STUDIA UBB. PHILOSOPHIA, Vol. 66 (2021), 1, pp. 189-211
(RECOMMENDED CITATION)
DOI:10.24193/subbphil.2021.1.10

ROMAN INGARDEN'S EGOLOGY AND CARTESIANISM

WOJCIECH STARZYŃSKI*

ABSTRACT. The article focuses on the problem of egology in the thought of Roman Ingarden, a conception that offers a creative and critical response to Husserl's egology and converges with the historical conception of the ego in Descartes. It analyses the problem in two stages based on two important texts by Ingarden: *Controversy over the Existence of the World* and *Man and Time*. Starting with reflections on the status of pure consciousness, Ingarden recognises the pure ego as something solely abstract compared with the worldly and irreducible real ego. From there his reflections on the ego move on to the problem of its substantiality, specific temporality as well as the role and experience of the body to finally produce a philosophy of existence with ethical and personalistic overtones. In this way Ingarden recreates the egological journey in Descartes, who, searching for the foundation of knowledge, identified subjectivity as the union of body and soul and saw its fulfilment in the ethical experience of generosity.

Keywords: *egology, ego, Cartesianism, Ingarden, Husserl, substantiality, temporality, human existence, realism.*

I. Introduction

When considering the possible inspirations Ingarden might have drawn from the philosophical tradition, people rarely mention Descartes.[1] Indeed, Ingarden himself refers to Descartes rather marginally. He was not a historian of philosophy and it should perhaps come as no surprise that none of his texts makes direct mention of Descartes' philosophy. However, if one were to identify a meaningful point of departure for the exploration of his attitude to Descartes' thought it would

* Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Warszawa, Poland. Email: wstarzyn@ifispan.edu.pl.

[1] Research into Cartesian themes in Ingarden's thought may be inspired to some extent by texts about Descartes' philosophy that were influenced by Ingarden and written from the perspective of ontology (Tarnowski 2017) and epistemology (Gierulanka 1962). This text explores the egological dimension absent in both these authors.

have to be in the context of his discussion with Husserl, and specifically its Cartesian part related to consciousness and the ego. In his conception of consciousness, Husserl did make rather frequent references to Descartes' solutions, and they were by no means unequivocally positive. Influenced by the neo-Kantian interpretation of Descartes, he raised a number of objections against the thought of the "father of modernity"[2]. One of the main such objections concerned the status of consciousness which, according to Husserl, was not adequately separated (or cleansed) from the real world or the real *ego*, which led Descartes to "absurd transcendental realism"[3]. Interestingly, Ingarden does not share Husserl's objections about this aspect of Descartes' philosophy. Instead, he approaches it rather positively, deems it worthy of consideration and adopts it as a starting point for his own conception[4]. It might therefore be said, preliminarily, that Ingarden turns Husserl's objections around: one should not so much think of *cogito* as totally independent of the world and, ultimately, making the world meaningful as begin by describing the "natural attitude" within which

> I relate to the world or I can do it in many different ways: watching it enquiringly, acknowledging certain states of affairs, encapsulating them in concepts, comparing, differentiating, counting, reaching conclusions on the basis of established facts etc. Similarly, I may like, dislike, enjoy, be saddened by, desire or avoid certain objects as well as hope for, fear, influence or be influenced by some events etc. All these various ways of relating to the world may be encapsulated in the Cartesian term *cogito*; they are *my lived experiences.* As long as I *live currently*, I am present to myself as someone who perceives, imagines, thinks, feels, desires etc. It is as such that I find myself within and in relation to the world which is always given to me in its real existence, even when I suffer from delusions or exclude some objects from its scope.[5]

[2] see Mehl 2020; Barbaras 2017, p. 14-19.

[3] Husserl 1960, p. 24.

[4] see Ingarden 2013, p. 39-40.

[5] Ingarden 1919, p. 338. In Part 4 of his early text *Dążenia fenomenologów* [The Aims of Phenomenologists] devoted to immanent cognition and the phenomenological cognitive attitude, Ingarden presents Husserl's main views on pure consciousness. He refers to Cartesian *cogito* as enworlded (following Husserl), but does not repeat Husserl's transcendental objections against this conception, clearly abandoning characteristic Husserlian rhetoric in favour of transcendentalism. In the subsequent edition of the text from the early 1960s, Ingarden is more vocal about the need to differentiate the various forms of behaviour towards the world from *cogito's* self-presence. However, the latter never removes the irreducible feeling of the world's reality: "all my behaviours towards things and processes in this world involve in one way or another, more or less importantly, centrally or peripherally, my conscious experiences that Descartes once referred to by the common term

Following this lead, I will make the hypothesis that the problem of egology in Ingarden, developed in discussion with Husserl, bears the hallmarks of a certain Cartesian attitude or at least shares some of its aspects. However, it is worth pointing out that the very status of a philosophical sub-discipline accorded to egology may be problematic in the context of Ingarden's thought, especially when it comes to the role the discipline is supposed to play in relation to ontology. The reason is that Ingarden is believed to have been primarily an ontologist which may mean that any detailed research into his work needs to be carried out on the basis of previously reached ontological conclusions. Yet, as it concerns the problem of consciousness, and then the *ego*, Ingarden identifies a specific first-person mode as a crucial component of the fundamental experience based on which one may talk about the special status of the *ego*[6]. This raises the question of whether the problems of egology may be reflected upon autonomously or even considered to represent a privileged domain with a bearing on ontological problems formulated at a later stage.

The interrelation between egology and ontology becomes specifically important in the context of the thesis about the substantiality of the ego, i.e. at the point where the reflections upon the ego enter the area of ontology. As we know, in Descartes, the problem of substance is introduced in the *Meditations* as the *ego* makes the first-person declaration "I am a substance"[7]. It is only once this first and fundamental statement is made that further theses on substances different from the *ego* may be put forward as part of "first philosophy". Is it then the case that Ingarden attributed the concept of substance to the ego based on some general ontological knowledge or can this problem be interpreted as primary and autonomous? Without claiming to be able to settle this complex issue within the confines of this article, I only want to highlight it, assuming that it is possible to read Ingarden's egological texts somewhat independently of his ontological work.

Ingarden's conception of egology appears mainly in two of his texts: fragments of Vol. 2 of *Controversy about the Existence of the World*[8] and *Man and Time*[9]. I will try to identify and explore the "egological" Cartesian themes that are present in these texts, or even – to refer loosely to Husserl's terminology – outline a "Cartesian

cogito. As long as I am alive, I constantly experience something, behaving in a certain way, and when I experience, I relate not only to the objects of the world that surrounds me in one way or another (e.g. with kindness or hostility), but I am continuously present to myself as someone who thinks, feels, sees or hears, desires or is repulsed, loves or hates, is delighted or indignant etc. As such I find myself in the world and always find the world real" (Ingarden 1963, p. 361).

6 see Ingarden 2016, p. 696-697.

7 Descartes 1984, II, 30, 31; AT VII, 44, 45.

8 Ingarden 2016, p. 645-735.

9 Ingarden 1983, p. 33-52.

way" insofar as these themes make up a discernible series of theses and arguments. Given the fact that Ingarden undoubtedly adopted Husserl's position as his main point of reference, could it be possible that, as part of his discussion with Husserl, or, more precisely, as part of the already mentioned neutralisation of Husserl's objections against Descartes, he would also model his thought on Descartes' solutions, especially those related to the status of the ego that Husserl, motivated perhaps by historical circumstances, was too quick to reject? I will understand the "Cartesian way" as a continuation and expansion of the historical thought that often remained within the domain of intuitions and premonitions but can now be clarified or modernised thanks to the advancements in phenomenology so that it becomes a deep source of inspiration.

II. The egological theme in the *Controversy about the Existence of the World*

Based on these assumptions, I will first read the key paragraphs from Vol. 2 of the *Controversy about the Existence of the World*. To begin reconstructing the Cartesian way, let us assume that the phenomenon of thinking is a conscious, individual and temporary experience (*cogitatio*) that creates, in its multitude, a "stream of experiences"[10] structured into a process.

Next, this undefined multitude is reduced (restricted) to "pure" lived experience, i.e. experience correlated by a real being, or the world, which is also reduced in its own way[11]. It seems that it is already at this point that Ingarden's reflections may be juxtaposed with Cartesian operations known from his *Rules* or *Meditations* where one can talk both about cleansing or structuring the field of experience (towards clear and distinct perception) as well as constituting the field of the subject. Regardless of how Cartesian operations are assessed from the phenomenological standpoint, pure consciousness could be correlated by, for example, the material world accounted for through its chief attribute of extension and considered to be an extended substance.

Third, Ingarden considers the pure ego to be the subject of pure experiences[12]. Writing about lived experiences, or their stream, he concludes that they must have a subjective foundation—the pure ego. Doing so, he confronts the classic thesis of Husserl who, influenced by neo-Kantianism, departed from Descartes in that respect, advocating for the need to make a sharp distinction between the pure ego and the

[10] Ingarden 2016, p. 649.
[11] Ingarden 2016, p. 675.
[12] Ingarden 2016, p. 676.

real person (as belonging to the world). Ingarden finds this solution unsatisfactory as it does not eliminate the problem of whether pure experiences are still lived through by specific individuals and also whether the (transcendental) ego, thus understood, remains a real person. As for Descartes, his famous *cogito* dictum from the *Meditations on First Philosophy* may also be said to be fraught with ambiguity and vagueness: on the one hand, it is undoubtedly a first-person statement made by a specific individual, whilst on the other one assumes its universality. As regards the instance introduced in the *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* which follows specific methodological rules to constitute the objects of *Mathesis* as scientific objects, it definitely does not have individuality, being a set of universal rules that an anonymous subject must comply with.[13]

To the extent that Ingarden finds the status of pure ego problematic,[14] and in the context of the problems of idealism and realism that he raises, he then focuses his reflections on the issue of the agency of consciousness as the distinguishing feature of the idealistic position.[15] It should be emphasised that, both for Ingarden and Descartes, the *ego* is not a world-creating instance in spite of having specific agency[16]. What this means for our reflections is that Descartes' position may be considered convergent with Ingarden's and, in that sense, realistic. As for the problem of *cogito*'s individuality, Ingarden's solution could be encapsulated in the thesis

[13] The difference may explain why the *Rules* became obligatory reading for neo-Kantian interpreters of Descartes who largely inspired Husserl (see Mehl 2020, Dufour 2006, Natorp 1882). Ingarden in turn keeps his distance from the theory of the object presented in the *Rules*, calling it a class theory (see Ingarden 2016, 30, fn. 68; 161, fn. 527).

[14] In this context, see Ingarden's later explanations made during his lectures in ethics: "Some might perhaps want to introduce a radical difference here, e.g. Husserl would say that this object is a person, a psycho-physical individual, whereas the act of justice or injustice is performed by a pure subject of pure consciousness. I do not deny that this conception is possible, but I do not believe in the existence of pure subjects that—within our experience—are not somehow related to persons, psycho-physical individuals, and I do not believe in a person (i.e. I think that such a conception of a person is false) that would be deprived of a centre of action, thinking, decision-making etc." (Ingarden 1989, p. 273-274).

[15] The notion of idealism in philosophy is highly ambiguous and becomes even more so when applied to Husserl's phenomenology (on that topic see W. Płotka 2019, p. 103-131). On the one hand, it seems that Ingarden needed a rather authoritative (hence, perhaps, misleading) definition of Husserl's position as idealistic to develop his own thought described as ontological and realistic. On the other hand, one cannot forget about the still insufficiently explored, yet very vehement, reaction against the position Husserl expounded in *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* that came not only from Ingarden but also from a larger group of phenomenologists active in the Munich and Göttingen circles. In this text I try to follow the Cartesian egological strand in Ingarden's thought "outside realism and idealism," as suggested by W. Płotka, although I do not treat this phrase as equivalent to "abandoning the Cartesian theme in phenomenology" (ibid. 128-129). On the contrary, I think it reopens and revives this theme.

[16] see Descartes 1984, II, 28, 31; AT VII, 41, 45.

that, even though it results from an abstraction, pure consciousness is possible and its bond with the real and individual ego is never broken. "Universal consciousness—insofar as anything determinate can be understood by this—is either some general *idea* of consciousness or an abstraction that in itself is non-self-sufficient, an abstract moment that can occur *in concreto* in the individual streams of consciousness, or in the individual experiences, only as a general structure of these"[17].

In the following step of the egological argument in Vol. 2 of the *Controversy about the Existence of the World,* Ingarden raises the problem of the temporality of consciousness as a stream of lived experiences. He acknowledges that the nature of lived experiences is that of a process, yet believes that the process is not linear but characterised by internal tensions, contradictions, discontinuities and gaps (as it is evidenced by the examples of lost consciousness or sleep). If the stream of consciousness is discontinuous, the multitude of lived experiences should again be grounded in the ego as their permanent foundation and organising principle thanks to which the stream can preserve its unity. The negative proof of that are psycho-pathological cases or the phenomenon of lost consciousness. Ingarden also clearly refers to the Cartesian hypothesis of the evil demon, which he interprets as a different consciousness intentionally engaged in creating our lived experiences, a hypothesis that clashes with and is overcome by the first-person truth-claim of the lived experience itself included in the *cogito*[18].

As regards the unity of the ego in temporary terms, it can be considered not only in the context of the immediate present marked out by the currently performed *cogitatio*, but also as intuitive and non-reflexive experience which surpasses the ego, a feeling of oneself that Ingarden links not only to Brentano's *das innere Bewusstein* and Bergson's *intuition*, but also to Cartesian *ego cogito*[19]. Writing about the link between the lived experience and the subjective nature of the ego, Ingarden states firmly: "R. Descartes already knew this, and said it expressly by declaring: *cogito, sum*—except that the *basis* of this necessary connectivity was not brought out into the open in Descartes. The concept of the ego is also not worked out to satisfactory clarity in Descartes"[20].

Ingarden thus identifies the ego as transcendental in relation to individual and present lived experiences, which enables him to advance the thesis about the ego's ontic autonomy, a thesis that may be said to resonate with the Cartesian first-

[17] Ingarden 2016, p. 647.
[18] Ingarden 2016, p. 661-662.
[19] see Ingarden 2016, p. 674, fn. 2292.
[20] Ingarden 2016, p. 683, fn. 2306.

person phrase "I am a substance" from *Meditation III*[21].

Coming back to the intuition of "living through" *(Durchleben)* as the experiential foundation of the ego's subjectivity, the question is whether this intuition has any content. As opposed to, for example, Kant, it seems that Ingarden links this intuition with special first-person knowledge that can be provisionally called existential and that would make it possible to go beyond the theoretical, pure ego. On the other hand, this raises the major problem of how to access the ego effectively and positively expand the content of that knowledge. From that perspective, the ego becomes a reality that is secret and profound. It is aware of that reality and experiences it in the most elementary way, even though it still knows little about it. Acquiring certain existential knowledge is possible, even if it remains an open question whether such knowledge can be discussed within the confines of philosophy. It seems that, for Ingarden, the most adequate way in which one can access or have insight into the profound ego is through aesthetic or moral experiences[22]. What is important at this stage of our reflections is that the ego is no longer an undefined and inaccessible foundation of lived experiences, but becomes, in the words of Ingarden, a personal centre and, eventually, a psychophysical individual object equipped with a body.

At this point, it is worth mentioning a theme that might be called performative although not in a narrow, linguistic sense. What Ingarden's ego performs is a self-constitutive expansion and transformation of reality. It extends its influence and the scope of its being, achieving this in a special way through its own body. This profound and hardly knowable ego manifests itself directly in behaviour (it is characterised by a specific form of behaviourism). In this context, Ingarden introduces the concept of the force of being and declares, citing Bergson's related concept of the tension of duration, that the ego feels the presence or absence of the force, realising its subjective potentiality and actuality.[23] Lived through, the ego is undergoing a process of continuous updating that cannot be reduced to Husserl's dispositions or habitualities. At the same time, the reality encompassed by the ego's being is subject to changes that cannot be viewed as purely cognitive. On the other hand, a characteristic feature of the ego as it performs acts of the will and feels the force of being are self-affective experiences (delight, surprise, joy, suffering). It is in these special moments that one can talk of the very essence of the ego manifesting itself, always marked by some generic qualities (e.g. general human features), but also specific, individual

[21] Descartes 1984, II, 30, 31; AT VII, 44, 45.

[22] see Ingarden 2016, p. 690.

[23] While I doubt whether the concept of the force is metaphorical as Marek Piwowarczyk claims (Piwowarczyk 2013, p. 292), I am inclined to follow Filip Kobiela's suggestion that it was Ingarden's way to describe the specific causality of the ego, although I do not believe that it should have a purely reactive and negative role as a "centre of resistance" (see Kobiela 2011, p. 136).

traits combined into a unique whole or *haecceitas*[24].

To sum up the egological argument from the *Controversy*: Ingarden considers pure consciousness as inseparable from the soul and a kind of abstraction. He links pure consciousness with the ego through including it in the scope of the soul and its "concrete fabric",[25] which leads to the problem of the dual phenomenological status of the body: as one's own body lived through in the first person and as a spatial, physical body.

For Ingarden, lived experience of one's own body takes place in two streams of consciousness—or different modalities in this context—whilst the body as such should be understood as a special field of action for the ego in its specific scope of being. Thus, and finally, Ingarden treats man as a dynamic, organic whole comprised of more or less closely related elements that are irreducible to one another. By the same token, he rejects parallelism in favour or a specific form of interactionism where separate domains of being overlap, exerting influence and "intruding" on one another. Let us also bear in mind that Descartes' *Meditations on First Philosophy* concludes with the introduction of the problem of the substantial union between body and soul where the two mutually irreducible and partially independent elements make up a unified, stand-alone whole of a new type corresponding to the "third primitive notion"[26] and confirmed by the first-person process of living through and experiencing

[24] Ingarden 2016, p. 692.

[25] Ingarden 2016, p. 696. The expression used by Ingarden evokes interesting associations with the conceptions of the living body (*la chair*) developed in the phenomenologies of Merleau-Ponty, Michel Henry or Jean-Luc Marion (see Starzyński 2017, 2012).

[26] Descartes 1991, III, 218; AT III, 665. It is beyond the limits of this article to reflect further on how these authors understand the soul and its relationship to the body. It should be mentioned, however, that even though Descartes rejected the tripartite division of the soul introduced by Aristotle, he did retain the concept of the soul in his "first philosophy," and even gave it an increasingly greater weight, identifying its two, intertwined dimensions. In the quoted letter to princess Elizabeth of 21 March 1643, he mentions that "there are two facts about the human soul on which depend all the knowledge we can have of its nature. The first is that it thinks, the second is that, being united to the body, it can act and be acted upon along with it (...)" and, further on, "as regards the soul and the body together, we have only the notion of their union, on which depends our notion of the soul's power to move the body, and the body's power to act on the soul and cause its sensations and passions" (Descartes III, 218; AT III, 665). In Ingarden's account of the soul, the dimension of theoretical (pure) thinking is expanded by adding practical actions and emphasising the role of the soul's "force" that can operate in "solidarity" with the body: "We also stumbled earlier onto the remarkable phenomenon of the solidarity, or even unity, between the consciousness-ego, in particular the ego of sensory perceiving, and "my" body" (Ingarden 2016, p. 703). It is not clear to what extent Ingarden was familiar with the evolution of Descartes' views on the "union between body and soul" and how much he might have been inspired by it. In the *Controversy,* he first says that "direct experience of ourselves as a concrete human being appears to be in conflict with widespread conceptions of both a scientific and philosophical bent (especially since Descartes'

the ego as equipped with its own body ("the body which by some special right, I called 'mine'")[27]. By exploring the union between body and soul, Descartes arrives at the problem of the ethical subject whose magnanimity and generosity (*générosité*) are experienced in first person as wonder and self-fulfilment[28]. Therefore, Descartes' expanded conception of the ego as a substantial union between body and soul definitely resonates with the conception advanced by Ingarden who sees the ego as a primary being, a profound, but not inaccessible, reality without which reality as such (the world of different types of "objects") could not be accessed and analysed, including through ontological analyses.

III. The egological theme in *Man and Time*

Let us now move on to other text by the Polish phenomenologist: *Man and Time.* I will examine this text in order to verify the egological "way" from the *Controversy about the Existence of the World,* outlined rather briefly so far, which, although it comes later chronologically, undoubtedly articulates Ingarden's position. As for the text itself, it is worth remembering that, in spite of being written with the general public in mind, it has been edited three times, and it is specifically in the final version that one can find direct references to the solutions from the *Controversy* (both texts were written in roughly the same period, if not simultaneously). Moreover, a closer look at the timeline of events shows that, in 1937, Ingarden participated in *Congrès Descartes*, an international philosophical congress in Paris organised with the immediate purpose of marking the 300th anniversary of the publication of Descartes' *Discourse on the Method.* He took this opportunity to deliver his paper *Der Mensch und die Zeit* [Man and Time]. That the text was much more important than its commemorative nature might suggest is best proved by the fact that, apart from the first version published in German in Vol. 8 of congress proceedings entitled *Analyse reflèxive et transcendance* alongside such authors as

times). The customary juxtaposition of the two alien factors (body and soul) does not appear to be borne out by original experience (...)" (Ingarden 2016, p. 702-703) to observe a few pages later: "But even Descartes—despite his two-substance theory—expressly points out toward the end of his "Meditations" the peculiar unity of the soul with the body in each and every one of us" (ibid., p. 707, fn. 2342). In this context, it is also necessary to highlight the potential problem of differentiating between the seemingly synonymous concepts of soul, spirit and person in Ingarden (the second and third concepts are absent in Descartes) who mentions the issue in his lecture on the thought of Edith Stein, among others (see Ingarden 1994, p. 307-309).

[27] Descartes 1984, II, 52, AT VII, 76.

[28] see Descartes 1984, I, 384-388; Marion 2013, 244-249.

Maurice Blondel, Leon Brunschvicg, Henry Corbin, Gabriel Marcel, Jean Wahl, and Oskar Becker[29], it also came out in two extended editions in Polish. The first was published in 1938 in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* [Philosophical Review][30]. The text was revised into its final version during the war to be published in 1946[31], laying the foundation for further anthropological research that I will not discuss in this article.

Ingarden's reflections in *Man and Time* take as their point of reference a Latin quotation from Descartes. He writes: „Descartes' words [from *Meditations on First Philosophy,* which] are alive and valid even today"[32]: "Hoc pronuntiatum, ego sum, ego existo, quoties a me profertur, vel mente concipitur necessario esse verum / Cette proposition : *Je suis, j'existe*, est nécessairement vraie, toutes les fois que je la prononce, ou que je la conçois en mon esprit / this proposition (pronuntiatum) *I am, I exist*, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me, or conceived in my mind"[33]. This first-person existential statement opens up Descartes' and Ingarden's reflections on the essence of the ego which remains enigmatic and demands to be explored: "But I do not yet have a sufficient understanding of what this 'I' is, that now necessarily exists (*nondum vero satis intelligo, quis nam sim ego ille, qui iam necessario sum),*" writes Descartes[34]. Ingarden says that "the problem of the essence of our ego as a human being living in time needs to be posed anew on the basis of the different experiences of time, and new solutions of it need to be sought"[35] and at the end of the text in its final version he refers to the *Meditations* again: "Who am I – Descartes' question returns once more – who persist in time (...)"[36].

This clearly Cartesian inspiration requires some additional comments. First, Ingarden quotes a unique form of Descartes' statement from the *Meditations* without even mentioning the traditional or canonical formula *cogito ergo sum* from the *Discourse on the Method* or *Principles of Philosophy*.[37] It may be said that Ingarden refers to what is usually called the Cartesian *cogito*, emphasising the existential moment that defines and forces itself upon the ego, but that does not privilege the intellectualist conception of the subject, of which Descartes is commonly accused. The first-person assertion of existence points to a certain primary experience that, even though it must

[29] Ingarden 1937.
[30] Ingarden 1938.
[31] Ingarden 1946.
[32] Ingarden 1983, p. 42.
[33] Descartes 1984, II, 17; AT VII, 25.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ingarden 1983, p. 42.
[36] Ingarden 1983, p. 51.
[37] On the different forms of *cogito* in Descartes' work and its special version from the *Meditations,* see Marion 1996, 7-30.

be thought and realised, seems to encompass the reality of the ego much more widely

than the mere process of thinking in the form of the stream of consciousness (as it was later put metaphorically). What is more, the first-person existential statement appears to acknowledge the existence of a special and privileged being.

Second, what Descartes pinpoints in this key ontological experience is the moment of *profertur*, i.e. a certain component act characterised by special performative activity.[38] In line with this interpretation, the essence of the ego would not consist in mere duration or remaining in existence but would require a moment of specific self-affirmation. Whatever the relation between the actual nature of asserted existence and the activity of the ego perceiving itself as existing, the asserted existence does allow one to identify a certain, still undefined, albeit specific, being. Bringing to the fore the existential formula of the ego was not Ingarden's original idea—among others, it brings to mind Husserlian reconstructions of Descartes' way based precisely on *Meditations II* —but the use he made of it seems to foreshadow the direction of many Cartesian studies in the second half of the 20th century, coinciding interestingly with Cartesian inspirations present in French phenomenology[39]. As I have already emphasised, according to Ingarden, the Cartesian *ego* must be brought up to date and made phenomenologically concrete. The Polish philosopher wants to reach that goal primarily through addressing „the problem of the essence of our ego as a human being living in time"[40].

Thus, inspired by Descartes and having asserted the existence of the ego, which he considers to be a primary and fundamental experience, Ingarden asks about the ego's essence which is supposedly accessed in the domain of time that the ego experiences. Notably, Descartes emphasises the fact that the proposition about the ego not only applies to a certain point in the present, as it were, but being a repeated experience (*quoties, quamdiu*), it refers eventually to something more durable, a temporal continuity that goes beyond the recurring "now" moments. This definitely anticipates and lays the ground for Descartes' focus on the problem of the substantiality of the ego, which Husserl criticised vehemently as a "fateful change (*verhängnisvollen*

[38] On the performative actions of Descartes' *cogito* see Marion 1981, 370-396 who, all the same, interprets the fact of the ego performing the act of a "thought thinking itself" expressed in the existential statement *Ego sum, ego existo* as "existence abstraite et universelle" "une énonciation vide": "L'existence performée reste abstraite, sauf que la marque encore une détermination : sa polarisation par l'ego. La pensée vide ne s'énonce qu'autant qu'un *ego* l'énonce; l'existence abstraite ne se performe ainsi qu'autant qu'un ego y trouve son mode d'existence" (ibid., 383). Based on the above formulas, it is hard to ascertain whether the self-affirmation of the ego in an existential statement goes anywhere towards defining it as a substance.

[39] see Starzyński 2014.

[40] Ingarden 1983, p. 42.

Wendung)"[41]. One might even suppose that *existo* is the first expansion of the assertion *sum*, the latter being empty of content, and already advances a preliminary thesis about the ontic status of the *ego*.[42]

Hence, Descartes adopts the proposition *ego sum, ego existo* as a departure point for defining the ego as a substance, which would mean not only that he surpasses the narrow understanding of the ego as a mere operator of *cogitationes*, but also that he goes beyond the theoretical problem of providing a foundation for knowledge. Substance itself would be understood here as related to independent and persisting being of the ego.

In addition, in *Meditations*, Descartes does not treat the ego as a perfectly transparent reality, but rather as reality that must be clarified by means of egology: "I will converse with myself and scrutinize myself more deeply; and in this way I will attempt to achieve, little by little, a more intimate knowledge of myself"[43]—which suggests a need for a totally new type of research or reflection.

Let us therefore assume that Ingarden cites the dictum from the *Meditations* intentionally, seeing it as an inspiration to go beyond the purely epistemological *cogito* that can only be justified in a narrow scope. From that perspective, interpreting *ego cogito* as an Archimedean foundation of certain knowledge (in the sense of nascent modern science and, later on, transcendental phenomenology) must be abandoned in favour of a different type of research where the ego determines the first-person experience—individual at first and then collective—of being human (an "I" and a "we"). "I am" is a proposition about my existence that is not uttered in a universal form as part of a "we" asserting a community of that experience.

From the very first words of his treatise, Ingarden positions himself in first-person plural: "We all live in time and we know it"[44]. However, he believes that, if the essence of the ego should be examined as "man living in time," the experience breaks into "two fundamentally different ways of experiencing time and ourselves

[41] Husserl 1960, p. 24.

[42] Jean-Marie Beyssade interprets the existential statement *Ego sum* as a direct ontological experience where: "l'affirmation que je suis enveloppe depuis le début l'affirmation que je suis une chose qui pense, puisqu'exister et être une chose sont ici termes synonimes" (Beyssade 1979, p. 227). Although he seems to derive the ego's substantiality from the experience of the multitude of acts requiring one subject: "la première vérité est-elle toujours accompagnée de la condition qui la fait connaître : la substance, qui jamais n'est immédiatement perçue, se donne par l'intermédiaire de ses actes ou de ses modes" (ibid., 223)—he does acknowledge that the existential statement applies to "l'individualité d'un Moi, mais aussi quelque chose comme une prémisse, qui lui sert d'antécédent logique, voire psychologique ou *chronologique* (my underlining - W. S.)" (ibid., 222).

[43] Descartes 1984, II, 24; AT VII, 34.

[44] Ingarden 1983, p. 33.

in time"[45]. The first of the two experiences of time discussed by Ingarden in an attempt to clarify the essence of the ego is related to our belief in our own true and durable existence—i.e. substantiality in the sense of Descartes—that accompanies the ego in spite of the simultaneous experience of constantly changing and passing *cogitationes.* "According to the first [experience of time and ourselves in time] it seems that what 'truly' exists is we ourselves; time, on the other hand, is only something derivative and merely phenomenal"[46]. Ingarden carries out a phenomenological analysis of this primary belief in the durability of the ego—that is the basis on which Descartes defines the ego as a substance—citing some more specific arguments to corroborate it.

First, his aim is to clarify the problem of the ego's permanent identity as the main component of that belief. This has to do with experiencing one's own identity that resists change and the passage of time even though it is continuously confronted with them. "In the constant passage and incessant newness of time I continually feel myself to be this same human being and I live in the primordial sensation that I shall remain myself in the future"[47]. This identity corresponds to Locke's transitive unity, coming down to the belief that "in the course of my life I am one individuum"[48].

One remains the same in time, not only in abstraction or as a postulate, but in the sense that "in the course of that very life I remain this same human being, in his full qualitatively invariant, determinate nature"[49]. This means that the "nature" is specific and unique for each individual as Ingarden's use of proper names suggests: "it is this qualification that I call my nature—thus, for each other person, e.g., Adam Mickiewicz or some Joe Doe"[50]. As we can see, Ingarden does not put forward any metaphysical thesis about universal human nature, but works on the basis of first-person and second-person experience of the belief in the specific durability of one's own and other people's individual natures expressed by a set of key qualities that resist the phenomenon of changeability typical of experienced time.

In this light, Ingarden defines the ego as a whole constituted of three components, mutually related moments: (a) the phenomenon of consciousness and conscious experiences which should be contrasted from (b) "psychic states and processes, as well as psychical and physical properties"[51], assuming their indirectly conscious nature, and finally (c) "a certain completely unrepeatable and specific

[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ingarden 1983, p. 33-34.
[48] Ingarden 1983, p. 34.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.

permanent qualification which determines the whole of me as a human being"[52]. Appearing in first person, the "nature" mentioned above provides the foundation for the experience of being oneself: "I feel myself to be a person constituted by this specific nature"[53]. A negative illustration of this concretely experienced identity of the ego is the phenomenon of split personality which represents an effective possibility of the ego's disintegration and, positively, lays bare the constantly renewed "ability to recognize my own self as I was yesterday [...] the feeling of being the self of my actual 'now' and my self of 'yesterday'"[54].

According to Ingarden, profound mental and physical changes, the phenomena of alienation and failure to understand oneself, occurring throughout the life of the ego, are certain variants confirming this "more or less distinctive feeling of being myself, of being the same as I once was"[55]. Conscious experiences, on the other hand, remain the most direct manifestations of the ego, but neither exhaust nor encompass all of human life. "I, as a human being, also appear to be independent of my conscious experiences in the sense that I can *be* even when they are not. [...] I am, in accordance with this feeling, a *lasting or abiding being*, whereas my experiences are merely *transient externalizations* or manifestations of me myself. I alone comprise the source and ultimate substratum of the experiences which on their side are something grounded in me [...] "[56].

It is worth observing that, in this analysis, whose point is to demonstrate the identity as well as autonomy of the ego as something specific for its ontic substantiality, Ingarden reconciles its two understandings, while referring to the classical definition of substance as a substrate or foundation for different properties. He founds this egologically and phenomenologically derived substantiality on the constantly repeated (albeit mundane, common and hence rather overlooked by philosophers) experience of life continuity that cannot be undermined by the transition from consciousness to sleep and vice versa: "After a period of being unconscious or after a dreamless sleep, I awake not only as the same human being that I was prior to falling asleep, but also as someone who existed whilst I was asleep"[57].

Therefore, when accounting for the ego as an independent whole providing a foundation and substrate for different properties, Ingarden says that it is a reality of a higher order compared to the reality of lived experiences or processes: "I am,

[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] ibid., p. 35, 34.
[57] Ingarden 1983, p. 35.

and have the feeling of being, a real entity, real to a higher degree, as it were, than my experiences"[58].

Ingarden eventually links the feeling of ego's existence not with current experiences, but first and foremost with being placed in the experienced world and taking effective action within it. In this sense, Ingarden defines the crucial specificity of the ego as not only having this or that special feature, but also as "really acting": "my action is not consumed in the experiencing itself, but in attacking a certain actuality with my powers"[59].

It is also worth noting that, existing as a durable reality of a higher order, the ego does so in an inter-subjective world to which it lends some of its quality of durability. "It seems to me likewise with respect to other people that they, too, are continually the self-same individuals, though I do not at all thereby ignore what happens to them, nor they change in this way or that as a result"[60]. Next, it is a world of things appearing in a non-theoretical fashion: "with these same houses, streets and cities, yesterday and today, and these same pieces of old furniture surrounding me since my childhood years, known to me in their silence and passivity"[61].

According to Ingarden, the higher order of reality, or rather its transcendence, that is typical of the ego also manifests itself in a specific dynamic relation to time whereby one can turn towards the past and future at will with the possibility of "reviving" them. This relation is not necessarily theoretically-cognitive or contemplative. On the contrary, turning towards the past seems to be woven into existence as it copes with a "burden" that puts specific restrictions on freedom. In line with Ingarden's thesis whereby I am aware of myself on the basis on my constant, albeit not directly perceptible, features that are manifested in action, living existential memory operates primarily in the domain of past actions.

> I (…) live under a distinct weight of the past; I am bound by it to a greater or lesser degree. I bend what I do 'now' to adjust to events and occurrences, which, though they had passed, still were, and which, once having occurred and been revivified by memory, *weigh* on my present. [...] I feel constrained not only because this or that once happened, but because it still exists for me today in some remarkable way […] I simply feel myself bound by, for example, obligations and promises once made. [...] There is a certain special noblesse of my own past, 'qui m'oblige' still today, just as there is a so called 'curse of the past', an anathema of culpabilities long ago perpetrated and past, yet still determining the course of my present life.[62]

[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid., 35-36.
[61] Ibid., p. 36.
[62] Ibid., p. 37.

In this context, Ingarden follows traditional metaphysical terminology to describe something that he calls preservation in being where, in each experience of the present, the past becomes revived and assimilated in a special way, including through efforts to break away from it.

Of course, talking about subjectivity constituting itself in the present, one needs to take account of the subjective inclination towards the future and "living through" it, which, however, should not be equated to Husserl's protention or Heidegger's "being-towards-death" or projection. Ingarden believes that the future is outlined in the present broadly and in many different ways as something awaiting oneself in the form of what can and cannot be anticipated. In the first-person mode this will manifest itself variously as waiting, hope or concern. Thus, Ingarden's transcendence of the ego means being independent from the present through the possibility of reaching towards the future and the past at will and actively.

As I have already mentioned, the ego can experience time in yet another way that stands in stark contrast to the first and leads to a totally different account of time. Ingarden identifies two moments here. First, I am conscious of time as a factor that contributes to the destruction of my existence which, in this light, appears to itself as random and accidental. The experience exposes the frailty of all being (not only myself, but also the entire accessible and experienced world) that can cease to exist at any moment. It is not part of the ego's essence that it must exist; quite the contrary, the ego is contingent on something external, something that precedes it. Importantly, the fact that the two experiences of time are mutually irreducible does not mean that they simply coexist in experience. Instead, one can talk about various forms of time experienced individually and collectively. For example, just as the passage of time is experienced in a special way in decadent historical periods, so too its perception is different depending on the age of an individual.

It is not hard to see that the theme of the accidental nature of the ego which, in spite of its relative autonomy, must be sustained in its existence, is also present in classical metaphysics, including Descartes'. Ingarden makes this thesis more concrete in his analysis of the phenomenon of time perspectives which, within the second meaning of time, means restricting the lived experiences of the subject to the present and stretching the experience between two abysses of nothingness: the past and the future. What this means for the ego is that it cannot free itself and be independent of time.

As I have already mentioned, in the phenomenon of time perspectives, the ego apprehends itself as intertwined with time or, more precisely, it experiences the present in terms of past or future events or as its being-so. Hindsight knowledge about the past compresses and expands time phases, but this should not be treated

as an illusion or a mistake. It is rather a certain egological process of existential importance thanks to which the ego always appears to itself in the aspect of a time perspective, thus retaining its own integrity. By juxtaposing two mutually irreducible temporalities, Ingarden endows his egology with a certain dramatic quality of existence experienced by the ego, calling into question the previously assumed core or stable foundation for the ego's essential features that make it resistant to obstacles and dependent only on its own force of being and actions in the world. Hemmed in by the two abysses of nothingness—both when it comes to the currently experienced and thus absolutely transient present moment and the tension of life that can end at any time—the ego needs a new type of existential knowledge that guarantees the possibility of keeping and ensuring its substantial status.

At this point, Ingarden refers to the phenomenon he developed during his studies into works of literature, namely shortened "time perspectives"[63], in which he sees a direct clash between two different and mutually irreducible experiences of temporality. It may be surprising that Ingarden transposes a phenomenon that has so far been described in the context of literary works onto the very heart of the existential drama of the ego without any explanations or caveats, thereby opening up the possibility of a reverse process whereby a work of art can be interpreted as a non-theoretical source record detailing the experience of one's existence.

The reference to this theory in the remarks concluding the first part of *Man and Time* proves insufficient for the author, though. In the second version published in 1938, Ingarden added Part Three where he writes explicitly about the urgent need to look for self-knowledge that would be "capable of assuring us about the existence and the properties of we ourselves as people transcending experience," admitting, in a rather peculiar way, that he himself is not able to undertake this task[64]. He seems almost to capitulate and back away, mentioning his unpreparedness and the general state of philosophy as an excuse. Nonetheless, he undertakes yet another, albeit "modest", attempt at interpreting the "existing conscious experience" in the temporal aspect where, among the multitudes of considered variants, he appears, on the one hand, to tend towards Bergson's idea of time as a "point-continuum"[65], and on the other, to claim that, in spite of the fact that its structure slips into nothingness, the present does not destroy existence and so does not undermine the order of substantial duration.

[63] see Ingarden 1973, p. 233-242.
[64] Ingarden 1983, p. 42.
[65] Ingarden 1983, p. 44.

In spite of all the previous reservations about the possibility of carrying out proper egological studies, in parts 4-6 that conclude *Man and Time* in its final version published in 1946, Ingarden outlines a positive conclusion based precisely on the existential knowledge he previously postulated and searched for. It requires a rather radical transition to the domain of *praxis* where the relation with the experienced time can be said to take on the form of an existential alternative in the function of authenticity. On the one hand, the experience of being "threatened by [its] passing on and by the unknown nothingness of tomorrow"[66] prompts the ego to adopt various escape strategies, forget and lose itself, which eventually leads to self-destruction or disintegration. In the temporal dimension, when the ego forgets about its own being, it needs to "kill" or fill time in order to detract attention from itself; "[it] neglects [itself]" (ibid.), creating external works or even building an ordered world around itself that only deepens its alienation. This losing of oneself does not only mean subjecting one's life to insignificant and worthless matters—"I 'lose' myself in the insignificance of life's everyday trivia […] spend myself in a deceptive pursuit after illusory values"[67]—but also creates an illusion of overcoming time and preserving oneself in a valuable work "of art, or science, or technical—in this world which is presumably independent of time, and to embody in it [itself], or that which [it] considers best in [itself]"[68]. Another type of an existential attitude adopted in an inauthentic effort to overcome time consists in succumbing to the illusion of modernity that breaks sharply with the past and cultural tradition, considering them obsolete. Ingarden suggests that by reducing and narrowing the world to the "present day," one achieves a false feeling of living "beyond time," and thus fails to realise that "on his tombs, on the ashes of his culture, about which some day no one will any longer know anything, *others* will build their works"[69].

How does Ingarden describe an existence that may be deemed authentic? In contrast to the attitude of escape, the one who "is" does not run but stays "with" himself. For Ingarden, this is equivalent to maintaining and developing a subjective attitude of affection: "by grasping himself through every pain and every joy, and through every effort and victory," keeping "the capability of being moved and enraptured"[70], which needs to be juxtaposed with "the source of an ever renewed

[66] Ingarden 1983, p. 46.
[67] Ingarden 1983, p. 49.
[68] Ingarden 1983, p. 47.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ingarden 1983, p. 46.

unrest"[71] and the possibility of removing it thanks to finding in oneself "the traces of being which is not subject to the passage of time"[72]. This discovery eventually leads to the internal "power of resistance"—"from the beliefs which I fostered, from the attachments with which I lived and from the desires which I tried to realize, is born the power which must be *alive* in me if I am to succeed in accomplishing the deed"[73]—and the knowledge that helps to make a choice with "no reference to ready-made models, external prescriptions or norms, but rather […] according to his own knowledge, grown out of his own deliberate effort"[74]. What this means for Ingarden is that the ego "ha[s] [itself] at [its] command and, in skirmishes with the adversities of fortune [...] shape[s] [its] own self as a continually growing inner power"[75]. This power and the feeling of having it also creates the sense of existential trust necessary "to ground [its] spirit in [itself]"[76].

Let us sum up the egological argument in *Man and Time:* Ingarden takes the Cartesian *ego sum, ego existo*, links it with the thesis about the substantiality of the ego and reflects upon it phenomenologically from the perspective of the first-person experience of one's own uniqueness and identity. He then juxtaposes it with two experiences of time appearing in that perspective. The first of those is the experience of identity that is specific to every ego, identity that resists temporary changes and leads to the thesis of the ego as a permanent being. Providing evidence of the ego's substantiality, this ontic permanence is not abstract and undefined. Rather, it inspires the phenomenological account of the ego as equipped with inner strength to act and create, i.e. transform reality. Here, the substantiality of the ego seems to offer an opportunity to become independent of time which appears to be secondary category. This definition of time stands in contrast to the other definition where the ego experiences itself not only as living in time, but also as being implicated in time or temporarily entangled so that it "carries the burden" of its past and future. Eventually, it becomes overwhelmed by the accidental nature of its existence and the world that it inhabits. Accidentality, randomness and existential frailty of the ego (including the collective ego and, consequently, certain constituted and relatively stable living worlds or civilisations) whose existence may end at any moment, all create the dramatic experience of the ego as located "between two abysses of nothingness."

[71] Ingarden 1983, p. 48.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ingarden 1983, p. 48.
[74] Ingarden 1983, p. 46.
[75] Ingarden 1983, p. 48.
[76] Ibid.

IV. Conclusion

An important feature of Ingarden's method of existential egological studies is his belief in the possibility of approaching classical metaphysical theses from a phenomenological standpoint to make them more concrete and thus give them new meaning. Taking the Cartesian thesis as his point of departure, Ingarden not only contrasts his position from the Husserlian conception of the transcendental ego, inner awareness of time and Brentano's inner perception, but also resists the temptation or formalising or homogenising time in the version suggested by both Kant and Heidegger.

His positive inspiration is Bergson's philosophy of time, idiosyncratically transformed, as a category that is secondary in relation to human cognitive activity. This is opposed to the extra-temporal experience of moments of duration which, as Ingarden believes, should be linked with single performances of free acts that are eventually described in more general and grand terms as a voluntary commitment to the "creation of goodness, beauty, and truth"[77].

The significance of this last expression is that the self-reflexive relation of the subject is not one of narcissistic egoism, but is in fact an attitude of a liberating detachment from oneself. It may be said that Ingarden's egology opens the door for the development of a personalistic-existential philosophy which stems from the experience of the accidentality or finality of existence, but in which the limitation to the present does not destroy the existence of the subject, or does not do so entirely, thanks to the subject's proper, i.e. authentic attitude. In this context, Ingarden diagnoses a specific crisis of philosophy, or even phenomenology, claiming that, in spite of the great number of accumulated studies carried out in many different, specialist areas, the two have little to say about the vital problems of human existence. Although elaborating on the idea seems difficult, it is both urgent and feasible. From that point onwards, descriptions of the phenomenon of the ego's existence are based on new reflections on its authenticity/non-authenticity. On the one hand, this entails focusing on, staying with and building oneself, all of which require maintaining and controlling the "tension of inner effort" and the courage to "forge ahead through effort and exposure to dangers"[78]. On the other, it involves fragmentation, being lost in time and escaping from oneself, which leads to "inner disintegration", "loss of faith", "betraying oneself", "slow breakup" or self-destruction through "extermination of my inner unity"[79]. This can be interpreted as heroisation of the ego, rather typical

[77] Ingarden 1983, p. 51.
[78] Ingarden 1983, p. 49.
[79] Ingarden 1983, p. 49.

of existentialist philosophy, where existential cognition of the ego results from the effort of the will and the ability to face reality during moments of trial. Hence, to exist means to resist becoming lost in time or, more precisely, to resist losing the rhythm of existence that is compatible with one's being and therefore proper.

Ingarden suggests an inward journey from the assertion of the ego's existence to the profound "ego" that, although usually not accessible to cognition, is not demoted to Kantian noumen or reduced to a transcendental structure. Even though it is radically exposed only during key moments of existential trial, this ego remains accessible to the subjective sphere of self-affecting experience of "the greatest treasures of rapture and happiness and aspires to actualize them"[80]. From this perspective, Ingarden perceives the life of the ego, on the one hand, as a continuous process of gathering existential resources, and on the other, as moments of "trial" when the amassed force is unleashed, breaking the bonds of temporal structures and overcoming them by performing, as he writes, free acts in responsibility.

Coming back to the Cartesian theme on which this article is based, I will venture the thesis that Ingarden's egology may be interpreted as one of the most consistently mapped out and phenomenologically modernised Cartesian journeys (from *Rules* to *Passions of the Soul*; from *cogito* to the union of soul and body; from a universal theoretical subject to an individualised ethico-aesthetic subject), a journey that is notable for the way it clarifies and phenomenologically develops the many unthematised ideas present in Descartes in their rudimentary form. These undoubtedly include the figure of madness (Ingarden refers to it through the recurring argument from psychopathology), the transition from sleep to wakefulness or the specification of freedom as a directly fulfilled, first-person experience. It seems that Ingarden's rather radical handling of the existential theme of the ego, whose originality rests in simultaneously retaining and working out the classical theory of substance, corresponds to the direction taken by Descartes in the last period of his thought when he developed the problems of the "third primitive notion". Finally, I believe that the experiment of reading Ingarden's egological fragments in isolation from the entire structure of the ontological "dispute" yields positive results as it opens up new vistas of research into Ingarden's philosophy and may also provide a promising foundation for the philosophical interpretation of Descartes' evolution that took place between his early and late period.

[80] Ingarden 1983, p. 51.

Acknowledgment

The project was held within the research grant on "The Presence of Kazimierz Twardowski's Thought in Early Phenomenology in Poland" financed by the National Science Centre, Poland within the OPUS program (No. 2017/27/B/HS1/02455). I would like to thank Guillaume Fréchette, Marek Piwowarczyk and Witold Płotka for their stimulating comments and suggestions.

REFERENCES

Barbaras R., "Czym jest rzecz myśląca?", *Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Myśli Społecznej*, 62 (supplement), 2017, p. 13-27.

Beyssade J.-M., *La Philosophie première de Descartes*, Paris Aubier, 1979.

Descartes R., *Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 1*. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Descartes R., *Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 2*. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Descartes R., *Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 3*. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, Anthony Kenny. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Descartes, René, *Oeuvres de Descartes*, 11 vols., ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, new edn. Paris: Vrin. Cited by abbreviation AT, volume and page number, 1996.

Dufour E., "Descartes à Marbourg", in M. Fichant, J.-L. Marion (eds), *Descartes en Kant*, PUF, Paris 2006, 471-493.

Gierulanka D., *Zagadnienie swoistości poznania matematycznego*, Warsaw, PWN, 1962.

Husserl E., *Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology*. Trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague, Boston (MA), London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.

Ingarden R., "Dążenia fenomenologów", *Przegląd Filozoficzny*, 22/1919, 3, 118-156; 4, 315-351.

Ingarden R., "Der Mensch und die Zeit", in: *Travaux du IX-e Congrès International de Philosophie (Congrès Descartes)*, vol. 8, Paris, Hermann, 129-136, 1937.

Ingarden R., "Człowiek i czas", *Przegląd Filozoficzny*, 41/1938, 54-67. Ingarden R., "Człowiek i czas", *Twórczość*, 2/1946, 2, 121-137.

Ingarden R., *Z badań nad filozofią współczesną*, Warsaw PWN, 1963.

Ingarden R., *Man and Value*, Philosophia Verlag München Wien, transl. A. Szylewicz, 1983.

Ingarden R., *The Literary Work of Art. An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature*. Trans. George G. Grabowicz. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.

Ingarden R., *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, vol. I. Trans. Arthur Szylewicz. *Polish Contemporary Philosophy and Philosophical Humanities*, vol. 6. Frankfurt: Peter Lang Edition, 2013.

Ingarden R., *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, vol. II. Trans. Arthur Szylewicz. *Polish Contemporary Philosophy and Philosophical Humanities*, vol. 8. Frankfurt: Peter Lang Edition, 2016.

Ingarden R., *Wykłady z etyki*, wybrał, opracował i wstępem poprzedził A. Węgrzecki, Warsaw: PWN, 1989.

Ingarden R., "O badaniach filozoficznych Edith Stein", in: *Spór o prawdę istnienia. Listy Romana Ingardena do Edith Stein*, Kraków, Wydawnictwo m, 286-310, 1994.

Kobiela F., *Filozofia czasu Romana Ingardena. Wobec sporów o zmienność świata*, Universitas, Kraków, 2011.

Marion J.-L., *Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes. Analogie, création des vérités éternelles et fondement*, Paris : PUF, 1981.

Marion J.-L., *Questions cartésiennes II. Sur l'ego et sur Dieu*, PUF Paris, 1996.

Marion J.-L., *Sur la pensée passive de Descartes.* Paris PUF, 2013.

Mehl E., "Phenomenology and Cartesian Tradition", in: *The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, (ed.) D. De Santis, B. C. Hopkins, C. Majolino, Routledge 2020.

Natorp P., *Descartes' Erkenntnistheorie. Eine Studie zur Vorgeschichte des Kritizismus*, Marburg, 1882.

Piwowarczyk M., "„Jestem siłą …". Próba ontologicznej interpretacji Ingardenowskiej metafory", in: (eds.) D. Leszczyński, M. Rosiak, *Świadomość, świat, wartości. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Andrzejowi Półtawskiemu w 90. rocznicę urodzin*, Oficyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław, 291-313, 2013.

Płotka W.. *Fenomenologia jako filozofia mniejsza. Rozważania wokół sporów o metodę Husserla*, Warsaw, Liberi Libri, 2019.

Starzyński W., *Neokartezjanizm fenomenologii francuskiej. Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Henry, Marion*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Biblioteka Polskiego Towarzystwa Fenomenologicznego, vol. 7, 2014.

Starzyński W., "Fenomenologiczne określenie cielesnego podmiotu w świetle kartezjańskich analiz Michela Henry'ego i Jeana-Luca Mariona", *Przegląd Filozoficzno-Literacki,* 34/2012, 219-227.

Tarnowski K., "Egzystencjalna i formalno-ontologiczna problematyka substancji u Descartesa", *Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Myśli Społecznej*, 62/2017 (Supplement), 181-208.