Dans le même ordre d'idées, le procès de l'ancien président Tchadien, Hissène Habré avait couté plus de 8,570 millions d'euros. Partant de ces exemples, il y a lieu de marteler le fait que le coût d'un procès pénal individuel est plus élevé que celui des affaires civiles et des droits de l'homme, et les procédures pénales internationales requièrent des ressources considérables. Donc, le manque des ressources financières conséquentes mises à la disposition de la future CPA risque d'entraver le bon fonctionnement de la justice, l'intégrité et la crédibilité des procédures pénales.

3.2. Immunités diplomatiques des Chefs d'États africains

Plusieurs analystes soutiennent que la proposition de créer la CPA est une tentative de l'UA de protéger les Chefs d'État africains et les hauts fonctionnaires de l'État contre l'obligation de rendre des comptes en cas des motifs raisonnables de croire qu'ils sont pénalement responsables des crimes de droit international³⁶. Loin de contribuer à la promotion de la justice pénale internationale, la CPA risque de contribuer plus à l'instrumentalisation de la justice et promouvoir l'impunité que d'y mettre fin. Pour sa part, Don Deya estime qu'il y aura une sorte de complémentarité et d'harmonie entre la CPA

³³ New Humanitarians, *Vers la création d'une cour pénale africaine?*, 2012, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/analyses/2012/06/13/vers-la-creation-d-une-cour-penale-africaine>, accédé le 15 avril 2023.

³⁴ New Humanitarians, *opcit* p. 2.

³⁵ Judi Rever, *opcit*, p. 18

³⁶ Garth Abraham, "Africa's evolving continental court structures: At the crossroads?" dans *South African Institute of International Affairs*, Occasional Paper no 209, 2015, pp.4-15 <https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Occasional-Paper-209.pdf> accédé le 15 Avril 2023

avec la CIJ, la CPI et d'autres tribunaux. Selon lui, le but de la future CPA est de réduire la possibilité que la 'politique' ou les 'considérations politiques' jouent un rôle dans ce qui devrait être essentiellement une tâche judiciaire. Cet argument nous semble irréaliste.

Tel que démontré par Adam Branch, l'argument légaliste avancé par Deya suscite des questions sur l'efficacité et la légitimité mêmes de la CPA³⁷. Plusieurs obstacles allant des déficits de financement à une compétence, de la nécessité d'un développement juridique des crimes nouvellement inclus, à un manque de clarté concernant les relations entre la CPA, la CPI et les juridictions nationales³⁸. Branch estime qu'une fois créée, la CPA sera inéluctablement politisée par les chefs d'états africains et l'UA afin de sauvegarder leurs intérêts. En d'autres termes, Branch estime que du fait de la disposition controversée du protocole de Malabo sur l'immunité la CPA sapera le respect du droit international au lieu d'y contribuer³⁹.

Comme nous l'avons analysé dans la section précédente, la question d'immunité était évoquée par la plupart d'Etats africains pour refuser d'exécuter le mandat d'arrêt international lancé contre les Présidents soudanais Omar al-Bachir, et Libyen Mouammar Khadafi et Uhuru Kenyata. Cette crise était un élément déclencheur des dénonciations et menaces des Chefs d'Etat africains de se retirer soit individuellement, soit collectivement du Statut de Rome créant de la CPI.

Les ténors des arguments contre la CPA accusent les leaders africains de saper les efforts de la CPI à lutter contre l'impunité. Branch, par exemple, dénonce le fait que la création de la CPA a été proposée comme un stratagème des dirigeants africains pour se garantir de l'immunité des poursuites à travers une procédure judiciaire inefficace⁴⁰. Selon lui, les leaders africains se servent de la souveraineté de leurs Etats comme bouclier contre toute procédure judiciaire pour les violations des droits de l'homme et crimes internationaux⁴¹. De ce fait, Branch estime que la CPA sera une institution compromise sous le

³⁷ Adam Branch, *The African Criminal Court Towards an Emancipatory Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp.198-219 <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge> accédé le 1er décembre 2022

³⁸ *Idem*, p. 5

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 5

⁴⁰ *Idem*, p. 5

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 5

contrôle des dirigeants africains, et qui va tout simplement contribuer à l'instrumentalisation cynique du droit pénal international⁴².

Dans le même ordre d'idées, Murungu soutient qu'en créant une chambre criminelle, l'UA n'a aucun autre but réel que celui d'essayer de protéger certains de ses dirigeants, qui commettent des crimes internationaux graves contre leurs propres citoyens⁴³. Par conséquent, il estime qu'une fois installée, la CPA, va tout seulement contribuer à promouvoir la culture d'impunité⁴⁴. Pour Kurt Mills, la proposition de la création de la CPA est « conçue comme une tentative de freiner les poursuites judiciaires à l'échelle internationale contre les Africains - ou du moins les Chefs d'État africains » et promouvoir l'impunité. Il considère la CPA comme une menace pour la CPI. Cet argument est également partagé par Richard Dicker, le représentant de Human Right Watch, qui affirme qu'en contestant les poursuites judiciaires de la CPI à l'encontre des Chefs d'État africains, l'objectif des dirigeants de l'UA est de faire reculer la lutte contre l'impunité pour des crimes les plus graves au regard du droit international, ou tout simplement cimenter un « un rejet de la lutte contre l'impunité »⁴⁵.

Par ailleurs, il sied également d'affirmer que la question de respect d'immunités diplomatiques est donc à l'origine des critiques et menaces de retrait des leaders africains du traité de Rome de la CPI. Pour ce faire, l'article 46 du protocole de Malabo confère « une immunité aux Chefs d'État durant l'exercice de leur mandat, y compris pour des chefs d'inculpations de génocide, de crimes de guerre et de crimes contre l'humanité. Cette immunité diplomatique est élargie à tout autre haut représentant de l'État et les protéger contre toute poursuite judiciaire. Ceci entre en contradiction avec le Statut de

⁴² Adam Branch, *opcit*, p. 7

⁴³ Chacha BhoKe Murungu, "Towards a Criminal Chamber in the African Court of Justice and Human Rights", in *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2011, pp.1-27. https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/19941/Murungu_Towards_2011.pdf?sequence=1 accédé le 20 mai 2023

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 27

⁴⁵ Dicker, Richard (2015), «The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Double Standards of International Justice», in Carsten Stahn (ed.), *The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court*, Oxford University Press, pp.3-12.

Rome, à travers l'article qui prévoit le défaut de pertinence de la qualité officielle devant la CPI, en cas de commission de crimes de masses⁴⁶.

Néanmoins, étant donné l'implication des Chefs d'État africains et les membres de leurs gouvernements dans la plupart des crimes commis dans leurs pays respectifs, il y a de raison de craindre que les immunités diplomatiques consacrées à l'article 46 du protocole de Malabo ne puissent promouvoir l'impunité au détriment d'une justice transitionnelle efficace sur le continent. Grâce aux immunités diplomatiques dont ils jouissent, plusieurs Chefs d'État africains tels que Omar Al Bachir, Mohammar Kadhafi, Yoweri Museveni, Paul Kagamé, Uhuru Kenyata, Robert Mugabe impliqués dans des crimes graves n'ont jamais été interpellés par l'UA. Ce laxisme judiciaire est dû d'une part au respect des immunités diplomatiques dont jouissent les présidents de la république et certains membres de leurs gouvernements en plein exercice de leurs fonctions; et d'autre part, par le manque de volonté politique réelle de dirigeants de l'UA d'initier une action en justice contre eux à la fin de leur mandat.

En outre, l'UA a été incapable soit de référer les Chefs d'État et membres de leurs gouvernements ayant commis des crimes de guerre, de génocide et contre l'humanité sur le continent africain, soit de soutenir une enquête judiciaire de la CPI pour établir les responsabilités des uns et des autres. Le cas de l'ancien président Tchadien Hissene Habré était initié non pas par les africains eux-mêmes, mais référé à eux par la communauté internationale⁴⁷. Ce silence coupable de l'UA suscite des questions sur l'efficacité de la future CPA à juger les Chefs d'État africains et membres de leurs gouvernements en plein exercice de leurs fonctions pour les crimes commis sur le sol africain.

En adoptant l'article 46 du protocole de Malabo qui leurs garantit les immunités diplomatiques, les Chefs d'État africains envisagent de mettre en place une justice à double vitesse. D'une part, le protocole de Malabo met les Chefs d'État et de gouvernement africains à l'abri de poursuites judiciaires; et d'autre part, il leurs permet de se servir de la future CPA pour se débarrasser de leurs challengers politiques et d'autres seigneurs de guerre qui ne jouissent d'aucune immunité des poursuites judiciaires. Il serait donc trop prétentieux et contradictoire pour les Chefs d'État et de gouvernement africains de vouloir juger, à travers la CPA, des crimes de corruption, blanchiment d'argent et

⁴⁶ Cour Pénale Internationale, *Statut de Rome*, opcit.

⁴⁷ Mutoy Mubiala, opcit

exploitation illicite des ressources naturelles dont ils sont eux-mêmes coupables au quotidien alors qu'ils bénéficient des immunités diplomatiques pour toute poursuite judiciaire devant la même cour.

3.3. La compétence juridictionnelle de la CPA

L'article 28b du Statut de la CADHP en annexe du Protocol de Malabo prévoit 14 crimes qui entrent dans la compétence juridictionnelle de la CPA, notamment les crimes de guerre, de génocide, contre l'humanité, d'agression, de changement anticonstitutionnel des gouvernements, la corruption, le blanchiment d'argent, l'exploitation illégale des ressources, piraterie, terrorisme, mercenariat, traite des personnes, trafic de stupéfiants, trafic de déchets dangereux⁴⁸. Cependant, la CPA éprouvera des défis majeurs pour juger efficacement certains crimes dont la plupart de Chefs d'État et haut-fonctionnaires africains sont régulièrement coupables, à savoir le crime de changement anticonstitutionnel des gouvernements, la corruption, le blanchiment d'argent, et l'exploitation illégale des ressources, pour ne citer que ceux-là

Comme indiqué dans la section précédente, le protocole de Malabo inscrit le changement anticonstitutionnel des régimes en Afrique comme l'un des crimes qui entrent la compétence de la CPA. A travers la Déclaration de Lomé de 2000, les États africains avaient pris l'engagement d'éradiquer tout changement anticonstitutionnel des régimes en Afrique qui conduit à plusieurs coups d'états sur le continent. Conformément à la déclaration de Lomé, le changement anticonstitutionnel est considéré comme un changement anticonstitutionnel de gouvernement :

- i. Un coup d'État militaire contre un gouvernement issu d'élections démocratiques ;
- ii. Une intervention de mercenaires pour renverser un gouvernement issu d'élections démocratiques;
- iii. Une intervention de groupes dissidents armés et de mouvements rebelles pour renverser un gouvernement issu d'élections démocratiques ;
- iv. Le refus par un gouvernement en place de remettre le pouvoir au parti vainqueur à l'issue d'élections libres, justes et régulières⁴⁹.

⁴⁸ Amnesty International, *Protocole de Malabo, incidences juridiques et institutionnelles de la Cour Africaine issue d'une fusion et à compétence élargie*, 2016, <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/documents/afr01/3063/2016/fr/> accédé le 20 avril 2023

⁴⁹ Union Africaine, *Déclaration de Lomé sur les changements anticonstitutionnels des gouvernements en Afrique*, 2000, p. 3, <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ahg-decl-5-xxxvi-f.pdf> accédé, le 20 septembre 2021

Vingt ans après la signature de la Déclaration de Lomé, les Chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement africain se sont mis à violer la politique de changement anticonstitutionnel de gouvernement mise sur pied par l'UA et à laquelle ils avaient librement souscrit. La première décennie qui avait suivi la signature de la Déclaration de Lomé était marquée par plusieurs coups d'états. La deuxième décennie, quant elle, était caractérisée soit par les changements répétitifs des constitutions, soit par des coups d'états dans certains pays africains.

Tel qu'argué par Ulf Engel, la politique de l'UA sur le changement anticonstitutionnel de gouvernement était revenue à l'ordre du jour depuis mi-2008 en réponse à cinq coups d'État et autres changements anticonstitutionnels de gouvernement à la suite de différents coups d'états observés en Afrique, notamment en Mauritanie (06 août 2008), en Guinée (23 décembre 2008), en Guinée Bissau (2 mars, 2009), au Niger (26 mai 2009), et au Madagascar (17 mars 2009)⁵⁰. En dépit d'une amélioration apparente observée vers la fin de la première décennie, les dirigeants africains sont passés de coups d'états militaires au changement de leurs constitutions respectives pour se pérenniser au pouvoir au-delà de deux mandats constitutionnels jadis reconnus⁵¹.

Dans le même ordre d'idées, Posner et Young soutiennent qu'il y a une amélioration en termes de respect de la politique de changement anticonstitutionnelle⁵². Ils justifient cette position d'une part, en faisant référence au nombre croissant de cas où des présidents africains ont modifié leurs constitutions pour leur permettre un troisième mandat ; et d'autre part, par la diminution du pourcentage des coups d'états ou assassinats par lesquels les présidents ont quitté le pouvoir, qui était de 70 % dans les années 1980 contre 19 % au milieu des années 2000⁵³.

Le point de vue général de Posner et Young sur l'état de la consolidation démocratique en Afrique est étayé par les données collectées par le Centre Monty G. Marshall pour la paix systémique. En moyenne, les pays africains

⁵⁰ Ulf Engel, *Unconstitutional Changes of Government-New AU Policies in Defence of Democracy*, Universitat Leipzig, Working paper series of the Graduate Centre Humanities and Social Sciences of the Research Academy, Leipzig, 2010, p. 5

⁵¹ Ulf Engel, *opcit* p. 6

⁵² Posner Daniel N. et Daniel J. Young 2007. *The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa*, in *Journal of Democracy*, pp. 126-140, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236701524_The_Institutionalization_of_Political_Power_in_Africa/link accédé le 20 mars 2022

⁵³ *Idem*, p. 126-140

sont clairement passés des régimes autocratiques à l'extrémité supérieure de ce que Polity IV appelle « anocraties », c'est-à-dire un type de régime hybride à une échelle entre « autocratie » et « démocratie⁵⁴. Cependant, Engel estime pour sa part qu'il y a une régression de la démocratie en Afrique. Il démontre que la deuxième phase de l'application de la politique de changement anticonstitutionnel des gouvernements est extrêmement ambivalente sur l'état d'avancement de la démocratie en Afrique. Alors qu'environ un tiers des États membres soutiennent le programme de l'UA pour la démocratie et la bonne gouvernance, environ un autre tiers s'oppose activement à la mise en œuvre des politiques qui pourraient conduire à un changement des gouvernements dans leurs propres pays, le tiers restant est indécis et oscille entre indifférence et réticence légère⁵⁵.

En 2011, l'Afrique du Nord a connu des soulèvements populaires sans précédent qui ont entraîné des changements anticonstitutionnels des gouvernements en Tunisie, en Algérie et en Égypte ; alors qu'en Libye, la terreur du régime contre les manifestations publiques avait rapidement dégénéré en une guerre civile à part entière⁵⁶. L'exacerbation de ce conflit avait poussé l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN) et ses alliés à imposer un non fly-zone qui avait permis à l'opposition armée de renverser enfin le régime Kadhafi. Cependant, dans tous les pays touchés par ces soulèvements populaires, les transitions sont loin d'être terminées⁵⁷.

Tout en épousant le point de vue de Engel, nous estimons que la Déclaration de Lomé n'a pas permis aux leaders africains de faire des avancées significatives vers la démocratisation de leurs institutions. La plupart de Chefs d'État africains ont réussi à changer leurs constitutions respectives pour se maintenir le plus longtemps possible au pouvoir en violation de leurs propres engagements qu'ils librement et volontairement pris par rapport à la Déclaration de Lomé de 2000. La plupart des dirigeants africains, y compris Paul Kagamé (Rwanda), Paul Biya (Cameroun), Dennis Sassou Nguesso (Congo-Brazzaville), Yoweri Museveni (Ouganda), Omar Al Bachir (Soudan), Eduardo Dos Santos (Angola), Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Abdelziz Bouteflika (Algérie), Alpha Condé (Guinée Conakry), Pierre Nkurunziza (Burundi) Alasan Ouatarra (Cote d'Ivoire) avaient réussi à contourner la

⁵⁴ Ulf Engel., *opcit.* p. 6

⁵⁵ *Idem*, p. 7

⁵⁶ *Idem*, p. 7

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 7

Déclaration de Lomé et modifier les constitutions de leurs États respectifs pour se maintenir au pouvoir le plus longtemps possible au-delà de deux mandats présidentiels constitutionnellement reconnus. Cette pratique a conduit à l'instabilité politique et économique dans la plupart de ces pays, et aux récents coups d'états au Mali, Guinée-Conakry et au Soudan.

Tel que démontré précédemment, à travers plusieurs changements anticonstitutionnels des gouvernements dans la plupart de pays africains, les Chefs États membres de l'UA n'ont pas la volonté de respecter leurs propres engagements vis-à-vis de la Déclaration de Lomé. La plupart de Chefs d'État africains tiennent à se pérenniser au pouvoir en toute violation de la Déclaration de Lomé qui encourage l'accession au pouvoir par des moyens démocratiques. En ratifiant le traité de Malabo, les Chefs d'État africains risquent d'être à la fois juge et partie en contradiction avec leurs propres ambitions politiques de rester le plus longtemps possible au pouvoir.

Il ne fait donc l'ombre de nul doute qu'il y a un manque de volonté politique des dirigeants africains de respecter leurs engagements pris dans le cadre de la Déclaration de Lomé, ainsi que différents protocoles et instruments juridiques régionaux et internationaux sur la démocratie et la bonne gouvernance. Ironiquement, le fait que la création éventuelle de la CPA inclut le changement anticonstitutionnel des gouvernements et régimes politiques parmi les crimes qui entrent dans le cadre de ses compétences au même titre que les crimes de guerre, crimes de génocide et crimes contre l'humanité pourrait justifier le retard enregistré dans la ratification des Accords de Malabo; et pourrait constituer, par ce fait même, un blocage au bon fonctionnement, voire à la matérialisation de ladite CPA.

Le protocole de la CADHP était adopté le 10 juin 1998 à Ouagadougou, mais il n'avait pas de compétence pénale. Il était ratifié par 30 États africains sur 54 et était entré en vigueur le 25 janvier 2004. Dix ans plus tard, le Protocole a été amendé, à travers l'adoption, au mois de juin 2014, le protocole de Malabo pour donner une compétence pénale à la CADHP. Cependant, depuis la signature du protocole de Malabo à ce jour, il n'a jamais obtenu les ratifications de 15 États de l'UA requise pour son entrée en vigueur tel que prévu à son article 13. Ceci démontre que les africains ne sont pas prêts à respecter leurs propres engagements auxquels ils ont librement souscrit afin de promouvoir une justice pénale pour juger les crimes de guerre, crimes de génocide, crimes contre l'humanité et le changement anticonstitutionnel des gouvernements dont ils sont eux-mêmes coupables au quotidien.

3.4. Conflit de compétence des juridictions entre la CPA et la CPI

Le fait que la compétence de la CPA reprend tous les crimes jugés par la CPI risque de conduire à un chevauchement, conflit de juridiction, voire une concurrence entre ces deux juridictions pénales internationales. En vertu des dispositions prévues dans le statut de Rome, la CPI est une juridiction complémentaire à celle des Etats et des organisations régionales. En d'autres termes, la CPI se saisit des cas des crimes de guerre, crimes de génocide, crimes contre l'humanité et crimes d'agression lorsque l'Etat sur le sol duquel ces crimes ont été commis est soit incapable, ou n'a pas la volonté de traduire leurs auteurs en justice. La CPI exerce également le rôle supplétif lorsque le système judiciaire régional est défaillant, ou n'a pas la volonté de promouvoir une justice pénale internationale à travers une organisation sous-régionale.

Comme le statut de Rome, le protocole de Malabo prévoit également une complémentarité entre la CPA et les cours et tribunaux et nationaux⁵⁸. Cependant, aucune disposition juridique à travers le protocole de Malabo ne fait allusion à une complémentarité en ce qui concerne la relation entre la CPA et la CPI. En d'autres termes, le protocole de Malabo n'a pas répondu à la question de savoir si l'enquête ou la poursuite des cas des crimes graves par la CPA interdisait à la CPI d'intervenir et vice versa. Ceci pourrait donner lieu à des conflits de compétence juridictionnelle entre la CPA et la CPI.

En revanche, du point de vue des dispositions prévues dans le statut de Rome, la notion de complémentarité de juridiction en matière pénale n'empêchera pas le procureur de la CPI de se saisir, de sa propre initiative (*proprio motu*), des cas des crimes commis aussi bien dans les Etats partie que ceux non-parties au statut de Rome. Tel qu'analysé dans la section précédente, plusieurs défis d'ordre juridique, politique et financier pourront, à tout moment bloquer, la CPA à mettre fin à l'impunité en vue de promouvoir une justice pénale internationale en Afrique. Sur le plan politique, le protocole de Malabo de 2014 maintient le respect des immunités diplomatiques qui s'opposent à toute investigation, jugement et arrestation des Chefs d'Etats et haut-fonctionnaires en fonction durant toute la durée de leur mandat.

Contrairement au protocole de Malabo, l'article 27 du Statut de la CPI ne reconnaît pas cette immunité diplomatique des chefs d'états et haut-fonctionnaires internationaux, car elle ne tient pas compte de la qualité officielle

⁵⁸ Amnesty International, *opcit.*

de la personne ayant commis des crimes graves qui entrent dans ses compétences. Par ailleurs, le fait que les Etats africains se retirent ou pas de la CPI, ne met pas leurs ressortissants, y compris les Chefs d'Etats et haut-fonctionnaires en fonction à l'abri des poursuites judiciaires de leurs ressortissants. Conformément à l'article 12 du Statut de Rome, la CPI n'a pas une compétence de juridiction sur les Etats non-parties. Cependant, elle peut solliciter la collaboration des Etats non-parties à travers un accord ou arrangement ad hoc⁵⁹.

En d'autres termes, même au cas où les Etats africains réussissent à se retirer collectivement ou individuellement, ils seront tout de même tenus de coopérer avec la CPI en tant qu'Etats non-partis. Les dispositions prévues à l'article 87, paragraphe 5 du statut de Rome stipule que :

a) La Cour peut inviter tout État non-partie au présent Statut à prêter son assistance au titre du présent chapitre sur la base d'un arrangement ad hoc ou d'un accord conclu avec cet État ou sur toute autre base approuvée.

b) Si, ayant conclu avec la Cour un arrangement ad hoc ou un accord, un État non-partie au présent Statut n'apporte pas l'assistance qui lui est demandée en vertu de cet arrangement ou de cet accord, la Cour peut en informer l'Assemblée des États Parties, ou le Conseil de sécurité lorsque c'est celui-ci qui l'a saisie⁶⁰.

Cependant, au cas où les Etats africains, en tant qu'Etats non-partie refuseraient de signer un accord de collaboration, la CPI pourra toujours saisir le Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU conformément aux dispositions prévues à l'article au paragraphe 5.b évoqué supra pour initier des poursuites contre les dirigeants et haut-fonctionnaires africains. Ainsi donc, comme démontré dans les sections précédentes, le fait que les Etats africains décident de se retirer individuellement ou collectivement de la CPI, n'empêchera pas le Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU de saisir cette même cour pour juger leurs ressortissants, y compris les Chefs d'états et haut-fonctionnaires.

En vertu du Chapitre VII de la Charte de l'ONU à son article 25, le Conseil de Sécurité peut utiliser tous les moyens, y compris le recours à la force militaire, pour maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationale ; et tous les Etats membres ont l'obligation de se soumettre aux décisions du Conseil de Sécurité⁶¹. De ce qui précède, il sied donc de marteler que le retrait des Etats africains de la CPI ne met pas leurs dirigeants et ressortissants à l'abri des poursuites

⁵⁹ Cour Pénale Internationale, *le Statut de Rome*, opcit..

⁶⁰ Cour Pénale Internationale, *le Statut de Rome*, opcit..

⁶¹ Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU), *la Charte de l'ONU*, New York, 1945

judiciaires aussi bien pour les crimes graves commis avant, pendant et après leur retrait du Statut de Rome. L'exemple du Burundi est une belle illustration de ce qui pourrait advenir aux dirigeants et ressortissants africains au cas où ils se retireraient individuellement ou collectivement du Statut de Rome. Le gouvernement Burundais s'était retiré de la CPI dans l'espoir d'éviter l'enquête sur les violations des droits humains commises par l'État à la suite des manifestations de rue d'avril 2015 contre la décision du président Pierre Nkurunziza de briguer un troisième mandat.

La répression violente du gouvernement contre l'opposition politique à la suite de ces manifestations aurait impliqué « des exécutions extrajudiciaires, des arrestations arbitraires et détention, torture, violences sexuelles, traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants et disparitions forcées », et les enquêteurs des droits humains ont estimé qu'« au moins 1 200 personnes auraient été tuées, des milliers illégalement détenus, des milliers auraient été torturés et des centaines auraient disparu »⁶².

En septembre 2005, soit un mois avant le retrait du Burundi du Statut de Rome, la Commission d'enquête de l'ONU sur le Burundi avait publié ses conclusions sur les violations présumées des droits humains au Burundi, y compris les entretiens avec plus de 500 témoins⁶³. La Commission avait constaté que « des crimes contre l'humanité ont été commis, et les auteurs sont des fonctionnaires de haut niveau, y compris les membres du gouvernement, les responsables des services nationaux de renseignement, la police nationale, les responsables militaires et les membres de la ligue des jeunes du parti au pouvoir (les imbonerakure) »⁶⁴.

Cependant, le gouvernement Burundais avait refusé de coopérer avec la CPI bien avant, et après les conclusions de cette enquête⁶⁵. Réagissant aux conclusions de l'enquête, la ministre Burundaise de la Justice Aimée Laurentine Kanyata avait indiqué que son gouvernement n'était pas lié par la décision de la CPI, car il n'avait pas été « notifié de la décision de la CPI d'enquêter sur les crimes présumés avant son départ effectif du Statut de Rome. Pour la ministre de justice du Burundi, Aimée Laurentine Kanyana, la décision de la CPI était

⁶² Bureau du haut-commissariat des nations unies aux droits de l'homme, *burundi : les violations des droits de l'homme se poursuivent, dit la commission d'enquete de l'onu*, 2018, p. 3, <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2018/09/1022742> accede le 15 novembre 2021

⁶³ Idem, p. 4

⁶⁴ Idem, p. 5

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 3

tout simplement considérée comme un acte illustrant la « la politisation des droits de l'homme et de la justice internationale, ainsi que la tentative de déstabilisation des états africains⁶⁶.

En dépit du retrait du Burundi du statut de Rome et le refus du gouvernement Burundais de coopérer avec la CPI, l'ONU avait tout de même initié une commission d'enquête pour établir les responsabilités des auteurs des crimes graves commis avant le retrait de ce dernier du Statut de Rome. Dans le même ordre d'idées, après le rejet de ses conclusions, la Commission d'enquête de l'ONU avait saisi le Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU pour plaider « que les principaux auteurs des crimes contre l'humanité et des violations graves des droits de l'homme puissent répondre de leurs actes et que la justice soit rendue aux victimes ⁶⁷.

Le deuxième cas, quelque peu similaire à celui du Burundi, est celui du mandat d'arrêt international lancé par la CPI contre le président Soudanais Omar Al Bashir alors que son Etat n'a jamais ratifié le statut de Rome. A la suite des conclusions de la Commission d'enquête internationale sur les violations des droits droit humanitaire et droit des droits de l'homme au Darfour, le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies avait adopté, le 1er juillet 2002, la résolution 1593 référant la situation du Darfour au Procureur de la CPI⁶⁸. La résolution exige que le gouvernement du Soudan et toutes les autres parties au conflit dans le Darfour à coopérer pleinement avec la Cour et la Procureur⁶⁹.

Pour le Conseil de Sécurité, une telle résolution représentait un précédent qui lui permet d'exercer son pouvoir de saisine. A la suite de cette résolution, la procureure de la CPI avait annoncé, le 6 juin 2005, l'ouverture des enquêtes sur les crimes graves commis dans la région de Darfour, au Soudan. Les conclusions de ces enquêtes ont conduit à l'inculpation d'Omar Al Bachir et deux hauts gradés. Cependant, sous la présidence d'Omar Al-Bachir, le Soudan avait signé le statut de Rome le 8 septembre 2000, mais ne l'a pas encore ratifié⁷⁰. Sur cette base, le gouvernement Soudanais rejette la compétence de la

⁶⁶ Bureau du Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux droits de l'homme, opcit, p. 4

⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 4

⁶⁸ Organisation des Nations Unies, Res/1593 du 31 mars 2005 <https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/85feb1a-29f8-4ec4-9566-48edf55cc587/283244/n0529273.pdf> accédé le 15 novembre 2021

⁶⁹ Ibid

⁷⁰ Sudan Tribune, *Sudan will never deal with the ICC-Bashir*, 2008, <https://sudantribune.com/article/28062/> accédé le 15 novembre 2021

CPI arguant que le Soudan n'est pas signataire du Statut de Rome, et que le Soudan a, à travers son propre système judiciaire, une compétence exclusive sur les crimes au Darfour.

Le Soudan estime donc que son gouvernement est juridiquement compétent, qualifié, et prêt à juger les personnes accusées de toute violation grave des droits de l'homme et du droit international humanitaire commis dans le Darfour⁷¹. Certains observateurs considèrent qu'une telle implication constitue une violation des principes de souveraineté nationale puisque le Soudan n'avait pas ratifié le statut de Rome⁷². Cependant, les dénonciations et refus du gouvernement Soudanais, l'UA et la majorité de ses Etats n'ont pas empêché la CPI de lancer un mandat d'arrêt international contre président Omar Al Bachir. En dépit du refus des africains d'exécuter le mandat d'arrêt national, la CPI et le Secrétaire General des Nations avaient continué à mettre la pression sur le gouvernement de la République d'Afrique du Sud et tous les autres gouvernements des pays africains à coopérer avec la justice pénale internationale conformément à l'article 89 du Statut de Rome.⁷³

Enfin, le troisième cas est celui de la Lybie qui n'est pas non plus partie au statut de Rome, mais dont le Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU avait référé les cas des crimes contre l'humanité commis en février 2011 par le régime de Kadhafi à la CPI. Pour ce faire, la CPI avait lancé un mandat d'arrêt international contre Kadhafi alors qu'il fut encore président en exercice de la Lybie. Cependant, ce mandat n'a jamais été exécuté aussi bien par la Lybie que d'autres Etats africains. À la suite de la mort de Mouammar Kadhafi, seuls Abdullah al-Senussi et Saif al-Islam Kadhafi sont restés en tant qu'individus recherchés par la CPI pour leur rôle dans la répression libyenne contre les civils⁷⁴. En dépit des preuves que la CPI a sur crimes qui ont été commis par d'autres acteurs du conflit, notamment rebelles libyens, ou « *thumar* », la procureure avait orienté ses enquêtes vers les deux fils de Kadhafi, Saif et

⁷¹ Ibid

⁷² Ibid

⁷³ Abrahamson Chigara, B. and Chidebe Nwankwo, opcit.

⁷⁴ United Nations Human Rights Council Commission, *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya*, 2012

<https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?f1=author&as=1&sf=title&so=a&rm=&m1=p&p1=UN.%20Human%20Rights%20Council.%20Commission%20of%20Inquiry%20on%20Libya&ln=fr> accédé le 15 janvier 2023.

Senussi qui étaient les seuls inculpés par la Cour⁷⁵. Compte tenu du rôle qu'ils auraient joué dans les crimes contre l'humanité, la CPI avait demandé que Saïf et Senussi, soient transférés à la Haye pour y être jugés alors que la Lybie n'est pas partie au statut de Rome⁷⁶. Toutefois, le gouvernement Libyen avait refusé de les extraditer à la Haye et préféré de les juger en Lybie.

Par ailleurs, il est important d'insister sur le fait que la plupart des crimes qui entrent dans les compétences de la CPI font partie du Jus Cogens et constituent, par ce fait même, une menace contre la paix et la sécurité internationale. Pour ce faire, le Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU a l'obligation de s'assurer que les auteurs de ces crimes soient déférés devant la CPI qui est une juridiction pénale internationale permanente, que les Etats dont ils sont ressortissants soient partie au statut de Rome ou pas. De ce fait, il y a donc un grand risque d'avoir un chevauchement de compétence juridictionnelle entre la CPI et CPA pour juger des cas des crimes graves commis avant et après les retraits individuel et collectif des Etats africains de la CPI.

Dans le même ordre d'idées, l'article 3 du protocole de Malabo reconnaît la saisine de la CPA par les Etats membres de l'UA, le Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l'UA, les organisations économiques régionales africaines, ainsi que toute organisation internationale reconnue par l'UA. Cette disposition laisse une brèche ouverte au Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU de saisir la CPA pour référer les crimes commis par les Africains sur leur propre sol pour être jugé par les juges africains en lieu et place de la CPI. Pourtant, la chambre pénale de la CPI est équitablement composée par des juges de tous les continents dont quatre sont africains. Il y a donc lieu de conclure que la réponse des leaders africains à ce qu'ils qualifient de politisation et instrumentalisation de la CPI est tout simplement controversée.

CONCLUSION

La création de la Cour Pénale Africaine (CPA) a été envisagée par les Etats membres de l'Union Africaine (UA) comme une réponse à ce qu'ils qualifient d'une « politisation » et « instrumentalisation » de la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI) par les puissances occidentales. Les leaders de l'UA, certains Chefs d'Etat et de gouvernements et analystes africains accusent la CPI

⁷⁵ United Nations Human Rights Council Commission, *opcit.*

⁷⁶ International Criminal Court, *Situation in Libya in the case of the prosecutor versus Saïf Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi*, 1 juin 2012 https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2012_06521.PDF accédé 20 mars 2023.

d'être un instrument politique utilisé par les occidentaux pour ne juger que les peuples africains. Cependant, ces accusations ont été contestées non seulement par la Procureure et la Greffe de la CPI étant donné que la plupart des ressortissants africains jugés par la cour ont été référés par les gouvernements des Etats africains eux-mêmes. Seuls les cas des anciens Présidents, dont Huru Kenyatta et son vice-président William Ruto du Kenya, Omar Al Bechir du Soudan, et Mouhamar Al Kaddhafi de la Lybie ont été référés à la Procureure de la CPI par le Conseil de Sécurité de l'organisation des Nations Unies (ONU).

En réponse à la « politisation » de la CPI, l'UA avait entamé un processus de la création de la CPA afin de juger les africains pour les crimes qu'ils ont commis sur leur propre sol. L'article 28b du Statut de la CADHP en annexe du Protocol de Malabo prévoit 14 crimes qui entrent dans la compétence juridictionnelle de la CPA, notamment les crimes de guerre, de génocide, contre l'humanité, d'agression, de changement anticonstitutionnel des gouvernements, la corruption, le blanchiment d'argent, l'exploitation illégale des ressources, la piraterie, le terrorisme, le mercenariat, la traite des personnes, le trafic de stupéfiants, le trafic de déchets dangereux. Cependant, plusieurs obstacles bloquent la création de la CPA, et pourraient compromettre son efficacité à juger ces crimes dont plusieurs officiels et seigneurs de guerre africains se rendent quotidiennement coupables.

D'une part, les leaders africains sont incapables de se retirer, soit collectivement, soit individuellement du Statut de Rome créant la CPI. D'autre part, les différents obstacles tels que le financement de la future CPA; les immunités diplomatiques des Chefs d'États africains; le conflit de compétence juridictionnelle entre la CPA et la CPI; la complexité des crimes endémiques qui entrent dans la compétence juridictionnelle de la CPA tels que le changement anticonstitutionnel des gouvernements, la corruption, le blanchiment d'argent et l'exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles dont les dirigeants africains se rendent quotidiennement coupables, pourraient constituer un handicap majeur à l'efficacité de la CPA.

Compte tenu de tous les défis précités, les gouvernements africains doivent, au préalable, améliorer leurs systèmes judiciaires nationaux avant d'envisager un quelconque retrait individuel ou collectif de la CPI. Conformément aux dispositions prévues aux articles 1, 12 et 13 du statut de Rome, la CPI a une compétence complémentaire à celle des états et n'a pas vocation à suppléer celle-ci. A ce titre, la CPI n'intervient que lorsque le gouvernement sur le territoire duquel les crimes ont été commis est soit

incapable, ou n'a pas la volonté de juger les crimes imprescriptibles qui entrent dans sa compétence juridictionnelle telle que décrite à l'article 5 du Statut de Rome qui crée cette juridiction pénale internationale. Plusieurs États, aussi bien signataires que non signataires du statut de Rome, s'opposent à l'extradition de leurs ressortissants à la CPI, car ils estiment que leurs systèmes judiciaires nationaux sont capables de les juger dans leurs propres pays. Par conséquent, la meilleure réponse que les leaders africains ont à donner à la politisation présumée de la CPI serait de rendre leurs systèmes judiciaires nationaux réellement indépendants et efficaces pour être en mesure de juger les africains pour les crimes de guerre, crime de génocide, crimes contre l'humanité et crime d'agression sur le sol africain.

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L'AIDE PUBLIQUE AU DÉVELOPPEMENT ET SON IMPACT SUR LES ÉTATS DU SUD. ANALYSE SUR 60 ANS D'EXPÉRIENCE AU CAMEROUN

PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT AID AND ITS IMPACT ON SOUTHERN STATES. ANALYSIS ON 60 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN CAMEROON

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Abstract

While official development assistance has had a positive impact in Asian countries, the situation remains disappointing in sub-Saharan Africa, and particularly in Cameroon. A number of variables explain this failure to achieve the objectives of official development assistance : while donors have repeatedly granted funds, it is no less true that they do not follow them up harmoniously in terms of implementation and allocation. Similarly, the responsibility of recipient states should be questioned. This article sets out to do just that, drawing on documentary research to understand the responsibilities of each party and to see to what extent official development assistance could also contribute to the development of the African continent.

Keywords: public aid, development, Southern State, Cameroon.

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INTRODUCTION

Il est un constat que bénéficiaire de l'APD depuis déjà pratiquement soixante ans, le Cameroun ne se retrouve qu'au stade de pays intermédiaire de tranche inférieure. Un revenu net brut (RNB) par habitant en 2019 compris entre 1 036 - 4 045 USD courants¹ - comparé par exemple à la Corée qui était bénéficiaire de l'APD à la même période et se trouve être désormais parmi les membres du comité d'aide au développement (CAD)².

Par ailleurs, nous nous sommes penchés sur la responsabilité de l'État quant aux espoirs nourris d'être émergent d'ici l'horizon 2035. Le chantier étant en cours, il est impératif que toutes les ressources financières et techniques aussi bien sur le plan interne qu'externe soient non seulement mobilisées mais qu'elles soient orientées vers des secteurs prioritaires avec des résultats concrets et visibles sur le terrain. La situation du Cameroun étant similaire à celle de nombreux pays africains, il est capital que les questions de paix, de sécurité et de corruption trouvent solution car tous les pays africains sont en rouge selon l'indice de perception de la corruption (IPC) de Transparency Internationale en 2020³. Ces défis précités constituent de véritables freins au développement de tout pays. Ce qui est surprenant est que le mécanisme de l'APD prévoit aussi une responsabilité de l'État bénéficiaire mais, il ne dédouane pas celle des donateurs. Ce qui suscite l'intérêt de savoir d'où viendrait le blocage des objectifs de l'aide publique au développement ; serait-ce au niveau des États bénéficiaires, ou alors des donateurs ?

La réponse à cette question peut être cherchée dans les circonstances même de naissance du concept d'aide publique au développement. Ce dernier a émergé à partir de la fin des années 1950. Il s'est imposé parallèlement à l'accession à l'indépendance des anciennes colonies. On est alors en pleine guerre froide et les puissances occidentales veulent conserver des liens avec les nouveaux pays indépendants. En France, le général de Gaulle voit dans l'Aide publique au développement (APD) un moyen de maintenir un lien et une

¹ Nouvelle classification des pays en fonction de leur revenu : 2020-2021, 01 juillet 2020. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/fr/opendata/nouvelle-classification-des-pays-en-fonction-de-leur-revenu-2020-2021>. Consulté le 25 avril 2022.

² Principales conclusions et recommandations du CAD <https://www.oecd.org/fr/cad/examens-pairs/Principales-conclusions-recommandations-CAD-Coree-2018.pdf>. Consulté le 25 avril 2022.

³ Indice de perception de la corruption 2020 https://transparency-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/CPI2020_Report_FR-WEB.pdf. Consulté le 24 avril 2022.

certaine influence sur les anciennes colonies. La stratégie était alors de changer les noms des instruments qui existaient pour gérer les colonies. La Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer, qui était la banque des colonies depuis 1944, devient la Caisse Centrale de Coopération Économique (elle existe toujours et s'appelle maintenant l'Agence Française de Développement). Le franc CFA, franc des Colonies Françaises d'Afrique, est gardé, mais la signification de son nom est habilement changée. Il devient le franc de la Coopération Financière d'Afrique en Afrique central et le franc de la Communauté Financière d'Afrique en Afrique de l'Ouest qui, en 2020 est remplacé par l'ECO. L'Aide Publique au Développement (APD) est largement inspirée du plan Marshall en Europe. La réflexion théorique sur le développement attribue alors un rôle actif à l'aide internationale, soulignant le besoin d'accélérer les investissements pour soutenir la croissance et donc, la nécessité d'apporter des financements extérieurs, car l'épargne dans les pays en développement est insuffisante pour financer les investissements au niveau souhaitable.

Les pays donateurs considèrent qu'ils ont tout intérêt à ce que les pays bénéficiaires se développent et deviennent ainsi des partenaires économiques plus intéressants⁴. Le 13 janvier 1960, le Groupe d'assistance pour le développement (GAD) est créé afin de servir de lieu de consultation entre les donateurs sur l'aide apportée aux pays en développement, le GAD qui plus tard prend le nom de Comité d'aide au développement (CAD) est alors composé de 11 membres dont l'Allemagne, la Belgique, le Canada, les États-Unis, la France, l'Italie, le Japon, le Portugal, la Commission de la Communauté économique européenne (CEE) – la CEE qui est aujourd'hui l'Union européenne (UE) -, du Royaume-Uni et des Pays-Bas⁵.

Mise donc sur pied par l'Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques (OCDE)⁶, l'aide publique au développement a été adoptée en 1969 par son Comité d'aide au développement (CAD) comme

⁴ L'historique de l'APD, <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/fr/questions-d-europe/0542-il-est-temps-de-reviser-les-objectifs-de-l-aide-publique-au-developpement>. Consulté le 25 avril 2022.

⁵ Le CAD 50 ANS, 50 Dates clés, page 5/72 <https://www.oecd.org/fr/cad/47072147.pdf>. Consulté le 25/04/2022.

⁶ Organisation internationale qui œuvre pour la mise en place de politiques meilleures pour une vie meilleure. Elle s'appuie sur 60 ans d'expérience et de connaissances pour préparer le monde de demain. Qui nous sommes ; <https://www.oecd.org/fr/apropos/>. Consulté le 25/04/2022.

référence de financement de l'aide extérieure⁷. Pratiquement soixante ans plus tard, le constat est amer pour ce qui est du continent Africain qui peine à se développer contrairement au continent Asiatique. Considéré pourtant comme plus avantageux par rapport au continent Asiatique dans les années soixante, les auteurs Africains du « Modèle asiatique » pensent que l'Afrique n'a pas su miser sur les facteurs qui l'auraient propulsé comme l'a fait l'Asie en investissant par exemple dans la production et en s'assurant que les bienfaits de la croissance soient distribués à toutes les couches sociales⁸.

L'APD ayant fait ses preuves de manière positive sur le continent asiatique⁹, pourquoi n'a-t-elle pas eu le même effet en Afrique quand on sait que dans les années 60 les deux continents étaient pratiquement au même niveau ? S'agit-il d'un problème de gestion ou alors d'orientation de l'aide, étant entendue que la responsabilité des donateurs et des bénéficiaires quant aux résultats obtenus en matière d'aide est évoquée dans l'Accord de Paris ? Pour ce qui est du Cameroun, l'inquiétude centrale est celle de savoir si les objectifs définis dans la nouvelle stratégie en cours qui doivent permettre à ce dernier d'être émergent d'ici l'horizon 2035 seront atteints au regard de la corruption grandissante et presque institutionnalisée aux côtés des défis sécuritaires qui secouent le pays ?

Une recherche documentaire basée sur l'exploitation des différents documents : rapports d'institutions internationales, régionales et nationales aux côtés d'une revue de la littérature sur l'APD et les objectifs du développement durable permet de rendre compte de l'impact de l'APD sur l'émergence du Cameroun au regard de sa stratégie nationale de développement après 60 ans d'expérience.

FONDEMENTS THÉORIQUES DE L'APD : FORMES ET LIMITES


Selon la définition du CAD de 2007, l'APD peut être financée soit par les dons soit par les prêts. Ces deux modes de financement se matérialisent

⁷ OCDE, L'aide publique au développement (APD), disponible sur <https://www.oecd.org/fr/cad/financementpourledeveloppementdurable/normes-financement-developpement/aide-publique-au-developpement.htm>. Consulté le 25/04/2022.

⁸ L'aide publique au développement doit se recentrer sur l'agriculture et l'éducation en Afrique, Question d'Europe n°586, disponible sur <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/fr/questions-d-europe/0586-l-aide-publique-au-developpement-doit-se-recentrer-sur-l-agriculture-et-l-education-en-afrique>. Consulté le 26/04/2022.

⁹ *Ibid.*

également sous deux formes qui constituent les canaux de la coopération entre les pays donateurs et receveurs. Il s'agit de la forme bilatérale et multilatérale. De façon basique, l'aide est dite bilatérale lorsque le financement du pays donateur (riche) va directement au pays bénéficiaire (pauvre), elle est dite multilatérale lorsque le financement du pays donateur transite par les organismes multinationaux tels que la Banque mondiale, le FMI, l'ONU etc. ayant des programmes en place dans les pays bénéficiaires. La figure suivante étale une illustration de ces transactions :



Qu'il s'agisse de la forme bilatérale ou multilatérale, on distingue trois types d'aide à savoir l'aide aux projets d'investissement, l'aide programme et la coopération technique. Le premier type étant destiné à accroître principalement le capital physique des pays bénéficiaires et du coup à faciliter les investissements. Le second comprenant le soutien budgétaire, l'aide à la balance des paiements et les contributions permettant de financer des plans de développement. Et le dernier type incluant les activités financées par un pays donneur ayant pour but d'améliorer le stock de capital intellectuel des pays bénéficiaires.

Le financement de l'aide rencontre quelques limites définies par le CAD en fonction de son utilisation. Il s'agit notamment « *de l'aide militaire : aucun équipement ni service militaire ne peut être déclaré APD. Du Maintien de la paix : la*

plupart des dépenses de maintien de la paix sont exclues, en ligne avec l'exclusion des coûts militaires. De l'énergie nucléaire : peut être déclarée en tant qu'APD, à condition que l'utilisation soit destinée à des fins civiles. Et enfin des programmes culturels : éligibles au titre de l'APD s'ils renforcent les capacités culturelles des pays bénéficiaires... »¹⁰. D'autres limites ou obstacles qui peuvent être imputées à l'aide sont celles qui entravent son efficacité à savoir l'aide liée ou celle octroyée à des fins géopolitiques. Selon l'OCDE, l'aide liée désigne « les dons ou prêts du secteur public pour lesquels les marchés sont limités à des entreprises du pays donneur ou d'un petit groupe de pays. L'aide liée empêche donc souvent les pays bénéficiaires d'utiliser de façon optimale les fonds alloués pour l'achat de services, de biens ou de travaux »¹¹. Quel est donc l'intérêt de l'aide dans ce cas si le pays bénéficiaire n'est pas libre de choisir la solution qui lui revient moins chère par exemple dans l'achat de biens ou services ? Toutefois, ces conditionnalités ont été certes réduites au fil des années grâce aux travaux du Comité d'aide au développement (CAD) sur le déliement de l'aide mais il n'en demeure pas moins que certains pays continuent avec cette pratique¹².

Le caractère géopolitique de l'aide est également un obstacle à l'aide dans la mesure où les pays donateurs ont tendance à accorder l'aide aux pays avec qui ils sont liés soit par un passé historique soit pour des intérêts politiques. Nous avons par exemples la France (dans l'intérêt de ses anciennes colonies), les États-Unis (en faveur du Moyen Orient), le Japon (en faveur des pays qui votent dans son sens aux Nations unies). Un sérieux manque d'objectivité se dégage et laisse voir clairement qu'au-delà de la lutte contre la pauvreté l'aide publique au développement cache d'autres intérêts¹³.

¹⁰ Aide publique au développement : définition et champ ouvert, <https://www.oecd.org/fr/developpement/financementpourledeveloppementdurable/normes-financement-developpement/aidepubliqueaudeveloppement/definitionetchampouvert.htm#ODA2017>. Consulté le 25/04/2022.

¹¹ Le déliement de l'aide : le droit de choisir, <https://www.oecd.org/fr/developpement/ledeliementdelaidedroitdechoisir.htm#:~:text=L'aide%20li%C3%A9e%20d%C3%A9signe%20les,de%20biens%20ou%20de%20travaux>. Consulté le 17/06/2022.

¹² Pierre Jacquet, « Les enjeux de l'aide publique au développement », *Politique étrangère*, Vol.4, Hiver, 2006, pp. 941-954. <https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2006-4-page-941.htm>. Consulté le 6/08/2022.

¹³ *Ibid.*

DE LA FATIGUE À L'IMPACT DES OBJECTIFS DU MILLÉNAIRE POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT SUR L'APD

Le financement de l'aide publique au développement (APD) s'est fait à l'origine par 11 membres comme évoqué dans l'introduction. Au fil des années, le nombre des membres est passé à 30¹⁴ ce qui a permis une mobilisation plus importante des ressources de financement. Parallèlement à l'augmentation du nombre de donateurs, le nombre de bénéficiaires connaîtra également des changements. Ainsi, la première liste des pays bénéficiaires de l'APD établie par le comité d'aide au développement (CAD) en 1969 comprend tous les pays et territoires d'Afrique à l'exception de l'Afrique du Sud, et d'Amérique à l'exception des États-Unis et du Canada, les pays non communistes d'Asie et d'Océanie à l'exception de l'Australie, du Japon et de la Nouvelle Zélande les pays européens suivants : Chypre, Espagne, Gibraltar, Grèce, Malte, Turquie et Yougoslavie. Durant les années 70 et 80, les pays communistes d'Asie, en particulier la Chine et le Vietnam, ont commencé à recevoir des volumes d'aide importants et ont donc été ajoutés à la liste de pays pour lesquels des données étaient collectées. L'Espagne a été rayée de la liste à sa demande en 1983¹⁵.

Toutefois, il est à noter que le Comité d'aide au développement (CAD) dont la mission est la gestion de l'APD collecte toutes les informations relatives aux donateurs et aux receveurs et révisé de façon triennale la liste des bénéficiaires de l'APD du fait de l'évolution économique de certains pays par rapport à d'autres. Cette liste qui se base également sur le revenu par habitant permet non seulement au CAD d'avoir des données statistiques à jour mais aussi de mieux comptabiliser l'aide. Les pays bénéficiaires pris en compte étant les pays en développement définis par la Banque mondiale (BM) comme ceux ayant des revenus faibles (RNB par habitant $\leq 1\ 005\$$ en 2016) ou intermédiaires (RNB par habitant compris entre $1\ 006\$$ et $12\ 235\$$ en 2016) à l'exclusion des membres du G8, de l'Union européenne (UE), et de ceux dont la

¹⁴ Allemagne, Australie, Belgique, Canada, Corée, Danemark, Espagne, États-Unis, Finlande, France, Grèce, Hongrie, Islande, Irlande, Italie, Japon, Luxembourg, Norvège, Nouvelle-Zélande, Pays-Bas, Pologne, République slovaque, République Tchèque, Royaume-Uni, Slovénie, Suisse, Union européenne.

¹⁵Historique de la Liste des pays bénéficiaires de l'aide établie par le CAD, <https://www.oecd.org/fr/cad/financementpourledeveloppementdurable/normes-financement-developpement/historiquedelalistedespayseveneficiairesdelaideetablieparlecad.htm>. Consulté le 22/06/2022.


date d'entrée dans l'UE est fixée. Les pays bénéficiaires de l'APD pour les apports de 2021 sont cités dans le tableau suivant :

Pays les moins avancés	Pays à faible revenu hors PMA (RNB par habitant <= \$1 005 en 2016)	Pays et territoires à revenu intermédiaire tranche inférieure, hors PMA (RNB par habitant \$1 006-\$3 955 en 2016)	Pays et territoires à revenu intermédiaire tranche supérieure, hors PMA (RNB par habitant \$3 956-\$12 235 en 2016)
Afghanistan (PFR)	République populaire démocratique de Corée	Angola	Afrique du Sud
Bangladesh (PRITI)	Zimbabwe (PRITI)	Arménie (PRITS)	Albanie
Bénin (PRITI)		Bolivie	Algérie (PRITI)
Bhoutan ¹ (PRITI)		Cabo Verde	Antigua-et-Barbuda ²
Burkina Faso (PFR)		Cameroun	Argentine
Burundi (PFR)		Cisjordanie et bande de Gaza	Azerbaïdjan
Cambodge (PRITI)		Congo	Bélarus
Comores (PRITI)		Côte d'Ivoire	Belize
Djibouti (PRITI)		Égypte	Bosnie-Herzégovine
Érythrée (PFR)		El Salvador	Botswana
Éthiopie (PFR)		Eswatini	Brésil
Gambie (PFR)		Géorgie (PRITS)	Chine (République populaire de)
Guinée (PFR)		Ghana	Colombie
Guinée-Bissau (PFR)		Guatemala (PRITS)	Costa Rica
Haïti (PFR)		Honduras	Cuba
Iles Salomon ¹ (PRITI)		Inde	Dominique
Kiribati (PRITI)		Indonésie (PRITS)	Équateur
République démocratique populaire lao (PRITI)		Jordanie (PRITS)	Fidji
Lesotho (PRITI)		Kenya	Gabon
Libéria (PFR)		Kirghizistan	Grenade
Madagascar (PFR)		Kosovo (PRITS)	Guinée équatoriale
Malawi (PFR)		Maroc	Guyana

Mali (PFR)	Micronésie	Iles Marshall
Mauritanie (PRITI)	Moldova	Iran
Mozambique (PFR)	Mongolie	Iraq
Myanmar (PRITI)	Nicaragua	Jamaïque
Népal (PRITI)	Nigéria	Kazakhstan
Niger (PFR)	Ouzbékistan	Liban
Ouganda (PFR)	Pakistan	Libye
République centrafricaine (PFR)	Papouasie- Nouvelle-Guinée	Macédoine du Nord
République démocratique du Congo (PFR)	Philippines	Malaisie
Rwanda (PFR)	République arabe syrienne (PFR)	Maldives
Sao Tomé-et-Principe ¹ (PRITI)	Sri Lanka	Maurice ³ (PRE)
Sénégal (PRITI)	Tadjikistan (PFR)	Mexique
Sierra Leone (PFR)	Tokélaou*	Monténégro
Somalie (PFR)	Tunisie	Montserrat*
Soudan (PFR)	Ukraine	Namibie
Soudan du Sud (PFR)	Vanuatu	Nauru ³ (PRE)
Tanzanie (PRITI)	Viet Nam	Niue*
Tchad (PFR)		Palaos ²
Timor-Leste (PRITI)		Panama ²
Togo (PFR)		Paraguay
Tuvalu (PRITS)		Pérou
Yémen (PFR)		République dominicaine
Zambie (PRITI)		Sainte-Hélène*
		Sainte-Lucie
		Saint-Vincent-et-les- Grenadines
		Samoa
		Serbie
		Suriname
		Thaïlande
		Tonga
		Turkménistan
		Turquie
		Venezuela
		Wallis-et-Futuna*

La volonté manifeste des pays du Nord à soutenir et à accompagner ceux du Sud dans leur progrès économique et social ne se concrétise pas car l'aide octroyée n'apporte pas de résultats satisfaisants. Déjà dans les années 1960, le constat est amer car les économies des pays pauvres ne connaissent pas de décollage et ces derniers restent toujours dépendants de la production manufacturière des pays riches¹⁶. En conséquence, au-delà du développement et du rattrapage économique, la satisfaction des besoins essentiels de la population devient la priorité des pays riches. Il faut donc réduire la pauvreté dans les pays pauvres¹⁷ afin que les populations aient une vie meilleure. Dans cet élan, l'assemblée générale des Nations Unies recommandait en 1970 aux pays riches de consacrer 1% de leur produit intérieur brut (PIB) dont 0,7% pour l'aide officielle¹⁸.

Selon les chiffres publiés par l'OCDE le 13 avril 2021 (voir graphique 3 ci-dessous) seulement 6 pays donateurs sur 29 ont déjà atteint le taux de 0,7%.



Source : OCDE (2021).

¹⁶ Pierre Jacquet, « Les enjeux de l'aide publique au développement », *Politique étrangère*, Vol.4, Hiver, 2006, pp. 941-954. <https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2006-4-page-941.htm>. Consulté le 6/08/2022.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Dix ans plus tard, à la suite de l'accumulation importante des emprunts par les pays pauvres, une partie de l'aide se trouve donc affectée au remboursement des dettes. Cette situation désoriente le but principal de l'aide qui est l'amélioration des conditions de vies des populations. De surcroît, au fil des années, le constat est triste car le financement de l'APD ne permet pas le développement de certains pays notamment ceux de l'Afrique qui ne connaissent pas de progrès social et économique. Une étude critique menée à cet effet par la banque mondiale sur l'efficacité de l'aide¹⁹ évoque une nouvelle fatigue de l'APD. Il ressort de ce rapport que les donateurs devraient continuer à financer les pays en développement mais pour que ce financement ait un véritable impact sur l'amélioration des vies il faudrait que l'aide soit mieux gérer, la responsabilité des donateurs et des bénéficiaires étant ainsi interpellée à cet effet. Pour donner suite à cela, le sommet du Millénaire tenu en 2000 avait ciblé huit objectifs principaux²⁰ déclinés en dix-huit cibles et quarante-huit indicateurs afin de réduire la pauvreté en 2015. Ces objectifs dits Objectifs du millénaire pour le développement (OMD) qui avaient été approuvés par tous les pays du monde et par toutes les grandes institutions mondiales de développement avaient pour objectif premier la réduction de l'extrême pauvreté et de façon globale l'amélioration des conditions de vie des populations sur le long terme. Grâce à ces objectifs du millénaire pour le développement, l'APD qui était victime de nombreuses critiques avait retrouvé une certaine légitimité car désormais, les financements internationaux étaient orientés vers ces objectifs. Ainsi, au moyen des indicateurs de suivi des progrès accomplis associés aux objectifs et cibles, des comparaisons peuvent être faites permettant ainsi de voir l'impact des OMD dans la gestion de l'aide. Dans le Rapport des OMD 2011, on peut voir par exemple que la proportion de la population vivant avec un revenu de 1,25 dollars par jour est passée de 42% en 1990 à 25% en 2005, en

¹⁹ Banque Mondiale, *Assessing Aid. What Works, What Doesn't and Why*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998. <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documentsreports/documentdetail/612481468764422935/assessing-aid-what-works-what-doesnt-and-why>. Consulté le 23 Juillet 2022.

²⁰ 1- Réduire l'extrême pauvreté et la faim ; 2- Assurer l'éducation primaire universelle ; 3- Promouvoir l'égalité des sexes et l'autonomisation des femmes ; 4- Réduire la mortalité infantile ; 5- Améliorer la santé maternelle ; 6- Combattre le VIH/sida, le paludisme et d'autres maladies ; 7- Assurer un environnement durable ; 8- Mettre en place un partenariat mondial pour le développement.

Afrique subsaharienne en revanche, l'effort a été moindre avec 58% en 1990 contre 51% en 2005²¹.

ANALOGIE ENTRE L'EFFICACITÉ DE L'APD ET LES AGENDAS 2030 (ODD) ET 2063 (UA)

Remise en cause et critiquée depuis plusieurs années, l'efficacité de l'aide a été sujette à de nombreux débats et continue de l'être malgré qu'ayant retrouvée une certaine légitimité dans les années 2000 grâce aux objectifs du millénaire pour le développement (OMD). À ce propos, Michel Herland, portant un regard critique au livre écrit par Jacques Brasseul sur « l'introduction à l'économie du développement », avait noté que « *les critiques à l'encontre de l'APD sont multiples : transformation de peuples entiers en assistés chroniques, financement d'équipements improductifs (les fameux éléphants blancs), renforcement des gouvernements corrompus et inefficaces qui captent par ailleurs la majeure partie de l'aide au détriment de ceux qui en auraient le plus besoin, découragement de la production locale par l'aide en nature...* »²². Toutefois, des solutions sont possibles pour rendre l'APD efficace dans une projection sur l'horizon 2030 à travers les objectifs de développement durable et l'agenda 2063 pour l'Afrique.


Efficacité de l'aide publique au développement

En quête des solutions pour la rendre efficace, le financement de l'aide a beaucoup fluctué entre 1960 et 2012 comme on peut le voir à travers ce graphique ci-dessous.

Le financement est passé du critère de sélectivité qui consistait à accorder plus d'aide aux pays dont les dirigeants montraient leur volonté à développer leur pays, au critère de conditionnalité qui consistait à donner l'aide à tous mais en imposant leur condition ; pour aboutir enfin à une vision axée sur la qualité.

²¹ OMD, Évaluation des progrès accomplis en Afrique dans la réalisation des objectifs du Millénaire pour le développement, Rapport, 2011, p. 22. file:///D:/Downloads/UNDP-ADFB-MDG-FR-2011.pdf. Consulté le 22/08/2022.

²² Michel HERLAND, *Commentaire du livre de Jacques Brasseul, Introduction à l'économie du développement*, Paris, Armand Colin, 2008. <http://mondesfrancophones.com/espaces/economies/introduction-al%E2%80%9999economie-du-developpement-de-jacques-brasseul/>. Consulté le 02/08/2022.



Dans les pays bénéficiaires, l'aide étant taxée d'amplifier la corruption, le clientélisme, le manque de compétitivité des producteurs locaux car le marché étant inondé par les produits étrangers, cette situation a conduit à intégrer la dimension qualité de l'aide. Cette dimension prend ses formes grâce aux différents forums de haut niveau qui se sont tenus en 2005 avec l'adoption de la déclaration de Paris sur l'efficacité de l'aide²³ du conseil de l'Union européenne en mai 2005, en passant par celle d'Accra en 2008 et Busan en 2011. Cinq points majeurs découlent de la Déclaration de Paris et restent comme référence pour ce qui est de la gestion efficace de l'aide tout en impliquant les donateurs et les receveurs. Il s'agit notamment de²⁴ :

(1) L'appropriation : les pays partenaires exercent une réelle maîtrise sur leurs politiques et stratégies de développement et assurent la coordination de l'action à l'appui du développement ; (2) l'alignement : les donateurs font reposer l'ensemble de leur soutien sur les stratégies nationales de développement, les institutions et les procédures des pays partenaires ; (3) l'harmonisation : les actions des donateurs sont mieux harmonisées et plus transparentes, et permettent une plus grande efficacité collective ; (4) la gestion axée sur les résultats : gérer les ressources et améliorer le processus de décision en vue d'obtenir des résultats ; et (5) la responsabilité partagée : Les donateurs et les pays partenaires sont responsables des résultats obtenus en matière de développement.

²³ OECD, Déclaration de Paris sur l'efficacité de l'aide au développement, 2005. <https://www.oecd.org/fr/cad/efficacite/34579826.pdf>. Consulté le 22/08/2022.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Désormais, il ne s'agit plus de miser uniquement sur le volume de l'aide mais de penser également comment mieux l'orienter afin de réduire la pauvreté. Le CAD renchérit à ce propos et fait savoir dans un rapport de l'OCDE en 2006 que « *l'accroissement de l'aide ne fera pas reculer la pauvreté en l'absence de réformes majeures de la gestion actuelle de l'aide. Une gestion efficace des finances publiques, y compris des aides reçues, est essentielle pour permettre aux pays de marquer des points dans la lutte contre la pauvreté* »²⁵. Malgré toutes ces réformes, la problématique que pose l'efficacité de l'aide est toujours d'actualité et continue de faire couler beaucoup d'encre surtout pour ce qui est de l'Afrique subsaharienne qui peine à sortir de la pauvreté. Les prévisions de la Banque mondiale concernant la situation de la pauvreté en Afrique subsaharienne sur la période 2015-2030 sont inquiétantes et selon les projections, près de 90% de la population subsaharienne vivra en 2050 dans l'extrême pauvreté c'est-à-dire avec moins de 1,90 dollars par jour²⁶.

Les objectifs de développement durable et l'agenda 2063 africain

En prélude à l'échéance des Objectifs du millénaire pour le développement (OMD), l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) organisait des travaux post-2015²⁷. On assiste alors en 2015 à l'adoption des Objectifs de développement durable (ODD) qui viennent succéder aux OMD et dont l'échéance est fixée en 2030. Ces 17 objectifs²⁸ permettent davantage à l'APD de

²⁵ CAD, Lignes directrices et ouvrages de référence du CAD, Harmoniser l'aide pour renforcer son efficacité, Rapport, 2006, p.4/ 99. <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264036253-fr.pdf?expires=1619451691&id=id&acname=guest&checksum=AAB066A536E7715466A12019F0E7E106>. Consulté le 23/08/2022.

²⁶ Banque Mondiale, L'extrême pauvreté continue de progresser en Afrique subsaharienne, Rapport, 19 septembre 2018. <https://www.banquemonde.org/fr/news/press-release/2018/09/19/decline-of-global-extreme-poverty-continues-but-has-slowed-world-bank#:~:text=19%20septembre%202018>. Consulté le 25/08/2022.

²⁷ PNUD, Construire le développement pour l'après-2015, <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/mdg/building-the-post-2015-development-agenda.html>. Consulté le 23/08/2022.

²⁸ Pas de pauvreté ; Faim « Zéro » ; Bonne santé et bien-être ; Education de qualité ; Egalité entre les sexes ; Eau propre et assainissement ; Energie propre et d'un coût abordable ; Travail décent et croissance économique ; Industrie, innovation et infrastructure ; Inégalités réduites ; Villes et communautés durables ; Consommation et production responsable ; Lutte contre les changements climatiques ; Vie aquatique ; Vie terrestre ; Paix, justice et institutions efficaces ; Partenariats pour la réalisation des objectifs.

garder sa position quant au financement des pays pauvres mais, cette fois-ci, le développement doit être pensé de façon inclusive et durable, la notion de durabilité constituant la valeur ajoutée des objectifs de développement durable (ODD). Ainsi, aux 17 objectifs et 169 cibles sur lesquels les financements devront être orientés sont fixés également, avec comme éléments clés pour le développement durable 5 axes que sont l'humanité, la planète, la prospérité, le renforcement de la paix et les partenariats²⁹.

Initié en 2013 et adopté en janvier 2015 lors de la Conférence des Chefs d'État et de Gouvernement de l'Union Africaine, l'Agenda 2063 avait été adopté en prenant en compte dans l'élaboration de ses objectifs ceux des travaux des Nations Unies sur le post-2015 et donc, des ODD qui devaient succéder aux OMD. Dans un contexte de mondialisation, l'Afrique devrait se développer et évoluer en phase avec les objectifs mondiaux ; afin qu'en fine elle puisse peser sur la scène mondiale en parlant d'une seule voix et en y apportant sa quote-part. Cet agenda venait ainsi succéder au Nouveau Partenariat pour le Développement de l'Afrique (NEPAD) qui avait vu le jour en 2001 (un an après l'adoption des OMD) et visait trois objectifs majeurs à savoir « *promouvoir la croissance accélérée et le développement durable, éradiquer la pauvreté généralisée et extrême, et mettre fin à la marginalisation de l'Afrique dans le processus de mondialisation* »³⁰. Dans la continuité des travaux du NEPAD, l'Agenda 2063 définit 7 aspirations, 20 objectifs, 34 domaines prioritaires, 171 cibles nationales et 85 cibles³¹ continentales pour un développement durable de l'Afrique. Ces objectifs avaient été définis non seulement sur la vision de l'Union africaine mais également des objectifs et domaines prioritaires qui figurent dans la position africaine commune (PAC) et dans les ODD post-2015.

L'agenda 2063 venait ainsi jouer le rôle de catalyseur et donner la trajectoire ou mieux encore inspirer les différents États africains dans l'établissement de leur stratégie de développement tant nationale que régionale, mais aussi sous régionale afin de permettre une meilleure cohérence

²⁹ « Les objectifs du développement durable : les informations et conseils pour les organisations de volontaires » https://www.unv.org/sites/default/files/UNV%20QA%20on%20SDGs_web_F.pdf. Consulté le 26/08/2022.

³⁰ NEPAD, « Objectifs », <https://www.afdb.org/fr/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/nepad>. Consulté le 26/08/2022.

³¹ Commission de l'Union Africaine, Agenda 2063, l'Afrique que nous voulons - Document cadre- page 133-135. <https://www.un.org/fr/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-frameworkf.pdf>. Consulté le 26/08/2022.

pour le développement durable du continent. Il est de ce fait le cadre stratégique pour la croissance inclusive et le développement durable en Afrique, et une stratégie visant à optimiser l'utilisation des ressources du continent au profit de tous les Africains.

Cela dit, quelques divergences sont observées dans les objectifs fixés par les deux agendas, comme l'avait souligné Maged Abdelaziz, Secrétaire général adjoint et Conseiller spécial pour l'Afrique : « *L'Agenda 2063 est beaucoup plus précis quant aux objectifs à atteindre. En matière d'éducation, par exemple, les objectifs de développement durable parlent d'assurer l'éducation primaire et secondaire pour tous, tandis que l'Agenda 2063 vise en plus une augmentation au niveau tertiaire. La sécurité sanitaire de l'eau est un autre exemple. Les objectifs de développement durable appellent à une augmentation substantielle, alors que l'Agenda 2063 définit précisément cette augmentation. Il en va de même pour les autres objectifs* »³². Il reste tout de même évident que, malgré ces divergences, les deux agendas évoluent dans la même logique qui est celle d'améliorer les conditions de vie des populations dans tous les domaines et à tous les niveaux. Et pour cela, il faut mobiliser plusieurs ressources financières mais aussi suivre les recommandations de l'Accord de Paris sur l'efficacité de l'aide. Il revient alors à voir la contribution de l'APD dans la stratégie d'émergence du Cameroun.

L'APPORT DE L'APD DANS LA STRATÉGIE D'ÉMERGENCE DU CAMEROUN

Il est important de ressortir clairement une idée sur les principaux donateurs de l'APD au Cameroun avant de faire le constat d'un échec du mécanisme de l'APD au Cameroun.

Les principaux donateurs de l'aide publique au développement au Cameroun

L'aide publique au développement est une source de financement extérieure qui, quoiqu'elle soit critiquée – basée sur les intérêts géopolitiques, taxée de néocolonialisme, aide liée, etc. – contribue tout de même au renforcement des économies des pays bénéficiaires grâce à ses différents financements. Les relations/coopérations interétatiques étant généralement basées sur les intérêts, chaque pays bénéficiaire devrait pouvoir tirer son

³² L'Agenda 2063 et les ODD vont ensemble, Décembre 2015 <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/fr/magazine/d%C3%A9cembre-2015/1%E2%80%99agenda-2063-et-les-odd-vont-ensemble#:~:text=Les%20diff%C3%A9rences%20%3F,une%20augmentation%20au%20niveau%20tertiaire>

épinglé du jeu et en faire bon usage ; la volonté des dirigeants à vouloir développer leur pays respectif étant interpellée à cet effet. Au Cameroun, l'Union européenne (UE) et ses États membres sont les principaux donateurs d'aide avec en 2016 un apport de 487 millions soit 57% de l'aide selon un rapport publié jeudi 22 septembre 2016, par l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE)³³. Selon le même rapport, la répartition géographique laisse voir pour ce qui est de l'aide bilatérale que « le premier bailleur bilatéral demeure la France (167 millions US) suivie de la Grande Bretagne (88,2 millions US), de l'Allemagne (87,4 millions US), des États-Unis (40,7 millions US) et du Japon (25,1 millions US) »³⁴. En 2019, l'aide publique au développement reçue par le Cameroun d'après les données du comité d'aide au développement (CAD) de l'OCDE se chiffre à 1 335 219 971 \$³⁵. Le financement de la Chine n'étant pas considéré comme l'aide mais plutôt comme un investissement.

En 2020, avec 66,8 milliards d'euros³⁶ accordés à l'APD, l'Union Européenne et ses 27 membres ont détenu la palme d'or comme principal donateur mondial d'aide au développement. De plus, « selon les chiffres provisoires publiés ce jour par le Comité d'aide au développement (CAD) de l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE), il s'agit d'une progression de 15 % en termes nominaux, correspondant à 0,50 % du revenu national brut (RNB) agrégé, contre 0,41 % en 2019. L'UE et ses États membres, qui fournissent 46 % de l'aide mondiale provenant de l'UE et d'autres donateurs du CAD, confirment ainsi leur position de premier donateur mondial et se sont sensiblement rapprochés de l'engagement qu'ils ont pris de consacrer au moins 0,7 % du RNB agrégé à l'APD d'ici à 2030 »³⁷. L'atteinte des

³³ Cameroun : 57% de l'aide publique au développement vient de l'UE, Septembre 2016 <https://www.journalducameroun.com/cameroun-57-de-laide-publique-au-developpement-vient-de-lue/>. Consulté le 24/08/2022.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Banque Mondiale, Aide publique au développement nette et aide publique reçues (\$ US courants), <https://donnees.banquemondiale.org/indicateur/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD>. Consulté le 26/08/2022.

³⁶ L'équipe Europe, premier donateur mondial, a porté l'aide publique au développement à 66,8 milliards € en 2020, 14 avril 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/france/news/20210414/aide_publique_developpement_europe_2020_fr. Consulté le 24/06/2022.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

objectifs de développement durable (ODD) étant une priorité mondiale, l'apport en ressources de l'UE aux pays bénéficiaires est un plus qui, bien employé serait avantageux pour chacun d'eux. Par conséquent, le Cameroun devrait mieux orienter ses financements afin d'accélérer le développement.

Constat critique de l'aide publique au développement au Cameroun

N'ayant pas pu avoir un rapport beaucoup plus récent, notre analyse s'appuie sur le tableau ci-dessous extrait du rapport du DAD-Cameroun³⁸. DAD-CAMEROON est le système d'information collaboratif développé de façon participative par Synergy International et le ministère de l'Économie, de la Planification et de l'Aménagement du Territoire (MINEPAT) du Cameroun, pour la gestion de l'Aide au développement au Cameroun qui montre la répartition de l'Aide au Développement pour la période 2012-2013 sur les engagements par type de partenaire. Les secteurs pris en compte étant ceux définis par le gouvernement dans le Document de Stratégie pour la Croissance et l'Emploi (DSCE) qui constituait le cadre de référence de l'action gouvernementale pour la période 2010-2020.

Tableau : Répartition des engagements de l'APD par type de partenaires 2012-2013

Type d'Organisme de Financement	Educa-tion	Gouver-nance	Indus-tries et services	Infrastruc-tures	Rural	Santé	Social	Autres secteurs	Accord (XAF)
Bilatéral	44 782	39 484	220	1 765 434	107257	26 666	7 998	13 479	2 005 321
	2,23%	1,97%	0,01%	88,04%	5,35%	1,33%	0,40%	0,67%	100%
Multilatéral	54 602	182 204	17 978	1 212 924	328095	65 994	26684	0	1 888 480
	2,89%	9,65%	0,95%	64,23%	17,37%	3,49%	1,41%	0,00%	100%
Total	99 384	221 688	18 198	2 978 358	435352	92 660	34682	13 479	3 893802
	2,55%	5,69%	0,47%	76,49%	11,18%	2,38%	0,89%	0,35%	100%

³⁸ Rapport du DAD-CAMEROON sur l'aide au développement 2012-2013, pages 24/183 [http:// www.undp.org/content/dam/cameroon/docs/UNDP-CMR-rapport-DAD\).pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/cameroon/docs/UNDP-CMR-rapport-DAD).pdf). Consulté le 27/08/2022.

À la lecture de ce tableau, notre constat est le suivant : qu'il s'agisse de l'aide bilatérale ou multilatérale, les secteurs comme l'éducation respectivement de 2,23% et 2,89 %, la santé respectivement de 1,33% et 3,49% et l'industrie respectivement 0,01% et 0,95% sont délaissés au profit des infrastructures qui sont respectivement de 88,04% et 64,23%.

Quand on sait que ces trois secteurs délaissés sont de véritables catalyseurs de développement, on se demande pourquoi des dotations plus conséquentes n'y ont pas été faites pendant toutes ces années. Pour ce qui est du capital humain, il correspond, selon la Banque mondiale à « l'ensemble des connaissances, compétences et conditions de santé que les individus accumulent tout au long de leur vie et qui leur permet de réaliser pleinement leur potentiel en devenant des membres productifs de la société »³⁹. Elle renchérit en précisant que « sans capital humain, une nation ne peut pas maintenir une croissance économique durable, préparer sa main-d'œuvre aux emplois plus qualifiés de demain ni soutenir la concurrence dans l'économie mondialisée ». Et d'ailleurs, au constat fait du manque d'engouement des donateurs à ne pas investir suffisamment dans le capital humain, la Banque mondiale met en place un nouvel indice conçu pour mesurer le capital humain qui a été inauguré en octobre 2018 à Bali (Indonésie), à l'occasion des Assemblées annuelles⁴⁰.

Pour ce qui est de l'industrie, son importance n'est plus à démontrer vu les bénéfices que génère l'industrialisation dans le monde. En effet, la valeur ajoutée réside dans la transformation des ressources agricoles et des ressources naturelles et le Cameroun en dispose suffisamment comme nous l'avons évoqué dans l'introduction. Les infrastructures sont certes nécessaires mais ne devraient pas être prioritaires, car le progrès ou encore la croissance d'un pays ne saurait se bâtir sur cette base si toutefois l'objectif recherché est bien d'améliorer les conditions de vies des populations sur le long terme⁴¹. De plus,

³⁹ À propos du Projet pour le capital humain, <https://www.banquemondiale.org/fr/publication/human-capital/brief/abouthcp#:~:text=Le%20d%C3%A9veloppement%20du%20capital%20humain,et%20l'acc%C3%A8s%20aux%20emplois>. Consulté le 28/08/2022.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Dambisa Moyo, « L'aide fatale. Les ravages d'une aide inutile et de nouvelles solutions pour l'Afrique », *Afrique contemporaine*, Vol.4, numéro 232, 2009, pp. 209-216. <http://www.afrique-contemporaine.info/articles/2009-4-dambisa-moyo-l-aide-fatale-les-ravages-d-une-aide-inutile-et-de-nouvelles-solutions-pour-l-afrique/>. Consulté le 30/08/2022.

à travers le tableau de la BAD-Cameroun évoqué ci-dessus, le secteur rural est le deuxième secteur qui est privilégié après celui des infrastructures mais le pourcentage qui lui est accordé est largement inférieur à celui des infrastructures avec respectivement 5,35% contre 88,04% pour l'engagement bilatéral et 17,35% contre 64,23% pour l'engagement multilatéral. Cette situation étant également à déplorer car le secteur rural qui comprend entre autres l'agriculture, la pêche, l'élevage, les produits forestiers est un pilier important dans l'économie. Ce qui, une fois de plus laisse croire que, si le financement y avait été accentué alors l'économie camerounaise serait allée à un stade beaucoup plus avancé de nos jours. Assurément, un financement massif dans le secteur primaire aurait permis de former les 90% de la population pauvre qui vit en zone rural⁴², d'améliorer leur revenu, de réduire l'inégalité de sexe car le secteur employant plus de femmes⁴³. Il apparaît également dans le tableau que le secteur social qui est d'une importance capitale dans les pays développés pour l'assistance des populations pauvres et également considéré comme instrument de réduction de la pauvreté⁴⁴ ne bénéficie que de 0,40% en aide bilatérale et de 1,41% en aide multilatérale contre 88,04% et 64,23% respectivement pour les infrastructures.

De nos jours, des progrès sont peut-être observés dans ces différents secteurs mais le retard est profond par rapport à ce qui aurait pu être fait dans le passé. Le secteur primaire ne représentant que 14,5% du PIB avec comme taux d'employabilité de la population active de 43%⁴⁵ ce qui est un véritable contraste mais s'explique par la faible productivité du secteur. Le secteur secondaire quant à lui est de 26% du PIB avec comme taux d'employabilité de la population active 14%⁴⁶ ce qui démontre une faible transformation des matières premières. Le reste de la population étant contenu dans le secteur

⁴² Stratégie de développement du secteur rural 2015-2020, <https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/CMR/Strat%C3%A9gie%20du%20Secteur%20Rural.pdf>. Consulté le 30/08/2022.

⁴³ Rapport national sur le développement humain 2019 : croissance inclusive, inégalités et exclusions, page 176/282, <https://cameroon.un.org/fr/31687-rapport-national-sur-le-developpe-ment-humain-2019-croissance-inclusive-inegalites-et>. Consulté le 30/08/2022.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 186.

⁴⁵ Le marché camerounais : Principaux secteurs, Avril 2021 <https://www.objectif-import-export.fr/fr/marches-internationaux/fiche-pays/cameroun/marche-principaux-secteurs>. Consulté le 29/08/2022.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

tertiaire qui représente 51,5% du PIB cela étant dû, au développement de la télécommunication et du transport⁴⁷ qui sont certes à saluer mais qui ne devraient pas être des priorités pour un pays qui souffre encore des problèmes de famine et de malnutrition⁴⁸, de développement du système éducatif, du système sanitaire, d'électrification bref des problèmes basiques qui contribueraient au bien-être des populations.

L'État ayant certes sa responsabilité dans cet état de chose⁴⁹, mais les donateurs aussi car, le pourcentage accordé au financement des infrastructures pouvait être réduit et ainsi être alloué aux autres secteurs qui auraient plus de valeur ajoutée dans le développement du capital humain. La nouvelle orientation de l'APD par la France⁵⁰ dans laquelle, parmi les nouvelles priorités on retrouve la lutte contre la pauvreté, la santé et l'éducation peut laisser croire que depuis toutes ces années l'orientation dans le financement de l'aide n'était pas faite dans les secteurs qui auraient vraiment impulsés un réel changement socio-économique sur l'ensemble du continent Africain en général et du Cameroun en particulier.

L'ÉMERGENCE DU CAMEROUN EN QUESTION

Le concept d'émergence a fait une entrée fracassante dans le discours économique et politique en Afrique depuis la fin des années 2000. L'expression « pays émergent » ou « économie émergente » est souvent employée pour désigner un pays ou un groupe de pays qui connaissent un dynamisme économique impressionnant dans la nouvelle économie mondialisée de la fin du XX^e siècle et du début du XXI^e siècle⁵¹. La compréhension souvent retenue pour un pays émergent est celle d'un pays qui possède les caractéristiques ci-

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle : le Cameroun se préserve de la famine, disponible sur <https://www.cameroon-tribune.cm/article.html/35763/fr.html/securite-alimentaire-nutritionnelle-le-cameroun-se-preserve-de-la>. Consulté le 29/08/2022.

⁴⁹ Pour une analyse de la gouvernance et de la situation politique du Cameroun, v. Sergiu Mişcoiu et Louis-Marie Kakdeu, « Authoritarian clientelism: the case of the president's 'creatures' in Cameroon », *Acta Politica*, no. 4, vol. 56, 2021, pp. 639-657.

⁵⁰ « Aide au développement en Afrique : la nouvelle doctrine française » <https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20210302-aide-au-d%C3%A9veloppement-en-afrique-la-nouvelle-doctrine-fran%C3%A7aise>, publié le 02/03/2021.

⁵¹ Valéry Ntwali et Guillain Cirhuza, « Emergence in the WAEMU and EMCCA areas », *Studia UBB. Europaea*, LXVI, 2, 2021, pp. 119-134.

après : un niveau de revenu par habitant qui passe progressivement dans la tranche intermédiaire, voire au-delà (Convergence); une transformation structurelle de l'économie qui se matérialise par une diversification et une sophistication plus poussée (avec le transfert de la main d'œuvre des secteurs à faible productivité vers ceux à forte productivité); une économie ouverte sur le reste du monde (Insertion dans les chaînes de valeurs mondiales)⁵².

La Conférence Internationale sur l'émergence de l'Afrique (CIEA) a complété ce cadre conceptuel usuel par deux caractéristiques complémentaires : un processus qui développe les capacités des populations pour éradiquer la pauvreté et réduire les inégalités (Développement humain); des modes de production et de consommation respectant la préservation de l'environnement (Développement durable). Le Cameroun nourrit depuis quelques années déjà l'ambition de devenir un pays à revenu intermédiaire de tranche élevée d'ici 2035, ayant déjà franchi la barre de pays à revenu intermédiaire de tranche inférieure, le niveau supérieur est désormais sa cible. Du Document stratégique de réduction de la pauvreté (DSRP) qui avait été élaboré en 2003 suivi en 2009 par l'élaboration du Document de Stratégie pour la Croissance et l'Emploi (DSCE) avec comme échéance 2019 et qui constituait la première phase de sa vision 2035, le gouvernement Camerounais est toujours à la recherche d'un cadre adéquat qui permettrait le développement du pays. À cet effet, il a élaboré une nouvelle stratégie qui constitue la deuxième phase à l'atteinte de sa vision en accord bien entendu avec les Objectifs de développement durable (ODD)⁵³.

Plusieurs définitions existent quant à la définition de l'émergence, mais nous allons retenir celle de l'Observatoire de l'émergence en Afrique (OBEMA) qui définit l'émergence comme « un processus de transformation économique soutenue qui se traduit par des performances aux plans social et humain et qui prend place dans un contexte politique et institutionnel stable susceptible d'en

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Contextualisation et priorisation des ODD: 46 cibles sur 169 sont prioritaires pour le Cameroun, 22 Août 2017, <https://cameroon.un.org/fr/23397-contextualisation-et-priorisation-des-odd-46-cibles-sur-169-sont-prioritaires-pour-le#:~:text=22%20ao%C3%BBt%202017Contextualisation%20et%20priorisation%20des%20ODD%3A%2046%20cibles%20sur%20169%20sont,%C3%A9mergent%20%C3%A0%20l'horizon%202035>. Consulté le 29/08/2022.

assurer la soutenabilité »⁵⁴. Il est alors question pour l'État Camerounais d'être plus rigoureux dans la gestion de cette stratégie afin d'atteindre son objectif. Pour arriver à une émergence viable, il faut une stratégie bien établie et répondant aux exigences en fonction des ressources disponibles et mobilisables mais aussi, un État qui joue véritablement son rôle.

La stratégie nationale de développement (SND)

Dans son ambition d'être un pays émergent, l'État Camerounais a mis en place la Stratégie Nationale de Développement (SND), elle constitue la deuxième phase de la vision 2035 et s'étend sur la période 2020-2030. Ce nouveau cadre avait été mis sur pieds dans le but rectifier le tir des manquements observés dans le Document de Stratégie pour la Croissance et l'Emploi (DSCE). D'ailleurs, lors de la clôture des travaux en 2019 sur les différents secteurs avec toutes les parties concernées relativement au PSND (Projet de la Stratégie Nationale de Développement), Paul TASONG, Ministre Délégué auprès du Ministre de l'Économie, de la Planification et de l'Aménagement du Territoire, en charge de la planification avait dit nous citons : « la poursuite de la marche vers l'émergence du Cameroun se fera en corrigeant les erreurs du passé »⁵⁵, il faisait ainsi allusion aux manquements observés dans l'exécution du DSCE. C'est dans cet élan que, le PSND avait été axé sur les infrastructures, les industries et services, la santé, l'éducation, les services sociaux et la gouvernance⁵⁶.

Dans la continuité du DSCE, la SND devra alors être bien pilotée afin que le Cameroun atteigne « une croissance du PIB réel d'environ 8 % (soit 5,7 % par habitant) sur la période 2015–2035. Il faudra pour cela que le taux d'investissement passe d'environ 20 % du PIB en 2015 à 30 % en 2035 et que la productivité, qui n'a globalement pas progressé au cours de la dernière

⁵⁴ Index de l'émergence en Afrique, 2019, p 18/94. https://www.giersa.ulaval.ca/sites/giersa.ulaval.ca/files/index_de_lemergence_en_afrique_2019.pdf. Consulté le 29/08/2022

⁵⁵ Planification de la deuxième phase de la Vision 2035 : les sectoriels formulent les orientations stratégiques, https://www.minepat.gov.cm/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=522:planification-de-la-deuxieme-phase-de-la-vision-2035-les-sectoriels-formulent-les-orientationsstrategiques&catid=25&lang=en&Itemid=144. Consulté le 28/08/2022.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

décennie, atteigne 2 %⁵⁷ » selon la Banque mondiale. Au-delà de la volonté d’avoir une croissance économique soutenue sur une longue période, il faudra pouvoir atteindre une croissance inclusive et durable qui permettra non seulement de réduire la pauvreté mais également de réduire les inégalités sociales qui minent la société. À ce propos, le Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement (PNUD) s’est engagé à réduire la pauvreté dans toutes ses dimensions. Il estime que la croissance économique seule ne permet pas de réduire la pauvreté, d’améliorer l’égalité ou de créer des emplois si elle n’est pas durable et ne profite pas à tous. Et donc, le développement ne peut être inclusif que si toutes les catégories de population – quels que soient leur sexe, leur origine ethnique, leur âge ou leur statut social – contribuent à créer des opportunités, partagent les bénéfices du développement et participent à la prise de décision⁵⁸. L’engagement du PNUD est louable car, il ressort malheureusement du rapport National sur le développement humain 2019⁵⁹ que, pour le Cameroun par exemple, malgré la croissance soutenue obtenue entre 2010 et 2018 respectivement de 2,9% et 4,2% beaucoup de disparités et d’inégalité subsistent au sein de la société. La pauvreté pour sa part est passée de 39,9% en 2007 à 37,5% en 2014 malgré l’augmentation de la croissance, on observe des régions où elle est plus accentuée par rapport aux autres et de façon globale, sur la même période l’indice de GINI⁶⁰ est passé de 39% à 44%

⁵⁷ La Banque mondiale au Cameroun, « La stratégie de partenariat de la Banque mondiale pour le Cameroun porte principalement sur le renforcement de la compétitivité du pays et l’amélioration de la prestation des services », publié le 3 Mai 2021, <https://www.banquemonde.org/fr/country/cameroon/overview>. Consulté le 12 avril 2022.

⁵⁸ PNUD, Le Développement Humain 2019 PNUD : Croissance Inclusive, Inégalités Et Exclusions, Rapport, 2019, p.26. <https://cameroon.un.org/fr/31687-rapport-national-sur-le-developpement-humain-2019-croissance-inclusive-inegalites-et>. Consulté le 22 juillet 2022.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Le coefficient ou l’indice de Gini porte le nom du statisticien et démographe italien Corrado Gini (1884–1965). C’est un indicateur de dispersion permettant principalement d’apprécier les inégalités dans la distribution des richesses d’un territoire. Il varie entre zéro et un, zéro étant la situation d’égalité parfaite (chaque citoyen est exactement aussi riche que son voisin), un étant la situation d’inégalité parfaite (un citoyen possède toutes les richesses, les autres aucune). Les pays du monde s’ordonnent ainsi entre 0,25 (pays d’Europe scandinave et centrale) et 0,70 (pays émergents d’Amérique latine, d’Afrique centrale), <http://geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr/glossaire/coefficient-gini>.

soit une augmentation de 13%. Les problèmes de genres persistent notamment dans le secteur agricole et dans l'éducation.

Les défis à relever sont donc énormes et pour se faire, l'État Camerounais invite non seulement tous les citoyens Camerounais à contribuer – en investissant davantage – à l'atteinte de l'objectif fixé qui est celui d'être un pays émergent d'ici 2035 mais également tous les différents partenaires au développement à considérer cette Stratégie comme le cadre de référence aux nouveaux accords⁶¹. L'industrialisation, l'éducation, la santé sont les secteurs où les investissements doivent être orientés en priorité pour la réussite de cette stratégie. La transformation industrielle engendre la création d'emplois et demande non seulement de nouvelles compétences mais aussi le renforcement des capacités d'où l'importance d'une éducation de qualité / formation pointue et orientée de la population sur les métiers actuels et futurs. Le secteur secondaire devra alors passer de 28,2% en 2018 à 36,8% à l'horizon 2030 dans sa contribution au produit intérieur brut (PIB)⁶².

Conditions pour aboutir à l'émergence : le rôle de l'État

Plusieurs approches existent sur le rôle et la responsabilité de l'État dans le développement socio-économique d'un pays. Des théories classiques et néoclassiques où on retrouve comme défenseurs Adam Smith, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et Hegel en passant par la théorie rationaliste de l'État de Spinoza, celle de John Locke qui évoque les concepts de « liberté » et de « propriété privée » qui doivent être garantis par l'État à celle de « l'État-providence » qui prône l'intervention de l'État dans l'économie et dont l'un de ces plus grands défenseurs John Maynard Keynes trouve que « seul l'État peut relancer la machine économique en reconstituant un niveau adapté de demande effective, en créant de nombreux emplois capables de relancer et d'accroître la productivité des entreprises publiques et privées »⁶³, l'État a

⁶¹ Stratégie Nationale de Développement, 2020, pp. 15-231. <https://www.dgb.cm/news/developpement-le-gouvernement-presente-sa-strategie-nationale-2020-2030/>. Consulté le 23/07/2022.

⁶² Article de journal Cameroun Tribune, <https://www.cameroon-tribune.cm/article.html/38042/fr.html/strategie-nationale-de-developpement-2020-2030-on-sappropriie-les-reformes>. Consulté le 25/08/2022.

⁶³ Dominique Sene, « Du rôle et de la responsabilité de l'État dans le développement économique et le bien-être social au Sénégal », *Sciences & Actions Sociales*, Vol 3, N° 5, 2016, pp.124-138. <https://www.cairn.info/revue-sciences-et-actions-sociales-2016-3-page-124.htm?ref=doi> . Consulté le 3/09/2022.

toujours eu à intervenir d'une manière ou d'une autre pour régulariser ou encore équilibrer les activités tant sociales qu'économiques.

Nous nous attarderons sur la thèse de « l'État-providence », aussi appelée « l'État-développeur » ou « l'État de développement » car, elle nous semble plus appropriée pour le continent africain dans cette mouvance d'émergence qui y est entreprise. Le concept d'État développeur qui, ces dernières années, a fait ses preuves en Asie est formulé en 1982 par Chalmers Johnson pour qualifier le rôle de l'État. En effet, la montée en puissance asiatique a fait et continue de faire couler beaucoup d'encre quant aux différentes actions qui ont été menées pour atteindre ce stade de croissance. Du rapport de recherche de la Banque mondiale sur les politiques de 1993 intitulé « le miracle de l'Asie de l'Est », il y ressort qu'il ne s'agit pas d'un miracle comme le qualifient certains ; mais que ces économies ont su mieux que d'autres remplir les conditions essentielles à la croissance que sont « l'accumulation supérieure de capital physique et humain ; l'affectation des ressources matérielles et humaines à des investissements très productifs ; et également à l'acquisition et la maîtrise des technologies »⁶⁴.

De fait, appliquant les caractéristiques principales du concept de l'État-développeur, qui se manifestent par « la volonté politique développementaliste, une bureaucratie autonome mais enchevêtrée dans l'espace social, et une relation privilégiée de l'État avec les milieux d'affaires »⁶⁵ l'Asie a pu se développer. Et donc, dans un continent qui ambitionne de rattraper son retard à travers notamment la mise en place de la Zone de libre-échange continentale africaine (Zlecaf), il serait plus qu'opportun pour les dirigeants africains de se tourner vers le concept d'État-développeur. Cette approche permettrait au continent de résoudre d'abord les problèmes primaires de sa population et parallèlement ceux secondaires. Ces problèmes regroupant le manque de compétence qui est toujours décrié, le faible niveau de scolarisation, l'épineux problème de la réduction de la pauvreté, le problème d'électrification, la

⁶⁴ Rapport de recherche de la banque mondiale sur les politiques, le miracle de l'Asie de l'Est, croissance économiques et politiques publiques, 1993. <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/769691468245385079/pdf/123510PUB0v20F0ry000French00020of02.pdf>. Consulté le 26/08/2022.

⁶⁵ Pauline Debanes et Sébastien Lechevalier, « La résurgence du concept d'État développeur : quelle réalité empirique pour quel renouveau théorique ? », *Critique internationale*, Vol 2, N° 63, 2014, pp. 9-18. <https://www.cairn.info/revue-critique-internationale-2014-2-page-9.htm>, Consulté le 2/07/2022.

maîtrise de la chaîne de valeur dans plusieurs secteurs d'activités encore à la traîne, les pauvres qui continuent de s'appauvrir et les riches qui continuent de s'enrichir, la faiblesse des institutions qui est toujours indexée, etc.

Face à cet état des choses, les pays en développement se doivent de trouver des moyens d'intervention plus efficaces et dynamiques afin de restaurer un climat social avec un minimum d'équité pour toute la population mais également un climat propice aux affaires afin d'encourager les investissements nationaux et étrangers. Dans son rapport sur le développement dans le monde de 1997, la Banque mondiale stipulait que : « *le développement - économique, social et durable - , n'est possible sans un État efficace. On admet de plus en plus qu'un État efficace est indispensable au développement économique et social* »⁶⁶. De plus, quand on remonte dans l'histoire, on peut voir que le développement des pays émergents a nécessité pour ces différents pays de mettre en avant l'intervention de l'État au premier plan dans le processus de développement. Qu'il s'agisse du Brésil, de la Russie, de l'Inde pour ne citer que ceux-là, l'État y a été l'acteur principal⁶⁷.

Et donc, la question qui « dérange » serait celle de savoir, comment pérenniser tous ces acquis et les mettre à profit pour le développement ? Serait-ce possible dans un environnement, de guerres civiles et de terrorisme qui font de plus en plus leur apparition sur le continent ? Et bien non, rien ne peut se construire dans un contexte pareil. Les deux guerres mondiales en sont la preuve, il serait sage pour les dirigeants de faire régner la paix. Le retard accumulé l'impose, il n'est plus question de « casser pour reconstruire » mais uniquement de construire. L'avantage d'être « le dernier » continent à la traîne serait justement de se servir de l'histoire des autres continents, d'y tirer des leçons et rectifier le tir. Au Cameroun, la stratégie qui mènera à son émergence d'ici 2035 étant en marche, il est légitime de se demander si l'objectif visé sera atteint vu l'état de crise dans lequel se trouve le pays ? Ces crises qui nous semblent être des facteurs nocifs à l'atteinte de cet objectif seront abordées en trois points :

(1) Le groupe extrémiste Boko Haram qui multiplie les attaques dans la région de l'Extrême-Nord où les civils sont de plus en plus tués. D'ailleurs,

⁶⁶ Banque mondiale, 1997, p. 20

⁶⁷ Jean-Louis Thiébault, « Comment les pays émergents se sont-ils développés économiquement ? La perspective de l'économie politique », Revue internationale de politique comparée, Vol.18, N°3, 2011, pp 11-46. <https://www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-politique-comparee-2011-3-page-11.htm> . Consulté le 16 /07/2022.

suite à un attentat suicide dans une petite ville de la région de l'Extrême-Nord du Cameroun qui a fait au moins 15 morts parmi les civils, dont cinq enfants âgés entre 3 et 14 ans⁶⁸, la cheffe du Fonds des Nations Unies pour l'enfance (UNICEF) Henrietta Fore s'était exprimée dans un communiqué en condamnant cet acte et en déplorant l'ampleur que prend la montée de la crise au Cameroun en ces termes : « je condamne cet acte horrible et j'appelle à la cessation immédiate des attaques contre les enfants, leurs familles et leurs communautés. Il n'y a absolument aucune justification pour cibler ou utiliser des enfants pour mener des attaques...Je continue d'être profondément préoccupée par le nombre croissant d'attaques contre des civils dans les régions de l'Extrême-nord, du Nord-Ouest et du Sud-Ouest du Cameroun. La montée de la violence a exacerbé une crise humanitaire nationale et on estime aujourd'hui à 3,2 millions le nombre d'enfants dans le besoin à travers le pays »⁶⁹.

(2) Le mouvement des séparatistes⁷⁰ dans le Nord-Ouest et le Sud-Ouest qualifié de « crise anglophone » qui sévit depuis 2016 déjà et dont le but est d'obtenir « l'indépendance » de ces deux régions qui constituent la zone Anglophone du Cameroun. Cette partie du Cameroun serait donc appelée « L'État d'ambazonie ». La zone est donc le théâtre des kidnappings avec demande de rançons, de la fermeture des écoles, de la baisse des activités dans la région, de l'exode des populations dans les autres régions du pays, des affrontements entre l'armée Nationale et celle des sécessionnistes qui causent des morts⁷¹.

(3) Une crise ambiante, pesante ou encore future est celle de l'après Paul Biya qui est le Président du Cameroun depuis 1982. La dernière élection en 2018 ayant créé de vives tensions dans le pays car les fraudes électorales avaient été dénoncées par le 2^{ème} en liste le Professeur Maurice Kamto. Dans un article

⁶⁸ Cameroun : l'UNICEF condamne un attentat suicide qui a tué au moins 15 civils dans le nord du pays, 10 janvier 2021. <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2021/01/1086252>. Consulté le 27/08/2022.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ Caroline Roussy, « Cameroun : aux origines de la crise séparatiste », entretien avec Dr. Christian Pout, 24 février 2020. <https://www.iris-france.org/144623-cameroun-aux-origines-de-la-crise-separatiste/>. Consulté le 26/06/2022.

⁷¹ Franck Foute, « Cameroun : à Bamenda, le spectre de « la sale guerre », envoyé spécial à Bamenda, 14 février 2021. <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1120624/politique/cameroun-a-bamenda-le-spectre-de-la-sale-guerre/>. Consulté le 20/07/2022.

de LACROIX paru le 23 octobre 2018 on peut lire « ...Les avocats de Maurice Kamto avaient dénoncé des « fraudes massives » et des cas présumés d'irrégularités, preuves à l'appui, la semaine dernière devant le Conseil constitutionnel. « Nous utiliserons tous les moyens de droit pour faire rétablir la vérité des urnes », ajoute Maurice Kamto. ...Si le secrétaire général de l'ONU Antonio Guterres a « pris note » des résultats et appelé ce que d'éventuelles contestations électorales suivent « les canaux légaux », le département d'État américain a relevé « un certain nombre d'irrégularités avant, pendant et après le vote du 7 octobre », créant l'impression que l'élection n'était pas crédible ou vraiment libre et équitable »⁷². Tout ce remue-ménage n'avait pas eu raison sur la « force de l'expérience » de son Excellence Paul Biya qui, bien entendu, avait été réélu.

D'une manière générale, la gouvernance en Afrique est à revoir pour un développement effectif du continent. À ce propos, le Prof. Eddy Maloka, Directeur général du Mécanisme Africain d'Évaluation par les Pairs (MAEP) créé en 2003 dont la mission est d'évaluer la démocratie et la gouvernance politique, la gouvernance économique et la gestion, la gouvernance en entreprise et le développement socio-économique, fait savoir dans un article d'Afrique Renouveau en 2018 que « la bonne gouvernance est la solution aux problèmes du continent africain. Les défis en matière de paix et de sécurité traduisent surtout des problèmes de gouvernance, telle la gestion des élections. Même les problèmes liés au terrorisme, à la gestion de la diversité, au développement ont trait à la gouvernance. En Afrique, la bonne gouvernance facilite tout, sinon il y a des blocages. C'est la clé ! La gouvernance judicieuse permettra à l'Afrique d'être reine du siècle »⁷³. Il évoque dans le même article que le MAEP comptait déjà 20 pays évalués à son actif notamment le Mali, le Kenya, le Mozambique, le Sénégal, le Nigéria, le Ghana, l'Afrique du Sud pour ne citer que ceux-là. Au Mali par exemple la situation qui y prévalait avait été

⁷² Présidentielle au Cameroun : Paul Biya réélu sans surprise, *afp*, le 23/10/2018 à 08:05 Modifié le 23/10/2018 à 08:43. <https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Presidentielle-Cameroun-Paul-Biya-reelu-Kamto-dit-toujours-vainqueur-2018-10-23-1300977951>. Consulté le 22/07/2022.

⁷³ Zipporah Musau, « La bonne gouvernance : solution aux problèmes de l'Afrique », entretien avec Prof. Eddy Moloka, *Afrique Renouveau*, Août-Novembre 2018. <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/fr/magazine/ao%C3%BBt-novembre-2018/la-bonne-gouvernance-solution-aux-probl%C3%A8mes-de-l%E2%80%99afrique>. Consulté le 1/08/2022.

prédite dans l'un de ces rapports, mais les recommandations faites n'ayant pas un caractère contraignant, il est possible qu'elles n'eussent pas été prises en compte.

Toutefois, l'un des fléaux qui ne devrait pas être négligé sur le continent africain est celui de la lutte contre la corruption principalement pour ce qui est de l'Afrique subsaharienne en générale et de l'Afrique centrale en particulier. À ce propos, les observations de Transparency International sont alarmantes malgré quelques progrès observés dans certains pays. Par ailleurs, il ressort de son rapport 2020 sur l'indice de la perception de la corruption quatre recommandations à l'encontre des gouvernements surtout au moment de la crise de Covid-19 ; il s'agit de « *renforcer les organes de surveillance ; garantir la transparence de la passation de marchés, défendre la démocratie, promouvoir l'espace civique ; publier les données pertinentes et veiller à garantir leur accès* »⁷⁴.

Toutes ces recommandations étant aussi importantes les unes que les autres, la première recommandation est celle qui, à notre avis, aurait dû être la plus urgente à mettre en application car du contenu de cette recommandation il s'avère que la situation pandémique a mis en exergue les failles dans les organes de surveillance. « Renforcer les organes de surveillance : la réponse à la covid-19 a mis en évidence les faiblesses d'une surveillance médiocre et d'une transparence insuffisante. Pour que les ressources soient effectivement distribuées à ceux qui en ont le plus besoin, et non pas détournées par des personnes corrompues, les autorités de lutte contre la corruption et les organes de surveillance doivent avoir les fonds, les ressources et l'indépendance nécessaires pour remplir leurs fonctions »⁷⁵. Effectivement, ces faiblesses continuent d'être observées quand on sait qu'au Cameroun, au Kenya, au Malawi, en Afrique du Sud etc. des malversations ont été révélées « Le Cameroun n'est certes pas le seul pays africain à être montré du doigt pour sa gestion des fonds Covid⁷⁶. Au Kenya, 21 millions de dollars destinés à l'achat de matériel médical ont ainsi « disparu ». En avril dernier, le président du Malawi annonçait plusieurs arrestations de fonctionnaires ayant détourné

⁷⁴ Indice de perception de la corruption 2020, https://transparency-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/CPI2020_Report_FR-WEB.pdf. Consulté le 24/07/2022.

⁷⁵ Ibid

⁷⁶ Cameroun : HRW veut une enquête sur des "détournements" liés à la Covid-19, 23 avril 2021

<https://fr.africanews.com/2021/04/23/cameroun-hrw-veut-une-enquete-sur-des-detournements-lies-a-la-covid-19/>

quelques 6,5 millions d'euros des fonds destinés à lutter contre le coronavirus. En Afrique du Sud, le terme de « covid preneurs » désigne désormais les « entrepreneurs du Covid » qui ont tiré profit de la gestion de la pandémie dans des conditions illégales »⁷⁷. Des exemples sont légion si bien qu'on en arrive à se demander à quand une prise de conscience patriotique factuelle des pays du Sud.

CONCLUSION

Comparativement au plan Marshall qui a permis à l'Europe de se reconstruire après la deuxième guerre mondiale, l'aide octroyée en Afrique a plutôt un effet inverse car 75% des personnes pauvres dans le monde vivent en Afrique ce qui n'était pas le cas en 1970 ou cette part était de 10%⁷⁸. De plus, selon les prévisions de la banque mondiale, ce taux passera à 90% en 2030⁷⁹.

Cet état de fait à la fois triste et accablant, laisse croire qu'il serait donc difficile qu'un développement véritable se produise si rien n'est fait par les gouvernements africains. Des stratégies et mesures devraient être développées et prises afin que les projets mis en place soient non seulement orientés au bénéfice du bien-être des populations mais aussi qu'un suivi rigoureux soit fait quant à la réalisation desdits projets. La corruption qui gangrène le système camerounais est indubitablement l'un des grands freins à la réalisation des projets car les fonds alloués sont pour la plupart détournés aux fins individuelles au lieu d'être orientés au service du développement de la population. On assiste alors soit à des travaux faits avec des matériaux de mauvaises qualités soit à des travaux inachevés avec des durées de projet différées.

⁷⁷ En Afrique, détournements de fonds Covid et défiance face au vaccin, 02 juin 2021.

<https://lecourrier.ch/2021/06/02/en-afrique-detournements-de-fonds-covid-et-defiance-face-au-vaccin/#:~:text=Au%20Kenya%2C%202021%20millions%20de,%C3%A0%20lutter%20contre%20le%20coronavirus.>

⁷⁸ <https://www.dw.com/fr/aide-au-d%C3%A9veloppement-afrique-%C3%A9chec/a-60565950>

⁷⁹ <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/accelerating-poverty-reduction-in-africa-in-five-charts#:~:text=%20Accelerating%20Poverty%20Reduction%20in%20Africa%3A%20In%20Five,much%20better%20leveraged%20to%20accelerate%20poverty...%20More%20.> Consulté le 17/09/2022.

Il est donc impérieux que les parties concernées – donateurs et bénéficiaires – prennent leur responsabilité au sérieux et s'engagent véritablement à ce que les objectifs de l'aide soient atteints⁸⁰. La partie bénéficiaire ayant la plus haute responsabilité, elle devrait donc, dans le cas du Cameroun par exemple, mettre des dispositifs en place afin de s'assurer que l'aide reçue bénéficie dans un premier temps au développement du capital humain – éducation/formation, santé – et dans un second temps à l'industrialisation et l'aménagement du territoire. La question monétaire pour les pays de la zone franc et celle de la bonne gouvernance sont également évoquées comme des freins à l'émergence des économies africaines.

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⁸⁰ Comme il semble être le cas de l'Union Européenne. V. Sergiu Mișcoiu, Dan Petrica, "The New EU-Africa Relations' Strategy: Soft Power or Neoliberalist Power?", In: Adebowale Akande (ed.), *Politics Between Nations. Contributions to International Relation*, Springer, Cham., 2023, pp. 539-560.

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REGARD SUR LE PANAFRICANISME COMME UN MOUVEMENT SOCIAL

LOOKING AT PAN-AFRICANISM AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

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Abstract

Pan-Africanism is both a project and a political commitment, an idea and an ideal which have largely contributed to the political and intellectual history of contemporary African societies. It is an imprecise term which leads to confusion. It is a word whose meaning varies depending on the individuals who use it. It is often constituted as an ideology, a political theory or even a concept. The question of its scientific definition is therefore almost never decided or discussed, each author making it, according to the needs of his demonstrations or his points of view, either an ideology, a concept, or a political theory. The proposal to include Pan-Africanism through the prism of the theory of social movements in this present study allows us to shed light and make a significant contribution to the history of Pan-Africanism.

Keywords: Pan-Africanism, social movement, political theory

INTRODUCTION

Le panafricanisme reste une thématique d'actualité dans l'Afrique postcoloniale. Il suscite passion, intérêt et/ou engouement dans les débats, dans les opinions publiques, comme chez les intellectuels et leaders politiques africains. Ce concept est ancien. Il est antérieur aux indépendances des États africains. L'appréhender historiquement est une tâche complexe qui pose

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plusieurs défis vue l'évolution de l'idée elle-même qui prit différentes formes depuis sa naissance il y a plusieurs siècles. L'historien franco-béninois Amzat Boukari-Yabara, dans un ouvrage intitulé *Africa Unite ! Une histoire du panafricanisme*, qui consacre une étude sur l'histoire du panafricanisme reconnaît la complexité de ce courant. Il affirme à cet effet : « *le panafricanisme est une énigme historique. Sa date et son lieu de naissance divergent en fonction des critères retenus pour le définir* »¹. Il n'y a pas que sa date et son lieu de naissance qui sont difficiles à établir. Il est aussi tout à fait complexe de déterminer une approche scientifique du panafricanisme. Le terme "panafricanisme"² est utilisé en des sens multiples. Il est souvent compris comme une idéologie, une théorie politique ou encore un concept. La question de sa définition scientifique n'est presque jamais tranchée ou discutée, chaque auteur en faisant, selon les besoins de ses démonstrations ou de son point de vue, soit une idéologie, soit un concept, ou soit encore une théorie politique. Dans cet esprit comment appréhender l'histoire du panafricanisme à partir d'une approche scientifique ? Bien que différentes conceptions du panafricanisme aient été alignées sur des positions politiques et théoriques disparates, il faut reconnaître que le panafricanisme est un ensemble d'hypothèses partagées. Les diverses idées du panafricanisme ont considérablement varié selon le temps et les lieux. La proposition d'inscrire le panafricanisme à travers le prisme de la théorie des mouvements sociaux dans cette présente étude permet d'apporter une lumière et une contribution significative à l'histoire du panafricanisme, un domaine négligé des études africaines.

¹ Amzat Boukari-Yabara, *Africa Unite! Une histoire du panafricanisme*, Paris, La Découverte, 2017, p. 5.

² D'après l'historien Phillippe Decraene, se référant au Dr W.E.B. Dubois c'est en 1900, lors de la première conférence panafricaine que le terme "panafricanisme" a été employé. Cette idée de la première formulation du terme "panafricanisme" est partagée aussi par l'historien P.O. Esedebe. Mais pour l'historien Oruno D. LARA, le terme "panafricanisme" n'a pas été employé au cours des préparatifs, son utilisation ait été attestée avant la conférence de 1900 pour évoquer le comité préparatoire. Le premier document dans lequel on trouve le terme "panafricain" est une lettre datée du 11 novembre 1899, écrite par Sylvester William à J.M Bourne, un membre de l'African Association.

I. LE CHOIX COMPLEXE D'UN CADRE THÉORIQUE D'ANALYSE DU PANAFRICANISME

L'histoire du panafricanisme est une histoire instable. C'est une histoire de circulations, circulation des hommes, circulation des idées, circulation des luttes. Pour la comprendre c'est à travers une démarche méthodique, qui relie entre elles des questions anthropologiques, historiques, sociologiques et structurelles de l'Afrique, ainsi que la nature des liens qui marquent l'Afrique et les peuples africains dans leurs rapports avec le monde³. Trois phases principales marquent l'histoire du panafricanisme. D'abord celle de la naissance qui plonge ses racines dans la lutte contre l'esclavage, qui s'est prolongée jusqu'à la veille de la Première Guerre Mondiale, avec la mort presque simultanée de Sylvester Williams (1911) et de l'idéologue Edward W. Blyden (1912), tous deux originaires de la Caraïbe. Ensuite, celle de la mise en forme de l'idéologie et des programmes, à travers une succession de « congrès » conçus, organisés et conduits par l'intellectuel africain-américain William Edward Burghardt Du Bois. Enfin, à partir du congrès de Manchester en 1945, celle du panafricanisme militant, largement incarnée par le dirigeant ghanéen Kwame Nkrumah⁴.

Plusieurs intellectuels vont essayer d'apporter une définition au panafricanisme. En voici quelques approches. En 1933, dans *The Crisis* William Edward Burghardt Du Bois définit le panafricanisme comme un mouvement qui vise à une compréhension intellectuelle et une coopération entre tous les groupes de « descendance nègre » afin de provoquer le plus tôt possible l'émancipation industrielle et spirituelle des noirs⁵. George Padmore en 1955 définit le panafricanisme comme une manifestation de solidarité fraternelle entre africains et peuples d'ascendance africaine⁶. En 1959, Philippe Decraene voit « le panafricanisme comme une simple manifestation de solidarité fraternelle parmi les noirs d'ascendance africaine des Antilles britanniques et des États-Unis

³ Pour une comparaison avec le phénomène national en Europe, v. Sergiu Mișcoiu, *Naissance de la nation en Europe. Théories classiques et théorisations constructivistes*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2010.

⁴ Recueil de texte de l'Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) sur *l'histoire du mouvement panafricaniste au vingtième siècle*, Dakar, 7-9 octobre 2004, p. 25 .

⁵ William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, *The Crisis* : November 1933, p. 247 .

⁶ Georges Padmore, *Panafricanisme ou communisme? La prochaine lutte pour l'Afrique*, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1960, p. 129 .

d'Amériques⁷». Selon l'historien P.O. Esedebe dans *Panafricanisme : l'idée et le mouvement* (1980) le panafricanisme est défini à ses débuts comme « *mouvement politique et culturel qui considère l'Afrique, les Africains et les descendants d'Africains à l'étranger comme un seul ensemble et qui vise à régénérer et unifier l'Afrique ainsi qu'à encourager un sentiment de solidarité entre les populations du monde africain* »⁸.

Le recueil de texte de la francophonie sur le mouvement panafricain réalisé en 2004 précise que le panafricanisme, est l'expression de la solidarité entre les peuples africains et d'origine africaine et la volonté d'assurer la liberté du continent africain et son développement à l'égal des autres parties du monde. Il est né dans le même contexte historique que d'autres grands mouvements de rassemblement de peuples, comme le panaméricanisme, le panarabisme, le pangermanisme, le panslavisme ou le pantouranisme⁹. Toujours dans le recueil de texte, pour le politologue Samuel Kwadwo Boaten Asante, il faut inclure deux aspects, le panafricanisme en tant que force d'intégration et le panafricanisme en tant que mouvement de libération. Le panafricanisme en tant que force d'intégration visant l'unité ou la coopération politique, culturelle et économique en Afrique¹⁰, et le panafricanisme en tant que mouvement de libération qui est la volonté de lutter contre les puissances coloniales¹¹. Pour l'historien Oruno Lara (2015), « *c'est une idéologie d'origine caribéenne et américaine qui prend racine parmi des intellectuels noirs qui ont l'ambition de combattre le racisme, les préjugés et la discrimination dont étaient victimes leurs communautés* »¹². Selon l'historien Amzat Boukari-Yabara (2017) la définition du panafricanisme varie entre « *un concept philosophique né avec les mouvements émancipateurs et abolitionnistes de la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle, un*

⁷ Phillippe Decraene, *Que sais-je sur le Panafricanisme ?* Presses universitaire de France, Vendôme, 1959, p. 11.

⁸ P. O. Esedebe, *Panafricanisme: l'idée et le mouvement, 1776-1963*, Howard University Press, Washington, 1980, p. 14

⁹ Recueil de texte de l'Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) sur *l'histoire du mouvement panafricaniste au vingtième siècle*, Dakar, 7-9 octobre 2004, p. 25 .

¹⁰ S. K. B. Asante, en collaboration avec David Chanaiwa, « Le panafricanisme et l'intégration régionale », *Recueil de texte de l'Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie*, p. 757 .

¹¹ Edem Kodjo David Chanaiwa, « Panafricanisme et libération », *Recueil de texte de l'Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie*, p. 779 .

¹² Oruno Lana cité par Patrick P. Dramé, *l'Afrique postcoloniale en quête d'intégration, s'unir pour survivre et renaitre*, Québec, les presses de l'université de Montréal, 2017, p. 11 .

*mouvement socio politique développé par les afro-américains et les antillais entre la fin du XIXème siècle et la fin de la seconde Guerre Mondiale, ou une doctrine de l'unité politique formulée par les nationalistes Africains dans le cadre des luttes anticoloniales et indépendantistes*¹³». Nnamdi Azikiwe premier président du Nigéria, dans un article intitulé "L'Avenir du Panafricanisme", *Présence Africaine* 1962/1 fait remarquer que : pour certains, le panafricanisme signifie la recherche d'une personnalité africaine. Pour d'autres, il implique la négritude. Tandis que pour un grand nombre, il s'applique à une situation dans laquelle le continent africain entier est libéré des entraves de la domination étrangère avec ses leaders préparant librement le progrès méthodologique et le bien-être de ses habitants¹⁴.

Il faut noter que le panafricanisme émerge dans le même contexte historique que les grands mouvements de rassemblements de peuples à savoir le panarabisme, le panasiatisme, le pangermanisme le panaméricanisme ou encore du paneuropéanisme. Le panarabisme va faire émerger le concept de nation arabe à la fin du XIXe siècle. C'est une idéologie affirmant la nécessité d'unir le monde arabe et qui donnait naissance après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, à des mouvements politiques et à une éphémère république unie (1958-1961) dominée par l'Égypte de Gamal Abdel Nasser. Le panasiatisme est une doctrine politique ayant pour objectif d'unir les peuples asiatiques et de développer les liens et les solidarités entre eux. Le pangermanisme entend réaliser l'unité politique de l'Allemagne en regroupant autant d'allemands que possible en un seul Etat. Le panaméricanisme, mouvement protéiforme né à la fin du XIXe siècle et postulant une communauté de destin pour les pays du continent américain, naît institutionnellement à Washington en 1889-1890, lors de la Première conférence internationale des États américains¹⁵. C'est un mouvement de solidarité continentale tendant à améliorer et à développer les relations des républiques américaines entre elles. Le panaméricanisme est à l'origine de l'Union panaméricaine (1910), puis de l'Organisation des États américains (1948).

Le paneuropéanisme est pensé à partir des années 1920 par Richard de Coudenhove-Kalergi. Avant de proposer son projet de Pan-Europe, il étudie le panaméricanisme. Pendant la période trouble de l'entre-deux-guerres, marquée

¹³ Amzat Boukari-Yabara, *Africa Unite! Une histoire du panafricanisme*, op.cit. p. 23.

¹⁴ Nnamdi Azikiwe, « L'Avenir du Panafricanisme », *Présence Africaine*, 60-1, 1962. p. 9.

¹⁵ Juliette Dumont, « Le panaméricanisme, creuset et carrefour de l'internationalisme éducatif (1917-1945) » *Dans Relations internationales* 2020/3 (n° 183), p. 114.

par des déchirements entre États européens sur les questions de frontières et des réparations de la guerre, un projet de fédération paneuropéenne paraît être la solution pour Coudenhove-Kalergi. En octobre 1923, à travers la publication de son essai *Pan-Europe*, il présente son projet d'Europe unie, une Europe politiquement et économiquement fusionnée. Le projet une fois réalisé permettra de pacifier le continent et de faire face aux réalités résultant de la guerre. Ces multiples projets à différentes échelles continentales sont une source de motivation pour la réalisation du panafricanisme.

De la diversité des points de vue décrits ci-dessus, il nous apparaît que le panafricanisme est un phénomène inspiré non par une seule idée mais par plusieurs. Formuler une définition n'est pas une chose aisée. Comme le reconnaît P.O. Esedebe, la confusion actuelle sur la définition du panafricanisme découle en grande partie de cette tendance à ne retenir qu'un seul aspect et à le souligner, à l'exclusion de bien d'autres¹⁶.

S'il est difficile d'apporter une définition assez claire du panafricanisme, il est autant complexe de choisir un cadre théorique d'analyse du panafricanisme. Le terme panafricanisme est souvent compris comme une idéologie, une théorie politique ou encore un concept. Il nous revient dans cette présente partie d'apporter quelques précisions. Comment aborder la notion du "panafricanisme" sous un angle scientifique à travers des exigences d'objectivité et de méthode.

II. LE PANAFRICANISME COMME UNE THÉORIE POLITIQUE INACHEVÉE

L'apport, de George Padmore et de Kwame Nkrumah, la nature de leurs œuvres intellectuelles et philosophiques semble faire du panafricanisme une théorie politique et, *de facto*, les théoriciens du panafricanisme. George Padmore défenseur du panafricanisme est conseiller politique de Kwame Nkrumah après l'accession de ce dernier au pouvoir en 1957 et semble avoir été amené à préciser quelque peu sa pensée dans ses ouvrages, particulièrement *panafricanisme ou communisme ?* parue en 1956. Pour lui le panafricanisme dépasse l'État-Nation et implique dans un premier stade la fédération régionale de pays indépendants pour finalement aboutir aux États-Unis de l'ensemble du continent africain. La seule force permettant d'atteindre cet objectif est un

¹⁶ P.O. Esedebe, *op.cit.* p. 127 .

nationalisme dynamique qui donnera naissance à une démocratie et un système économique socialiste.

En effet, mouvement d'émancipation et de libération des noirs de la diaspora au départ, Kwame Nkrumah avec le concours de George Padmore va positionner le panafricanisme sur le plan de l'action politique et sociale, en soutenant que c'est par l'unification que l'Afrique sera libre. Il va concevoir le panafricanisme sur le plan intellectuel et politique comme une théorie de l'émancipation politique et économique des peuples colonisés. Le concept qu'il va développer est celui de "l'unité africaine". Celui-ci appliqué à terme doit permettre la formation des États-Unis d'Afrique, impliquant la fin de la balkanisation du continent¹⁷.

L'indépendance du Ghana acquise, en 1957, Kwame Nkrumah devenu président du Ghana a les mains libres pour appliquer sa théorie contenue plus tard dans ces ouvrages *"Le consciencisme, Philosophie et idéologie pour la décolonisation et le développement, avec une référence particulière à la Révolution africaine"* publié en 1964 et *"L'Afrique doit s'unir"* publié aussi en 1964. Dans le premier, il propose une méthode de libération culturelle et de décolonisation totale qui n'est plus seulement un ensemble de recettes pragmatiques, mais une philosophie et une idéologie¹⁸. Selon l'historien Yves Benot dans l'ouvrage *"L'Afrique doit s'unir"* de Kwame Nkrumah l'argumentaire développé est une « véritable théorie de l'unité africaine¹⁹ » qui est à la fois économique et politique. Ces ouvrages considérés comme des références en pensée panafricaine, correspondent grosso modo aux plans et aux idées de reconstruction économique et la mise en place de mesures de politiques publiques d'incitation sociale, politique et économique en faveur du continent africain. Kwame Nkrumah va s'orienter vers une approche continentaliste du panafricanisme. Avec l'indépendance de la Guinée de Sékou Touré, il s'engage en 1958 dans une union Ghana-Guinée qui se définit comme panafricaniste. Cette union est posée comme le point de départ des États-Unis d'Afrique et prend pour cette raison le nom d'Union des États africains en 1959 avec une vocation à s'élargir

¹⁷ Sergiu Mișcoiu, « Balkan Populisms: The Cases of Bulgaria and Romania », *Southeastern Europe*, vol. 38, no. 1, 2014, pp. 1-24.

¹⁸ Boyon Jacques, Nkrumah (Kwame), « Le consciencisme, Philosophie et idéologie pour la décolonisation et le développement, avec une référence particulière à la Révolution africaine (Consciencism) », *Revue française de science politique*, 16^e année, n°5, 1966. p. 991 . https://www.persee.fr/doc/rfsp_0035-2950_1966_num_16_5_392969_t1_0991_0000_001

¹⁹ Yves Benot, *Idéologies des indépendances africaines*, François Maspero, Paris, 1969, p. 150 .

ultérieurement à d'autres États. L'adhésion du Mali à cette union, en 1961, fait même espérer qu'elle puisse devenir l'embryon des États-Unis d'Afrique. Ces tentatives sont une forme d'exécution des idéaux panafricains qu'il a théorisés dans ces œuvres.

Deux ans après *L'Afrique doit s'unir*, Kwame Nkrumah approfondit son analyse dans un autre ouvrage, dont le titre paraphrase une célèbre formule de Lénine, *Le Néocolonialisme, dernier stade de l'impérialisme*. Ces deux livres d'après le sociologue Saïd Bouamama démontrent que, Nkrumah n'ancre pas l'unité africaine dans un socle culturel ou identitaire mais dans la rationalité économique et politique. En d'autres termes, ce n'est pas un passé plus ou moins mythifié qui fonde l'unité africaine mais une communauté de destin issue des exigences d'une indépendance réelle et orientée vers l'avenir²⁰.

Kwame Nkrumah ne se contente pas seulement de parler de panafricanisme dans ses discours, il agit, conformément à cet idéal. Avec son conseiller des affaires africaines George Padmore, il mène un ensemble d'actions et lance plusieurs tentatives de regroupement avec d'autres États africains. Avec l'indépendance de la Guinée de Sékou Touré, il s'engage en 1958 dans une union Ghana-Guinée. Cette union est posée comme le point de départ des États-Unis d'Afrique et prend pour cette raison le nom d'Union des États africains en 1959 avec une vocation à s'élargir ultérieurement à d'autres États. L'adhésion du Mali à cette union, en 1961, fait même espérer qu'elle puisse devenir l'embryon des États-Unis d'Afrique. En avril 1958, il organise au Ghana la première Conférence panafricaine des pays indépendants de l'Afrique et, en décembre de la même année, la Conférence panafricaine des peuples, démontrant une continuité dans le panafricanisme, prouvant la cohérence entre, la théorie, le discours et la pratique.

Au regard du combat panafricain de Kwame Nkrumah, de sa collaboration avec George Padmore, des actions qu'ils ont mené on est à même de considérer le panafricanisme comme une théorie politique. Le panafricanisme reste toutefois une théorie politique inachevée et non aboutie. Renversé du pouvoir, au Ghana, en 1966 pour cause de problèmes d'ordre politique et économique, Kwame Nkrumah n'eut la possibilité de défendre ses idées. En considération aussi de problèmes d'ordre historiques, de rivalités

²⁰ Bouamama Saïd, *Figures de la révolution africaine : De Kenyatta à Sankara*, Paris, La Découverte, 2017 p. 186 .

politiques et économiques, le desideratum de l'unité politique et économique du continent, en d'autres termes les Etats-Unis d'Afrique ne put se réaliser.

III. LE PANAFRICANISME, UN MOUVEMENT SOCIAL TRANSNATIONAL

La naissance du panafricanisme, son évolution, la promotion et la diffusion internationale des idées panafricaines, le programme de ses membres, leurs activités, leurs modes de financement et de recrutement au cours des décennies, ces réseaux d'influences internationalisés peuvent être analysés à travers le prisme de la théorie des mouvements sociaux. L'étude des mouvements sociaux constitue aujourd'hui un champ bien identifié des sciences sociales, à l'intersection de la science politique, de la sociologie et de l'histoire contemporaine et moderne, avec ses manuels et ses recueils de textes, ses revues, ses sections spécialisées au sein des associations professionnelles de science politique et de sociologie²¹. Les différents travaux sur les mouvements sociaux disponibles dans la littérature sociologique, politique, psychologique, historique mettent l'accent, au gré des auteurs, sur telle ou telle de leurs composantes. Les différentes études sur les mouvements sociaux se développent aux États-Unis au début des années 1970. La constitution de ce secteur de recherche date en France d'une trentaine d'années, mais n'en a pas été extrêmement rapide et fructueux, s'intéressant à des objets et sollicitant les perspectives théoriques des plus diverses. De nombreux concepts et modèles émanent de ce champ de recherche, tous cherchant à justifier la constitution d'un mouvement social ainsi que les raisons qui poussent les individus à participer à un mouvement social.

Divers courants théoriques ont marqué historiquement le champ d'étude des mouvements sociaux. Nous avons l'analyse marxiste. Pour comprendre, interpréter les mouvements sociaux, une bonne appréciation des apports théoriques du marxisme est importante. Karl Marx (1818-1883) a écrit de nombreuses analyses politiques, des textes qui s'attachent à l'analyse des phénomènes collectifs. Dans ces travaux théoriques, études historiques et politiques, il rapporte en effet les activités des mouvements collectifs aux rapports économiques et sociaux qui existent entre les classes, les luttes politiques et l'évolution historique. Il reprend l'expression de mouvement

²¹ Éric Agrikoliansky, Isabelle Sommier, Olivier Fillieule, *Penser les mouvements sociaux. Conflits sociaux et contestations dans les sociétés contemporaines*, Paris, La Découverte, 2010, p. 7.

social forgée par Charles Fourier dans la *Théorie des quatre mouvements* (1808)²². Dans le *Manifeste du parti communiste* (1848), co-écrit avec Friedrich Engels, il expose les différentes phases du mouvement ouvrier qu'il appréhende comme un mouvement social. Les écrits de Karl Marx fournissent des outils conceptuels importants dans l'analyse et la compréhension des mouvements sociaux. L'histoire des théories des mouvements sociaux remontent aussi aux théories des sociologues et psychologues français Gabriel Tarde ou Gustave Le Bon, pionniers de la psychologie des foules. Gustave Le Bon, publie *Psychologie des foules* en 1895 et Gabriel Tarde *L'opinion et la foule* en 1889. Les sociologues, et notamment la première école de Chicago, vont peu à peu s'intéresser à l'action collective, cherchant plus précisément les motifs réels d'engagement des individus. A la suite notamment de Charles Tilly et d'Anthony Oberschall, accompagnée des recherches de Sidney Tarrow, de Doug Mc Adam et de John Mc Carthy, se constitue la théorie de la mobilisation des ressources. Elle considère le mouvement social comme un ensemble de conduites rationnelles, instrumentales, par lesquelles un acteur collectif tente de s'installer au niveau d'un système politique, de s'y maintenir, d'y étendre son influence en mobilisant des ressources qui peuvent inclure la violence.

Divers travaux sont considérés comme piliers en matière d'études des mouvements sociaux. Mancur Olson (*The logic of collective action*, 1966), James Buchanan, Gary Becker, Ronald Inglehart (*The Silent Revolution*, 1977), C. Tilly, Michel Offerlé (..) mènent des travaux sur les comportements collectifs. William Kornhauser est à l'origine de la théorie de la société de masse. Erving Goffman expose la théorie des cadres. Mc Adam (1988), Daniel Gaxie (*Économie du parti et rétribution du militantisme* 1977), travaillent sur le militantisme. Peter Elsinger, Sydney Tarrow, Olivier Fillieule, Lilian Mathieu, travaillent sur les structures des opportunités politiques. Certains contextes politiques peuvent favoriser l'émergence de mouvements sociaux ou d'actions collectives. V. Taylor et N. Whitter (1992), M. Berstein étudient les dimensions identitaires des mouvements sociaux. John Mc Carthy et Mayer Zal, Anthony Oberschall et Charles Tilly travaillent sur la mobilisation des ressources. Ils vont s'intéresser notamment aux structures de mobilisation et aux liens que les organisations entretiennent entre elles et avec l'environnement.

²² René Mouriaux, « Analyse marxiste », *Dans Dictionnaire des mouvements sociaux* (2009), p. 62.

Dans un sens général, « les mouvements sociaux désignent un ensemble de mobilisations et d'actions collectives concertées en faveur d'une cause, combinant l'utilisation de techniques de protestation, un travail de revendication sociale à l'égard des autorités en place et la défense d'une conception de la juste répartition des biens désirables au sein d'une société²³ ». Les mouvements sociaux sont d'importantes mobilisations qui réunissent des individus en vue de faire valoir des objectifs communs, voire de contester une situation donnée. Ils ont recours, le plus souvent, à des manifestations, des grève, des formes de participation politique conventionnelles ou non conventionnelles, à visée contestataire. Une première composante fondamentale d'un mouvement social est sa dimension collective, soulignée dans la quasi-totalité des définitions²⁴ et qui explique que la notion d'action collective soit généralement utilisée en synonyme de mouvement social. Et, de fait, les phénomènes de révolte individuelle, c'est-à-dire déconnectée de tout support ou cadre collectif, sont laissés de côté par la sociologie des mouvements sociaux²⁵. C'est autour de fins partagées ou de projets communs que des individus en viennent à coordonner leur action dans un même mouvement social. À ce titre, John McCarthy et Mayer Zald proposent une définition des mouvements sociaux. Pour eux, il s'agit d'un ensemble d'opinions ou de croyances communes à une population qui exprime des préférences pour le changement de certains éléments de la structure sociale et/ou de la distribution des récompenses dans la société. Pour Herbert Blumer il y voit des entreprises collectives visant à établir un nouvel ordre de vie²⁶. Le recours à l'action collective comporte en effet une dimension conflictuelle, une relation d'opposition, d'antagonisme et de confrontation avec un adversaire plus ou moins clairement identifié.

En analysant la théorie des mouvements sociaux, on ne peut s'empêcher de se référer aux travaux d'Alain Touraine qui propose un cadre théorique d'analyse des changements sociaux. Il est en France l'un des premiers sociologues à travailler sur les mouvements sociaux. Dans *Production de la*

²³ Nay Olivier, *lexique de science politique, vie et institutions politiques, troisième édition Dalloz, 2014*, p. 362 .

²⁴Pour Erik Neveu, par exemple, il s'agit d'un « un agir-ensemble intentionnel » (1996, p. 10); pour François Chazel, d'une « entreprise collective de protestation et de contestation », 1992, p. 268 .

²⁵Lilian Mathieu, *Comment lutter ? Sociologie et mouvements sociaux*, Les éditions Textuel, Paris, 2004, p. 17 .

²⁶ *Idem*, p. 24 .

société (1973), Alain Touraine insiste sur "l'historicité" des mouvements sociaux. Pour lui, toute société est caractérisée par un système d'action historique. Pour comprendre les mouvements sociaux, il faut prendre en compte les contenus idéologiques, les dimensions de solidarités et d'hostilité à l'égard de l'adversaire. L'historicité est le concept central de l'approche de Touraine car une société ne repose ni sur ses ressources matérielles, ni sur l'idéologie, mais sur son historicité. Touraine se démarque du courant marxiste, car dans son analyse du changement social, les luttes sociales qui caractérisent les mouvements sociaux s'articulent non pas autour de la production économique, mais autour de l'historicité, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des valeurs, ressources sociales et orientations culturelles d'une société. Il définit les mouvements sociaux comme « *l'action conflictuelle d'agents des classes sociales luttant pour le contrôle du système d'action historique*²⁷ », plus loin comme « *un affrontement d'intérêts opposés pour le contrôle des forces de développement et du champ d'expérience historique d'une société*²⁸ ». Le mouvement social est une action collective des individus en vue d'un changement social ; cette action est destinée à contrôler les orientations sociales de leur environnement. C'est le dépassement du mouvement contestataire du groupe, et la mise en cause du pouvoir et de sa domination. Prenant l'exemple du mouvement ouvrier, celui-ci n'est qu'un mouvement social selon lui que si, au-delà des revendications contre les crises de l'organisation sociale et des pressions pour la négociation, il met en cause la domination de la classe dirigeante²⁹.

Alain Touraine attire donc l'attention sur deux notions que sont l'action sociale (relative aux acteurs) et les mouvements sociaux (qui concernent leur changement). A partir de ces notions, il définit les faits sociaux par l'objet de leur action, et par la signification que les acteurs lui donnent. Il énonce trois principes nécessaires à l'analyse d'un mouvement social. « *Un mouvement social est la combinaison d'un principe d'identité, d'un principe d'opposition et d'un principe de totalité (...)*³⁰ ». Pour être considéré comme un mouvement social, le phénomène doit reposer sur les trois principes : *un principe d'identité* (c'est à dire qui lutte ?), *un principe d'opposition* (c'est à dire qui est l'adversaire ?), et *un principe de totalité* (c'est à dire pourquoi lutter ?)³¹.

²⁷ Alain Touraine, *Production de la société*, Edition du Seuil, Paris, 1973, p. 307 .

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 323 .

²⁹ *Ibidem*

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 324 .

³¹ *Ibidem*

Le principe d'identité est la définition de l'acteur par lui-même. Un mouvement social ne peut s'organiser que si cette définition est consciente, mais la formation du mouvement précède largement cette conscience. C'est le conflit qui constitue et organise l'acteur. Ce qui est du *principe d'opposition*, un mouvement ne s'organise que s'il peut nommer son adversaire, mais son action ne présuppose pas cette identification. Le conflit fait surgir l'adversaire, forme de conscience des acteurs en présence. *Le principe de totalité* n'est rien d'autre que le système d'action historique dont les adversaires, situés dans la double dialectique des classes sociales, se disputent la domination³².

Analysons le panafricanisme au regard des trois principes qui selon Alain Touraine permettent de parvenir à un statut de changement social. Ces trois principes sont abordés simultanément selon les trois phases principales du panafricanisme.

La première phase du panafricanisme qui se situe entre le XVIIIème siècle et le début du XIXe siècle est marquée par une résistance à l'esclavage mené par les peuples d'ascendance africaine (*principe d'identité*) sur le continent africain ou résidant dans les Amériques, les Caraïbes et en Europe. Les meilleurs combattants contre l'esclavage sont les esclaves eux-mêmes. Par leur résistance, ils lutteront continuellement contre les puissances négrières et le système esclavagiste (*principe d'opposition*), jusqu'à le rendre fragile et finalement obtenir l'abolition de l'esclavage (*principe de totalité*).

La seconde phase du panafricanisme qui se situe entre le début du XIXe siècle, le congrès de Manchester en 1945 et les années d'indépendance 1960 est marquée par des luttes anticolonialistes et indépendantistes mené par les noirs d'Afrique et de la diaspora (*principe d'identité*). Ces luttes sont menées contre les puissances coloniales (*principe d'opposition*) pour la revalorisation de l'Afrique, la libération du continent et l'obtention des indépendances pour tous ces territoires (*principe de totalité*).

La troisième phase du panafricanisme celle qui commence à partir du congrès de Manchester en 1945 est incarnée par les militants nationalistes africains (*principe d'identité*). Ces derniers s'opposent aux puissances coloniales et à leurs agents locaux (*principe d'opposition*) et prônent la nécessité de l'unité des Africains à tous les niveaux, économique, culturel, politique et diplomatique en sorte d'aboutir à la formation des Etats-Unis d'Afrique (*principe de totalité*).

³² *Ibidem*, p. 324 à 327 .

Un mouvement social ne se limite pas à une mobilisation ou à un événement isolé. Il prend forme en général dans une combinaison et/ou une succession de mobilisations et d'événements³³. Ce qui est le cas du panafricanisme. Les principaux acteurs du panafricanisme vont organiser des conférences, des congrès et des festivals favorisant la diffusion des idées panafricaines. De nombreuses publications d'articles et d'ouvrages seront destinées aussi à cette fin. Le panafricanisme reste donc un mouvement social. Il a connu une dimension transnationale. Historiquement, culturellement et socialement le mouvement a formé une résistance englobant les peuples noirs des deux rives de l'Atlantique. De ses origines en tant que mouvement de protestation initié par les descendants d'Africains déportés outre-Atlantique, il va se développer à travers les Amériques, l'Europe et l'Afrique, avec le projet d'unir tous les noirs en un réseau de solidarité pour mettre fin à l'oppression. Le mouvement a fait l'objet de glissements discursifs et géographiques tout au long du XIX et du XXe siècle. C'est le moteur de mouvements de libération anticoloniaux ou le motif d'une solidarité entre États indépendants d'Afrique soucieux de leur intégrité territoriale. La circulation internationale des idées panafricaines a permis des engagements et des actions à travers plusieurs continents et ceci sous multiples formes : institutionnelles, militantes, élitistes, populaires, artistiques, politiques, économiques (...).

IV. LA DIMENSION CULTURELLE ET POLITIQUE DU PANAFRICANISME

Le panafricanisme en tant que mouvement social transnational comporte deux dimensions: une dimension culturelle et une dimension politique. Il s'est développé au sein du panafricanisme, des courants littéraires et culturels et une émergence des organisations politiques panafricanistes. Tous ces éléments ont eu des proportions transatlantiques. Le mouvement social qu'est le panafricanisme est un mouvement social à la fois culturel et politique. De nombreux intellectuels noirs, par leurs écrits et leurs actions ont su, petit à petit, faire émerger les bases d'un panafricanisme culturel fondé sur un certain nombre de valeurs et principes. Une série d'organisations et de conférences panafricanistes et d'activités commerciales, littéraires et culturelles mirent les Africains en contact avec des noirs américains et contribuèrent à influencer sur l'évolution de la dimension culturelle du panafricanisme.

³³ Nay Olivier, *op.cit.* p. 362.

Plusieurs personnalités jouèrent, par leur action, un rôle prépondérant dans le développement d'un panafricanisme culturel. Nous avons Booker T. Washington, fondateur et directeur de l'Institut de Tuskegee, établissement d'enseignement qui servit de modèle à de nombreuses communautés d'Afrique et des Caraïbes ; le docteur William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, qui, en tant que rédacteur en chef de la revue *Crisis* et « père » du Mouvement des congrès panafricains³⁴, fit de l'Afrique un champ d'action subsidiaire de la National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) ; Marcus Garvey, utilisa son Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League (UNIA) non seulement pour susciter un mouvement d'émigration, mais aussi pour promouvoir la solidarité, sur le plan institutionnel ou politique, entre tous les peuples d'ascendance africaine ; Aimé Césaire qui (de concert avec d'autres Noirs des Caraïbes tels que Léon Damas, de Cayenne, Jean Price-Mars, d'Haïti, et le poète et homme politique sénégalais Léopold Sédar Senghor) lança, surtout dans le monde noir francophone, le concept de négritude, variante culturelle du panafricanisme en tant que conscience collective des Noirs³⁵. Nous pouvons citer également la revue *Présence Africaine*. Une revue créée par un africain résident en France, Alioune Diop avec la collaboration d'africains, d'afro-descendants et de quelques occidentaux. La revue est spécialisée sur "la culture africaine". Elle consacre de nombreux articles sur le sujet³⁶. Ainsi plusieurs aspects de la culture : la littérature, la musique, la danse, la poésie, la peinture la photographie (...) vont être revisités par des artistes noirs qui prennent des positions avant-gardistes et engagées dans la revalorisation de leur identité culturelle. *Présence Africaine* est donc la revue engagée pour la cause noire et œuvrera pour la reconnaissance de l'homme noir³⁷. La dimension culturelle reste un aspect

³⁴ L. Hanga Golden, Ov. Melikian « Une figure scientifique et publique : William E. B. Du Bois », *Présence Africaine*, 1966/4 N° 60 | p. 77 .

³⁵ *Histoire Générale de l'Afrique VII (l'Afrique sous domination coloniale 1880-1935)*, p. 821 .

³⁶ Pour ne citer que : Le monde noir 1950/1-2 (N° 8-9), L'art nègre 1951/1-2 (N° 10-11), Le travail en Afrique noire 1952/1 (N° 13), Aspects de la spiritualité africaine 1958/1, Hier Gold Coast, aujourd'hui Ghana 1957/1 (N° XII) axé sur Kwame Nkrumah et l'indépendance au Ghana, L'homme de culture noir et son peuple 1957/5 (N° XVI).

³⁷ Ngengi Mundele Albert, « Néhémie et Alioune Diop : leadership d'engagement pour l'Afrique d'aujourd'hui », *Présence Africaine*, 2017/1 N° 195-196, p. 637 .
<https://www.cairn.info/revue-presence-africaine-2017-1-page-637.htm>

majeur du panafricanisme. Le panafricanisme reste avant tout un mouvement culturel.

En ce qui concerne la dimension politique du panafricanisme, à partir du congrès de Manchester en 1945, le panafricanisme entre dans une nouvelle phase, une phase plus militante, une sorte de maturation. En effet, une série d'évènements vont renforcer la dimension politique du panafricanisme. Nous sommes au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le processus d'émancipation des territoires coloniaux va émerger vis-à-vis des métropoles colonisatrices. La contribution de l'Afrique comme soutien aux métropoles pendant la guerre disqualifie un certain racisme colonial et éveille chez les colonisés la conscience de leurs droits. Le vent de changement commence à souffler particulièrement depuis les années 1945. L'ONU offre très vite une tribune aux revendications fondées sur le droit des peuples à l'autodétermination. L'indépendance de l'Inde en 1947, la défaite de Dien Bien Phu en 1954, la conférence de Bandoeng en 1955, l'échec franco-britannique à Suez en 1956 mettent en cause la survie du colonialisme en Afrique. Les notions de "tiers monde" et de "sous-développement" émergent, posant la question de l'égalité à l'échelle mondiale. L'église plaide dès 1954 en faveur de "l'autonomie politique des peuples coloniaux"³⁸. Ces aspirations trouvent un écho auprès des milieux intellectuels africains. Le premier Congrès des écrivains et artistes noirs est organisé en 1956 à Paris, dont Du Bois, George Padmore pères du panafricanisme sont invité³⁹. L'anticolonialisme développé par des marxistes et des chrétiens de gauche en France inspirent notamment la fédération des étudiants africains noirs de France (FEANF). Cette fédération est fondée en 1950, elle sera le vivier de futurs cadres et d'hommes politiques en Afrique⁴⁰.

Les intellectuels africains vont jouer un rôle non négligeable, à la fois dans les métropoles et sur le terrain. Ils invoquent les principes démocratiques occidentaux contre le maintien du statut colonial et donnent une impulsion décisive à la mobilisation politique dans leurs pays respectif. Les peuples colonisés gagnent en instruction et dans certains pays cherchent à s'organiser. A partir des années 1950, une volonté de construction d'une identité politique va

³⁸ Chrétien Jean-Pierre, « Indépendance de l'Afrique francophone », *Francearchives*, 2015, p. 5 .

³⁹ « Messages », *Présence Africaine*, 1956/3 N° VIII-IX-X |, p. 383 .

<https://www.cairn.info/revue-presence-africaine-1956-3-page-379.htm>

⁴⁰ Amady Aly Dieng, *Les premiers pas de la Fédération des étudiants d'Afrique Noire en France (FEANF) 1950-1955 de l'Union Française à Bandung*, Paris, l'Harmattan, 2003, p. 7 .

affleurer de plus en plus. Les mouvements nationalistes émergent. Les grandes figures clivantes de la décolonisation (Senghor, Nkrumah, etc..) entrent en scène et des partis nationalistes sont fondés. C'est au nom des valeurs que l'occident leur a enseignées (la liberté, égalité, démocratie, etc..) que ces mouvements recrutent et gagnent en influence. Les partis nationalistes, vont réclamer l'autonomie ou la fin de la tutelle à l'image du Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) de Félix Houphouët-Boigny (premier président de la Côte d'Ivoire) fondé en 1946. Ces années de luttes vont être couronnées par les indépendances. Certains pays acquièrent leur indépendance (période allant de 1957 à 1965) plus rapidement que d'autres qui doivent l'arracher au prix de guerres longues et meurtrières. Les indépendances acquises plusieurs problématiques se posent. Comment organiser un nouvel État ? Que faire des frontières héritées de la colonisation ? Quelles relations entretenir avec les anciens colons ?

Les chefs des nouveaux États africains croient à une possible identité politique de leur pays et de leur continent. Ils pensent que pour faire entrer l'Afrique dans la modernité, il leur faut trouver une identité politique⁴¹. La recherche de l'identité politique va se faire à travers le courant du panafricanisme. Tour à tour, les personnalités politiques qui ont conduit leurs pays à l'émancipation totale revendiquent un " leadership " africain. On peut citer Kwame Nkrumah, leader du Ghana, Sékou Touré, président de la République de Guinée et bien d'autres. Ces leaders africains vont trouver une nécessité de mutualiser les efforts et de créer de nouvelles solidarités continentales. Un projet de réalisation d'un Etat fédéral africain (Etats-Unis d'Afrique) va être une option. Il est longuement soutenu par Kwame Nkrumah. Ledit projet constituera un échec vu les divergences. Néanmoins, en 1963, à Addis-Abeba (Ethiopie), trente Chefs d'États africains et de gouvernements se rencontrent pour fonder une organisation qui doit donner une impulsion politique au continent. L'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine (OUA) est créée. Elle naît dans l'optique de permettre aux pays africains de peser sur la scène internationale en parlant d'une seule⁴². L'OUA marque un

⁴¹ V. aussi Sergiu Mișcoiu, « Du récit des conflits au conflit des récits : Raconter les politiques conflictuelles en Afrique », in : Simona Jișa, Sergiu Mișcoiu et Modibo Diarra (dir.), *Raconter les politiques conflictuelles en Afrique. Regards croisés*, Paris, Editions du Cerf, 2021, pp. 7-22.

⁴² Mamoudou Gazibo, *Introduction à la politique africaine*, Québec, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2006, p. 234 .

tournant décisif dans la construction de l'histoire politique africaine, de facto l'histoire de la construction du panafricanisme qui reste avant tout un mouvement politique.

CONCLUSION

Appréhender scientifiquement le panafricanisme n'est pas chose aisée. À la suite de cette étude, nous avons passé en revue les différentes définitions et conceptions du panafricanisme. Plusieurs intellectuels ont chacun à leur manière, contribué à la construction du panafricanisme. Du point de vue scientifique, le panafricanisme peut être appréhendé à partir de la théorie des mouvements sociaux. La théorie des mouvements sociaux reste un cadre idéal d'analyse du panafricanisme. Le panafricanisme est donc un mouvement social. Un mouvement social avec une dimension culturelle et une dimension politique.

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EUROPEAN UNION ENERGY POLICY ON THE EXTERNAL MARKET: TOOLS AND OPPORTUNITIES. CASE STUDY: EU'S ENERGY RELATIONS WITH THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO

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Abstract

Energy-related issues occupy a central place on the political agenda of the European Union, so it is no wonder that several studies in the field of international relations focus on this EU policy. However, most of them tend to follow the subject from the perspective of the Union's need to cover its energy deficit by identifying new sources of supply, neglecting the issue of promoting sustainable development at the level of its foreign policy. Starting from these considerations, the present study aims to analyse the energy cooperation between the Union and the Kingdom of Morocco, following the instruments through which European officials try to boost renewable energy projects. The research will also highlight the opportunities in terms of achieving the foreign policy objective previously exposed, within the bilateral dynamics between the two actors. In order to assure a comprehensive analysis of the subject, the research will be conducted based on Robert Keohane theories regarding cooperation and international institutions.

Keywords: *European Union, Morocco, energy, policy, strategy.*

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INTRODUCTION

The European Union has assumed an increasingly important role internationally through its foreign policy, mainly based on elements of soft power. The central position occupied by the EU on a global scale cannot be contested considering the value of its gross domestic product and the diplomatic instruments through which it has strengthened its relations with other actors. For these reasons, the Union is a key element in promoting the transition to the use of forms of sustainable energy worldwide. Starting from the above considerations, the importance of analysing the way in which the EU tries to promote its energy policy goals externally, as well as the opportunities for such an approach, becomes clear.

The literature that focuses on the EU external energy market is extensive since the scientific approaches on the subject were driven by the recent events in Eastern Europe that put European officials in a position to speed up the process of diversifying supply sources to reduce energy dependencies on the Russian Federation. However, there was a tendency to neglect the other EU's foreign policy interests in this area, such as encouraging sustainable development. Thus, the analysis of the relations between the Union and an actor like Morocco, which does not represent a possible source of supply (in terms of resources such as oil and natural gas), can constitute an element of innovation at the level of research in the field of international relations.

The present study therefore follows the energy dynamics between the European Union and Morocco, in order to find an answer to the following questions: 1. What are the instruments through which European officials try to boost renewable energy projects on the external market? and 2. What are the opportunities in terms of achieving the foreign policy objective previously exposed?

In order to ensure a comprehensive research of the subject, three main themes will be pursued:

(I) First of all, we must consider what are the energy objectives of the European Union on the external market, as well as the correlation between the energy policy and other policies of the actor. In other words, the energy issue covers several areas of competence of the EU, and it is not enough to focus strictly on the area in question. Thus, the first part of the study will also cover environmental and foreign policy, both of which are closely related to energy strategy.

(II) Secondly, in order to be able to identify the opportunities regarding the promotion of these objectives in the relationship with the Kingdom of Morocco, it is necessary to see what are the energy characteristics of the state, respectively (1) the availability of raw materials, (2) the energy project opportunities ' determined by the geographical factors of the country and (3) the actor's energy policies.

(III) Finally, the instruments and methods by which the Union sustains renewable energy development projects at the level of relations with Morocco will be followed. In this sense, both multilateral partnerships between the European Union and the countries of the Maghreb region (such as Union for the Mediterranean), as well as the steps taken at the level of bilateral relations of the two actors, will be taken into account.

METHODOLOGY

In order to find an answer to the two questions mentioned above, in the paper I turned, from a methodological point of view to the case study. Even though there is no generally accepted definition of this tool, the case study can be understood as an intensive analysis of a person, a group of people or a unit¹ which allows the researcher to elaborate hypotheses that can be further explored in other research². Thus, the case study starts from studying a particular phenomenon in order to formulate ideas that can be applied to understand other similar issues.

The sources of documentation used in the present research can be divided into two main categories: primary and secondary. In the case of the former, these include a series of official documents and sources that provided the necessary information for analysing the relationship between the two actors. This covers the websites and descriptive sheets of the European Union from which data on relevant policies for this study were extracted. In addition, platforms that ensure transparency of EU initiatives and expenses (such as the Union for the Mediterranean website) provided a good starting point for analysing the Union's promotion of renewable energy on the external market.

¹ Roberta Heale, Alison Twycross, "What is a case study?", *Evidence-based nursing*, no.1, 2018, pp. 7-8.

² Kendra Cherry, *What is a case study?*, 2022, [<https://www.verywellmind.com/how-to-write-a-psychology-case-study-2795722>], 28 July 2023.

Moreover, in order to gather data on Morocco's interest in renewable energy issues, documents issued by authorities with responsibilities in the field, such as the Moroccan Agency for Energy Efficiency (AMEE), the National Office of Electricity and Drinking Water (ONEE), the National Federation of Electricity and Renewable Energies (FENELEC), and The Research Institute for Solar Energy and New Energies (IRESEN) were used. Additionally, to gain an overview of the energy characteristics of the Kingdom, analyses conducted by several government institutions (USA International Trade Administration), international associations (International Hydropower Association (IHA)), and research institutions (Oxford Business Group) were followed.

Last but not least, press articles written by journalists working for reputable media companies (such as the BBC) helped to extensively document Morocco's efforts in developing solar, hydraulic and wind energy projects, as well as the financial contribution of the European Union for their implementation.

The secondary sources include the research works in the fields of international relations, energy policy and foreign policy, relevant for the present article.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Before starting to apply the chosen structure, it is necessary to define the theoretical issues which stay at the basis of the analysis. In this regard, Robert Keohane's perspective on the concepts of cooperation and international institutions provides a solid starting point for this research.

Basically, the researcher embraces the neorealist idea of an anarchic international system, which results in the impossibility of achieving harmony among actors on the global stage. However, according to Keohane, anarchy does not preclude the possibility of cooperation, which occurs when actors identify common interests. More precisely, he argues that actors tend to cooperate in order to attain greater benefits than they would achieve by acting independently³. Taking this into account, it can be asserted that interdependencies among actors in terms of the pursuit of their interests have a beneficial effect on cooperation. Furthermore, interdependencies can,

³ Robert O Keohane, *After Hegemony - Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 53.

in turn, be intensified through the means of international institutions⁴ like treaties, bilateral agreements, international organisations, conventions, partnerships, and agreements⁵.

Thus, the idea behind the choice of the structure outlined in the methodological segment becomes clearer: essentially, the first and second parts of the analysis assist us in comprehending the interests of the two actors concerning sustainable development, which forms the basis for identifying collaboration opportunities. The final part focuses on international institutions that facilitate the positive relations between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco in the energy area.

CORRELATION BETWEEN ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL AND FOREIGN POLICY

The logical beginning of this scientific approach consists in exposing the energy policy goals of the European Union. In this regard, the official website of the European Parliament provides a concise presentation of the Union's interests in the energy field, which can be summarised in the following five points:

“(I) Diversify Europe’s sources of energy, ensuring energy security through solidarity and cooperation between EU countries; (II) ensure the functioning of a fully integrated internal energy market, enabling the free flow of energy through the EU through adequate infrastructure and without technical or regulatory barriers; (III) improve energy efficiency and reduce dependence on energy imports, cut emissions, and drive jobs and growth; (IV) decarbonise the economy and move towards a low-carbon economy in line with the Paris Agreement; (V) promote research in low-carbon and clean energy technologies, and prioritise research and innovation to drive the energy transition and improve competitiveness⁶.”

The objectives set out above can be classified into two main categories: one includes the first three points, considering the issue of ensuring the energy needed by the Union, or, in other words, the energy security. The latter fall into the second category, that of sustainable development and decarbonization of

⁴ *Op. Cit.*, p. 215.

⁵ John Duffield, “What are International Institutions?”, *International Studies Review*, nr. 9, 2007, pp. 1-22.

⁶ *Energy policy: general principles*, 2022, [<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/68/energy-policy-general-principles>], 17 June 2023.

the economy. Thus, the connection between energy and environmental policies is obvious, especially considering the fact that, as stated in the General Union Environment Action Program to 2030, the EU aims to speed up the transition to a climate-neutral, resource-efficient economy⁷. Moreover, one of the climate actions identified within the European Green Deal involves encouraging sustainable industry as a key element of the green transition⁸.

However, addressing climate issues through the green economy is not merely an aspiration achievable solely through regional measures; it requires a global approach. Indeed, as researchers Sebastian Oberthür, Claire Dupont, and Javier Cifuentes-Faura assert and demonstrate, EU climate policies have progressively become a source of inspiration for other actors⁹. Still, being a model of sustainable development is not enough to comprehensively address the green transition on an international level, as most states and organisations do not have the resources of the Union. For this very reason, the EU has taken on the role of a global leader in climate strategy¹⁰, through its external policy instruments. In this context, three main factors influence the success of achieving energy objectives: (1) the consistency and specificity of the external energy policy and its goals and interests; (2) the diplomatic apparatus and policy tools; and (3) external recognition of the EU energy actorness by third parties¹¹. The first two, as will be presented in the final part of the analysis, are closely interconnected since energy market interests are pursued through a series of diplomatic instruments created to foster positive relations between the European Union and other actors. Regarding the last factor, it is necessary to mention one aspect: the energy characteristics of the Kingdom of Morocco, as well as the vision of Moroccan officials regarding the advantages of developing an economy based on sustainable energy, strongly influence how the Kingdom

⁷ *Environment action programme to 2030*, 2022, [https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/environment-action-programme-2030_en, 17] June 2023.

⁸ *European Green Deal*, 2020, [<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/european-green-deal.html>], 19 June 2023.

⁹ Sebastian Oberthür, Claire Dupont, "The European Union's international climate leadership: towards a grand climate strategy?", in *Journal of European Public Policy*, no.7, 2021, pp. 1095-1114.

¹⁰ Javier Cifuentes-Faura, "European Union policies and their role in combating climate change over the years", in *Air Quality, Atmosphere & Health*, no. 8, 2022, pp. 1333-1340.

¹¹ Luka Tichy, Zbyněk Dubský, Jan Mazač, "The external energy actorness of the EU towards Egypt", in *Energy Strategy Reviews*, 2021, pp. 1-11.

perceives the energy opportunities arising from cooperation with the Union. Hence, the aforementioned matters shall form the focal themes analysed in the next section.

MOROCCO ENERGY CHARACTERISTICS

According to data retrieved from the official website of the International Trade Administration, Morocco's energy sector is heavily reliant on imported hydrocarbons¹². The matter at hand highlights the inadequacy of resources required to meet the energy demand within the state's territory, as well as the necessity for implementing renewable energy projects. In this regard, the country's geographic positioning in a Mediterranean climate zone represents an opportunity for the development of wind and solar energy. Furthermore, according to the 2018 Hydropower Status Report developed by the International Hydropower Association, Morocco possesses significant potential to enhance its hydropower storage capacity and bolster its green energy production¹³.

Moreover, Moroccan officials have consistently demonstrated openness to investments in the three aforementioned areas, as the state's renewable energy objectives are the most ambitious in the region¹⁴. The validity of this statement is supported by a series of factors. Firstly, Morocco developed the first wind farm in Africa in the late 1990s in the El Koudia El Beida area. Additionally, the country has made substantial investments in the Noor-Ouarzazate Complex, which stands as the largest solar power plant in the world. Also, Morocco boasts 26 hydropower stations with a combined capacity of 1360 MW, including Al Wahda, the second-largest dam in Africa¹⁵. The positive impact of these achievements becomes evident when examining the most recent data on the state's energy production. In 2021, the share of hydroelectricity reached 16.14%, wind accounted for 13.37%, and solar

¹² *Morocco - Country Commercial Guide*, 2022, [<https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/morocco-energy#:~:text=At%20present%2C%20Morocco%20has%20an,wind%20and%201.3%20from%20hydropower>], 20 June 2023.

¹³ *Country profile-Morocco*, 2018, [<https://www.hydropower.org/country-profiles/Morocco>], 20 June 2018.

¹⁴ Michael Hochberg, "Renewable energy growth in Morocco: an example for the region renewable energy growth in Morocco", *Middle East Institute*, 2016, pp.1-8.

¹⁵ Aida Alami, *How Morocco went big on solar energy*, 2019, [<https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20211115-how-morocco-led-the-world-on-clean-solar-energy>], 23 June 2023.

contributed 7.58% to the overall energy production in Morocco¹⁶. In other words, starting from the year 2021, renewable energy began to represent a quarter of the total energy produced in the Kingdom.

Secondly, there is a series of evidence suggesting that investments in sustainable development will continue, given that as early as 2009, Moroccan officials aimed at increasing the share of renewable energies in the national energy network 42 percent by 2030¹⁷. In addition to this fact, a study conducted by the Autonomous University of Madrid revealed that the state's endeavours in the discussed field will have a strong positive impact on the GDP and employment in the long term¹⁸.

The last but not least aspect that must be discussed is related to how the state manages sustainable development projects with the support of institutions responsible for this domain. Two such institutions are the Moroccan Agency for Energy Efficiency (AMEE) and the National Office of Electricity and Drinking Water (ONEE), both of which are tasked with overseeing the implementation of government policies. More specifically, AMEE has the role of supporting state projects aimed at reducing energy dependence through the promotion of energy efficiency¹⁹, while ONEE is responsible for managing the distribution networks of electrical and hydraulic resources.²⁰ In addition to these, the National Federation of Electricity and Renewable Energies (FENELEC) provides a collaborative platform for actors involved in the green transition process, representing the interests of its members²¹. Furthermore, in order to promote applied research

¹⁶ *Hydropower plays a growing role in the development of renewables in Morocco*, 2020, [<https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/reports/morocco/2016-report/economy/pumped-up-hydropower-plays-an-increasingly-significant-role-in-the-renewables-segment>], 23 June 2023.

¹⁷ *Country profile-Morocco*, 2018, [<https://www.hydropower.org/country-profiles/Morocco>], 20 June 2018.

¹⁸ Rafael de Acre, "A simulation of the economic impact of renewable energy development in Morocco." *Energy Policy*", *Energy Policy*, 2012, pp. 335-245.

¹⁹ *Moroccan Agency for Energy Efficiency (AMEE)*, [<https://www.amee.ma/en/node/113>], 17 June 2023.

²⁰ *National Office of Electricity and Drinking Water (ONEE)*, [<https://www.devex.com/organizations/national-office-of-electricity-and-drinking-water-onee-morocco-139576>], 17 June 2023.

²¹ *National Federation of Electricity and Renewable Energies (FENELEC)*, [<https://www.fenelec.com/English/topic/index.html>], 17 June 2023.

and collaborative innovation projects²², Research Institute for Solar Energy and New Energies (IRESEN) was established in 2011.

Thus, given the information exposed in this section, it can be mentioned that the lack of energy resources and the opportunities arising from development of green projects motivates the Kingdom officials to invest in renewable energy.

EU-MOROCCO COOPERATION TOOLS

When referring to the instruments through which cooperation between the EU and Morocco is achieved in the energy sector, a primary aspect to consider is the Union for the Mediterranean. Established as an initiative to continue and strengthen the action directions set within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the organisation aims to exploit the potential for sustainable development in the region.²³ More specifically, as mentioned on the official website, the Union for the Mediterranean acts as a unique platform to facilitate and promote regional dialogue and cooperation, as well as concrete projects and initiatives in the fields of Energy and Climate Action²⁴. One of the concrete outcomes of the organisation was the establishment of the SEMed Private Renewable Energy Framework (SPREF), which provides financial and technical support for the implementation of renewable energy projects²⁵. Currently, there are a total of 5 beneficiary states of the project, among which, Morocco is included.

In addition to these, since 2007, the Africa-EU Energy Partnership was established as a collaborative forum aimed at encouraging joint programs on key energy issues of interest to both Europe and Africa²⁶. Furthermore, during the sixth EU-African Union summit, The Africa-EU Green Energy Initiative

²² *Research Institute for Solar Energy and New Energies (IRESEN)*, [<https://iresen.org/institute>], 17 June 2023.

²³ *Energy & Climate Action*, [<https://ufmsecretariat.org/what-we-do/energy-and-climate-action/>], 19 July 2023.

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁵ *SEMed Private Renewable Energy Framework (SPREF)*, [<https://ufmsecretariat.org/project/semed-spref/#:~:text=The%20SPREF%20helped%20countries%20meet,%2C%20Morocco%2C%20Tunisia%20and%20Lebanon>]., 19 July 2023.

²⁶ *Sub-Saharan Africa, 2022*, [https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/international-cooperation/key-partner-countries-and-regions/sub-saharan-africa_en], 02 August 2023.

was established with the aim of fostering the economic development of the African continent through investments in renewable energy²⁷.

In any case, the main ways through which the European Union seeks to promote its foreign policy objectives regarding renewable energy remain bilateral agreements.²⁸ Over time, the EU has repeatedly contributed to Morocco's sustainable development projects, resulting in numerous initiatives in the relations between the two actors, all of which cannot be covered in this article. Therefore, we will focus only on the most recently implemented collaboration instruments, which also represent the most significant steps in energy cooperation.

We will use the year 2019 as our starting point, as it marked the fourteenth meeting of the EU-Morocco Association Council. During the debates, discussions on sustainable development dominated the agenda, covering topics such as renewable energy, energy efficiency, biodiversity, and the sustainable use of natural resources²⁹. In the same year, the European Union granted €106.5 million for the Noor Ouarzazate complex through the Neighbouring Investment Facility (NIF).³⁰ Three years later, a new collaboration instrument, namely the EU-Morocco Green Partnership was introduced to support their common goals of becoming low-carbon, climate-resilient economies, and transitioning to a green economy³¹. Moreover, through this partnership, the two parties aim to foster innovative, sustainable, job-creating, and environmentally friendly projects³². Once again, the agreed-upon matters were supported through concrete actions. In March 2023, the European

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ Laura Basagni, "How the EU Green Deal Shapes the Agenda for the Mediterranean", in Tiziana della Ragione (ed.), *Anticipating and mitigating side effects: the road to a successful green transition in the Euro-Mediterranean region*, Barcelona: *European Institute of the Mediterranean*, 2022, p. 17.

²⁹ Amine Bennis, "Power Surge: How the European Green Deal Can Succeed in Morocco and Tunisia", *European Council on Foreign Relations*, 2021, pp. 1-20.

³⁰ *Morocco: European Investment Bank funds one of the biggest solar power complexes in the world*, 2019, [<https://south.euneighbours.eu/news/morocco-european-investment-bank-funds-one-biggest-solar-power-complexes/>], 1 August 2023.

³¹ *The EU and Morocco launch the first Green Partnership on energy, climate and the environment ahead of COP 27*, 2022, [https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-morocco-launch-first-green-partnership-energy-climate-and-environment-ahead-cop-27-2022-10-18_en], 1 August 2023.

³² *Ibidem*.

Union launched a new cooperation program with Morocco, investing millions of euros in the green transition, thereby supporting the so-called green entrepreneurship sector.

In addition to these, the European Investment Bank, commonly referred to as the EU climate bank, has been operating in Morocco since 1979. A significant proportion of the investments made through it in the Kingdom have been in the renewable energy sector, (more specifically 30%³³) so that it can be asserted that the European Investment Bank's Representation in Morocco is the main instrument for promoting the green transition in the country,

All in all, based on the above, we can draw the following conclusions: It is clear that financial efforts play an important role in the European energy policy on the external market. At the same time, these efforts are accompanied by plans and initiatives to institutionalise the relations with Morocco, such as regional cooperation frameworks and bilateral treaties. In other words, the European energy policy on the external market is supported by two main areas, namely the economic and diplomatic ones.

CONCLUSIONS

Through this study, a comprehensive analysis of the energy relations between the European Union and Morocco has been proposed, aiming to explore the opportunities and instruments that the EU employs to promote sustainable development in the Kingdom. The ideas of Robert Keohane on the concepts of cooperation and international institutions have been used as the theoretical framework of the research.

The first two parts of the paper have traced the interests of the actors regarding sustainable development. In the first part, the connection between the EU's energy, environmental, and foreign policies was demonstrated in order to illustrate the actor's aims in promoting alternative forms of energy globally. The second part followed the Moroccan officials' interests in developing the necessary technologies for the green transition, interests grounded in the obstacles faced in ensuring the country's energy needs. In other words, while the EU want to export its energy policy principles and has the resources required to achieve this, Morocco seeks to attract funds for its green transition projects. Thus, the congruence of the interests of the actors tends to facilitate their cooperation.

³³ *European Investment Bank (EIB)*, 2020, [https://www.eib.org/attachments/publications/la_bei_au_maroc_en.pdf], 1 August 2023.

Regarding the instruments used to promote the EU's energy interests in Morocco, it can be stated that European officials have established a series of international institutions to enhance collaboration with the Kingdom. These encompass both regional partnerships and bilateral agreements that facilitate diplomatic communication between the two actors. Moreover, diplomatic efforts are accompanied by investments in Morocco's infrastructure and green transition plans.

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**FOUNDATIONS OF AFRICAN PERCEPTIONS
ON SECURITY AND VIOLENCE.
OVERLAPPING THE NEED FOR PEACE WITH
THE NARRATIVES OF STRUGGLE,
A SAFE WAY OR AN AFRICAN WAY?**

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Abstract

Would western defined security be an African security and would this reproduce, or develop, from indigenous African ontologies, so that African understanding of security and violence could actually bestow to the global peacekeeping actions?

Considering this research question, focused on the understanding of security and violence in an African postcolonial and maybe de-colonial taxonomy, the present paper invites to reflect on the evolution of the concepts of security and violence in African scholarships, their connections with the sustainable African social development narratives that seem to monopolize the space of debates in African Studies. Moreover, the intentions are to explore the disruptions between the need for peace and the narratives of struggle in the context of a critical resistance to the global connecting and disconnecting biases that define the conceptual "security" and "violence".

This content analysis and critical look on the becoming of the term of violence, at the base of a typical evolution of the term security, in African literature or African focused debates, might contribute to defining that security and violence are floating terms, their understanding in an African taxonomy should be Africanized, being highlighted that

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security includes violence as inner boosting element, that allows for the two to be in a strange relationship, recalling for attentive consideration and critics on the application of Western inspired peacekeeping actions that do not take into account specific conditions such as territory and culture.

Keywords: *violence, security, (de) coloniality, resistance, signifier*

INTRODUCTION

The questions and objectives of research that have given light to this paper track around the hermeneutics of security and violence in an African repository, linked to development, decolonization and power relations at the international level, in an African perspective. The key idea expressed by Serequeberhan, in commenting Kant, that «it has to be maintained that it is the “weak” and not the “powerful” that can possibly serve as a “fulcrum” for “a federation of free states.” In the manner of the six-inch-tall Lilliputians, these states have to be able to overpower the Gulliver nations that dominate the international scene and threaten collective security.»(Serequeberhan, 2015, p. 68), is a starting point for this analysis.

It is the expression of disruptions on imagining security, lastly defining violence, in a manner that trascedes Western thinking and it is affirmed by new debates and narratives of African Philosophy recognition, African Self-reognition, sustainable African development, as well as new social change, opposed but linked to resistance, and, when all il told, the violence. More than analyzing an eventual evolution of the concepts of security and violence in African scholarships, this analysis proposes to use the perceptions of a two staged exploration on the central concepts (the possible perception in African narratives read in a frame of European perception on it).

Through qualitative research the central objective would be to explore the disruptions between the need for peace or collective security and the narratives of struggle in the context of a critical resistance to the global connecting and disconnecting biases that define the conceptual “security” and “violence”. In this context, wondering on the possible existence of differences in the way concepts are understood, interiorized and applied, is a pertinent act of the social sciences and philosophy. Since global power balance is put into question when talking about perceptions on security and violence, the perspective proposed herein is an alternative to the analysis of discourses carried in the sphere of knowledge production in Sub-Saharan Africa, in the context of de-coloniality.

Therefore, the question boosting the present reflection is “Would western defined security be an African security and would this reproduce, or develop, from indigenous ontologies, so that African understanding of security and violence could actually bestow to the global peacekeeping actions?”

This is rather a challenge to follow narratives of African development by own means, focusing on colonial power relations and decolonization, which, in line with Cabralism would include armed, economic and political resistance (Cabral, 2016, p. 43), with the expected result to unpack, deconstruct and compare the meanings of “security” and “violence”, in order to bring a small contribution to the agenda of those who are able to create ideas and put in act peacekeeping actions that would be able to capitalize creatively these concepts, their interdependency and the results of their interactions in the perception of nationals who might not consider positive some peacekeeping actions exercised from outside their nation, region or more, their epistemic sphere.

As a phenomenon ranging on a terrain of “myths of independence and illusions of freedom” (Ndlovu Gatsheni, 2013, p. 4), decolonization is used to mark the delimitations between coloniality to which concepts herein will be linked, and (de) coloniality as the expected turn of the decolonial, presuming the aim of ex-colonies, or generally states from the Global South and the Third World to achieve the real liberation from the global colonialism and consequently the global coloniality, as matrixes of colonial power. In the context of decolonization, which, according to Abdelkhabir Khatibi did not bring the decolonization of thought (Spurr, 1993, p. 200), which was sustained by many African thinkers, including Wa Thiong’O (1981), the meanings of “violence” and “security” are analyzed on a scale of various meanings related to the contestation of the colonial power, ranging from the resistance to Western Thinking or Global North epistemology, from a distinguished, distinguishable or less Global South epistemology, up to the narratives of African becoming as a new social change. “Security” would be seen as global narrative, interiorized, and “violence” a weapon to prevent the dissolution of such narrative or, on the contrary to contribute to its deconstruction.

In order to simplify the theoretical frame of the reflection, decoloniality will be considered the matrix on which comparison of “security” and “violence” would be unpacked, taking into account all features of the decoloniality that express, include, or imprint the evolution to which and ever of the meanings given to the two concepts in African narratives from published books, papers and even discourses susceptible of a large circulation in the social

media. Practically, the analysis contains a qualitative exploration of ideas expressed by philosophers, historians and analysts of African contexts.

According to definitions and observations of Everisto Benyera on the distinctions between coloniality and decoloniality, this analysis will link the central notions to coloniality as “continued presence of a sophisticated power matrix” on one side and decoloniality, which argues that the colonial state became indigenised in order to survive (Benyera, 2020, p. 30), on the other side. However, decoloniality in the present analysis will be intended as a potential or ideal contestation of the essence colonial power relations themselves, presuming the process of indigenization would have caused the overcoming of fears, insecurities, resentments that colonial rule induced on colonized people. When used (de) coloniality in the text, the necessity to distinguish, at a later moment, whether coloniality or decoloniality has to be the subject to value for the respective aspect, is reflected.

VIOLENCE AND SECURITY AS SIGNIFIERS TO (DE)COLONIALITY

Various and often redundant scholarships have concentrated on violence, the meanings, types and relations of it with the knowledge production, and ultimately the (de)coloniality. But, it was less expressed how security evolves in the narrative of (de)coloniality, in correlation with violence.

Moreover, violence was often looked as action, event or process, while the third meaning, that of process, was considered in regards to colonial order, violence being one pillar of colonialism (Mbembe, 2001, p.13). Due to this ramified look from “security” and “violence” to colonialism and finally decoloniality, passing through perceptions and discourses that form the categories of knowledge production, the present analysis has to be necessarily poststructuralist, in the sense that it was given by Michel Foucault when referring to the avoidance of cultural category totalities (2002, (17)). Departing from “violence”, its meanings are taken away from predefined structures and also from its proximal type – the process – in order to construct for it an event-process historical frame, in relation to which “security” is its result, as much as its cause. However, the semiotic look would be a first step of this analysis.

Regarded separately, security and violence could be signifiers to (de) coloniality.

In Umberto Eco's interpretation of the ways Hippocrates considered the term of sign, that would stand between the signified and the signifier, precisely as being less neutral than the symbol as token or "identification mark" (Eco, 1986, p.27), the content analyzed herein is defined by the presence of a "chain of signifiers", "that ultimately dissolve into the discourse as an activity", consisting of continuous producing of signifiers through interpretative processes (Eco, 1986, p. 24). For this reason, and considering Eco's intention to develop a discourse on signifiers departing from Jacques Lacan, it is fundamental to link this activity of dissolution of signifiers in the discourse, to the necessary consideration of the relationship between discourse and history as interpreted by Lacan in Platon's Symposium, in 1991, not as situated-ness but as "how history itself arises from a certain way that discourse enters into reality" (Scalambrino, 2015, p. 78).

This brief overview on the semiotics linked to the idea that "security" and "violence" could be seen as signifiers to (de) coloniality is relevant in order to consider, for the first stage of the analysis, why these two concepts are linked to (de) coloniality, in a network of signifiers, but also to show that discourse of violence and discourse of security at the moment they enter into the reality, are necessarily historical, on one hand. On the other hand, talking about coloniality and the idea of dissolution in discourse as activity, and the idea of process capitalized by Umberto Eco, introduces the preference to consider violence as an event-process and not only an event or a process, on the contrary to security, which is no event and no process, linked to violence in the frame of coloniality and decoloniality in ways that will be detailed in the followings.

VIOLENCE AND SECURITY, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON THEIR FEATURES OF COLONIALITY

The choice was to explore the links of "violence" and "security" with coloniality (proximal type for the decoloniality), and not colonialism, colonial order, or any form of mediation postcoloniality, or Western style of the periphery (Appiah, 1991, p. 348), as the meanings given, perceptions and opinions expressed in African repository in reference to them are regarded under the three categories of coloniality such as the coloniality of power, of knowledge and of being (Ndlovu Gatsheni, 2013, p. 7). Coloniality is shaped by Global South's thinkers like Quijano, Grosfoguel or Maldonado Torres, as underpinning the relations of power still existent in the Western perception

on the capitalist world, trying to construct a de-colonial thinking, according to Ndlovu Gatsheni (2013), or delimitating a space of understanding of “global power imbalances between the Africans and Europeans” (Ndlovu Gathseni, 2013, p. 12).

Notwithstanding this intentional delimitation of space that is highlighted in African repository and that will obviously guide this analysis, the coloniality is also expressed by its *modus operandi* through institutionalization of all spheres of life (Benyera, 2020, p. 29), being a product of the colonialism, seen to have imposed Western modernity with violence, having limited the possibilities of the “Other” to create and manage its own perspective on the reality (Nyere, 2020, p. 124).

In consideration of these meanings of coloniality, approaching all fields and being included in all Global South narratives, Benyera’s institutionalization caused by coloniality itself, might reveal the nature of the relationship of perpetual re-signification between violence, security and coloniality (with its specific difference of de-coloniality), in a correlation between new emerging security ideologies and mechanisms for the calculation of the protection, that turned to be the currency of citizenship (Mbembe, 2017, p. 22). A currency that was not available for everybody, at every time or in the same way, under colonial rule, due to net divisions between citizen and subject in Africa, already commented in 1946 by Mahmood Mamdani (1996, p. 48).

The “not-for-all” security or protection is still linked, in the perception tributary to coloniality, to the categorizations as race, human / non-human narratives, that causes the reaction, as positive violence against coloniality, seen that reaction itself regards a “cleansing and epistemological revolution” ongoing and continuous, with meanings as interpreted by Edward Said, developing on the words of Franz Fanon (Ahluwalia, 2001, p. 48), revolution which could not exist in case coloniality would be denied. Paradoxically violence as reaction appears as positive although it is linked to coloniality whose existence it can’t deny, meanwhile security, was, from the beginning, a privilege, as marked by Mamdani in the example of individually paid state security staff for the protection of the properties and indirectly food and livelihoods (Mamdani, 1996, p. 206).

Many references to violence in a colonial context and explicitly in an African repository were highly rating violence as intertwined with the necessity of resistance, inspired by George Sorel’s “smashing of the authority” (Mbembe, 2019, p. 22) or Franz Fanon’s decolonization as political event (Mbembe, 2019,

p. 6), as well as by Amilcar Cabral's considerations on violence as representing the politics of imperialism (Lovejoy & Falola, 2003, p. 37). Violence, seen per extension to its political value, could, therefore, seem feature of coloniality and decoloniality as well, or represent the past, present and future of any order, as it is always in act.

On the contrary, references to security are subtle and implied, a critical stance of the demander in reference to aims of peace, safety, harmony and development expected or defended, in a Western, Euro-American world or perspective (Slater, 2004, p. 39, 66).

In the narrative of resistance, violence might be that signifier that produces another signifier, namely security, for the signified coloniality, if applying the semiotic lens proposed. But, security is a narrative whose abuse in the rhetoric would boost violence, in terms of Western „invasiveness, penetration and intervention" (Slater, 2004, p. 26), and other political strategies called by Nkrumah as strategies to cement the West's position of influence on independent African states (Langan, 2018, p. 17); or, like commented by Achille Mbembe in reference to the limitation of movement and identity of individuals for security reasons (Mbembe, 2017, p. 24) or the regime of confinement (Mbembe, 2017, p. 177) for a security aim, which finally produces violence. In the meantime, narratives of security returned to have an autochthonous face meaning violence, in the case of regime security overlapped on human security, in the postcolonial state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013, p. 86).

On the other hand, in the African dialectics, the act of resistance is, in the first instance, an opposition, causing narratives of opposition, through critics or through disregard of old power-knowledge relations, being reflected as decolonization, in the form of postcolonial critique or the fortification of a critical community (Langenbacher & Shain, 2010). In terms of violence expressed by this critical resistance, security is searched for, but also deconstructed, since acquiring consciousness on being on the same side or on different sides of the same barricade, would mean the dissolution of the security as a non valid narrative or irreconcilable narrative. Translated into the realities of the postcolonial state, it is the case reminded by Achille Mbembe when talking about a sort of „tonton macoutization" in some African states in a postcolonial context, when the pre-existent lack of discipline leads to bridges between soldiery and the world of crime, or the law and order operations are mixed with violent administrative coercion (Mbembe, 2001, p. 83), deepening the sense of lack of security of populations.

In the African literature, there are numerous citations of authors like Franz Fanon, Amílcar Cabral, Aimé Césaire who represent the resistance in both action type (for example, the war of Algeria) and epistemic liberation, but who pleaded for the “return to the source” (Cabral, 1978), „restitution” – the term used by Franz Fanon to express the invention of the own liberation (Mbembe, 2017, p. 169) and the actual reinvention or regain of the self-hood (Ahluwalia, 2001, p. 40), as social change and, as Achille Mbembe called it, progress of the manity (Mbembe, 2017,p.182). Therefore, violence appears as having been regarded also with condescendency, while interrogations on the ethical face of it were flourishing.

As for security, being ethical because of being a narrative expressing an aim of the humanity, customary right and informal settlement (Theodory, 2018, p. 170), a good, intended as feature of the life (Mbembe, 2001, p. 46) and a need highlighted by the paradigm of Western states whose security need not to be threaten (Langan, 2018, p. 167), or the need to protect oneself against the Other / the refugees (Onoma, 2013, p. 40), or an interest (Mude, 2020, p. 87), interrogations linked to ethics could hardly be started without taking into account the position of the speaker. Perceptions on the security that was imposed by military domination, like in the case of the Fulani people in Nigeria, were illustrating that security is not ethical on both sides, it is not an entirely humanity respectful aim, not even a right, good or need for those who do not see in that security other than an imposition/

For this motivation, security is contextual, and eventual (or evenimental), although, on the contrary to violence, security as narrative and extraterritorial (Slater, 2004, p.17) would tend to blend power relations of coloniality and refer to a global interest to security and moreover, to the negation of power relations in the intend to maintain an equilibrium called peace. Mark Langan notes the security-driven approaches to Africa, by western states that considered moral to assist developing countries manage their security threats (Langan, 2018, p. 152).

It is important to reveal that development, seen as the transformation that took inevitably place after the materialization of violence, a conflict, a resistance, was used strategically, along with security, in the discourse of African political classes, especially in Francophone African states, in order to justify French patronage networks (Langan, 2018, p. 160). Recalling on the indigenization pertaining to decoloniality, and ideas on inevitable transformations at Marx, Engels and Hegel, also (Peet, 2006, pp. 166-171), as

well as in the various analysis that explored the main capacity of the states to sustain violence, as resistance and opposition, or as the management of the conflict (Woodhouse, 2006, pp. 78-79), the notion of „security“ tends to lose previous features and be modelled in the context of authoritarian regimes.

From a different perspective, according to western narratives that practically gave the definition to the term development, development includes security, and since a developed society was wrongly defined as secure in the same western perspective, that tried to colonize other spaces of knowledge production, security appears as a western constructed term, almost equivalent to a transformation after violence as in the case of development.

Hence, while violence is creative, in the ways also Franz Fanon saw it (Mbembe, 2019), security is destructive of the creative process, locking it on the need to produce a certain result, from a certain perspective. There is no previous consciousness on the actual result of the resistance act of violence, or the types of security referred to, or the entity of the beneficiaries, prior to creating a transformation through violence, and that is why security is seen more as an event, or an event-result (it is known to be a result, but not a necessary one). Kwame Nkrumah saw in security an event, highlighting the African regional self-reliance (Acharya, 2018), which is actually connected to the process of decolonization, and expresses the African dreams of decoloniality. Being in the same „chain of signifiers“, security is based on violence and inseparable from it. Security insinuates itself on all fields of life, like violence, whose spirit creates a sort of culture (Mbembe, 2001, p. 175).

As a matter of fact, professor Boaventura de Sousa Santos sees in the insistence of Franz Fanon to highlight the necessity of the violence in the decolonization process meant to assure security among other goods in the ethical sense of the term, the proof of disruption between two worlds of sociality: the metropolitan one and the one of coloniality (De Sousa Santos, 2018, p. 25), so the necessary conflict between them in reference to the types of security they considered and obtained. Seen that subjects of power in general, colonial subjects in particular, are the same in the two worlds, of metropole and *coloniality*, the meanings of violence and security were mitigated to the point that the question was whether one can imagine a universal good such as security being contextual or situated. Meanwhile, for violence, the situation would look different, as it would not be located in a symptomatic positionality, but in the genealogy and trajectory (Sithole, 2015, p. 224) including, for this reason, in the intentions and ways security could be perceived and projected.

Fanon's already recorded "cleansing and epistemological revolution" (Ahluwalia, 2001, p.48), could perennially deepen the disruptions of such different worlds as the metropolitan one and that one of the *coloniality*. On these disruptions Achille Mbembe brings up Fanon again, who problematizes the crisis of the dominant, considering absurd and intolerable for either the dominated becoming like the dominant, or not being already like the latter (Mbembe, 2019, pp. 137-138). And in this argument could lay the confirmation of a globosity of the term security itself, because even if imposed on one side or on the other side, it would have the same meanings for both sides of a colonial relation, causing similar narratives of coloniality.

If violence should be considered an event-process, standing on perceptions from African repository, security, by its double folded role of cause and result could be seen as the triggering element for the desire of truth and law, admitting that security is signified by the perception on the questioning of the truth and by the need of being protected by a law, in reaction to the commandment of colonialism (Mbembe, 2001, p. 26).

Hence, the meanings of violence are extended in this direction, in relation to security, just considering that in the mind of the colonizers, or the strongest ones, who should be victorious in spite of those most knowledgeable, the use of violence with Africans would fulfill the gaps created by the absence of truth and the lack of law (Mbembe, 2017, p. 70).

In relation to the perception on the questioning of the truth, as signifier for security, it is relevant the relation between security, as seen in African narratives, pawnship and Ubuntu ("I am because you are"). To explain this, African narratives of voluntary offering oneself as pawn for the debt of a relative was brought forward, called the pannyaring (Ekechi, 2013, in Lovejoy and Falola). In this case, the truth of the pawn, or his justification for his offering himself is an act of protection of his relative, which is, by being a donor act, an act of power that jeopardizes the security, or peace, or right to question his own truth of the relative, leaving him with less certainties for the future.

Albeit, in the sense that the term security was used by African leaders, security was linked to the unity and the principle of Ubuntu, due to which, in the same logic, the relative's questioning of the truth is based on the justification that because the other is, he could be, because of the other's sacrifice it was possible for him to feel secure, the abandonment on the Other being a feature of the security and of the politics of liberation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018, p. 216), equivalent with peace in pan-african decolonial

narratives. Pannying is thus justified for the aim to secure the person as debtor, to secure the creditor, nonetheless to secure relations between them, for a peaceful climate. Accepting the inherent violence of the power one exercises on the pawns and *pannyards*, although the relation of power would be valued differently by any of them in regards to the intentionality of being dominated, would reveal that security might however be linked to de-coloniality, as long as indigenized power relations are central to these narratives.

At the other pole, every manifestation of power creates the opportunity for the contestation of power (Bongmba, 2006, p. 182), which functions also in the case of the violence used by security officers in the name of the necessity to defend security, causing instead a harassment of people by political authorities in African states (Bongmba, 2006, p. 29; Makinda&Okumu, 2007, p. 12), bringing forth the deconstruction of the security with the expansion of a narrative of deep-rooted violence. Thereupon, the escalation of violence determined narratives of demilitarization of the culture (Mbembe, 2021, p. 25) to flourish and put into question security as having to be searched and not created, whilst it would be as much structural as the violence in relation to coloniality. Violence was considered, for many decades, structural, because it shaped the social self in time, being already built in the structure and more importantly, it does not need an actual subject-action-object relation to be identified (Galtung, 1969, p. 171), or endemic (Ndlovu Gatsheni, 2013, p. 9).

Looking on security as structural too would mean developing on Mamdani's theory on displacing the victim narrative with that one of the survivor's narrative, concentrating on the issue (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018, p. 155) as reflection of an inner security reason of any of the subjects: the perpetrator or the victim.

VIOLENCE-SECURITY AND THE DECOLONIAL TURN

The resurgence or insurgence of decolonization/decoloniality in the twenty-first century is directly ranged against the violence of modernity, colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018, p. 43). At the point of a decolonial turn reflected in narratives of last years, therefore, security is put in danger by the main act of resisting the power that aims to establish it and consequently search for it, from the point of view of defending own perceptions and methods to manage it. Or, as it was noted by Achille Mbembe (2016), the state of security feeds from the state of insecurity, whose

lasting is extended as it contributes to the consciousness of the necessity of the first one and merely offers an argument for its long-lasting.

While violence is systemic, structural, institutional, symbolic, and physical (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013), security is looked at under its rhetorical force, for the senses it has in the African Self-Recognition narratives especially in revolutionary poetics (Egudu, 1978). In the meantime, as recorded before, it is considered an event (the outcome of a long process of violence), integrative (many times related to ideology), a rhetoric of the colonialism who appealed to secrets and the security of its rule that was described as the nocturnal face of the democracy (Mbembe, 2019), but also considering speeches of African unity and development carried even by contested leaders, or, finally, a perpetually absent good (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013, p. 9).

Taking into account such directions, in the context of decolonization processes, defined after the non-alignment movement, the narrative of security that should have been a narrative of non-violence, became one of counter-violence, security being continuously produced within conflict situations. As it was suggested by Achille Mbembe the actions of a new power, that intends to maintain a maximum vulnerability of the masses for a better control of resources, are not only for an economic aim (2021, p. 186), but mostly to ponder the “price of life” in capitalism, within the question of the African personhood based on the “vital force” (Masolo, 2004, p.55), which includes, among others, the ideals of security.

Both concepts, violence and security, were politically used. At least at a discursive level, the liberation processes, named as actual war in Algeria, but only as conflicts in other African states, ended up as a conflict “among ourselves”, following Cesaire’s opinion on the situation of Patrice Lumumba’s Congo (Mbembe, 2017, p. 157) and the independence paradigm. Hence, security was not linked exclusively to coloniality, but to the questioning of competition, in a decolonial context. The independence paradigm regarded the reproduction of colonial violence and was seen in regards to Zimbabwe’s ZANU party philosophy of embracing violence as a legitimate political tool (Mpofi & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015, p. 128), also.

The culture of violence in politics (Lovejoy & Falola, 2003, p. 116) was promoted from the colonial period and transferred as a nationalist paradigm of war (Ndlovu-Gatheni, 2015, p. 6) in many African states, case in which, many times, the decolonization process became “bastardized and ideologized” (Ndlovu-Gatheni, 2015, p. 7), leaving no room to changes from inside the aims

of liberation (an actual social change), but to the replication and maybe reinterpretations of old forms of power relations in the society (an ideology of resistance).

All these are showing that security and violence might have the same root, while security has its violent dimension or an inner violence, first of all epistemological.

During the decolonization process, this inner epistemological violence should be deconstructed by the aim of this process, and epistemic colonization (Ipadeola, 2017, p. 148) is expected to be reversed. On the consequence, security follows this logic of deconstruction, having the tendency, on the contrary to the ideals and directions of decolonization, to maintain a systematic and of *long durée* violence of the Western narratives on African narratives, or on the Third World (Pieterse, 2010, p. 99), including in regards to the meanings of security.

Achille Mbembe rightly observes that in the most simple equation on violence, the principal parameter is the powerful or the dominant and all myths of violence are related to him, especially those that incriminate the weak or the dominated as instigator for the violence of the dominator (Mbembe, 2019, p. 138). In fact, Tsenay Serequeberhan talks about the necessary confrontation and appropriation of the colonizer's violence from the colonized (2013, p. 71). Or, from a detailed example on the colonialism in Nigeria given by Toyin Falola (2009, p. 52), there is a reading on the possibility of a voluntary surrendering, through negotiations, due to which violence can be avoided. But, looking at Mbembe's assertion that violence is physical, moral and also rethorical (Mbembe & Sarr, 2017, p. 35) it seems that surrendering to these forms of violence is caused by the seduction exercised by the fable of colonization over some colonized, who became conscious complices to it (Mbembe, 2021, p. 73). The main foundations of surrendering consisted of long periods of conflicts leaving communities in an estate of starvation and vulnerability to (neo)colonial salvation, on one side, but, according to Toyin Falola surrendering was also the effect of modern types of manifestation of power, resembling slavery, by the „corrupt political leadership that promotes cultures of dependency and poverty“ (Falola, 2013, p. 50).

At this point, the intention of the dominant (neo-colonizer) to maintain security, seen to be dependency, at least, could be confounded to that one of the neo-colonized to have security assured (like right to come out of the poverty), although talking about two different understandings of the security, being this the first argument to reflect upon on the considerations made at the beginning,

that African meanings on security might be different than those given by a western thinking or in the language of the colonizers.

For the language of decolonization, violence was risking to become a good of common interest and focus, being base to the creation and evolvement of a civil society (Mbembe, 2001, p. 36). However, the actions of African intellectuals combatting colonialism, through resistance actions and discourses had little effect on the achievement of a well-being in these societies, at a socio-political and (in this way) even at an epistemological level (Falola, 2003, p. 38). Taking into account, as global meaning, the well-being as security, the observation that violence through resistance and discourse, in African contexts, could not have led to the achievement of security speaks for itself and shows that violence could be considered, in an African repository, not sufficient for the fulfillment of security.

For Franz Fanon, resistance and consequently decolonization were both violent, and since he explored the manners the colonized became violent into the colony (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013, p. 143), he opened the path on considering that decolonization was mostly prepared and sustained by a steady construction of violence in a colonial context based on the psychological violence recorded by Ngugi Wa Thing'o (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015, p. 6). In the context of this phenomenon, the main definition of security, acknowledged in colonizer's terms, could have been questioned, due to epistemological violence, that includes elements to sustain the logical apparatus of commandments (Mbembe, 2001, p. 111) and consequently a view popularized in Fanon's writings on security as a signifier for the quality of a human to be a master, or in control of the Self or of the Other (Kiros, 2004, p. 221).

But the violence of the decolonization phenomenon had to be built necessarily on the aim to change senses and directions of defining security, as feature of the human status, decolonization being akin to the "reclaiming of a humanity" (Serequeberhan, 2013, p. 74), re-elaborated by Achille Mbembe in the humanization of the "thing" as reversed process to the "*thing-ification*", the creation of a new man, a new language and a new humanity (Mbembe, 2017, p. 168).

Because security is seen as a need in western culture, deemed the Maslow's pyramid of needs, and knowing that the colonial postcolonial state, is "formed out of a residual apparatus of violence and coercion" (Serequeberhan, 2015, p. 29), therefore also based on epistemic violence and hermeneutic coercion, the meanings of security could be searched in the ways

understanding and approach to violence are changing. Namely, from violence over the dominated in order to be conquered, to violence of setting maps (Garuba, 2002), hence creating a space of security, ending with the violence to cure (civilize or develop), like, cartoonish, the “cure of Africans from their supposed laziness” (Mbembe, 2001, p. 113).

Chasing the same line of transformation recorded for the violence, security should be first reflected upon from the point of view of an action of conquest, or, as result of action of violence that has already ended, namely an imposed status of peace, as a consequence to humanitarian interventionism after 1990, highlighting a moral obligation of the international community in relation to a state whose security, even at a social internal level is considered to be threatened (Lau, 2020, p. 108). Thereupon, security is signified by borders and assured by the membership, as broad term for nation ship, which recalls the deconstruction of it, pursuant to the critical resistance to the establishment of nations for the colonized, without the will of the colonized, and the issue of nations created by the will or guidance of colonial mapping, through divisions of ethnical groups that were themselves considered as created (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018, p. 149). And in the end, security is well-being, or development from a western perspective, therefore, in African perception, a tool for the forced integration into the design of a global world where harmonization is nurtured for the objective to keep alive western categorization views and images. Although in the colonies there would have existed some minimal preoccupation of the colonizers for the welfare of the colonized, especially in the british ones, this welfare needed to be identified likewise and this identification was itself imposed, subject to the violence of power relations (Esteva, 1992, p. 10).

Taking into account these perspectives, the encounter of violence and security on the terrain of morality is central to the argument, for the defining of a possible context of overlapping the need for peace on the narratives of struggle and the considerations on the meanings of security in an African perspective, as being different or subsumed to an African epistemology, with all necessary results from this, in regards to peacekeeping narratives at a global level.

In its quality of result, need, good or aim, security must be moral, while violence, seen as event-process, would be difficult to value as moral or not, because it has stages, subjects, circumstances and endings that allow many undertones. The demand on the morality of violence was entrenched with the

critical resistance to the cultural domination „which dehumanized Africans and destroyed many of their institutions”, a European encounter that needed to be understood, nevertheless was put under the scrutiny of a „Fanon school” (Falola, 2003, p. 37). In fact, the morality of the violence could be translated in the duty to violence argued by Fanon, whose perspective on violence was that it was a political as much as a clinical concept and in regards to the latter, a practice of the transformation of symbols (Mbembe, 2017, p. 162).

The clinical vision on violence is defended also from the perspective of the political discourse in the Global South, referring to the reason of the West or the dominant reason on the stage of the international relations, like in the intervention of President Sukarno about “Inject[ing] the voice of reason into world affairs” in relation to which Tsenay Serequeberhan fittingly averts a „global political reason, beyond might, violence, and brute force” (2015, p. 72). Admitting this global political reason would be peace, and security, in Global South possible understanding, the layouts of violence and security are overlapped, due to a common feature of representing cures and being instruments for the epistemological freedom (injecting reason, intended as real global reason, not Western reason), case in which peace keeping means giving space to the narratives of a struggle that leads to the deconstruction of Western, and ultimately, any type of imperialism.

Violence, characterized as „systemic, structural, institutional, symbolic and physical” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020, p. 23), was seen as undesirable for some and, in the meantime, desirable for its endings (Falola, 2014, p. 60) or sustained by the war of justice (Ojo, 2011, p. 343), for others. Considering achieving security an ending of the manifestation of violence, it becomes linked to coloniality but remains the support for a decoloniality based on Fanon’s „radical negation” (de Sousa Santos, 2018, p. 75) of the previous order, which actually confirms its pre-existence without which the new order searched by decolonization, as new thinking and doing for the rehumanizing of the world (Gatsheni, 2020, p. 27), wouldn’t have been possible.

CONCLUSIONS

As explored in this perspective, violence and security are important elements for the consideration of coloniality / (de) coloniality, and their evolution in tandem with peace, in a holistically considered African context. The terms of violence and security are floating terms in African narratives and security is dependent on violence so that, security should be looked in within

violence that portrays all fields of realities, as it was defined in African repositories of knowledge. Violence is systemic and structural having many features to be looked at as an event-process, meanwhile security is eventual and generic, being considered not for granted but a result of the necessary struggle of liberation from colonial archetypes, more than just colonial relations, in a consideration of (de)coloniality defined as the burden of new methods to return to epistemologies that were validated prior to the manifestation of coloniality. Since violence is creative in African narratives and for the achievement of security violence would be central, security becomes created, too, but the creation of security is not casual and not independent from the ways violence is created. Therefore, security has to be searched not only from the point of view of an aim to achieve, but under the form of a method to contain the violence of own manifestations. In this sense, policies that regard administration of various aspects of life in African contexts should ponder that the understandings of security and violence should be Africanized, in order for any policy or act to be really symbolically adapted to African ontologies. Peacekeeping actions of Western inspiration should be less interventionist, should look into the specificity of the territory, be only supportive and not coercive, should function on request and not on supposed moral obligation, but, the most important, they should first understand the cultural needs in relation to security, as well as the ontological positions towards violence (to avoid cultural clash and inefficiency of security seeking, regarded as security creating in African narratives).

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BONNE GOUVERNANCE ET CULTURE DE LA PAIX DANS LA DEMOCRATIE : QUESTION DE METHODE

GOOD GOVERNANCE AND CULTURE OF PEACE IN DEMOCRACY: QUESTION OF METHOD

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Abstract

Today, like never before, humanity is developing a fear of self-destruction. After the development of atomic weapons, the current nuclear weapon, although considered a weapon of deterrence, threatens the world with an apocalypse from which it could not recover. Faced with this situation, after the second war, the ultimate question nagging people's minds is the following: what weapon would be used in the next war? As a result, saving humanity from the catastrophe that is looming on the horizon requires recourse to the founding values of good governance and the culture of peace.

Despite the old European democracy and the emerging African democracies, we still wonder about the trajectories to take to combine peace in a world which, more and more, is heading towards its extinction. With the current Russian-Ukrainian conflicts, introducing a war at the doorstep of Europe, as well as the putsches recorded in Africa, with the establishment of military juntas, the case of Mali in 2020 and 2021, of Guinea in 2021, of Niger and Burkina Faso in 2022, of Gabon in 2023, also the increase in the authoritarian regime in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in Rwanda, without forgetting the establishment of the ghost state in the Central African Republic, etc. there is reason to question the idealistic and realistic aims of democratic values.

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History has made democracy not only a system of management of public affairs par excellence, but also a way of living and a way of being. Founded on the values of freedom and tolerance, democratization requires our appropriate resolution to expose a systematic method that can lead to the construction of a culture dedicated to dialogue and the peaceful management of conflicts. Democratization, through the combination of good governance and the culture of peace, constitutes a process which requires a method bringing together both a part linked to the form, relating to the political and institutional organization, and a part linked to the substance, relating to the behavior of political actors.

Keywords : *Democracy, liberalism, socialism, conflict management, good governance*

INTRODUCTION

« Les guerres prenant naissance dans l'esprit des hommes, c'est dans l'esprit des hommes que doivent être élevées les défenses de la paix ». ¹En posant que la démocratie est une approche pour la bonne gouvernance et la culture de la paix, la planche que nous donnons à lire a pour objet de mettre en place des conditions pouvant nous permettre d'identifier un système ou un comportement démocratique. Il est question, pour nous, de plancher sur une méthode rigoureuse qui, d'une part, conditionne la démocratisation d'un système de gestion et de gouvernance politique, en soutenant que la démocratie constitue un « modèle institutionnel ou structurel » ², relative au partage et à la déconcentration du pouvoir politique, et d'autre part, forge en l'homme la culture de la paix, en saisissant la démocratie comme « modèle culturel ou normatif » ³, correspondant au respect des adversaires et à la promotion de la non-violence.

Introduit dans le discours moderne par la Banque mondiale en 1989, la bonne gouvernance est considérée comme « les traditions et les institutions

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¹ UNESCO, *Une fenêtre ouverte sur le monde, le courrier, UNESCO a 20 ans*, Paris, Jane Albert Hesse, juillet-Août, 1966, p. 6.

² Luc Sindjoun, « La loyauté démocratique dans les relations internationales : sociologie des normes de civilité internationale », dans *Études internationales*, n° 1, v. 32, 2001, pp. 31-50.

³ *Idem.*

qui permettent d'exercer l'autorité dans un pays ».⁴ De ce fait, « la bonne gouvernance est le processus par lequel les institutions publiques conduisent des affaires publiques, gèrent des ressources publiques et garantissent la réalisation des droits de l'homme sans abus ni corruption, et dans le respect de l'état de droit. Le véritable test d'une bonne gouvernance est la mesure dans laquelle elle tient ses promesses en matière de droits de l'homme : droits civils, culturels, économiques, politiques et sociaux ».⁵ Sous la plume de Rhodes, en général, « la « bonne gouvernance » conjugue nouveau management public et promotion de la démocratie libérale ».⁶ Nous entendons par Culture de la paix, selon la définition des Nations Unies, un « ensemble des valeurs, attitudes, comportement et modes de vie qui rejettent la violence et préviennent les conflits en s'attaquant à leurs racines par le dialogue et la négociation entre les individus, les groupes et les Etats »⁷. Eu égard à ce qui précède, L'intérêt de la présente étude réside est dans son projet : faire de la démocratie notre cheval de bataille pour la bonne gouvernance et le bon vivre ensemble. Notre choix de la démocratie se justifie du fait qu'elle constitue le système politique qui est non seulement répandu et à la fois contesté, mais aussi, compose dans sa politique des facteurs déterminants de la vie sociale et économique de l'humanité.

Notre objectif de donner un écho sur la formation à la conduite démocratique et une étude approfondie des jeux démocratiques dans leurs pratiques dialectiques. D'une part, il nous conduira à construire une méthode systématiquement formelle, et d'autre part, à bâtir une culture susceptible d'ouvrir les esprits vers un idéal social. Il s'agit de favoriser une analyse critique d'un système de gestion politique, afin d'être à même de vérifier que celui-ci est démocratique ou non, ou encore le rendre démocratique au besoin. Il faut permettre aussi, au niveau de la réflexion, la culture d'un comportement démocratique à partir des constructions des valeurs de liberté et du respect de la personne humaine.

⁴ Gjalte de Graaf et Hanneke van Asperen, « L'art de la bonne gouvernance : quand les représentations du passé inspirent la pratique moderne », dans *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives*, n° 2, v. 84, 2018, pp. 419-435.

⁵ <https://www.ohchr.org/fr/good-governance>

⁶ *Idem*.

⁷ Sophie Arie, « Existe-t-il une approche européenne de la construction de la paix ? », dans *Fiche d'analyse*, Paris, juillet, 2008, https://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-analyse-809_fr.html?imprimer=1

A la question de savoir ce que c'est la démocratie, sa portée et son fondement, et à celle de savoir comment parvenir à l'instauration de la gouvernance démocratique dans le système politique et dans le comportement humain, aussi de savoir si toutes les démocraties devraient-elles s'appliquer de la même manière, nous formulons l'hypothèse selon laquelle : il faut une méthode. Tant qu'il n'y a pas de méthode pour sa réalisation, le projet, l'intégration des valeurs démocratiques à la fois dans l'homme et dans des institutions établies, ne pourrait rester qu'une vue de l'esprit. La méthode constitue une procédure de mise en œuvre de notre projet. Raison pour laquelle, à notre avis, certains débats semblent, dès nos jours, tant stériles qu'une confrontation entre les partisans de la « démocratie libérale communautaire » et ceux de la « démocratie pluraliste » de même que le colportage des réflexions des penseurs quant au perfectionnement de différentes démocraties. Dès lors qu'un système de gestion ou les animateurs politiques ne sont pas démocratisés, il est moins prudent d'organiser des causeries sur la démocratie en dehors de la démocratie elle-même.

La méthode démocratique est un instrument pour le chercheur pouvant lui permettre d'être en mesure d'apporter un jugement critique sur le caractère démocratique ou non d'un système politique dans un premier lieu⁸. Dans un second lieu, la structuration de la pensée exige, de la méthode, le pouvoir de forger une culture dialectique tournée vers l'édification d'homme nouveau dans un monde où l'on se doit de se donner des explications quant à la responsabilité de chacun devant l'autre.

Loin d'être exhaustive, notre étude est dialectique et réflexive. Elle se fonde sur trois points. D'abord, nous traiterons du sens de la démocratie. Il sera question pour nous d'exposer brièvement la démocratie dans sa structure fonctionnelle. Il sera question de définir la démocratie, d'établir son rapport avec le libéralisme et d'affronter deux systèmes importants se réclamant être démocratiques. Ensuite, nous exposerons la première partie de la méthode qui est formelle. Et enfin, nous aborderons la deuxième partie de notre méthode, liée au comportement et à la culture démocratique.

⁸ Pour un répertoire des défis auxquels la démocratie se confronte, v. Sergiu Mișcoiu, *Au pouvoir par le 'Peuple'. Le populisme saisi par la théorie du discours*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2012 ; Sergiu Mișcoiu, « Balkan Populisms: The Cases of Bulgaria and Romania », *Southeastern Europe*, vol. 38, no. 1, 2014, pp. 1-24.

1. DU PROJET DE LA DÉMOCRATISATION D'UN SYSTÈME POLITIQUE : INITIATIVE ET SUCCÈS.

Le projet de démocratisation de l'homme et des institutions est à la traversée du temps et de l'espace. Dans son évolution, il rencontre des influences aussi diverses quant à son acceptation qu'à sa compréhension. Le risque de mutation est énorme car elle doit faire face à des situations conjoncturelles que le temps et l'espace lui imposent. Nonobstant ces contraintes, nous tenterons de nous fonder sur l'idée de la démocratie dans ses marques.

1.1. De la démocratisation et la démocratie

Lorsqu'il pense au problème du rachitisme politique, dont souffrent les sociétés africaines, Mbembe tombe à la conclusion qu'il est impératif de démocratiser le développement⁹. Pour lui, la démocratisation du développement suppose une libéralisation d'initiative et de créativité. Il revient au pouvoir de l'Etat de créer des conditions favorables aux hommes de disposer de l'entière liberté d'initiative et de stimuler auprès de ceux-ci l'esprit de créativité et d'innovation. Il est question, pour Mbembe, de réorganiser le système politique à travers un processus de démocratisation qui aboutirait à un développement intégral de l'homme.

La démocratisation se présente, de ce fait, comme « une trajectoire de formation des normes, des valeurs et d'institutions précises comme cadres d'une action politique significative au regard de la tolérance des Droits de l'homme, de la concurrence »¹⁰. Il paraît assez clair que la démocratisation consiste à mettre en place des mécanismes de gestion, autrement dit institutions d'appui à la démocratie, et de gouvernance tournés vers les exigences d'une légitimité des acteurs à travers les citoyens, et une garantie de l'objectivité de l'espace politique. Précisément, la démocratisation consiste à établir un système de gestion et de gouvernance capable de rendre compte de l'exercice du pouvoir accrédité d'une part et, d'autre part, elle consiste à une réalité purement extérieure aux individus ou aux acteurs.

⁹ Achille Mbembe, *Les jeunes et l'ordre politique en Afrique Noire*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1985, p. 216.

¹⁰ Chaîne de Solidarité Agissante, *Module de formation sur la Démocratie*, Décembre 2006, p. 32.

Du grec¹¹ « demos » qui signifie « peuple » et « Kratein » qui signifie « gouverner », « demokratia » veut dire ce système politique dans lequel il y a un gouvernement qui dirige avec le consentement du peuple. C'est-à-dire, le peuple est le souverain primaire, et c'est lui qui exerce le contrôle politique. Les citoyens gouvernent soit directement, soit indirectement. C'est à dire par représentation. La démocratie, ce système de gestion de la chose publique par excellence, est définie comme « cette forme de régime où le peuple exerce lui-même la souveraineté ou beaucoup plus souvent par ses représentants »¹². Dans l'expression d'Abraham Lincoln, nous trouvons cette définition de la démocratie tel que l'article 2 de la constitution française du 4 octobre 1958 le stipule : « gouvernement du peuple, par le peuple et pour le peuple »¹³. Cela revient à dire que la démocratie ainsi définie, est ce système qui se propose d'associer l'ensemble de citoyens, dans la mesure du possible, à la gestion de la chose publique. A travers une série d'idées et de principes sur la liberté, l'égalité et la tolérance, la démocratie se présente comme une constitutionnalisation de la liberté. Faisant des démocrates, les partisans des libertés civiles et politiques. Ainsi, démocratisation se confond à la promotion de la liberté individuelle.

1.2. Du libéralisme

Ayant des origines idéologiques dans le XVIIIe, voire le XVIIe siècle, la doctrine libérale, une doctrine d'affranchissement, de liberté politique, économique, et religieuse vise à « garantir les libertés civiles et politiques contre l'absolutisme royal et l'intolérance religieuse »¹⁴. Il s'agit ici, non pas d'admettre une autorité selon la théorie du Léviathan, mais plutôt, de restituer, par le corps social, des libertés et des droits individuels non aliénés par le contrat. Ce sont les libertés et les droits individuels qui sont à l'origine de l'association politique librement formée par les participants au contrat social. C'est-à-dire, l'Etat ou « un groupement d'individus dirigé par un gouvernement central au nom d'une idée d'entreprise, qui est la réalisation d'un certain ordre social et politique dont

¹¹ *Idem.*, p. 8.

¹² Leclercq, cité par Edouard Mpongo Bokako Bautolinga, dans *Institutions Politiques et Droit constitutionnel*, Kinshasa, Editions Universitaires Africaines, 2001, p. 3.

¹³ Edouard Mpongo Bokako Bautolinga, *Institutions Politiques et Droit constitutionnel*, Kinshasa, Editions Universitaires Africaines, 2001, p. 3.

¹⁴ Alain Miroir, « La doctrine libérale sur l'Etat, l'Eglise et la société. », dans *Histoire de la laïcité*, Bruxelles, PULB, pp. 89-105.

les sujets de l'Etat seront les bénéficiaires »¹⁵. Et l'Etat doit se séparer à jamais avec les religions sauf s'il s'agit de l'éducation de la jeunesse, ils doivent collaborer. Ce qui constitue le pacifique projet pour Alain Miroir. C'est à dire qu'à travers le culte de l'intelligence humaine, la doctrine libérale n'admet comme son seul dogme que la liberté de la pensée dans toutes ses formes et dans toutes ses manifestations.

Face à des situations classées : critique sociale, critique politique, évocation d'une personne, évocation d'un lieu, évocation d'une époque, etc. lorsque l'on souffre d'un malaise, il y a lieu de faire appel à un mode et un champ de positionnement. Le libéralisme admet un militantisme permettant de se formuler à travers divers moyens d'expression qui touchent non seulement le cadre local, mais aussi géopolitique mondial. Par exemple, à travers les chants, les artistes participent à une prise de parole publique. Bouimedini et Dadoua s'aperçoivent que « la chanson sociale touche plus ou moins directement à la politique »¹⁶. C'est-à-dire qu'à travers les chansons satiriques ou patriotiques, par exemple, les artistes parviennent à persuader la conscience populaire quant à leur situation conjoncturelle. Ce système satisfait aux exigences doctrinales d'affranchissement, de liberté politique, économique, religieuse. Cela s'applique, également, à la liberté individuelle et à la liberté de penser.

Cependant, il y a lieu de signaler qu'il est plusieurs types de démocraties à l'intérieur desquelles, il existe des degrés. Nous nous proposons dans le cadre de notre étude, d'analyser deux démocraties différentes : la démocratie marxiste ou socialiste et la démocratie libérale.

1.3. La démocratie marxiste ou socialiste et la démocratie libérale : quelle trajectoire institutionnelle pour une bonne gouvernance ?

Partant des conceptions du modèle d'explication de l'évolution économique, le moteur primordial responsable de toutes les transformations sociales, évoquées par Joseph Schumpeter¹⁷, à la suite de Marx, est celui qui ne subit aucune influence de l'extérieur et, par conséquent, est le fondement

¹⁵ Edouard Mpongo Bokako Bautolinga, *Institutions et Politique et Droit constitutionnel*, Kinshasa, Editions Universitaires Africaines, 2001, p. 63.

¹⁶ Belkacem Boumedin et Nebia Dadoua Hadria, « Le discours rap en Algérie, entre stratégie d'intégration et volonté d'internationalisation », dans *Les jeunes face à l'exclusion : des stratégies d'intégration aux stratégies marginales*, Paris, l'Harmattan, 2013, pp. 199-211.

¹⁷ Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalisme, Socialisme et Démocratie*, Paris, Payot, 1961, p.75.

même de l'action créatrice de l'histoire de l'humanité. Cette idée, appuyée par le Djutéisme, révèle son accomplissement par l'implication d'un Etat-providence.

Pour Esping-Andersen¹⁸, l'Etat-providence est l'exigence de l'assurance d'un bien-être minimum pour chaque citoyen. L'évolution se produit au sein même de la société. Cette évolution est poussée par la masse populaire qui fonde, par le fait même, l'histoire de l'évolution économique, politique et sociale.

Le point de départ du Djoutché¹⁹, sur l'évolution sociopolitique de l'homme et de la société, est une histoire de lutte. En effet, l'homme lutte pour s'affranchir des entraves de la nature et poursuit sa progression sur le plan idéologique et culturel. Cette lutte, pour arriver à sa réalisation, est menée par la masse populaire. Cette dernière est composée des sociétés laborieuses, des maîtres de la société, capables de mener une transformation révolutionnaire au sein d'un système social. La lutte incessante est chez Djoutché une édification du socialisme et du communisme qui cherche à éradiquer dans toutes ses formes l'inégalité et l'injustice sociales.

A travers le concept d'Etat-providence, une assurance du bien-être commun a pour objectif d'établir un équilibre social. Un équilibre qui consiste à mettre en place un système de protection des plus faibles, face à la marchandisation par les plus forts. Créer une société dans laquelle le modèle de stratification est établi non pas selon les forces du marché, mais plutôt sur les standards de la classe moyenne. C'est ainsi que le système socialiste et communiste, visant à libérer la masse laborieuse de l'exploitation sociale et nationale, propose le chemin de la souveraineté.

Cependant, le point de vue capitaliste évoqué par Perroux²⁰, dans le cadre de l'évolution sociale, admet un progrès économique fondé sur une expression en termes de satisfaction et de coût. C'est-à-dire qu'il faut tenir compte ici de la plus grande satisfaction qu'un bien de consommation ou un bien de production peut produire au consommateur et le coût du bien ou de la production dans le marché. De ce fait, dans chacun des échanges, le but à poursuivre est le rendement. Cela étant, le rendement n'est possible que si le

¹⁸ Gosta Esping-Andersen, *Les trois modes de l'Etat-providence. Essai sur le capitalisme moderne*, Paris, PUF, 1999, p. 32.

¹⁹ Kim Djeung Il, *Des idées du djoutché de notre parti*, Pyongyang, Editions en Langues Etrangères, 1985, p. 27.

²⁰ François Perroux, *Le capitalisme*, Paris, PUF, 1960, p. 10.

système économique, dans sa dynamique, dépend à la fois des liaisons automatiques ou quasi automatiques et du libre choix. Raison pour laquelle, dans ce système, le modèle de stratification est la production du marché. « Celle-ci est juste, parce qu'elle reflète l'effort, la motivation, l'adaptation et l'indépendance »²¹. Toutefois, le système reflète sur le plan social, l'importance des efforts de chacun sur le marché des biens et des services. Aux yeux d'Esping-Andersen, il est imprudent à l'Etat-providence, dans sa tâche, de pouvoir assurer le minimum social. Cette façon d'agir est contraire à la morale capitaliste. Du coup, les conceptions morales s'opposent et se confrontent.

Dans sa mission économique, l'Etat procède à la disparition de la classe considérée de « petit gens », pour être remplacée par les nouveaux salariats et des ouvriers plus prospères tout en prévenant les conditions et les risques d'exode massifs vers le plan privé afin d'éviter dans toutes ses formes, les inégalités sociales. Face à la morale capitaliste, qui consiste à promouvoir l'effort et l'indépendance individuels, le socialisme est saisi comme la source de la pauvreté et du chômage. Précisément, l'assurance d'un minimum social défavorise la compétitivité et supprime, de ce fait, l'effort individuel à la performance. En l'occurrence, le droit au chômage et les allocations familiales sur le nombre d'enfants occasionnent des conflits au sein des familles, et aussi, pompe le pouvoir d'achat des autres. La protection sociale dit Esping-Andersen : « cause corruption morale, imprévoyance, oisiveté et ivrognerie »²². Dans cet imbroglio souligné, les deux principes moraux s'objectent.

Le néolibéralisme, quant à lui, est un système d'économie d'entreprise qui exige des résultats jugés avantageux. Et comme tout système économique, « il ne sauvegarde et ne promeut le progrès économique que pour une accumulation de capital efficient »²³. Et dans sa tâche essentielle, le capitalisme découvre ou constitue des marchés capables d'absorber, sans cesse, des quantités de marchandises accrues. Cependant, dans le cas d'une sous-consommation des grandes masses, Marx et la théorie socialiste²⁴ évoquent la cause de la crise et le mal du système capitaliste. La production capitaliste se trouve face à une sous-consommation, car ne pouvant être consommé par la masse, qui n'a pas de moyens suffisants de s'en acquérir premièrement, et

²¹ Gosta Esping-Andersen, *Op.cit.*, p. 83.

²² *Ibid*, p. 59.

²³ François Perroux, *Op.cit.*, p. 12.

²⁴ Fritz Sternberg, *Le conflit du siècle : capitalisme et socialisme à l'épreuve de l'histoire*, Vienne, Seuil, 1958, p. 50.

deuxièmement ces produits ne correspondent pas à la consommation personnelle des capitalistes.

Ainsi, plutôt que de savoir jusqu'où l'humanité sera entraînée avec ce conflit, le sens du dialogue exige, comme le pense Perroux²⁵, l'invention des sociétés neuves. Une situation dans laquelle, le nouvel homme serait le produit d'une confrontation conséquente. Nous y reviendrons, dans la partie de notre investigation consacrée à la culture démocratique. Que peut-on dire de la partie formelle de notre méthode ?

2. DE L'APPROCHE FORMELLE DE DÉMOCRATISATION D'UN SYSTÈME POLITIQUE POUR UNE BONNE GOUVERNANCE.

Cette partie renferme trois volets : Les principes, les fondamentaux et les arborescences (²⁶).

2.1. Les Principes de la démocratie

Il s'agit ici des principes sur lesquels repose la démocratie. Ces principes sont les suivants : la souveraineté, la liberté et le respect des Droits fondamentaux des personnes.

2.1.1. De La souveraineté du peuple

En démocratie, la souveraineté du peuple réside dans le fait qu'émane du peuple tout pouvoir. Tout pouvoir émane du peuple. En effet, dans la démocratie, le pouvoir n'est ni l'émanation d'une classe donnée de la couche sociale, ni une exhalaison divine. Par contre, il est une dévolution du suffrage populaire. Et de là vient la légitimité et la sacralité du pouvoir. Il est directement exercé par le peuple par voie de referendum ou d'élection et, de façon indirecte, par les représentants du peuple, choisis par le peuple lui-même. D'où la nature de la délégation du pouvoir.

2.1.2. De La liberté en démocratie

Le système démocratique est avant tout un système qui garantit des libertés fondamentales de la personne humaine. Il n'est point un système où un gouvernement se lance à un semblant d'évolution ou de développement tout en

²⁵ François Perroux, *Coexistence pacifique : guerre ou partage du pain ?*, Paris, PUF, 1958, p. 37.

²⁶ Jean-François Pluviaud, Fragment.

aliénant la liberté des personnes soumises à ce mouvement. On ne pourrait prétendre avoir édifié une société, aussi harmonieuse qu'elle puisse être, tout en présupposant le modèle et le type d'homme à engendrer. L'homme est un être perfectible et en perpétuelle évolution. Il est un projet de lui-même.

Notre méthode est diamétralement opposée à la méthode qui consiste à s'appuyer sur des situations précaires de la masse afin de l'orienter vers l'édification d'un système prétendant apporter des solutions salvatrices tout en aliénant leurs libertés.

2.1.3. Du respect des Droits fondamentaux de la personne

« Le principe de protection des Droits fondamentaux de la personne est très largement admis. Il est incorporé à des constitutions écrites dans le monde entier, il figure dans la charte des Nations Unies et fait l'objet d'accords internationaux »²⁷. Parmi ces droits nous pouvons citer : Le Droit à la liberté de religion, le droit à la liberté de parole, (...). Dans un sens plus pratique, la démocratie admet le droit à la liberté de la presse, le Droit à la liberté de réunion et d'association, (...). Par exemple, la Constitution de la RDC stipule dans son article 11 : « Tous les êtres humains naissent libres et égaux en dignité et en droits. Toutefois, la jouissance des droits politiques est reconnue aux seuls congolais, sauf exceptions établies par la loi »²⁸. Cependant, dans la pratique, le pouvoir public trouve dans cette disposition une voie vers la fragilisation du pouvoir. Par exemple la répression violente des marches pacifiques et les arrestations arbitraires.

2.2. Les fondamentaux de la démocratie

Nous entendons par fondamentaux, un ensemble de procédés qui, à travers leur caractère immuable, sont destinés à provoquer par leur répétition systématique le basculement dans un autre univers de réflexion. Le système démocratique obéit à ce mode de fonctionnement à travers les institutions qui l'appuient à savoir : le vote, la participation, le multipartisme, la protestation et les médias.

²⁷ Chaîne de Solidarité Agissante, *Module de formation sur la Démocratie*, Décembre 2006, p. 23.

²⁸ Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, *La constitution de la République Démocratique du Congo*, du 18 février 2006, Amandée, le 20 janvier 2011, Kinshasa, p. 16.

2.2.1. *Du Vote*

Il est admis que « l'action de voter pour élire des représentants qui exerceront les charges publiques est la forme la plus visible et la plus répandue de la participation à la vie des démocraties modernes, c'est aussi la plus fondamentale »²⁹. C'est à travers le vote que le peuple exprime leur souveraineté. A travers le vote, les électeurs expriment leurs préférences politiques d'une part, par exemple, par le vote de la Constitution par referendum. Et d'autre part, le vote permet aux électeurs de choisir leurs représentants. Dans ses fonctions sociales,³⁰ le vote traduit le sentiment d'appartenance à un groupe social, le partage des valeurs collectives nationales, le partage des valeurs consensuelles et la légitimation des gouvernants.

2.2.2. *De la participation*

Les citoyens participent à la vie politique de leur pays. Cette participation est à la fois un droit et un devoir. C'est un droit dans la mesure où l'institution politique démocratique met en place des mécanismes de reconnaissance aux citoyens, de leur droit de liberté. Un citoyen est libre d'user ou non de son droit de participation. Ayant, en même temps, des devoirs, le citoyen mesure par sa liberté, l'importance de sa prise de position. En adhérant à des associations, des groupes de bénévoles, à des organisations privées ou encore dans des groupements politiques, et dès lors que cette participation est massive, il y a lieu de faire entendre sa voix et d'augmenter sa chance d'influencer l'histoire dans la vie politique de sa communauté³¹.

²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 43.

³⁰ Stanislas D'ornano, « Question 3. Pourquoi le vote est-il à la fois un acte individuel et un acte collectif ?, <https://www.melchior.fr/cours/complet/question-3-pourquoi-le-vote-est-il-la-fois-un-acte-individuel-et-un-acte-collectif>

³¹ Dans certains systèmes démocratiques plus avancées, la participation des citoyens se manifeste à travers des outils plus peaufinés comme le droit de retirer le mandat des élus dans certaines conditions ou la délibération publique. V. Sergiu Mișcoiu, « Recall Practices in Central and Eastern Europe: From Citizen Accountability to Partisan Account Settling », In: Yanina Welp et Laurence Whitehead (eds.), *The Politics of Recall Elections*, Basingstoke, Palgrave/Macmillan, 2020, pp. 159-178 ; et, respectivement, Sergiu Gherghina et Sergiu Miscoiu, « Crowd-Sourced Legislation and Politics », *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 63, no. 1, 2016, pp. 27-36.

2.2.3. Du multipartisme

Pour paraphraser Mbembe : « l'illusion parsemée par les partis-uniques, à savoir qu'il pourra y avoir un « bon gouvernement », qui tel un « bon père » assurera le bien-être intégral au « bon-peuple » y compris malgré lui s'effiloche »³². L'illusion fait partie de ce qu'Esping-Andersen entend par l'Etat-providence. Mbembe³³ ajoutera que la tâche ou le rôle de l'Etat est encore moins une tâche de « Providence ». A travers la mise au crédit d'un « pluralisme agonistique »³⁴ et dans le but de rompre avec toutes les formes d'autoritarisme soit historique qu'inédit, la démocratie exige une libéralisation de l'espace politique. Du coup, le multipartisme se présente comme la forme d'organisation la plus appropriée dans la démocratie. En partant du pluralisme, les élections permettent aux citoyens d'une démocratie de se choisir leurs dirigeants à travers des moyens équitables et pacifiques.

2.2.4. De la protestation

« La contestation constitue un banc d'essai pour la démocratie »³⁵. Bien que cette idée soit difficile à admettre et à digérer, trop de résultats empiriques peuvent prouver l'incontournable vérité. La protestation est, de ce fait, la forme légitime pour un peuple de s'exprimer contre un programme ou une politique mise en place par un gouvernement. C'est une forme de rassemblement pacifique et une forme de contestation non violente. Ce regroupement ou manifestation a pour visée d'attirer l'attention des médias sous la forme : d'organisation des manifestations ou des défilés, boycotts de certains produits, signature des pétitions, mise en grève, ainsi que toutes autres formes d'action directe à l'instar des droits des syndicats à l'organisation de grève contre les employeurs.

2.2.5. Des médias comme 4eme pouvoir.

Les Médias constituent la radio, la télévision, l'internet, les revues, les journaux, les livres et tous ces moyens de transmission de communication et d'information. Les médias permettent la diffusion de l'information. Ils sont un

³² Achille Mbembe, *Op.cit.*, p. 228.

³³ *Ibid*, p. 215.

³⁴ Charles Mbadu Kia-ManguedI, *La philosophie et le pouvoir politique. De la politique politicienne à la politique vraie*, Kinshasa, PUK, 2016, p. 120.

³⁵ Chaine de Solidarité Agissante, *Module de formation sur la Démocratie*, Décembre 2006, p. 45.

moyen d'expression essentiel pour les acteurs démocratiques et ils jouent un grand rôle dans la formation de l'opinion publique³⁶. Autrement dit, les médias, non seulement, forment et informent, mais aussi, se constituent en chien de garde quant à l'action du gouvernement.

2.3. Les arborescences comme identité démocratique

A la différence avec les deux premiers : les principes et les fondamentaux, malgré la variation de leur formulation, ils se retrouvent dans toutes les démocraties. Mais par contre, les arborescences sont des perfections spécifiques à chaque démocratie et reflètent ce qui est sa vision propre. Les arborescences sont dominantes à chaque démocratie. Elles sont son cadre de perfectionnement. Elles constituent la gestion des principes et des fondamentaux relatives à des réalités concrètes de chaque Etat et de chaque nation. Il est question de prendre en compte le facteur culturel, religieux et historique d'un peuple ou d'une communauté donnée.

Par rapport à sa forme et à son type, toute démocratie, (directe, représentative, participative, chrétienne, constitutionnaliste, libérale, populaire, parlementaire, présidentielle : capitaliste ou socialiste), répond à la rigueur du respect des principes et des fondamentaux. C'est alors qu'au gré des circonstances et des situations tangibles, qu'elle cherche son propre couronnement. Raison pour laquelle, l'on peut constater l'importance grandissante du pourcentage de l'abstentionnisme électoral en Suisse et aux Etats-Unis, tandis qu'il est faible en Grande Bretagne ou en Italie et encore moins en France.

Le succès de notre méthode réside avant tout dans sa pratique. Car démocratiser est avant tout question de trouver le lien « entre la culture d'un peuple et sa capacité à faire fonctionner la démocratie »³⁷. Ainsi, la démocratisation se résume d'une part à la construction d'un cadre institutionnel précis comme base d'action politique, et d'autre part, la formation d'une trajectoire de conception des normes et des valeurs.

Partant de l'idée selon laquelle « l'enseignement et la pratique de la prévention et de la résolution pacifique des conflits doivent se faire dès le début de la scolarité afin d'habituer l'élève aux vertus du dialogue, à la non-violence et

³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 47.

³⁷ *Idem*, p. 36.

à l'esprit cosmopolite »³⁸, nous nous trouvons devant un cadre idéal d'inspiration d'une démocratie africaine en général et congolaise en particulier. C'est ce qu'exige, en effet, une « pédagogie du sens »³⁹. L'adaptation du système éducatif à la situation et aux problèmes concrets par rapport à une société ou un peuple donné. A travers, notamment, l'invitation du sage à la danse dans la chanson dite « d'introduction à la parole entonnant de l'arbre à palabre »⁴⁰, nous réalisons que la culture du dialogue n'est pas étrangère à la tradition africaine. Depuis le temps, la tradition africaine perpétue une dialectique du travail, du partage et de gestion des conflits, témoignée par la sagesse proverbiale qui constitue le chemin d'une réconciliation sociale. Dans ce contexte, nous pensons qu'il y a lieu d'aboutir à un système démocratique issu de l'héritage culturel congolais. Cependant, la tradition européenne présente un modèle de construction de la paix sous forme « des valeurs éthiques et morales transversales : l'échange, le partage, le respect de la diversité, l'amitié entre les peuples. Nous pouvons réunir ces valeurs à la fois éthiques, à savoir des normes pour vivre ensemble, et morales, à savoir des normes pour « bien » (11) vivre ensemble à l'intérieur de la notion de « solidarité », que l'on retrouve posée par de nombreux acteurs, et qui trouvent une application pratique dans l'action humanitaire ».⁴¹ La mise en avant du savoir, en faisant de la formation un outil de paix, fait du savoir une valeur dans la gestion des conflits. Par exemple, à travers *Think Tank*, le dialogue et le débat donnent une ouverture aux échanges et aux partages.

Précisément, le post néolibéralisme, sous la plume de Virginie Ikeroutène, « se définit par une structure politique permettant une redistribution du pouvoir de décision (section 1.2), un système économique néoextractiviste qui s'inscrit pleinement dans le système capitaliste (section 1.3), et par des relations internationales qui traduisent une vision d'un ordre mondial multipolaire

³⁸ Henri-Faustin Bolelo E'ongo Falanga, « Faut-il un cours d'éducation à la paix à l'école ? », dans *Congo-Afrique*, (septembre 2015), n° 497, pp. 591-599.

³⁹ Hervé Cellier, « La réussite éducative en France : dispositif, fragilité et pédagogie. », in *Les jeunes face à l'exclusion : des stratégies d'intégration aux stratégies marginales.*, Paris, l'Harmattan, 2013, pp. 49-67.

⁴⁰ Kamwiziku Wozol, « Initiation à l'histoire du clan et/ou de la tribu et aux relations inter clanique. Le cas des peuples Soonde-Lunda. », dans *L'éducation de la jeunesse dans l'église-famille en Afrique*, Kinshasa, Facultés catholiques de Kinshasa, 2001, pp. 75-85.

⁴¹ Sophie Arie, *Op. Cit.*

(section 1.4) ». ⁴² C'est-à-dire que le post néolibéralisme est un système qui prend en compte les particularités culturelles et historiques des communautés. Il est clair ici que le développement d'une communauté est fonction de sa propre identité culturelle. Ainsi, le respect des identités culturelles quant à leurs diversités, soutenu par Virginie Ikeroutène, illustre l'idée que nous évoquons à travers ce concept, les arborescences en démocratie.

3. LA DÉMOCRATIE COMME MODE DE VIE ET MODÈLE CULTUREL OU NORMATIF

Le comportement démocratique exige de l'esprit humain une aptitude et une habilité remarquable dans la gestion des conflits, d'une part et d'autre part, un sens développé du rapprochement à autrui à travers le dialogue.

3.1. *Le pragmatisme réducteur des conflits*

Aristote définit l'homme comme un animal politique. Considéré comme une vérité, Carlo le démontre « par le fait que nous évoluons au sein de groupes sociaux, qu'il y a plus de gens mariés que de célibataires, que l'on consacre beaucoup de temps et d'argent à des fêtes ennuyeuses, et que le mot « solitude » est normalement chargé de connotations négatives » ⁴³. Vivre en société implique une relation de perte et de gain pour les uns et les autres. La perte ou le gain est causé(e) ou tiré(e) par chacun de nous par l'action ou l'inaction de l'un ou de l'autre. Ainsi, la vie en communauté avec des milliards de semblables constitue, pour Vry William ⁴⁴, un défi que l'homme n'a jamais auparavant rencontré au cours de son histoire.

La relation sociale, ayant un contenu significatif, mesure l'ensemble des rapports conditionnant l'action ou l'inaction d'un membre de la société à un autre. Le rapport est tantôt de lutte, d'opposition et d'hostilité, tantôt de solitude, de sympathie et de bienveillance que les êtres, les uns après les autres, orientent leur conduite. « Selon Weber la relation sociale désigne le comportement de plusieurs

⁴² Virginie Ikeroutène, *Évaluation du post-néolibéralisme comme modèle de développement*, Mémoire de Master 2 en Économie du développement, Faculté d'Économie de Grenoble, Année universitaire 2021-2022, file:///C:/Users/AcerES/Downloads/valuationdupost-nolibéralismecommemodlededveloppement.pdf

⁴³ Carlo M. Cipolla, *Les lois fondamentales de la stupidité humaine*, Paris, PUF, 2012, p. 27.

⁴⁴ William Vry, *Comment négocier la paix : du conflit à la coopération chez soi, au travail et dans le monde*, Paris, Nouveaux Horizons-ARS, 2001, p. XV.

individus ou groupes qui règlent leur conduite les uns sur les autres et s'orientent en conséquence »⁴⁵. C'est-à-dire que le conflit est, de ce fait, une relation sociale.

D'après Carlo, la troisième loi fondamentale de la stupidité humaine énonce : « Est stupide celui qui entraîne une perte pour un autre individu ou un groupe d'autres individus, tout en n'en tirant lui-même aucun bénéfice et en s'infligeant éventuellement des pertes »⁴⁶. Le danger est permanent. Face à l'homme stupide, il n'y a aucune précaution à prendre si ce n'est que l'appréhension de l'autérité. L'« Autre » est capable de générer une situation d'hostilité ou de paix. Il met le « Je » devant une contrainte, sa volonté de coopérer. Et ne permet pas, cependant, une remise en cause du problème de la coexistence. Puisqu'il est impératif que nous apprenions à coopérer, afin d'abolir la distance qui nous sépare de l'autre, il y a lieu de faire appel à l'instrument capable de faire traverser les obstacles en perpétuelle interposition. Le langage est non seulement notre instrument, mais aussi un pouvoir de la manifestation de l'être relationnel de l'homme.

Chez Jürgen Habermas⁴⁷, il y a une présupposition du langage dans l'activité communicationnelle. Ici, le langage est saisi comme étant un médium. Exigeant, dans le cadre de la rationalité communicationnelle, une entente. Cette entente n'est possible que si les participants à l'activité communicationnelle se conforment au principe d'intercompréhension. Il est question chez Habermas que les participants se mettent d'accord concernant les énoncés quant à leur validité, légitimité et vérité. En premier lieu, il est question de vérifier la vérité de sa proposition. Précisément, dans son objectivité, l'énoncé doit être capable de résister à un examen critique quant à sa véracité ou fausseté dans un cadre formel. En deuxième lieu, l'agir communicationnel exige que le langage soit pratique et contextuel. C'est-à-dire qu'il y a lieu de définir le cadre dans lequel se tient la communication. Enfin, le troisième élément pour un acteur à l'intercompréhension est subjectif. S'agissant, ainsi, du lieu de l'auteur, ce dernier exprime sa pensée et ses intentions.

L'activité d'affranchissement se déroule dans un contexte de dévoilement des uns en face des autres. Atteindre l'autre à travers le langage et les paroles est cette puissance de traverser ou de se tracer un passage à travers les obstacles

⁴⁵ Julien Freund, *Sociologie du conflit*, Paris, PUF, 1983, p. 113.

⁴⁶ Carlo M. Cipolla, *Op.cit.*, p. 34.

⁴⁷ Jürgen HABERMAS, *Théorie de l'agir communicationnel*, Tome 1, Paris, Fayard, 1987, p. 116.

sans cesse interposés. C'est ce qu'implique le mot dialogue chez Eliane Amado⁴⁸.

3.2. *La liberté ouverte du dialogue*

La société d'aujourd'hui, essentiellement fondée sur la compétition, aussi paradoxalement que nous pouvons le constater, est la conséquence d'une exploitation intensive des ressources non extensibles et précieuses. La limitation de ces ressources fait du positionnement socio-ethnographique un modèle de stratification. Du coup, l'exclusion sociale fait des groupes marginalisés des fauteurs de troubles. L'approfondissement du sujet au niveau d'une étude des phénomènes sociaux à travers les approches macrosociologique et microsociologique démontrent à suffisance qu'il y a nécessité de créer une situation satisfaisante pour tous. Pour ne citer que la notion de « tranquillité publique » évoquée par Véronique Bordes⁴⁹, dans le cadre de la politique de la jeunesse, face à l'exclusion des jeunes, la conclusion est que la jeunesse s'autorise à « prendre place », pour faire du conflit et les jeux de pouvoir des indicateurs d'une relation qui s'organise. Car, pense Vry William⁵⁰, le taux de violence varie, dans une large mesure, par rapport à la manière dont les gens, selon leur culture, choisissent de vivre leurs différends. Comme le disait le peuple Semang⁵¹, les êtres humains peuvent contrôler le conflit puisqu'il est une création humaine. Attendu que le résultat d'un conflit est aussi important que la manière dont on règle ce conflit, nous admettons qu'il faut substituer à l'idée de compétition, l'idée de coopération et la notion du donner et du recevoir dans un cadre dialogale et d'entretenir le palabre.

Le Talmud dit: « dans tout dialogue on est Trois »⁵². Dans un sens métaphysique, la vérité est saisie comme transcendante au dialogue. Et autrui est le premier appel vers cette transcendance, voir même la première image ou la première suggestion de la transcendance. Martin Buber⁵³ désigne par le terme

⁴⁸ Eliane Amado et Lévy-Valensi, *La communication*, Paris, Editions universitaires, 1972, p. 71.

⁴⁹ Véronique Bordes, « L'usage du conflit comme stratégie marginale : deux exemples. » dans *Les jeunes face à l'exclusion : des stratégies d'intégration aux stratégies marginales.*, Paris, l'Harmattan, 2013, pp. 133-147.

⁵⁰ William Vry, *Op.cit.*, p. 54.

⁵¹ *Idem*, p. 55.

⁵² Eliane Amado et Lévy-Valensi, *Op.cit.*, p. 98.

⁵³ Martin Buber, *Philosophie de la relation*, Paris, Seghers, 1968, p. 69.

de dialogue, la réalité concrète de la relation ontologique « Je-Tu ». Une relation qui met en jeu le « Je », le « Tu » et la Vérité. Le rapport entre les trois est de la préférence de la vérité du « Tu » par le « Je » plus que le « Je » lui-même. Le dialogue est saisi dans son fonctionnement, d'un côté, comme une communication entre partenaire et, de l'autre côté, comme une manière d'être et de se faire être.

Dans le sens communicationnel du terme, le mécanisme du dialogue est une activité qui s'effectue dans la tension extrême à surmonter la difficulté à dire et la difficulté à comprendre. Il s'agit dans un premier lieu de conjuguer des efforts incessant d'expressions correctes et imparables. On y associe parfois des expressions suggestives et imagées. Dans le second lieu, il y a cette sollicitation ininterrompue d'un effort d'intelligence. Il est nécessaire de faire pleinement attention aux mots et d'être vigilant à ce qui les déborde, aussi bien qu'il faut être primitivement sincère.

Du point de vue dialectique, le dialogue se présente comme l'ordonnateur du mouvement de la réalité et, en même temps, comme le mode logique que Perroux⁵⁴ appelle : « dialectique du dialogue ». Entre deux partenaires livrés au dialogue, il y a nécessité d'une recherche en commun de la vérité par la communication contradictoire. Dans la recherche d'une solution jugée juste ou une proposition jugée vraie, par les deux interlocuteurs, la violence est exclue. Chacun des participants se dispose à accepter l'autre et s'engage à communiquer entant qu'être rationnel dans un processus qui se déroule et se suspend dans un temps et dans un espace social organisé et déterminé.

Dans son sens comportemental, ce deuxième sens du dialogue est une attitude de la conscience ou une manière d'être et de se faire être. Ce mode d'être implique une culture du dialogue en évitant ainsi l'idée de violence et de meurtre. Le comportement vise à faire de la dialectique, une méthode consistant à apprécier de l'extérieur le conflit afin d'en expliquer les aspects. C'est ainsi qu'opposé à l'éristique, qui ne cherche qu'à contredire et est incapable de mener une étude sur une question, la dialectique est une opposition à la saisie syncrétique des choses. Son objectif est de faire tendre le sujet à l'intelligence du discours. Ce que Jean Lacroix⁵⁵ désigne du signe de « passage de l'animalité à l'humanité » n'est rien d'autre que ce contrôle de sa propre raison par la raison d'autrui. A travers la réfutation, l'être humain se lance vers le savoir

⁵⁴ Henri Janne, « Spécificité de la morale laïque », dans *Histoire de la laïcité*, Bruxelles, La renaissance du livre, 1979, pp. 303-327.

⁵⁵ Jean Lacroix, « les sens du dialogue », Boudry, Baconnière, 1962, p. 126.

authentique. Autrement dit, au relativisme de la vérité. C'est-à-dire que par le moyen des confrontations incessantes, l'on arrive à des efforts aussi perpétuels de dépassement. C'est par le rendre compte à l'autre que l'on arrive à se définir.

La voie vers la culture du dialogue est béante et fouillée à travers la dialectique de la raison bien que mettant en question l'accessibilité de l'idée de la vérité, mais invite à l'autocritique de la raison elle-même. Il n'est nullement pour nous question d'une affaire ironique telle que certains le pensent. Plutôt, à la suite d'Henri Janne, nous admettons que le refus de la transcendance constitue le principe fondamental de notre morale. De ce fait, il n'est de raison que dans l'homme et dans ce qui est propre à la nature humaine. Henri Janne trouve que dans le phénomène proprement humain et dans son caractère sociale « le code symbolique des hommes c'est le langage utilisé soit intérieurement, soit dans la communication laquelle permet une recherche commune des agencements symboliques les plus appropriés pour rendre compte de la réalité ou construire des enchaînements cohérents »⁵⁶. Ce qui veut dire que le caractère social de l'homme dans son mode relationnel compose inéluctablement le contenu normatif des comportements ayant pour seul mode d'expression, le langage. L'homme est un être qui doit son évolution à ses semblables.

CONCLUSION

Notre réflexion a porté essentiellement sur la méthode de démocratisation. De prime abord, nous avons montré que la démocratie est un système de gestion politique dans lequel le pouvoir est une émanation du peuple. Et que la démocratie pouvait se confondre au libéralisme. Dans le rapport entre le socialisme ou communisme et le capitalisme, il convient de comprendre que chaque système démocratique, dans le cadre de leurs graphes, éprouve des cycles de perfectionnement quant à ses objectifs spécifiques. Ensuite, nous avons ressorti les principes et avons classifié, de manière ordonnée, des éléments dits institutions d'appui à la démocratie, en terme de fondamentaux. Et introduit un cycle de perfectionnement en termes d'arborescence. Enfin, il nous a semblé opportun d'aborder la partie de notre méthode faisant ainsi de la démocratie, à la fois, un comportement et une manière d'être. De ce fait, dans ce que nous jugeons de comportement démocratique, nous avons, à travers le primat de la gestion pacifique des conflits et le sens du dialogue, tenté de faire assoir les valeurs de liberté et de tolérance.

⁵⁶ Henri Janne, *Op.cit.*, pp. 303-327.

Nous optons pour un aménagement conceptuel et terminologique dans la prise en compte de la formation des valeurs démocratiques. A travers l'exposition de notre méthode de démocratisation, nous pensons pouvoir mettre à la disposition des chercheurs, des acteurs politiques et de la jeunesse un instrument d'étude systématique, non seulement, du système politique, mais aussi du comportement de l'individu affronté à un critère démocratique d'appréciation. Ainsi, doté d'une méthode, nous pensons avoir fait de la démocratie une approche pouvant permettre de mener une étude rigoureuse pour conjuguer la bonne gouvernance et culture de la paix.

La démocratie a un objet, l'étude des systèmes de gestion et de gouvernance politiques, ainsi que des comportements et manières d'être fondés sur la liberté et la tolérance. En lui affectant une méthode, nous espérons qu'elle pourrait s'émanciper en science autonome, pour parler, par exemple, d'une discipline ayant des matières spécifiques. Ce qui pourrait, dans l'avenir, faire l'objet d'une étude approfondie.

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MÉMOIRE, NOSTALGIE ET « LA FIN DE L'UTOPIE » À L'ÂGE DU « PRÉSENTISME »

MEMORY, NOSTALGIA AND „THE END OF UTOPIA” IN THE AGE OF „PRESENTISM”

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Abstract:

Less than a decade after the proclamation of “the end of history”, the anxieties about “the end of utopia” are gaining ground in the intellectual field all over the world, in the context of both “the crisis of the future” and the haunting of the present by the painful pasts. The latter two are the main consequences of the fracture in the contemporary temporal order – occurred in the ‘70s and deepened after the fall of the Iron Curtain – which defines the “presentist regime of historicity”. These dynamics are counterbalanced, in the same period, by a “global epidemic of nostalgia”, including the commodified forms of “retromania”, that reveals the presentist “faces of utopianism”, from the non-instrumental “retrospective utopias” – as poles of “existential” types of reflective nostalgic practices – to the instrumental “retrotopias” based on the “restorative nostalgia”, which were mobilized in the contemporary memory wars, starting from the ‘80s. Reflecting the tensions between the fixation on the traumatic legacy of the “age of extremes” and the apprehensions about “the future of nostalgia”, the presentist dynamics of multidirectional memory discloses conflictual landscapes (social, cultural, and political), from the mnemonic turn of the ‘70s and the ‘80s – which has arisen against the background of the decline of both welfare state and the nation-states, and of the global economic crisis – to the post-Cold War contests around “the divided memories” of “Europe’s Europes”, coexisting with the clashes of contradictory “faces” of nostalgia and utopia.

Keywords: *presentism, multidirectional memory, nostalgia, retrospective utopia, retrotopia*

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INTRODUCTION

Dans son dernier essai, *Retrotopia* (2017), Zygmunt Bauman esquissait un tableau socioculturel sombre, qu'un anti-utopiste comme Leszek Kołakowski aurait décrit, probablement, dans les termes d'une « inertie sans espoir »¹, et qui indiquait un bouleversement profond non seulement des perceptions sur l'avenir, mais des repères mêmes de la modernité « solide »², en apparence encore stables vers la fin des années '60. Rappelons que, peu avant les crises surgies dès le début de la décennie suivante, dans le paysage européen façonné par la dynamique de la Guerre Froide, des formules telles que « "l'avenir radieux" des socialistes », « le miracle allemand » et « les trente glorieuses » étaient emblématiques pour l'esprit dominant d'un âge de la prospérité³ (au-delà des écarts significatifs entre les expériences des deux blocs antagonistes), caractérisé par la foi dans le progrès et par les mobilisations collectives en vue des changements sociaux positifs. Par contraste, l'émergence de la rétro-utopie – définie comme le résultat d'une « double négation » (un « rejet suivi d'une résurrection ») du modèle utopique construit par Thomas More – reflète un bouleversement radical des visions progressistes :

As the old fears drifted gradually into oblivion and the new ones gained in volume and intensity, promotion and degradation, progress and retrogression changed places [...]. This prompted the pendulums of the public mindset and mentality to perform a U-turn: from investing public hopes of improvement in the uncertain and ever-too-obviously untrustworthy future, to re-reinvesting them in the vaguely remembered past, valued for its assumed stability and so trustworthiness. [...] [T]he future is transformed from the natural habitat of hopes and rightful expectations into the site of nightmares [...].⁴

Le tournant décrit par Zygmunt Bauman – un « sociologue utopiste » avec des « convictions socialistes »⁵, conscient, tout comme les esprits

¹ Leszek Kołakowski, "The Death of Utopia Reconsidered", in Sterling M. McMurrin (éd.), *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values IV*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 247.

² Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007a, p. 67.

³ François Hartog, *Regimes of historicity: presentism and experiences of time*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2015, p. 108.

⁴ Zygmunt Bauman, *Retrotopia*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017, p. 8, 9-10.

⁵ Michael Hviid Jacobsen, "'The Activating Presence' – What Prospects of Utopia in Times of Uncertainty?" in *Polish Sociological Review*, no. 3 (155), 2006, p. 339, 341.

sceptiques pareils à Leszek Kołakowski, du potentiel périlleux du « radicalisme de l'utopie »⁶, et qui connectait cette résurrection, en suivant Svetlana Boym, à un « âge de la nostalgie » – n'était pas un thème nouveau au moment de la parution de *Retrotopia*. En effet, il a nourri, dès années '90, nombre d'analyses tributaires de diverses disciplines (*Cultural Memory Studies*, *Nostalgia Studies*, *Utopian Studies* etc.), dont les points de convergence sont les idées visant l'âge de l'incertitude, la crise de l'avenir, la mémorialisation obsessionnelle et la fin de l'utopie. « Le XX^e siècle a débuté avec une utopie futuriste et s'est achevé par la nostalgie », notait Boym⁷ au début du nouveau millénaire. En prolongeant la réflexion de l'auteure de *L'avenir de la nostalgie*, on dirait que « le siècle des extrêmes »⁸ s'est achevé par l'exaltation de l'utopie néolibérale de « la fin de l'histoire »⁹, pour que, à la fin de la première décennie des transitions à l'Est, l'on annonce la fin de l'utopie et la quasi généralisation, dans la « nouvelle Europe », de la nostalgie pour le socialisme réel, celle qui « glorifie le passé qui avait glorifié l'avenir »¹⁰. Ce trajet ne reflète qu'une étape au cours des mutations advenues en Occident dans les années '70, sur le fond du déclin de l'État-Providence et des États-Nations. Débutés à l'âge de la nostalgie, ces changements continuent dans la décennie suivante par les « guerres » des mémoires traumatiques, généralisées en Europe après la fin de la Guerre Froide. Au-delà des crises économiques, les symptômes du déclin sont l'épuisement des « énergies utopiques », qui affecte la pensée historique, ainsi que l'imaginaire social, et « l'obscurcissement » des projets de l'avenir face au présent menaçant : « ... the New Obscurity is part of a situation in which a welfare state program that continues to be nourished by a utopia of social labor is losing its power to project future possibilities for a collectively better and less endangered way of life. »¹¹ Tout comme à l'Ouest, pendant les années '70-'80,

⁶ Paul Ricoeur, « L'idéologie et l'utopie: deux expressions de l'imaginaire social » in *Autres Temps. Les cahiers du christianisme social*, no. 2, 1984, p. 62.

⁷ Svetlana Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia*, New York: Basic Books, 2001, p. xiv.

⁸ Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991*, London: Abacus, 1995.

⁹ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Macmillan, 1992.

¹⁰ Mitja Velikonja, "Lost in transition: Nostalgia for socialism in post-socialist countries" in *East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures*, no. 23 (4), 2009, p. 546.

¹¹ Jürgen Habermas, "The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian Energies", in Jürgen Habermas, *The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991, p. 50-51, 54.

dans l'Est des années '90, la principale réaction défensive-compensatoire des acteurs confrontés aux traumatismes sociaux a été la nostalgie. De fait, à l'Ouest (et surtout au Royaume Uni et en France), où le collapsus des « industries et des communautés a laissé une trace ineffaçable dans la culture populaire et dans la psychologie collective »¹², la nostalgie pour « le projet socialiste » matérialisé dans l'État-Providence avait intégré aussi des fantaisies concernant l'« autre » Europe¹³.

Dans les deux contextes – qui marquent deux étapes de l'europanisation culturelle, contrabalancée par les processus de « nationalisation de l'histoire »¹⁴ –, la mémoire est au centre des pratiques culturelles institutionnalisées, telles que les politiques historiques, « la muséification », la célébration des « lieux de mémoire » etc.¹⁵. En contraste avec la culture mémorielle officielle, la culture populaire nostalgique dévoile, à l'Ouest, les visages d'un passé perçu comme « un pays étranger »¹⁶. C'est sur le fond de l'émergence, à l'époque, du premier flot néo-nationaliste, de concert avec la crise économique globale, qu'on assiste à la « résurrection de l'esprit tribal », vue par l'auteur de *Retrotopia* comme une réaction publique aux « changements incohérents des conditions d'existence » : dès lors, le présent et l'avenir deviennent, eux aussi, « un pays étranger »¹⁷. Quant à l'Est des années '90, il est à remarquer une dislocation des mémoires collectives, qui s'accroît dans le contexte des déséquilibres transitionnels et de la fragmentation héritée des communismes, et qui implique, à côté des « fractures » des régimes mnémoniques officiels¹⁸, l'antagonisme entre les politiques historiques révisionnistes et la nostalgie pour le socialisme réel. Dans

¹² Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 13.

¹³ Charity Scribner, *Requiem for communism*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003, p. 4, 63-64.

¹⁴ Klas-Göran Karlsson, "The Uses of History and the Third Wave of Europeanisation", in Małgorzata Pakier; Bo Stråth (éds.), *A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance*, New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010, p. 38-39.

¹⁵ Jeffrey K. Olick, *The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility*, New York & London: Routledge, p. 175, 192.

¹⁶ David Lowenthal, *The Past Is a Foreign Country*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 4.

¹⁷ Zygmunt Bauman, *Retrotopia*, op. cit., p. 51.

¹⁸ Jan Kubik; Michael Bernhard, "A Theory of the Politics of Memory", in Michael Bernhard; Jan Kubik, (éds.), *Twenty Years after Communism. The Politics of Memory and Commemoration*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 17.

le climat des crises économiques et politiques, du chaos idéologique et de l'incertitude, cette polarisation s'étend à l'imaginaire social nostalgique – y compris son pôle utopique¹⁹ –, comme montré par le « choc » des « utopies rétrospectives »²⁰ et des rétro-utopies, contrebalancées par les « utopies consuméristes »²¹.

Sans insister, pour l'instant, sur cette émotion collective « multicouche et polymorphe », ayant « des dimensions et des connotations distinctes, parfois opposées »²², il faut remarquer que « la normalisation » de la nostalgie²³ dans les sociétés actuelles, « constamment façonnées » par ses versions « privées et publiques »²⁴, indique plus qu'une phase de l'évolution d'une « particularité omniprésente de la dynamique culturelle moderne »²⁵. Vue comme un effet de « l'écart profond entre l'expérience et l'attente », entraîné par « l'accélération du mouvement temporel »²⁶, la nostalgie est, à côté de la mémoire traumatique, un pylône du « régime d'historicité présentiste »²⁷ dont l'hégémonie, visible dès années '70, est symptomatique pour les transformations majeures du paradigme moderne. En effet, ces mutations, qui ont modelé ce que semblait

¹⁹ Michael Pickering; Emily Keightley, "The modalities of nostalgia" in *Current Sociology*, no. 54 (6), 2006, p. 921.

²⁰ Mitja Velikonja, "Lost in transition...", *op. cit.*, p. 535, 537; cf. Alina Iorga, "1989: « révolutions », « renaissances » et la crise des utopies", in *Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai. Studia Europaea*, no. 1, 2023, p. 219-236.

²¹ Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Times...*, *op. cit.*, p. 107. Tous ces avatars utopiques (en tant que pôles des nostalgies) sont présents aussi, avec des nuances différentes, dans l'imaginaire occidental.

²² Michael Hviid Jacobsen, "In times of nostalgia: the brave new world of a grand old emotion", in Michael Hviid Jacobsen (éd.), *Nostalgia Now: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives on the Past in the Present*, London: Routledge, 2020, p. 9.

²³ Michael Hviid Jacobsen, "Introduction: The Many Different Faces of Nostalgia – Exploring a Multifaceted and Multidisciplinary Emotion", in Michael Hviid Jacobsen (éd.), *Intimations of Nostalgia. Multidisciplinary Explorations of an Enduring Emotion*, Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2021a, p. 11; Idem, "Fear and retrotopia – Critical reflections on the rise of defensive emotions in liquid modernity" in *Zoon Politikon*, no. 12, 2021b, p. 95.

²⁴ Niklas Salmose, "Nostalgia Makes Us All Tick: A Special Issue on Contemporary Nostalgia" in *Humanities*, no. 8 (3), 2019, p. 144.

²⁵ Emily Keightley; Michael Pickering, *The Mnemonic Imagination. Remembering as Creative Practice*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012 p. 113.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 115, 117.

²⁷ François Hartog, *ibidem*.

être, peu après l'*annus mirabilis*, un âge des « fins » – de la tradition, de l'histoire, de l'utopie et des idéologies²⁸ – sont connectées à la dynamique de la « mémoire compétitive »²⁹ des multiples « passés présents »³⁰, révélés soit dans la « hantise » de l'héritage traumatique, soit dans les visages contrastants de la nostalgie et de l'utopie. Tributaires des deux impératifs du nouveau paradigme de la « mémoire agonistique », une alternative équilibrée aux paradigmes compétitifs encore hégémoniques (national(iste) /antagoniste *vs* transnational /cosmopolite) – le multiperspectivisme et la contextualisation³¹ –, les pages suivantes se donnent pour but de synthétiser les réflexions dédiées à ces dynamiques complexes, situées au croisement des études culturelles sur la mémoire, la nostalgie et l'utopie.

PRESENTISME ET « PASSES PRESENTS ». MEMOIRE, NOSTALGIE ET UTOPIE

Dans une étude influente publiée en 2003, François Hartog s'intéressait à la relation entre, d'une part, « l'universalisation du patrimoine » et l'essor de l'industrie qui a soutenu ces pratiques mnémoniques tout au long du dernier quart du siècle passé, mais surtout après la fin de la Guerre Froide, et, d'autre part, l'émergence de la nostalgie pour un « régime d'historicité plus vieux », « longtemps inopérant »³². Hartog reliait « la gigantesque onde » mémorielle dont l'« alter ego » matériel fut le patrimoine, jaillie dans les années '80 dans « la vieille Europe », mais qui avait inondé presque tout le monde (les États Unis, l'Amérique du Sud post-dictatoriale, la Russie de la *glasnost*, les pays de l'ancien bloc de l'Est, l'Afrique du Sud de l'après-apartheid et l'Israël) à l'émergence du régime d'historicité présentiste. Ce dernier est défini en tant

²⁸ Anthony Giddens, "The Politics of Risk Society", in Anthony Giddens; Christopher Pierson, *Conversations with Anthony Giddens. Making Sense of Modernity*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1998, p. 207; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History ...*, *ibidem*; Russell Jacoby, *The End of Utopia. Politics and Culture in an Age of Apathy*, New York: Basic Books, 1999.

²⁹ Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 5.

³⁰ Andreas Huyssen, "Present pasts: media, politics, amnesia" in *Public Culture*, no. 12, 2000.

³¹ Ana Cento Bull; Hans Lauge Hansen; Francisco Colom-González, "Agonistic Memory Revisited", in Stefan Berger; Wulf Kansteiner (éds.), *Agonistic Memory and the Legacy of 20th Century Wars in Europe*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, p. 21-23.

³² François Hartog, *ibidem*, p. 149.

que paradigme d'un monde situé sous l'emprise d'« un présent ubiquitaire et tout-puissant », qui incorpore l'obsession pour le passé et où « l'avenir est perçu comme une menace, et non pas comme une promesse » : « It is as though there were nothing but the present, like an immense stretch of water restlessly rippling. [...] [W]e can certainly talk of a crisis. "Presentism" is the name I have given to this moment and to today's experience of time. »³³ La problématisation de la fixation sur le passé, qui domine la culture contemporaine de la mémoire – un passé englobant une pluralité de temps historiques reconstruits dans le contexte du présent « permanent, éluusif et presque immobile », lui-même une forme de la distance, poussée à l'extrême, entre « l'espace d'expérience » et « l'horizon d'attente »³⁴ –, n'était pas un thème nouveau à l'époque de la parution des *Régimes d'historicité*. ... En préfaçant l'émergence d'un axe-clé dans les débats entamés, de nos jours, sur le terrain des *Memory Studies*, de telles préoccupations sont repérables, à partir des années '90, dans les recherches en mnémohistoire, intéressée « non autant aux aspects factuels, qu'à l'actualité du passé – non pas au passé en tant que tel, mais au poids et à sa réception ultérieures »³⁵. À ce moment-là, Jan Assmann, l'un des savants les plus renommés dans le domaine, signalait l'« effet de hantise » qui accompagnait cette présentification : « The past is not simply "received" by the present. The present is "haunted" by the past and the past is modelled, invented, reinvented, and reconstructed by the present. »³⁶

Les effets négatifs du phénomène, qui découle de, mais, en même temps, entretient la focalisation sur les grands traumatismes de l'histoire, sont à discerner tant au niveau de la dynamique des mémoires collectives (sociales, culturelles et politiques), que sur le plan épistémologique. Bref, cette hantise forclose les modalités alternatives de la remémoration³⁷, en inhibant l'engagement des acteurs dans des expériences affectives « créatives » de la souvenance partagée,

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 6, 7, xviii, 18.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 17-18; cf. Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures past: on the semantics of historical time*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, p. 258.

³⁵ Marek Tamm, "Introduction: Afterlife of Events: Perspectives on Mnemohistory", in Marek Tamm (éd.), *Afterlives of Events: Perspectives on Mnemohistory*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 3.

³⁶ Jan Assmann, *Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism*, Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 9.

³⁷ Ann Rigney, "Remembering Hope: Transnational activism beyond the traumatic" in *Memory Studies*, no. 11 (3), 2018, p. 369.

qui est animée – dans le cas des « passés douloureux » – par les impératifs d’une « éthique de la mémoire »³⁸ et en empêchant, implicitement, la projection de l’avenir dans une perspective constructive: « More specifically, it leaves memory studies at risk of losing the ability to capture, wherever it does occur, the transmission of positive forms of attachment. »³⁹ Si les traumatismes des « sujets impliqués »⁴⁰ inhibent le plus souvent « l’imagination mnémonique » et, donc, « l’assimilation du passé dans des narrations [...] cohérentes », une fois établi un certain écart temporel, les passés douloureux peuvent être récupérés à travers les « expériences de second main » occasionnées par les processus commémoratifs collectifs⁴¹. Les valences affectives des souvenirs partagés dans le cadre de ces derniers sont essentielles dans la mesure où elles influencent les sentiments identitaires censés consolider les communautés de la mémoire. Quand ces émotions sont plutôt positives, étant liées à un passé de la solidarité collective, elles cimentent des « communautés éthiques ». Par contraste, « le désengagement, l’indifférence et l’aliénation » détournent la remémoration de ces émotions du passé et, implicitement, le sentiment de solidarité du présent⁴². Dans le cas de la « souffrance héritée », dont l’archétype est la postmémoire de la Shoah⁴³, ces processus exigent un « engagement imaginatif » qui, en tant que « condition préalable de l’empathie » des participants, soutient la « synthèse » entre le passé remémoré, le présent reconstruit et l’avenir projeté: « ... the mnemonic imagination moves us beyond the boundary of our own experience, enabling us to engage with second-hand experience and to synthesise our own experience with that of others. »⁴⁴

L’effet de hantise signalé par Jan Assmann dès années ’90 parvient à inhiber – à l’âge de l’incertitude, de l’explosion informationnelle, mais aussi de

³⁸ Emily Keightley; Michael Pickering, *The Mnemonic Imagination...*, *op. cit.*, p. 12, 165-193; Cf. Avishai Margalit, *The ethics of memory*, Cambridge MA & London: Harvard University Press, 2004.

³⁹ Ann Rigney, *ibidem*, p. 369-370.

⁴⁰ Michael Rothberg, *The implicated subject: beyond victims and perpetrators*, Stanford: Stanford University Press 2019.

⁴¹ Emily Keightley; Michael Pickering, *The Mnemonic Imagination...*, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

⁴² Avishai Margalit, *ibidem*, p. 101, 144.

⁴³ Marianne Hirsch, “The Generation of Postmemory” in *Poetics Today*, no. 29 (1), 2008.

⁴⁴ Emily Keightley; Michael Pickering, *ibidem*, p. 179, 118, 178.

la globalisation des « politiques de la désinformation »⁴⁵ et de la peur⁴⁶ –, cette synthèse créative, en contribuant à l'érosion des « bases pour la coopération sociale, la solidarité et le consensus », que Barbara Misztal reliait, dans la même période, à la dissolution de la « confiance sociale »⁴⁷. Du point de vue de la dynamique de la mémoire, les phénomènes en cause révèlent le poids de deux catégories de facteurs (au moins). D'une part, la présentification des passés douloureux dans les régimes mnémoniques officiels est concurrencée, après la fin de la Guerre Froide, par les actions des « guerriers mnémoniques »⁴⁸, qui instrumentalisent des filons mémoriels similaires dans leurs versions rétro-utopiques⁴⁹ de l'histoire. Les principaux effets culturels et psychosociaux de ces mobilisations guerrières sont les fractures dans les régimes officiels⁵⁰, les clivages accentués par la dislocation des mémoires collectives, la dégradation de la « conscience historique »⁵¹ et la confusion idéologique. D'autre part, la prolifération, dans les médias virtuels, des narrations hybrides qui incorporent des contenus comparables – à l'intérieur d'une « nouvelle écologie », définie par la compétition des « réalités expérientielles multiples » et par l'émergence des « guerres digitales »⁵² –, ainsi que l'essor de la « rétro-manie »⁵³ au niveau de la culture populaire sont des facteurs qui amplifient la confusion, sur le fond du métissage des versions antagonistes de l'histoire. Ces derniers facteurs

⁴⁵ Eirikur Bergmann, *Conspiracy & Populism: The Politics of Misinformation*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

⁴⁶ Ruth Wodak, *The Politics of Fear. The Shameless Normalization of Far-right Discourse*. Second edition. London: Sage, 2021.

⁴⁷ Barbara Misztal, *Trust in modern societies: the search for the bases of social order*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 3.

⁴⁸ Jan Kubik; Michael Bernhard, *ibidem*, p. 17.

⁴⁹ Ruth Wodak, *ibidem*, p. 95; cf. Alina Iorga, « Passés troublés, rétro-utopies et mobilisations guerrières en Europe contemporaine » in *Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai. Studia Europaea*, no. 2, 2022.

⁵⁰ Jan Kubik; Michael Bernhard, *ibidem*, p. 17. Cf. Alina Iorga, « Passés troublés ... », *op. cit.*, p. 164.

⁵¹ Klas-Göran Karlsson, *ibidem*, p. 44.

⁵² Andrew Hoskins; Pavel Shchelin, "The War Feed: Digital War in Plain Sight" in *American Behavioral Scientist*, no. 67 (3), 2022, p. 3, 4.

⁵³ Olivia Angé; David Berliner, "Introduction. Anthropology of Nostalgia – Anthropology as Nostalgia", in Olivia Angé; David Berliner (éds.), *Anthropology and nostalgia*, New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2016, p. 3.

contribuent, dans une grande mesure, au désengagement et à l'aliénation des « sujets [supposé] impliqués » dans les processus de la remémoration partagée.

Les impasses repérables dans la sphère de la mémoire collective ne peuvent pas être détachées du contexte épistémologique du *boom* mémoriel vu par Hartog comme un élément définitoire du régime d'historicité présentiste. Dans une analyse dédiée à l'activisme mémoriel transnational, doublée d'un plaidoyer pour la « souvenance de l'espoir » présenté, à l'instar d'Ernst Bloch, comme « l'avenir non encore libéré du passé », Ann Rigney problematisait la même obsession pour « les atrocités qui ont marqué l'histoire récente »⁵⁴, en évoquant tant les inquiétudes exprimées presque deux décennies auparavant par Andreas Huyssen, que son conseil quant à la reconstruction de la mémoire pour l'avenir : « Perhaps it is time to remember the future, rather than only worry about the future of memory »⁵⁵. Tout comme Enzo Traverso, qui situait, plus tard, le phénomène dans le contexte de l'émergence du présentisme et de l'« éclipse des utopies »⁵⁶, Huyssen expliquait la frénésie de la mémorialisation, visible au niveau sociétal et dans les milieux académiques, par une « inaptitude d'imaginer l'avenir », causée par « la dissolution finale, en 1989, des grandes narrations ayant soutenu la pensée utopique au XX^e siècle »⁵⁷. L'observation est convergente avec les réflexions de Hartog visant les conséquences culturelles-épistémologiques de la chute du Mur de Berlin, quand « l'histoire n'est pas arrivée à une fin, ni même dans le sens donné par Francis Fukuyama, mais, en revanche, une rupture apparut dans l'ordre du temps (d'abord en Europe, puis, graduellement, dans plusieurs endroits du monde) » : « ... after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the final collapse of the Marxist utopia, concerns had shifted over to the other side, onto the crisis of the future »⁵⁸. On ne saurait disjoindre cette crise de l'impasse actuelle des *Cultural Memory Studies*, une discipline placée, comme l'a montré Rigney, sous l'hégémonie du « paradigme traumatique », du « deuil et de la mémorialisation » de l'héritage collectif des passés violents. Dès lors, la reconsidération de « la relation en apparence naturelle entre la mémoire et le trauma » devient une exigence scientifique : « Memory studies is not inherently backward-looking, but may become overly

⁵⁴ Ann Rigney, *ibidem*, p. 377, 369.

⁵⁵ Andreas Huyssen, *ibidem*, p. 38.

⁵⁶ Enzo Traverso, *Left-wing melancholia: Marxism, history and memory*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2016, p. xiv.

⁵⁷ Ann Rigney, *ibidem*, p. 368.

⁵⁸ François Hartog, *ibidem*, p. 146, 197.

presentist in its outlook if it fails to establish an archive of mnemonic practices that extends beyond current practice and its traumatic horizons. »⁵⁹

En analysant, à l'instar de Reinhart Koselleck, les mêmes « spectres » des « passés présents », repérables dans la politique et la culture contemporaines, Andreas Huyssen avait mis en relief, quelques années avant la publication de l'étude de Hartog, les changements de perspective en ce qui est des relations entre le passé, le présent et l'avenir, dans les conditions de la compression du temps et de l'espace sous l'influence de la révolution informationnelle et de l'essor des nouveaux médias. Sans négliger la mémoire historique et politique concentrées sur le pôle traumatique, Huyssen accentuait une autre dimension du flot mémoriel susmentionné, qu'il associait aux fantaisies de tel ou tel « âge d'or », incorporées dans les représentations commerciales de la mémoire et de la culture populaire nostalgique, en dehors de tout lien aux cadres historiques : « After all, many of the mass-marketed memories we consume are "imagined memories" [...], and thus more easily forgotten than lived memories. »⁶⁰ En admettant la nature problématique du concept de « mémoire imaginée », tributaire de celui d'« ersatz / armchair nostalgia » lancé par Arjun Appadurai⁶¹ et utilisé plus tard par Svetlana Boym dans son analyse de la « privatisation de la nostalgie », Huyssen insistait sur la distinction entre les souvenirs ancrés dans l'expérience vécue et les représentations mnémoniques commerciales, purement compensatoires : « The notion is problematic to the extent that all memory is imagined, and yet it allows us to distinguish memories grounded in lived experience from memories pillaged from the archive and mass-marketed for fast consumption. »⁶²

Complètement disjoints de la mémoire sociale et historique, la plupart de ces pseudo-souvenirs ne reflètent pas le sentiment d'une perte irréparable, spécifique aux processus remémoratifs dont l'objet est un passé plus ou moins idéalisé, soit-il un « passé de second main », investi avec des significations éthiques, morales, culturelles etc. connectées à l'expérience du présent et aux projets de l'avenir. De fait, les « souvenirs imaginés » évoquent la rétro-manie, alimentée par la multiplication, dans les médias, des produits du *retrotyping*, responsables pour « la fragmentation et la privatisation » de la mémoire sociale, incluant la nostalgie, réduite dans ces cas-là, par le détournement de

⁵⁹ Ann Rigney, *ibidem*, p. 369-370.

⁶⁰ Andreas Huyssen, *ibidem*, p. 27.

⁶¹ Arjun Appadurai, 1996, *Modernity at Large*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 78.

⁶² Andreas Huyssen, *ibidem*, p. 27.

l'imagination mnémonique, à ses valences régressives, pas nécessairement mélancoliques⁶³. En favorisant l'« amnésie sociale » et culturelle, ces produits témoignent d'une réification du passé, limité à « un répertoire [...] d'images de stock », incompatible avec l'engagement imaginatif, affectif et éthique⁶⁴ authentique. Par contraste, la remémoration créative des « passés de second main » peut générer non seulement des émotions comparables à celles qui accompagnent les expériences « de premier main », impliquant, dans le cas de la nostalgie, la synthèse des trois sentiments qui lui sont propres – la perte, l'absence et la langueur / la mélancolie –, mais aussi des réactions morales et éthiques : « To recognise another's loss and lack, to empathise with their longing and to be able to creatively reconcile it with our own, is the precondition for ethical social action. »⁶⁵ Quoique située en dehors de ces processus de la remémoration partagée, qui peuvent intégrer des versions de la « nostalgie de second main » / la « nouvelle nostalgie » / la « néostalgie »⁶⁶, la mémoire imaginée explorée par Huyssen maintient sa pertinence dans l'analyse des phénomènes culturels-identitaires que François Hartog décrira plus tard dans les termes de la rupture temporelle et du nouvel agencement du passé, du présent et de l'avenir, entraînés par le présentisme. Tributaire des mutations qui ont modelé le tournant culturel des années '70-'80, y compris « le glissement conceptuel de l'histoire vers la mémoire »⁶⁷, cette fracture s'accroît après 1989, en révélant la crise de l'avenir :

Our relations to time were suddenly and irreversibly shattered and confounded by certain events of the recent past: the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the collapse of the communist ideal as the future of the revolution, and the simultaneous rise of a number of fundamentalist movements. [...] Everywhere the order of time ceased to be self-evident. Fundamentalisms, with their mixture of archaic and modern features, grapple in part with a crisis of the future. Since the traditions they turn to in order to remedy the ills of the present are incapable of opening onto a future, they are largely "invented."⁶⁸

⁶³ Emily Keightley; Michael Pickering, *ibidem*, p. 160, 166.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 162, 164, 150.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 118.

⁶⁶ Mitja Velikonja, "Lost in transition...", *op. cit.*, p. 544.

⁶⁷ Małgorzata Pakier; Bo Stråth, "Introduction. A European Memory?", in Małgorzata Pakier; Bo Stråth (éds.), *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁶⁸ François Hartog, *ibidem*, p. 112; cf. Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions", in Eric Hobsbawm; Terence Ranger (éds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 1.

Ces déséquilibres expliquent la persistance, tant au niveau de la culture populaire nostalgique, qu'à celui de la culture mémorielle institutionnalisée, des pratiques censées conserver les sentiments de continuité à l'intérieur des sociétés du présent : « The issue is rather the attempt, as we face the very real processes of time-space compression, to secure some *continuity within time*, to provide some extension of lived space within which we can breathe and move. »⁶⁹ L'observation s'applique aussi dans le cas des pratiques culturelles nostalgiques qui, malgré les interférences éventuelles avec les formes rétro repérables partout dans les médias contemporains – y compris les médias virtuels, ces lieux de la « mémoire digitalement compromise » et du « passé fracturé », où la « mémoire du présent pour le présent » obscurcit les projections d'un « avenir humain réalisable »⁷⁰ –, participent de la synthèse créative des expériences spécifiques aux époques diverses, des formes de la mémoire collective et, certes, des différents horizons d'attente.

En laissant de côté ses versions commerciales, on comprend la nostalgie comme une émotion collective complexe et comme une forme privilégiée de l'imagination mnémonique qui, intégrée dans ce processus de la remémoration créative, révèle une dimension progressiste et critique, essentielle pour la dynamique de la mémoire sociale, politique et culturelle, surtout dans le monde contemporain hanté par le « spectre » de la *Unsicherheit*, ce mélange des « sentiments collectifs d'insécurité, d'incertitude et d'inquiétude »⁷¹. De concert avec Michael Pickering et Emily Keightley, on considère que la nostalgie, associée souvent à l'imagination régressive, devrait être « reconfigurée dans les termes d'une distinction entre le désir du retour à un état antérieur des choses ou à un passé idéalisé et le désir non pas d'y revenir, mais de *retrouver dans certains aspects du passé une base pour le renouvellement et pour la satisfaction [projetée dans] l'avenir* »⁷². En tant qu'émotion historique et pratique culturelle – comme l'observait Svetlana Boym, dans une perspective convergente avec celles de Koselleck, Huyssen et Hartog –, la nostalgie exprime le désir de regagner cet espace de l'expérience, de plus en plus serré, « qui ne correspond plus au nouvel horizon d'attente »⁷³. L'observation n'implique, dans la conception de Boym non plus, l'incompatibilité entre l'imagination nostalgique

⁶⁹ Andreas Huyssen, *ibidem*, p. 34, n. s.

⁷⁰ Andrew Hoskins; Pavel Shchelin, *ibidem*, p. 11.

⁷¹ Michael Hviid Jacobsen, "Fear and retrotopia...", *op. cit.*, p. 107.

⁷² Michael Pickering; Emily Keightley, *ibidem*, p. 921, n. s.

⁷³ Svetlana Boym, *ibidem*, p. 10.

et celle progressiste qui peut être intégrée dans le pôle utopique des pratiques culturelles « réflexives », distinguées par l'auteure de *L'avenir de la nostalgie* par rapport aux pratiques « restauratrices » : « Nostalgia [...] can be retrospective but also prospective. Fantasies of the past determined by needs of the present have a direct impact on realities of the future. Consideration of the future makes us take responsibility for our nostalgic tales. »⁷⁴ En contraste avec ces versions prospectives, la nostalgie restauratrice, ancrée exclusivement dans l'imagination régressive, incorpore la retro-utopie, qu'on envisage ici dans une acception politique-instrumentale, en tant que forme de la « culture de la nostalgie »⁷⁵ illustrée par certaines utopies ultra-conservatrices, dont les avatars extrémistes révèlent un potentiel dystopique considérable⁷⁶. La délimitation de ces versions de la rétro-utopie des « utopies rétrospectives »⁷⁷ qui reflètent un pôle de la mémoire sociale et une composante non-instrumentale de « la culture nostalgique »⁷⁸, compatible avec l'engagement dans une direction émancipatrice, nous semble obligatoire. Dans cette perspective, il faut insister sur la distinction essentielle entre la nostalgie instrumentale et celle non-instrumentale, associées aux deux types de culture (souvent connectées, mais pas nécessairement) que Mitja Velikonja exemplifie dans ses analyses dédiées à la yougonostalgie et à la titostalgie: « It is not a revisionist or "restorative nostalgia" [...], not a return of the past, the regime, the leader or past times, but a return of the utopias of those times. »⁷⁹ Si la version instrumentale, mobilisée dans des buts commerciaux, politiques ou culturels, appartient à la « culture de la nostalgie », celle non-instrumentale, « auto-référentielle et démunie de tels desseins », illustre « la culture nostalgique »⁸⁰.

On va intégrer, donc, dans la catégorie des utopies rétrospectives, d'une part, les utopies conservatrices qui ne font pas l'objet des instrumentalisations (politiques ou d'une autre nature) et dont les formes, ancrées dans de diverses expériences historiques, sont dépendantes des significations changeantes du

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, p. xviii, xiii, xvi.

⁷⁵ Mitja Velikonja, *Titostalgia – A Study of Nostalgia for Josip Broz*, Skopje: Mirovni Inštitut, 2008, p. 29; Idem, "Lost in transition...", *op. cit.*, p. 539.

⁷⁶ Michael Hviid Jacobsen, "'The Activating Presence' – What Prospects of Utopia in Times of Uncertainty?" in *Polish Sociological Review*, no. 3 (155), 2016, p. 359.

⁷⁷ Mitja Velikonja, "Lost in transition...", *op. cit.*, p. 535.

⁷⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 539; Idem, *Titostalgia...*, *op. cit.*, 29.

⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 133, n. s.

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 29; Idem, "Lost in transition...", *op. cit.*, p. 539.

conservatisme, conçu en tant que pôle traditionnel ou projection de la stabilité, repérables tant dans les idéologies *mainstream*, que sur le plan des perceptions sociales. Le plus exposé aux transferts du capital symbolique censé légitimer les agendas populistes de la droite radicale et extrémiste, le conservatisme a subi, comme toutes « les idéologies robustes »⁸¹, des mutations successives. Il en va de même, certes, pour les utopies qui ont constitué, tout au long de l'histoire moderne, les « compléments nécessaires »⁸² des grandes idéologies. Dans l'étude déjà citée, dédiée à l'épuisement des énergies utopiques lors des crises économiques des années '70-'80, Jürgen Habermas mettait en relief, par exemple, le « conservatisme » des sociaux-démocrates occidentaux, en tant que défenseurs de l'État-Providence⁸³, qui était attaché – en contraste avec le néo-conservatisme influencé par le néo-libéralisme – aux valeurs progressistes de l'utopie de la société du travail. Dans cette version, le conservatisme est, donc, parfaitement compatible avec les imaginaires utopiques socialistes et libéraux orientés vers l'avenir⁸⁴.

D'autre part, on envisage, dans la perspective de la même distinction, les utopies rétrospectives associées à la nostalgie réflexive non-instrumentale pour le socialisme réel de l'Est – *Ostalgie*, la yougonostalgie, la titostalgie, certaines versions de la nostalgie post-soviétique etc. – similaire à la nostalgie pour la société du travail de l'Ouest, ainsi que, en général, aux pratiques nostalgiques ouvertes à l'imaginaire progressiste, caractéristique des utopies socialistes et libérales. À ce point, il nous faut remarquer que, dans le cas de « la nostalgie rouge »⁸⁵, les versions non-instrumentales sont, à peu d'exceptions (dont les plus significatives apparaissent dans la Russie à partir des années 2000), dominantes: « The nostalgic narrative, although it also lends itself to easy political instrumentalization, was not devised by the post-communist Left as a mnemopolitical alternative. It is first and foremost the offspring of popular

⁸¹ Russell Jacoby, *ibidem*, p. 9.

⁸² Paul Ricoeur, « L'idéologie et l'utopie... », *op. cit.*, p. 60, 61.

⁸³ Jürgen Habermas, *ibidem*, p. 60: « Today the legitimists are the true conservatives, who want to stabilize what has been achieved. They hope to find a point of equilibrium between the development of welfare state and modernization based on a market economy. »

⁸⁴ Ruth Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, Bern: Peter Lang AG, International Academic Publishers, 2010, p. 217.

⁸⁵ Mitja Velikonja, "Lost in transition...", *op. cit.*, p. 547.

culture and everyday memory – that is, it is exclusively vernacular.»⁸⁶ En meme temps, il faut souligner que les utopies rétrospectives animées par cette nostalgie « vernaculaire », « biographique » ou « existentielle »⁸⁷ n'impliquent pas, en général – aux exceptions repérables, dans le même contexte, toujours en Russie, où l'on enregistre des fusions avec « les fantaisies utopiques » attachées au passé impérial⁸⁸ – le désir des acteurs sociaux, appartenant, pour la plupart, à l'ancien prolétariat, de restaurer les systèmes politiques communistes⁸⁹. D'ailleurs, *Ostalgie*, la yougonostalgie, la titostalgie, comme d'autres utopies rétrospectives, pas nécessairement liées aux expériences socialistes, émergent quand « le retour au passé n'est plus possible »⁹⁰.

La distinction entre les nostalgies instrumentales et non-instrumentales s'avère utile dans l'analyse de certaines formes de l'utopie dont l'ambiguïté reflète la complexité de la « modernité liquide »⁹¹ et la confusion idéologique que les néo-populismes⁹² entretiennent après la fin de la Guerre Froide. En accompagnant tous les changements sociaux majeurs et surtout les révolutions et les transitions⁹³, la nostalgie intègre cette complexité dans son pôle utopique, un miroir symbolique de son « ambivalence fondamentale »⁹⁴. Cela est évident dans le cas des mutations symptomatiques pour ce qu'on a décrit, peu après la fin du « court XX^e siècle », comme une « ère de l'apathie » et de « l'exténuation politique », du « collapsus des visions et des ambitions intellectuelles », et où « la conviction selon laquelle l'avenir va reproduire le présent [semblait avoir] étouffé les aspirations utopiques »⁹⁵. La « nouvelle Europe » entrainait, en ce temps-là, tout comme sa moitié occidentale pendant les années '70-'80, dans l'âge de la nostalgie, visible surtout dans les visages des utopies rétrospectives

⁸⁶ Daniela Koleva, *Memory Archipelago of the Communist Past. Public Narratives and Personal Recollections*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022, p. 213.

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 229, 231.

⁸⁸ Maya Nadkarni; Olga Shevchenko, "The politics of nostalgia in the aftermath of socialism's collapse. A case for comparative analysis", in Olivia Angé; David Berliner (éds.), *op. cit.*, p. 86-87.

⁸⁹ Cf. Alina Iorga, "1989: « révolutions »...", *op. cit.*, p. 237-238.

⁹⁰ Daniela Koleva, *ibidem*, p. 248.

⁹¹ Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Times...*, *op. cit.*

⁹² Sergiu Mișcoiu, *Au pouvoir par le 'Peuple'. Le populisme saisi par la théorie du discours*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2012.

⁹³ Mitja Velikonja, "Lost in transition...", *op. cit.*, p. 537.

⁹⁴ Svetlana Boym, *ibidem*, p. xvii.

⁹⁵ Russell Jacoby, *ibidem*, p. xii, 158.

évoquant le socialisme réel (plus ou moins idéalisé). Dans bien des cas, ces dernières sont l'expression de la « souvenance de l'espoir » (comme dirait Ann Rigney) et des aspirations de l'ancien prolétariat à retrouver l'esprit d'un « monde rassurant » et d'« une société juste », caractérisés par la solidarité et, en général, par une relative prospérité, mais aussi l'esprit des « temps qui scrutaient l'avenir »⁹⁶. Ces hypostases coexistent en conflit avec les utopies rétrospectives partagées dans les milieux conservateurs anticomunistes (dont on prend ici en considération strictement les versions non-instrumentales). Raccordées au pôle traumatique de la (post)mémoire du communisme⁹⁷, celles-ci sont l'expression du retour aux utopies conservatrices de l'époque pré-communiste, en reflétant surtout l'imaginaire conservateur de l'entre-deux-guerres, comparable au modèle retracé par Karl Mannheim⁹⁸.

Les visages de l'utopie évoqués ci-dessus (en tant que types idéaux) doivent être différenciés, d'une part, de « l'utopie des chasseurs », « une version "privatisée" et "individualisée" des anciennes visions de la bonne société » (« ouverte vers l'humanité de ses membres »⁹⁹), qui, tout comme les utopies totalitaires du siècle passé, a glissé vers « sa propre dystopie »¹⁰⁰. Convertie en « une compulsion, une addiction et une obsession », « l'utopie de la chasse » peut interférer avec l'« ersatz nostalgia » promue par les industries de divertissement et complètement déconnectée de la mémoire sociale et historique. En reflétant la crise du temps signalée par Huyssen et Hartog, cette dernière fournit un pseudo-antidote aux détresses spécifiques au monde contemporain : « Ersatz nostalgia [...] makes everything time-sensitive and exploits that temporal deficit by giving a cure that is also a poison. »¹⁰¹ L'utopie attachée à de telles nostalgies commodifiées, individualistes et non-réflexives reste une version de l'escapisme, démunie de toute impulsion émancipatrice et réduite à la fonction purement compensatoire¹⁰². En annexant le passé dans les formes réifiées du retotyping, cette utopie « étrange et hétérodoxe » est clouée

⁹⁶ Mitja Velikonja, "Lost in transition...", *op. cit.*, p. 535, 546.

⁹⁷ Alina Iorga, "1989: « Révolutions »...", *op. cit.*, p. 236, 238.

⁹⁸ Karl Mannheim, *Idéologie et utopie (Une introduction à la sociologie de la connaissance)*, Paris : Librairie Marcel Rivière et Cie, 1956, p. 95.

⁹⁹ Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Times...*, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

¹⁰⁰ Lyman Tower Sargent, « Pour une défense de l'utopie », in *Diogène*, no. 1 (209), 2005, p. 11.

¹⁰¹ Svetlana Boym, *ibidem*, p. 38.

¹⁰² Ruth Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

dans l'« ici et maintenant »: « Instead of living *towards a utopia*, hunters are offered a living *inside a utopia*. »¹⁰³

D'autre part, les utopies rétrospectives liées à la nostalgie vernaculaire non-instrumentale doivent être dissociées des rétro-utopies mobilisées dans le contexte de la réémergence – après la vague jaillie à l'Ouest dans les années '80 –, du néo-nationalisme corrompu, à nouveau, par le populisme aux tendances extrémistes, qui s'empare des grands thèmes de l'imaginaire conservateur¹⁰⁴. L'instrumentalisation de la rétro-utopie dans les agendas de ces acteurs reflète, peu après *l'annus mirabilis* 1989, le réveil de « la démesure totalitaire »¹⁰⁵ des deux côtés de l'ancien Rideau de Fer. Aujourd'hui, observait Michael Hviid Jacobsen – à un moment où le monde semblait avoir oublié les conséquences épouvantables des mobilisations guerrières de la rétro-utopie, en tant que pôle de la nostalgie restauratrice¹⁰⁶, sur le territoire de l'ex-Yougoslavie, considérée naguère la matérialisation d'une utopie pratique –, le problème le plus grave de l'utopisme n'est pas autant sa propension totalitaire, que « la privatisation des utopies »¹⁰⁷. Pour Bauman, Boym, Kołakowski et beaucoup d'autres esprits familiarisés à l'ambivalence révélée, sur le terrain politique, tant par l'utopisme que par la nostalgie, c'est une époque menacée (à nouveau) par la fin de l'utopie.

EN GUISE DE CONCLUSIONS

« Toutes les fois que l'utopie disparaît, l'histoire cesse d'être un processus menant à une fin dernière », observait Karl Mannheim à la fin des années '20¹⁰⁸. Les inquiétudes de Mannheim à ce sujet – résonnantes non seulement parmi les partisans d'un utopisme réaliste, conscient de son relativisme, mais aussi parmi les sceptiques enclins à la critique du penchant totalitaire que les utopies institutionnalisées du « siècle des extrêmes » ont illustré sous des formes tragiques – visaient, en premier lieu, l'obstruction du dynamisme social et la

¹⁰³ Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Times...*, *op. cit.*, p. 104, 109.

¹⁰⁴ Ruth Wodak, *ibidem*, p. 95; Alina Iorga, « Passés troublés, rétro-utopies ... », *op. cit.*, p. 158.

¹⁰⁵ Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, *L'utopie ou la crise de l'imaginaire*, Paris: Editions Universitaires, 1979, p. 198; cf. Corin Braga, "Utopie, eutopie, dystopie et anti-utopie" in *Metábasis, rivista di filosofia on-line*, no. 2, 2006, p. 9.

¹⁰⁶ Alina Iorga, « Passés troublés ... », *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁷ Michael Hviid Jacobsen, "'The Activating Presence' ...", *op. cit.*, p. 344.

¹⁰⁸ Karl Mannheim, *ibidem*, p. 108.

réification de l'homme. Mannheim appréhendait que l'homme ne se transformât – si l'avenir dystopique du marasme, qu'il avait entrevu, s'était matérialisé – dans « un pur être d'instincts » ayant perdu, paradoxalement, tout idéal, après un long parcours « héroïque ». Et cela juste au moment de l'atteinte du « stade le plus élevé de la prise de conscience » de son rôle d'artisan de l'histoire : « ...ce serait précisément [...] quand l'histoire cesse d'être un destin aveugle et devient de plus en plus la création personnelle de l'homme, que la disparition des différentes formes de l'utopie ferait perdre à celui-ci sa volonté de façonner l'histoire à sa guise et, par cela même, sa capacité de la comprendre »¹⁰⁹. En glosant, lors des conférences de 1976 (à une époque où se montraient déjà les signes de la crise du temps, transformée après 1989 dans une crise de l'avenir), sur la théorie de Mannheim, Paul Ricoeur observait que, « si l'on considérait l'idéologie comme une fausse conscience de notre situation réelle, on pourrait imaginer une société privée d'idéologie. En tout cas, on ne saurait imaginer une société privée d'utopie, parce qu'une telle société n'aurait aucune fin »¹¹⁰. Plus d'un demi-siècle après la parution du recueil sur *l'Idéologie et [l']utopie...*, et peu après l'institution, en Pologne, de la loi martiale suivie de l'arrestation des grévistes de Solidarność, Leszek Kołakowski, le marxiste révisionniste et l'auteur du *Manifeste Socialiste Libéral Conservateur* (1978), lançait lui-même, de l'exil, un appel à reconsidérer le thème de « la mort de l'utopie ». Il plaidait pour une approche équilibrée de la coexistence conflictuelle inévitable – et, cependant, indispensable à « notre survivance culturelle » –, de l'utopisme et du scepticisme anti-utopique, en illustrant une position convergente avec les idées des utopistes ambivalents comme Zygmunt Bauman :

The victory of utopian dreams would lead us to a totalitarian nightmare and the utter downfall of civilization, whereas the unchallenged domination of the skeptical spirit would condemn us to a hopeless stagnation, to an immobility which a slight accident could easily convert into catastrophic chaos. Ultimately we have to live between two irreconcilable claims, each of them having its cultural justification.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 114-115.

¹¹⁰ Paul Ricoeur *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, New York & Guildford: Columbia University Press 1986, p. 283.

¹¹¹ Leszek Kołakowski, "The Death of Utopia...", *op. cit.*, p. 247.

Un demi-siècle plus tard, les idées de Kołakowski gardent leur pertinence, comme l'attestent tant les instrumentalisation populistes et extrémistes de la retro-utopie, que le scepticisme qui a conduit, dès années '70, à la « claustration des énergies utopiques dans le domaine de l'art et de la culture », une tendance conservée après *l'annus mirabilis* des deux côtés de l'ancien Rideau de Fer : « This move was linked to several distinct characteristics of the period, including fear of totalitarianism, scepticism of totality, and loss of faith in the proletariat as an agent of radical change. It was predicated on the anti-utopian climate of the Cold War and on a deeper cultural pessimism. »¹¹² Au-delà de ce contexte, le problème le plus grave des sociétés du présent semble être la fin de l'utopie, dont la fonction d'« éducation du désir » constitue « un élément-clef » dans le processus des transformations sociales : « Utopia, in the sense of the vision of unalienated society, does indeed have the function of catalysing change and the problem in capitalist society is to keep this vision and the possibilities of change alive. »¹¹³ Comme l'avait remarqué Ruth Levitas en 1990, à l'instar de Zygmunt Bauman, cette composante du socialisme (« l'utopie d'opposition dominante au XIX^e siècle et au début du XX^e ») a diminué dans les utopies critiques du présent, qui illustrent non seulement l'estompement de la croyance dans le progrès, mais aussi l'aggravation du fatalisme¹¹⁴. Plus de trois décennies après la parution du *Concept de l'utopie*, ce fatalisme s'amplifie sur le fond des crises culturelles et idéologiques corrélatives à la « post-politique » contemporaine¹¹⁵, en raison inverse par rapport au rôle catalyseur des utopies progressistes : « The function of utopia thus reverts from that of goal and catalyst of change to one of criticism and the education of desire, without any necessary move forward into action. »¹¹⁶

En tant que moteur de l'action transformatrice et ressort imaginaire des visions sociétales alternatives, l'utopie reste un remède contre l'épuisement des énergies collectives, l'abandon des idéaux, la réification, l'aliénation et l'inertie. Ce remède est d'autant plus nécessaire que les appréhensions de Mannheim se

¹¹² Ruth Levitas, *Utopia as Method. The Imaginary Reconstitution of Society*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 15.

¹¹³ Ruth Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

¹¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 225.

¹¹⁵ Chantal Mouffe, *Agonistics. Thinking the World Politically*, London and New York: Verso, 2013, p. 119.

¹¹⁶ Ruth Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

sont avérées bien fondées, si l'on pense à la dynamique socioculturelle reflétée par l'utopie de la « chasse » et par l'« ersatz nostalgie ». Dans ces circonstances, l'idée de reconsidérer, à côté du thème de la fin de l'utopie, le potentiel émancipateur de la nostalgie réflexive, dans un effort de récupérer les aspects du passé qui pourraient offrir « une base pour le renouvellement » du présent, semble non seulement raisonnable, mais aussi réaliste. Cela pourrait devenir possible si l'on acceptait que cette forme de nostalgie prospective, attachée à la conception d'une mémoire multidirectionnelle ou agonistique, ne s'oppose point à l'engagement affectif et éthique dans la remémoration créative des passés douloureux. Ce serait une matérialisation de l'équilibre indispensable à la gestion des histoires contestées, tout-à-fait compatible avec l'« éthique de la mémoire ».

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CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND FAITH IN ROMANIA. WHAT THE ORTHODOX BLOGGERS SAY?

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Abstract

The last twenty years have seen a rapid development of religion and conspiracy theories amid the expansion of digital technologies. This study seeks to address the gap in the literature on conspiracies and digital religion by focusing on the perception of Orthodox bloggers as a new type of religious actor emerging online, towards Faith and conspiracy theories in the Romanian Ortho-sphere. The study uses Romania as a case due to its Orthodox majority, good internet infrastructure, constant flow of conspiracies online and its unique geopolitical features. The findings point tendency among Ortho-bloggers towards thinking and sharing conspiracies.

Key words: *Ortho-bloggers, conspiracy theories, Faith, Romania, perceptions.*

INTRODUCTION

The last two decades marked a revival of religion both globally following and adapting to technological developments¹, as well as individually with new institutionalized and non-institutionalized religious actors emerging on the

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¹ Scott M. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Dialogue, 2005.

background of Internet, digital applications and social networks' expansion.² All these developments were captured by the literature on religious studies within two particular concepts: digital religion and religion 2.0.³ Considering the topic of this research, digital religion can be defined as nothing but a mechanism for dealing with modernity by weaving together religious metanarratives, other non-religious topics and features of the digital space.⁴ Religion 2.0 can be defined through the idea of a third spaces of digital religion where new digital religious actors emerge. It was developed as a way of recognizing the emerging space that is created through 'the religious digital' as people engage religion within the networked world.⁵

One such new digital religious actor emerging within the third space of digital religion are Orthodox Bloggers or Ortho-bloggers. They can be defined as individuals or groups of individuals active in the online environment, who share the same Orthodox dogmatic norms and values. Their online activity is focused on spiritual life and religious moral values, theology debates, Orthodox clergy's activity and the Orthodox Churches' activities offline and online.⁶ However, what makes them a particular religious actor is the fact that their digital activity it is not limited to religious topics only. Often, together with their digital communities or alongside other Ortho-bloggers, they discuss political, security or economic issues⁷ and even engage in various forms of digital activism such as advocating for women's rights.⁸

² Giulia Evolvi, "Blogging My Religion. Secular, Muslim, and Catholic Media Spaces in Europe," in *Routledge Studies in Religion and Digital Culture*, ed. Heidi Campbell, Mia Lövheim, and Gregory Price Grieve, New York: Routledge, 2018.

³ Gregory Grieve, "Religion," in *Digital Religion: Understanding Religious Practice in New Media Worlds*, ed. Heidi Campbell, New York: Routledge, 2013.

⁴ Heidi A. Campbell and Alessandra Vitullo, "Assessing Changes in the Study of Religious Communities in Digital Religion Studies," *Church, Communication and Culture* 1, no. 1, 2016, pp. 73–89.

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⁶ Michail Suslov and Irina Kotkina, "'Ortho-Blogging' from Inside: A Virtual Roundtable," *Digital Icons: Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European New Media*, vol. 14, 2015, pp. 163–72.

⁷ Dragoş Şamşudean, "Digital Orthodoxy. A Typology of Non-Institutionalized Orthoblogs," *Baltic Words*, vol. XV, no. 3–4, 2022, pp. 92–102.

⁸ Nadia D. Zasanska, "New Producers of Patriarchal Ideology: Matushki in Digital Media of Russian Orthodox Church," *ESSACHESS - Journal for Communication Studies*, vol. 12, no. 2, 2019, pp. 99–128.

At the same time conspiracy theories continued to remain a topic of interest in the field of social sciences. More than that, the recent Covid-19 pandemic offered a new dynamic to researchers on conspiracy theories who explored both the adaptation to digital technologies of conspiracy ideas⁹, as well as the effects of this phenomenon in crisis situations such as the global pandemic.¹⁰ In particular, considering the religious conspiracies, there is an urge coming from religious studies researchers on the need for more studies on the conspiracy and religion.¹¹ From "God" perceived and analyzed as a standing ultimate conspiracy¹² towards religious values acting as catalysts for spreading and believing conspiracies¹³ and digital religious communities and conspiratory ideas the connection between religion and conspiracy theories seeks to be explored.¹⁴

In spite of the rich evidence on the digital religion and religious Catholic, Protestant and Neo-Protestant actors online dealing with conspiracy ideas, we know very little about how Ortho-bloggers position themselves towards conspiratory ideas, society and Faith. This is important since during the COVID-19 pandemic some of the Ortho-blogs active online were closed by the Romanian security services on account of spreading disinformation and conspiratory ideas about anti-Covid vaccine.¹⁵ Their perceptions regarding

⁹ Benjamin J. Dow et al., "The COVID-19 Pandemic and the Search for Structure: Social Media and Conspiracy Theories," *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, Vol.15, no. 9, 2021, pp. 1–22.

¹⁰ Lotte Pummerer et al., "Conspiracy Theories and Their Societal Effects During the COVID-19 Pandemic," *Social Psychological and Personality Science* Vol.13, no. 1, 2022, pp. 49–59.

¹¹ David G. Robertson, "The Hidden Hand: Why Religious Studies Need to Take Conspiracy Theories Seriously," *Religion Compass* Vol.11, no. 3–4, 2017, pp. 1–8.

¹² Brian L. Keeley, "God as the Ultimate Conspiracy Theory," *Episteme* vol.4, no. 2, 2007, pp. 135–49.

¹³ Moreno Mancosu, Salvatore Vassallo, and Cristiano Vezzoni, "Believing in Conspiracy Theories: Evidence from an Exploratory Analysis of Italian Survey Data," *South European Society and Politics* Vol.22, no. 3, 2017, pp. 327–44.

¹⁴ Joseph E. Uscinski, Darin DeWitt, and Matthew D. Atkinson, "A Web of Conspiracy? Internet and Conspiracy Theory," in *Handbook of Conspiracy Theory and Contemporary Religion*, ed. Asbjørn Dyrendal, David G. Robertson, and Egil Asprem, Leiden: Brill, 2018, pp. 106–33.

¹⁵ Digi24 News, "Site-ul ortodox.info închis pentru fake news [ortodox.info site closed for fake news]," 2020, <https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/sci-tech/lumea-digitala/site-ul-ortodoxinfo-ro-inchis-pentru-fake-news-se-pregatete-omorarea-pensionarilor-in-lagare-de-concentrare-si-exterminare-1297481>. accesat la data de 06.12.2023.

Orthodoxy and current socio-political topics¹⁶ are translated into articles and narratives posted online with which digital users interact. Thus, within this research I try to address the gaps within the religious studies and conspiracies literature by analyzing the ways in which Orthodox bloggers perceptions and activities online are linked with conspiracy theories topics.

My qualitative research is based on a deductive thematic analysis applied to 25 semi-structured interviews conducted with Ortho-bloggers in June–November 2021. I chose Romania as a case because it is one of the majority Eastern Orthodoxies from the perspective of the number of believers.¹⁷ Also, the internet infrastructure from the perspective of the network and digital technologies is well developed, there is a constant presence of conspiracy ideas in the online environment.¹⁸ In the end, Romania presents unique geopolitical characteristics due to its membership in the EU and NATO¹⁹, its ethno-cultural diversity and its proximity to the Russian Federation (an actor that politically instrumentalizes Faith conspiracy narratives).²⁰

PROFILING CONSPIRACY THEORIES: WHO? WHAT? WHERE?

The literature on conspiracy theories embodies a wide range of definitions. A general approach towards conspiracy theories emphasize that they are "attempts to explain the ultimate causes of esignificant social and political events and circumstances with claims of secret plots by two or more powerful actors"²¹. Studies from Psychology consider conspiracy theories as beliefs that are

¹⁶ Dragoş Şamşudean, *Op.cit.*

¹⁷ Sergiu Gherghina and Aurelian Plopeanu, "Social Networks, Attachment and Integration: Understanding the Church Attendance of Romanian Migrants," *Journal of Beliefs and Values* Vol.42, no. 1, 2021, pp. 110–23.

¹⁸ Raluca Buturoiu et al., "Who Believes in Conspiracy Theories about the Covid-19 Pandemic in Romania? An Analysis of Conspiracy Theories Believers' Profiles," *Societies* vo. 11, no. 4 ,2021.

¹⁹ Dan Dungaciu and Lucian Dumitrescu, "Romania's Strategic Initiatives in the Black Sea Area: From Subregionalism to Peripheral Regionalism," *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea*, vol.19, no. 2 ,2019, pp. 333–51.

²⁰ Denys Shestopalets, "Religious Freedom, Conspiracies, and Faith: The Geopolitics of Ukrainian Autocephaly," *Review of Faith and International Affairs* vol.18, no. 3 ,2020, pp. 25–39.

²¹ Karen M. Douglas et al., "Understanding Conspiracy Theories," *Political Psychology* vol.40, no. S1, 2019, p. 4.

usually unsubstantiated and implausible²² or as an "unnecessary assumption of conspiracy when other explanations are more probable"²³. Researchers in the field of social sciences define conspiracy theories as "an explanation of historical, ongoing, or future events that cites as a main causal factor a group of powerful persons, the conspirators, acting in secret for their own benefit against the common good"²⁴. Douglas and Sutton²⁵ in their recent study further argue that "The claim made implicitly by every conspiracy theory, is that the wider public should (but do not) know about a conspiracy. Each serious conspiracy theory is in fact bidding to become incorporated in public knowledge". At the same time, conspiracy theories are also framed as a sub-category of fake news and disinformation²⁶. A study conducted by van der Linden and colleagues' highlights conspiracy ideas as a component of fake news broadcast through the mainstream media²⁷. While the definition of conspiracy theories embodies different approaches, the effect of conspiracy ideas can be traced among individuals from the perspective of three major categories.

On the one hand, there are those who believe in conspiracy theories, driven by a wide range of motivations that are related both to their own person and to the society in which they live. Among the personal categories of reasons are demographic factors²⁸. The low level of education among individuals is associated with a high level of belief in conspiracy theories. The "belief in simple solutions for complex problems, feelings of powerlessness and subjective social class" represent mediators of this relationship between education and conspiracy

²² Robert Brotherton, Christopher C. French, and Alan D. Pickering, "Measuring Belief in Conspiracy Theories: The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale," *Frontiers in Psychology*, vol. 4, no. MAY, 2013, pp. 1–15.

²³ D Aronovitch, *Voodoo Histories: The Role of the Conspiracy Theory in Shaping Modern History*. London: Jonathan Cape, 2009, p. 5.

²⁴ Joseph E. Uscinski, "The Study of Conspiracy Theories," *Argumenta*, no.3, 2018, p. 235.

²⁵ "What Are Conspiracy Theories? A Definitional Approach to Their Correlates, Consequences, and Communication," *Annual Review of Psychology*, no. 74, 2023, p. 282.

²⁶ Salman Bin Naeem, Rubina Bhatti, and Aqsa Khan, "An Exploration of How Fake News Is Taking over Social Media and Putting Public Health at Risk," *Health Information and Libraries Journal*, vol. 38, no. 2, 2021, pp. 143–49.

²⁷ Sander van der Linden, Costas Panagopoulos, and Jon Roozenbeek, "You Are Fake News: Political Bias in Perceptions of Fake News," *Media, Culture and Society*, vol. 42, no. 3, 2020, pp. 460–70.

²⁸ Douglas et al., *Op.cit.*

theories²⁹. Other demographic markers associated with belief in conspiracy ideas are the male gender, unmarried people, those with lower income, unemployed, members of an ethnic minority group and with a weaker social network³⁰.

Conservative norms both at the religious level (dogmatism and proselytism) and at the political level (rightwing populism) represent another set of factors that explain the existence of beliefs in conspiracy ideas³¹. More than rightwing populism, conspiracy theories "are associated with ideological extremism, distrust of rival ideological camps, populist distrust of mainstream politics, and ideological grievances"³². According to another study, "white males with high conservatism and Protestantism showed higher endorsement of conservative conspiracy theories. Furthermore, ideological conservatives who frequently discuss politics showed higher association with a conservative conspiracy theory"³³.

Finally, in the category of personal factors associated with belief in conspiracies there are the existential reasons, as they are called by the literature on conspiracy theories³⁴. Several aversive feelings such as 'fear', 'uncertainty' or the feeling of 'being out of control' increase the likelihood of believing conspiracies³⁵. Other studies point to personal feelings of 'powerlessness'³⁶,

²⁹ Jan Willem van Prooijen, "Why Education Predicts Decreased Belief in Conspiracy Theories," *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, vol. 31, no. 1, 2017, p. 50.

³⁰ Douglas et al., "Understanding Conspiracy Theories"; Robert Hogg et al., "Conspiracy Beliefs and Knowledge about HIV Origins among Adolescents in Soweto, South Africa," *PLoS ONE*, vol. 12, no. 2, 2017, pp. 1–9.

³¹ Mancosu, Vassallo, and Vezzoni, "Believing in Conspiracy Theories: Evidence from an Exploratory Analysis of Italian Survey Data." *South European Society and Politics*, Vol.22, no.3, 2017, pp.327-344.

³² Robbie M. Sutton and Karen M. Douglas, "Conspiracy Theories and the Conspiracy Mindset: Implications for Political Ideology," *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences*, no.34, 2020, p. 118.

³³ Seong Jae Min, "Who Believes in Conspiracy Theories? Network Diversity, Political Discussion, and Conservative Conspiracy Theories on Social Media," *American Politics Research*, vol. 49, no. 5, 2021, p. 415.

³⁴ Douglas et al., *Op.cit.*

³⁵ Jan-Willem van Prooijen and Karen M Douglas, "Conspiracy theories as part of history: The role of societal crisis situations", *Memory Studies*, Vol.10, no.3, 2017, pp.323-333.

³⁶ David Zarefsky, "Conspiracy Arguments in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates," *Argumentation Library*, Vol. 24, 2014, pp. 195–209.

'existential anxiety'³⁷ and attitudes described as 'anxious attachment style'³⁸ being linked with a high degree of confidence in conspiracy ideas among individuals. Thus, as a first category of determinants of beliefs in conspiracy theories, there are personal ones in the form of individual socio-demographic characteristics, personal values and feelings.

In addition to this, some other research points towards the historical and social context as another major category that embodies different factors that encourage the emergence and belief in conspiracy ideas. According to a recent study, the attitude of people who believe in conspiracy theories is a naturally occurring consequence based on a different social reality in which individuals live. This is generally characterized by the distinct perception of real norms and the existence of alternative norms according to which individuals behave, distrust in social relationships as well as lower trust in institutions and traditional authorities³⁹. Van Prooijen and Douglas⁴⁰ emphasize that historically "societal crisis situations—defined as impactful and rapid societal change that calls established power structures, norms of conduct, or even the existence of specific people or groups into question—have stimulated belief in conspiracy theories". Thus, conspiracy beliefs are also associated with a paradoxical mechanism of adaptation to historical trauma⁴¹. At the same time, social curiosity expressed through finding meaning when information is unavailable, available information is conflicting or events seem random also lead individuals and social groups to believe in conspiracy theories⁴². Finally, studies on the psychology of social groups indicate that the "need to feel

³⁷ Anna Kaisa Newheiser, Miguel Farias, and Nicole Tausch, "The Functional Nature of Conspiracy Beliefs: Examining the Underpinnings of Belief in the Da Vinci Code Conspiracy," *Personality and Individual Differences*, Vol. 51, no. 8, 2011, pp.1007–11.

³⁸ Ricky Green and Karen M. Douglas, "Anxious Attachment and Belief in Conspiracy Theories," *Personality and Individual Differences*, Vol. 125, no. December 2017, 2018, pp. 30–37.

³⁹ Lotte Pummerer, "Belief in Conspiracy Theories and Non-Normative Behavior," *Current Opinion in Psychology*, Vol. 47, 2022.

⁴⁰ "Jan-Willem van Prooijen and Karen M Douglas, *Op.cit*, p.323.

⁴¹ Michał Bilewicz, "Conspiracy Beliefs as an Adaptation to Historical Trauma," *Current Opinion in Psychology*, Vol. 47, 2022, pp. 1–6.

⁴² Karen M. Douglas, Robbie M. Sutton, and Aleksandra Cichocka, "The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories," *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, Vol. 26, no. 6, 2017, pp. 538–42.

positive about the groups they belong" be it a nationality related one, political party or religious group, it is associated with a high belief in conspiracy theories⁴³.

Among the themes on which conspiracy theories are built, politics and governance stand out as being addressed extensively. While authoritarian political regimes and far-right political movements are often associated with conspiracy theories, The global order having as the spearhead Illuminati and the Zionist Movement or events such as the assassination of John F. Kennedy and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have also encompassed democratic societies too⁴⁴. Conspiracy ideas based on Manicheanism, a sense of victimhood and an ambivalence towards representative politics represent discursive frameworks within the populist agenda of political leaders such as Victor Orbán in Hungary, Donald Trump in the United States and Chávez in Venezuela⁴⁵. The effects of conspiracies rooted in political themes can be traced in the inability to implement political mandates and public policies or their hindrance⁴⁶, but also at a general level by inducing in society a long-lasting cynicism and distrust towards the government⁴⁷.

Another major theme related to conspiracy theories is health, part of what during the COVID-19 pandemic was called as infodemic⁴⁸. Among the most widespread sub-theme is related to vaccines, mainly associated in the last decade with diseases such as E-bola, AIDS and smallpox. The main conspiracy

⁴³ Douglas et al., *Op.cit*; W. Soral et al., "The Collective Conspiracy Mentality in Poland," in *Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them*, ed. E. J. and Uscinski, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 372–84.

⁴⁴ Daniel Allington, Beatriz L. Buarque, and Daniel Barker Flores, "Antisemitic Conspiracy Fantasy in the Age of Digital Media: Three 'Conspiracy Theorists' and Their YouTube Audiences," *Language and Literature*, Vol. 30, no. 1, 2021, pp. 78–102.

⁴⁵ Andrea L.P. Pirro and Paul Taggart, "Populists in Power and Conspiracy Theories," *Party Politics*, no. April 2021, 2022, pp. 1–11.

⁴⁶ Stephan Lewandowsky, Dawn Holford, and Philipp Schmid, "Public Policy and Conspiracies: The Case of Mandates," *Current Opinion in Psychology*, Vol. 47, 2022.

⁴⁷ Minchul Kim and Xiaoxia Cao, "The Impact of Exposure to Media Messages Promoting Government Conspiracy Theories on Distrust in the Government: Evidence from a Two-Stage Randomized Experiment," *International Journal of Communication*, 10, 2016.

⁴⁸ Monica Stephens, "A Geospatial Infodemic: Mapping Twitter Conspiracy Theories of COVID-19," *Dialogues in Human Geography*, Vol. 10, no. 2, 2020, pp. 276–81.

idea is that vaccines against such diseases cause convulsions, brain damage or autism⁴⁹. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has led to a major return of conspiracy themes related especially to health, but not only. Medical measures such as vaccination, but also non-medical measures such as wearing a mask and social distancing were the focus of COVID conspiracy ideas⁵⁰. In addition to the conspiracy theories regarding the production of vaccines and their effects, sub-themes such as the origin of the virus and the response of governments to the pandemic were found in the conspiracy discourse⁵¹. The health conspiracies associated with COVID were also linked with political authorities bringing up conspiratorial narrative as a regular tactic in the political discourse and endorsing non-authority persons who develop new narratives based on conspiracies⁵².

Other conspiracy ideas consider topics such as religion, pseudoscience and science fiction (sci-fi) beliefs and climate change and environment. According to the studies related to conspiracy theories and religion, at the intersection of these ideas three distinct components stand out: a) conspiracies as religion which centers on the philosophical and psychological underpinnings of ideation; b) conspiracies about religion focused on the dynamics of social groups in various political contexts and c) conspiracies in

⁴⁹ Gabriel Andrade, "Medical Conspiracy Theories: Cognitive Science and Implications for Ethics," *Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy*, Vol. 23, no. 3, 2020, pp. 505–18; Chandra L. Ford et al., "Belief in AIDS-Related Conspiracy Theories and Mistrust in the Government: Relationship with HIV Testing among at-Risk Older Adults," *Gerontologist*, Vol. 53, no. 6, 2013, pp. 973–84.

⁵⁰ Kinga Bierwiazzonek, Aleksander B. Gundersen, and Jonas R. Kunst, "The Role of Conspiracy Beliefs for COVID-19 Health Responses: A Meta-Analysis," *Current Opinion in Psychology*, Vol. 46, 2022; Irena Pavela Banai, Benjamin Banai, and Igor Mikloušić, "Beliefs in COVID-19 Conspiracy Theories, Compliance with the Preventive Measures, and Trust in Government Medical Officials," *Current Psychology*, Vol. 41, no. 10, 2022.

⁵¹ Daniel Freeman et al., "Coronavirus Conspiracy Beliefs, Mistrust, and Compliance with Government Guidelines in England," *Psychological Medicine*, Vol. 52, no. 2, 2022, pp. 51–63.

⁵² Calvin Yixiang Cheng, Wanjiang Jacob Zhang, and Qiyue Zhang, "Authority-Led Conspiracy Theories in China during the COVID-19 Pandemic – Exploring the Thematic Features and Rhetoric Strategies," *Convergence*, Vol. 28, no. 4, 2022, pp. 72–97; Tomasz Oleksy et al., "Content Matters. Different Predictors and Social Consequences of General and Government-Related Conspiracy Theories on COVID-19," *Personality and Individual Differences*, Vol. 168, no. May 2020, 2021.

religion concentrated in dogmatically harmonized sets of conspiracy ideas adapted to different religious groups and particular circumstances⁵³. Considering the case of Romania, finding scapegoats in actors like the EU, for the declining faith and morality of society, represents a germ of conspiratorial ideas among the local Orthodox clergy.⁵⁴ Regarding pseudoscience and science fiction beliefs, conspiracy ideas advance the idea of "predictive programming", namely that, through mass media shows such as the Matrix movies and X-Files TV series, societies are indoctrinated and prepared for future changes⁵⁵. At the same time, media productions related to the conquest of space and what is in the universe as well as the secrecy behind the space race fuel conspiracy theories based on pseudoscience and sci-fi⁵⁶. Finally, conspiracy ideas are born around the climate and environment theme, including discussions about how governments control the weather and climate warming as a tool for the political world elites in their pursuit of building a new world order⁵⁷.

In their path of believing conspiracy theories and the promotion of conspiracy ideas focused on the previously highlighted themes, individuals benefit from social media and the social polarization generated in the online environment⁵⁸. Studies on communication and digital media point towards the growing impact of various social media networks in spreading conspiracy

⁵³ Asbjørn Dyrendal, "Conspiracy Theory and Religion," in *Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories*, ed. Michael Butter and Peter Knight, London: Routledge, 2020, pp.371–85; D.G. Robertson, E. Aspren, and A. Dyrendal, "Introducing the Field: Conspiracy Theory in, about, and as Religion," in *Handbook of Conspiracy Theory and Contemporary Religion*, ed. A. Dyrendal, D.G. Robertson, and E. Aspren, Leiden: Brill, 2019, pp.1–18.

⁵⁴ Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Mişcoiu and Dragoş Şamşudean, "Religion, Homosexuality and the EU: Grasping the Beliefs of Romanian Orthodox Priests", *Sexuality, Gender & Policy*, Vol.5, issue 2, 2022, pp.108-121.

⁵⁵ Seth Barrett Tillman, "Conspiracy Theories," *History Today*, Vol. 64, no. 2, 2014.

⁵⁶ Andrei Rogatchevski, "Space Exploration in Russian and Western Popular Culture: Wishful Thinking, Conspiracy Theories and Other Related Issues," in *Soviet Space Culture Cosmic Enthusiasm in Socialist Societies*, ed. Eva Maurer et al., Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

⁵⁷ Mikey Biddlestone, Flavio Azevedo, and Sander van der Linden, "Climate of Conspiracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Consequences of Belief in Conspiracy Theories about Climate Change," *Current Opinion in Psychology*, Vol. 46, 2022.

⁵⁸ Douglas et al., *Op.cit.*

theories, based on algorithms and the so-called 'echo chambers'⁵⁹. Facebook represents one of the social media networks that is positively associated with the spread of conspiracy ideas within the digital environment. The conspiratorial activity of the groups formed within this network, although significant before the COVID-19 pandemic in promoting extremist ideologies and 5G conspiracies⁶⁰, gained momentum during the pandemic on health-related issues⁶¹. Instagram is another social media network that has stood out in spreading conspiracies through memes, funny photos that convey different messages⁶². Other social media apps that stood out as channels and 'echo chambers' for promoting conspiracy ideas are TikTok⁶³, Twitter⁶⁴ and Reddit⁶⁵.

Alongside the category of individuals who believe in various conspiracy theories emerging and propagated in the social media based on personal or systemic factors, there is another category of people who reject conspiracy ideas. A high level of education as well as critical thinking are associated with

⁵⁹ Peter L. Forberg, "From the Fringe to the Fore: An Algorithmic Ethnography of the Far-Right Conspiracy Theory Group QAnon," *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, Vol.51, no. 3, 2022, pp. 291–317.

⁶⁰ Axel Bruns, Stephen Harrington, and Edward Hurcombe, "'Corona? 5G? Or Both?': The Dynamics of COVID-19/5G Conspiracy Theories on Facebook," *Media International Australia*, Vol.177, no. 1, 2020, pp. 12–29.

⁶¹ Daniel Allington et al., "Health-Protective Behaviour, Social Media Usage and Conspiracy Belief during the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency," *Psychological Medicine* Vol. 51, no. 10 ,2021.; Lena Frischlich, "'Resistance!': Collective Action Cues in Conspiracy Theory-Endorsing Facebook Groups," *Media and Communication*, Vol. 10, no. 2, 2022, pp. 130–43.

⁶² Derya Gür-Şeker, Ute K. Boonen, and Michael Wentker, "#conspiracymemes A Framework-Based Analysis of Conspiracy Memes as Digital Multimodal Units and Ensuing User Reactions on Instagram," in *Conspiracy Theory Discourses*, ed. Massimiliano Demata, Virginia Zorzi, and Angela Zottola ,Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2022.

⁶³ Justin Grandinetti and Jeffrey Bruinsma, "The Affective Algorithms of Conspiracy TikTok," *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* Vol. 67, no. 1, 2022.

⁶⁴ Amos Fong et al., "The Language of Conspiracy: A Psychological Analysis of Speech Used by Conspiracy Theorists and Their Followers on Twitter," *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* Vol. 24, no. 4, 2021, pp. 606–23.

⁶⁵ Chad A. Melton et al., "Public Sentiment Analysis and Topic Modeling Regarding COVID-19 Vaccines on the Reddit Social Media Platform: A Call to Action for Strengthening Vaccine Confidence," *Journal of Infection and Public Health* Vol.14, no. 10, 2021, pp. 5–12.

individuals who do not believe in and do not promote conspiracy ideas⁶⁶. People who reject conspiracy ideas and are less inclined to believe in conspiracies are associated with democratic thinking and an open attitude towards political debates⁶⁷. Religiosity in its moderate forms of dogmatic thinking and faith practice represents, in addition to the above, another marker of people who detach themselves from conspiracy theories⁶⁸. Finally, besides those who either believe or do not believe in conspiracy ideas, there is a third category of individuals and social groups associated with ignorance.

Both at the micro and macro societal level, ignorance as a personal and group attitude is present among individuals⁶⁹. From the macro-political perspective, ignorance is associated either with a political strategy of the leaders who try to preserve or increase their power (strategic ignorance) or with weak mobilization of the electorate in campaigns and referendums⁷⁰. At the same time, macro-professional ignorance is also associated with the inability of individual or state actors to produce qualitative knowledge in different fields of

⁶⁶ Jan-Willem van Prooijen, "Why Education Predicts Decreased Belief in Conspiracy Theories" *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, Vol.31, no.1, 2017 pp.50-58; Viren Swami and David Barron, "Rational Thinking Style, Rejection of Coronavirus (COVID-19) Conspiracy Theories/Theorists, and Compliance with Mandated Requirements: Direct and Indirect Relationships in a Nationally Representative Sample of Adults from the United Kingdom," *Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology*, Vol. 15, 2021.

⁶⁷ Seong Jae Min, "Who Believes in Conspiracy Theories? Network Diversity, Political Discussion, and Conservative Conspiracy Theories on Social Media," *American Politics Research* Vol.49, no. 5 ,2021, pp. 415–27; Adam M. Enders and Steven M. Smallpage, "Informational Cues, Partisan-Motivated Reasoning, and the Manipulation of Conspiracy Beliefs," *Political Communication*, Vol. 36, no. 1, 2019, pp. 83–102.

⁶⁸ Alexander Yendell and David Herbert, "Religion, Conspiracy Thinking, and the Rejection of Democracy: Evidence From the UK," *Politics and Governance* Vol.10, no. 4, 2022, pp. 229–42.

⁶⁹ Linsey McGoey, "Micro-Ignorance and Macro-Ignorance in the Social Sciences," *Social Research: An International Quarterly* Vol.87, no. 1 ,2020.

⁷⁰ Grégoire Mallard and Linsey McGoey, "Strategic Ignorance and Global Governance: An Ecumenical Approach to Epistemologies of Global Power," *British Journal of Sociology* Vol.69, no. 4 ,2018; Russell Hardin, "Ignorant Democracy," *Critical Review* Vol. 18, no. 1–3 ,2006, pp. 179–95; Ilya Somin, "Deliberative Democracy and Political Ignorance," *Critical Review* Vol.22, no. 2, 2010, pp. 53–79.

activity⁷¹. Micro-ignorance found in the form of what the literature calls 'willful ignorance' is considered "an important source of socially harmful behavior" due to the fact that "it can serve as an excuse for selfish behavior" which in the end affect the decision making process ⁷². The micro perspective of ignorance is that of maintaining one's own lifestyle and personal ideas while they are challenged by reality, conspiracies or both⁷³. Taking into account the presence of ignorance as a general attitude present at the personal and systemic level, although I did not identify studies regarding the ignorance of conspiracy theories, such a category cannot be ignored from the analytical framework of this study. While emphasize different attitudes and forms of conspiracies find within the digital space, this study seeks to address the urge within the religious studies on analyzing more about conspiracies, religion and the Internet using a little explored case that I will detail within the next section.

EXPLORING CONSPIRACY AND FAITH IN ROMANIA: A RESEARCH DESIGN

The literature on methodologies within the social sciences points to several models for selecting cases. For the purpose of this study I select Romania as a single case, that is representative for the subject approach. Romania is a relevant case due to three major reasons. First, there is a high level of religiosity among individuals, both in the case of the domestic population and diaspora. The increased religiosity has been noted to be a constant in recent decades, with Romania ranking among the first in the EU in terms of the religiosity of the population.⁷⁴ At the same time, Romanian Orthodox Church continued to maintain its majority with a high confidence rank among the

⁷¹ Daniel Lee Kleinman and Sainath Suryanarayanan, "Dying Bees and the Social Production of Ignorance," *Science Technology and Human Values* Vol.38, no. 4 ,2013, pp. 492–517.

⁷² Zachary Grossman and Joël J. van der Weele, "Self-Image and Willful Ignorance in Social Decisions," *Journal of the European Economic Association* Vol.15, no. 1 ,2017, p. 173.

⁷³ Penhall-Jones and Margaret Leila, "Self-Deception and Wilful Ignorance: 'Self-Induced, Purported Ignorance?'" , Thesis, University of Adelaide, 2022, Accesed in 08 December 2023.

⁷⁴ Gherghina and Plopeanu, "Social Networks, Attachment and Integration: Understanding the Church Attendance of Romanian Migrants." *Journal of Beliefs and Values*, Vol.42, no.1, 2021, pp.110-123.

population, despite controversies over its communist history⁷⁵. Second, the digital space in Romania is constantly flooded with conspiracies on various topics and forms. The most current wave of conspiracies in the Romanian digital environment referred to the recent covid-19 pandemic.⁷⁶ However, political conspiracy topics⁷⁷ and even conspiracy ideas related to Orthodoxy and the Orthodox Church⁷⁸ have not escaped the offline and online media in Romania. Finally, Romania offers a particular social and political context, being a young democracy among European states, a young member of the European Union and offering a religious mosaic: from Christianity, Judaism and Islam to various denominations and heterodox religious groups.⁷⁹

In order to collect my data I conducted semi-structured interviews with Romanian Ortho-bloggers. I focus on Orthodox religious bloggers who work in the Romanian online environment, from 2007 to 2020. On the one hand, 2007 marks Romania's accession to the European Union and the adoption of a new set of socio-political values and norms. On the other hand, the chosen period captures the technological evolutions in Romania in the digital sphere.⁸⁰ The present research uses 25 semi-structured interviews with Romanian Ortho-bloggers, which covers several themes related to their online activity (Appendix 1). Details about the Ortho-bloggers can be also consulted in Table 1

⁷⁵ Lucian Turcescu and Lavinia Stan, "The Romanian Orthodox Church and Democratization: Twenty Years Later," *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* Vol.10, no. 2-3, 2010, pp. 144-59.

⁷⁶ Nicoleta Corbu et al., "Romanians' Willingness to Comply with Restrictive Measures during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Evidence from an Online Survey," *Journal of Applied Communication Research* Vol.49, no. 4, 2021, pp. 369-86.

⁷⁷ Dana Sultănescu, "War of the Words. The Online Conversation about NATO in Romania: Communicators, Content, Communities," *Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations* Vol.24, no. 1, 2022, pp. 25-46.

⁷⁸ Giuseppe Tateo, "When Conspiracy Meets Faith Making Sense of Tragic Events in Bucharest, Romania," in *Religious Dimensions of Conspiracy Theories Comparing and Connecting Old and New Trends*, ed. Francesco Piraino, Marco Pasi, and Egil Asprem, London: Routledge, 2022.; Gherghina, Mişcoiu and Şamşudean, *Op.Cit.*

⁷⁹ Mihai Popa and Liviu Andreescu, "Legal Provisions, Courts, and the Status of Religious Communities: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Inter-Religious Relations in Romania," *Religion, State and Society* Vol.45, no. 3-4, 2017, pp. 297-316.

⁸⁰ Dan-Cristian Dabija et al., "Cross-Generational Analysis of Information Searching Based on Social Media in Romania," *Transformations in Business & Economics* Vol.16, no. 2, 2017, pp. 248-70.

(Appendix 2). At the same time, I used a selection of documents collected from Ortho-blogs active in the digital environment in Romania. In order to create the sample of Ortho-blogs I conducted a systematic review of the Romanian Orthosphere between January-May 2022. I identified more than 50 Ortho-blogs active (with a frequency of posting between several posts per day to one or two posts per month) based on dedicated blogging platforms such as WordPress and Web.com and 80 Ortho-blogs active on social media platforms (Facebook and Instagram).

Considering the method of analysis, for this study I use the deductive thematic analysis to interpret the answers to interviews and Ortho-blog documents. This method is suitable for the study of attitudes towards conspiracy theories among Orthodox religious bloggers, as it allows the identification of common themes in relation to the belief, rejection or ignorance of conspiracies, offering at the same time several ways to interpret the data.

ROMANIA ORTHO-SPHERE: CONSPIRACY IDEAS AND ATTITUDES AMONG ORTHODX BLOGGERS ACTIVE ONLINE

The few studies on Orthodox religious bloggers highlight a diverse activity of these new digital religious actors. From themes with a theological charge to topics related to political security, economy and ecological activism, Ortho-bloggers express different opinions within the religious communities they manage online.⁸¹ Three major categories of attitudes towards conspiracy theories stand out in the Romanian Orthosphere based on the perception of faith and the systemic context surrounding the Ortho-bloggers. On the one hand, some of the religious bloggers believe in various own conspiracy ideas. On the other hand, others not only believe but take a step forward and share conspiracy content online through their own Ortho-blogs. Finally, there is an attitude of ignorance and rejection of conspiracy theories among Orthodox religious bloggers. All this are detailed within the paragraphs below.

Putting the own faith in conspiracies: perceptions and personal conspiracy narratives among Ortho-bloggers

The data provided by the interviews highlight the tendency of Ortho-bloggers to construct own conspiracy narratives. The association between religious activity and the national and international socio-political or economic

⁸¹ Suslov and Kotkina, *Op.cit*; Zasanska, *Op.cit*; Şamşudean, *Op.cit*.

situation is a way in which personal conspiratory ideas are born among Orthobloggers. One respondent detailing about the Autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church explains that "The story from Ukraine was much stronger, being more politically related to the major themes: the West vs. Russia, Constantinople Patriarchate linked to USA versus Moscow Patriarchate. Romania was caught in the middle" (R1). This general idea that mixes the activity of a local Orthodox Church with that of some Autonomous Patriarchates and with the international activity of some state actors (USA, Russia, Romania) is not supported with any evidence by the respondent. Following the same pattern, another interviewee describes the Romanian Orthodox Church as being "the largest LLC with businesses worth of millions" led by duplicitous people in their faith (R4). As with the previous example, the respondent does not provide any evidence for the statement. Mixing elements of institutional Faith with political and economic topics, Orthobloggers give evidence of personal conspiracy beliefs. In this case, the belief that behind the activity of the Church there is a hidden, political or economic interest. Although this may be the case, the fact that the respondents have no evidence for what they claim puts their statements in the category of pseudo-science and conspiracy ideas.

The political activity of some regional and national institutions also attracts the Orthobloggers. Through generalization and trivialization, conspiratorial ideas appear among the respondents. R4 describes the European Union as "an impostor who tries to falsely identify himself with EUROPE". Further, it adds that: "The EU is an increasingly ideological quasi-extremist and totalitarian organization that tries to impose a uniform way of thinking". Finally it emphasizes that "I am aware that my points, my opinions are classified by the Brussels Union as non-compliant. If they would have a way, the Brussels Union would show me a yellow card". There is no empirical evidence to support these statements regarding EU's activity, mocked by the expression "Brussels Union". The same respondent step forward with its conspiracy explanations stating that Facebook has an increasingly discriminatory position towards opinions expressed online that do not align with the requirements of the European Union (R4). The complexity of the conspiracy ideas highlighted by this respondent exceeds the "big brother" effect. The online environment seems to be only a controlled space where we take risks when we post and expose ourselves to EU sanctions (yellow card).

On the national level, one conspiracy that stands out is that other countries do better than Romania. On the background of Romania's admission to the EU one respondent states: "Serbs do better. The population was not consulted, personally I am against it. We deserve worse anyway, because that's what we're good for as a nation" (R11). The conspiracy resides in the fact that not only because of the EU Romania is having a hard time, but to a certain extent we deserve it because it is part of our national identity.

Continuing the idea of the previous respondent, another states that "I do not consider that Romania was greatly advantaged by joining the European Union. Unfortunately, Romania is exploited beyond measure, without offering its citizens the advantages they deserve" (R16). As it was with conspiracies above, no data on the excessive exploitation of Romania and the extraordinary life in Serbia were offered, the conspiracy identifying only the guilty party: EU.

Finally, conspiracies appear among the Ortho-bloggers interviewed with reference to the Orthodox Faith in Romania, subject to a constant attack from several directions. On the one hand, the siege of the local Orthodoxy is led by the ecumenist movement through the association of the Romanian Orthodox Church with the World Council of Churches and the joint service with the Catholic Church and other cults. All this, as stated by respondent 11, makes the Orthodox religious cultural context in Romania a serious trap that continues to divide the believers. Another source leading the siege on the Orthodoxy is a part of the local political environment, as explained by interviewee 20:

"in Romania, a political movement with a strong anti-ecclesiastical character has coagulated, which transmits violent messages, hate and threats at the level of party activists, respectively through the mass of voters. Messages that, although apparently, convey the intention to reform the Church, hide the intention to secularize society and drastically reduce the Orthodox religious phenomenon in Romanian society" (R20)

How the respondent reached this conclusion and the evidence of this plan are not presented. Adding on the sieged Orthodoxy conspiracy, another Ortho-blogger interviewed states: "Regarding recent events such as Colectiv, ROC had nothing to discuss. I think it was a major trap into which ROC fell". Thus, while the Orthodox faith is besieged by ecumenism and secularization, local actors set traps to catch the Orthodox Church on the wrong foot. While all of the above shows conspiracies on an individual level among Orthodox religious bloggers, a closer look at the online Ortho-blogs may vary those and better explain the access and distribution of one's personal conspiracies within the Romanian Ortho-sphere.

Preaching the word of conspiracies: access and share of them within the Ortho-sphere

The Orthodox blogs shows the fact that the conspiracy narratives constructed by Ortho-bloggers at an individual level, sometimes find a way out and escape within the digital environment. On the one hand, this happens through articles which titrate and contain conspiratorial ideas. Within an SACCSIV Ortho-blog one such article title states: "Virtual Reality Porn Has Seen Sales Increase / Plans for Nervous System and Brain Implants". The news talks about how the Oligarchs of the world (called in the article the Controloligarchs) are trying to dominate people's private lives by implanting chips and VR systems, pushing humanity towards a dystopian world of pleasure.⁸² Another Ortho-blog, another conspiracy title article stating: "The media and the prosecutors orchestrated an attack on the Romanian Orthodox Church". Further, within the article it is explained that "It can be seen with the open eye that there are obscure agreements between certain segments of the media and the judiciary system, their actions being coordinated and aiming at the distorted presentation of reality."⁸³ Combining real data and informations about technological breakthroughs or real judicial actions, Ortho-bloggers expose articles and news in a conspiratorial manner, designing an image of an Orthodox Faith besieged by shadow leaders at international or national level.

To facilitate access to conspiracy topics, some Ortho-blogs have created dedicated sections for such articles. Within the "ACVILA ORTODOXĂ blog" several such designated blog sections can be found called accordingly: "Books about secret societies", "The new World Order" and "The danger of vaccines".⁸⁴ Following the same construction of the Ortho-blog "OrthodoxINFO" blog introduces the following sections of content to online followers and users:

⁸² SACCSIV-Blog Ortodox, "Pornografia În Realitatea Virtuală a Înregistrat o Creștere a Vânzărilor / Planuri Pentru Implanturi Asupra Sistemului Nervos Și a Creierului," Blog article, 2023, <https://saccsiv.wordpress.com/2023/11/27/pornografia-in-realitatea-virtuala-a-inregistrat-o-crestere-a-vanzarilor-planuri-pentru-implanturi-asupra-sistemului-nervos-si-a-creierului/#more-104926>. Accesat la data de 07.12.2023.

⁸³ OrtodoxInfo, "Presa Și Procurorii Atacă Orchestrat Biserica Ortodoxă Română. În Culisele Investiției Recorder-DNA," 2023, <https://ortodoxinfo.ro/2023/12/06/presa-si-procurorii-ataca-orchestrat-biserica-ortodoxa-romana-in-culisele-investigatiei-recorder-dna/>. Accesat la data de 07.12.2023.

⁸⁴ Orthodox Aquila (Acvila Ortodoxa), "Acvila Ortodoxă," <https://acvilaortodoxa.wordpress.com/>. Accesat la data de 07.12.2023.

"Anti-System", "Big-Brother", "Chip", "WWIII" and "Vaccine".⁸⁵ Within these sections, it is possible to identify, even chronologically, articles with various conspiracy themes, from specifically religious themes to political conspiracies related to the COVID-19 pandemic and the so-called global occult. At the same time, Ortho-blogs stand as a proof for what I discussed in the previous section regarding the construction of own personal conspiracy narratives by Ortho-bloggers. In a section like the ones described above, from the OrtodoxINFO blog, we find the message: "The system wants to silence us! Support OrtodoxINFO! We strive to keep this site alive and provide you with information that sheds light on the challenges we are experiencing".⁸⁶ Although the blog indeed was closed during the pandemic for several months because it undermines the anti-COVID-19 vaccination campaign by spreading disinformation. This happened because it violates the legislation in force at that time not because the state violates freedom of expression, proof that after a few months the Ortho-blog became active online again and remaining so until today.

While organizing and putting into word through articles online their personal conspiracy theories, Ortho-bloggers actually engaged their users and followers. Thus, they actually engaged in debate their conspiracies, stepping forward from just construct them in their mind and post them online. The digital technologies of the blogs engage users, such examples being found within the Ortho-blog "OChilieAthonită". Within a blog article which predicts a great famine in the year 2025, 34 users share this information, while approximately another 40 followers react with various appreciative emojis to the material. The article does not provide any empirical, scientific evidence in support of the highlighted theses, on the contrary, considering climate change an invention and a scare used by globalist institutions to prevent farmers from producing food.⁸⁷

Not only can users in their turn further share online the conspiracy ideas and react to them confirming the confidence in the information provided, but they actively engage in the development and expansion of the conspiracy ideas introduced by Ortho-bloggers. One such example can be found in the comments of an article that stated: "ALARM! Adoptions by homosexuals are taking place

⁸⁵ Ortho-blog OrtodoxINFO, <https://ortodoxinfo.ro/>. Accesat la data de 07.12.2023.

⁸⁶ OrtodoxINFO, "Identitatea Digitală – Tiranie, Nu Securitate!," 2023, Chip Section of the Blog. <https://ortodoxinfo.ro/2023/11/30/identitatea-digitala-tiranie-nu-securitate/>. Accesat la data de 07.12.2023.

⁸⁷ OChilieAthonită Ortho-blog "Marea Foamete Globală din 2025," <https://www.facebook.com/OChilieAthonita>, Accesat la data de 07.12.2023.

in Romania!".⁸⁸ In the comments section, one of the respondents continued the alarmist conspiratory idea of the article by stating:

"If the "legislator" believes that "they were born this way"... did they announce (of course NOT) in the election campaign that they will give the children to... pedophiles? Like these – a gay in fact... he deals with this, pedophilia; otherwise, a homosexual man does not appear "per se" or "as such" but only through "coupling" with another, he needs another man and searches until he finds one to corrupt him. Now - it is not limited to such "direct" corruption, but the practice, helped by Satanists from "power", of hunting/capturing young, innocent children in order to destroy them. And for this reason, every homosexual is a SEXUAL CORRUPTOR, impotent with adults and then attacks and corrupts the young."⁸⁹

Another comment explains the fact that "The entire parliament is made up of prostitute servants, as is the press. Only God saves us. Hierarchs the same, very few are honest with the people. The people are only with God at the present time."⁹⁰, and another user continued: "Let no one imagine that homosexuals will preserve the innocence of children, saving them from this terrible sin!".⁹¹

Finally, Ortho-blogs themselves are spaces for creating conspiracy ideas, not only by Ortho-bloggers, but also by users. Starting from non-conspiracy material posted on Orthodox religious blogs, followers bring conspiracy ideas to the comments section. One such example can be found in the Ortho-blog "ortodox.brothers.ro" where the following comment is posted on a sermon posted online: "I have never heard from the mouth of this priest "Christ", only the Lord Jesus. It makes me think of Pentecostals. Be careful what wolves in sheep's clothing you promote :). The pond is full of #ecumenism".⁹² Because the

⁸⁸ OrtodoxINFO, "ALARMĂ! În România Au Loc Adopții de Către Homosexuali," 2021, <https://ortodoxinfo.ro/2021/11/15/alarma-in-romania-au-loc-adoptii-de-catre-homosexuali/>. Accesat la data de 07.12.2023.

⁸⁹ OrtodoxINFO-Comment 1. "ALARMĂ! În România Au Loc Adopții de Către Homosexuali," Accesat la data de 07.12.2023.

⁹⁰ OrtodoxINFO-Comment 3. "ALARMĂ! În România Au Loc Adopții de Către Homosexuali," Accesat la data de 07.12.2023.

⁹¹ OrtodoxINFO-Comment 4. "ALARMĂ! În România Au Loc Adopții de Către Homosexuali," Accesat la data de 07.12.2023.

⁹² Ortho-blog "Ortodox.brothers.ro", "Părintele Daniel Avram. Noi Nu Întelegem Pentru Că Nu Îl Avem Pe Duhul Sfânt.," 2023, <https://www.instagram.com/ortodox.brothers.ro/>.

priest uses a synonymous address to describe the person of Christ, the user conceives the conspiracy idea that the Romanian Orthodox Church is infiltrated with Protestant theology and ecumenism. What should be noted when discussing Ortho-blogs is that on the one hand there are spaces where the personal conspiracies of Ortho-bloggers gain an audience. On the other hand, conspiracy ideas posted online engage Ortho-blog users who further distribute, react and elaborate on conspiracy ideas in comment sections. Finally, Orthodox religious blogs are spaces where users in turn, starting from correct information and data, create their own conspiracies online. Besides those who believe and generate conspiracy ideas in the Romanian Ortho-sphere, Ortho-Bloggers or users, there are Orthodox religious bloggers who distance themselves from conspiracy theories.

Keeping distance with conspiracies: from ignorance to objectively analyze the world around

Contrasting the respondents among whom I identified conspiracy ideas, more than half of the interviewed Orthodox religious bloggers ignore or objectively explain facts and actions in the context of their digital activity. On the one hand, there are Ortho-bloggers who ignore conspiracy ideas, this being emphasized by the explanations regarding the reasons of why they carry out their activity online. Respondent 2 explains that Orthodox religious blogging is for him only a way to get closer to the believers in the parish he shepherds by adapting the pastoral methods towards today's technological reality: "through blogging I have the opportunity to address a larger number of people and bring the message of the Gospel to people's lives and everyday problems" (R2). Another interviewee explains the fact that the themes and subjects he approaches in the digital environment do nothing but address the activities and the story of the parish of which he is a part of: "online posts help us share the story of our parish and make known the activity within the religious community in that we live" (R10).

On the other hand, some of the respondents objectively explain the institutional activity of different actors in society or empirical realities that surround them. Elaborating on the European Union's activity and Romania, R12 explains that:

There is no way to say that joining the EU contributed negatively to the evolution of Romania, but only the fact that Romania was not prepared for the rigors of the EU. Belonging to the EU gives us the security guarantee that we are not alone in

the face of threats from the east, the EU is the guarantee of preserving the national identity of each state. We are lucky to be part of the European family. At the level of Romania, the truth is that the Romanian society is in a moral decline. The EU does not teach you to steal, kill, bribe, etc.

Contrary to the conspiracy ideas that identify the EU as the culprit for the negative developments in Romania, the respondent explains that it is not EU norms or Christian values that are the cause of the situation in which Romania finds itself, but rather what society does, what individuals do with those norms and values. Moreover, addressing the subject of this article directly, one of the respondents makes an indirect evaluation of the Romanian Ortho-sphere, through the answer it gives: "unfortunately, there are countless so-called religious posts that take advantage of the authority that a Church offers and run false information, with source that are impossible to verify" (R19).

Finally, R12 offers some explanations for the conspiracies of the "Besieged Orthodoxy". It explains that part of the attacks on the Romanian Orthodox Church is also due to its lack of institutional response: "On the one hand, maybe it is the Church's fault because it fails to promote its philanthropic, pastoral and educational activity. This is the great disadvantage of the ROC, it did not know how to communicate, although the human resource exists in this sense". The respondent adds further on the topic of the cultural-religious situation in Romania, describing it as complex, with an ultraconservative Orthodoxy present offline and online: " We are dealing with a wave of ultra-conservatism and ultra-religious groups. It is our duty that through spiritual activity, including online, to say that the state is the state, the Church is the Church, there is a symphony, but to "give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's" (R12). On the contrary, the activity of Ortho-bloggers should not involve spreading conspiracies but separating reality from wrong perceptions and messages.

CONCLUSIONS

This study aimed to emphasize and explain how Ortho-bloggers position themselves towards conspiracy theories, society and Faith by analyzing the activity of Romanian Ortho-bloggers and the Ortho-blogs active online. The data collected from interviews with Orthodox religious bloggers and Ortho-blogs highlights several attitudes towards conspiracy theories. On the one hand, some of the Ortho-bloggers are creators of conspiracy theories. Starting from dissatisfaction with politicians and Romania's status as EU member or the

state of the Orthodox Faith in Romania, Orthodox bloggers are looking for scapegoats that give rise to conspiratorial ideas. Moreover, such conspiracy religious bloggers post different articles and texts within the religious blogs they manage, created on the basis of their conspiracy theories. This not only allows the spread of conspiratorial ideas but, through the digital functions of the blogging platforms, the users and followers of Ortho-blogs engage directly too in the development of those conspiracies.

Thus, the conspiracies ideas of the Ortho-bloggers acquire a parochial character, a snowball effect being created through which the followers add their own conspiracies to the initial conspiracy launched by the Ortho-blogger. At the same time, the data on Ortho-blogs show that there is no control of Ortho-bloggers over the comment section. Even in the context of non-conspiracy news or materials, users intervene with conspiratorial ideas. Thus, while Ortho-bloggers do not directly create conspiracy ideas and materials, by not managing the page and tolerating conspiracy theories from users, they show an openness and acceptance of such unverifiable ideas, as even one respondent explains.

On the other hand, contrasting the own conspiracy ideas created by the Ortho-bloggers themselves and the tolerance of some Orthodox religious bloggers towards such ideas present on their blogs, other Orthodox religious bloggers choose to ignore or argue factually and objectively the ideas they expose online. Whether their digital activity addresses specific activities or tries to identify real causes for various societal, personal or Romanian Orthodox Churches' problems, a part of the Romanian Ortho-sphere distances itself from the conspiracy discourse.

The contribution of this article is first an empirical one towards the general study of the relationship between conspiracy theories, Faith and society by focusing on a new religious actor online: Ortho-bloggers. More specific, this study extends the debates within the religious studies and conspiracy literature by emphasising and explaining the Ortho-bloggers attitudes and how Ortho-blogs function as a third digital space of online religion. At theoretical level, this articles emphasize how different themes how different conspiratory themes existing in the literature can be found in the Ortho-bloggers' way of creating, sharing and engaging conspiracies online. The views expressed by the respondents show that individual dissatisfaction, the search for scapegoats and the lack of evidence remain among the characteristics of conspiracy ideas even with the Ortho-sphere in Romania. Since the activity of Ortho-bloggers takes

place online, implying a transnational character, the analysis can be replicated in the case of other states, with a majority population or not, being Orthodox. At the same time, other researches can focus specifically on certain types of conspiracies among Ortho-bloggers: religious, political, scientific or of another nature.

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Appendix 1

Semi-Structured Interview Guide

1. Considering your activity online, what is your opinion about the expansion of the Internet and social media networks in the last 5-10 years?
2. How would you describe your blogging activity in the last 5-10 years?
 - What about religious Orthodox blogging - Ortho-blogging?
3. What would be the topics you most often cover and address in your Ortho-blogging activities?
4. What might be your personal motivations for practicing religious blogging?
 - What other personal motivations do you consider, taking into account your daily offline activities
5. Why did you choose to post in this Orthodox blogging format online?
 - How did you start Ortho-blogging?
6. How would you describe the role and activity of the Orthodox Church in the last 5-10 years, as an institution, in society?
 - What about the activity of Metropolies/Archdiocesis in their specific canonical areas?
7. From your experience, are there any provisions from the RoOC hierarchs regarding the activity of lay people and clergy in the online environment?
 - What about synodal decisions (Holy Synod / Metropolitan Synods / Local Synaxes), documents, communications?
8. From the perspective of your online activity, how would you describe the Internet infrastructure in Romania, in the last 5-10 years?
 - What about the national regulations/laws regarding online activities?
9. What do you think about the developments in the socio-political field in Romania after the accession to the EU in 2007?
 - What could be possible advantages/disadvantages of Romania's membership in the EU?
 - How do you assess the impact of these developments on your online activity?
10. How do you assess/describe the cultural-religious context in Romania in the last 5-10 years?
 - What about the cultural-religious context at the regional level (Eastern Europe) from the perspective of the Orthodox religious actors in the area?
 - How do you assess the impact of these developments on your online activity?

Note: The follow-up questions are presented with bullet points.

Appendix 2
Table 1: Profile of the Interviewees

Acro- nym	Urban/ Rural	Age Category	Region	Interview length (min.)	Gender	Education	Type of Interview
R1	Rural	30-39	North-West	64	M	Higher	Online
R2	Rural	30-39	North-West	36	M	Higher	Telephone
R3	Urban	40-49	South-West	31	F	Higher	Online
R4	Urban	40-49	South	44	M	Higher	Online
R5	Rural	30-39	West	37	M	Higher	Online
R6	Urban	40-49	North- East	68	F	Higher	Online
R7	Urban	30-39	North- West	31	M	Higher	Online
R8	Urban	20-29	Center	39	M	Higher	In Person
R9	Urban	40-49	North-West	32	M	Higher	Online
R10	Rural	20-29	North-West	32	M	Higher	Online
R11	Urban	30-39	North-East	35	M	Middle	Online
R12	Urban	20-29	South-East	67	M	Higher	Online
R13	Urban	50-59	Center	40	M	Higher	Online
R14	Urban	40-49	Center	33	M	Higher	Online
R15	Rural	20-29	North-West	37	M	Higher	Online
R16	Rural	20-29	North-West	29	M	Higher	Online
R17	Rural	40-49	North-West	33	M	Higher	Online
R18	Urban	60+	North-West	42	M	Higher	In Person
R19	Urban	30-39	North-West	25	M	Higher	Online
R20	Urban	20-29	North	31	M	Higher	In Person
R21	Urban	20-29	South	29	M	Higher	Online
R22	Rural	20-29	North-West	39	F	Higher	In Person
R23	Urban	50-59	North-West	22	M	Higher	Online
R24	Urban	40-49	North-West	34	F	Higher	In Person
R25	Urban	14-19	North-West	24	M	Middle	In Person

GAZA WAR: FROM IDENTITY POLITICS TO POLARIZATION IN THE WESTERN FOREIGN POLICY

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Abstract

One of the trickiest conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa has reopened as a result of the October 7 terrorist strikes. Open discussions were however halted by Hamas' unilateral strike, even though the two-state solution appeared increasingly likely with the Palestinian Authority serving as the future structural restructuring of #FreePalestine. The situation in the Gaza Strip caused a great deal of divisiveness in western public opinion in addition to internal conflicts and tensions. So, the purpose of this paper was to provide a poststructuralist analysis of the dominant academic viewpoints on the state of affairs between Israel and Palestine. The relationship between identity and foreign policy is examined in this study by utilising the primary methodological instruments of reflectivist international relations theory, including intertextuality, genealogy, discourse analysis, and deconstruction. They study both epistemological and ontological aspects because of the theoretical framework, and the narratives of "us and them" were and continue to be important components in the history and current circumstances of the Gaza Strip. The findings provide context for the significance of Hamas' rhetoric and the monopoly of power, as well as outlining the identitarian divide between Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.

Key words: *Poststructuralism, Palestine, Israel, Gaza Strip, Hamas identity and foreign policy.*

RESEARCH DESIGN AND POSTSTRUCTURALIST FRAMEWORK

Not only did Hamas launch a direct military attack on Israel on October 7, but it also carried out a terrorist strike against civilians, killing 1000 people and taking over 200 hostages. The Middle East and North Africa region once

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again came to the focus of international actors after this horrific tragedy. In addition to the attack's effects on the world and regional scene and the evident terrorist threat posed by Hamas's acts, it is critical to comprehend the larger context of the struggle between Israelis and Palestinians and Hamas as a terrorist group. The primary reason for the extreme polarisation of international support for the Israel-Palestinian discussion could be attributed to the historicity of this conflict.

The primary research issue that this study attempts to address is: What part does the rhetoric of the main political leaders play in the conflict that broke out on October 7th? The aim of this investigation is to comprehend the ways in which discourse from Gaza leadership and Israel employed identity politics to sustain a tense situation that, sadly, resulted in terrorist attacks and a continuous conflict between Israel and Hamas. Two crucial variables in the setting will be emphasised by a subsequent set of secondary questions: identity (what is the Palestinian people's identity evolution like?) and polarisation (what are the primary discursive causes that contribute to the polarisation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?).

In order to enhance our comprehension of the discourse, the methodology will involve a qualitative discourse analysis of the principal political actors within the conflict context, along with a crucial historical-interpretive approach to establish connections between the discourse variable and temporal and spatial variables. Furthermore, a crucial constraint of this study is that terrorism must be understood in light of its historical roots rather than being legitimised in a vacuum. A crucial element is the unpredictability of society and the way terrorist leaders take use of it to enlist youth for their fight against the West. In order to determine why Gaza permitted Hamas to expand to such an extent and become the most powerful political force in the area as well as the home base of the terrorist group responsible for the horrific attack on October 7, this essay will examine Gaza's current state.

Finally, in order to accomplish these research goals, the Copenhagen School of Security's human security perspective and poststructuralism as an international relations theory—both of which have been greatly influenced by Lene Hansen's work—will have an impact on this paper's general theoretical perspective.

POSTSTRUCTURALISM AS AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

Poststructuralism, akin to other reflectivist ideas, emerged in the 1980s with socio-constructivism, primarily drawing inspiration from the social and philosophical theories of the social sciences¹. It was regarded as a critical theory of the presumptions of neo-liberalism and neo-realism about the international system, as well as how the neo-neo debate dominated the thinking of IR theory at the time. In addition to generally criticising the rationalist viewpoint, poststructuralist theory attempted to reinterpret the state as an actor in international relations, rather than the only one to be examined, and to expand on observations about non-state, trans-state actors as well as stateless individuals who, in certain situations, are persecuted by their own state².

Poststructuralists increase the flexibility of the identity variable and its relationship to the idea of foreign policy, placing particular focus on the discursive creation of "us and them." In this instance, it is crucial to briefly describe the historical background that shaped the development of this theory. One of the greatest concerns during the second phase of the Cold War, which lasted from the 1970s to the 1980s, was the possibility of a nuclear holocaust brought on by the Western bloc's and the USA's armaments race against the Soviet Union and the communist bloc. The power and offensive/defensive aspects of this indirect confrontation were already explained by the *security dilemma*, but poststructuralist theory outlined how rhetoric is used to create a clear threat and point towards a direct enemy in order to justify military preparations and investments. Even in the current state of affairs, it is crucial to evaluate the use of foreign policy and identitarian elements to present an enemy and a number of threats poststructurally in order to understand how the discourse may be utilised to support a number of acts.

The anarchical nature of the international system and the notion of states as self-help agents are the two main points of contention for the neo-neo debate critics³. The realist perspective of IR theory's self-help concept is insufficient because states are artificial social constructions that symbolise the political

¹ Lene Hansen, "Poststructuralism" in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 169-183.

² Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, Londra: Routledge, 2013, pp. 15-33.

³ *Ibidem*, pp. 33-49

community of people we can trust. We share multiple social components or, more often than not, we come to share a common national or regional identity. Because the identities, values, and norms of the political community are complicated and subject to change over time, self-help should therefore be viewed as more ambiguous. States are obligated to follow regulations, but the analysis of interactions should be done by shifting the perspective, as the anarchy of the international system is not inherent in the international structure itself. State and non-state entities must be included in this discussion as anarchical structure arises from their interactions. The link between the factors of identity and foreign policy, which may fluctuate over time, is therefore once again a determinant of the international structure.

Another important contribution made by the poststructuralist structure is the question raised in regards to the ontology and epistemology⁴ of the IR theories in general. Starting with the ontology, the poststructuralist is outlining the main assumptions of state capitalism in the international structure of the world. Realists describe state centrism based on self-help as the core element of the pursuit of security and expression of power both offensively and defensively. In the liberal perspective, states are the key to the construction of peace among states by collaborating with states and other non-state actors based on common values such as human rights, freedom, and democracy. But the ontology of poststructuralism is to question the idea of the state coming back to the state as an expression of the political community, but also by tackling the continuity of the state by looking at how the discourse of leadership changes based on foreign policy or identity changes. Moving to the epistemological aspects, the positive/rational neo-IR theories look at cause-and-effect relations between independent and dependent variables. Therefore, the critical perspective of the post-positivist/reflectivist problematizes this assumption again by looking at the “structures” as being constructed by humans, thus making it hard for them to be a real independent variable and trying to deepen the understanding of the historicity and biased nature of the structure in order to be more comprehensive.

Because of the significance of language and the way that reality is created through rhetorical representation, discourse serves as the primary analytical

⁴ Benoît Dillet, “What is Poststructuralism?” in *Political Studies Review*, Volume 15, Issue 4, 2017, pp. 516-527, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929917712931> accessed in 8th of October 2023.

instrument⁵. In order to construct the narrative of "our and others" interests in the international systems, poststructuralists view foreign policy in direct connection to the concept of identity⁶. It's crucial to keep in mind how the international community responds to violence in the international arena dependent on how state leaders present it in order to comprehend this crucial discourse truth. An example of this can be found in the phrase "genocide," which, when used in a UN resolution, requires an international response. Sadly, there are glaring examples such as the genocide in Rwanda, where the UN's lack of action and nebulous language obscured the horrific facts of the murder and instead created the social reality of an escalating civil war, as I previously explained in my work on the critique of the UN's rhetoric towards the Rwandan genocide.

Another significant component of poststructuralism is genealogy, where it is critical to comprehend the relationship between historicity and truth. It is crucial to comprehend the historical background of previous statements or actions when examining a speech or even an action, but it is just as crucial to comprehend the individuals in positions of power. This is precisely the way in which Michel Foucault's writings⁷ illustrate the concepts of the power and knowledge. In his opinion, truth and power are concepts that complement one another rather than being external standards to society. Through his writings, Foucault attempted to demonstrate how particular epistemes changed throughout time in order to demonstrate that truth is not a product of history⁸, and that truth has a history of its own in many of these metanarratives.

⁵ Lene Hansen, "Discourse analysis, poststructuralism, and foreign policy" in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Timothy Dunne, *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 95-107.

⁶ Jason Glynos, David Howarth, "The Retroductive Cycle: The Research Process in Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis" in Tomas Marttila (ed), *Discourse, Culture and Organization. Postdisciplinary Studies in Discourse*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 105-125.

⁷ Andrew W. Neal, „Michel Foucault“ in Jenny Edkins and Nick Vaughan-Williams (eds.), „Critical Theorists and International Relations“, Oxford: Routledge, 2009, pp. 161-170.

⁸ Jan Selby, "Engaging Foucault: Discourse, Liberal Governance and the Limits of Foucauldian IR" in *International Relations*, Volume 21, Issue 3, 2007, pp. 324-345, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117807080199> accessed in 10th of October 2023.

The idea of deconstructing rhetoric is another topic that is utilised in both postmodernism⁹ and poststructuralism. Discourses should be understood as socially produced epistemes in addition to discursive acts, and postmodernist analysis aims to comprehend the discourse's underlying presuppositions. The French author Jacques Derrida¹⁰ suggests two ideas: double reading and deconstruction, to accomplish this process. Deconstruction¹¹ is the process of demonstrating that some concepts that seem natural are, in fact, man-made social institutions arranged in hierarchical order to impose an order that serves a specific group of people. Reading both the elements that make up reality and the reality itself is known as double reading. The coherence of the artificial ideas that make up the story must be understood on the first reading, and on the second reading, the tensions this artificial component of the construction creates and how it undercuts the notion that reality is constructed must be understood.

Intertextuality is a final idea that forms the cornerstone of poststructuralist analysis. Julia Kristeva's work¹² on the intersectionality of several discourse levels and how it might lead to a more nuanced understanding of meaning served as the inspiration for this analysis paradigm. Through the correlation of the discourse with independent variables related to time and space, the intertextual model compares "them and others" in order to read textually based on three models: official speeches (model 1), extended foreign policy debates (model 2), cultural representations (model 3A), and marginal political discourses (model 3B).

⁹ Roland Bleiker, „Postmodernism” in Richard Devetak, Jim George and Sarah Percy (eds.), *„An Introduction to International Relations”*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 189-212.

¹⁰ Maja Zehfuss, „Jacques Derrida” in Jenny Edkins and Nick Vaughan-Williams (eds.), *„Critical Theorists and International Relations”*, Oxford: Routledge, 2009, pp. 137-149.

¹¹ Andrew Benjamin, “Deconstruction” in Paul Wake, Simon Malpas (eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Critical and Cultural Theory*, New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. 87-95.

¹² Julia Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue and Novel.” In L. S. Roudiez (Ed.), *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, pp. 64-91 *apud* Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice*, Londra: Routledge, 2013, pp. 49-57.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

The Arab nationalism that surfaced in the wake of Sharif Husayn ibn Ali's Pan-Arabism movement and his Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1916 had a direct bearing on the identity of the Palestinian people¹³. Their own identity's formation is somewhat unclear, but it was scarcely discussed following Palestine's territorial dispute with Israel and the immigration of Jews into the country. Prior to the tense circumstances arising between Israel and the Palestinians, the national identity of the former was more of a regional feature that set them apart from the Ottoman Empire and an additional layer of identification to the Arab identity. In a different instance, the European Jewish community created the Zionist movement¹⁴ in response to antisemitic sentiments and to further the goal of reclaiming the Holy Land, which the Palestinians had been living in. Zionism evolved into an international movement based on the notion that Jews were a national identity independent of any political state, thanks in large part to Theodor Herzl but without a state. There are myths that claim there has been a protracted war between Jews and Palestinians in the Israel-Palestine areas as a result of these opposing viewpoints about the Holy Land.

With the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Arab civilization facing uncertainty at this critical juncture, the First World War brought about a significant political shift in the Middle East and presented a significant chance for the establishment of a new political order in the area. The western bloc and the Sykes-Picot Agreement¹⁵ between France and the United Kingdom, rather than Arab communities or Sharif Husayn ibn Ali's Pan-Arabic movement, actually brought about the significant transformation. According to this arrangement, the Palestinian mandate was under the tight supervision of the UK, and the region was split between the international mandates of France and

¹³ As'ad Ghanem, "Palestinian Nationalism: An Overview" in *Israel Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2013, pp. 11-29, doi: <https://doi.org/10.2979/israelstudies.18.2.11> accessed in 14th of October 2023.

¹⁴ Donna Robinson Divine, "Zionism and the Transformation of Jewish Society" in *Modern Judaism*, Volume 20, Number 3, 2000, pp. 257-276, doi: <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/22112> accessed in 14th of October 2023.

¹⁵ Pinar Bilgin, "What is the point about Sykes-Picot?" in *Global Affairs*, Volume 2, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 355-359, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1236518> accessed in 15th of October 2023.

Britain. In addition to this global protectorate, the Balfour Declaration¹⁶—which guaranteed the Palestine regions as a potential state for the Jewish population and offered assistance to Zionists—was another significant event.

As a result, the British mandate permitted a significant Jewish migration to Palestine during the interwar years. Following the substantial expansion in the Jewish population in Palestine, there was also an increase in friction between the two populations and a string of violent incidents. Consequently, the British mandate attempted to restrict immigration, which in turn led the Jewish militia to intensify its operations and level of violence¹⁷. The Holocaust and acts of genocide in Europe also played a major role, encouraging more Jews to seek safety in Palestinian territory. Although there was an increase in support for a Jewish state on a global scale, it did not ease the tensions that existed between Israelis and Palestinians. In the end, British Palestine was divided into two states by the United Nations¹⁸: Israel, which was to be the state of the Jewish community, and Palestine, which was to be the state of the Palestinian people, with Jerusalem serving as the international capital. It appeared to be a feasible option at first, but the Arab states, who were only recently granted complete independence from international mandates, perceived this as a unilateral move intended to uphold a form of colonialist state in the area.

The first Israel-Arab war broke out when the Arab governments rejected Israel's request for independence, which led to Israel's official statehood in 1947. The Arab League invaded the Palestinian territories in 1948¹⁹ with the intention of occupying the state of Israel and formally rejecting the UN partition. This led to the outbreak of war. Even though the newly formed state of Israel first felt that the battle was somewhat unfair to them, they were able to hold onto their position. They also took control of a sizable portion of the Arab world, leaving just the West Bank under Jordanian sovereignty and Gaza under Egyptian rule.

¹⁶ Mayir Vereté, "The Balfour Declaration and Its Makers" in Elie Kedourie, Sylvia G. Haim (eds.), *Palestine and Israel in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 60-88, eBook.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 60-88.

¹⁸ Elad Ben-Dror, "How the United Nations Intended to Implement the Partition Plan: The Handbook Drawn up by the Secretariat for the Members of the United Nations Palestine Commission" in *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 6, 2007, pp. 997-1008, doi: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40262544> accessed in 16th of October 2023.

¹⁹ Kirsten E. Schulze, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, London: Routledge, 2017, pp. 15-24.

The tensions between the Arab states and Israel continued to remain quite high, with no chance for the negotiations of a Palestinian state with the West Bank and Gaza being ruled by two different regimes that only collaborated for the Palestinian cause in the case of the Arab League. Taking into consideration the risk of escalation of violence, the decision of Egypt to block the Israeli ships from using the Suez Canal in 1956²⁰ led to the full-blown six-day war in 1967. This time the coalition of Arab states reduced to mainly Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and again failed to advance in the Israel territories, but even more, they lost the West Bank, Gaza, and even the Sinai Peninsula²¹. This conflict was significant because it was another resounding victory for Israel and served as a deterrent to other Arab state foreign operations in the future. It also gave Israel a stronger military and diplomatic presence in the West Bank and Gaza. Because of a variety of factors, including affordable housing that allowed the Jewish population in the Palestinian areas to grow and political and religious convictions, the occupation had a significant role in the migrations of the settlers. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was also a prominent player in internal security matters.

Thus, internal pressure from the Palestinians replaced the external Arab governments as the source of friction. The Palestinian response to the tensions created by settlers gave rise to the first Intifada (1987–1993)²². The PLO was viewed as secular, which led to a string of demonstrations, violent riots, and regrettably, even terrorist acts in the 1990s. In Gaza, Hamas was established as a result. The degree of violence demonstrated led to the imposition of peace talks through international intervention during the 1993 Oslo Accords²³, which resulted in a significant shift in the dynamics between Israel and the PLO. With the creation of the Palestinian Authority, this is a crucial step towards ending the occupation of those lands and building an independent Palestine. Unfortunately, the peace process fell through, and the fighting resumed with

²⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 25-33.

²¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 34-41.

²² Don Peretz, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising*, New York: Routledge, 2018, pp. 16-21.

²³ Mansour Nasasra, "The Politics of Exclusion and Localization: The Palestinian Minority in Israel and the Oslo Accords" in *Ethnopolitics*, Volume 20, Issue 5, 2021, pp. 523-544, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2019.1683300> accessed in 18th of October 2023.

even more terrorism and bloodshed during the second Intifada²⁴, which lasted from 2000 to 2005. Because of this, Israel ended the occupation in 2005. Another significant development was Hamas's takeover of Gaza²⁵, which led to a rift between them and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

For the most part, tensions between Israel's troops and Hamas continued in Gaza due to the blockade imposed by the Israeli government. The conflict reignited massively after the terrorist attacks on October 7th, a deliberate death streak of civilians, and the crisis of more than 200 hostages. The current situation in Gaza could be clearly described as a third intifada that this time captured the attention of the international community and created a significant degree of polarisation among public opinion and state leaders.

POSTSTRUCTURALIST DECONSTRUCTION OF THE GAZA CONFLICT

Israel declared war on Hamas in Gaza following the horrific terrorist attack on October 7. The world community was split between supporting Israel's right to self-defence and the Palestinian people's humanitarian cause. Due to the vetoes of China, Russia, and the United States of America on multiple resolutions pertaining to humanitarian help or a ceasefire, we are still without international action with a resolution that is still debated in the meantime. There was a great deal of polarisation surrounding the Israel-Palestine dispute because to the tensions and debates surrounding it, including worldwide citizen rallies and marches. In order to illustrate the relationship between foreign policy and identity, this paper will attempt to dissect some of the variables, analyses, or viewpoints presented from an ontological and epistemological poststructuralist perspective.

The public's perception of the relationship between Hamas and the Palestinian cause is one significant correlation. As the Muslim Brotherhood's representation in Gaza, Hamas was established during the first Intifada with the goal of waging a political and military struggle for Palestine's independence. Even if their original goals may have been characterised as a movement of freedom fighters, they formally rejected the Oslo Accords and

²⁴ Brent E. Sasley, "The End of Oslo and the Second Intifada, 2000–2005" in Asaf Siniver (ed), *Routledge Companion to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, London: Routledge, 2022, pp. 153-167.

²⁵ Rhys Machold, "Unsettling the Hamas taboo: fragments, narrative and the politics of exposure" in *International Politics* 60, 2023, pp. 754–761, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-023-00457-5> accessed in 20th of October 2023.

refused to acknowledge the Palestinian Authority and PLO, or at the very least, work with them. From the start, they have been an anti-systemic organisation that has prevented frank dialogue about the future of the state of Palestine. In 2006, after a closely fought election between Hamas and Fattah, Hamas emerged victorious with the majority vote²⁶, providing more evidence of the organization's alignment with the political will of Gaza's Palestinian population. They gained complete control in 2007 following the Battle of Gaza, despite the closeness of the elections. The frontal clash between Fattah and Hamas resulted in the collapse of the unity government, Hamas's takeover of the Gaza Strip, and the division of the Palestinian territories. The Palestinians did not give Hamas legitimacy; instead, it used violence and force to establish its political agenda and monopolise authority in Gaza.

Another important element is the duality of Hamas as a political party or organisation and a terrorist organization. Ismail Haniyeh²⁷, the political leader in exile, is declaring a political negotiation for a solution for the two states, while at the same time, Yehia Sinwar²⁸, the leader in Gaza, is continuing to orchestrate the terrorist fight and the hostage's crisis. Two leaders of Hamas with different rhetoric is just another intertextual example of how Hamas is just pure identity politics for various actors to legitimise their actions. Ismail Haniyeh is using the rhetoric of the Palestinian cause to promote his political agenda, while Yehia Sinwar is using the same humanitarian cause to justify its terrorist acts and display of violence.

The events that occurred after the fights in 2007 created a gap between the Palestinian territories, and thus it could be argued that they might have led

²⁶ Camille Mansour, "Reflections on the War on Gaza" in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Volume 38, Issue 4, 2009, pp. 91-95, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2009.38.4.91> accessed in 18th of October.

²⁷ Gianluca Pacchiani, "As IDF advances in Gaza, Hamas chief Haniyeh claims to seek 'political negotiations'" in *The Times of Israel*, 2nd of November 2023, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-idf-advances-in-gaza-hamas-chief-haniyeh-claims-to-seek-political-negotiations/?fbclid=IwAR0GZyoKIC5jtyfmQjMWk7FTEbFLeOBlGpYCVl3ZkAKa7sEFuvkXD4y12z8> accessed in 5th of November 2023.

²⁸ Einav Halabi, Itamar Eichner, Meir Turgeman, "Hamas chief: all Israeli hostages for all Palestinian prisoners" in *YNetNews*, 28th of October 2023, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hjv5rrqz6?fbclid=IwAR0v5eIXRnR_z4zEgfkgl92Sshjbb-8ejAaVEkIL9MKsVGR_Ew-nlG4lOs4 accessed in 30th of October 2023.

to an identitarian difference²⁹. Even if most of the scholars literature argues about a collective mental identity based on the fight for the same cause, Gaza and the West Bank already have different historical experiences during the Egypt and Jordanian rule, different PLO leaders, and since the foundation of Hamas, a clear internal narrative. Hamas denies any Palestinian authority and has no open dialogue with the PLO in the West Bank. Furthermore, Hamas has the monopoly of power in the Gaza Strip and is thus the main political actor that influences the collective perception of its citizens. Creating a different narrative in the Gaza Strip creates a problem for the Palestinian cause, and attacking Israel unilaterally in the name of "Free Palestine" is another sign of division between Gaza and the West Bank. These events could be described in the future as the third Intifada, but this time with a significant rupture between the Palestinians of Gaza and the West Bank due to the identitarian foreign policy of Hamas and the intertextuality of no support from the PLO of the West Bank. The future idea of a #FreePalestine would be a lot harder because the ontological idea of a Palestinian state was directly damaged by the unilateral actions of Hamas.

Israel's approach to the Palestinians, particularly with regard to the Gaza Strip, is the subject of the greatest internal dispute. The emergence of terrorist movements is significantly influenced by social instability. Important studies published by Amnesty International³⁰ referred to Israel's blockade and previous historical occupations as "Palestinian apartheid." In the case of counterterrorism actions, Israel described these decisions as necessary. The provenance of truth is once again demonstrated by this context's genealogy. Hamas's extremist rhetoric was clearly aided by the 2005 blockade of Gaza, which helped them to portray an abusive Israel. However, the current terrorist attack is not justified; it is merely an act of identity used to justify extreme violence and a plot by Hamas to incite further instability in the region and weaken the perception of Israel both regionally and internationally. The truth is that there can never be a justification for terrorism, and freedom fighters do not

²⁹ Uri Horesh, "Palestinian dialects and identities shifting across physical and virtual borders" in *Multilingua*, Volume 40 Issue 5, 2021, pp. 647-673, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1515/multi-2020-0104> accessed in 20th of October 2023.

³⁰ "ISRAEL'S APARTHEID AGAINST PALESTINIANS A LOOK INTO DECADES OF OPPRESSION AND DOMINATION", *Amnesty International*, 2nd of February 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2022/02/israels-system-of-apartheid/> accessed in 20th of October 2023.

intentionally kill civilians and hold them hostage in order to make a political point—this is just more divisive rhetoric used to divide the public. Thus, it is not a structural phenomenon in the case of terrorism in Gaza, because again, in this case, the “structures” were created by human actions, and this is why it is hard to take them into consideration as independent variables, but it was more about the discourse ideas that wanted to obtain more political power and legitimise military and extremist action based on identity issues.

The polarisation affected both international actors and public opinion, and because of it, I want to create an intertextual model 1 by looking at the EU’s leaders in foreign policy, which is related to model 3A by looking at the mainstream media presenting the events from October 7th. In the case of the European Commission’s president, Ursula von der Leyen³¹, she put emphasis on counter-terrorist actions balanced with the humanitarian case of Palestine in her 5-point plan for the conflict. Whereas Josep Borrell³² just focused in his statement on the ceasefire and the need for humanitarian aid. Here, a multipolar position on the conflict can be observed from the perspective of the European leadership. At the same time, identity is again a key to outlining the Palestine cause. In the media, Al Jazeera, similar to the discursive manner of Borrell, put the accent more on the humanitarian side of the conflict, and the abuse and western media such as CNN or BBC focused again on the terrorism threat. This intertextual analysis of the western discourse outlines the main polarisation issues present in the western communities. The humanitarian case of Palestinians is debated together with the terrorist threat of Hamas, and as a result, the foreign policy of international actors is based on identitarian elements where Palestine is identified as a terrorist threat for the Middle East

³¹ Jorge Liboreiro, “‘No Hamas rule, no blockade.’ Von der Leyen proposes five principles for Gaza’s future” in *Euronews*, 6th of November 2023, <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/11/06/no-hamas-rule-no-blockade-von-der-leyen-proposes-five-principles-for-gazas-future?fbclid=IwAR2fSGI9ft0f7511GHecT9HQa2TXICi610vH4iPHvyM8YJycU673ipwA6Bc> accessed in 7th of November 2023.

³² EEAS Press Team, “Foreign Affairs Council: Press remarks by High Representative Josep Borrell upon arrival” in *European External Action Service*, 13th of November 2023, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-press-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-upon-arrival-12_en?fbclid=IwAR2eA33Me5MDsV3JvVDib3wFjEDzllMDHLFiIiv8IoLPzu4jH6mvZ2VCOzs accessed in 13th of November 2023.

region or a humanitarian case, and unfortunately, civilians both from Israel and Palestine are caught in the two extremely identity-polarised foreign policy agendas.

CONCLUSIONS

The Middle East has long had a security challenge as a result of the Israel-Palestine conflict, which manifested itself on an internal, regional, and global scale. The multiplicity of players undoubtedly overcomplicated the situation and the peace process, but just as things seemed to be heading towards a two-state resolution, Hamas's unilateral decision caused the Israeli Defence Forces and Hamas to resume direct combat in the Gaza Strip. The real issue at hand is not the Palestinian cause per se; rather, it is the aggressive application of identity politics in foreign policy to preserve power for certain status quo stakeholders. It has to do with the absence of human security and the necessity for the international community to take up the cause of upholding human rights and human dignity in the face of both terrorists and repressive political agendas.

This conflict succeeds in widening the gap between the Palestinians of the West Bank and the ones from Gaza due to the extremist rhetoric over the years of Hamas' rule. Not just that they heavily influenced the narrative in Gaza for the collective identity of Palestinians, but they damaged the image of the Palestinian cause by using again the discursive elements of a terrorist organization. Even if Israel is on the defensive side now, the historical occupation and the blockade just facilitated the discourse of abusive regimes promoted by the Hamas as a political actor in the region and created a more sustainable narrative based on its strategy. Due to the high degree of controversy surrounding the internal situation, there was a polarisation on the matter of terrorist threats and humanitarian cases. Unfortunately, the ones that are suffering the most in these debates and foreign policy agendas are civilians from both camps, who are the first line of victims in the direct war and the identitarian conflict.

The outcome based on this conflict, the one in Ukraine, and the overall high level of violence are unmistakable indicators that the international system's peace and existing global order are shifting. In an effort to build a future international architecture less reliant on foreign policy that is skewed by identity factors, this paper and the poststructuralist literature in general aim to contribute to the ongoing discussion by outlining identity politics and breaking them down.

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SUFISM IN THE MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY IRANIAN POLITICS

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Abstract:

The objective of this article is to explore how political Sufism, in conjunction with political Shī'ism, influences contemporary Iranian internal and external affairs, the decision-making process, and the future political ideology. While religion has consistently been an integral part of Iranian state and culture, the primary faith has not always played a definitive role in political decisions throughout history, particularly in recent decades. To gain a deeper understanding of Iranian politics and its future trajectory, it is essential to comprehend the role of Sufi elements within it. This work elucidates the core political Sufi ideas and their persistence and development within Persian borders up to the present day, despite facing substantial opposition from the ulama. Furthermore, in order to identify these Sufi elements within the current Iranian political landscape, the article analyzes all presidential administrations since the Revolution and highlights how political Sufism has become ingrained in both the decision-making process and political propaganda.

Key-words: *Sufism, Iran, politics, Shī'ism, propaganda, eschatology*

INTRODUCTION: WHY SHOULD WE FOCUS ON POLITICAL SUFISM

In order to truly understand the manner in which the Iranian state and leadership functions, it is absolutely necessary to acknowledge the importance of the most defining element for Iran both as a country and culturally: religion. Even though Twelver Shī'ism is the state religion of Iran and the most common one inside the Persian borders, it is not the single one that shaped the mentality and traditions of Iranians over the centuries. Surprisingly enough, even the

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modern and contemporary political sphere has not escaped from this external influence. Along Shī'ites, there are important communities of Sunni, Zoroastrian, Christian, Hindu, and, probably the most relevant, Sufi people (officially about 7%¹), each putting its print on the original Shī'i eschatological and messianic story, which is commonly used to legitimize everything in Iran from its inception and particularly since 1979.

It is neither strange nor new in Iran's long and violent history for religion and politics to be intermingled, especially throughout and after Khomeini's reign. However, not just Shī'ism played an important role in this perpetual connection between religion and politics, but also Sufism, the mystical non-branch of Islam that evolved over centuries from complete asceticism and indirect social involvement to today's relative direct approach to Iranian political and popular issues.

This implication in the state affairs of Sufism alongside Shī'ism is interesting and essential to be understood from three main aspects:

First of all, many Sufis consider state meddling in private affairs to be a "nuisance" (*mozahem*). Usually, individuals are targeted by Sufi values in their private lives, but today the influence on state politics is most obvious in public publications and audiovisual productions². After 1989, there has been an ideological convergence between Sufism and the state that was triggered by the establishment of state mysticism on the one hand, and Sufism's ongoing ethical *réveil* on the other.

Second, most of the leaders of Iran from the Qajar Era until the present were highly influenced (sometimes involuntarily) by Sufi practices or had an affinity for mysticism. This can be observed in the cases of several Shāhs, majlis, ministers, members of the Assembly, and even Supreme Leaders (both Khomeini and Khamenei), as well as presidents (such as Rafsanjānī, Khatami, Ahmadīnejād or Rouhani).

Last but not least, even the existence of the Sufi orders under the second Pahlavi Shāh (1941-1979) was largely unknown until the publication of Richard

¹ Sufis can be Shī'ah or Sunni (Sufism is not a classic Muslim branch), so a statistical parallel including all three of them would be impossible. US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, *International Religious Freedom Report 2007: Iran*, 2007.

² Such as <https://www.majzooban.org/fa/> or website of the Permanent Secretariat of the Biennial Symposium Examining the Existential Dimensions of the Divine Mahdī (*Dabirkhana-yi da'imi-yi ijlas-i dusalaneyi barrasi-yi ab'ad-i vujud-i hazrat-i Mahdī*).

Gramlich's seminal study in the 1960s³. Several authors⁴ have just begun to fill the void in the early 1990s, but there is still much more to discover regarding the implications of Sufism in the political sphere.

That being the case, the purpose of this article is to find how is Sufism involved in today's Iranian politics, how do political Shī'ism and Sufism manage to coexist despite their discrepancies and if Sufism is going to maintain its position and be relevant in the following decades.

1. SUFISM IN MODERN TIMES

Today, according to the studies and approximate calculations of Sir John Malcolm, Gramlich, or Ja'far Shahri⁵, about 1/5 of the entire Iranian population is Sufi, and at least 2/5 is strongly influenced by their practices and ideas⁶, but it wasn't always the case.

Sufism began to develop in Iran as early as the 4th century⁷ AD, given the influence of Christian ascetics, Neoplatonism, or neo-Pythagoreanism on pre-Islamic society. In the 7th and 8th centuries, it became extremely popular among the common people, helping them to think independently (positive Sufism), but at the end of the 8th century, Sufism had already turned into a "negative" one, in which the intellectual society and culture suffered from stagnation and even regressions due to the promoted irrationality through mysticism. Consequently, it played a key role in the development of Iranian thinking, in a direct manner at first and indirectly during the post-Timurid Era.⁸

As a result of this early implication in the Islamic decision-making process, Sufism has influenced the development of Islam since its inception and

³ Richard Gramlich, *The Shī'ah Dervish Orders of Persia 1: The Affiliations*, German Oriental Society: Wiesbaden, 1965.

⁴ Such as Karamali Ghadamyari, Abbas Amanat, Matthijs Van den Bos, Mohammad Abu Rumman or Seema Golestaneh.

⁵ Ja'far Shahri, *Ta'rikh-i ijtimā'i-yi Tihiran dar qarn-i sizdahum*, Moin: Tehran, 1990, ii, p. 287.

⁶ These numbers are completely different from the official approximation (and more reliable) because of two reasons: it is very difficult for the state authorities to make accurate Sufi statistics (because Sufism is not a branch and can have very complex forms) and a considerable part of the Iranian Sufis are afraid of officializing their faith.

⁷ It appeared in the 3rd century but had no organized form.

⁸ Marietta Stepanyants, "Sufism in the Context of Modern Politics", *The Journal of Oriental Studies*, 2009, pp. 178-179.

has played an important role in the concept of Muslim religious orientation. It opposes religious obedience, replacing it with education and knowledge, the importance of material elements is diminished, while the idea of the essence of the soul and its liberation is essential. Theological knowledge is considered incomplete or even useless without realizing the symbiosis between it and what the person feels.⁹ Therefore, not even *sharī'ah* is followed *ad-literam*. Rather each law should be analyzed and only after to be decided what is still valid and what should be considered as law.

Unlike legalists, Sufis do not regard the Qur'ān or Hadith as absolute authorities. Being written by man (even if they were guided by divinity), they are considered limited and subjective. Sufis respect them, especially at the beginning of their journey to the Absolute Truth (*ṭarīqah*), but continue their cognitive mission until the end of life. Moral and ethical conduct is considered to transcend legal limits, thus it is sometimes ignored by Sufis, because *sharī'ah*, for example, is a legal code only for the visible world. Also, the imposed faith is impossible, precisely because man cannot truly have faith without personal experience.¹⁰

Sufism is based on the *zahir-batin*¹¹ duality and follows the idea that there is no belief superior to another, because, in according to them, there is a unity of humanity beyond the visible world, therefore believers of other religions are not considered to be inferior either. Additionally, there is the idea of a "perfect man" (*al-insan al-kamil*¹²), who believes in Allāh, seeks him, and perceives him

⁹ "Notice in your heart the Prophet's knowledge, without book, without teacher, without instructor." - The Qur'ān, Al-Takathur 102:1-8 (quran.com, 2022).

¹⁰ Ignaz Goldziher, *Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law*, Princeton N.J.: Princeton U.P., 1981, pp. 140-143.

¹¹ Zahir = refers to the outer dimension, or the outer face, of the Islamic faith (the act); "the outer or apparent meaning of the Qur'ān is made known traditionally through the discipline of *tafsir* (exegesis), while the hidden meanings of the text are accessed through the esoteric hermeneutical process known as *tawil*" (John L. Esposito, *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, 1st ed, Oxford University Press: New York, 2003, s.v. "Zahir");
Batin = refers to the inner, spiritual dimension (the intention); "is made known only through the hermeneutical process known as *tawil*" (John L. Esposito, *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, 1st ed, Oxford University Press: New York, 2003, s.v. "Batin").

¹² Al-insan al-kamil = refers to a person that has reached perfection; a concept usually used to describe the Prophet or the Imams in Shī'ism; "the origin and goal of the universe" (John L. Esposito, *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, 1st ed, Oxford University Press: New York, 2003, s.v. "Ḥaqīqah al-Muhammadiyah").

through his interpretation of the soul. Iqbal, the Sufi philosopher, even goes further and suggests that man is so independent of Allāh, here in this world, that he could also act as his associate. This is mainly due to the creative function of man, similar to The Creator.

This mystical form of Islam is compatible with secularism, being tolerant of other beliefs. However, it cannot be seen as a viable option against fundamentalism, because Sufism can also take less pleasant turns. After all, throughout history, the "mystical way" was both a social form of protest against the political system and the power that legitimized it: advocated for free religious expression, but opposed rational thinking; urged the love for life, but also for the renunciation of worldly activities unworthy of finding the Absolute Truth; the Sufi community is able to escape the purely religious and legalistic leadership, but can just as easily become dependent on the *shaykh*, thus being manipulated.

Even though, Sufism began to transform into a true political movement only after the writings and movements of Al-Ghazālī, in Iran it has always been a diplomatic and mitigating bridge between Sunni and Shī'i conflict or between radicalism and progressive thinking. Sufism and Sufi practices were and are still used in order to change or at least make more acceptable the rigid and fanatical Shī'i ideas, to which the youth become distant today.

Sufism played for the first time an important role on the Persian political stage after the extremely deep marks left by the invasions of the Tatar and Mongol hordes. Seeking refuge, the people of the time turned away from institutions and legalism, trying to find solace in the Sufi mysteries, which managed to treat the social and religious pain of the population.¹³ This is the span in which Sufism changes from its "positive" to its "negative" form, largely due to the economic chaos of the time. Moreover, this period marks both a new era of popularity for Sufism, this time at the level of all social strata, and a degradation of it (because the basic principles deteriorate after realizing the possibility of popularity, money, and social position). However, not even in this state of degradation or stagnation, Sufism has ever actually become irrelevant in Iran.

¹³ Karamali Ghadamyari, "Sufism Impact on Iranian Society, Culture and Literature", *European Journal of Experimental Biology*, 2012.

The Sufi orders that contributed the most to the Persian life (particularly today's life) were the *Ni'matullahiyya* and *Dhahabiyya*¹⁴ ones, but their impact was rather bottom-up, as they initially affected only the common people, having no access to political or social elites.¹⁵

The social and political movements in the Iranian history and the incidents among the intellectuals of the *Ni'matullahiyya* Order present three periods into which the historical development of Sufism in Persia may be divided, starting from the nineteenth to twenty-first centuries: 1770-1898 (until the beginning of the constitutional idea); 1898-1978 (failure of the constitutionalists and appearance of the new revolutionary ideas); and 1978 to present day.

In the attempt to take over the Sufi popularity in connection to the sanctity and assumption of the hierocratic functions among the population, the *ulama* played an important role in marginalizing and persecuting the Sufis in the Safavid period and early Qajar. This conflict has forced Sufis to adapt to the new situation and borrow certain non-Sufi political and populist strategies in order to maintain their position in society.

Beginning in the 19th century (very late 18th century, to be more precise), although institutional Sufism was considered undesirable by state authorities, it started to become relevant among the common people, achieving a Sufi cultural revitalization. Even if they were not directly represented politically, during the various military conflicts, the generals sought the help and blessing of the *shaykhs*, either in order to attract more people to join the army or to give the soldiers hope and confidence in victory.¹⁶

Religious discretion and the pious preservation of the esoteric, for the sake of social conformity, are two characteristics that helped Sufis survive in Iran and assert their viewpoint at certain moments. Thus, often different Sufis

¹⁴ The *Khaksar* Order is also usually specified alongside the two orders in this matter, but there is not much clear information about how it has worked in the last decades or how it is organized today.

¹⁵ The *Naqshbandiyya* Order, which has influenced much of the history of the Persian world, even with links to the leadership of the Iranian states, still exists today but only in Kurdistan, in rural areas, not having much involvement in the development of today's Iranian mentality.

¹⁶ Leonard Lewisohn, "An introduction to the history of modern Persian Sufism", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, 1999, pp. 437-461.

or individuals with strong Sufi inclinations claimed to be Orthodox and later managed to penetrate the *ulama*.¹⁷

In the middle of the 19th century those certain clerics with strong Sufi inclinations were appointed to key positions in the Persian state. Many political and religious leaders of this period were trained in Isfahan, where Sufism flourishes.¹⁸ Therefore, Sufism started to have important political representatives in every region of Iran and a significant number of members in the Parliament and Government.

However, during those times, exclusivist political readings of Shī'ism have managed to be institutionalized in the new state structures. Therefore, Sufis have had to downplay associations (especially between 1978 and 1990) between Sufism and alternative spiritual authority as embodied in the figure of the *shaykh*, *pīr*, or *qutb*, while supporting the concept of *wilayat* (or *walayat*) as an essential central idea of both Islamic Republican ideology¹⁹ and Sufi notions of spiritual authority.

Even Khomeini has had good relations with Sufi leaders before the Revolution (with, *Sultan`alishahis*, for example). He had a similar education to them (so intellectual paradigms were often similar) and considered his actions to be 'perfect mystic'²⁰, like a true Sufi believer. However, Sufism was seen by revolutionary elites as incompatible with the new socio-political movement, although the Revolutionary Movement itself used many Sufi elements and habits with strong Sufi influence. In fact, Khomeini's movement based on *wilayat-i faqih* had many elements borrowed from the Sufi *wilayat*²¹ (which has little to do with Khomeini's model, but they have the same basis, with a slightly different interpretation and certain commonalities). The Sufi *wilayat* rather opposes, on the political side, monarchy (and absolutism) and suggests the

¹⁷ Husayn 'Ali, a prominent member of the *Ni`matullahi* Order, successfully infiltrated the *ulama*, kept his beliefs secret, managed to facilitate information within the clergy, and influenced certain *ulama* decisions.

¹⁸ Abbas Amanat, *Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shī'ism*, I.B Tauris: London, New York, 2009, pp. 2-14.

¹⁹ Matthijs van den Bos, "Elements of Neo-Traditional Sufism in Iran", Martin van Bruinessen; Julia Day Howell (eds.), *Sufism and the 'Modern' in Islam*, I.B Tauris: London, New York, 2007, p. 66.

²⁰ Ibn Arabi's mystical concept of the "Perfect Man" had impacted Khomeini from an early age.

²¹ *'irfan*-type *wilayat*, which is more of a social ideology rather than a political system.

necessary existence of political pluralism and democracy.²² Therefore, the Revolutionary sympathizers opposed institutionalized Sufism rather than Sufism itself, and, eventually, many revolutionary elites, were trained in *'irfan*²³, especially in the way perceived by the *Sultan`alishahis*.²⁴

In the 20th century, Sufis became heavily involved in local and legislative politics, being pro-constitution (not pro-*Usūli*), as well as in the media, being widely present in the major Iranian newspapers. Publication of new works and reprinting of old works on Sufism under the *Ni`matullahi* print house has been banned since 1995 by the Ministry of Islamic Guidance²⁵ but the ideas continued to spread through other newspapers, in a more subtle, but efficient manner.

During Khomeini's Revolution, the Sufis were again persecuted. Even so, today, Sufis remain active supporters of the fundamentalist ideology of the Islamic Republic, a political stance that reflects this branch's emphasis on the preservation of the monocentric side of Islamic teachings (*hifz-i zdhir*) and its concern for pure *shari`ah* affairs. Additionally, even though they suffered a lot during the Revolution (many orders having to regroup in other states), in the post-revolutionary period most of them alongside sub-orders began to flourish and have become more and more relevant in the following years. This is due to the fact that especially during the Khatami period, the strictness and control of the state regarding the activity of the institutional Sufism (and not only) were drastically improved.

Today, direct involvement of Sufism in current state policy is unlikely due to the strict Sufi view that the current Islam practiced in Iran is not "The

²² But not completely incompatible with Khomeini's regime, as Matthijs Van Den Bos suggests: "Several Sufis whom I met, in their turn, projected into Khomeini an immaculate *qoth*, who had been surrounded, however, by evil court mongers. These men of politics had kept him from revealing his true identity. Wretched and ignorant court mongers, they said, accounted for Khomeini's silence during the era of revolutionary violence and repression." (Matthijs Van Den Bos, *Mystic Regimes: Sufism and The State in Iran, From The Late Qajar Era to The Islamic Republic*, Brill: Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2002, p. 180).

²³ Even Khomeini was familiarized with it, alongside *'erfan*, which is (in his case) the Sufi interpretation of how the Iranian state and society should function in relation to political ideology (Matthijs Van Den Bos, *Mystic Regimes: Sufism and The State in Iran, From The Late Qajar Era to The Islamic Republic*, Brill: Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2002, p. 180).

²⁴ Van den Bos, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

²⁵ Lewisohn, *op. cit.*, p. 461.

True One", and certain public debates on various state policies could put them in a dangerous position. However, this does not stop Sufis or those with a penchant for mysticism from getting involved in an indirect manner, influencing policies and state decisions either using media or through certain politicians who are easy to be manipulated.

In today's Parliament, Sufis are on both sides of the political spectrum: some pro-*ulama* and some against it; conservatives, but also progressives. However, usually, Persian Sufis and their supported figures have often aligned themselves (and still do) as advocates of secular liberalism and modernization, expressing sympathy for democracy²⁶ and opposing an absolutist Islamic state. Unfortunately for them, though, they are not enough to create a coalition of Sufis and reformists.²⁷

2. POLITICAL SUFISM AND SHI'ISM IN CONTEMPORARY IRAN

After Khomeini's death in 1979, the powers of the Supreme Leader of Iran dimmed, as people no longer had trust in this form of absolutist leadership. As a result, a significant number of powers were transferred from the substitute of the Imām to the president, while the Parliament and government rebecame relevant in the state, facilitating a more democratic environment regarding the state affairs.

Rafsanjānī and Khatami Period

The first president, Rafsanjānī was to serve for two terms in what became known as the 'era of reconstruction', to be followed by eight years of 'reforms' under Khatami. The Rafsanjānī period could be characterized as one of reconstruction because Iran managed to get out of the economic crisis created by the democratic states' embargo. It was lifted shortly after the president and his close allies started to promote commerce and free trade of goods, showing the west that Iran is willing to change and cooperate. His Five-Year Developmental Plan, which emphasized the importance of an increased role for

²⁶ However, paradoxically enough, Sufis are unwilling to have spiritual authority subject to questioning, especially to some sort of intrusive inquiry that is central to the idea of democracy.

²⁷ Matthijs van den Bos, "Elements of Neo-Traditional Sufism in Iran", in Martin van Bruinessen, Julia Day Howell, *Sufism and the 'Modern' in Islam*, I.B Tauris: London, New York, 2007, pp. 70-71.

the private sector and foreign investments, and his moderation in Iranian foreign policy (which reflected in Iranian behavior during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait), represent best the way in which the first president of the new Islamic Republic was seeing both internal and external state affairs. However, this economic recovery has not been achieved in a sustainable way, but based strictly on trade and almost nothing at all on investments.²⁸ As a result, this issue not only kept potential foreign businessmen away but also encouraged corruption among traders and ordinary people selling in markets.

Rafsanjānī supported the idea of *wilayat*, but was much closer to the Sufi perspective, by flirting with the idea of making the transition to democracy in Iran, supporting political pluralism²⁹, and trying to combat the intellectual purges made by revolutionaries (especially against the leftists), upholding democratic and western principles or values, attempting to get closer to capitalism in order to coexist with other states and facilitating a better life for the population³⁰, while also keeping many elements of theological faith and perception in Iran's state policy. Even more, during the 8 years of his presidency, he managed with the support of the Parliament and population to diminish the powers of the Supreme Leader.

Speaking about Rafsanjānī's closeness towards Sufism, one of the clearest events suggesting inclination of the state to mysticism occurred at the end of the 1990s. In 1997, the administration openly invited 22 foreign diplomats to Kerman to visit the mausoleum of the "Renowned Mystic Poet Shāh Ni'matullāh Vali" in the city of Māhān. Such event has not happened (officially) since the pre-Qajar period: the state leadership to visit (alongside diplomatic guests) a Sufi monument. This event and previously noted decisions, offered the next administration the chance to repair the relationship between Sufis and state, while also consolidate the new "shy democracy".

²⁸ Ali M. Ansari, *The Rafsanjani and Khatami Presidencies*, The Adelphi Papers, 2017, 47:393, pp. 13-14, DOI: 10.1080/05679320701868128.

²⁹ He reintroduced the possibility of forming political parties and reusing left and right ideas.

³⁰ Many of the measures were also took to preserve his power and many policies were populist rather than in direct service of the people.

Khatami's reformist period was marked by his attempts to democratize the state, eliminate corruption in institutions, and refocus state's economy to investments, not just letting it sustain itself on trade.³¹

Seeking to appease the social tensions created by Khomeini and his Revolution, Khatami made a further step in comparison to Rafsanjānī and invited *shaykhs* and Sufi masters (who were forced to flee out of Iran before and during the Islamic Revolution) to come back.

Following, the Sufi political perception started to gain popularity, influencing, for the most part, the young urban population, which even today is extremely interested in and influenced by mysticism, despite the authorities' attempts to redirect their attention to Orthodox Shī'ism.³² Carols Castaneda's ideas, Kurdish Sufi miracles, Gnosticism, or Hindu teachings all have a more appealing character to young Iranians in comparison to the Islamic treatises or theological law.³³ Few of them even become part of organized/institutionalized Sufism and most of those who do become part of them are usually doing it after the discovery of certain "revealing" materials on the Internet by mistake. This inclination of today's population to Sufism is not surprising at all considering that after Khomeini's death, the Iranian society was highly impregnated with mysteries, practices, writings, and Sufi or non-Sufi mystical art, which were presented through Sufi materials or intermediaries. Even many personalities of the Revolutionary Guard use today or used in the 1990s and 2000s, to go to all sorts of legacy Sufi mystical readings.³⁴

Ahmadīnejād Presidency

The Ahmadīnejād period commenced in 2005, and throughout his eight years in office, he revitalized the public perception of Revolutionary and eschatological ideas, reversing many democratic advancements made by his predecessors. Not only did he align Iranians with the state's religious objectives

³¹ Matthijs Van Den Bos, *Mystic Regimes: Sufism and The State in Iran, From The Late Qajar Era to The Islamic Republic*, Brill: Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2002, pp. 173-174.

³² "The young generation is indeed attracted to Sufism. They understand that the *mollahs'* Islam will not take them anywhere, but are simultaneously deeply religious - as are the Iranian people. It is only logical, then, that they would come to [this] *Hoseyniye*" (Matthijs Van Den Bos, *Sufi Authority in Khatami's Iran...*, p. 365).

³³ Matthijs Van Den Bos, "Sufi Authority in Khatami's Iran. Some Fieldwork Notes", *Oriente Moderno*, vol. 21 (82), no. 2, 2002, pp. 363-365.

³⁴ van Den Bos, *Mystic Regimes...* p. 173.

and foreign affairs, but he also introduced a new perspective on eschatological and messianic principles.

He was supported by Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard in the presidential campaign and initially posed as the perfect successor of Khamenei, suggesting a connection between him and the Supreme Leader similar to the one the current Supreme Leader had with Khomeini.³⁵ However, in reality, Ahmadīnejād rapidly completely changed this popular belief, perhaps as a result of power-seeking. Not only that the former mayor of Teheran was opposing some important initiatives of the Supreme Leader, but also decided to change the central point of the eschatological story from the state objective to people's one, mainly by giving specific and messianic meanings to buildings, projects, policies or political statements.³⁶

Although the town of Jamkaran has never been more than a small locality near Qom, it has been elevated by Ahmadīnejād to the state of religious center (hundreds of millions of dollars invested in the construction of the site) to become the representative place of the new messianic idea promoted by the president. Jamkaran became a very important religious site also because of the political and social context of that time, being intensely promoted by clerical supporters of the anti-Khatami movement. In this case, just like Khomeini did previously, the radical conservators relied heavily on the diffuse nature of the messianic story left by the revolutionary era and lack of coherence in folk tales about the "End of the Time" event.

Starting in Khatami's times, but flourishing during Ahmadīnejād and lasting even today is the fact that the new messianic movement promoted by the state is no longer transmitted only in madrassas or orally, but also on the Internet. There is a whole virtual infrastructure through which the Islamic Republic develops its religious propaganda, sometimes even in other states³⁷. The most successful sites were initiated and/or influenced by former members of Hujjatiyya (an order of Sufi origins), such as the website of the Permanent Secretariat of the Biennial Symposium Examining the Existential Dimensions of the Divine Mahdī.³⁸

³⁵ He even militated for increasing the powers of the Supreme Leader.

³⁶ Abbas Amanat, *Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi'ism*, I.B Tauris: London, New York, 2009, pp. 227-232.

³⁷ Some sites are also in English, French, Urdu, Arabic, etc.

³⁸ Amanat, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-234.

The current Mahdist movement (since Ahmadīnejād came in office), just like the one in Timurids' time, has a rather Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian character in terms of apocalyptic myth, which are today propagated more through Sufi stories and traditions among the urban population, deviating from the traditional ideas and introducing new elements. Interestingly enough, the current media and politicians are using the anti-Zionist Semitism sentiment shaped by Khomeini, to propagate the modern messianic idea among all the social strata. Additionally, another renewed aspect from Khomeini's time is the one related to how demonic is the west and that it has plans to destroy the Islamic world. The new insertion in this story is the orientation towards the fact that the west is the reason why the Mahdī will soon return and lead the Islamic world to victory in the final battle.³⁹ In a nutshell, the confrontation is not anymore between some unspecified good and evil forces, but between Muslims (Shī'ah people are the only ones worth considering as being true Muslims) and "the others" that want to destroy the "chosen community" by spoiling its beliefs, values, and faith.

Ahmadīnejād's reelection as president⁴⁰ has heightened these apocalyptic ideas, as he believes that any universal values such as human rights, religious tolerance, political moderation, democracy, or scientific objectivity are negative for the Iranian community due to the fact "they originate in or belong to the west". The manner and timing of the Mahdī's reappearance were usually predicted in Khomeini's style, without emphasizing much on his ideas related to how the state should be governed and most of the time ignoring and hiding any issue of the Islamic Republic, in order to present his incumbency to the people as functional as possible. What is not necessarily in Khomeini's style, when we are talking about Ahmadīnejād's discourse are the presumed "miracles" (that already happened or will happen) correlated by the former president to every single major decision that he was taken. In this case, just like the change of eschatological perspective, it could be a heavy indirect Sufi influence. In the Sufi tradition, truly relevant theological, social, and political results always appear in the form of or are somehow connected to a miracle

³⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 230-238.

⁴⁰ By obviously and outrageously rigging the elections. This led to powerful protests in the urban areas, where people felt the need to defend their democratic rights (reformed, Sufi view), while the rural population was now perceiving Ahmadinejad as illegitimate because he obtained the position through tyranny (conservative, Shī'ah view).

(*karamat*) and the miracles induced to the population by Ahmadīnejād perfectly fit the description.

Rouhani and the current Iranian Parliament

On a platform of internal and international change, Ḥasan Rouhani, a pragmatic conservative, was elected president of Iran in June 2013. He attempted to address the country's deepening economic crisis, ease social restrictions, and free political prisoners⁴¹ (particularly the 2009 reformist presidential candidates Mir-Hossein Musavi and Mehdi Karrubi). Rouhani also tried to improve relations with the international scene in order to reduce the sanctions imposed during Ahmadīnejād's time and agreed in 2013 to temporarily suspend the nuclear program in exchange for removing a good chunk of those sanctions.

All of these won him significant support from the country's urban youth, middle class, minorities and Sufi leaders. Not only that but his approach gained acceptance from reformists and moderates, and it was tolerated by nationalists and radical conservatives. Even though neither did he have too many notable achievements during his 8 years in the office (or at least not too many controversies, which would have made him popular worldwide), nor did he take any relevant decisions for this work rather than those already specified, he managed to propel himself among the favorites to take the position of the next Supreme Leader. Clearly, such an event would mean a closer Iran to democracy and religious toleration, while gradually diminishing the eschatological mission of the state⁴² (without completely abandoning it, because, after all, it represents the Iranian identity).

Now speaking about the Parliament, during and after Ahmadīnejād's presidency (until present) its constituency changed significantly. If in the Rafsanjānī period a new type of conservatism emerged⁴³, during Ahmadīnejād the mainstream parliamentarians, especially those who entered the Parliament in 2009 (who became the majority in the meantime), were neither pro-Rafsanjānī (conservatives), nor pro-Khatami (progressives), nor pro-

⁴¹ Thomas Juneau, *Iran under Rouhani: Still Alone in the World*, Middle East Policy, 2014, 21(4), pp. 92-104.

⁴² However, reality shows us that the chances of this happening are low and we will see why later in this chapter.

⁴³ Ali M. Ansari, *The Rafsanjani and Khatami Presidencies*, The Adelphi Papers, 2017, 47:393, pp. 19-20, DOI: 10.1080/05679320701868128.

Ahmadīnejād (nationalists), but pro-Khamenei. Today's manner in which the Parliament is actually divided is not necessarily based on these political orientations, but into the "Interactionist Bloc" and "Conflictualists".⁴⁴

Reformists, pragmatists (modern conservatives), and traditional conservatives who back Rouhani's ideas or previous President Muḥammad Khatami make up the Interactionist group. The state administration and bureaucracy are where their influence is concentrated. Here we can find most of the parliamentarians that represent Sufis or are highly influenced by Sufi ideas.

Hardline conservatives, including the Supreme Leader, clerics in the Guardian Council, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Basij civil militia make up the Conflictualists. They shaped Iran's "deep state," as Iranian experts refer to it. Conflictualists advocate for re-Islamization of society, as well as increasing government control over "morality". They think that self-sufficiency and resistance to Western hegemony will address Iran's problems. Also, Conflictualists prefer maintaining Iran's historical policy of selective engagement, since they fear Western norms becoming normality and people revolt against Iran's religious elite.

However, in order to spot the differences, moderates or pragmatists (who are the main representatives of the Interactionist Bloc), advocate for "limited social and cultural emancipation", as well as international participation and acceptance of the international order's reality, which can be both found in the Sufi version of *wilayat*. President Hojatoleslam Ḥasan Rouhani, Minister of Intelligence Hojatoleslam Seyed Mahmud Alavi, Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini (a member of the Expediency Discernment Council), and Ayatollah Muḥammad Emami-Kashani are among the most powerful figures connected with this political coalition against the ultra-nationalist alliance. Therefore, we can see a clear political conflict not only between ideologies but also a religious-driven battle between Shī'ah ultra-nationalist and moderate Shī'ah, alongside "non-religious"⁴⁵ and Sufis or Sufi-influenced individuals.

⁴⁴ Saeid Golkar, "Iran after Khamenei: Prospects for Political Change", *Middle East Policy*, 2019, 26(1), pp. 81-82.

⁴⁵ Not literally "non-religious" because it would be impossible in today's Iran to be a member of the Parliament without being a declared Shī'ah. In this context, I am using the term "non-religious" as referring to those reformist politicians that do not emphasize almost at all the religious aspects or importance on any legislative or executive decision.

Aside from the members of the assembly's political views, theirs and state institutions' association with religious schools is another factor that influences the political decisions taken by the legislative. Iran's politics are influenced by four major Shī'ah seminaries: Najaf, Qom, Mashhad, and Isfahan. While the Najaf seminary has long been the most revered among Shī'ah clerics, the Qom seminary has grown the most in importance when speaking about Iranian politics, particularly since the 1979 Revolution. Along with Najaf and Qom, the notoriety of Mashhad and Isfahan seminaries has also grown under the religious government, and they now play a larger role in Iranian politics. However, Isfahan is probably the single one whose importance flourished the most in contemporary times, being the only seminar closer to the moderate and reformist ideas of Rafsanjānī, Khatami, and Rouhani, by integrating into the Shī'ah teaching and also promoting Sufi ideas, traditions, and values.⁴⁶

'Alī Khamenei and the Future of the Supreme Leader Position

The last political figure that should be analyzed for the sake of this work is Ahmadīnejād's main supporter: 'Alī Khamenei. The position of *faqih* in Iran became less important after Khomeini's death, until Ahmadīnejād came into office, as it no longer enjoyed the status of *marja'*, making the new designated Supreme Leader not respecting all the necessary requirements to occupy this position.

The Supreme Leader's privileges over domestic decisions, army, and foreign policy were transformed only to ensure continuity of the political system⁴⁷ and clerical supremacy. Meanwhile the Office of the Presidency was designed to facilitate the good functioning of the state as a republic and to evolve as new political figures appeared on the domestic and international stage. The position was made incapable to control the entire state by

⁴⁶ For more information regarding the four seminars, see Saeid Golkar, "Iran after Khamenei: Prospects for Political Change", *Middle East Policy*, 2019, 26(1), p. 83. Qom promotes Sufi ideas as well, but pales in comparison to Isfahan on this matter.

⁴⁷ According to the new constitution, the *marja'iyat* criterion was eliminated from the requirements for occupying the Supreme Leader position and was replaced by the criterion of either being an Islamic jurist or a *mujtahid*. However, even so, Khamenei was still not qualified, since he was not even a full jurist or a *mujtahid* when he came into power, according to some information in a leaked video taken behind the closed-door session of the Assembly of Experts (Saeid Golkar, "Iran after Khamenei: Prospects for Political Change", *Middle East Policy*, 2019, 26(1), pp. 75-88).

maintaining a balance between the multiple centers of power in the Iranian political, economic and social spheres. In return, these actors offer their loyalty to the one whose aura of invincibility is essential for maintaining system cohesion.⁴⁸ The Supreme Leader is not considered to be a dictator, because, in theory, he has neither has all the instruments of the state under his wing, nor can he lead in an absolutist way (by definition at least), because he rules by defending and using strictly Islamic values and traditions, therefore it is not labeled as being contradictory to the Shī'ah values.

The personal and social background of Khamenei comes from a very traditional pre-modern clerical family. Very early on, he embraced the violent extremist path of Navab Safavi⁴⁹ and all his adult life he has been a fundamentalist. The current Supreme Leader of Iran is a true believer who has openly defended extreme views and who, at the same time, was and still is very patient in hiding his most radical perspectives and policies, when necessary, in order to achieve his personal objectives.⁵⁰ This does not mean that he is realist or pragmatic in the sense that goals and means are calculated after considering every possible risk and advantage. On the contrary, he considers that goals and means could be irrational, even leading to mass suicides or potential wars with the United States (along with Israel and the west).

Khamenei's foreign policy goals are mainly ideological, for the most part continuing what his good friend Khomeini started in 1979, by opposing the current international system as well as confronting the United States and Israel, even in contexts that do not include the two "fierce opponents of Iran". As I stated before, he insists on this willingness in the confrontation with the United States to pursue means on the model of Karbala - a clear mission of martyrdom - without considering the objective of the situation.

As a result of this predisposition of Khamenei, he allowed worshipers to follow a deceased *marja'*⁵¹, through his first *fatwa* as Supreme Leader. This was an unmistakable reference to Khomeini and his followers, and also a clear act of

⁴⁸ Banafsheh Keynoush, "Iran after Ahmadinejad", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 2012, 54:3, pp. 127-146, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2012.690988.

⁴⁹ An Iranian Shī'ah cleric and founder of the Fadā'iyān-e Islam group, that staged numerous successful high-profile assassinations of politicians and clerical figures and failed state coupes in the 20th century.

⁵⁰ Mohsen M. Milani, "The Transformation of the Velayat-e Faqih Institution: From Khomeini to Khamenei", *The Muslim World*, 82 (3-4), p. 178.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* pp. 175-190.

mysticism. He also lauded Imām 'Ali's mystical characteristic of "asceticism," while noting that his "absence of worldly attachment" had been accompanied by his active pursuit of "social justice", and that this was to be considered an attribute of 'Ali's participation in the (worldly) government. However, the mystical aspect of the decision is not surprising at all, considering both the close relation to Khomeini during his life and his affinity for the Hojjatie Society (a very important Iranian Sufi entity).⁵²

If the nomination of Khamenei was a real issue for both political and clerical relevant actors, today's situation raises even more debates and worries of future uncertainty. Khamenei is 84 years old (in 2023) and currently, there is no relevant candidate to replace him after his death in the position of Supreme Leader⁵³. This time is not due to the fact that nobody is qualified enough to occupy this position, but the popularity of any eligible candidate is so low that no person would represent a viable option.

There are three options discussed to compromise and solve the issue regarding the position, in case a true leader does not appear in the following years: to become an honorary one, to become part of the government, similar to a Ministry, or to be elected by the people (all of them being democratic, while the last one the least probable).⁵⁴

Even so, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) could impose (using the army) the retention of the format regarding the Supreme Leader, as well as the appointment of a new one. They could even force the installation of Ahmadinejad, even if he has no clerical training at all. Such regime would facilitate the persistence of international sanctions, allow extreme conservatives additional opportunities to dominate the Iranian economy, impose authoritarian measures of control upon the population and probably ban any sort of official religious mysticism different from the one promoted by the state.

We will see how President Raisi (Sayyid Ebrahim Raisolsadati) will tackle all of these issues and unknown variables that are currently present in Iranian affairs in the years to come. It is going to be interesting from two perspectives: first of all, he is a former student of Khamenei, so probably we will witness a mixture of nationalism and radical political Shi'ism, sprinkled

⁵² Masoud Kazemzadeh, "Ayatollah Khamenei's Foreign Policy Orientation", *Comparative Strategy*, 2013, 32:5, pp. 443-458, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2013.840208.

⁵³ Clifton W. Sherrill, "After Khamenei: Who Will Succeed Iran's Supreme Leader?", *Orbis*, 2011, 55(4), p. 641.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 642.

with mysticism; and second, not only does he follow the traditions of the Qom-Mashhad seminary schools, but he also wears a black turban, indicating that he is a descendant of Prophet Muḥammad, which in clerical culture confers a large degree of seniority and a great deal of respect. By contrast, his most important rivals, Rouhani and Larijani, wear white turbans, therefore they are considered less legitimate compared to Raisi both policy-making and leadership-wise.

CONCLUSIONS

From pre-Islamic times, the Persian region and culture used to maintain a strong (even indivisible) connection between religion and state leadership. Today's Iran does not deviate from this principle, making the eschatological and messianic idea of the Twelfth Imām the meaning of the Muslim community existence and putting the prophecy itself in the form of a common goal of the people, which comes with the hope of better and eternal life. Precisely, in order to facilitate the existence of this hope in life, people often tend to have a greater inclination towards different mystical traditions and customs. Although most of them are not found in the holy books or in the divine pronouncement, they address better the general population, giving them what legalism has failed to do for more than a millennium: to offer man the impression that he actually matters.

Therefore, it is not surprising that Sufism has been very successful in the Muslim community and especially in the Shī'i one after the beginning of the Major Occultation, in which people no longer knew who they should really follow. Sufism is a refuge, both for the common people and for the intellectuals who do not accept that their community can be stuck by principles made for another era.

Until the end of the 19th century, it coexisted deliberately and officially with Shī'ism, including in the highest strata of society, thus obviously influencing even the economic, social and political environment of the state. However, with the promotion of Shī'i extremism and later revolutionary ideas, Sufism was forced to fall into the shadows, especially around 1979 and throughout the Revolution.

Even though the context was unfavorable and hostile, the Sufis and their influence have never disappeared. On the contrary, they have adapted, hiding their religious identity and affinities, manipulating different people into key positions in the state, and promoting their values through intermediate and indirect mechanisms, so that they remain relevant but silent at the same time.

As a result, many of today's Iranian politicians and theologians have been voluntarily (directly) or involuntarily (indirectly) influenced by Sufi principles and ideas. Even the Supreme Leaders, Khomeini and Khamenei, along with all the presidents of the state from 1989 to the present have shown at least a passion for mysticism and/or Sufi values during their terms, through statements made or decisions taken.

Moreover, the spread of mystical and Sufi ideas through the media, and later intensively through social media, made Iran's youth and urban population to consider the Sufi values as legitimate when they appeared in the social, economic or political context, either individually or in a complementary way with the Shī'ī ideas. Basically, the political class (also influenced by the same means) is forced today to listen to the needs and desires of the people and consider the application of mystical ideas (Sufi or not) when it comes to the new legislation.

As a result, in the early 1990s, Rafsanjānī, through his Five-Year Developmental Plan, not only wanted to reduce embargoes on Iran and put the economy back on its feet, but also to lead the state to a *wilayat* similar to the Sufi one, in which political pluralism and democracy are promoted, religious freedom is at least tolerated, and the power of the Supreme Leader is diminished or even drastically reduced.

Later, Khatami not only sought to eradicate corruption and reform the system, but also facilitated access to Western quality products and education (giving up the correlation between Westerners and Satan, promoting ethnic and religious diversity), and invited back to the country the Sufi leaders and orders.

During Ahmadīnejād's time, the constant interplay between Shī'ism and political Sufism can be best seen. He tried to create his own eschatological cult by combining Shī'ī ideas with revolutionary and mystical ones, often resulting in "miracle" type projects and obvious theological or logical contradictions. In an attempt to redirect the eschatological perspective of the people from the goal of the state to that of the community (and of each individual) and thus legitimize himself as the right leader, "chosen by Allāh" (posing as a possible successor to the function of Supreme Leader), he managed to give eschatology a much more abstract and philosophical role and to transform the ultimate goal from focusing on addressing the entire Muslim community, to creating a holy place in their own small community (such as the construction of the Jamkaran

mosque and the road to Tehran to facilitate the return of the Imām from Occultation).

Rouhani's two terms have been spared from too many scandals or major changes from a theological or political point of view and were focused on economic recovery. Like Rafsanjānī, he has also dealt with the transcendence to a Sufi *wilayat*, easing social restrictions (especially religious) and trying to pursue a friendlier foreign policy.

However, when it comes to the political future of Sufism and the current interdependent relationship between political Shī'ism and political Sufism, things are quite vague, but there is some potential. To this day, there is no real successor to Khamenei as Iran's Supreme Leader, and both more likely future approaches to this issue support the current coexistence of the two political ideologies and the development of Sufi influence in the Iranian state policy. The relative favorites (because no one is strongly supported by the people) for the post are mostly moderates or reformists, including Rouhani (the nephew of Khomeini and other radicals are also on the list, but they have almost no chance⁵⁵), which would mean a clear continuation or even accentuation of the transition to a more moderate and permissive system in Iran. The second option, the transformation of the position to an honorary one or a ministry, would mean, as in the case of the previous possibility, the beginning of a broad process of democratization of the state, which would obviously facilitate political Sufism in the future. Only the alternative of a nomination forced by the military could turn the situation upside down and send Sufism back into the shadows of Khomeini's period, but this scenario, although possible, is unlikely, given the unpopularity of any Revolutionary Guard leader or Ahmadīnejād. We will see what the Raisi presidency brings in the years to come.

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⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 641.

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PATTERNS OF COMMUNICATION ON CLEAR HYDROGEN INNOVATION IN THE TRANSATLANTIC ENVIRONMENT

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Abstract

The potential of clear hydrogen to develop into a valuable resource in the future is becoming a growingly attractive debate topic, in the context of a targeted decarbonized economy. The present article analyses the interest that institutional and corporate actors in the European Union and the United States dedicate to this subject by assessing the comprehensiveness of the official, governmental communication and that of private actors - focusing on gas transmission companies, either producers or transporters - on the exploitation of clear hydrogen. The aim of the research is to investigate where is currently the most visible attention manifesting and whether public institutions or the private sector are more engaged in bringing about change in the near future in the field of green transition.

Keywords: *European Union, United States, clear hydrogen, communication, green transition*

DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH

The research strategy encompasses a qualitative (mainly) and quantitative analysis of the language used in public and private actors' addresses regarding the hydrogen issue. Thus, we have resorted to EU and US

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official governmental documents and a number of press releases. Also, data from reports and studies proved to be useful for statistical purposes.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CLEAN HYDROGEN LEGISLATION

Europe is recognized as being a frontrunner on hydrogen innovation initiatives, and other states internationally follow suit, although challenges and uncertainties remain in many cases. Both advantages and disadvantages of hydrogen exploitation are subjects of debate in the energy environment worldwide. Regulators and private actors must cooperate so that the ambitious endeavour of a green future becomes a reality.

Addressing the 21st century climate challenges, in line with its Green Deal initiative, the European Union launched in 2020 its “Hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe”, with a view “towards a hydrogen ecosystem in Europe: a Roadmap to 2050”. The strategy underlined policy actions in 5 directions: investment support; support production and demand; creating a hydrogen market and infrastructure; research and cooperation and international cooperation.¹

In July 2020 the European Clean Hydrogen Alliance – bringing together public and private stakeholders in various formats: roundtables, working groups, and the electrolyser partnership – was created with the mission of deploying innovative green technologies by 2030.² The Sixth Hydrogen Forum has taken place on June 27, 2023, with the participation of around 700 attendants approaching topics such as the latest developments on the regulatory framework, the hydrogen economy, connecting public and private investments, the hydrogen bank.³

The European Hydrogen Backbone comprising thirty-two energy infrastructure operators from 25 EU member states, as well as Norway,

¹ European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions- *A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe*, 2020 [<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0301>], September 12, 2023.

² European Commission, *European Clean Hydrogen Alliance* [https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/strategy/industrial-alliances/european-clean-hydrogen-alliance_en], September 30, 2023.

³ European Commission, *6th European Hydrogen Forum report* [6th European Hydrogen Forum report_final.pdf], September 30, 2023.

Switzerland and the United Kingdom was founded also in the summer of 2020. Bound by a shared vision, they have published a first paper for a dedicated hydrogen pipeline infrastructure in July 2020.⁴

2023 saw the adoption of a new plan to establish a European Hydrogen Bank (EHB), responsible for “a full hydrogen value chain in the EU, alongside the Net-Zero Industry Act” as Kadri Simson, EU Commissioner for Energy observed.⁵ Investing three billion euros in the future hydrogen market, one of the EHB four pillar is aimed at streamlining current – European and international - financial instruments.⁶ A pilot auction supported through the Innovation Fund was to open on November 23, 2023, granting up to €800 million for clean hydrogen projects developed in the European Economic Area (EEA).⁷

Taking a look across the Atlantic, the United States’ first – ever National Clean Hydrogen Strategy and Roadmap was released on June 6, 2023, under the Biden – Harris Administration.⁸ It was envisioned as “a strategic framework for achieving large-scale production and use of clean hydrogen, examining scenarios for 2030, 2040, and 2050”. The Hydrogen Interagency Task

⁴ Amber Grid, Bulgartransgaz, Conexus et al., *European Hydrogen Backbone, European Hydrogen Infrastructure vision covering 28 countries*, 2022 [<https://www.ehb.eu/files/downloads/ehb-report-220428-17h00-interactive-1.pdf>], October 1, 2023.

⁵ European Commission, *Commission outlines European Hydrogen Bank to boost renewable hydrogen* [https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-outlines-european-hydrogen-bank-boost-renewable-hydrogen-2023-03-16_en], September 30, 2023.

⁶ European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Hydrogen Bank*, 2023 [<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023DC0156&qid=1689756932873>], September 30, 2023.

⁷ European Commission, *Upcoming EU Hydrogen Bank pilot auction: European Commission publishes Terms & Conditions*, 2023 [https://climate.ec.europa.eu/news-your-voice/news/upcoming-eu-hydrogen-bank-pilot-auction-european-commission-publishes-terms-conditions-2023-08-30_en], September 30, 2023.

⁸ US Department of Energy, *Biden-Harris Administration releases first-ever National Clean Hydrogen Strategy and Roadmap to build a clean energy future, accelerate American manufacturing boom*, 2023 [<https://www.energy.gov/articles/biden-harris-administration-releases-first-ever-national-clean-hydrogen-strategy-and>], September 30, 2023.

Force was conceived in order to facilitate a comprehensive governmental approach to the implementation of the US hydrogen strategy.⁹

Nevertheless, the potential of the most abundant chemical element in the universe had been tackled even before. In 2020, the US Department of Energy publicised the Hydrogen Program Plan – an extensive document unveiling a strategic perspective on hydrogen research, development, and demonstration (RD&D).¹⁰

The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (or Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, 2021, in line with the objective of the so-called “Hydrogen Shot”, designed to reduce the cost of clean hydrogen to \$1 per 1 kilogram in 1 decade¹¹) supported progress by allocating USD 9.5 billion for clean hydrogen electrolysis, manufacturing and recycling initiatives and especially for Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs.¹² The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has further incentivized America’s development on the path towards clean energy.

The figure below displays the level of public spending on research, development and demonstration (2018 – 2022) in different world regions including Europe and the Americas.

The Hydrogen Map created by Pillsbury Law follows the evolution of more than 200 blue and green projects around the world (some of them already operational). Western Europe and Asia Pacific were identified as drivers of the global low-carbon economy, whereas the US initiatives followed an ascendant trend.¹³

⁹ US Department of Energy, *U.S. National Clean Hydrogen Strategy and Roadmap* [<https://www.hydrogen.energy.gov/library/roadmaps-vision/clean-hydrogen-strategy-roadmap>], October 1, 2023.

¹⁰ US Department of Energy, *Energy Department releases its Hydrogen Program Plan*, 2020 [<https://www.energy.gov/articles/energy-department-releases-its-hydrogen-program-plan>], October 1, 2023.

¹¹ Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technologies Office, *DOE launches the Hydrogen Shot Fellowship*, 2021 [<https://www.energy.gov/eere/fuelcells/articles/doe-launches-hydrogen-shot-fellowship>], October 1, 2023.

¹² US Department of Energy, *DOE establishes Bipartisan Infrastructure Law’s \$9.5 billion Clean Hydrogen Initiatives*, 2022 [<https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-establishes-bipartisan-infrastructure-laws-95-billion-clean-hydrogen-initiatives>], October 1, 2023.

¹³ Dominic Ellis, *Hydrogen Map shows 57 projects are operational globally*, 2021 [<https://energydigital.com/oil-and-gas/hydrogen-map-shows-57-projects-are-operational-globally>], October 1, 2023.




Figure 1. Government RD&D spending for hydrogen technologies by region, 2018 – 2022

Source: International Energy Agency, *Global Hydrogen Review 2022*, <https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/c5bc75b1-9e4d-460d-9056-6e8e626a11c4/GlobalHydrogenReview2022.pdf>

A McKinsey Study entitled “Road Map to a US Hydrogen Economy Promotes Scale-Up Activities in the Growing Hydrogen Economy” underlined that “the US is uniquely positioned to grow and lead the green hydrogen economy due to the abundant, low cost renewable energy sources needed to produce green hydrogen, including wind, solar, hydropower and nuclear.”¹⁴ However, the same company in collaboration with the Hydrogen Council, in the Hydrogen Insights 2023 remarked that over 1000 dedicated initiatives (the majority of them to be fully or partially deployed by 2030) have already been announced worldwide, most of them located in Europe.¹⁵

¹⁴ Plug Power, Inc., *McKinsey study ‘Road Map to a US hydrogen economy’ promotes scale-up activities in the growing hydrogen economy*, 2020 [<https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/10/05/2103399/0/en/McKinsey-Study-Road-Map-to-a-US-Hydrogen-Economy-Promotes-Scale-Up-Activities-in-the-Growing-Hydrogen-Economy.html>], October 1, 2023.

¹⁵ Hydrogen Council, *Hydrogen Insights 2023 An update on the state of the global hydrogen economy, with a deep dive into North America*, 2023 [<https://hydrogencouncil.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Hydrogen-Insights-2023.pdf>], October 1, 2023.

PATTERNS OF COMMUNICATION – EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DISCOURSE ON THE FUTURE OF HYDROGEN

The official EU discourse on hydrogen underlines the comprehensive agenda on this field and the very pragmatic strategies and punctual actions but nevertheless it states clearly the community's ambitions to take the lead in this provokative transformation and transition process. Delivering her speech at the inauguration of the European Hydrogen Week, EU Commission President said in 2021:

“Clean hydrogen will have a central place in the climate-neutral economy of the future and I am proud of Europe’s role as the world’s clean hydrogen trailblazer. At the beginning of this year, more than 200 new hydrogen projects have been announced globally. 55% of them are in Europe... We have to scale up clean hydrogen production, expand its applications, and create a virtuous circle where demand and supply feed each other and bring the prices down. That is the principle. This is without any doubt a global endeavour, but I want Europe to be leading the race.”¹⁶

Discussing punctual interventions to achieve this strategic goal, von der Leyen's address approached a four-point structure; it was the case of the Hydrogen Council event on January 2021:

“Today I would like to tell you what the European Union is doing in concrete. Let me focus on four practical actions. First, we have set clear targets for cutting our emissions, and made them legally binding. We want to cut our emissions by at least 55% by 2030, on the way to climate neutrality by 2050. (...) Second, we are investing in clean hydrogen like never before. Our recovery plan, called NextGenerationEU, is worth 750 billion euros. (...) Third, we are changing the rules of the game to facilitate the deployment of clean hydrogen. (...) For instance, last month we proposed a revised regulation for the Trans-European Networks for Energy. (...) And fourth, we have created a new alliance with the private sector. Our success will depend entirely on cooperation with companies like yours. This is why we have launched the European Clean Hydrogen Alliance. And I am glad that over one thousand companies have already joined it.”¹⁷

¹⁶ EU Commission Press, *President von der Leyen opens the European Hydrogen Week* [<https://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/eu-institution-news/president-von-der-leyen-opens-the-european-hydrogen-week-eu-commission-press/>], August 11, 2023.

¹⁷ European Commission, *Speech by President von der Leyen to the Hydrogen Council*, 2021 [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_21_158], August 11, 2023.

We must retain powerful expressions like “leading the race”, “changing the rules of the game”, that keeps us aware of the EU’s ambition to set the norm when it comes to green energy based on hydrogen use.

The most recent State of the Union (SOTEU) address dating from September 13, 2023 accounted for another occasion when the European Commission prompted, in a competitive paradigm, the Union’s imperative of being the trend setter: “From wind to steel, from batteries to electric vehicles, our ambition is crystal clear: The future of our clean tech industry has to be made in Europe”; (...) “In the last five years, the number of clean steel factories in the EU has grown from zero to 38. We are now attracting more investment in clean hydrogen than the US and China combined.”¹⁸

Back in 2020, First Vice President of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, former European Commissioner for Climate Action, also remarked that “in developing and deploying a clean hydrogen value chain, Europe will become a global frontrunner and retain its leadership in clean tech”.¹⁹

On the same note, in a vivid competition spirit, the American official discourse also pointed out the US’ objective of taking the lead in the newly emerging hydrogen industry: “Ensuring America is the global leader in the next generation of clean energy technologies requires all of us — government and industry — coming together to confront shared challenges, particularly lack of market certainty for clean hydrogen that too often delays progress. That’s why DOE is setting up a new initiative to help our private sector partners address bottlenecks and other project impediments — helping industry unlock the full potential of this incredibly versatile energy resource and supporting the long-term success of the H2hubs”²⁰, to quote the U.S. Secretary of Energy Jennifer M. Granholm.

¹⁸ European Commission, *2023 State of the Union address by President von der Leyen*, 2023 [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_23_4426], September 14, 2023.

¹⁹ European Commission, *Powering a climate-neutral economy: Commission sets out plans for the energy system of the future and clean hydrogen*, Brussels, 2020 [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1259], October 1, 2023.

²⁰ US Department of Energy, *Biden-Harris Administration to jumpstart clean hydrogen economy with new initiative to provide market certainty and unlock private investment*, 2023 [<https://www.energy.gov/articles/biden-harris-administration-jumpstart-clean-hydrogen-economy-new-initiative-provide-market>], September 29, 2023.

Pointing to the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 signed by incumbent US President Joe Biden, in an interview for Albuquerque Journal Alex Greenberg, director of the state Economic Development Department's Science and Technology Office, argued: "Up to now, Europe has had more of a head start in pursuing the transition to hydrogen. But with the IRA, the U.S. has real potential to become the global leader."²¹

While research is still ongoing and national hydrogen strategies started to take shape in various EU countries, thematic presentations of different energy operators in Europe (reunited under the umbrella of the European Hydrogen Backbone²²) underlined the significant, competitive potential of green hydrogen exploitation and the possible emergence of so-called "hydrogen valleys": "(...) hydrogen and power-to-X production has significant potential in Finland" (Gasgrid, Finland), "Hydrogen is considered alongside electricity as a prerequisite for Europe's ability to act and compete in the 21st century." (Ontras, Germany), "Connecting the Baltic region with Central Europe with an onshore or offshore pipeline would enable Europe to increase its energy self-sufficiency and energy security" (Elering, Estonia), "To connect future markets with production centers, EUSTREAM plans to dedicate one or more of its main transit pipelines only for transport of 100% hydrogen." (EUSTREAM, Slovakia), "Spain's long-term ambition is to be one of the main hydrogen suppliers in Europe" (Enagas, Spain), "To ensure that hydrogen is developed to its full potential, there must be a defined perspective towards the development of a well-interconnected European hydrogen market over time (...) In Western Romania, the interconnection with Serbia is also envisaged for 100% hydrogen use." (Transgaz, Romania), "(the Transitgas pipeline) it is therefore an ideal partner to ensure the necessary imports from outside Europe and more specifically from North Africa" (FluxSwiss, Switzerland).

Paul Epstein, a partner for Shearman and Sterling (a multinational law firm headquartered in New York City) noted that "both public officials and

²¹ Kevin Robinson-Avila, "Federal incentives accelerate New Mexico's hydrogen economy", *Albuquerque Journal* [https://www.abqjournal.com/news/local/federal-incentives-accelerate-new-mexicos-hydrogen-economy/article_95be467b-cb05-5c66-82db-108cf3dd9333.html], September 29, 2023.

²² Amber Grid, Bulgartransgaz, Conexus et al., *European Hydrogen Backbone, loc. cit.*

industry recognize the important role hydrogen could play in the decarbonization of the U.S. economy.”²³

American oil and gas companies convinced of the potential that hydrogen can have in the future, also addressed the topic, including from an international perspective, and we have selected several examples in this regard: “Renewable hydrogen will play a pivotal role in the energy system of the future and this project (i.e. Holland Hydrogen I, Europe’s largest renewable hydrogen plant to come operational in 2025) is an important step in helping hydrogen fulfil that potential.” (Anna Mascolo, Executive Vice President, Emerging Energy Solutions at Shell²⁴); “Chevron believes in the value of delivering large-scale hydrogen solutions that support a lower carbon world. We aim to deliver lower carbon energy to a growing world by creating a profitable, large-scale, lower carbon hydrogen business that builds on our existing assets, capabilities, and customers.”²⁵ (Chevron, California); “By helping to activate new markets for hydrogen and carbon capture and storage, this project (i.e. a hydrogen production plant and one of the world’s largest carbon capture and storage projects, developed at Baytown, Texas), can play an important part in achieving America’s lower-emissions aspirations.”²⁶ (Joe Blommaert, president of ExxonMobil Low Carbon Solutions).

We remarked that the language in the companies’ presentations appeals to contextualization, examples, epithets, assessments (of the status quo) and predictions (including timeframes) such as in the following syntagma: “it is expected that”, “would also be possible”, “a possible scenario assumes that”, “a vital role is foreseen”.

²³ Paul Epstein, *Hydrogen’s present and future in the US energy sector*, 2021

[<https://www.shearman.com/perspectives/2021/10/hydrogens-present-and-future-in-the-us-energy-sector>], October 1, 2023.

²⁴ *Shell to start building Europe’s largest renewable hydrogen plant*, 2022

[<https://www.shell.com/media/news-and-media-releases/2022/shell-to-start-building-europes-largest-renewable-hydrogen-plant.html>], October 1, 2023.

²⁵ Chevron new energies, *Accelerating lower carbon solutions*

[<https://www.chevron.com/operations/new-energies>], October 1, 2023.

²⁶ *ExxonMobil planning hydrogen production, carbon capture and storage at Baytown complex*, 2022

[https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/news/news-releases/2022/0301_exxonmobil-planning-hydrogen-production-carbon-capture-and-storage-at-baytown-complex], October 1, 2023.




Figure 2. Hydrogen valleys

Source: Uwe Weichenhain, *Hydrogen Valleys: first elements of the new hydrogen economy*

<https://www.rolandberger.com/en/Insights/Publications/Hydrogen-Valleys-first-elements-of-the-new-hydrogen-economy.html>

A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH TO LANGUAGE

The hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe (24 pages, 9632 words exclusive of footnotes), launched in 2020, makes use of words and phrases like: “hydrogen” – 322 times, “strategic” – 17, (“strategic vision”, “strategic roadmap”, “strategic objective”, “strategic element”, “Strategic Forum”, “strategic interest”, “strategic investments”), “potential” – 14, “public” – 9, “private” – 8, “global” – 8, “long term” – 5, “priority” – 5, “leadership” – 4.²⁷

Also, for statistical purposes, we have resorted to a WordCounter application and the results showed that the most frequently used words in the Strategy are: hydrogen (322 times), renewable (91), EU (80), production (77), energy (73), gas (49), support (44); among the most common trigams (i.e. three-word phrases) in the document we found: “renewable and low-carbon” (16 times), “research and innovation” (14), “the Commission will” (14), “greenhouse gas emissions” (13), “clean hydrogen alliance” (8).

For comparison, the 2023 US Clean Hydrogen Strategy and Roadmap (99 pages, 24.343 words, exclusive of figures, tables and bibliography) unveils the preference for the aforementioned words as follows: “hydrogen” – 1258,

²⁷ European Commission, *A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe*, loc. cit.

“potential” – 93, “long term” – 37, “global” – 35, “public” – 25, “strategic” – 20 times, “private” – 19, “priority” – 7, “leadership” – 5.²⁸

A simple percentual calculation revealed that, in some cases, the selected words appear in a larger percentage in the US Strategy compared to the EU document, sometimes approaching to double. Additionally, we observed that “hydrogen” and “potential” represent the two most used words in both strategies, whereas at the other side of the spectrum there are to be found the concepts of “priority” and “leadership”, considering our limited words’ selection. Nevertheless, this is not a counterargument for the EU’s assertiveness in securing a leading position onto the future of green hydrogen.

THE CASE OF ROMANIA

The potential of hydrogen is actively debated in Romania, too. A recent example refers to the 2023 edition of the Central European Natural Gas Congress, organized by Transgaz in Sibiu, on 27-29 September. The event was attended by both public and private entities from Central and South-East Europe and addressed topics of high actuality among which the diversification of natural gas supply sources and transmission routes in Central, South Eastern Europe and the Balkans, medium and long-term usage of natural gas as part of the European energy mix, financial support for the development of gas infrastructure in the aforementioned regions, new digital technologies in the energy industry, hydrogen as a long-term and large-scale energy carrier.²⁹ The first edition of the Congress took place in 2022 in Slovakia.

The Romanian national gas transmission company Transgaz is one of the actors currently involved in a pilot project (ROHYD) of studying the injection of hydrogen into natural gas pipelines. Efforts are based on the company’s collaboration with third parties, such as Romanian research institutes and energy universities. On the international side, Transgaz has initiated and signed in April 2022 a MoU with TSOs from Slovakia (EUSTREAM), Hungary

²⁸ US Department of Energy, *US National Clean Hydrogen Strategy and Roadmap* [<https://www.hydrogen.energy.gov/clean-hydrogen-strategy-roadmap.html>], September 14, 2023.

²⁹ Transgaz Communication Department, *Transgaz organized in Sibiu the 2023 edition of the Central European Natural Gas Congress in Central, South-East Europe and the Balkans, 2023* [https://www.transgaz.ro/sites/default/files/Release%2029.09.2023_0.pdf], October 1, 2023.

(FGSZ) and Poland (GAZ SYSTEM) aimed at sharing expertise on the issue of blending hydrogen with natural gas.³⁰

Romania has adopted a Law on hydrogen on June 20, 2023 and its national strategy on hydrogen was subjected to debate, as announced by former Energy minister, Virgil Popescu.³¹

CONCLUSIONS

Analysing speeches of different institutional and corporate entities on the subject of future hydrogen usage as well as the EU's and the US' dedicated strategies we can conclude that both the public and the private sector are interested in exploring the industrial potential of hydrogen with a view to achieve ambitious, strategic environmental goals by the next decades.

Especially the institutional discourse unveiled a competitive paradigm of exposing results or prospects for the future, the leading position in the clean tech innovation being disputed between the Europe and America, though the former is still rejoicing an advantage in terms of number of proposed projects and financial investments. A number of key expressions in public addresses characterize the competitiveness spirit.

Hydrogen will continue to attract the attention of a variety of stakeholders as research on its potential goes on but there are still questions to be answered while advantages and disadvantages are being calculated and calibrated.

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³⁰ Transgaz, *Company presentation* [<https://www.transgaz.ro/en/about-us/company-presentation/company-presentation>], October 1, 2023.

³¹ Afrodita Cicovschi, *Legea privind Hidrogenul a fost adoptată: Producția va fi de 288,8 mii tone, 2023* [<https://adevarul.ro/economie/strategia-nationala-pentru-hidrogen-a-fost-2277167.html>], October 1, 2023.

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REPRESENTATIONS OF THE COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IN ROMANIAN CINEMA. THE THAWING PERIOD

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Abstract:

This paper intends to illustrate an often neglected, yet relevant aspect of the collective memory construction in communist Romania. In addition to other forms of collective remembrance, cinematic representations of the recent past have played a significant role for both the political regime and the Romanian society by providing political legitimacy as well as entertainment. The communist resistance was one of the most recurrent topos of collective memory, whereas underground party supporters – the so called “illegalists” – often had to be presented as figures of identification. The cinema permitted, however, a negotiation of the recent past on different levels. Starting from these considerations and focusing on the film production „Duminică la ora 6” (Sunday at Six, Lucian Pintilie, 1966), the paper brings into discussion the communist resistance discourse during the liberalization period.

Keywords: *communist resistance, cinema, collective memory, communist regime, Romania, liberalization period*

INTRODUCTION

This paper deals with constructions of collective memory in Romania respectively with the communist resistance which emerged as an essential

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topos¹ or motif during the communist period. The main emphasis relies on its visual construction by Romanian filmmakers.

This topos has been constructed transnationally both in the Eastern Bloc and in the West, in the latter case, however, it has not been related to the communist party members. Unlike in the communist countries, this topos has not played such a large legitimizing role in the West, concentrating mainly on the anti-fascist resistance in conservative or intellectual circles.² Although communist resistance was in fact the most widespread, it was not discussed in the West during the Cold War. Highly influenced by politics, these constructions of the past were in a closer interstate and inter-Bloc relationship than one would assume.³ For this reason, the changes in the political context are of particular importance in the investigation of the underground resistance.

Taking a step further and looking at the socialist camp, one can find similarities at first sight. In all these countries, the communist resistance was highlighted by the anti-fascist discourse. Historiography, history books, eyewitness accounts, conferences, as well as cultural products such as literature, film and theater have constructed communist resistance as a central theme throughout the communist period. Nonetheless, the socialist camp was anything but homogenous, and even if individual regimes had tried to create through the communist resistance a transnational basis of legitimacy and thus a common memory space, there were nevertheless temporal and spatial variations that reflected mainly the country's self-image and its relation with the Soviet Union. Countries such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and even the German Democratic Republic, which formerly had a stronger communist movement,⁴ positioned themselves differently to this topos than, for example, Romania.

¹ "Topos" is used in this article as a recurrent motif inherent in the collective memory formation.

² Cf. Johannes Tuchel, "Zwischen Diffamierung und Anerkennung: Zum Umgang mit dem 20. Juli in der frühen Bundesrepublik" in *APuZ*, no. 27, 2014, pp. 22-23.

³ Comparative analyzes refer in particular to the relations between East and West Germany. See, for example: Peter Reichel, *Erfundene Erinnerung. Weltkrieg und Judenmord in Film und Theater*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 2007; Detlef Kannapin, *Dialektik der Bilder: Der Nationalsozialismus im deutschen Film. Ein Ost-West-Vergleich*, Berlin: Dietz, 2005.

⁴ Lucian Boia, *Strania istorie a comunismului românesc (și nefericitele ei consecințe)*, București: Humanitas, 2016, pp. 13-14.

Another difference may arise from the artistic freedom provided in these countries. This results in another peculiarity that makes up the artistic, or in this case, the cinematic work. The close connection between the cinema and the construction of social reality, and consequently of collective memory, has been recognized and exploited since the first film screenings at the end of the 19th century. The cinema rapidly developed into an industry shaped by the new structures of power. The socialist cinema represented a field whose power structures were based primarily on the institutional configuration. Because of the nationalization of cinema, both film production and the content were mostly politically determined. Unlike other media, film production itself is a collective activity involving ideas from multiple directions. Eventually, the film has still the capacity to externalize, store and distribute mental images on external media, whereby, through the film reception process, these images are in turn resumed and anchored in the social memory.⁵

Taking this into consideration, one can argue about an interpretation conflict emerging from the production and the reception of a film. Therefore, it is assumed that the cinematic construction of collective memory is by no means a one-sided communication, but presupposes a struggle for interpretation or a negotiation of the past, even if it might have been carried out more or less directly, given the more rigid memory politics in communist regimes.

Constructed as an identification figure and thus becoming part of the heroic self-representation of socialism, the topos of the resistance fighter has been furthermore assumed at different negotiation levels: from the level of film production over the moving image to the film criticism and the audience reception.

However, this paper will focus on the cinematic construction of the communist resistance during the liberalization period in Romania, trying to answer the question of how this topos could be negotiated through the medium of film? Considering this, the intention is not to evaluate or classify these cinematic representations as dissident, regime-critical or regime-friendly discourses, but rather to examine the negotiation of the past⁶ between the actors

⁵ See the concept of "media of collective memory" in Astrid Erll, *Kollektives Gedächtnis und Erinnerungskulturen*, Stuttgart/Weimar: J.B. Metzler, 2005.

⁶ Negotiation implies at least two actors stating different opinions. Regarding visual representations, this could be explained in terms of pluri-semantic messages or a distancing film language.

involved. In order to answer this question, the paper continues in the next section with a short insight into the thawing period and the Romanian cinematographic context at the time. However, the main emphasis is placed on the film analysis *Duminică la ora 6* (Lucian Pintilie, 1965/66), which ultimately shows how representations of the resistance have been negotiated during film production.

THE THAWING PERIOD IN ROMANIA

The different and often contradictory uses of the resistance topos in the construction of the regime's self-representation also meant redefining this self-image through the continuous negation of the „other” or the other's image. Consequently, the identity and orientation frames have been introduced in a renegotiation process. This resulted in both a content and a stylistic change in the cinematic representation of the communist resistance and thus a change in the self-representation of the regime. Elements of the other were gradually included in this topos, but not without encountering critical rejection at first. It may have been not just existing contemporary witness experiences or the different understanding of the past of the emerging filmmakers that played a decisive role, but also the political circumstances and the artistic freedom. Besides these determinants, which brought about a change of self-representations, there were primarily the turning points in the political course of the entire Eastern Bloc that required such a refiguration of the past, mainly because these changes generated oscillating decisions and instability of the entire political system.

Joseph Stalin's death was such a turning point that occurred internally within the Eastern Bloc, but it had a worldwide impact. Stalin's totalitarian regime and cult of personality, as well as the self-representations propagated during his regime had to be redefined by a new party leader. Nikita Khrushchev initiated a new political course at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: the de-Stalinization.⁷ Here one can also point to the negation of a (past) “other” in the redefinition of the self-image. The period of “political relaxation”, carried out differently in the socialist

⁷ See about “Stalinization” and “De-Stalinization” in different socialist states in: Jan Foitzik, “Entstalinisierungskrise in Ostmitteleuropa”, in Roger Engelmann, Thomas Großbölting, Hermann Wentker (ed.), *Kommunismus in der Krise. Die Entstalinisierung 1956 und die Folgen*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008, pp. 35-60.

countries, was called according to Ilja Ehrenburgs novel the “thawing period”.⁸ However, Khrushchev's politics proved to be contradictory: on the one hand, he initiated a period of liberalization that resulted in a cleavage in the cultural sphere between reformist and conservative artists; on the other, he tightened his political control to end the turbulences in the Eastern Bloc.⁹

In Romania, Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej reacted to this new course claiming that he carried out a so called “de-Stalinization” as early as 1952, before Stalin's death¹⁰ (with the party exclusion of Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca and Teohari Georgescu).¹¹ But later, under the pretext of de-Stalinization, he initiated a new wave of purges within the party and the universities and tightened repressive measures against those who showed solidarity with the Hungarian uprising.¹² The contradictory remembrance politics and unilateral historiography evinced during the PMR plenary session of 9-13 June 1958, in which the party exclusion of the last former illegalists occurred. In the context of Nikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinization course, they had criticized Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and questioned his role in the resistance.¹³

Only a few years later (1958-1964), after the unrest in the Eastern Bloc subsided, a de-Stalinization process was initiated in Romania, or even a “de-Russification” process, which led to the dissolution of Soviet institutions, the

⁸ See (comparative) studies in Dietrich Beyrau, Ivo Bock (ed.), *Das Tauwetter und die Folgen: Kultur und Politik in Osteuropa nach 1956*, Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1988; Engelmann et al. (ed.), *Kommunismus in der Krise*, 2008; Karen Laß, *Vom Tauwetter zur Perestrojka. Kulturpolitik in der Sowjetunion (1953-1991)*, Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau, 2002.

⁹ Laß, *Vom Tauwetter zur Perestrojka*, pp. 44-98.

¹⁰ Dan Cătănuș, “Regimul comunist și problema intelectualității 1956-1965”, in Dan Cătănuș (ed.) *Intelectuali români în arhivele comunismului*, București: Nemira, 2006, p. 50.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² Cf. document 124: “1956 octombrie 30, [Timișoara]. Memoriu manuscris ce conține cererile studenților din Timișoara, formulate cu ocazia mișcărilor studențești izbucnite în contextul Revoluției din Ungaria”, Source: ACNSAS, Fond Penal, dosar 799, vol. 5, ff. 5-6, here: pp. 538-539; document 127: “1956 noiembrie 23, București. Ședința cu instructorii teritorialii ai CC al PMR [...], here: pp. 544-556, etc. in Mihnea Berindei; Dorin Dobrințu; Armand Goșu (ed.), *Istoria comunismului din România. Documente. Perioada Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej*, București: Humanitas, 2009.

¹³ Alina Tudor; Dan Cătănuș (ed.), *Amurgul ilegalităților, Plenara PMR din 9-13 iunie 1958*, București: Vremea, 2000.

change of toponymy and also a turn in the memory politics.¹⁴ This process ended in 1964 with the so called “declaration of independence” from the Soviet Union. Without going deeper into the political context, I would just like to recall this transitional unstable situation that occurred in the entire Eastern Bloc. The Romanian cultural policy wavered between liberalization and repression until another turning point was set in 1971, with the so called “July theses”.

In this circumstances, filmmakers and artists tried to distance themselves from socialist realism themes in order to pursue new artistic paths. In doing so, they turned to the aesthetics of Italian Neorealism or the French Nouvelle Vague.¹⁵ Although the formalist criticism became loud again, the films were admitted anyway. This expressed the uncertainty and dichotomy in the cultural field. On the other hand, neither commissioned films nor inhibitory interventions were dispensed with, even if they could be partially evaded. A content or aesthetic related negotiation of the still rigid, heroic representations of the resistance – continuing to be a source for political legitimacy – was carried out hesitantly; critical voices were tolerated only in the later thawing period.

THE NEGOTIATION OF THE PAST IN *DUMINICĂ LA ORA 6*

During this time, the Romanian filmmaker Lucian Pintilie (later becoming known for his regime-critical position) made his film debut with *Duminică la ora 6/ Sunday at six*. The film itself was his only one admitted by the censorship. Retrospectively, it received less attention compared to his later, more controversial productions, possibly because Lucian Pintilie adopted a

¹⁴ Cf. document 185: “1963, septembrie 9, București. În contextul răcirii relațiilor dintre conducerile PMR și PCUS și al derusificării instituțiilor [...]”, Source: ANIC, Fond CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, dosar 9/1963, ff. 20-26, here: pp. 762-765; document 192: “1965 martie 8-9, București. Referat și situație statistică prezentate de Petre Lupu conducerii PMR privind aplicarea deciziilor de schimbare a numelor unor instituții, străzi, localități în contextul rescrierii istoriei partidului și al recuperării istoriei naționale pentru legitimarea acestuia”, Source: ANIC, Fond CC al PCR – Secția Administrativ-Politică, dosar 17/1962, ff. 59-75, here: pp. 784-788, in: Berindei/ Dobrințu/ Goșu (ed.), *Istoria comunismului din România*, 2009.

¹⁵ Cf. Thomas Heimann, “Erinnerung als Wandlung: Kriegsbilder im frühen DDR-Film”, in Martin Sabrow (ed.), *Geschichte als Herrschaftsdiskurs. Der Umgang mit der Vergangenheit in der DDR*, Köln: Böhlau, 2000, S. 37-85, here: p. 50; cf. Oksana Bulgakowa, “DEFA-Filme im Kontext der „neuen Wellen“ im osteuropäischen Film”, in Skyler Arndt-Briggs et al. (ed.) *DEFA international. Grenzüberschreitende Filmbeziehungen vor und nach dem Mauerbau*, Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013, pp. 73-91.

distant, even dismissive attitude towards the film story addressing the communist resistance.¹⁶ Nevertheless, he has given this conventional film story a new dimension through the experimental film language, enabling new readings and challenging audiences' viewing habits and expectations. However, *Duminică la ora 6* differs from his subsequent cinema productions by its subject set in the recent past, and in particular by the experimental, unconventional film language. Lucian Pintilie's subsequent feature films emphasized on the one hand a realistic-critical approach in *Reconstituirea* [*Reconstruction*, 1969], on the other hand an allegorical perspective in *De ce trag clopotele, Mitică?* [*Why Are the Bells Ringing, Mitică?* 1979]. Without pursuing a unitary approach, these films reveal a critical dimension, which was in any case undesirable to party officials, mainly because of its more or less direct reference to the present (presentification). As Pintilie's only approved feature film, *Duminică la ora 6* appeared at the opportune time marked by a liberalized cultural policy. The late thawing period that briefly occurred between Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej's purges and Nicolae Ceaușescu's national communism, turned out to be a fruitful period for Romanian artists and filmmakers. This short cultural-political transition reflecting however a wavering self-image of socialism, tacitly allowed a dissociation from socialist realism, and an approach to a relative large variety of styles. A stylistically motivated negotiation of the past again came to the fore, but this time not under the sign of earlier formalism, but under an expanding artistic approach.

In this context, Lucian Pintilie's film was nevertheless at a seemingly contradictory interface between domestic criticism and international recognition. That it belonged – along with the later feature films *Ediție specială* [Mircea Daneliuc 1977] and *Să mori rănit din dragoste de viață* [Mircea Veroiu 1983] – to those exceptions, that had not addressed the real issue, was discussed only after the communist regime.¹⁷ These were issues that had been worked out in the cinema, without providing the required political homage.¹⁸

¹⁶ The film critic Călin Căliman regards this as “stylistic exercise on a given topic” (“exercițiu stilistic pe o temă dată”): Călin Căliman, *Istoria filmului românesc: (1897-2000)*, București: Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 2000, p. 284.

¹⁷ Cf. interview with Mircea Veroiu in: Ioan-Pavel Azap, *Traveling. Interviuuri cu regizori români de film*, vol. 1, București: Tritonic, 2003, p. 157.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

Reshaping the Cinematic Understanding of Resistance

The film plot brings a love story in the foreground, which had to fail due to the political entanglement of its protagonists. The title *Sundays at 6* goes back to the appointment of the two main characters Radu (Dan Nutu) and Anca (Irina Petresu), who had to meet on a dance evening in order to plan and carry out a resistance action together. But the scheduled meeting was prevented by the riots of the right wing party followers – the legionnaires. They get to know each other by chance, and the relationship developed without them knowing anything about each other's political implication. However, by the acquisition of the multiplier, Anca proved to be the contact person to meet Radu on that dance evening. Her story, told as flashback from Radu's point of view, made a tragic turn: Anca was murdered by the police agents from the Siguranta and Radu was betrayed by another contact person.

The film story is traced back to the year 1940 when the Iron Guard came to power. Despite some evidence such as the appearance of the so called "Green Shirts", an explicit mention of political events was abandoned. Moreover, the political affiliation of the resistance fighters was reduced to the occasional use of the address form "comrade" and to Maria's statement about the potential emergence of socialism. Consequently, the resistance actions such as the provision of a multiplier or the workers strike are less politically substantiated, but rather in connection with the love story, set in an internal tension between private and public life. Renouncing at propagandistic statements, the visual representation of the resistance struggle takes, in contrast to the previous films, not a heroic, but a psychological, even defensive form. The danger to which the film characters are exposed by the agents of the Siguranță (Security Service), who track Radu in the city of Constanța, takes on a physical form – namely a direct confrontation – only at the end of the film. The legionaries, the factory director and the two agents who have broken into the couple's hideout can be reduced to functional figures, due to their one-time appearance. The de-personalization of the enemy shows a turning away from the hitherto cinematically used antagonistic representations.

Moreover, the resistance – especially after the conspicuous performance of the multiplier-action and after Anca's alleged interrogation [32,26-39,00] – is portrayed as a defensive, internalized struggle for survival, hampered by traumatic memories and insecurity. The resistance is turning, according to the screenwriter Ion Mihăileanu, into a "credo" and „above all, a protest. But not an impulsive, furious protest, but rather a way of life that penetrates into the

deepest resorts of individual psychology.¹⁹ In addition, this introspective conception of resistance is reinforced by the expressive film language, be it in form of flashbacks, subjective camera, associative editing, or exposure and sound, thus overcoming the conventional narrative. According to Lucian Pintilie, the fates of the characters should evolve in a natural, everyday life. By the use of wide-angle lenses, a rigid character guide have to be avoided, thus permitting an unbiased acting of the protagonists.²⁰

Besides replacing heroic characteristics of the protagonists with individualized and internalized visions of the outer reality, the film presents another novelty in the cinematic depiction of resistance, namely the central and active role of women and the youth, which are moved into the foreground of the film story. The inner tension of the two young protagonists is contrasted with the carelessness of the youth in the train station, both visually presented by cross-cuttings (or shot reverse shots) and in the dialogue between Radu and Maria.²¹ The director also explains his film by referring to the young people who have chosen to fight.²² On the other hand, the role of the women is no longer that of an external supporter of the resistance struggle, but an active protagonist, even though with human weaknesses. Even the Communist Party is represented by the figure of Maria (Graziela Albini), of a woman who, as a "collective individual"²³ linearly exercises her representative function, communicating orders to Radu at regular meetings, and enduring his difficulties with perseverance. The relationship between the two young people and the party is thus simplified by Maria's linear evolution.²⁴ She puts Radu in contact with both Anca, a young Architect student who shows lack of

¹⁹ In original: "...și, mai ales, un protest. Nu un protest impulsiv, furios, mai degrabă un mod de viață care intră în cele mai intime resorturi ale psihologiei individuale." In: Alexandru Racoviceanu, "Dialog cu scenaristul Ion Mihăileanu" in *Cinema*, no. 3, 1965.

²⁰ Alexandru Racoviceanu, "Cît mai aproape de cotidian" in *Cinema*, no. 3, 1965.

²¹ Maria emphasizes that Radu is not an average young man [19,11], whereas Radu also points to the carelessness of the youth, which might persist even at the rise of socialism [1,08,25-1,09,00]. See also Anca in the park [52,01-53,36].

²² Bujor T. Rîpeanu, "Colocviu regizoral despre filmele noi" in *Cinema*, no. 11, 1964.

²³ Maria uses the "we"-form when she is taking Anca under protection [54,15].

²⁴ Cf. Arhiva Națională de Filme, „Duminică la ora 6” – archival materials: Călin Căliman, "Duminică la ora 6" in *Contemporanul*, no. 5, 1966, p. 5; Tudor Caranfil, "Duminică la ora 6" in *Tribuna*, 10, no. 4, 1966, p. 7. (Press articles and other materials from this archive are listed below under „ANF, D6.”).

experience, insecurity and fear, and with the woman from Constanța who has finally proved to be a traitor. Despite the cinematic narration based on Radu's retrospective view, Anca visually comes to the fore.

Radu becomes a reserved and tense underground activist. By perceiving the risks and dangers of a love affair between two illegals, his confrontational attitude towards Anca increasingly changed into a protective one. Since he could not prevent her tragic death, he approaches the fate of an anti-hero. Radu remains only with a traumatic memory, which he plays against the oblivion by passing on his experiences to Maria, before he finally falls victim to the security men in Constanța.

The representation of the main protagonists is thus less in line with the political demands of offering viewers a (heroic) identification figure. The emphasis on young people – namely on a young worker and UTC-member as well as an architecture student – meets the new requirements of the cultural functionaries. However, the film takes a certain critical distance both stylistically and by the tragic hopelessness of anti-heroes. According to the film review written by Călin Căliman in that period, the protagonists' entangled inner world faces an observed realism representing the anonymity of the strikers, the adolescents, the people on the street, and the society as a whole.²⁵ Moreover, this anonymous society is "presentified" (*vergegenwärtigen*) by a discrete reference to the clothing style of the 1960s.²⁶ Consequently, the audience is offered the possibility to associate between past and present events.

Alternative film readings are also enabled by a film language which produces critical distance to the represented characters. In addition to the film story criticized as pessimistic and the content-related extension of this topos, the film language played for Lucian Pintilie a far more important role. Flashbacks, subjective camera or point of view-shots, cross-cuttings and associative montage or visual metaphors revealing a non-linear, non-classical narration with temporal ellipses should not lead to any identification of the audience with the main characters, but to a critical distance. This proved to be the main purpose of the film. The narrative perspective is counteracted by the camera. The film image creates an identification proximity to Anca, whereas Radu's voiceover, the montage overlapping different temporal levels, and the subsequent disrupted narration, as well as the use of visual metaphors, create a

²⁵ ANF, D6: Călin Căliman, "Duminică la ora 6" in *Contemporanul*, no. 5, 1966, p. 5.

²⁶ See sequences: walk Anca and Radu [19,54-27,41] and Anca in the park [52,01-54,36].

critical distance to the narrated. Radu's traumatic recall – namely the image of people who are leaning on the balcony railing of an inner courtyard seen from the fixed point situated in an elevator going down, as well as the image of passing through a (prison) basement - interrupts the cinematic narrative,²⁷ tuning out to be sequences representing Anca's death as well as her imprisonment. Finally, these flashback sequences can only be traced back to Radu's last images of Anca. The protagonist's inner world imprinted with shock-like memories as well as the transitions between temporal planes are also marked by close-up framed faces appearing behind glass windows, wire fences or prison grids. All these aspects represent a dissociation from the outer world,²⁸ which also confer to resistance narratives an introspective dimension through film language.

The Negotiation of the Past: Film Production and Reception

Duminică la ora 6 can be considered the artistic creation of a new generation of filmmakers, who seized the freedoms of the 1960s as an opportunity to experiment new stylistic paths. Both the director Lucian Pintilie, as well as the screenwriter Ion Mihăileanu – who himself was an illegalist²⁹ – and the camera operator Sergiu Huzum made their debut with this film and paved their way as critical artists. The film project was started in 1961 and had to be taken over originally by Iulian Mișu.³⁰ Although Lucian Pintilie initially appeared to reject the script as „unfashionable“, Liviu Ciulei persuaded him to first make an „unproblematic feature film.“³¹ Already at the beginning, the director has turned away from a documentary-authentic reproduction of the past, which was expected at that time, and committed himself to an aesthetic negligence, which was unusual, above all, for an „antifascist“ film:

²⁷ [02,43-02,53 / 02,58-03,17 / 03,25-04,10]; [17,50-18,03]; [27,41-28,03 / 28,40-28,56]; [32,07-32,26]; [47,06-47,17]; [55,24-55,30]; [56,28-56,35 / 57,12-57,42 / 57,52-58,02 / 59,40-59,56 / 1,00,16-1,00,28]; [1,07,00-1,07,56].

²⁸ See for example [00,00-01,45 / 02,22-02,30]; [28,57-29,10]; [53,30]; [27,00]; [4,10-6,02].

²⁹ Căliman, *Istoria filmului românesc*, p. 280.

³⁰ Bujor Tudor Rîpeanu, *Filmul în România. Repertoriul filmelor de ficțiune românești, 1911-1969*, Vol. 1, București: Editura Fundației Pro, 2004, p. 131.

³¹ „Notă cu privire la Liviu Ciulei și Lucian Pintilie“, 10.10.1963 in CNSAS, Dosar I 256686, vol.1, p. 98.

“I am not interested in the plastic, anecdotal outer re-composition of the epoch. We will not make any efforts to reconstitute it. The image will bear the mark of an intentional neglect, without great contrasts [...], by using mercury vapor lamps in illuminating, many “hand shots” and experimenting the “trans-trav”-method. Even in scenography we will not seek to insist on the detail of the epoch, but will place the action especially in expressive environments: wastelands, house facades, city fringes near the swamps [...].”³²

Not only the street and its numerous exterior motifs contributed to the atmospheric depiction, but also the initially unplanned interior shots at original locations turned out to be atmospherically appealing.³³ In doing so, the filmmakers attempted to draw on the aesthetics of the Italian Neorealism, and also on the younger *Nouvelle Vague*.³⁴ The film narrative itself was originally based on a simple epic structure that Lucian Pintilie explicitly refused during the filming.³⁵ However, his free approach challenged him, as he had to reorganize the film footage. Finally, he regretted the fragmentation and dramaturgical “blanks” at which, in his view, the film had to suffer. But the improvisation and the discovery of the cinema image, as well as the need for a distant approach to the film characters led him to a rejecting attitude towards traditional narration. The suggestive power of film narratives seemed to him

³² In original: “Nu mă interesează recompunerea exterioară plastică, anecdotică a epocii. Nu vom depune eforturi de reconstituire documentară a acesteia. Imaginea va purta amprenta unei neglijențe voite, fără mari contraste [...], prin folosirea în iluminare a lămpilor cu vapori de mercur, cu multă „filmare din mână” și experimentare a procedului „trans-traw. Nici în scenografie nu vom căuta să insistăm asupra detaliului de epocă, ci ne vom plasa acțiunea mai ales în ambianțe expresive prin ele însele: maidane, calcanele caselor, marginea de oraș ce se învecinează cu balta [...]” In Bujor T. Rîpeanu, “Colocviu regizoral despre filmele noi” in *Cinema*, no. 11, 1964.

³³ Only 3 of the original 18 planned stage sets could be realized in the studio, so that the film crew had to recourse to original interior locations. Cf. Alexandru Racoviceanu, “Cît mai aproape de cotidian” in *Cinema*, no. 3, 1965.

³⁴ The aesthetics of Italian Neorealism and French *Nouvelle Vague* also inspired the “black wave” of Yugoslav film, which seemed to have similarities with the Romanian film tendencies of the 1960s in terms of critical approach and lesser public support. However, the limited reach of this trend in Romania might be seen as a major difference. Cf. “Novi film” [<http://filmlexikon.uni-kiel.de/index.php?action=lexikon&tag=det&id=5521>] and “Schwarze Welle” [<http://filmlexikon.uni-kiel.de/index.php?action=lexikon&tag=det&id=5248>], 26. October 2015.

³⁵ George Littera, “Confesiunile regizorului la masa de montaj” in *Cinema*, no. 10, 1965.

much more important, and he intended to further enhance his cinema activity towards a protest against the subject in favor of the cinema image.³⁶

Duminică la ora 6 premiered on 10. 1. 1966 and recorded a relatively small audience success compared to other feature films of the 1960s addressing the communist resistance, but a larger audience compared to Pintilie's subsequent banned films, which continued to receive much more attention from the film critics.³⁷ These audience results might be traced back to Pintilie's uncomfortable attitude and provocative film language. The director himself points in his later memories³⁸ to the „cursed” recording of the feature film *Duminică la ora 6* by cultural and party officials, as well as to its international awards.³⁹ However, shortly after the film had been finished, the negotiation of the past revealed split attitudes which came to the fore in a debate of the Association of Filmmakers (Consiliul Asociației Cineaștilor - ACIN).⁴⁰ The critical remarks of several filmmakers (G. Saizescu, M. Drăgan, M. Iacob) were based largely on political arguments and concerned with, on the one hand, the „unrepresentative figures”, on the other hand, the inscrutable representation of the resistance in terms of its actors, goals and reasons. The film was considered “inappropriate” both in concept and “local color” (atmosphere). The

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ Out of a total of 12 feature films dealing with communist resistance and filmed between 1960 and 1969, 8 feature films with over two million spectators were recorded until December 2013. *Duminică la ora 6* had 1,715,107 spectators. Lucian Pintilie's other films *Reconstituirea* and *De ce trag clopotele, Mitică?* reached, after their re-performance in 1990, 578,611 resp. 352.770 spectators. Cf. *Spectatori film românesc*, 2013 [<http://cnc.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Total-spectatori-film-romanesc-la-31.12.2013.pdf>], 19 October 2015.

Duminică la ora 6 had reached 1.276.803 spectators by December 1967. Cf. ANF, Fișă filmografică, nr. I/89, p. 11.

³⁸ Lucian Pintilie, “Ca un bonjourist”, 1998, in Lucian Pintilie, *Bricabrac: [articole, interviuri, discursuri]*, București: Humanitas, 2003, p. 289.

³⁹ Worth mentioning here are in particular the awards of the International Youth Film Festival in Cannes 1966; the Golden Trophy “Cabeza de Palengue”, Acapulco, 1966; the special jury prize for the world's first interior lighting with mercury vapor lamps, UNIATEC Congress, Prague, 1966; the critics award of the Film Festival in Mar del Plata, 1966; special jury award and prize for the feminine role (Irina Petrescu) of the National Film Festival in Mamaia, 1966 etc. In: ANF, Fișă filmografică nr. I/89, p. 12; cf. Rîpeanu, *Filmat în România*, p. 132.

⁴⁰ Rîpeanu, *Filmat în România*, p. 131.

proponents (I. Mihu, M. Marcus, M. Ilieșu, D. Fernoagă, A. Miheleş, I. Grigorescu) stressed Lucian Pintilie's performance of stylistically approaching modern cinema.⁴¹ Although admitted, *Duminică la ora 6* was contrary to the memory politics of that time, which can be shown by the later restriction of film distribution, as the number of spectators in Romania remained unchanged between 1971 and 1981 at about 1,600,000.⁴²

Nevertheless, the negotiation of the past continued with the ambiguous reaction in the press. Film criticism oscillated between the stylistic renewals resulted from Pintilie's improvisation in the cinematic depiction of the resistance struggle and the confusion created by this film language itself. Pintilie's "tacit" intention to create its free scope for cinematic improvisation by emphasizing a love story, thereby avoiding the conventional subject without having to be exposed to the accusation of misrepresentation of the resistance, was addressed critically in the press. Accordingly, the lack of dramaturgical dynamics and the reduction of communist resistance to the transport of a multiplier were considered to be unacceptable. The countless flashbacks would also lead to confusion.⁴³ The disrupted cinematic narration through leitmotifs caused discontinuities and confusion, which would eventually transform the film into a "hybrid work" that was neither oriented to the "traditional" nor to the "modern", but rather reflected the director's "unfulfilled artistic ambitions."⁴⁴ Beyond "reminiscences of theatrical conventions and literacy"⁴⁵ traced back to Pintilie's film language, the film closing also drew the attention of the critics. The main protagonist's hopeless reaction to the agents of the Siguranță as well as his weakness turning him to an anti-hero, would remove any trace of optimism.⁴⁶ In this respect, the gloomy conclusion was regarded again as inappropriate for emphasizing revolutionary struggles.⁴⁷ However, the criticism of *Duminică la ora 6* was not used as a pretext for restricting the director's artistic freedom, as proved to be the case with his subsequent feature films.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*.

⁴² A possible explanation could be Pintilie's dissident attitude as well as Dan Nuțu's emigration to USA in 1979. Cf. Rîpeanu, *Filmul în România*, Vol. 1, p. 132.

⁴³ ANF, D6.: D.I. Suchianu, "Duminică șa ora 6" in *Gazeta literară*, 8, no. 4, 1966, p. 6.

⁴⁴ ANF, D6.: Tudor Caranfil, "Duminică la ora 6" in *Tribuna*, 10, no. 4, 1966, p. 7.

⁴⁵ ANF, D6.: Eugen Atanasiu, "Carnet cultural. «Duminică la ora 6»" in *România Liberă*, XXIV, no. 6609, 1966.

⁴⁶ ANF, D6.: D.I. Suchianu, "Duminică la ora 6" in *Gazeta literară*, no. 4, 1966, p. 6.

⁴⁷ ANF, D6.: Călin Căliman, "Duminică la ora 6" in *Contemporanul*, no. 5, 1966, p. 5.

CONCLUSION

The topos of communist resistance unfolded in the thawing period up to its introspective and everyday representation. This enabled new film aesthetics as well as a certain turning away from grand narratives. Consequently, the negotiation of the recent past was clearly evident on the production and visual level. The unconventional film language not only provoked the viewing habits of the audience, but also influenced the subsequent cinematic depictions of resistance. Following this pattern of introspective resistance which opened new stylistic directions, further films were shot in Romania until the mid-1970s, when action films and entertainment series attempted to overcome a certain saturation regarding this topos.

However, this critical, distance creating approach was still undesirable among representatives of the official memory politics. Moreover, in the negotiation of the recent past, Lucian Pintilie – unlike other filmmakers – generally took a different attitude towards party and cultural officials, which was not based on a consensus or compromising dialog, but on an outcry for artistic freedom:

„Then I perceived that dialog with censorship is excluded, because dialog is a vague form of normality; that aberrant situations must be aroused and exploited with coldness; and that, in general, relations of force, not of trading, must be used.“⁴⁸

This determined attitude made him appear as a controversial personality and a banned filmmaker whose films were no longer allowed in Romania until 1989.

In conclusion, the thawing period reveals opposite discourses, which can be traced back to inhibiting stabilization attempts on behalf of the political decision makers, but also to the attempt of the filmmakers to break these rigid topoi in terms of their content - if the authors experienced directly the presented period, or aesthetically - when a young generation of filmmakers emerged. In the present case it has been shown that the thawing period in Romania revealed rather an aesthetically motivated negotiation of the past and an extension of the topos of communist resistance to everyday and introspective aspects.

⁴⁸ In original: „Atunci am perceput că în relațiile cu cenzura dialogul este exclus, pentru că dialogul este o formă vetustă de normalitate, că trebuie pîndite și exploatare cu răceală situațiile aberante și că în genere trebuie folosite relații de forță, nu de tranzacționare.“ In Pintilie, „Ca un bonjourist“, p. 351.

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DER AUFSTIEG DES RECHTSPOPULISMUS IN RUMÄNIEN

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Abstract:

Die nur sehr spät entstandenen Entwicklungsstufen des modernen Nationsbildungsprozesses in Rumänien begünstigen bis heute noch die strukturellen Schwächen in Legislative, Judikative und Exekutive und den unterentwickelten staatlichen Verwaltungsapparat, durch das die Korruption der führenden politischen und wirtschaftlichen Eliten weiterhin ein aktuelles Thema bleibt. Durch die institutionellen und staatlichen Strukturprobleme, die durch Korruption begünstigt werden, bleibt das Land weiterhin rückständig und die Bevölkerung folglich arm, unzufrieden und weiterhin ungebildet, durch das der Nationalismus und Populismus, nicht nur auflebt sondern besonders attraktiv für die Bevölkerung wirkt und angesichts der internationalen politischen Spannungen eine Gefahr für die junge Demokratie bedeutet.

Keywords: *Nationalism, Populism, Right-wing, Romania, Political Party, Election 2020, Democracy, BOR,*

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EINLEITUNG

Den großen Wahlsieg von 2020 trug in Rumänien mit 9,8/9,17 %, ¹ die bis dahin komplett unbekannte Partei AUR - Bündnis für die Vereinigung der Rumänen (Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor, AUR), die eine rechtsextremistische Haltung vertritt und im Dezember 2019 von George Simion ² gegründet worden ist. Als Ursache für den Wahlsieg der ultranationalistischen Partei kann man die Pandemie, die wirtschaftlichen Schwierigkeiten Rumäniens, die politische Unzufriedenheit der Bevölkerung gegenüber der Korruption der „alten“ Parteien, die schwache Bildungspolitik und die internationalen und geopolitischen Probleme aus der umliegenden Nachbarschaft nennen. Diese sozial-politischen Stagnation sind ein Nährboden für die rechtsradikale populistische Partei gewesen, die mit fremdenfeindlichen, antisemitischen und völkischen Ansichten, die mit religiös-traditionellen Elementen verbunden werden, gegen alle Demokratisierungsbestrebungen Rumäniens ankämpft und sich bei der Bevölkerung einer zunehmenden Beliebtheit erfreut.

AUR IM AUFSTIEG

Die Erscheinung dieser Partei bleibt weiterhin mit vielen Fragen verbunden, da noch unklar ist wer diese Partei überhaupt finanziert und wie sie in nur knappen drei Monaten bei den Parlamentswahlen auf fast 10% anwachsen konnte und es vor vielen anderen etablierten Parteien ins rumänische Parlament geschafft hat, obwohl sie bei den Lokalwahlen im September 2020 gerade mal 0,99% Stimmen für die Bezirksräte, 0,43% für die Gemeinderäte und lediglich 0,29% Stimmen für die Bürgermeisterämter erzielt hatte. ³ Nach nur drei Jahren liegt sie bei den Wahlumfragen bereits bei etwa

¹ Christian Schuster, "Parlamentswahlen in Rumänien", in *Research Lab Democracy and Society in Transition*, 2020, [<https://www.donau-uni.ac.at/de/universitaet/fakultaeten/wirtschaft-globalisierung/forschung/research-lab-democracy-and-society-in-transition/demokratie-politische-kommunikation-und-politische-bildung/netpol/blog/2020/die-parlamentswahlen-in-rumaenien-2020.html>], zugegriffen 06. Januar 2021.

² Mihnea Lazăr, "Analiză. Ce este, de unde vine și ce vrea AUR, partidul de extremă dreapta care a ajuns de la puțin peste zero la pragul electoral", in *Digi24*, 2020, [<https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/politica/ce-este-de-unde-vine-si-ce-vrea-aur-partidul-de-extrema-dreapta-care-a-ajuns-de-la-putin-pest-zero-la-pragul-electoral-1413193>], zugegriffen: 10. Februar 2021.

³ *Ibd.*

20%. Über soziale Medien und Plattformen, die „als Sprachrohr Russlands und der Rumänischen Orthodoxen Kirche gelten“⁴ hat die Partei vor allem in sozial schlechteren und ärmeren Milieus und ländlichen Regionen Rumäniens, wo der Einfluss der Kirche relativ groß ist, ihre Parteianhänger gefunden, die hauptsächlich aus anti-system Bewegungen stammen, wie die Parteimitglieder selbst auch. Ihre Parteimitglieder und Anhänger stammen zum Beispiel aus Anti-Impf-Bewegung und fremdenfeindlichen oder neofaschistischen Kreisen, die gegen die ungarische Minderheit ankämpfen, Hooligans sind oder Anhänger der Legionärsbewegung Codreanu und setzen sich für die Wiedervereinigung mit Moldawien ein, um zu Großrumänien zu werden, Slogans wie Bessarabien ist Rumänien sind hierfür kennzeichnend.⁵ Angesichts der Situation in Transnistrien und der gegenwärtig sehr angespannten Verhältnisse zu Russland, dürfte das nicht unproblematisch sein. Die Partemitglieder – und Parteianhänger der AUR stammen insbesondere aus Initiativen gegen Abtreibung, gegen Homo-Ehen und vor allem aus radikalen Jugendorganisationen der Orthodoxen Kirche⁶. Problematisch wird es hierbei, da die AUR Partei zunehmende gemeinsame Ansichten und Diskurse mit der Legionärsbewegung Rumäniens zu teilen scheint. Eine weitere Enttäuschung, die mit dem Sieg dieser Partei zusammenhängt ist die Tatsache, dass viele AUR- WählerInnen aus der Diaspora stammen. Obwohl die PSD als Linke Partei schon immer einen rechtspopulistischen Diskurs besaß⁷, der nicht unüblich in postsozialistischen Ländern ist, hatte sie keine ernstzunehmende euroskeptizistische und ausländerfeindliche Haltung⁸ wie in anderen Ländern aus Mitteleuropa. AUR hingegen kann sich als rechtsextreme Partei sehr gut mit Ungarns rechtsextremistischer Partei Jobbik vergleichen, da viele Ähnlichkeiten bestehen, wie dem Wunsch Großungarn widerherzustellen, der

⁴ Christian Schuster, „Parlamentswahlen in Rumänien“

⁵ Clark, Roland, „Is fascism returning to Romania? A new Romanian radical right party is resurrecting Romania’s interwar fascism“, in *Opendemocracy*, 2020 [<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/countering-radical-right/fascism-returning-romania/>], zugegriffen 11. Februar 2021.

⁶ *Ibd.*

⁷ Ioan Stanomir, „Paradoxalul populism românesc“ in *Dilema Veche*, 2016, [<https://dilemaveche.ro/sectiune/tema-saptamanii/articol/paradoxalul-populism-romanescl>], zugegriffen: 11. februar. 2021.

⁸ George Jiglău, „Should we trust Romania at the head of the European Union council? *The conversation*“, 2019, [<https://theconversation.com/should-we-trust-romania-at-the-head-of-the-european-union-council-111294>], zugegriffen 11. Februar. 2021.

Nostalgie der Zwischenkriegszeiten, der Sympathie gegenüber den Pfeilkreuzern aus der Nazi Zeit, Antisemitismus und Ausländerfeindlichkeit und der Hass gegenüber Homosexuellen.⁹ Die Erklärung für die Erscheinung AUR's könnte in der politischen Kultur Rumäniens selbst liegen und der Spaltung innerhalb der rumänischen Gesellschaft, die zwischen modernen und antimodernen Tendenzen zerissen ist aber auch als eine 'natürliche' Reaktion seitens der 'Macht' gesehen werden kann. Autokratische Regime und illiberale Herrschaften versuchen mit allen Mitteln den Säkularisierungsprozess der Macht und die funktionale Differenzierung der Gesellschaft aufzuhalten, indem sie versuchen die Gesellschaft zu „homogenisieren“¹⁰ und sie durch Formen der Unterdrückung zu einem Einheitswillen zu zwingen, damit ihre Macht erhalten bleibt. Ähnliche Manifestationen können auch in den Befreiungsprotesten Weissrusslands, Russlands und in der Ukraine beobachtet werden, in der die autoritären Regime auf die Liberalisierungswünsche ihrer Bevölkerungen mit gewaltvollen Unterdrückungsmaßnahmen reagieren. Die Überschung ist daher nicht ganz so groß, dass AUR so viele Unterstützer gefunden hat, da der Nationalismus in Rumänien seit den 90er Jahren zugenommen hatte. 2004 beispielsweise wählten 20 % aller RumänInnen, die ultranationalistische Partei PRM (Partidul România Mare), die Partei Großrumäniens unter dem Vorsitzenden Corneliu Vadim Tudor und wie AUR auch zu einer der vier größten Parteien Rumäniens gehörte. Die nationalistischen und rechtsextremistischen Parteien wie die PRM – Partidul Romania Mare und Persönlichkeiten wie Gheorghe Funar, die den rumänischen Protochronismus¹¹ noch einmal ganz neu aufleben ließen, sind also keine Seltenheit in der rumänischen Politik. Obwohl diese Parteien und ihre Protagonisten in den letzten Jahren aus der politischen Öffentlichkeit verschwunden sind, heißt das nicht, dass auch ihre Wähler verschwunden wären. Unter Beweis stellt das nun der Wahlsieg AURS von 2020. Durch den religiösen Fanatismus, den diese Partei in ihren öffentlichen Diskursen und Parteiprogrammen vertritt, kann

⁹ Britta Schellenberg, „Karte der rechtspopulistischen und rechtsextremen Parteien in Europa“ in *Bpb*, 2017, [<https://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtspopulismus/242635/europakarte>], zugegriffen: 13. Februar 2021.

¹⁰ Stoenescu, Roxana-Alice (2020), „Homogenization Process“ in *Studia Europaea*, Vol. 2020 Nr. 2. In 375-395. DOI: 10.24193/subbeuropaea.2020.2.17.

¹¹ Anneli – Ute Gabanyi, *The Ceaușescu Cult*. București: Fundația Culturală Română. 2000, S. 32-33; Georgeta Daniela Oancea, *Mythen und Vergangenheit, Rumänien nach der Wende*. Inaugural- Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophie an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München, 2005, S. 52 ff.

vermutet werden, dass die Orthodoxe Kirche Rumäniens sie unterstütz.¹² Es ist allgemein bekannt, dass die Orthodoxe Kirche Rumäniens auf die rumänische Politik Einfluss ausübt, wie schon bei den Präsidentschaftswahlen von 2014 sichtbar wurde, als man zwischen dem ethnisch „wahren“ Rumänen (Victor Ponta) der PSD und dem „guten“ Rumänen (Klaus Johannis) der PNL differenzierte.¹³ Die Orthodoxe Kirche Rumäniens untermauert nämlich den nationalen Pantheon ethnisch, da sie sich als nationale Religion begreift und der orthodoxe Glauben als Staatsreligion (BOR, Gesetz Art. 5 (1)) verstanden wird. Diese Kollaboration wird als `Simphonia` – einem Zusammenspiel¹⁴ von Kirche und Staat bezeichnet.¹⁵ Diesen machtpolitischen Einfluss hat die Orthodoxe Kirche, weil sie keine Reformations- und Säkularisierungsprozesse erlebt hat und faktisch nicht vom Staat getrennt ist. Durch ihren autokephalen Statut wird sie als gesetzlich und juristisch autonom anerkannt (BOR Gesetz Art. 4 (2))¹⁶, was ihr erlaubt sich in politische Entscheidungsprozesse einzumischen. Vorallem nach den 90er Jahren erhielt sie aufgrund der institutionellen, politischen und ökonomischen Instabilität des Landes sehr viel Ansehen, da sie als nationaler Identitätsstifter die Einheit des rumänischen Volkes verkörpert. Aus diesem Grund wird die Orthodoxe Kirche Rumäniens auch nicht vom Staat besteuert, sondern eher durch „Spenden“ und

¹² Roxana Stoenescu, „Die langsame und ambivalente Entwicklung der Zivilgesellschaft in Rumänien“, in: Astrid Lorenz und Daniela- Maria Maris (Hg.), *Das Politische System Rumäniens. Entwicklung und Herausforderungen in Europa*, VS, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2022, S. 79-99, S. 93.

¹³ Walter Rothholz, „Anmerkungen zur politischen Kultur in Rumänien“, in *Studia Europaea*, No. 2, 33–61, 2016, [<http://studia.ubbcluj.ro/download/pdf/1018.pdf>], zugegriffen: 03. Februar 2021; Roxana-Alice Stoenescu, „Der Transformationsprozess Rumäniens und seine Hindernisse zur Demokratie“ in *Studia Europaea*, Volum: 63 Nr. 2, 21 – 54, 2018, DOI: 10.24193/subbeuropaea.2018.2.16, S. 300.

¹⁴ Raul Rognean, „Die Orthodoxe Kirche Rumäniens, der „Zöllner“ zwischen politischen Eliten und Bürgern. Wie viel institutionalisierte Kirche verträgt die politische Kommunikation“ in *Studia Europaea*, 123-140, 2017, zugegriffen: 20. März. 2017.

¹⁵ Klara A. Csiszar, „Religion in Rumänien“, in *Religionen in den Ländern der Welt*, Hrsg. Markus Porsche-Ludwig und Jürgen Bellers, 31-373, 2012, Nordhausen; Roxana-Alice Stoenescu, „Der Transformationsprozess Rumäniens und seine Hindernisse zur Demokratie“, S. 299.

¹⁶ Walter Rothholz, „Anmerkungen zur politischen Kultur in Rumänien“, in *Studia Europaea*, No. 2, 33–61, 2016, [<http://studia.ubbcluj.ro/download/pdf/1018.pdf>], zugegriffen: 03. Februar 2021

öffentlichen Staatsgeldern erhalten, vorallem um den Bau von weiteren Kirchen vortsetzen zu können. Die enge Beziehung von Kirche und Staat sehen wir an beispiele wie dem Patriarchen Miron Cristea, der Premierminister Rumäniens während der Jahre 1938-1939 war und für seine antisemitischen Haltungen bekannt ist oder an der Kollaboration des Patriarchen Teoctist mit dem Geheimdienst der Securitate.¹⁷ Auch dem populistischen PSD Parteivorsitzenden Liviu Dragnea, der wegen Wahlbetrug vorbestraft war, hat die Orthodoxe Kirche Rumäniens 2014 einen ehren Titel vergeben.¹⁸ Liviu Dragnea war nämlich ein starker Verfechter der Orthodoxen Kirche und ihrer Ansichten, spendete der Kirche viel Geld und setzte sich gegen die gleichgeschlechtliche Ehe ein und für das Konzept der traditionellen Familie.¹⁹ Vehement stellte er sich gegen die Einführung einer Versteuerungspflicht der Orthodoxen Kirche.²⁰ Der große Machtverlust der PSD Partei, die als treue Anhänger der Orthodoxen Kirche Rumäniens gelten, lassen darauf schließen, dass die Orthodoxe Kirche Rumäniens besorgt war ihren Einfluss in der Politik zu verlieren. Das plötzliche in Erscheinung treten der Partei AUR, die sich für ultranationalistische, familiäre und christliche Werte ausspricht und sich dadurch deutlich für die Interessen der Orthodoxen Kirche Rumäniens einsetzt, lässt darauf schließen, dass diese Partei auch ihre Unterstützung genießt. Der zunehmende Verlust an Ansehen der Orthodoxen Kirche Rumäniens in den letzten Jahren sind ein weiterer Grund, warum vermutet werden kann, dass hinter dieser Partei die Orthodoxe Kirche

¹⁷ Klara A. Csiszar, "Religion in Rumänien"; Tismăneanu, Vladimir (), *Comisia Prezidențială pentru analiza dictaturii comuniste din România – Raport final* [dt. *Präsidentenkommission für die Analyse der kommunistischen Diktatur in Rumänien – Endbericht*] 2006, [http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/RAPORT_FINAL_CPADCR.pdf], Bukarest, zugegriffen 18. Mai. 2016, S. 456.

¹⁸ Iran Ripan, "VIDEO Liviu Dragnea, decorat de Patriarhul Daniel. Preoții i-au cântat vicepremierului „Vrednic este!", in *Adevărul*, 2014, [https://adevarul.ro/locale/ramnicu-valcea/video-liviu-dragnea-decorat-patriarhul-daniel-preotii-i-au-cantat-vicepremierului-vrednic-este-1_543a7e780d133766a8e0a1de/index.html], zugegriffen 11. Februar 2021.

RiseProject. [<https://www.riseproject.ro/memburu/>], zugegriffen: 13. Februar 2021.

¹⁹ Christian Citre, „CCR“.

²⁰ Ibid., Zachmann, Sebastian (2014), "Dragnea, despre impozitarea afacerilor Bisericii: Nu sunt de acord să punem impozit pe credință", in *Adevărul*. [https://adevarul.ro/news/politica/dragnea-despre-impozitarea-afacerilor-bisericii-nusunt-acord-punem-impozit-credinta-1_5288af0ec7b855ff5605fa24/index.html], zugegriffen: 11. Februar 2021.

Rumäniens steht. Erklärbar wird dies, wenn man sich die Ereignisse der vergangenen Jahre wieder in Erinnerung ruft, besonders seit dem *Collectiv* Brand, als die Stellungnahme der Kirche darin bestand den Opfern die Schuld an ihrem Leid zu geben, da sie einem satanistischen Rockkonzert beigewohnt haben, anstatt zum Gottesdienst zu gehen. Die Situation verschärfte sich als die Koalition für die Familie, die mit Hilfe der Orthodoxen Kirche Rumäniens 2018 drei Millionen Unterschriften für ein Referendum gesammelt hatte, um eine Änderung der rumänischen Verfassung herbeizuzwingen, um den Begriff *Familie* durch die Begriffe von Mann und Frau definieren zu lassen.²¹ Nicht überraschend ist daher, dass der Co-Vorsitzende der AUR Partei Claudiu Târziu, während der Unterschriftenkampagne der Koalition für die Familie Mitglied im nationalen Koordinierungsrates für die Koalition war und ein Befürworter des Referendums. Auch der Senatspräsident der AUR Sorin Lavric, hat sich als Mitglied der Koalition für die Familie ebenfalls vehement für das Referendum eingesetzt.²² Die ehemalige Vertreterin der Partei im Senat, Diana Țoșoacă Ivanovici machte sich als Anwältin und Verfächterin des *Ips Teodosie*, um den Skandal des Wahllfahrtsbesuches zur Höhle des Heiligen Andreas einen Namen.²³ Erzdiözese Tomis, angeführt von Seiner Eminenz Theodosius verlangte die Absetzung der Pandemiemaßnahmen und Vorschriften, um die jährliche Wallfahrt stattfinden zu lassen.²⁴ Argumentiert wurde, dass die Pandemie-Vorschriften die Glaubens-, Gewissens-, Meinungs-, und Religionsfreiheit einschränken würden. Falls es Inffizierte nach der

²¹ Vasile Dâncu, „Familia. Înainte și după referendum“, in *Sinteza*, 2018 [<https://www.revistasinteza.ro/familia-inainte-si-dupa-referendum>], zugegriffen: 08. Februar 2021; A. Dancă, „19 milioane de români, așteptați la referendumul pentru familie“, in *Vatican News*, 2018, [<https://www.vaticannews.va/ro/mapamond/news/2018-10/referendum-familie-romania-6-7-octombrie-2018.html>], zugegriffen: 08. Februar 2021, siehe auch: Roxana Stoenescu, „Die langsame und ambivalente Entwicklung der Zivilgesellschaft in Rumänien“, S. 93.

²² Ionuț Dincă, „AUR, un partid „de familie“: Ce „nepotisme“ sunt la Brașov“, in *Bună ziua Brașov*, 2020, [<https://bzb.ro/stire/aur-un-partid-de-familie-ce-nepotisme-sunt-la-brasov-a157665>], zugegriffen: 11. Februar. 2021.

²³ Mihnea Lazăr, „Analiză.

²⁴ Cristina Antal, „Ips Teodosie, fost securist, vrea pelerinaj, fara restrictii, in Ziarul de Investigatii, 2020, [<https://zin.ro/21/11/2020/romania-nasilor/ips-teodosie-fost-securist-vrea-pelerinaj-fara-restrictii/>], zugegriffen 13. Dezember 2023

Wallfahrt geben sollte, werde seine Eminenz alle heilen.²⁵ Deutlich sichtbar wird hierdurch wie eng die Partei AUR mit den ultrakonservativen und religiös – traditionellen Interessen der Orthodoxen Kirche Rumäniens verflochten ist. Das Referendum für die Verfassungsänderung, um den Begriff der Familie umzudefinieren wurde abgelehnt, da sich die Europäische Kommission²⁶ und viele internationale Organisationen, in die Debatte einbrachten und diesen Vorschlag als diskriminierend und als Verstoß gegen die Menschenrechte erachteten. Die extrem konservative, religiöse, homophobe und diskriminierende Haltung der Parteien, Kirche und einem Teil der rumänischen Gesellschaft brachte weitere Anspannungen hervor und entbrannte noch einmal in einem Konflikt als gesetzlich beschlossen werden sollte, ob Kindern im Jugendalter bzw. Jugendlichen Sexualkunde unterrichtet werden sollte. Diesem Gesetzesvorschlag widersetzte sich die Orthodoxe Kirche Rumäniens massiv, da es entgegen der kirchlichen Moral wäre Kinder im Jugendalter aufzuklären.²⁷ Als das Gesetz, mit der Bedingung, dass die Eltern ihren Kindern ein Einverständnis zur Teilnahme an dem Sexualkundeunterricht geben müssen, doch eingeführt werden sollte²⁸, wurde 2020 ein neuer Gesetzesvorschlag seitens der rechtspopulistischen PMP vorgelegt – Partidul Mișcarea Populară/ Partei der Volksbewegung. Dieser Gesetzesvorschlag verlangte, dass jedwelche Inhalte oder Bedeutungen, zum Thema Gender aus allen öffentlichen Bildungseinrichtungen, wie etwa Schulen oder Universitäten verboten werden sollen. 81 Senatoren der PSD, ProRomânia

²⁵ Cătălin Schipor, În plină criză de coronavirus, ÎPS Teodosie a împărtășit peste 100 de persoane cu aceeași linguriță, in *Libertatea*, 2020, [<https://www.libertatea.ro/stiri/ips-teodosie-a-impartasit-pest-100-de-persoane-cu-aceeasi-lingurita-ce-le-a-cerut-biserica-enoriasilor-care-se-tem-de-transmiterea-virusului-pe-aceasta-cale-2915358>], zugegriffen 13. Dezember 2023.

²⁶ Europäische Kommission, *Berichte über Bulgarien und Rumänien im Rahmen des Kooperations- und Kontrollverfahren*, 2018, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/MEMO_18_6363], zugegriffen: 10. 02. 2021.

²⁷ Anghel Gheorghe (2020), "Patriarhia Română a militat pentru caracterul opțional în școli al orelor de educație pentru viață", in *Basilica.Ro*, [<https://basilica.ro/patriarhia-romana-a-militat-pentru-caracterul-optional-in-scoli-al-orelor-de-educatie-pentru-viata/>], zugegriffen 10. Februar. 2021.

²⁸ Galescu Laura, "Legea a fost promulgata: orele de educatie pentru viata si sanatatea, inclusiv educatia sexuala, vor fi obligatorii". *Portalînvoățăământ*. [<https://www.portalinvatamant.ro/articole/legi-25/legea-a-fost-promulgata-orele-de-educatie-pentru-viata-si-sanatate-inclusiv-educatie-sexuala-vor-fi-obligatorii-in-scoli-9277.html>], zugegriffen 10.Februar 2021

und PMP stimmten dafür, 22 stimmten, seitens der USR und UDMR dagegen, und 27 seitens der PNL enthielten sich.²⁹ Durch solch ein Gesetz wäre der demokratische Rechtsstaat angegriffen worden, da man die Grundrechte der Gleichheit aber auch die Achtung der Gewissens-, Meinungs-, und Ausdrucksfreiheit missachtete und neben der Diskriminierung der Frau und der LGBT Community, ganze Fächer und Themen aus dem gesamten Bildungs- und vorallem Hochschulbereich streichen müsste, durch dass viele Lehrkräfte ihre Arbeitsstellen verloren hätten. Auch dieser Gesetzesvorschlag wurde ende Dezember abgelehnt.³⁰

Dieser Kampf zwischen Reformen und Konservatismus mündete in weitere heftige Diskussionen, die die Kirche zunehmend kritisierten und damit die rumänische Gesellschaft erneut zwischen modernen und antimodernen und religiös-traditionellen Tendenzen spaltete. Während der Pandemie wurde die Kirche erneut heftigst kritisiert, da sie durch die rituellen Praktiken beim Gottesdienst die hygienischen und gesundheitlichen Vorkehrungen nicht beachtete, die in der Pandemie-Zeit vorgeschrieben worden sind und damit ihre Gläubigen einer erhöhten Ansteckungs- und Infektionsgefahr mit Covid-19 aussetzte.³¹ Kürzlich geriet die Orthodoxe Kirche Rumäniens wieder in ein schweres Gefecht mit der Gesellschaft, da bei einer Taufe ein Säugling ums Leben gekommen ist, die Kirche aber ihre veralteten Praktiken in keinsterweise ändern oder reformieren möchte.³²

²⁹ Andreea Pora, „Parlamentul interzice teoriile despre identitatea de gen. Reacții: de la „poliția gândirii“ la „e ca în Evul Mediu“, in *Europa Libera Romania*, 2020, [<https://romania.europalibera.org/a/parlamentul-interzice-teoriile-despre-identitatea-de-gen-reac%C8%9Bii-de-la-poli%C8%9Bia-g%C3%A2ndirii-la-e-ca-%C3%AEn-evul-mediu-/30675861.html>], zugegriffen 09. Februarie 2021.

³⁰ Christian Citre, „CCR: Legea care interzice orice referire la identitatea de gen în școli este neconstituțională“, in *G4Media*, 2020 [https://www.g4media.ro/ccr-legea-care-interzice-orice-referire-la-identitatea-de-gen-in-scoli-este-neconstituționala.html?fbclid=IwAR3_RTEYmk27nGrQgTB2R1WCvFTFtLpED_KCcAve3l8US9qZd9lJkgVvpiM], zugegriffen: 10. Februar. 2021.

³¹ Kati Molnar, „Covid-19. Rumänien: Orthodoxe Gottesdienste als Gefahr in Corona Zeiten“, in *MDR Aktuell*, 2020, [<https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/osteuropa/land-leute/rumaenien-orthodoxe-gottesdienste-als-corona-party-100.html>], zugegriffen 10. Februar 2021.

³² Müller-Heinze, „Tod von Baby löst Diskussion um Taufritual aus“, in *MDR Aktuell*, 2021, [https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/osteuropa/rumaenien-taufe-orthodox-kirche-baby-stirbt-100.html?fbclid=IwAR2eyQwVYmeGQ8ZVUpbCoqWfR1yJnZwzmInlUC1E_UzQbJ4fazbni73q1C8], zugegriffen 25. Februar 2021.

ERGEBNISSE DER PARLAMENTSWAHLEN 2020

Das positive an den Parlamentswahlen von 2020, ist die Tatsache, dass trotz des Wahlsieg der PSD und einer extremistischen Partei, Rumänien das erste Mal von einem Parteienpluralismus sprechen kann, da die Mehrheitsentscheidung nach über 30jährigen Transformationsprozess nicht mehr nur ausschließlich von der Ex-Nomenklatura, der PSD und ihren abgespaltenen populistischen Schwesternparteien bestimmt werden kann. Bisher wurden alle gesetzlichen und politischen Entscheidungen in den beiden Kammern Rumäniens, trotz formaler Parteien-Koalitionen, mehrheitlich immer von der Nomenklatura entschieden, die vorallem von der PSD getragen wurde, da sie der ehemaligen PDSR- Sozialistische Partei Rumäniens, die sich von der FSN – Front der Nationalen Rettung Ion Iliescu löste und ihre Wurzeln in der ehemaligen PCR – Kommunistischen Partei Rumäniens hat. Sicherlich rekrutiert auch die PNL Partei weiterhin noch viele Mitglieder aus den Reihen der PSD und besteht selbst auch noch aus vielen Kadern, allerdings ist die proeuropäische Ausrichtung der PNL Partei und ihre Zugehörigkeit zur EVP immer noch eine Garantie für die Wahrung des demokratischen Rechtsstaates. Die geringe Wahlbeteiligung der 2020er Wahlen bedeutete eine Niederlage für die rumänische Demokratie und war für die gesamte rumänische zivilgesellschaftliche und oppositionelle Bewegung eine große Enttäuschung, da nach all den erbitterten Kämpfen und dem großen zivilgesellschaftlichen Engagment der vergangenen sechs Jahre, kaum Wählerinnen und Wähler, junge Menschen und die eigentliche Trägerschaft der neuen Generationen sich an der Wahl beteiligt haben. Einige gaben der Pandemie die Schuld für die geringe Wahlbeteiligung³³ andere der Missmut über die politische Lage, andere wiederum der fehlenden politischen Bildung oder dem fehlenden Interesse an der Politik. Dem kann zum Teil zugestimmt werden, andererseits stellen die Parlamentswahlen, um über das Zweikammernsystem Rumäniens zu entscheiden, eigentlich die wichtigsten Wahlen dar. Dieser Wahlgang bestimmt nämlich die gesamte legislativ und damit gesetzgebende Gewalt, die bisher immer in der Macht der PSD lag, so wird nun auch besser verständlich, warum in den letzten Jahren Reformschritte und Demokratisierungsprozesse kaum voran gekommen sind. Die PSD- Partei hatte kein Interesse daran, Gesetze vorzulegen, die das Land modernisieren und demokratisieren würden, da ihre Macht sonst schwinden würde. Ebenso wenig ist sie daran interessiert

³³ Christian Schuster, "Parlamentswahlen in Rumänien".

die Parlamentswahlen durch Wahlkampagnen zu bewerben. Die Parlamentswahlen sind daher die einzigen Wahlen in Rumänien für die kaum sichtbare Wahlkampagne mit riesigen Bannern, Flyern, Broschüren, Konferenzen, Präsentationen der Kandidaten gemacht werden. Das bedeutet, dass für eine mehrheitlich politisch ungebildete Gesellschaft, die Parlamentswahlen weitgehend bedeutungslos und als unwichtig erscheinen. Die Mehrheit der rumänischen Bevölkerung ist sich nicht einmal bewusst, dass der Präsident eine sehr eingeschränkte und eher repräsentative Funktion für die Innenpolitik Rumäniens einnimmt und dass der Premierminister, die eigentlichen exekutiven Befugnisse hat. Das Verständnis der Funktionsweise des Parlamentes, bleibt der rumänischen Bevölkerung daher, so gut wie völlig unbekannt, wenn man bedenkt, dass dies eine Gesellschaft ist, die 100 Jahre unter Diktatur, autoritären Regimen und Einparteienherrschaften gelebt hat. Ein weiterer Grund für die geringe Wahlbeteiligung liegt auch in dem schweren Zugang zu den Informationsplattformen dieser Wahlen, um Daten, Personen und Informationen zu und über die vorgeschlagenen Kandidaten zu erlangen. Man muss teilweise alle Kandidaten der Wahllisten auf jeder Plattform einzeln heraussuchen oder über das Facebook auf einzelne Profile klicken, zu denen es oftmals kaum oder nur sehr oberflächliche Informationen gibt. Das ist zum einen sehr Zeitaufwendig und zum anderen sehr unübersichtlich und unzugänglich. Der wichtigste Grund für die geringe Wahlbeteiligung liegt darin, dass man für die eigentlich wichtigsten Wahlen Rumäniens nur in den lokalen Wahlrunden wählen darf, wo der Wohnsitz eingetragen ist. Nun haben aber viele berufstätige Personen, Pendlerinnen oder Studentinnen, die in anderen Städten als ihrem Heimats- oder Geburtsort arbeiten oder studieren und in Miete leben, nicht immer einen geregelten Wohnsitzstatut, da viele Mieterinnen keinen steuerpflichtigen Mietvertrag von ihrem Vermieter erhalten. Ohne Mietvertrag kann man aber seinen aktuellen Wohnsitz oder den Arbeitsaufenthalt bei der Polizei nicht anmelden. Folglich kann man ohne seinem angemeldeten Wohnsitz mit dem einfachen Ausweis nicht in der Stadt wählen, in der man sich gerade befindet. Aus diesem Grund konnten am Sonntag dem 06. Dezember 2020 ein Großteil der rumänischen und vorallem berufstätigen oder studierenden Bevölkerungsgruppe nicht wählen gehen, da die meisten keine Ummeldung ihres Wohnsitzes haben. Hieraus wird nun deutlich, dass nicht zwingend die politische Teilnahmelosigkeit an der geringen Wahlbeteiligung der Grund für die große Abwesenheit der Wählerinnen gewesen sein muss, sondern viel eher die

gesetzlichen Regelungen dieses Wahlverfahrens (Gesetz Nr 35. Art. 8 13. März 2008), der vielen Wählern die Möglichkeit ihrer Stimmabgabe vereitelt hat. So wird auch verständlich, warum die Mehrheit der zur Wahl gegangenen Bevölkerung eher ältere Personen waren, die in ihren Heimatstädten oder Privathäusern leben und ihren Wohnsitz nicht geändert haben.

ABSCHLUß

Wie man deutlich sehen konnte versucht die etablierte Macht Rumäniens die beginnenden Reformprogressse der Opposition weitgehend einzudämmen, indem sie mit einer Partei reagierte, die nichts anderes als Gewalt propagiert und dabei die Unterdrückung und Zertsörung demokratischer Rechtstaatlichkeit verfolgt. Gefordert wird die Abschaffung der Freiheit und Gleichheit , indem gesellschaftliche Minderheiten- und politisch, ethnisch, religiöse, soziale oder andere Gruppen unterdrückt, verboten oder ausgegrenzt werden sollen. Motiviert wird das über politisch- ideologische Leitsätze, die mit religös-kulturellen Gehalten vermengt werden und als „politische Religion“ verstanden werden kann. Hierdurch sollen die Demokratisierungsprozesse der EU und innerhalb der Gesellschaft Rumäniens aufgehhalten werden, um den eigenen Einfluss möglichst lange noch erhalten zu können.

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ON MERCENARIES IN WORLD POLITICS

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Abstract:

The purpose of the present paper is to emphasize the way mercenaries integrated in the world politics. It offers an overview of the historical context, highlighting short details about the early appearance of mercenary troops who, although not yet bearing that name, acted in the same way. What is more, it pursues the evolution of mercenaries from their very beginning to the contemporary era, making a short stop to the Middle Ages, and then to the pre-modern period. Furthermore, it describes the metamorphosis of mercenaries in the contemporary period, giving birth to the new 'dogs of war' under different names. However, these transformations came with behavioural changes as well. They changed their attitude and their chaotic actions on the battlefield, fulfilling, sometimes, a different role, but for the same purpose, which labelled them as 'new mercenaries' from the outset.

Keywords: *mercenaries, world politics, condottieri, war, army, professional soldiers, Private Military Corporations.*

THE ORIGIN OF MERCENARIES

Ever since ancient times, the presence of mercenaries was discussed in different corners of the planet. Often, it was mentioned that they practice "the second oldest occupation in the world"¹, being part of the history of wars since its inception. Even without explicitly naming them *mercenaries*, they were acting

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¹ Sarah Percy, "Mercenaries", *Military History*, 2013, <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199791279/obo-9780199791279-0105.xml>. [accessed on November 20, 2023].

the same manner as those who are catalogued in this way today, but their description changed with the passage of time. Generally speaking, the mercenaries were those specially trained soldiers who took part in hostilities during wars in return for material benefits.²

Their origin dates back to the period before our era. Ever since, the leaders of the great empires hired people to join their own army to make it stronger in wars. The earliest evidence of the presence of mercenaries dates back to 1469 before Christ (from now on, BC), during the First Megiddo Battle.³ This battle ended with the victory of the Egyptians in front of the rebel groups and with the conquest of Megiddo, which lies north of Palestine, result that led to the establishment of the Egyptian empire in southwest Asia. The rebel group was, in fact, an alliance of 330 Syrian and Palestinian princes, under the command of King Kadesh, of the *Mitanni* group.⁴ For sure, in order to win such a battle, the Egyptian army must have been enormous, even proportionate to the Egyptian population at that time. The mercenaries' participation in this conflict was deduced by historians from the fact that such an army could not have been constituted only by Egyptian volunteers, but that the pharaoh would have had to "hire a part of his army from non-Egyptian sources."⁵

Among the mercenaries who had fought for the Egyptians, the group that could have been identified was the *Sherden* group (or Sea Peoples, Peoples of the Sea), who came from all over Anatolia. They were recognized by archaeologists by the equipment they used, which was different from that of the Egyptian soldiers of that time. *Sherden* mercenaries, besides armour, helmets and shields, differentiated themselves from the common soldiers by their swords, which were made especially for them. These were straight, sharp, cast iron, unlike those of the Egyptian soldiers, which were copper and curved. The metal for their swords was hard to find in Egypt at that time, which made their import imminent.⁶

² Ulrich Petersohn, "The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security Companies on Civil War Severity between 1946 and 2002", *International Interactions*, 2014, p. 191, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.880699, [accessed on December 9, 2023].

³ Alan Axelrod, *Mercenaries: A Guide to Private Armies and Private Military Companies*, Los Angeles: Sage, 2014, pp. 9-10.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 12-14.

The weapon used by the *Sherden* fighters can indicate that they were not specifically used for defence, but rather, their purpose was the attack. They were considered much more capable and more efficient than the Egyptian soldiers, which placed them in the category of the military elite of the time.

Later, there was some evidence that one of the most famous names in history who used the help of these paid fighters to win different wars was King Alexander the Great, who was among the world's first military strategists and leaders. In the 4th century BC, in the great war between Greece and the Persian Empire, other evidence of mercenaries' existence appeared. Alexander the Great had at his disposal a large number of Greek soldiers, specially trained, having well-developed combat skills, who fought in this war alongside the Macedonian king's army. But in the same war, other mercenaries, of Greek nationality as well, could be found on the other side of the barricade. Under the command of the Persian army leader, they fought against Alexander the Great in return for rewards.⁷ Often, Greek mercenary troops were hired by the opposing parties in the conflict, so for them there was nothing out of the ordinary to fight against their co-nationals.

In the third and second centuries BC, the presence of mercenaries was felt in the Punic Wars (called *Punic* according to the name given by the Romans to the Carthaginians, namely the *Punics*) carried between Rome and Carthage. Although all three wars were won by the Romans, the first two were extremely balanced. In the first war, Xanthippus, the leader of the Carthaginians "did not only lead the army of Greek mercenaries but also trained other Carthaginian forces."⁸ Due to this good military training, even if the war ended with the victory of the Roman Empire, it exhausted both parts. In the Second War, Hannibal raised an army of 50,000 mercenaries from northern Africa and Spain, with whom he crossed the Alps, to northern Italy.⁹ In spite of the difficulties encountered on the way, because of the weather in the Alps, or due to the fighters from the tribes they passed by, his army, rather than falling, increased its number, succeeding in attracting these hostile fighters to his army, in return for benefits. Despite this, Hannibal's powerful army was defeated by the Romans.

⁷ John France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008, p. 1.

⁸ Alan Axelrod, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 26-28.

Both the Romans and the Spartans carefully selected their soldiers. They prioritized the principle that an army should be made of “only the strongest and the most disciplined”¹⁰ people. In general, the ancient armies were stricter in recruitment. Therefore, the most important thing was that the soldiers had special training, which would give them an advantage in the army's struggle, which led to a predilection for mercenaries, developed by the military leaders of that time.

Beginning with the fifth century after Christ (AC from now on), in the Roman Empire arises the question *how can the mercenaries differentiate themselves from the other fighters in the armed forces?* The Romans set two terms to identify mercenaries: *conducticius* and *miles mercenarius*¹¹, and the meaning depended on the context in which it was used. Both terms mean payment for employment, but these terms have not been used much. It is certain that the men recruited in the Roman army (or any foreign armies to the country of origin of the fighters), who were paid salaries or other benefits, could be described as mercenaries.

From the 9th-10th centuries the character of Hungarian nomadic mercenaries began to be highlighted.¹² They have acquired from their ancestors' different skills that helped them in practicing this profession. Even if no specific terms were used to denote the job the first Hungarians practiced, they were mercenaries in the true sense of the word. They used to fight in exchange for a material gaunt, especially in exchange for precious metals such as gold or silver. Even if they were to take hostages, they did not use them as slaves, because it would have made it difficult for them to live and achieve their goals, but they did not kill them either, only to enjoy taking a human life, but they used to think rationally from an economic point of view. In return, the Hungarians preferred to ask for rewards, usually money.¹³

The fact that they fought as mercenaries flashed perfectly on their way of organizing the military. The financial reward was given to them as a gratitude for the quality military service. Even though their payments were often made

¹⁰ Kelly DeVries, “Medieval Mercenaries Methodology, Definitions, and Problems”, in John France (ed.), *op. cit.*, p.44.

¹¹ Bernard S. Bachrach, “Merovingian Mercenaries and Paid Soldiers in Imperial Perspective”, in John France (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 174.

¹² Charles R. Bowlus, “The Early Hungarians as Mercenaries: 860–955”, in John France (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 194-195.

¹³ *Ibidem.*

of gifts or benefits, it was clear that they were a military force hired and paid.¹⁴ Like other mercenaries of that time, the Hungarians used to practice robberies to secure their livelihood.

Hiring mercenaries has proven to be more economically efficient than sacrificing their own soldiers during fights. At that time, there were not many independent armed forces¹⁵, and this situation forced the leaders to turn to the common people. By requiring craftsmen or shepherds to participate in armed conflicts for the empire they were part of had no advantage, and more, it led to various losses. On the one hand, their production was lost throughout the battlefield. Loss of production could be long-term and often cost more than the wages paid to mercenaries for fighting. On the other hand, the army was not as strong as the quantity selection of the soldiers did not exclude inexperienced men in the use of weapons or in respecting war tactics and strategies. In addition, mercenaries trained on their own, being professional warriors, and they were never felt any pressure by the weight of the name they were fighting for, but only the reward that would follow.

The importance of having as many soldiers as possible in an army is indisputable, but any military force, in order to claim war gain, needed a qualitative nucleus, made up of military elites, more specifically – the mercenaries, who were trained for to act mercilessly against the opponents.

Since the 12th century, most of the soldiers were paid. They served their superiors in the obligation. Many of them were simple ordinary people, and could not be described as mercenaries, lacking the necessary military training. Beginning with this period, the pay for the armies of the great empires was introduced, which were experiencing a substantial increase, leaving behind what mercenaries valued for them just a few centuries ago.¹⁶

All in all, since their very first appearance, mercenaries have fulfilled the same role, regardless of the historical period we refer to. First, they were recruited by various foreign armies who wanted to protect their own soldiers in difficult struggles or lacking specialized military force, then they were placed on battlefields in exchange for money or personal benefits to contribute to the armies' success.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ Keith Suter, "Mercenaries in Warfare", *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 287, Nr. 1674, 2005, p. 29.

¹⁶ John France, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-11.

MEDIEVAL MERCENARIES: CONDOTTIERI

In the Middle Ages, as in previous times, mercenaries' presence was felt in wars and not only. In this age, mercenaries were defined by notions such as "paid" or "foreigner", but not all soldiers of different origin who were paid could have been called *mercenaries*.

One of the most famous mercenary groups of the Middle Ages was the *Varangian Guard* of the Byzantine army. This was composed of former Scandinavian, or exiled Vikings. This guard fought for the Byzantine Empire in Anatolia, in the Holy Land, Bulgaria, Sicily, etc.¹⁷ Also, the Byzantine emperors used a common practice among the Romans: to employ mercenaries in imperial guards. These were usually very well received in the Byzantine Empire.¹⁸

In the 13th and 15th centuries Italy, there was a change in the way of recruiting and organizing the armies. The prolonged fights of that period determined the alteration of the Italian armies, especially those in Milan, Florence and Venice. In this context, there was a growing need to employ Free Companies¹⁹, made up of foreign professional fighters, to complete the armies found in a visible force loss and numerical decrease. The Italian state hired mercenaries through contracts, known as the Italian *condotte*. These contracts dated back to the 13th century and involved a formal written agreement between the employer and the employee on the terms of the service provided. This included information on payment and duration of services, number of fighters, type of fighters' equipment.²⁰ The payment was often made monthly, and the duration of the employment was at that time of six months, with the possibility of renewing the contract. These contracts also stipulated some additional terms, such as doubling the wage payments for "significant victories".²¹ The contracts were different in length and content, depending on

¹⁷ Irina-Maria Manea, „Faimoasa gardă de vikingi din Constantinopol”, *Historia.ro*, [f.a.], <https://historia.ro/sectiune/portret/faimoasa-garda-de-vikingi-din-constantinopol-580962.html>. [accessed on December 8, 2023].

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ David Nicolle, *Italian Medieval Armies: 1300- 1500*, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1983, p. 14.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

²¹ Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology*, Vol. 1, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 416.

the groups with which they were concluded, and their content evolved over time.

Condotta in aspetto (or the apparent contract) allowed the mercenaries' captain to work a long-term job with an employer, "with the right to fight elsewhere during the armistice, provided that he returned when called."²² *Condotta ad provisionem* did not provide an exact number of the brigade, but allowed the captain to determine it according to his own perceptions. The second type of *condotta* was used in the second half of the 15th century.²³

By signing these contracts, the mercenaries who took part in wars to help the Italians were given the name of *condottieri*, very famous at that time. The Encyclopaedia Britannica defined them as "leaders of a group of mercenaries hired to fight in many wars among the Italian states from the mid-14th century to the 16th century. The name derives from *condotta*, or *contract*, through which *condottieri* have put themselves in the service of a city or a lord."²⁴ The first Italian mercenary armies were formed, in particular, by foreign fighters. At the beginning of the 14th century, they were made up of Catalans and French, who fought in the southern wars. In the middle of the same century, the armies were mainly formed by Germans and Hungarians. By the end of the century, the Italians began to mobilize more and more mercenary armies, and *condottieri* began to conquer territories for themselves.²⁵

Under the command of the captains of the *condottieri* troops, there were also ordinary soldiers who fought, who formed a cavalry almost entirely armoured and were recognized for their disordered and greedy characters. In the absence of other purposes than personal gains, they could have also been classified as mercenaries. *Condottieri* armies often changed the parts they fought for, and their battles often led to bloodshed. Some cities in Italy, such as Milan or Venice, offered long-term employment contracts for mercenaries, starting to recruit them during the peace periods.²⁶

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ Mansur G. Abdullah *et al.*, "Italian History", *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, [f.a.], <http://www.britannica.com/topic/condottiere> [accessed on December 8, 2023].

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ David Nicolle, *op. cit.*

Within the *condottieri* troops, there were not only foreigners fighting. Certainly, the number of fighters across borders exceeded that of the Italians, but it was gradually changing. Foreigners were becoming less numerous, while Italian soldiers began to specialize in the art of war. The first Italians enlisted in mercenary armies were rural nobles whose contribution was overlooked by researchers.²⁷

These mercenaries have become indispensable on the battlefield. More and more Italian army leaders filled their units with specially trained soldiers who did not show any kind of mercy on the battlefields. For those who hired them, it was not important that they were not disciplined at all, or that the combat mode of the *condottieri* was extremely disordered, but they rather emphasized the fearless character of the fighters and the results they produced in the battles. For employers it counted that fights ended in their favour, regardless of the means used by mercenaries or their behaviour during the wars.

The lack of remorse and relaxation with which mercenaries treated the atrocities themselves produced in wartime were the results of exhausting training, both physical and mental, which helped them become experts in dealing with the most dangerous weapons and freed them from any kind of rebuking the consciousness that could arise from the actions they undertook.

It was known that mercenaries, *condottieri* in this case, were considered "soldiers-for-hire"²⁸, which meant they only fought for rewards, which were often offered in cash. The form of payment and the amount of the salary was stipulated in the *condotta*. Some *condottieri*, in the 15th century, aspired to another kind of reward. They have applied for and have been granted citizenship from the states that have hired them. Once they became citizens of those states, they were being respected by society, which then allowed them to apply for administrative functions of the state.²⁹

For some fighters, the aspiration to leadership positions was natural, following the efforts they made for the Italian states. Despite the fact that many of them were illiterate, because they were born in poverty and became mercenaries of extremely young age to survive, they managed to become

²⁷ Clifford J. Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 417.

²⁸ Mark Fulloon, "Private Military Companies: The New Condottieri", *Social Alternatives*, Vol. 32, Nr. 1, 2013, p. 50.

²⁹ David Murphy, *Condottiere 1300-1500: Infamous Medieval Mercenaries*, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007, p. 54.

leaders. This was the case with the Sforza family. Their dynasty began with Muzio Attendolo, later known as Sforza. It came from a relatively poor and illiterate family. Due to its qualities as a fighter and imposing power both in front of its opponents and in front of its own army, it has come to the leadership of the most powerful and successful *condottieri* troops in Italy. The profession of the family was continued by his son, Francesco Sforza. Through his mercenary skills and forced marriage to the daughter of one of the most influential Italians of the time, he became the Duke of Milan in 1450.³⁰ So even though the Sforza family members came from a rather hostile environment, Francesco became the leader one of Italy's most powerful city-states.

Condottieri were not simple mercenaries, and their dismissal was difficult. Relationships between them, their leaders and employers were extremely complex. They constantly evolved in terms of equipment, tactics, or way of waging, therefore, the rulers preferred to have them in their armies. Political leaders and ordinary people from different Italian city-state have found a more effective method of hiring *condottieri* troops to fight in their wars because, this way, they could engage in trade.

In other terms, even if *condottieri* were appreciated and accepted by societies inside Italy because they were an important piece in the Italian armies, there were also important personalities who criticized the presence of foreign mercenaries enrolled in the Italian city-state armies of the Peninsula. The most prominent name that opposes the general trend of believing that "soldiers to rent" represented the piece of resistance of the army was the great philosopher, diplomat and Italian politician Niccolo Machiavelli. In his famous work, "The Prince", he has spoken of the fact that mercenaries were dangerous and not trustworthy, noting that they "were not afraid of God, nor keep their word to men."³¹ He stated that if a mercenary was talented, he would always try to increase his power "either by defeating you who are his master, or by knocking others off without your will."³² If the mercenary turned out to be incompetent, it would ruin the prince through unnecessary expenses.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 55.

³¹ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Bucharest: Mondero, 1999, p. 47.

³² *Ibidem*.

Continuing with the idea that independence and self-sufficiency really means security, Machiavelli asserted that dependence on foreign troops could lead to the decline of the prince's power.³³ His ideas in this direction were drawn in the context of an Italian state who put its fate in the hands of foreign mercenaries, these being widely used in the peninsula, and the results were often disastrous.

Moreover, the Italian philosopher accused foreign mercenaries of the lack of soldier spirit to defend their own lands and homes. In his opinion, these fighters were lazy, seeking just the easiest way to get money, whether or not it brought benefits to the state that hired them. By continually changing the barricades, mercenaries demonstrated that they were not trustworthy, because if they were in the service of a state only for money, they could work at any time for the opponents of the prince who had initially hired them. Their greed and infidelity was perceived by Machiavelli, who said that "as enemies rob you in time of war, these armies rob you in peacetime."³⁴

In his writings, Machiavelli harshly criticized the foreign mercenaries in the peninsula. His criticisms were based on the exaggerated use by the Italian leaders of the army of these military elites, which have gradually replaced the national armies. From his point of view, "all the misfortunes of [...] Italy have no other cause than the fact that it has long supported only mercenary armies."³⁵

Mercenaries were very popular in the Middle Ages, especially during the Renaissance. The most famous were *condottieri*, sophisticated professional soldiers, who spent their entire life serving different employers. Criticizing them was commonplace, but it was not always well founded, because most of them were very successful and loyal to their employers.

THE ROLE OF MERCENARIES IN PRE-MODERN WARS

From the mid-17th century to the early 20th century, inter-state wars in Europe were relatively short, with a few exceptions. During this premodern period, both parties wanted to resolve their dispute through a struggle that would lead to peaceful negotiations. Napoleon and Moltke the Young have perfected a form of war based on the concentration of forces in time and space.

³³ *Ibidem.*

³⁴ *Ibidem.*

³⁵ *Ibidem.*

“The war was both declared and concluded in accordance with certain rules.”³⁶ It began with a declaration of war and ended with a peace agreement. Unlike these, the new wars are not characterized by concentration but by the dispersion of forces in time and space.

As in previous centuries, mercenary military elites played key roles in various wars of the pre-modern era. Their involvement in the wars was based on the wars trade, especially by advancing technology that has helped them to build better weapons and trade or traffic them across borders; and the internationalization of violence. Hiring mercenaries was becoming more natural for conflict states.

Civilian administrations have sought to enter into a contractual relationship with “small units of professional soldiers.”³⁷ The aim of this collaboration was to get higher benefits for the members of the public administration as once these arrangements came into operation, they had greater control over the armed forces of the state by appointing their own officers. In this way, the state authority extended beyond military issues, which made mercenary armies become permanent armed forces of the contracting states. The practice of stopping working with professional soldiers at each end of the campaign and then re-naming them for a new campaign has proven to be extremely costly. The most convenient way to manage, from a financial point of view, was to turn the paid armed forces into permanent army.

It was tried to replace mercenary armies with armies made up of national soldiers. The introduction of uniforms has had a positive effect on them, helping to impose a unitary identity. This was a powerful impetus, making it possible for the soldiers to be massively subordinated. But in order to become a powerful army, it was necessary for the soldiers to meet certain requirements,

³⁶ Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005, p. 11. For details on the transformation of war or the “new wars”, see also Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999; Laura M. Herța, “Aspecte ale sociologiei și analizei relațiilor internaționale. Dihotomia războaie noi – războaie vechi” in Liviu Țîrău, Ștefan Melancu (eds.), *Interferențe euro-atlantice*, Cluj-Napoca: EFES, 2013, pp. 444-456; Laura M. Herța, “Hybrid Warfare – A Form of Asymmetric Conflict”, in *International Conference Knowledge-Based Organization*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, 2017, “Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy Publishing House, Sibiu, pp. 135-143.

³⁷ Christopher Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security. The rise of private military companies*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2006, p. 35.

imposing something more than military capabilities. In this context, it was noted that in order to achieve military objectives, specific training was needed, concluding that mercenaries were perfectly adapted to any military situation.

In order to be able to develop their skills and build new abilities, mercenaries needed special and specialized training, both physically and mentally. Physical training focused on resistance and pain management, and psychic skills on the ability to make accurate decisions as quickly as possible under stress conditions. Typically, the training was “miserable, uncomfortable and exhausting.”³⁸

In addition to regular and guerrilla exercises, which were considered primitive, there were also shock training exercises. These were intense and brutal, managing to mark their executioners for life. There were even middle-aged children participating in these trainings that taught them “to cut heads easily and enthusiastically”³⁹, turning them into warriors, like child soldiers. Here they first entered the process of indoctrination, psychological training and familiarity with the environment in which they would practice.

Normally, shock trainings, because of the intensity, should be done over a short period of time, about a few weeks, not a few months, because too much weight is lost if it lasts for a long time.

The shock phase is just the beginning. Acquiring and refining the skills of a mercenary must develop into a life-long regime. For professionals, the learning process never stops. They build their training system based on this initial learning phase.⁴⁰

Also during the pre-modern period, the wars were industrialized. New types of increasingly dangerous weapons were created, such as the hydrogen bomb.⁴¹ Army sizes have increased, but their deployment as well as the “supplies” needed for a campaign were still limited. Despite limitations of any kind, states began to focus more on national soldiers reaching some millions, so the use of mercenaries in the wars became irrelevant.⁴² Industrialization has increased the scale of the war to an unprecedented level, which has led to the elimination of mercenary forces in state security until the end of the Cold War.

³⁸ Paul Balor, *Manual of the Mercenary Soldier: A Guide to Mercenary War, Money, and Adventure*, Boulder: Paladin Press, 1988, pp. 30-32.

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁴¹ Christopher Kinsey, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 42.

States, even if they abolished the forces of military elites on their domestic territory, still used the services provided by mercenaries across borders to promote their own interests. The state authorities had the role of strictly controlling these groups.

In these circumstances, national governments recruited soldiers from their own citizens, expecting them to fight for patriotic reasons, rather than financial ones. "They expected the parents to produce free soldiers, and their sons (and, occasionally, daughters) were recruited through the new system of national patriotism."⁴³

After the *Peace of Westphalia*, which puts an end to the *Thirty Years' War*, there was a considerable ascension of the nation-states. This increase was mainly caused by the increase in the sense of national identity, through which citizens began to create a much closer connection with their state. Along with the nation-states, the citizens' lack of confidence about the need to use foreign mercenary armies was being built, and there was gradually established the permanent army formed of their own citizens. Through the development of national sentiment, the citizens of the 17th-19th centuries' countries were increasingly willing to give their lives for their co-nationals. The need to create permanent armies has arisen from the evolution of societies, the mentality of leaders, but above all, the way in which international relations have unfolded. During this period, the frequency of armed conflicts was much lower, and mercenary troops hardly find their place into a fight, wars being rarely encountered.⁴⁴

Moreover, the population growth of the states meant that they had enough citizens to create considerable armies and enough resources to supply them. Once the armies have become bigger and military tactics have changed, it has become increasingly important how these troops can be motivated. If the mercenary armies of the 18th century were kept united by strict discipline, where only iron rules could create a cohesion of the group from which employers could not have expectations of morality, courage or loyalty, the permanent armies were motivated not only by the desire to earn income, but also by patriotism, a feature of the national soldiers that made the group more united.⁴⁵

⁴³ Keith Suter, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁴⁴ Christopher Kinsey, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-57.

⁴⁵ Sarah Percy, *Mercenaries. The History of a Norm in International Relations*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 96-97.

However, over time, it was noticed that extremely large armies outweighed the capabilities of states, becoming less efficient as more and more problems in supply, training techniques and the leadership of such great battalions. However, this period remained dedicated to permanent armed forces, and the best solutions from outside the states continued to be rejected.⁴⁶

So at the beginning of the pre-modern period, mercenaries still had an important role in the battlefields, but the development of states and mentalities that arose with the awareness of military needs in combat campaigns, caused considerable fluctuations in the use of services provided by paid soldiers. It was understood that the role of mercenaries has been discredited, but yet they have not disappeared entirely from the battlefields, because there has remained a sham for them as well. If a state has a lacked of national strength, they could hire mercenary troops.

MERCENARIES' METAMORPHOSIS TO PRIVATE MILITARY CORPORATIONS

Focusing on the 20th century, when the security was almost entirely privatized, we can see the differences between those newly created corporations and the old mercenaries. One could observe the evolution the mercenaries had over time and their changed role in the contemporary era. As tackled in a previous article⁴⁷, the contemporary period brings with it a change of mentality and a new way of approaching a war. Moreover, the critical issue is that in the new wars, the force is not directed against the enemy's armed force, but to the civilian population.⁴⁸

The commercialization of the military force spreads during this period, due the *statization* of the wars. One of the essential elements of the new wars is the loss of the state monopoly over the military force.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 110.

⁴⁷ Ramona Ioana Goga, "Privatization of Security in the 20th century – From Mercenaries to Private Military Corporations", *Studia UBB Europaea*, volume 1/2018, pp. 251-264.

⁴⁸ Laura M. Herța, Claudiu-Bogdan Aldea, "How can Regional and International Organizations Enhance Peace Processes? Lessons Learned from Sierra Leone", in Delia Pop-Flanța, Laura M. Herța (eds.), *Conflict Resolution and Crisis Communication. Transforming Conflicts and Building Peace*, Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 7-8 April 2022, p. 48.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 16

Albeit the central administrations of the states made significant efforts to gradually replace the mercenaries with permanent national armies, they could not ban the presence of professional soldiers in contemporary wars. With the overthrow of the Communist regime ending the Cold War, a new form of military organization, based on a private corporate approach, emerges in the foreground. Private Military Corporations (from now on PMC) have begun to take on military training roles, usually in states that have recently gained independence.⁵⁰

After the Cold War, the demand for *soldiers of fortune* has reborn due to their proven skills, especially in Africa. In the internal conflicts of the states, their presence was seen as natural on the battlefields. However, unlike in the past centuries, when mercenaries frightened every human soul they encountered, they appear to be in a different light in the contemporary period. If before they were involved in any conflicts in exchange for advantages and benefits, being merciless in any situation, in the contemporary wars, they appear to intervene in some battles only to help them end faster or, as in the case of African civil wars, they can help the population escape the tyranny of dictators or powerful groups that take hold of states and create horror.

In this period, governments are still dependent on their military forces to protect their vital borders and interests. But with the end of the Cold War, they began to turn to support this new security actor. Today, the international system is experiencing a huge increase in the number of PMCs operating on the international scene.⁵¹ The PMCs could be defined as legally established international firms that provide services involving the possibility of exercising force in a systematic manner, by military or paramilitary means, as well as the consolidation, transfer, facilitation, discouragement or defamation of this potential, or the necessary knowledge to implement them for their customers.⁵²

Checking the international context, PMCs have far largely escaped legal regulation, in part by avoiding the international definition of a 'mercenary'. Yet there are an increasing number of law-suits brought against PMCs by civilians who have been injured or by the families of those killed by PMCs in different

⁵⁰ Donald Stoker, *Military Advising and Assistance. From mercenaries to privatization, 1815–2007*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2008, p. 6.

⁵¹ Christopher Kinsey, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁵² Carlos Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security. A Guide to the Issues*, Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010, p. 48.

states. Even some of the families of private contractors themselves proved to intent lawsuits against the private military companies for the practices they have employed. Their presence in armed conflicts proved to be extremely confusing and harsh, operating the same way as mercenaries. The development of international laws attempting in order to regulate the PMC industry could highlight a serious question over the legitimacy of PMCs and make governments question whether they should use this specialised force.⁵³

As stated in a previous paper⁵⁴, the appearance of private military corporations seemed to announce the existence of a new world of mercenaries. Yet, if several decades ago the mercenaries were poorly organized and extremely visible, the new PMCs were rigorously kept, without claiming the mercenary's old-fashioned charm. Despite the efforts of private military corporations to present themselves as legitimate subjects with business concerns other than mercenaries, they did not avoid this label.⁵⁵ The negative connotations associated with mercenaries are also pointed out by the infamous quote from Shakespeare: "Cry 'Havoc!', and let slip the dogs of war." [*Julius Caesar*, (Act 3, Scene 1) 1601]. Sometimes, people use this quote when referring to the use of PMCs, which are in their essence mercenaries, in order to demonstrate the negative associations surrounding the use of mercenaries.⁵⁶

Once the PMCs entered the platform of international relations, the military force market was gaining considerable proportions. This market is like *a two-edged sword*. On the one hand, pessimists argue that private security *threatens* to undermine state control over violence and democratic processes, seeing it as a sort of group of corporate mercenaries. On the other hand, optimists say private options offer *solutions* to hard-to-resolve security issues that can work in accordance with national interests or the values shared by the international community.⁵⁷

If we take a closer look to these private military corporations and the general international attitude towards private power, they suggest that private power is increasingly accepted and efforts to control it have failed one by one.

⁵³ John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens (eds.), "Private Military Contractors", in *The Globalization of World Politics*, 3rd ed., 2014, p. 11.

⁵⁴ Goga, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-264.

⁵⁵ Sarah Percy, *Mercenaries. The History...*, p. 206.

⁵⁶ John Baylis *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁵⁷ Deborah D. Avant, *The Market for Force. The Consequences of Privatizing Security*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 4-5.

These are highlighted by the low influence of the United Nations *Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Funding and Training of Mercenaries* in the 1990s. In 1989, after nine years of work to complete it, it was ratified only by African states with a particular problem with mercenaries. The Convention entered into force only in 2001, which demonstrates the lack of interest of States in this regard.⁵⁸

Created shortly after this Convention, the PMCs managed to impose themselves in the international environment. Legitimate commentators analyse the “phenomenon” of the PMC, stating that its success is not based solely on the Convention (and, implicitly, Article 47) erroneous, but on the fact that it cannot be applied to private military corporations due to the identified gaps in content.⁵⁹

Certainly, both mercenaries and the PMCs have the potential to cool relations between the state and its citizens, and can ease the attainment of a state's interest in using force, becoming tyrannical, or in supporting a civil war. But the state that decides to privatize the use of force is more morally responsible for disrupting democratic control over the use of force than the private actor it employs.⁶⁰

Despite the criticism, private military companies provide military and security services to states, international organizations, non-governmental international organizations, global corporations and wealthy people. States that have contracted private military services range from extremely powerful and capable as the United States, to failed states like Sierra Leone. Meanwhile, major global corporations have hired PMC to provide site security and planning, and international non-governmental organizations working in fragile conflict areas or territories have done the same.⁶¹

Nowadays, the PMC undertook a series of activities, which had been the responsibility of the state military until now. Such activities can be divided into: operational military support, military advice, logistical support, security services and crime prevention services.⁶² Undoubtedly, private soldiers specialize in these skills, demonstrating first-class military skills. Many former

⁵⁸ Sarah Percy, *Mercenaries. The History...*, p. 208

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 237.

⁶¹ Deborah D. Avant, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

⁶² Christopher Kinsey, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

soldiers, now employed by the PMC, have served in the world's most important armies, especially the American, British and French armies considered to be the most "refined" in the world.⁶³

So far, there have been changes in industry that have sought to distinguish between PMC and mercenaries, recognizing the first's right to exist and incriminating the latter. Then mercenaries began to look similar to different criminal individuals, in the sense that they were in fact projected into the illegal force of a contract killer, while today, a security counsellor working for PMC only takes over a legally constituted work from the client.⁶⁴

The emergence of private military corporations on the international scene has been marked by controversy from the beginning. They have never been sufficiently used and accepted to be a challenge to international law against the use of mercenaries. All types of combat services provided by the PMC were far too controversial to be widely accepted. While some have suggested that this market is the release of another type of mercenary, others argue that this is simply the expansion of privatization in the sphere of national security.

As emphasized elsewhere⁶⁵, in the 20th century, analysts who researched on mercenaries, focused on analysing their behaviour since the 1960s and the emergence of private military corporations and the privatization of security in the last decade of this century.⁶⁶ As PMC claims to be differentiated from mercenaries, there appeared other entities, namely the Private Security Companies (henceforth PSC), which tend to present themselves as separate entities of the PMC. Together with private military corporations, PSCs are currently widely used in government circles. Despite the differentiation of the two entities, some specialists in the field contend that the term *Private Security Companies* is nothing more than a more elegant name for private military corporations. However, the term PSC is often out of context and applied to conventional security companies.⁶⁷

What is more, based on the realist approach of the issue, some researchers clearly differentiate between "mercenaries" as being individual soldiers for hire; "private military companies" as companies that provide

⁶³ *Ibidem*, pp. 55-56.

⁶⁴ Christopher Kinsey, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

⁶⁵ Ramona Ioana Goga, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-264.

⁶⁶ Sarah Percy, *Mercenaries*, p. 2.

⁶⁷ Carlos Ortiz, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

military support and “private security companies” as companies that provide security to individuals and to property.⁶⁸

If we think about the emergence of PMC and PSC, it does not necessarily suggest that the international environment is more responsive to the use of private power. Rather, the reaction to these newly established societies and the evolution of the industry from the one that promotes active battles to the one that avoids them, demonstrates that the anti-mercenary rule still leaves its mark on the strategies of that period. Moreover, in order to pave the way for wider acceptance, the PSC emphasizes that they are not engaged in any active struggle, but especially insist that they are neither PMC nor they are made up of mercenaries.⁶⁹

The services offered by the PSC can be divided into four main categories: logistical support, operational or tactical support, military counselling and training, and security. Logistic support entails tasks such as food preparation and delivery, cleaning and, at the same time, maintenance tasks at military bases. Tactical or operational support can best be explained as providing services that are normally considered to be exclusively for national armed forces. These services may include military interrogation, or even the operation and support of weapons systems. Ensuring military counselling and training is a significant part of the PSC's work. Members of private security companies train the armed forces, police forces and auxiliary forces.⁷⁰

The degree of development of this industry is highlighted by the use of the PSC by non-governmental organizations (from now on NGOs) and by the United Nations. They use private security companies to provide security to their staff, to the humanitarian aid, and in the refugee camps. In these roles, PSC's work is predominantly defensive and counter-opposed to fighting. However, even the UN and other NGOs see this type of security as controversial and are reluctant to discuss officially that they are using the services provided by private security. Many NGOs express feelings of horror and indignation as to the need to work with the PSC and are sensitive to the negative publicity that may result from open discussions on the use of commercial security providers.⁷¹

⁶⁸ John Baylis *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁶⁹ Sarah Percy, *Mercenaries. The History...*, pp. 206-207.

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 225-226.

⁷¹ *Ibidem*, p. 229.

As it has previously been discussed, there is significant debate surrounding the labelling of PMCs/PSCs and mercenaries. Mercenaries, as we have already mentioned above, generally connote negative images. Historical and academic references created for them an image of greedy, amoral, and barbaric fighters. National armies, on the other hand, have been depicted as patriotic, noble warriors fighting on behalf of a moral purpose bigger and more significant than themselves.⁷²

The post-Cold War era has seen a remarkable evolution in the role of mercenaries, with a notable comeback in armed conflicts worldwide. As we know, the globalization phenomenon—which has led to a surge in interconnection and the dismantling of conventional geopolitical barriers—is what defines this era. It has affected the course of warfare and undoubtedly contributed to the ubiquity of mercenaries in modern conflicts.⁷³ Globalization has played its role in eroding traditional notions of state sovereignty, thus creating opportunities for paid foreign fighter elites to operate in areas of conflict. Nonetheless, it has led to a certain decline in the effectiveness of traditional state borders, allowing mercenaries to exploit weak or failed states.

The emergence of logistics infrastructure has played a major role in bridging the geographical gaps between areas of conflict and the global market for private military services. This improved connectivity has been crucial in enabling the efficient movement of private military personnel and mercenaries across the world. The rapid progress of transport infrastructure, including air travel and maritime routes, has substantially reduced the time required to deploy private military elites to far-reaching conflict zones. At the same time, advancements in communication technologies have revolutionized coordination, intelligence sharing, and strategic decision-making in real-time, effectively shrinking distances even more. These unprecedented changes in transportation and communication have fundamentally transformed the way private military services operate, allowing them to act with unprecedented speed and efficiency across diverse theatres of conflict.⁷⁴

The rise of globalized armed conflicts has posed significant obstacles to enforcing laws against the use of mercenaries. While international legal

⁷² John Baylis *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁷³ Sean McFate, *Mercenaries and War: Understanding Private Armies Today*, Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 2019, p. 20.

⁷⁴ Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004, pp. 132-140.

systems, such as the UN Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Funding, and Training of Mercenaries, were implemented to address this issue, they have struggled to adapt to the constantly evolving nature of warfare and the involvement of private military actors. Despite the initial aim of this Convention to fight the growing threat of mercenaries, it has faced limitations in effectively controlling their use due to the complex and ever-changing landscape of modern warfare and the complex role played by these private military entities. Also, the Convention's difficulties to address issues such as the blurred lines between mercenaries and private security forces reflects the ongoing tension between regulatory frameworks and the evolving nature of conflict in the globalized era.⁷⁵

All in all, although in the contemporary wars mercenaries still pursue their own interest and personal well-being, they are no longer the same puppets indoctrinated to kill, mock or torture innocent people but, they are showing that they are capable of doing activities that have positive effects, being even collateral ones. Nevertheless, the military elites are still capable of demonstrating their "craftsmanship" on battlefields, coming with a different attitude in contemporary wars. It is difficult, if not impossible, to consider mercenary troops able to carry out peacekeeping actions, but the change of their role in the current conflicts is quite visible. Globalization has faded the traditional boundaries of conflicts, providing opportunities for mercenaries to take on unconventional roles. Rather than just being involved in direct combat, they now also provide training, advice, and logistical support. Their adaptation to these multifaceted roles shows the versatility and adaptability of modern mercenaries.

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⁷⁵ Lindsey Cameron, Vincent Chetail, *Privatizing War: Private Military and Security Companies Under Public International Law*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 66-70.

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THE CRISES IN POST-WAR EDUCATION IN CLUJ

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Abstract

This article aims to analyse the education system in the city of Cluj during the post-war period, after World War 2, with a close focus on the period of time between 1944 and 1948. It's a period characterized by a series of successive crises resulting from political decisions. These decisions affected all levels of education, all ethnic and religious groups in the region, as well as the political opponents to the newly established communist regime of the Romanian Communist Party, primarily represented by these three political parties: the National Peasants' Party, the National Liberal Party, and the Socialist Party.

Throughout the research into education within this time period, a combination of methods were used, including historical, comparative and statistical methods, and the sources used refer to both official and unofficial archived documents, contemporary press, and edited documents.

Keywords: *crises, communism, education, Cluj, democratization, reform*

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND. THE TIME PERIOD BETWEEN: AUGUST 30, 1940 - OCTOBER 11, 1944

Following the Vienna Dictate, the way schools were organized in Transylvania during the 1940-1944 period caused great dissatisfaction for Transylvanian Romanians. The Hungarian government ordinance from November 6, 1940, determined that existing state run primary schools in exclusively Romanian communities would be changed into schools for the Romanian minority. However, the Hungarian school administration only limited itself to establish and add a few Romanian educational institutes

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alongside the schools that were transformed into Hungarian state primary schools. This led to a situation where, despite the Romanian population outnumbering the Hungarian one by a staggering 200,000, the Romanian community didn't even have half the number of schools the Hungarians had, with many of these few Romanian schools having a very Hungarian-specific character. Out of approximately 4,700 Romanian nationality teachers teaching in Northern Transylvania in 1940, a vast majority of nearly 3,900 of them left in August alone after the Hungarian troops entered, after having to face expulsions and/or persecution. Among the few that remained in the country, many were fired for political reasons or transferred to old Hungary.¹

During 1939/1940 academic year, there were 14 high schools in Cluj, 7 taught in Romanian and 7 in Hungarian. Following the Dictate, the Horthy authorities suspended all 7 Romanian schools, only allowing and authorizing one section taught in Romanian at the former "Gheorghe Barițiu" high school to keep running. However, quickly afterwards even this section was dismantled, and from the 1941/1942 academic year, Romanian students no longer had the opportunity to attend secondary education courses in their native language. Students were only able to attend secondary education in their own Romanian tongue after the liberation of Northern Transylvania.²

For Romanians, the situation in secondary and vocational education was worse than what was happening in primary school education. Out of the 17 existing higher education schools in 1940, in addition to the various other vocational schools, the Hungarian government maintained only one state school, which was the Romanian high school in Năsăud. For the others, permission was given to establish Romanian sections and departments alongside within a select few secondary schools, the normal superior school, and a Hungarian higher commercial school. Even though the teaching jobs in these Romanian schools, sections and departments were reserved for Romanian native teachers they were held almost exclusively by Hungarians.³

In 1940, the "Franz Joseph" University returned from Szeged to Cluj and resumed its activities there, whilst the Romanian "King Ferdinand I" University took refuge in Sibiu, where it remained for the next 5 years, until 1945.⁴

¹ *Istoria României. Transilvania, Vol. II (1687-1947)*, Cluj-Napoca: Ed. "George Barițiu", 1999, pp. 1488-1489.

² Ștefan Pascu (red.), *Istoria Clujului*, Consiliul Popular al Municipiului Cluj, 1974, p. 421.

³ *Istoria României...*, loc. cit., p. 1489.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

In the autumn of 1944, the confessional education system represented the basis and foundation of the Hungarian education system that was in place in Transylvania. This system worked as a network which included 1041 educational units of the four big confessions (Catholic, Reformed, Unitarian, and Evangelical), and ranged from rural schools to secondary schools that were financed by church funds.⁵

THE TIME PERIOD BETWEEN: OCTOBER 12, 1944-1948

Following the annulment of the Vienna Dictate, primary, secondary, as well as university-level education underwent a series of changes in Cluj. The educational system faced many challenges, primarily the the lack of space with many of the previously existing schools having been destroyed during the war, as well as a lack of Romanian teaching staff available. In Cluj County, schools opened back up in December 1944 after the war ended. Hungarian ethnic students continued their classes in the old school buildings, whilst new schools were planned to open up for Romanian students.

Shortly after the liberation of Cluj, the Hungarian university moved to Szombathely. At the same time, Hungarians who remained in Cluj negotiated for the resumption of the Hungarian universities activities to continue. Various Hungarian university professors wrote articles in the Hungarian newspaper "Világosság," seeking to justify the necessity of resuming and continuing education in the Hungarian language by evoking the historical past of the Hungarian education as a whole. With the support and aid of the Soviet military command in Cluj, their efforts were not in vain. The "Ferenc József" University (now named the Hungarian University of Cluj) managed to continue to function, with the vast majority of its staff and its leadership keeping their positions. However, it was not exempt from attacks; starting in November, right-wing Romanian nationalists questioned the university's right to exist. These right-wing nationalists were also helped by the far-left political extreme, as they shared the same opinion. Prominent political figures in the far-left, Vasile Luca and Ana Pauker, deemed it should sufficient just to establish a Hungarian language department rather than have a whole university.⁶

⁵ Endre Barabás, „A magyar iskolaügy helyzete Romániában 1918–1940”, in *Kisebbségi Körlevél*, 1943, pp. 271-286, pp. 351-363.

⁶ Mihály Zoltán Nagy, Gábor Vincze (eds), *Autonomists and centralists. Enigmas of historical decisions. Northern Transylvania from September 1944 to March 1945*, Cluj-Napoca: Fundația CRDE, 2008, p. 78.

On a local level, both Romanian and Hungarian Communists accused the Hungarian university of not having enough professors "with democratic thinking" and through an address drafted by Prefect Vasile Pogăceanu, it demanded the Hungarian university rectorate to appoint "sincere and democratic" professors for various faculties and departments. This was then followed by another address in January 1945, where the prefect demanded the resignation of 29 professors on the basis of them having "an anti-democratic, chauvinistic, and fascist attitude." A day later, the prefect went on to suspend the autonomy of the Hungarian university, as well as the University Council. However, this directive wasn't enforced and simply remained only on paper.⁷

On November 9, 1944, the first assembly of Romanian students in Cluj took place at the Academic College premises, where they decided to collaborate with Hungarian students. This helped bring about improvements to the students lives, students were now provided with a canteen, a male student dormitory on Avram Iancu Street, and a female dormitory on Calea Moșilor, and a dormitory leadership was created made up of six boys and six girls.⁸

Secondary, higher, and university education reorganized at a faster pace than primary school education after the liberation of Cluj, mainly as a result of the quick enrolment of children from affluent social backgrounds. The more "democratic" outlook and changes desired to be brought about were made by integrating the old teaching staff into "democratic" organizations and the Communist Party's in efforts to provide a much more "democratic political education", alongside the removal of teaching staff that expressed opposition and resistance to this movement.⁹

A unique situation within university education arose in the case of the Faculty of Medicine in Cluj, which in the summer of 1940, after the Vienna Dictate, moved to Sibiu, along with all the faculty's teaching staff. After the liberation of Cluj, the Faculty of Medicine wished to return back to the city of Cluj. To try and accomplish this task, at the end of October 1944, a delegation of doctors from the Faculty of Medicine was formed, led by Prof. Dr. Iuliu Hațieganu, who was the former rector of the University of Cluj before the Dictate. However, Hațieganu was unable to achieve this task as he was very shortly afterwards arrested in November 1944. Although he was later released,

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ *Tribuna*, 11.11.1944, p. 2.

⁹ *National Archives Cluj County Service, Fund Regional Committee RCP Cluj, Inv. 2, Dos. 1/1947, f. 90.*

Hațieganu remained under constant military surveillance. He was reintegrated and once again appointed into teaching, where he continued his teaching career until 1948 when Professor Aurel Moga accepted to collaborate with the Communist Party to eliminate Hațieganu from higher education.¹⁰

The Faculty of Medicine in Cluj managed to achieved its mission of returning back only after March 6, 1945, when the administrative and technical service of the university returned to the capital of Transylvania, bringing along with it the Faculty of Medicine, its teaching staff, and its students.¹¹

During the Soviet administration, the situation of all levels of education in Cluj County was precarious due to the lack of teaching staff and spaces available for conducting classes. If these difficulties weren't hard enough to deal with, the situation was also made worse by conflicts that arose on political and ethnic grounds among the student body.

THE INVOLVEMENT OF TEACHERS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE CITY OF CLUJ

Starting from January 1945, through a prefecture ordinance, it was established that until the legal communal elections were to be conducted, 56 members of the Municipal Council of Cluj Municipality would be appointed by their respective local parties, among the city's citizens. Among these 56 members, the University rector automatically was given a position in the Municipal Council. Additionally, prominent figures from the city, including the likes of Dr. Emil Petrovici (rector of the "King Ferdinand I" University) and Dr. Lajos Csógor (rector of the "Bolyai" University), were invited and participated in the most important sessions of the council.¹²

There were a significant number of teachers that played a crucial political role in the city's life, and whilst also being teachers, some of them also held high administrative positions: Dr. Lajos Csógor who was the assistant at the "Ferenc József" University (renamed as the Hungarian University of Cluj) and from

¹⁰ Marcela Sălăgean, *Soviet Administration in Northern Transylvania (November 1944 - March 1945)*, Cluj-Napoca: Centrul de Studii Transilvane/Fundația Culturală Română, 2002, pp. 23-24.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² Dan Brudașcu (coord.), *80 Years Since the Establishment of the Romanian Administration in Cluj-Napoca, Vol. II*, Cluj-Napoca: Consiliul local al municipiului Cluj-Napoca, Primăria municipiului Cluj-Napoca, 1999, p. 19.

1945, the rector of the "Bolyai" University was also the vice prefect. Tudor Bugnariu was a university professor and also simultaneously held the Mayor role, as well as Dr. Ioan Demeter who was also a university professor in addition to being the Deputy Mayor.

"DEMOCRATIZATION" OF EDUCATION

The so-called elimination of "fascism" from the Romanian education system, which in reality was all a facade and turned out to be its communist transformation, started under the leadership of the new Minister of Education, Comrade Pavlov. He aimed to purge education at all levels, attempting to remove all elements that were an inconvenience to the regime, including teachers, educators, students, and pupils as well as old textbooks containing passages explicitly hostile to Russia. Romanian schools began to serve as a means of Russification of the Romanian students. The entire historical Romanian, Latin, European, and Christian cultural tradition was abandoned, and replaced with the imperative of Russian, Bolshevik, and Pan-Slavic "internationalism". Russian language became a mandatory subject for pupils starting from the fourth grade in primary schools and carried on throughout all other schooling levels, with a significant number of hours allocated to its teaching. Even the Ministry of Public Education's advertising sector, "Gazeta învățământului," turned into a purely Russian newspaper where only the language remained Romanian.¹³ Even at festivities and events, they started not only with the singing of the Romanian national anthem but also with the Soviet one.

PURGING EDUCATORS DURING THE HORTHY REGIME (OCTOBER 11, 1944 - MARCH 6, 1945)

After the liberation, in primary education, most teachers who worked during the Dictate period went into politics, many joining the Socialist Party, and many maintained a "hostile" attitude towards democracy. Nevertheless, to align with the new trend, they took some facade actions. One such action was the gathering of teachers in Cluj on November 19, 1944, where a motion was passed, emphasizing the duty of the teaching staff to fight against fascism and chauvinism throughout Northern Transylvania. The task of purging the

¹³ Onisifor Ghibu, "Memories to Groza, March 1946", in *Call to the judgment of history*, Vol. I, București: Ed. Albatros, 1992, p. 106.

teaching staff of all fascist and chauvinistic elements was considered crucial. Some of the other points included the fight to offer education to students' in their native mother tongue and the establishment of schools in each region, that were tailored to its geographical, economic, and social characteristics. The assembly also advocated for the collaboration between the union, regional inspector, and high school directors in Cluj, and also promoting the mandatory teaching of the Hungarian language and literature in Romanian high schools.¹⁴

A purification commission was then established on November 22, 1944, tasked with this purging of the primary and secondary teaching staff in Northern Transylvania. Working in collaboration with political organizations, professional organizations and authorities, the commission required all teachers to complete a questionnaire regarding their activities during the previous regime.¹⁵ The commission aimed to dive in and analyse the teachers' past and highlight their political alignment and attitudes in order to remove and purge all members who supported fascist principles from their teaching positions.

After three days of work, the commission made several decisions:

1. Vigorously examine the past of all teaching staff members, focusing on fascist or democratic attitudes.

2. Proposed removing all directors who served the former regime after March 19-20, 1944, from school leadership positions, allowing them to continue only as teachers unless there were specific objections.

3. Excluded 7 teachers from directorial or union roles, considering them fascists.¹⁶

4. Admitted 6 teachers to the union, proposed the removal of 4 staff members from the Inspectorate and suggesting their transition to teaching roles.

5. Provisionally admitted around 80 teachers to the union, with the right to appeal, by November 26.¹⁷

¹⁴ *Tribuna Ardealului*, Year V, No. 1174, 28.11.1944, p. 3.

¹⁵ *Tribuna Ardealului*, Year V, No. 1171, 24.11.1944, p. 4.

¹⁶ Dr. Kántor Lajos, Szopos Sándor, Szabó Dezső, Kányády Béla (*Tribuna Ardealului*, Year V, No. 1175, 29.11.1944, p. 4).

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

Most teachers judged by the commission continued their educational activities. Out of the 11 cases judged in the first week of December 1944, the outcome resulted in one teacher retiring, one was restricted to teaching only in the province, and the others received permission to continue their teaching activities. By December 5, approximately 500 teachers and professors were reviewed.¹⁸

On December 14, 1944, the decisions taken by the Purification Commission for teachers in Northern Transylvania were made public. These also included the admission of 45 teachers, mostly restricted to provincial positions, rejecting 5, and retiring 2, along with 11 whose status remained uncertain and yet to be decided. The commission's decisions were considered provisional and subject to appeal.¹⁹

A year later, during the general assembly of the Secondary School Teachers' Union in Cluj, in December 19, 1945, the teachers reviewed the post-liberation education period. They observed that Hungarians had been reorganized and integrated into democratic societies, and had formed the Teachers' Union that included both primary and secondary teachers which was led by Hungarians. Only three teachers who remained in Cluj under the Horthy regime were part of this union and consequently, it was claimed that the union was used to exclusively serve Hungarian interests.

In the spring of 1945, an ad-hoc provisional committee was formed to oversee the union until new elections were held in the fall. The use of the union²⁰ for political purposes that favoured the occupiers and Hungarians prompted Romanians to demand the separation of Romanians and Hungarians, starting with higher level education teachers and then extending to primary school teachers.²¹

Communists opposed this split, while non-communists advocated for it. The whole situation degenerated into chaos, leading to a disciplinary committee requesting the removal of non-communist teachers from education entirely.²²

During February 12-14, 1945, at the conference of the Cluj Regional Communist Party, the issue of the Cluj University was discussed. Two

¹⁸ *Tribuna Ardealului*, Year V, No. 1179, 05.12.1944, p. 4.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, No. 1186, 14.12.1944, p. 2.

²⁰ *Scântea*, Seria III, Year XVI, No. 552, 20.06.1946, p. 3.

²¹ NACCS, *Fund Cluj Police Inspectorate*, Dos. 635/1946, f. 8.

²² *Ibidem*, f. 8.

arguments emerged: one supporting the creation of a common Romanian-Hungarian nucleus to try and maintain unity and later separating into two autonomous universities (Teofil Vescan jr.), and the other advocating for the immediate establishment of two autonomous universities (Jordáky Lajos). The decision that was ultimately taken was to create the Cluj University Bloc, consisting of separate Romanian and Hungarian universities and a bilingual technical university.²³

Two royal decrees were then passed on May 29, 1945, which confirmed the operations of two distinct universities in Cluj, one Romanian and one Hungarian.²⁴ This marked the return of educational institutions to their pre-Dictate locations. The University "King Ferdinand I," which moved to Sibiu, and all primary and secondary schools with Romanian as their teaching language were allowed to return. Additionally, a State University with Hungarian as the teaching language was established in Cluj.²⁵ Following this, in June, 30 Hungarian professors were approved for employment at the Hungarian University.

During the Regional RCP Conference in Cluj on May 3-4, the Deputy Prefect Dr. Ludovic Csógör stated that in the issue of the university, the Hungarian community was not affected as some people previously stated, he went on to say because "*All those who were here on April 16 (1945) in the service of the University will be taken over by the Romanian state and will be assigned to their service*".²⁶ Despite this, in the first phase of the purging process, the teachers and professors who operated during the Horthy regime were targeted, most of whom were of Hungarian ethnicity, in this new second stage of this "purification" process, all those who opposed and resisted the communist regime were targeted, and in particular now Romanian teachers and professors.

²³ Nagy, Vincze, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

²⁴ *Collection of laws and regulations*, Volume XXIII, January XIII-December 1945, București: Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului, Imprimeria Centrală, 1946, May 1945, pp. 981-982.

²⁵ Later, these Universities will become known under the names "Babeș" University and "Bolyai" University, unified in 1958, thus forming "Babeș-Bolyai" University.

²⁶ "Minutes of May 3-4, 1945, on the occasion of the Regional conference in Cluj of the PCdR", *NACCS, Fund Cluj RWP Regional Committee*, Inv. 1, Dos. 1/1945, f. 65.

THE CLUJ EDUCATION SYSTEM BETWEEN MARCH 9, 1945, AND 1948

The Romanian Communist Party declared a strong interest in youth of society and the positions and attitudes they held. They went on to wage a fierce battle to either attract them to their side or eliminate those who resisted them. The youth, it was said, made up and represented the most dynamic force in the country, but so far they had simply just been used as pawns by legionnaires and reactionaries, fighting alongside fascists against the Soviet Union.

To change this state of affairs, the government attempted various tactics, trying either to entice them or to "open their eyes",²⁷ and if these methods failed, they resorted to punishments, especially for the most vocal opponents. Such actions commenced in schools, as they saw it as the perfect environment to mould them. To ensure that the youth received a "healthy" education, it was deemed necessary to create an environment purified of all "polluting" outside elements that could influence the students.

The Progressive Youth, a communist organization, frequently lamented that it couldn't enter and have an as active role as it wanted to in schools due to the resistance from "reactionary" teachers that stood against them. Thus, they initially moved towards purging educators, teachers, and professors who opposed them under the notion that they were against "democratization". Primary school teachers were asked to take a screening, and it was decided that teachers would return to their positions if they managed to pass successfully through it.²⁸ Educators that failed to pass were depicted as "slaves to fascist analytical programs", distorting the souls of the youth with hostile principles, promoting hatred and lies. That these teachers had stealthily infiltrated the blood of the youth, many of whom acted without realizing they were "blind and unknowing tools in the service of the fascist cause". The Communists' were also annoyed and their unease also stemmed from the fact that in their eyes, the youth refused to investigate the "truth" and persisted in a misguided idea; if they lacked the strength to break away from this, they were destined to be "pawns in the funeral procession of the Romanian nation." Left-wing media was filled with calls such as: "*Youth, it is time to wake up and join the fight for the perfection of true democracy*".²⁹ However, the efforts of the Communist Party remained largely futile, with numerous demonstrations held by teachers,

²⁷ Romulus Hatos, "Who confuses the youth?", in *Plugarii*, No. 15, p. 1, 31.01.1945.

²⁸ *Adevărul Ardealului*, No. 5, 5.04.1945, p. 7.

²⁹ *Plugarii*, No. 8, 14.01.1945, p. 1.

students, and pupils supporting opposition parties and the king himself testifying to their failure.

After March 6, 1945, education was expected to serve as a function of indoctrination, preparing children and the youth as a whole to become the "new man" of the future and eliminating the students' critical spirit and spontaneity. Alongside a demagogic campaign to eradicate illiteracy, a sinister discrimination based on class criteria was at work, and those admitted to schools were subjected to a perfidious system of "ideological training." Starting in the fall of 1944, when Stefan Voitec, leader of the PSD (Social Democratic Party), became the head of this department the Ministry of National Education the Communist Party paid particular attention to this department. Some Communists went on to blame Stefan Voitec for having an "anti-democratic spirit" and allegedly infusing this spirit into the Ministry of Education, accusing him of showing too much tolerance towards the "reactionaries" within the education system. The Communist Party advocated for a swift purging and "re-education" of students and teaching staff entirely, without any form of tolerance towards opposing ideas. The Party's radical attitude was not liked and this was evident during the demonstration on November 8, 1945, which was primarily organized by the National Liberal Youth and the National Peasant Youth, where a large number of students attended.³⁰ The reaction of the communist authorities was harsh, resulting in several dozen arrests, especially among the youth. Lists were drawn up of the students that had participated in the demonstration, and they were monitored for months. In total, 557 people were arrested, with cases classified for 188 of them.³¹

Similar actions took place in other cities across the country, not just in Cluj. The demonstration on November 8, 1945, commemorating the King's name day, was used by the Communist Party as a pretext to remove reactionary teachers from education.³² The students, who participated in the demonstrations at the Central School, mostly children of the upper class and

³⁰ Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania, *Final Report*, Bucharest: 2006, pp. 472-488, [https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/article/RAPORT%20FINAL_%20CADCR.pdf], 10 August 2023.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 472, *apud* Petre Țurlea, 8 noiembrie 1945, București: INST, 2000.

³² Fanu Duțulescu, *"The Democratization of the School"*, Craiova: Institutul de Arte Grafice RAMURI, 1945, p. 3.

wealthy people, were to be sent to peripheral schools, and replaced with children of the working class to take their place.

Professor Mihail Dragomirescu whilst being a faculty professor was at the time a leader of the Patriots Union. He declared in a meeting on November 27, 1945: "*The most brutal reaction, the remnants of the Legionnaires linked to the National Peasants and Liberals, concentrate in schools, through directors, teachers, and senior students, as well as in the student body. [...] The question arises whether it is good to bring this youth to the popular demonstrations of the National Democratic Front (FND).*" Vasile Luca's response was: "*If they go on to do something, we beat them, and they will lose their desire to do anything. We can integrate them among workers*".³³ Later, the violence escalated and resulted in massive arrests among students.

Alongside the demonstrations supporting the political opposition, there were protests that actively fought against the policies of the Communist Party and the ones they wanted to implement. One such protest occurred at the Theoretical High School in Buzău, where the sixth-grade girls opposed the placement of Stalin's portrait in their classroom, which disappeared after a few days after it was placed. Because no measures were taken against the perpetrators, the headmistress Florica Martinaș was arrested by the Security Service, after it was concluded that she must be held responsible for the overall atmosphere and activity in the school she led, and had to assume the guilty of violating one of the important roles she had: demonstrating to be a convinced democrat by taking measures to perfect the school's democratization process. Under this role she held, she wasn't allowed to tolerate such actions in her school, and so she was blamed for what had happened.³⁴

Realizing that such issues wouldn't resolve themselves, a decision by the Ministry of National Education in April 1946 prohibited students from all state, denominational, and private schools to participate in any from political party activity, both in school and outside it. All associations and committees formed by students, except for class committees and cultural societies, were disbanded, through which the Party continued to manipulate and use students for propaganda purposes. Thus, in May 1945, during the RCP Regional Conference in Cluj, Emil Huluba declared in favour of using students for political purposes

³³ *Final Report, loc. cit.*

³⁴ Duțulescu, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Gheorghe Onișoru, *Romania Between 1944-1948, Economic Transformations and Social Realities*, București: Editura Fundației Academia Civică, 1998, p. 167.

as he stated that "*There are enough students. These students should form teams for villages, with songs, Hungarian and Romanian dances, and each team should have a Party leader. This way, we could enter in more beautifully and deeply into the souls of the villages and the people*".³⁵

However, the dissatisfaction of the students couldn't be compared to the "reactionary" agitations and response of the students. A pole of resistance against the communist regime being established in Romania was formed by students from all university centres. They organized into anti-communist groups, as Ion Gavrilă Ogoranu³⁶ reports, acting under the "ideal inoculated by the Iron Guard" and fighting in the name of faith, love for the country and justice. The bolshevization of the country in their eyes represented the greatest danger Romania had ever faced and had to be opposed. Their actions resulted in mass arrests, heavy legal action and sentences of years in prison, pain, tears, and humiliations.

One of the figures that caused trouble for the secret police was a university professor at the University of Cluj, Raul Volcinski. Professor Volcinski dedicated much of his time to the anti-communist struggle and fight. Upon learning about the group of fighters in the Făgăraș Mountains, he tried through various means to contact them in order to aid and support their actions. This led to the birth of his relationship with the Făgăraș students in Cluj.³⁷

STUDENT STRIKES IN 1946

The failure of the Party to attract and inoculate the student youth was further highlighted at the Regional Assembly of the Romanian Communist Party in Cluj on May 1945 when Ioan Várady strongly criticized the weak

³⁵ "Minutes...", f. 60.

³⁶ Ion Gavrilă Ogoranu was the leader of the Anti-Communist Armed Resistance in the Făgăraș Mountains between 1948-1957, and in 1946 he took part in the student revolt in the "Avram Iancu" dormitory in Cluj-Napoca. The communist authorities sentenced him to 15 years in prison in 1948, and to death in 1951. After the decimation of his group, Ogoranu stayed hidden for 21 years without being caught by the Securitate (S. Puris, "Communist regimes condemned in Cluj" [http://epochtimes-romania.com/article.php?article_idî8869], 11 November 2019).

³⁷ Ion Gavrilă Ogoranu, Lucia Baki, *Fir trees break, but they do not bend*, Vol. III, Timișoara: Mesagerul de Făgăraș, 2011, pp. 171, 174.

activity of the The Union of Communist Youth (Romanian: Uniunea Tineretului Comunist; UTC), which failed to become a large successful movement and organization, because as Várady stated, it did not take into account the spirit of the local youth. In Cluj, most young people were students and pupils, not workers. Furthermore, most of the young people who joined the ranks of the UTC were Hungarians which was an additional reason why the Romanian youth rejected to join and align themselves with it.³⁸

Further problems arose as inter-ethnic conflicts worsened in 1946. During the academic life in the spring of this year, in Cluj, communism was not the main concern. There was still hope and belief that the Western powers would restore classical democracy. But rather 'the Hungarian issue', was the foremost cause of concern as it became an old but renewed problem now the Hungarian rule had been expelled from Northern Transylvania. Bartolomeu Anania wrote in his memoirs that "*if Romanians returned home now and fully lived and enjoyed in the sentiment of victory, Hungarians did not hesitate to show their animosity towards this victory and to popularize among their people the idea that the Romanian victory is fleeting, and that Transylvania will be returned to Hungary diplomatically*".³⁹ So, this was a major problem that communist authorities now faced, as now it was even more prevalent than in previous years. This conflict between Romanian and Hungarian students, Romanian adherents of historical parties on one side, and Hungarian students and workers, supporters of the CP, on the opposing side became the main concern.

To try and unite them and bring them together within the Communist Party, the communists tried using various methods. Some proposed that the best measure to calm spirits in student circles would be to provide them with material and moral help. Students on the whole were mostly poor, without housing, without food, and without books for their studies, the University also did not have heating, and pupils had to attend classes in coats. It would be good, suggested Comrade Belindeanu, for Dermata (a shoe factory in Cluj) to provide boots for students, thus aiming to improve the relationship between students and worker communities. The boots were to be distributed through the Progressive Youth organisation, as well as all other facilitations.⁴⁰ For the

³⁸ "Minutes...", f. 52.

³⁹ See Valeriu Anania, *Memorii*, Iaşi: Ed. Polirom, 2008.

⁴⁰ RCP Cluj County Committee, Inv. 2, Dos. 16/1946, f. 1.

most "sincerely democratic" students, the Cluj PRC instituted offered 7 scholarships of 50,000 lei each on February 1946.⁴¹

For the same purpose, Teohari Georgescu brought a sum of 25 million lei and a wagon of wheat to give out to students in Cluj.⁴² However, despite these efforts, the measures proved to be ineffective. On the one year anniversary since the installation of the Groza government, conflicts arose on the streets of Cluj, confrontations and fights especially between Romanian students and Hungarian workers. Sadly, these confrontations resulted in casualties.

On May 10, during other demonstrations, the students came out with a portrait of Maniu and stood before the Local Commission, shouting 'Down with terror!' in front of the Communist Party. Then they protested in front of the Prefecture, shouting 'Down with the government, down with the prefect!'. They were arrested.⁴³

This conflict ultimately culminated in the daytime attack on the 'Avram Iancu' dormitory near the University, where the medical students were housed. The 'Avram Iancu' dormitory had long been on the blacklist, seeing as it was considered a 'fascist nest where Legionnaires were reorganizing and a storehouse where there had to be serious arms deposits.' Comrade Mihai Patriciu requested a list of leaders to take vigorous action against these 'fascist movement chiefs,' more than just arresting and mistreating them at the police station for shouting in the streets, but that greater action needed to be taken.

An attack was carried out by a group of chauvinistic Hungarian workers from the János Herbák factory (formerly Dermata). They came out with two trucks and armed with sticks, bats, and other blunt objects, including firearms, and they attacked the reactionary students in order to give them a 'worker's lesson'. After vandalizing the dormitory and attacking the students, the workers, frightened by a Soviet patrol, fled. The students then went on strike, demanding the withdrawal of the accusations against the student body, the repair of the damages, and the punishment of those responsible for mistreating the students and vandalizing the dormitory. But the authorities hesitated to identify the 'working class' aggressors, and who were untouchable by the law enforcers. To resolve this conflict, the central political parties and the Groza

⁴¹ *Cluj RWP Regional Committee*, Inv. 1, Dos. 9/1946, f. 34.

⁴² *RCP Cluj County Committee*, Inv. 2, Dos. 16/1946, f. 1.

⁴³ *NACCS, Fund General Administrative Inspectorate Circ. III Cluj*, Dos. 6/1946, f. 198.

government sent Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu to handle the situation. The minister tried to persuade the students to give up the strike and attend their lessons and exams, promising to reopen the canteens and take action against those who triggered this conflict between the student body and communist workers. This was when Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu made the famous statement: *“First and foremost, I am Romanian and then a communist”*.⁴⁴

In the days following the event, everyone awaited the start of an investigation to determine the true culprits for the events of the night of May 28. However, not only was there no investigation that took place, but moreover, it was not even desired or planned by the authorities. The authorities on the contrary intended to cover up everything and blame it on the students, saying “those hooligans who had repeatedly provoked our Hungarian brothers and fellow citizens” (are to be blamed).⁴⁵

On May 29, 1946, a medical student, Ciortin Horațiu, the National Peasants' Party (NPP) youth leader at the University, was arrested and sent to Bucharest. According to communist sources, he was the one who covertly led all the student actions, strikes and demonstrations. After being informed that he was wanted by the police for arrest, Ciortin Horațiu went into hiding, and his place was taken by another medical student, Pițurcă. The same source wrote that all the actions of the students and peasants from Mănăștur and Florești were directed by the NPP leaders.⁴⁶

Other strikes followed, so that on June 19, after 19 long days of strike, it was announced that one of the seven arrested students, of those who were taken out of the city of Cluj, had been released. At that moment, a statement was issued announcing the end of the strike. The next day, another statement came, announcing the self-dissolution of the “Petru Maior” Student Center. In just a few days, Cluj was again filled with young people as the tensions were seemingly declining. The dormitories and canteens were then reopened, and the “Avram Iancu” dormitory was swiftly repaired. No one talked about the strike anymore, and all of it had now passed and was nothing more than a

⁴⁴ Gheorghe Marian, “Student strike from Cluj - 1946” [http://epochtimes-romania.com/articles/2007/03/article_8893.html], 23 June 2020.

⁴⁵ Laura Șuteu, “1946: The «Bearded Angel» Anania Led the Student Strike, Provoked by the Violence of the Hungarians” [<http://www.ftr.ro/1946-ingerul-cu-barba-anania-a-condus-greva-studentilor-provocata-de-violentele-ungurilor-46997.php>], 12 July 2020.

⁴⁶ Cluj RWP Regional Committee, Inv. 1, Dos. 10/1946, f. 21.

tragic memory. The words of the Cluj police chief were confirmed: 'The government could not be overthrown by the strike of brats.'⁴⁷

After these events, next up followed an assault of indoctrination on the students with the creation of so-called "voluntary work sites".⁴⁸

The students were to be very closely monitored. The communist press spoke on behalf of the "democratic" student body that condemned the "chauvinistic manifestations of the hooligans in Cluj", who, through "political maneuvers, drive the student body to hooligan acts". Then, just two months after, on the occasion of an attempt to capture them, the University Democratic Front received from the same students the promise and commitment to not engage in any political activity.⁴⁹

In March 1947, after the short-lived experiment called Progressive Youth ended, the Communist Youth Union was re-established. Later that year, in May, the National Union of Students of Romania was created in Cluj. This union was controlled by communist representatives, including the likes of: Corneliu Bogdan, Gheorghe Brătescu - Ana Pauker's son-in-law - and the left-wing social democrat Alexandru Glanstein-Muşat.⁵⁰

The fact that, despite the numerous purges of university personnel that occurred, students still remained loyal to the historical parties in Romania demonstrates their conviction that the Romanian Communist Party is the true enemy of democracy and of the nation. However, the purges did not stop. The purges continued and were enforced relentlessly in the hope that the situation would eventually be resolved and they would eventually win over the students loyalty. Based on Laws 486 and 594 regarding the purification of public administration, several professors from the Faculty of Law in Bucharest, and the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy - P.P. Panaitescu -, as well as the Faculty of Medicine - Petre Tomescu -, and the Faculty of Theology - Nichifor Crainic, were dismissed from service. They ceased to be part of the university teaching staff. Similarly, in other faculties across the country, the Purge Commissions removed many university professors and "lecturers of fascist doctrines" from education. The newspaper *Dreptatea* protested against these actions, writing

⁴⁷ *RCP Cluj County Committee*, Inv. 2, Dos. 16/1946, f. 7.

⁴⁸ *Patria*, Year XXVII, No. 17, 09.03.1946, p. 1.

⁴⁹ *Scânteia*, Seria III, Year XVI, No. 538, 02.06.1946, p. 3.

⁵⁰ *Final Report*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

that “in the highest cultural forum, where objectivity and seriousness were expected to prevail over personal or political interests, the purge was carried out in the same terms and sentiment as in all other institutions”. The Peasants also expressed their dissatisfaction for the purge of university teaching staff in Bucharest.

Immediately after August 23, 1944, a commission composed only of representatives of the Romanian Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party was set up, in which representatives of the National Peasants' Party and the National Liberal Party could not interfere and take part in any way. Until March 6, 1945, the commission purged 49 out of the 1,000 members of the university teaching staff in Bucharest, including professors Mihai Antonescu, Nichifor Crainic, and Gheorghe Dima, and leaving aside many others who had a marked activity during the dictatorships. Some of those professors who had been purged were later on reinstated, especially those who, in the meantime, “completed their registration form in one of the National Democratic Front parties or groups”.

On April 4, 1947, during the County Conference organized in Cluj, Mogyorosi announced to comrades that they had two weeks to draw up a table of the teaching staff that further needed to be purged. “*The teaching staff is not in our hands*”,⁵¹ the angry communists admitted.

On May 27, 1947, the leadership of the national peasant youth, composed mainly of students, was arrested throughout the country. Arrests continued even in 1949, after the The Romanian Workers' Party (RWP) boasted that they were successfully stabilizing the situation.

To some extent, the argument can be made that the Communists' had managed to achieve their goals at the University. Seeing as at the beginning of 1947, there were 600 party members in the Romanian University and almost none in the Hungarian University, by the end of the year, the County boasted the existence of a single student party organization, which had over 1,400 members in the Romanian University and over 200 in the Hungarian 'Bolyai' University, hence suggesting that the communists successfully brought about unity. If in 1946 there were 80 student party members, by February 1947, there were already over 650.⁵²

⁵¹ CRP Cluj Regional Committee, Inv. 2, Dos. 1/1947, f. 101, 127.

⁵² CRP Cluj Regional Committee, Inv. 2, Dos. 1/1947, f. 90, 111.

One of the greatest dissatisfactions of the RCP leadership was the issue of refractory students, one that was relevant throughout the Communist regime, which is also why the most radical measures seen were taken against them. It led to the gathering of all imprisoned students who were then sent on the "island of absolute horror", in the prison of Pitești, where, from 1949, a monstrous experience called the "re-education" began.

PRE-UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN 1947

In 1947, there were only 10 schools for illiterates in the city of Cluj, attended by 410 people and led by teachers who were mostly communists. There were 24 primary schools in the city, with 20,960 attendees, taught by 552 teachers. Similar to previous years, the schools were simply unsatisfactory for many. They were plagued by Material difficulties, such as a lack of didactic materials, furniture, or adequate premises - in relation to the number of students, as well as a need for an additional 300 classrooms at the county level - , poorly revised manuals, with some manuals even containing lessons contrary to the "concepts of historical materialism". The schools were also suffering from the "*inconvenience of adequate education seeing as they were not being entirely staffed with purely democratic elements or at least sincerely adopted by the new democracy*".⁵³ Another dissatisfaction was the failure to change the attitude of the peasantry, especially the poor, towards school and the education system.

Given these difficulties, priorities focused on "*democratizing the teachers and replacing didactic material based on bourgeois-reactionary ideology with new material, necessary for the democratization of primary education*".⁵⁴

By the end of the year, the organization of cultural activities in primary and secondary schools began. In the public education domain, some successes were achieved and seen. In November 1947, 36 teachers joined and became party members, however, these new 36 members were superficially selected. In the following years, after further ongoing, multiple purges among the teaching staff, the percentage of students with failures and those that had to re-take the classes increased highly, too high when looked at as a percentage the total

⁵³ CRP Cluj Regional Committee, Dos. 9/1947, f. 39.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, Inv. 2, Dos. 1/1947, f. 89-90.

number of students, which, as the communists themselves noted, indicated the “weakness” of the teaching body.⁵⁵

Additional problems were encountered in denominational schools, which in secondary education were quite numerous in Cluj, where achievements couldn't be compared to, and did not even reach the level of those in state education.⁵⁶

Part of these problems will persist in the following years, unable to be solved so easily. The composition of what made up the teaching staff in Cluj was deemed to required “greater vigilance” from the Education Section. Even by 1951, there were still considered to be many staff members who were described as 'outdated', staff members that were originating from priests, officers, who although well-trained professionally, were dominated by the bourgeois spirit.⁵⁷

THE REFORM OF EDUCATION IN 1948

On August 3, 1948, through Decree no. 175/1948, of the *Law for the reform of education*, was adopted and enforced, and the formation of young people in a communist spirit was decreed. This brought about much stricter control over elementary, middle, and higher schools and suppressed the amount if autonomy universities had, as well as providing staff for the industrialization plan by expanding medium and higher technical education. The 1948 education reform aimed to complete the politicization of the education system as well as “cleansing” the Romanian education by introducing social discrimination in the admission process into middle and higher education. The communist leadership also aimed to create a layer of staff to apply the party's policies in the state apparatus, army, justice, and culture in general. In the vision of the leaders in Bucharest, school represented the first link in the system of preparing the staff necessary for building socialism.⁵⁸

According to the new law, preschool education was now optional and addressed children between 3 and 7 years old, having nurseries and pre-

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, Inv. 2, Dos. 9/1947, f. 29; *F. Primăria Municipiului Cluj*, Dos. 3-17 XII. 1950- 27 XII 1951, p. 54.

⁵⁶ *CRP Cluj Regional Committee*, Inv. 2, Dos. 1/1947, f. 90.

⁵⁷ In the same year, a census of all illiterates was conducted, revealing a total of 1157 individuals. To address this issue, a work plan was developed, including home literacy programs (NACCS, *F. Sfatul Popular al orașului Cluj*, Dos. 3/1950-1951, f. 51).

⁵⁸ *Final Report*, *loc. cit.*, p. 474.

schools directly subordinated under the control of the Ministry of Public Education. The child had to be educated in the communist party's spirit from an early age. To achieve this goal, the recognition of equal rights for women with men was also inscribed. Enjoying new freedoms, women were even encouraged to aim for and occupy any positions, including political ones. Women were increasingly encouraged to abandon household activities, leaving the education of children to the Party and government. "*Instead of wandering in the streets, (the child) is given a healthy education*",⁵⁹ declared the Minister of Education, Gheorghe Vasilichi, at a national conference with school inspectors. However, it was a poisoned gift, as communism thus struck and entered the family without the parents really realizing what was happening. Later on, mothers would be obliged to take up their jobs just three months after giving birth, so that the child can be moulded from the earliest stages of infancy, starting from the cradle, then from kindergartens, general schools, high schools, and eventually universities, all in order to minimize the parents' contribution to their children's education and hence manage to indoctrinate the child as early as possible. It was no coincidence that there was a continuous effort to purge teaching staff who did not conform to the party's line of thought and a massive push to involve women in political life. More and more women now involved in the work force meant there were now more and more tax payers which in turn resulted in greater government revenue from tax.

Elementary education was set to start at 7 years old, the first four grades being general and mandatory. The 4-year middle education was divided into the following types of schools: high schools, pedagogical schools for training teaching staff needed in preschool and elementary education, and technical and vocational schools. The enrolment of high school graduates into university was reserved, with a few exceptions, for students with a "healthy origin", upper class children from wealthy, influential families and former party activists (or UTC, UASCR).

The 1948 education "reform", following the Soviet model, had serious long-term consequences on the Romania's cultural state. By deliberately brutalizing and changing the analytical programs of schools and faculties, the "reform" produced many generations of "point-based" pseudo-intellectuals, who constituted the new ruling class of society during the communist regime.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, apud *Scântea*, 8 august 1948, p. 1.

The education system was called upon to perform an indoctrination function, to prepare children and young people according to the “new man” mould and to eliminate the students' ability of critical thinking and spontaneity. In parallel with the demagogic campaign to eradicate illiteracy, a further discrimination based on class and religious criteria was being carried out. Those enrolled and admitted into schools were subjected to a perfidious system of ideological training. Therefore, the year 1948 would mark the disappearance of politically and ideologically neutral education as now all educational and cultural institutions became a sort of appendage of the state administration. Moreover, in the task of educating the masses in the communist spirit, alongside other persuasive work, the regime's propaganda didn't hesitate to acknowledge that a very important role was played by the influence that the state exerted.⁶⁰

THE IMPACT OF COMMUNISM ON MINORITY EDUCATION. STUDY CASES. THE IMPACT OF COMMUNISM ON HUNGARIAN MINORITY EDUCATION

Regarding the impact communism had on minority education, G. Vincze distinguishes two categories of consequences. On the one hand, there were measures that, although affecting the entire population, they had much greater repercussions on the Hungarian minority, and on the other hand, there were direct efforts targeting education in the Hungarian language, aiming to restrict and possibly even gradually eliminate it entirely. Thus, while the measures of the 1948 education reform affected all confessions and groups in Romania, their consequences for the Hungarian population were much more detrimental and it resulted in the dismantling of an entire educational network based on denominational school units. Directly following the reform's implementation, 468 Catholic school units, 531 Reformed, 34 Unitarian and 8 Evangelical units were nationalized, and their assets were confiscated and transferred over to the state.⁶¹ Also, the nationalization of denominational schools (Romanian, Hungarian and Jewish), as stated in the political report of the RWP County Committee of Cluj in August 1948, “*was received with joy by the broad masses of people and contributed to the facilitation of our work, realizing that this measure of great importance has taken in the interest of the great masses of the people. The firm and*

⁶⁰ Gheorghe Boldur-Lăteșcu, „Reeducation in România” [<http://www.romanalibera.ro/opinii/aldine/reeducarea-in-romania-147940.html>], 09 August 2020; see *Final Report*, Chapter III.

⁶¹ G. Vincze, *Illúziók és csalódások (Iluzii și decepții)*, Miercurea-Ciuc: Ed. Status, 1999, p. 196.

*favourable attitude of the masses paralyzed any attempt of the Catholic clergy to undertake any opposing action from the very beginning. Overall, the action of nationalizing schools proceeded in perfect tranquillity”.*⁶²

Starting from the second half of the 1950s, there was a systematic process of narrowing and decreasing the scope of activities of Hungarian language education system had.

THE IMPACT OF COMMUNISM ON JEWISH EDUCATION IN CLUJ

In northern Transylvania, after the Vienna Diktat and the enforcement of anti-Semitic Hungarian laws, the proportion of Jewish students admitted to public secondary schools dropped to 3%. However, Chief Rabbi Moshe Carmilly-Weinberger managed to obtain approval from the Hungarian Minister of Religions and Public Instruction in 1940 for the establishment of a Jewish ran gymnasium in Cluj.⁶³ Besides secondary schools, Jewish elementary schools and religious schools operated from 1940 to 1944. In the time period May-June 1944, teachers and students from the Transylvanian schools, together with the Jewish population from the annexed parts of Hungary, suffered martyrdom at Auschwitz-Maidanek.

After the Holocaust, the return of the few survivors raised the issue that there had to be an institutional reconstruction of Jewish education in Transylvania. After the official repeal of racial legislation on December 19, 1944, teaching staff of Jewish origin were reintegrated into education, while Jewish schools resumed their activities.

The issue of education was often addressed by the communist Jewish press after 1945, with its purpose being to “*re-educate school youth in a fair, honest, democratic spirit, and to provide the best possible intellectual preparation to become useful adults of society*”.⁶⁴ In Cluj, the elementary school with Romanian as the main teaching language of instruction but with Hebrew language courses reopened in 1945. A medium-level vocational school in machine construction was inaugurated with the material support of JOINT, alongside another trade

⁶² RCP Cluj County Committee, Inv. 2, Dos. 2/1948, f. 31.

⁶³ Moshe Carmilly Weinberger, *The History of the Jews of Transylvania*, București: Ed. Enciclopedică, 1994, p. 95. See Ladislau Gyémánt, “Jewish Education in Transilvania in the Inter-war Period”, in *Studia Judaica XI-XII*, Cluj-Napoca: Ed. EFES, 2004, pp. 66-71.

⁶⁴ *Unirea*, Year I, No. 8, 21-22.12.1945, p. 3.

school. Following this, in October 1946, the Romanian-Hebrew kindergarten resumed its previous activity. Religious education also resumed. However, all these Jewish educational institutions definitively closed their doors in 1948 when, as a result of the establishment of the communist regime, the education reform saw the introduction of the centralized state system.⁶⁵

PURGING OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS

Rising tensions were not only prevalent among the students but also among the professors at the Cluj University. Noteworthy is the case of Nicolae Mărgineanu, a lecturer at the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Cluj, who was also a key activist of Maniu, the vice president, along with diplomat Vasile Stoica, of the Romanian-American Association. His ties and connections with the West were exploited by his colleagues at the University of Cluj, who began filing complaints against him with the Ministry of Education. His compromise began in 1945 after refusing to collaborate with the Communists when the Security Police requested information on the professor's political background and current activities.⁶⁶

On February 25, 1945, in a *Report on the insinuations and undermining actions of the communist university organization led by Nicolae Mărgineanu, lecturer at the Cluj University and a trusted man of the N.P. Maniu group*, the University Cell Bureau wrote about the mentioned professor deceiving the vigilance and good faith of Prime Minister Petru Groza. He was presented by Radu Stoichiță, a UTC member, as a neutral person even though in 1945, the professor refused to join the Plowmen's Front or the Romanian Communist Party (RCP). Nicolae Mărgineanu opposed any political affiliation, not that he rejected or didn't agree with the left-wing movement. He had even been part of the "Friends of the USSR" association, but he did have a membership in the "Friends of America" association. The Prime Minister was timely warned by comrade Daicoviciu about "the dishonest and dubious character of Mărgineanu", and Radu Stoichiță was admonished. The professor was accused of being in an audience with Groza to prevent the extension of the retirement rights of Professor Ștefănescu Goangă and to defame and cast doubt on the communist members of the teaching staff at the University of Cluj, especially the likes of

⁶⁵ Gyémánt, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

⁶⁶ Lidia Bodea, "In the land of the forgetful, the forgetful one is king", in *Revista 22*, Year XV, No. 914, 14 September 2007.

Alexandru Roșca, Mihail Kernbach, Constantin Daicoviciu, and Emil Petrovici.⁶⁷

According to the University Cell Bureau, Mărgineanu wanted the retirement of Professor Ștefănescu Goangă to take his place in the Psychology department. However, since Tov. Roșca would be his competitor for this position, it was necessary to compromise him as well. Secondly, as a "Manist agent", Mărgineanu aimed to compromise the communist leadership of the University and sow discord between the government and professors in order to break up any form of relationship between them, allowing the "reactionaries" to work undisturbed and take over the University's leadership.

The Communist Senate members requested the continued presence of Professor Ștefănescu Goangă, beyond retirement age, after the University Cell Bureau understood that his political presence was actually necessary as he provides "valuable support in all university matters, especially in the case of new appointments". The communist party leadership thus had the "duty" to intervene in order to:

1. Expose the "Manist agen," Nicolae Mărgineanu, who was then facing the university's disciplinary council for "slander and serious deviations from academic and scientific ethics";
2. Extend the retirement period for Professor Ștefănescu Goangă;
3. Immediately publish the decree appointing Tov. Alexandru Roșca as a lecturer;
4. Amend the higher education law to prevent the reactionary atmosphere at the University and by default be able to retire the teaching staff members over a certain age who have proven themselves to be totally unproductive scientifically and didactically and replace them with capable elements;
5. Purge at least 2-3 notorious reactionaries, to make an example out of them and make others think. Regarding the purge, the University Cell Bureau proposed a "gentle" measure for those purged, but very effective for neutralizing the reaction, which was to deprive them of the right to vote, to be elected and to be part of the appointment committees at the University.⁶⁸

On February 27, 1946, two days after the University Cell Bureau's report, the Cluj RCP regional urgently sought help from the Central Committee of the RCP:

⁶⁷ *Cluj RWP Regional Committee*, Inv. 1, Dos. 1/1945, f. 198-199.

⁶⁸ *Cluj RWP Regional Committee*, Inv. 1, Dos. 1/1945, f. 198-199.

"Comrades! We ask for assistance for comrade Professor Dean Daicoviciu Constantin, a member of the regional committee and a very good activist. Similarly, Comrade Rector Emil Petrovici who likewise is also a good activist and Comrade Prof. Roșca who is responsible at ARLUS and does important work. The comrades from the university provide us with great help in our work among Romanians and at the university. The reaction seeks to compromise them. The campaign is directed against the Tovis and against democratic professors".⁶⁹ The campaign was led by Mărgineanu, who had access to the Prime Minister, the professor managing to gain the friendship of Groza's son, "who often goes to Mr. Prime Minister Groza's and misinforms him, and then comes to Cluj and causes agitation among the students and uses the name of the Prime Minister, saying that he has the Prime Minister on his side. This causes great dissatisfaction among the Tovis and democratic professors.

We kindly ask for your full support to remove the reactionary elements so that these elements do not find open doors everywhere."⁷⁰

Gradually, Mărgineanu fell out of favor with the authorities, and in September 1947, he was "compressed" from the University, meaning his position was removed from the teaching staff. In April of the following year he was arrested, and was taken to the "Great Finance" trial (October 27-November 2, 1948), where he was accused of espionage in favour of "Western imperialists".⁷¹ He was sentenced to 25 years in prison for "high treason through disbelief, crimes of organization and participation in political and paramilitary fascist organizations, rebellion, conspiracy for treason, undermining constitutional order, and rebellion", of which he served 16 years. Lidia Bodea writes that the accusations, copied from the standard rhetoric of trials and sentences that characterized the first wave of communist terror in Romania, had nothing to do with reality, but was based on lies and deception.⁷²

After his release, he wrote several books about the years spent in prison (Malmaison, Jilava, Pitești, Aiud, and Gherla), an autobiographical volume, and another volume, "Amphitheaters and Prisons", about university professors expelled from their chairs or imprisoned by the Communists. Although he was employed as a documentalist at the Academy Branch Library, and later on

⁶⁹ Bodea, *loc. cit.*

⁷⁰ RWP Cluj Regional Committee, Inv. 1, Dos. 9/1946, f. 31.

⁷¹ Ilarion Țiu, "Nicolae Mărgineanu, «spy of the imperialists»" [<http://istoriacomunismului.blogspot.com/2008/01/nicolae-margineanu-spion-al.html>], 04 December 2019.

⁷² Bodea, *loc. cit.*

appointed director of the Institute of Pedagogical Sciences, it wasn't until 1971 that he was allowed to return to the psychology department at the University of Cluj, with the opportunity to teach abroad in Cologne, Bonn, and Hamburg. He was invited to join the Rockefeller Foundation in 1979-1980. But after being diagnosed with cancer, he returned to Romain, where he passed away on June 13, 1980.⁷³

The purging of teaching staff continued in 1947 when, under the pretext of reducing budget expenses, the closure of over 200 chairs was announced. As well as that many more numerous teaching staff was forced into retirement due to new age limits being put in place or simply just forced to retire. These measures were politicized, used to remove those not affiliated with left-wing parties and organizations from higher education.⁷⁴ As a result, the RCP repudiated and rejected several people, some true geniuses, including university professors Petre Sergescu, Constantin Marinescu, Scarlat Lambrino, and Sever Pop. In the outlet Official Gazette No. 160/1948, an "important decision" of the Council of Ministers was published, punishing these four professors for "leaving the country." Along with the withdrawal of their Romanian citizenship, their assets were also confiscated.⁷⁵

Alongside them, it's worth mentioning some⁷⁶ of the professors who taught at the universities in Cluj:

Name, Forename	Short Biography	Sentence
Ghibu Onisifor	General Secretary of Instruction in the Governing Council, corresponding member of the Romanian Academy since 1919. From 1919 to 1945, he was a professor of pedagogy at the University of Cluj. He was expelled from teaching in 1945 for the activity conducted in 1917 in favor of the union with Bessarabia.	Arrested in March 1945 (detention in the Caracal camp), he was released, then rearrested and sentenced by the Military Tribunal of Sibiu to 5 years of imprisonment. He was pardoned in 1958 and died in 1972.

⁷³ Țiu, "Nicolae Mărgineanu...", *loc. cit.*

⁷⁴ Marin Nedelea, *History of Romania in dates, 1940-1995*, București: Ed. Niculescu SRL, 1997, p. 80.

⁷⁵ *Adevărul*, Year 62, No. 17.210, 14.07.1948, p. 4.

⁷⁶ *Cotidianul*, No. 240 (4615), 10.10.2006.

Rimiroiu Gheorghe	Founder and director of the Institute of Microbiology and Serology in Cluj, he graduated from several faculties, including the Faculty of Medicine in Cluj.	Arrested in 1950 and sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment, he passed away in detention (1954). Similarly, his brother died in a camp.
Jordáky Lajos	Professor at the Bolyai University in Cluj	Arrested and tried in 1949 for "bourgeois cosmopolitanism-nationalism"
Marinescu Constantin	Director of the Institute of Universal History in Cluj and the Romanian School in Fontenay aux Bois (France), corresponding member of the Romanian Academy.	Managed to flee the country. Sentenced in absentia to 15 years of imprisonment.
Papilian Victor	A distinguished figure in Romanian medicine, son of General Constantin Papilian, a thinker, university professor, director of the National Theater in Cluj (1928), and the Opera (1934-1938). He was a member of the SDP, loyal to Constantin-Titel Petrescu.	Arrested in 1952, he left prison sick in 1954 and died in 1956 (Cluj).
Iuliu Moldovan (1882-1966) ⁷⁷	Medic, dignitary in the Governing Council of Transylvania, corresponding member of the Romanian Academy (1920), prominent member of the NPP, former undersecretary of state at the Ministry of Labor, Health, and Social Welfare, director of Astra (1932-1947), university professor in Cluj, founder of the School of Hygiene and Public Health in Cluj. He also wrote works about the Romanian healthcare system.	Arrested in 1950, he was interned at Sighet for 24 months, later classified under MAI Decision No. 334/1951, his sentence was increased by 60 months. He was released on July 5, 1955.

CONCLUSION

Along with the other social classes, Cluj's intelligentsia, which included pre-university and university teachers and students, was called to occupy an

⁷⁷ Romulus Rusan, "The Union's Elites Exterminated in Prisons"

[<http://www.revista22.ro/elitele-unirii-exterminate-in-inchisori-5086.html>], 16 June 2023.

important role in political and administrative life. The essential condition was belonging to the communist ideology, rejecting any bourgeois attitudes and enlisting in the struggle to purify the country of any force that would oppose the establishment of the communist regime. The response of the intelligentsia was not a unified one. While some were drawn to the new regime, out of conviction or opportunism, others fought to the death against it. The regime, however, was intolerant of any form of diversity. Communism aimed and pursued the homogenization of society at any cost, which naturally demanded the liquidation of the "elites," the peaks of society and those segments that ensured the enduring development of a society. Priority attention was directed to the "working class," which was easier to manipulate, while the intellectual class was considered as a group and often viewed with suspicion and hatred. There was a fear and concern over true intellectuals who could potentially expose them.⁷⁸

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⁷⁸ Ioan Scurtu, Gheorghe Buzatu, *The History of Romanians in the 20th Century*, București: Ed. Paideia, 1999, p. 561.

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BUCHREZENSION

**ACHILLE MBEMBE, *BRUTALISME*. ÉDITIONS LA DECOUVERTE,
PARIS, 2020, 246 P.**

Andreea Bianca Urs*

Auf allen Kontinenten berühmt, geschätzt und gelesen, ist Achille Mbembe einer der Hauptpfeiler der postkolonialen Studien und liefert ständig Inhalte und Orientierungshilfen für Sozialwissenschaftler und kritische Theoretiker. Achille Mbembe wurde 1957 in Kamerun geboren und ist Professor für Geschichte und Politikwissenschaft an der *University of the Witwatersrand* sowie Forschungsdirektor am *Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research* (WISER) in Johannesburg (Südafrika). In einer Welt, in der Rassenunruhen in vollem Gange sind, bietet die Lektüre des Buches „*Brutalisme*“¹, von Achille Mbembe einen neuen Blick auf die Wechselfälle der heutigen Welt. Das Buch untersucht politische und soziale Phänomene aus der Perspektive des „Brutalismus“, einem Begriff, mit dem der Autor verschiedene Formen der Unterdrückung, Gewalt und Herrschaft durch Machtstrukturen beschreibt. Mbembe untersucht die Art und Weise, wie diese Themen die Gesellschaft beeinflussen und prägen, und zeigt die Zusammenhänge zwischen verschiedenen Formen der Unterdrückung wie Kolonialismus, Apartheid und anderen Formen sozialer Herrschaft und Kontrolle auf.

Seit einiger Zeit ist das Konzept der Globalisierung etwas überholt.² Zu Beginn des neuen Jahrtausends schlug Gayatri Spivak das Konzept der Planetarität vor, um das „Globale“ zu beseitigen, das ihrer Meinung nach

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¹ Achille Mbembe, *Brutalisme*, La Découverte, Paris, 2020.

Ab jetzt steht die Seite in Klammern.

² Jean Comaroff et John L. Comaroff, « Theory from the South : Or, how Euro-America is Evolving Toward Africa », *Anthropological Forum*, Routledge, Vol. 22, no. 2, 2012, 113-131.

verwickelt und unfähig ist, eine ethische Alternative zur heutigen Globalisierung zu bieten³. Planetarität bietet einen Rahmen für die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Versagen postkolonialer und sozialistischer revolutionärer Nationalstaaten, die Globalisierung zu bekämpfen und Befreiung herbeizuführen. Planetarität ruft vor allem neue Formen der Kollektivität, des Internationalismus und des Zusammenlebens hervor, die auf radikaler Andersartigkeit basieren⁴. In seinem *Brutalismus* meint Mbembe, dass Planetarität zwei Dimensionen umfasst: „die Fähigkeit zur globalen Darstellung der Erde“ und nicht unwichtig, „das Bewusstsein einer gemeinsamen Zugehörigkeit zu einer räumlichen Ordnung, die die gesamte Menschheit umfasst“ (S. 61).

Der Autor betont die Auswirkungen des *Brutalismus* auf den Menschen und bringt Themen wie strukturelle Gewalt, Rassenpolitik, Imperialismus, Technologie (im gesamten Aufsatz wird die Idee, dass das Digitale uns vom Körper trennt, mit Argumenten untermauert) und Machtverhältnisse in die Diskussion ein, wobei ein besonderer Schwerpunkt auf der Körperlichkeit liegt („*Brutalismus* funktioniert nicht ohne eine politische Ökonomie der Körper“- S. 43). Darüber hinaus beschreibt Achille Mbembe die schwarzen Körper als einige Grenzen Europas (Kapitel *Grenzkörper* S. 121). In diesem Buch finden wir auch eine sehr scharfe Kritik an der Art und Weise, wie Migration in Europa gesteuert wird, aber auch eine scharfe Kritik an Europa im Allgemeinen, an die der kamerunische Autor seine Leser mit der Zeit gewöhnt hat.

Achille Mbembe glaubt, dass der Westen sich durch Theorie vom „Rest“⁵ unterschieden hat, auch wenn „Afrika der Lieferant einiger der anspruchsvollsten Konzepte war, ohne die die Fassade der modernen Kritik deutlich abgetragen worden wäre“⁶. Wir teilen die Idee, dass „jede Untersuchung der Stellung Afrikas in der Theorie notwendigerweise eine Infragestellung der Erfahrung der Welt im Zeitalter der Planetenmacht darstellt“⁷ und im *Brutalismus* haben wir die Gesamtidee in 8 Kapiteln dargestellt.

³ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *Death of a Discipline*, Columbia University Press, 2003.

⁴ *Ebd.*

⁵ Achille Mbembe, *Out of the dark night. Essays on decolonization*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2021, S. 20.

⁶ Achille Mbembe, « L’Afrique en théorie », *Multitudes*, no. 73, 2018, S. 144.

⁷ *Ebd.*

Der Aufsatz beginnt mit der Erde als endlicher Ressource und geht weiter zu den kranken Körpern, dem Blut, der unendlichen Gewalt, den Kämpfen, den einfachen und schlechten Ideen, die im Inneren der Erde nebeneinander existieren, genau wie in einer medizinischen Klinik (Kapitel 3 – Animismus und Viszeralität). Die Zeilen im Buch zwingen uns unweigerlich dazu, mentale Verbindungen zum Krieg im Osten der Demokratischen Republik Kongo, zur chronischen Gewalt und zum Tod herzustellen, der zur einfachen Banalität geworden ist (S. 151)⁸.

Ziel des Buches ist es, eine kritische Analyse dieser Themen zu liefern und den Leser dazu einzuladen, über die Natur der Macht nachzudenken und darüber, wie sie die Welt, in der wir leben, prägt. „Brutalismus“ rückt wesentliche Fragen zu Politik, Macht und Menschlichkeit in der heutigen Gesellschaft in den Vordergrund. Es ist ein Werk, das kritisches Denken anregt und zu einem besseren Verständnis der Dynamik der Macht und ihrer Auswirkungen auf Einzelpersonen und Gemeinschaften einlädt. Darüber hinaus zeigt uns dieses Buch jedoch präzise und konkret die Rolle Afrikas in dieser neuen Planetenwelt. Welche Rolle nimmt Afrika ein?

In Afrika sind die Risiken des Untergangs am höchsten. Doch gleichzeitig sind dort die Möglichkeiten für kreative Entfaltung am reichsten, und einige der planetaren Einsätze bezüglich der Frage der Reparatur werden sich mit noch größerer Dringlichkeit manifestieren, beginnend mit der Reparatur des Lebens und seiner Ganzheit, der Beständigkeit und Langlebigkeit sich bewegender und zirkulierender menschlicher Körper, der Gegenstände, die uns überallhin begleiten, aber auch dieses untrennbaren Teils von dem, was die Menschheit geworden ist. (S. 24)

Der Autor beharrt darauf, dass der planetarische Wendepunkt im Zustand Afrikas und die tendenzielle Afrikanisierung des globalen Zustands möglicherweise die beiden bedeutenden philosophischen, kulturellen und künstlerischen Ereignisse des 21. Jahrhunderts darstellen werden. An diesem Punkt werden die zentralen Fragen der Zeit, die die Menschheit am

⁸ Ein relevantes Beispiel für Brutalismus ist der Tod des italienischen Botschafters in Goma (Nord-Kivu, Demokratische Republik Kongo) in einem turbulenten und unklaren Kontext im Februar 2021.

Andreea Bianca Urs, "National Security and fulfilled promises? A brief analysis of the State of Siege in the Democratic Republic of Congo", *Studia UBB Europaea*, LXVI, 2, 2021, S. 59.

unmittelbarsten betreffen, mit größter Dringlichkeit und Schärfe auftreten.

Das beinhaltet Themen wie die Neubevölkerung des Planeten, große Bevölkerungsverschiebungen und die Notwendigkeit, Grenzen zu überwinden, sowie die Zukunft des Lebens und der Vernunft oder sogar die unvermeidliche Dekarbonisierung der Wirtschaft. Angesichts der riesigen animistischen Ressourcen wird jeder global ausgerichtete Gedanke zwangsläufig mit der afrikanischen Thematik konfrontiert sein müssen (S. 25).

Das Buch endet mit der Betonung der „Schatten des westlichen Denkens“ (S. 169) und der Hervorhebung der Schulden, die Europa gegenüber dem schwarzen Kontinent hat, mit Hinweisen darauf, was Afrika sein könnte, aber nicht ist. Das Problem der Restitution afrikanischer Kunstobjekte wird angesprochen, ein weiteres ungelöstes Problem (S. 190). Von verwundeten Körpern bis zur Mobilität (S. 95 - 134), von der Enklavierung bis zur Kontraktion der Welt (S. 150- 156), vom Problem des Lebens bis zum Verlust der Welt und der Fähigkeit zur Wahrheit (S. 187-211), bemerkenswert ist die Fähigkeit des Autors, die wesentlichen Probleme der heutigen Welt zusammenzufassen und zu nuancieren. Durch den Brutalismus finden wir ein Manifest für das Bewusstsein für Afrikas Platz in der Welt.

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