

METAPHYSICS, ABSOLUTE AND THE HOMONIMY OF THE NEGATIVE. PROLEGOMENA FOR A SPECULATIVE LOGIC.¹ PART II²

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ABSTRACT. Our paper addresses eight main and traditional issues of Philosophy: the issue of speculative logic; the issue of the fundamental premises of existence and thinking — which engages on the path of absolute ontological reduction; the issue of absolute Nothingness revealed as the ultimate result of the previous reduction; the issue of the realness and effectiveness of Nothingness; the issue of ontological Difference; the issue of the consistency and apodicticity of metaphysics; the issue of the nature of the Absolute; and the issue of the Ontological Argument. The results that we gained at the end of our work show that the ontological Ground is the Absolute and that the Absolute is the transcendent instance of immediate identity of irreducible opposites. This instance is consistent with the traditional claims of philosophical and theological metaphysics and it supports the Ontological Argument through the overcoming of the formal logic principles.

Keywords: *speculative logic, theological metaphysics, Hegelianism, Ontological Argument, undetermined immediateness*

1.1 The transcendental appearance of ontological relativism (continued)

The idea of infinite recurrence or infinite hierarchies or scalar ontology — “the great chain of being” (Lovejoy, 1936/1997, p. 50-84) or “Behemoth” (Florenski,

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1929/1999, p. 26-27), as it is known in the old traditions that, however, *did not support the ontological autonomy of string determinations* — is based on three concepts: **a.** the entire sphere of the real is made up of an infinite string of interdependent elements; **b.** the elements determine one another in a certain order or hierarchy; **c.** there is no absolute or irreducible ontological foundation or reality, no totality of the sphere of the real that would represent an univocal and absolute principle of this multiple; the states, influences and conditionings etc. both of any element and the string depend entirely on the context or on the particular, even singular, perspective of the element taken into consideration.

All of these mean that: 1. there is no actuality of the string or series; 2. the model of the string is pure possibility; 3. this pure possibility is reducible to Nothingness because of the string's impossibility and of all its levels; 4. the string is self-contradictory, since it is postulated as being "absolutely relative" — a concept which is a contradiction in terms on its own. This contradiction is non-speculative, because specularity means exhaustive totality through difference. Yet, in a string of this type, as we will demonstrate, totality, exhaustion and difference are all rejected.

1. The non-actuality of the string results from the absolute progressive infinite dependence of each level or element on the preceding ones. Since there is no unrelative or unconditional identity that would provide an irreducible ontological basis to the string or to any of its elements, or a simultaneous and unmediated absolute infinite actualisation for the string's multiple, every moment or determined level of the string must, in fact, be actualised independently of the others and of any other possible instance. But then it would no longer be a string. Moreover, the actuality of every element would be infinitely delayed, i.e., delayed to the infinite number of levels or elements conditioning it. For, in order for the element or level x to be actualised, it is necessary that, previously, x^∞ elements should have been already actualised (where $x > 1$),³ considering that every element out of x^∞ elements, and x^∞ itself, are affected by the same non-actualisation or infinite conditionality. In other words, an infinite conditionality would lead to an infinite delay, which directly leads to the concept of ontological impossibility or pure ontological blockage.

2. It is not difficult to note that the model according to which this infinity of strings should be actualised is that of infinite progression. The only problem would be that, without an already given principle of actualisation, no progression can be actualised by virtue of the infinity of steps that need to be undertaken for each individual level. The objection against approaching the limit, which Zeno of Elea raised against

³ Conversely, to demonstrate reduction, we can mathematically suggest the infinity of the string that must be previously actualised through the formula: $\left(\frac{1}{x}\right)^\infty$, where $x > 1$.

infinite movement in his famous logical and mathematical paradoxes, returns in full force. — In order for A to be constituted, it is necessary for A' to have been constituted; in order for A' to be constituted, it is necessary for A'' to have been constituted; in order for A'' to be constituted, it is necessary for A''' to have been constituted etc., *ad infinitum*. One cannot escape pure possibility precisely because of the infinite suspension of the origin's foundation point, a point infinitely delayed or blocked.⁴

⁴ Some authors claim that, after the discovery and development of mathematical analysis and differential calculus, the issue raised by the Eleatic paradoxes has been solved. (Seife, 2000/2010, p. 49-52) The invention of the mathematical void (\emptyset), and its scoring in the numerical set through 0 would be responsible for this progress, so that the divisibility of determined being would still be able to reach its limit through its instantaneous reduction to void or zero. This occurs under the conditions in which, as is well known, Greek thought in general and Eleatic thought in particular “abhorred the vacuum” in ontology and indetermination in general, for which reason they did not conceive Being as having any point of absolute ontological discontinuity in itself — an indispensable condition for the infinite divisibility (of determined being) discussed in Zeno's paradoxes.

We believe that, although the introduction of the concept of terminality in mathematics led to explaining the existence of determination and quanta, however this concept should be approached metaphysically. Otherwise, it risks becoming a limitative condition indicating a speculative blockage. As a prerequisite to any progression, thus to any change, the void represents an immediate terminal point of cancellation, thus limiting or blocking any elementary formation. If it remains at this level, one can no longer understand how both the inter-elementary translation and the interaction among noetic components can occur (“How can 0 be overcome in the numerical string?” or “How can elements which are separated by \emptyset be engaged in a mutual relation?”), be they mathematical, logical or of any other conceptual nature. But the very original formation of any first, original element remains obscure and is threatened by the irrepressible and invincible spectre of arbitrariness which would compromise any kingdom of Logos. One can only add to this the fact that any determined being, taken in its pure abstraction, in its pure ontological presence, is participating in Being and, being founded by the latter, there is no reason why the concept of infinite divisibility could not thus be reinstated, even if the possibility of exhaustiveness in a void is accepted — a thesis that could be assessed only at the closure of the present text. This would imply that, essentially, a creature cannot be un-created, or, at any rate, not through infinite progressive divisibility; and that, in fact, it is erroneous to call a creature “finite”. Everywhere in nature we would encounter the infinite, not the absolute one, but the determined infinite or infinite in its genus. Following Leibniz, who claimed that he could no longer see finite objects anywhere in the world, G. Cantor argues, after developing his theory explained in *Mannigfaltigkeitslehre*, that human intellect was structurally formed in the horizon of infinity which is, anyway, inherent to it (Becker, 1954/1968, p. 322-328). Moreover, in Zeno's paradoxes, it is the very infinite divisibility of Being that is rejected by rejecting the fundamental condition of this divisibility: the realness of Nothingness, of the Void as it was postulated by the atomists. Consequently, rejecting the Void did not result, as some mistakenly believed, in the infinite divisibility of Being (a consequence seen as disastrous and unacceptable by the Eleates in particular and the Greeks in general), but in the immediate completeness of its unity. Essentially, the contradiction revealed by the Eleatic paradoxes is the one between the atomists' postulate of the Void, of Nothingness as foundation, on the one hand, which implies the **terminality of determinate being**, from which some would derive its very *finite* nature, and on the other, the infinite progression of division, which means precisely the **uncircumscription of determinate being**, i.e., its *infinity*.

3. The entire string of the infinite “ladder” or infinite becoming is impossible even if, through a miraculous occurrence, it would be actualised, as some scholars conceived it, postulating a circular interconditionality in a loop of determined elements. — As G. Priest paralogistically believes (Priest, 2002/2007, p. 62). (Priest’s second thesis for the elimination of Aristotelian *prime matter*, which argues that at the zero level of substance one would have an entity that would represent the coincidence between form and matter, is nothing more than either a paralogism, or the thesis of the Actual Infinity itself.) — In other words, once actualised, this “ladder” would fall apart in

However, the problem is that going from Being (even understood as determinate being) to Nothingness (or unbeing) constitutes the very absolute passage between contradictory concepts. Accomplishing such a passage is impossible through *progression*, as the atomists claimed, because no matter how fragmented Being (determinate being) would be, we would still be on its territory. Overcoming it in favour of Nothingness or unbeing would require an absolute shortcut, an absolute exhaustion of traversing the Being, its integral totality, an absolute qualitative leap in order to find its limit. In other words, this overcoming should have already been given, already been accomplished. This, once more, implies the specularity of exhaustion only encountered in the concept of actual infinity.

Overcoming Being or determinate being would practically mean that Nothingness or non-being is already given (Hegel, 1966, p. 63-65). Moreover, this immediate apprehension of the two concepts of Being and Nothingness only occurs from an outside third perspective that encompasses both. Videlicet, only when we have overcome and preserved a concept (in Hegel’s words, *Aufhebung*) will that concept prove its effectiveness. Once overcome, its entire infinite inner essence is contained and apprehended; i.e., it is infinitely actual. Until the concept is not overcome and we are still in its conceptual territory from which we cannot escape, the infinity of its essence is still determined and strictly, narrowly potential, thus ineffective and impotent.

Conversely, we will also see that Being’s or determinate being’s synthesis, namely the ontological founding of *the something*, presumes an absolute result of exhaustiveness: that of the Nothing itself in this case. Nothingness must be overcome too so that the founding of the origin point of *something’s* inception can occur: this implies the same exhaustiveness. However, this result will be further investigated below and we will see that it was not possible for it to emerge until the development of Christianity’s Trinity doctrine, because it requested as prerequisite the absolute ontological transfiguration of the Negative.

To summarize the situation of the Eleatic paradox in a new approach, hereby exposed: the infinite divisibility of determinate being is real, but it is achievable (i.e., determinate being can be terminally and exhaustively divided) only if the absolute of Nothingness is given both as its boundary and as suppression of its boundary. Thus, determinate being reveals itself, simultaneously, as infinite in its essential infinitely divisible inwardness or an inwardness with an infinite variation; and as completed, finished, even as something that can be overcome, apprehended, contained, but only if the exhaustive nullification through its reduction is admitted. — If Nothingness is not real, then escaping the essence or inwardness of a concept is also not real and thought remains a prisoner of conceptual monism. — Thus we see now that ancient metaphysics was blocked by the impossibility of the occurrence of the actual infinity (either by postulating the potential one as a real foundation in Aristotle’s version, or by postulating the abstract, separate, thus ineffective, transcendence of the Principle — *nulla est fluxorum scientia* — in the Platonic and neo-Platonic versions) (Octavian, 2003, p. X-XI, 40-48).

the same instant, on account of the fact that the elements cannot support one another mutually or scalarly in the absolute, even when their system would be circular. Let us not forget the third fundamental postulate of this system (the most important one): no absolute totality, no pure unity, no identity transcending the elements of the string is given. If this were the case, then element A, for instance, would have to causally and/or ontologically support element B succeeding it; and this, in turn, would have to support element C and so on. But this implies that element A has an endpoint, a limit, a negation in order to allow a transition to element B. But we find ourselves in the situation in which, once A reached its endpoint,⁵ as we are forbidden from postulating a form of indeterminate identity, which is actually, infinitely and absolutely transcendent and common to A and B, one can no longer see how the transition to B would be possible. The endpoint of A would result in an absolute ontological chasm or, better said, in an absolute meontological chasm. Certainly, one possible objection would be that there could appear an immediately superior and determined level between A and B, hierarchically superior to A and B, say A', which is responsible for the community between A and B and thus of their communicability. So A' would ontologically supplant the presupposed lack of difference between A and B and would insure the transition from A to B. But the string is only an infinite succession of elements without an absolute transcendent identity, such that A' would find itself in the exact same situation as A and B, both in itself, as it would postulate an absolute synthesis of opposites under the conditions of its own determination or circumscription; as much as in relation to another element, say B', towards which it would be supposed to make its transition. If, here too, we were to postulate a new hierarchic level superior to A' and B', namely A'', which would be responsible for the community between A' and B', we would merely import the problem to this new level. Then, a new postulate of a new superior level would import the problem to the new level, and so on, *ad infinitum*. Thus, we would return to the problem of the string's actuality that, as can be seen, suffers from an infinite impossibility of transposing the actuality of the string from one level to another, regardless of what level and towards which direction. In short, the entire transposition of the string's actuality from one level to another would once again be reduced to pure possibility. But, since pure possibility is itself precisely this kind of formation of progressive actualisation strings, and since it is itself a perpetual delay of the origin point or "bridgehead" of the first element that must be infinitely constituted and actualised from an infinity of elements in an infinite number of steps; and since these elements

⁵ We note here a tacit self-contradiction: even though ontological relativism does not acknowledge absolute terminality, it still puts forward the absolute difference (i.e., the absolute terminality) of the string's elements.

are also conditioned by other infinities of elements through other infinities of steps etc. etc., the result is that **pure possibility (*Nihil privativum*)**, taken on its own, without any external actualisation principle, without any other active exterior actual agent that would instantiate these privative infinities through an actual infinite, is in fact pure impossibility, i.e., purely **Nothingness, *Nihil negativum***. The pure possible taken on its own, absolutely in itself, reveals to be nothing else but the pure Impossible.⁶

4. We are shown here the reasons why postulating relativity as absolute is not only a contradiction in linguistic terms, but an ontologically reflected contradiction: i.e., it is impossibility in itself. It is not by accident that the propositions that resume the liar's paradox in various forms — "I am lying" — in order to attempt the accreditation of an absolute bending of all criteria — "Everything is relative", "The truth is relative", "There is no absolute truth", "There is no absolute", "Everything is subject to interpretation", "It is forbidden to forbid" etc. etc. — all fall into the ontological chasms of foundational, metaphysical sophisms. When one believes that determination can immediately take the place of indetermination, or that the occurrence can immediately replace its actuality principle, or that a part, strictly speaking, can immediately stand in for the whole, we are already dealing with a paradox, in the best case scenario;⁷

⁶ This is the moment when potentialist (i.e., relativist) thought also brings forth its objection: after the emergence of this disjunction between determined elements, of this pure chasm of absolute negative that separates the elements in a final, absolute discontinuity, how can one still postulate the existence, the being, the synthesis of *the something*? How could one overcome this chasm, what sort of bridge or bridgehead could there exist to escape the abyss of complete suppression? Wouldn't relativity, potentiality, relation be preferable to such a ruthless suppression? The answer can only be negative: one cannot build castles and fortresses on sand. And the answer's negativity must be subject to metaphysical exhaustiveness: it is precisely *in the chasm, in the abyss, in the negative, in the impossible* that the redeeming answer is found. As we have anticipated in a previous note, this answer is related to the issue of ontological and ideal transfiguration of the negative itself; only Christianity opened up this horizon.

⁷ The paradox of the relationship between the whole and its parts is one of the most compelling cases for the justification of speculative thought, as it illustrates the unity of opposites: one-multiple, principle-occurrence, general-individual, universal-singular, identity-difference, whole-parts. Regardless of whether one speaks about the equipotence between the set of semicircles and that of diameters, already noted by Proclus, or of the equipotence between the cardinal of \mathbb{N} and the cardinals of \mathbb{Z} , \mathbb{Q} or \mathbb{R} , etc. (Becker, 1954/1968, p. 303-308, 338-347, 355-359; Munteanu, 1999, p. 18-19), the logical and mathematical paradoxes reflect apodictically and eminently the need to overcome formal thought which is foundationally self-contradictory. But this cannot be accomplished in whatever way. The sophistry we reject here is not synonymous with speculative thought, precisely because it does not assume everything that results from the concepts it postulates. When the results contradict the premises, instead of undertaking the reappraisal of all elements, including those initially rejected, sophistry unequivocally manifests arbitrarily selective tendencies. — In the present case, rejecting transcendence or absolute identity — probably based on an initial naive inclination to preserve the thought apparently outside the possibilities of contradiction, videlicet, to preserve formalism —;

but when one postulates that the indeterminate, the principle or the whole itself does not even exist, then the paradox falls into sheer unspeculative self-contradiction,⁸ and the sophistic aberration is complete.

— If one claims that “everything is relative” or that “there is no absolute truth”, four simultaneous self-contradictions occur that unequivocally and immediately cancel the proposition that has just been stated:

1. (from an ontological standpoint) any criteria that would distinguish the relative from the non-relative so as to provide us with the evidence that (absolute) truth does not exist, immediately vanishes.

2. (from an ontological standpoint) the relativist statement itself is also part of “everything”; but if this “everything” is relative, then the relativist statement is also relative, thus false, null. But then, if “everything is relative” is null, the consequence is that there is at least one thing that is not relative.

3. (from the perspective of the premises’ criterion of truth) one cannot aim for the truth of a relativist statement unless one accepts that truth exists *a priori* (prerequisite to the articulation of the relativist statement), therefore not everything is relative. Thus, one already presumes that there is (an absolute) truth.

4. (from the perspective of the consequences’ criterion of truth) in the very same instant when one claims to cancel absolute truth, one also claims that a relativist statement possesses absolute truth. Therefore, in addition to the fact that a relativist statement already presupposes the premise of (absolute) truth, it also immediately reclaims and reinstates it through its very cancellation.

Finally, some could see an objection in the self-contradictory circularity of the *liar’s paradox* (let us recall it: if one supposes that the statement “I am lying” is false, then its content expresses precisely its falsity, thus the statement claiming it is consequently true; but, since the statement is now presumed to be true, then its content tells us precisely the truth about the statement, namely that the statement is false, thus the final conclusion of the entire statement is that it is true because it is false and it is false because it is true). The objection would argue that, since the statement is undecidable from the standpoint of formal logic, one could thus invoke the very postulate of relative circularity as absolute within this very case. But here one would commit a transcendental illusion: the level of the intellect that detects the formal blockage would be mistaken for the level of the reason that detects the

this results in an even more serious dead end, entirely deprived of any solution, manifested through a self-contradiction of which one expects escaping either by abandoning it, either by arbitrariness. In other words, a self-contradiction that is thus inescapable.

⁸ The fundamental condition of speculation is precisely the effective realness of the totality or of indeterminacy or of the whole.

statement's discursive universe. And the discursive universe of the formal circular self-contradiction "I am lying" also presupposes the same truth or principle of identity: every time the statement oscillates between false and true, one presupposes the statement has a true meaning (as true or false or as true and false); and its self-contradictory content also falls under absolute speculative identity: it is self-contradictory. —

Concerning the relation between the elements of a string, respectively the mutual position of elements that should be in continuity with one another, Aristotle wrote in *Metaphysics*, XI, 1069a that continuity appears between two elements when

I say that things are continuous when the boundary of each of them, by which they are in contact and held together, is one and the same, so that clearly continuity occurs in those things from which it is natural for some unity to arise by virtue of their contact. (Aristotle, 2007, p. 428 — *trans. apud* Aristotle, 1998, p. 350)

It is evident that here the elements that come in a continuum have continuity by means of the limit that simultaneously separates and unites them. This presupposes or implies the very third-party position ("something unique") of absolute totality, of pure uniqueness, of transcendent identity of the string's elements. The elements cannot touch each other in the absence of such community, since the limit (which is already irrational or super-rational in itself) would have to be completely impenetrable not only between the two elements, but also in their internal reduction, completely suppressing their internal consistency. For the parts that make up these entities too are also clearly marked off one against the other. Moreover, if we speak about macroscopic things, we see that the limit between them is maintained even when they touch, otherwise they would have to directly interpenetrate their substances. Even when the palm of one's hand is laid on the table and perceives its physical properties, there still is an absolute limit between the palm and the table preserved in an absolute distinction between the two elements; in the empiric sphere, this distinction is given as a physical potentiality. — On a microscopic or quantic level, this potentiality becomes ontological, because particles can fuse together under certain circumstances and between certain limits, which proves that here potentiality is, however, not pure, but still a determined one. Yet, neither pure Potentiality could eliminate the original ontological disjunction, since Potentiality in itself is the external overlapping between Being and Nothingness.

Resuming, then, the question of ontological foundation, it is unveiled that the first step that *representation-thought* can take to speak about foundation can only be the meontological one: the only place it reaches is **Nothingness** (Hegel, 1966, p. 10; Hegel, 2000a, p. 41). In order to see this result, we are left with no choice but to

resume the issue of the infinite string of elements, but regressively, in the opposite direction.

1. Thus, a certain element, a being, A, is given. A is composed of the “quantum” of being (let us call it A’) and of the ontological differences and negations that determine it, i.e., separate it from other elements and separate its properties and sides from one another.

2. We focus our attention on A’, namely on the positive content elements, respectively the “quanta” of positive predications pertaining to the being, that tell us what A is. We reach the conclusion that these elements, in turn, are also, first of all, different from one another and, secondly, composed of other elements: namely, A’ is made up of A’’ and its inherent differences.

3. We direct our attention to A’’. In turn, A’’ is made up of A’’’ and the inherent differences... Etc. Etc. Etc.

If we wish, however, to find out which is the first point of absolute *initium* of the first instantiation in this infinite string of being, we only have at our disposal the following onto-logical ramifications:

α. Postulating an original Being that would no longer be able to be reduced to other component elements.⁹ The only difficulty is that such a being is conceived here through *dianoia*, namely, through *representation*. This is why such a being presents itself as a purely dogmatically postulated entity, without understanding what are the conditions or the attributes of its actuality. This raises two questions:

i. ***What makes it be***, as such?¹⁰

⁹ We are hereby reminded of **Definitions I and II** from Spinoza’s *Ethics* (Spinoza, 1957, p. 39). But there is a double difficulty in Spinoza’s case. Firstly, since Nothingness itself can claim a deeper “degree” of (me)ontological immediacy than Being, Spinoza does not provide sufficient explanations as to why he chooses Being instead of Nothingness. Secondly, since after postulating infinite Substance, Spinoza firstly admits the infinitely absolute plurality of attributes for the infinite absolute originary Substance, then the plurality of the Substance’s modes, one does not understand what is the source of this multiplicity of attributes and modes. Multiplicity cannot be given without difference, and the difference is essentially negation. This brings us back to the issue of Nothingness about which Spinoza mentions nothing in his writings. With the exception of the case in which the abstraction of the infinite absolute Substance itself would represent the foundation for an absolute reductive overlap between Substance and two of its fundamental modes: presence and absence, being and nothingness. Which is a step undertaken by Hegel who later proposes this approach by clearly stating that metaphysics must restart from the point where Spinoza left it. (Hegel, 1963, p. 443; Hegel, 2000a, p. 17).

¹⁰ This is the instance where any positivist intellect can afford the classical interrogative error as an “objection” against the argument of the “First Mover” or the “First Cause”: “And who or what created or caused God?” The question is mistaken because it presumes the discursive horizon of *representation* within which it also expects a solution to its interrogation.

ii. Hoes does one get from *a pure Being to determined beings*? Such a transition presupposes an absolute ontological difference. But a pure Being has no negations and, being, seemingly, absolute, it is not compatible with the concept of an exteriority that would provide us with the source of this negation either. If we chose to postulate, purely and simply, such a negative or nothingness as a counterpart, as an instance opposed to Being, out of a mere dialectical spirit, we would end up in the arbitrary and opaque situation of not finding any onto-logical legitimacy for the source of this negation, the postulate thus being unjustifiable.

β. Why should we uncritically postulate, at the end of the foundation of the strings of determinations a pure Being, since every positive element, every “quantum” of presence in every determination proved to be a negative entity, in fact, because, since it was marked by its own negations, every element was decomposable, deconstructable? Therefore, everything here will be exhaustively reduced to Nothingness.

1.2 Pure original Being

A. In order to respond to β. we need to first check the metaphysical coherence of point α. with its two implications: i. being is given as absolutely originary and pure, thus clear of any negative; ii. the passing from pure originary Being to determined being is either unexplainable, either founded in Emanationism, but in the latter case, there should no longer exist any determined, mortal being; and the very concept of “emanation” would be equally problematic, since the difference presupposed by the change of Being into emanation would be just as unintelligible. Or there wouldn’t even be any difference, thus emanation wouldn’t exist either.

We will start from the end and go to the beginning.

α. ii’. If the original Being is pure and without negation, then determine being is either unexplainable (even impossible), or it is an emanation from the originary Being, but then one cannot explain, however, its determination and, thus, the very principle of differentiation in emanation.¹¹

¹¹ This is the fundamental issue of Neoplatonism which, on the one hand, cannot explain the inner mechanism of Difference or of the Negative. On the other, precisely because of the first shortcoming, namely, that any derived instance is inscribed in a hierarchy, in a degenerating order. — At best, Plotinus argues that, if the inferior and derived elements form a relationship and pass from one state to another “sending forth as much of themselves as they can” to their environment and generating or producing effects, how could the Principle, the One remain closed in itself and not give itself over too, how could it not generate or beget or produce effects too? But this sending forth, this begetting, this overflowing and its results are, in Plotinus’s case, degenerating, as no occurrence of Difference is of the same being or rank as its Origin, though every occurrence is the Origin’s copy (*Enneads*, II (11), [1.]-[2.], IV (7), [1.], Plotinus, 2005, p. 509-511, 549-551).

Possible objections would argue that: **1.** determined being is an illusion; **2.** the determination of Being is an illusion.

In other words, the objection would claim that the ontological difference is an illusion. We have already discussed this sophistic contradiction: *if we have illusion, then we have ontological difference*. The illusion is impossible if there are no ontological differences or at least the possibility of ontological differences. Illusion itself consists in the variance between two elements (usually, subject and object or essence and appearance). For, if there is no difference between them, how could illusion be possible?

Consequently, regardless of whether we say that the determination of Being is an illusion, or that any “concurrent” or exterior existence to original Being is an illusion, illusion confirms and reveals the ontological Difference, namely the negative or, if we wish, Nothingness.

The next question arising here would be an attempt to clarify the relation between Being and Nothingness.

α. ii’. If we reached the conclusion that Nothingness is real (or that Nothingness, in J. Lacan’s words, “is inscribed in the Real”), then we must understand the two possible hypotheses we could formulate: **1.** Being and Nothingness are ontologically opposed to each other, so they represent an absolute dualism; **2.** Being and Nothingness are in a different kind of mutual position. And solving this hypothesis depends on the way in which we conceive the substance of Being itself (α . i.), respectively the void of Nothingness (β .).

1. Dualism implies exterior equivalence or the parity between Being and Nothingness.¹² If Being and Nothingness are (externally) equivalent, then they **a.** intermix with each other, they are interchangeable. And then they **b.** combine in an infinite complexity.

a. In the first case, where Being and Nothingness are equivalent and thus, interchangeable, the third-party horizon of their unity appears directly, respectively the horizon of the intermediary element that allows their intermixing. Since this third element contains both, it can be neither one nor the other. So it is a form of absolute indifference. However, since this indifference means absence of any multiplicity, Being and Nothingness immediately disappear. And the only “result” (result of our endeavour; ontologically, the third element is a foundation or a premise, not a result) is the ***Absolute Undetermined Immediacy***. (Hegel, 1966, p. 56)

¹² The mythical and theological scenarios that correspond to such a concept can be found in Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism and Taoism. Even though Taoism, on the one hand, implies dualism rather on a cosmological level; on the other, the transcendent unity of *yin* and *yang* is absolutely undetermined, apophatic and evokes the undetermined identity of opposites (Lao Zi, 1999).

b. In the second case, we return to the presupposition of an infinite string of determinations we have already examined. But here we can rebuild the demonstration by supposing that there is a third term that enables the transition or translation from one multiplicity level to the other and maintains Being and Nothingness simultaneously as different and identical. This third element reveals itself as a consequence of the common discursive universe of both Being and Nothingness, on the one hand; on the other, it appears as a consequence of the difference between Being and Nothingness, a difference that would not belong to either of them (otherwise, they would be indistinct and no transition would be needed any more). Once this postulate is reached, then, on the one hand, the situation previously anticipated in **β**. is already underway. Specifically, we would deal with a multiple reciprocal shifting between quanta of being and quanta of differences; but each level of positive or actual quanta would prove to be reducible or deconstructable by virtue of its inner and outer determination. And to make the duality intelligible to the end, the only logical continuation is, on the other hand, the investigation regarding the pure Being itself, meaning section **α. i.**

2. Other types of positions can be those in which **a.** either Being, **b.** or Nothingness have a position regarded as ascendant or privileged in relation to the other.

a. But if Being has a privileged position, then we have a situation in which it is infinitely absolute, and Nothingness becomes only an infinitesimal “perimeter”, comprised and surrounded by Being on all “sides” (Octavian, 2003, p. 21-22). — Certain species of Gnosticism can be indicated as belonging to this perspective (Culianu, 1990/2002, p. 263-285; Grozea, 2001, p. 97-124; Manolache, 2000, p. 162-167). In fact, this situation is implied by the presupposition of marking off Being through the negative it rejects. As Being is infinitely actual absolute, then no difference between the whole and its parts is given in its substance. The consequence is that Being is already marked off entirely, compromised by the infinitesimal negative it rejects *ad infinitum*, but which constantly consumes it in this ontological rejection. However, since any source of Being is already marked off by the rejected negative, there is no origin or any purely homogenous point of Being unmarked by the negative that Being is supposed “to fight” sisyphically to overcome. Every “quantum” or particle of Being is itself a sum of negations, therefore no quantum of Being can actually escape the monstrous gravity of the negative chasm. Thus, Being is not consumed, but it has already been immediately consumed by the negative. And it presents itself as a chasm without substance as well, and it is directly and eternally reduced to its own abysmal void.

b. If Nothingness has a privileged position, the situation is not any less precarious. A Being that would be assumed as subsisting in an ocean of Nothingness

would immediately succumb into absolute ontological erosion.¹³ Its very substance would have to be actualised or established on a foundation other than its presence in the meontological ocean and thus one would have to seek yet again a solution of a third kind. Contrary, Being would immediately disappear, being immediately overwhelmed by the devouring Nothingness, the ontological deconstruction being immediately absolute. Rather, since the foundation here is the Absolute, Being would not have ever been actualised and everything is, again, reduced to Nothingness.

Therefore, we see that every supposition from **α.ii.** ends in Nothingness. This is the fate of *representation-thought*. It cannot conceive the entities it refers to without engaging them through forms that already comprise ontologically complex or disjunctive multiplicities, which cannot hold any position in relation to their origin other than the one of a derived, exterior element that is ultimately irrational. In other words, *representation* did not complete the phenomenological and ontological reduction through which it could aim for an unconfusing, truly irreducible, elementary foundation.

More precisely, the very concept of Being that this type of thought engages is one vitiated by an uncritically presumed transcendental appearance and which thus has dramatic consequences for any endeavour it inspires.

B. α.i. Here, the question undoubtedly is the one regarding Being, as we have formulated it above: *what* precisely *makes it be*, as such?

Normally, Being is *immediately supposed*: a presence, an act, something that is *in the here and now* or “*in general*”. This means that it presents itself as continuity or as elementary continuum without interruptions. Any *distinctive point* of Being, analysed in itself, leads to this idea of irreducibility of the **abstract being** that essentially *maintains it*: disjoint from itself, *ad infinitum*, its abstract positing could never be terminally suppressed, since it is infinitely actually present in all its parts and any analysis of the *ens* of the “quantum” of being (however infinitesimal), could not, in fact, go past the first element, because it would be united, perichoretically and immediately integrated, yet extensively, with the infinite string of quanta of being set as its foundation.¹⁴ So the presence content, the being consistency of the

¹³ Ancient cosmogonist mythologies often draw upon the image of an indeterminate ocean from which an initial element singles itself out. — For the ancient Greeks, Chaos/Nyx was the original indetermination from which Uranus and Gaea spontaneously emerge. — Beyond the onto-logical (thus also intuitive) impossibility of such spontaneous punctual self-actualisations occurring out of Privation, one must note that such scenarios are the immediate ways in which thought immersed in *representation* has managed to irrationally settle the super-rational.

¹⁴ The Eleatic principle of the indivisibility of Being. An infinitesimally “small part” of Being is the whole of Being. “Summing up” the diversity that lies in such a pure identity-with-itself is instantaneous, absolutely immediate; namely, it does not occur, nor will it occur, nor has it ever occurred; **for it is given as such, already con-summated, without ever having been summed up per se.** — This principle was later resumed and theologically confirmed in the Judeo-Christian tradition.

quantum would be in itself unlimited, unbound, therefore irreducible. Or, conversely, the analysis of the first quantum would immediately contain the analysis of the entire infinite string, because no difference between one quantum and another, between one part and the whole, are given in being, such that any part contains, in fact, the whole with the entirety of its multiplicity. In other words, the infinite disjunction of abstract being in the multiplicity of its constituting elements would never end; similarly, disjunction would be unable not only to go past the first quantum, but not even to instantiate its first *initium* point, both because of the impenetrability of an *absolute infinite* string and **of the pure impossibility of locating or effectively, yieldingly, concretely apprehend such oneness**. This idea is usually directly expressed through the logical formula of identity: $A \equiv A$ or $A=A$. At any rate, it is the identity Being is equated with.

Concerning this idea, some interpretations have tried to eliminate the concept of multiplicity implicitly contained in the idea of identity or continuum, arguing that multiplicity pertains only to our *representation*. In its essence, Being and, implicitly, identity, are absolute immediacy. But once we speak of absolute immediacy, it is impossible to keep speaking of Being and identity. For these represent precisely a presence, an actuality; in other words, they irreducibly suppose **something manifest, even though enstatic**, and what is manifest is, at the same time, **differentiated, therefore in an ontological extension with itself, regardless of how immediate or co-interior this identity or extension is**. This means continuum or equality, or any other name of such meaning that we would want to use. Yet this extension is irreducibly a *multiplicity*, even though the ontological caesura between the multiples is here suspended or eliminated or transformed in any way.

This leads us to the fundamental issue in this matter: what is the immediate, fundamental point, the initial quantum (in whatever sense or direction would it be considered) that represents the essence of this Being or identity? But, more importantly, what is given “before” this quantum, “before” the “first extension”?¹⁵

¹⁵ A question that does not coincide with the atheist question: “Who or what has created or caused God?”. For the simple reason that here we have overcome the positivist thought that phantasmatically identifies determinations everywhere. And which, consequently, implies as answer to its question (addressed, with an unconscious self assured vanity, to the void itself) nothing but an infinite string of interconditioned determinations. Namely, it supposes the very ontological relativism of the infinite string of determinations that has been previously analysed and which we have just proven as impossible above in section 1.1. And when, in order to overcome the impossibility of this string (perceivable even intuitively), the atheist intellect believes that it experiences, in turn, a form of immediacy or exhaustion, in fact it does not presume to place it anywhere else but within **determined being** grossly apprehendable through empirical “immediacy”. This is why it sacrifices even its very own phenomenological reduction through which it could devise a form of mystery or transcendence however imprecise. What this drive brings forth is nothing but the absolute futility of questions such as the one above.

Such a hyper-analysis leads to this conclusion: the extension, the consistency or the substance of pure Being consists, essentially, in **the absolute and immediate conversion of the negative into affirmative; this is given as an absolutely immediate coincidence of the negative with itself in its absolute lack of coincidence with itself or with anything else.** We will briefly resume the arguments for this conclusion:

1. Being is something *manifest*, therefore *extensive*.
2. Extension means multiplicity, and the manifest means differentiation (Hegel, 2000a, p. 9-49).

3. Differentiation and multiplicity already suppose the negative, i.e., the ontological rejection by which at least two elements are maintained as ultimately disjoint, never overlapping.

4. This negative would precisely have the implication of a complex substance such as an infinite string of elements and levels — a paradigm we have proven false in section 1.1 of this text. The essential feature of such a structure of ontological or pyramidal ordering is the infinite delaying of its own overall actuality and of any of its levels in particular by its foundation's adjournment from one level to the other.

5. But pure Being does not manifest such symptoms: the elements contain one another, but not hierarchically, pyramidally, orderly etc., but *perichoretically*, they overlap in a pure and absolute extensive and self-transparent singularity; the transition from one element to another in this multiplicity does not raise the difficulty of overcoming the boundary, the interstitial ontological exteriority, since the transition has already been made and given without having actually ever to be accomplished, since the elements are identical in the infinity of their foundation. However, since Being does undoubtedly possess an extension, it is something manifest and present, thus it contains multiplicity — **the elements of this multiplicity are utterly different from one another.** However, although their difference is real and irreducible, it is simultaneously and analytically constituted as a simultaneous and absolutely infinite overlapping of all their parts and of all their inner elements. (John of Damascus, 2004, p. 19; Maximus the Confessor, 1990, p. 69-78, 1999, p. 211-212, II, 1.; Palamas G. S., 1977, p. 287-298, 310-311; Palamas G. S., 2009, p. 343). —

— We anticipate here the fact that, at the end of our endeavour, after having reached the criterion of effectiveness and immediacy, we will indeed find in **our empirical immediate world** the **presentification** of Being as directly accessible, but, however, not directly comprehensible and apprehendable. The world's determined things, those we can perceive with our sensitive intuition, are indeed a true form in which we partake of Substance. They are a genuine sign of Immediacy. But this sign is not self-sufficient and, consequently, it is not immediately apprehendable and intuitively perceivable in the entire absolute infinite string of its ontological instauration. Such apprehension could only be the object of an intellectual intuition or of a metaphysical speculation. Thus, positivism turns out to be nothing but the erroneous result of a flaw in transcendental topology and intentionality. —

For the same reading, see St. Anselm of Canterbury (Anselm, 1997, p. 25). — Thus, the difference does not reveal discontinuities or these discontinuities are “closed up” and “filled up” by and in themselves with Being or as Being and they articulate an absolute continuum of those respective elements.

6. Moreover, if we pursue to the end the absolute coincidence of pure Being’s elements, if the absolutely and perichoretic identical multiplicity of the substance of pure Being is seen in its essential nature, in its condition of absolute actuality, the absolute concept of the identity of elements, placed in the (over)borderline horizon of its own superlative, immediately leads to *pure immediacy* in which the condition of overlapping for overlapped elements is already completed (without ever having to be completed). For they are not given as identical, but they have already been given as such in absolute (Hegel, 1966, p. 64-65). Their identity is not extensively summed up, but it is already given in the pure anteriority of the absolute immediacy.

7. *The only conclusion compatible with these findings is the immediate overlapping tautology, the absolute and original coincidence between Identity and Difference.* Thus, responding to the second question, “what is given before the first quantum of presence of perichoretic actuality?” — it is this **absolute coincidence between Identity and Difference.**

Nevertheless, the concept of this ultimate overlap is unreachable unless one is willing to analyse Difference itself in its very own concept, hence to continue with our (me)ontological reduction already disclosed in the Preamble’s preceding sections. All the more so as considering that even inside pure Being, as analysed here, the Foundation proves to be an essence fundamentally originated only from Difference (thus, Negation, thus Absence, thus Nothingness) absolutely “converted” (i.e., revealed) in itself as affirmation, presence, being, identity, continuum. — Namely, the revelation here is that Being already presents itself to us as Nothingness immediately reverted or absolutely reflected in itself, absolutely and immediately prior to any other reversion or reflection; and this occurs precisely because **this Nothingness is not privative, nor has it ever been.** Some kind of absolutely self-differentiated Difference in the immediacy of its own prior identity or an absolute Difference of Difference in relation to the identically absolute immediacy differentiated prior to differentiation itself. Therefore, some kind of a pure and absolute, apophatic and exhaustive Transcendence of the (non)*something* which appeared in the original texts of metaphysical or theological thought as the superlative of absolute Indeterminateness.¹⁶ The absolute

¹⁶ Here, the final intuition of the transcendence of radical indeterminateness seems to be ecumenical. Although its every cultural postulation had very different, sometimes opposite, doctrinal, speculative and ideological consequences in the works of the authors we passingly mention here: Lao Tse; Plato (*Parmenides, The Sophist*); Plotinus; Adi Śankarāchārya (*Advaita Vedanta*); St. Dionysus the Areopagite;

and transcendent void deprived not only of determinations, but of the presence of any *something*, anything manifest, thus of anything in the absolute, leads to an absolute withdrawal in the pure immediacy which, being completed in itself absolutely self-differentiatedly beyond any multiple, is the absolute and transcendent plenitude of over-determinateness,¹⁷ that is the immediately absolute ontological condition for the *something* or for that which is given as manifest. As already cleared above, we can call this the **(Absolute) Undetermined Immediacy**. This concept will be briefly developed below.

1.3 The originary actual Nothingness or the over-Being. The **Absolute Undetermined Immediacy**

β. We will start here by the speculative experiment of the β. version: the ontological and phenomenological reduction is taken to the complete exhaustion of any quantum of Being, a Being that is “dissolved” or revealed in its originally immediate substance as Nothingness. We will briefly examine the presupposition of this Nothingness.¹⁸

Here, we will firstly discuss the supposition of the over-determination of the absolute Impossible¹⁹ that bears the absolutely immediate and irreducible premise both for the void of Nothingness and the continuum of Being. — The concept that presents itself as such a premise is that of the **Absolute Undetermined Immediacy**.

The **Absolute Undetermined Immediacy** appeared as the point of absolute *initium* of the pure extensive Being, as we have shown above. The same point also appears at the outset of Nothingness’s concept analysis: Nothingness itself, as Absence or Negation, usually appears as an intensive void through which one can glimpse an emptiness, but a “consistent” emptiness — *representation* attempts to intuit here

St. Gregory of Nyssa; St. Basil the Great; St. Cyril of Alexandria; St. John Chrysostom; St. Maximus the Confessor; St. Symeon the New Theologian; Meister Eckhart; Nicholas of Cusa; J.G. Fichte; F.W.J. Schelling; G.W.F. Hegel. The cultural adversity of the above doctrinal implications can be ascribed to subjective historical failures. However, the primal originary intuition of radical Indeterminateness can be understood as munificence of a transcendent donation.

¹⁷ Or of the **To Be**. (Octavian, 2003, p. 20-21, 26-30)

¹⁸ To be as clear as possible and remove any source of confusion, it must be said that there aren’t two types of absolute immediate and (over)apophatic Nothingness. But here we speak about the **Undetermined Immediacy** as root or as pure un-beginning, which, in dogmatic Trinitarian theology, was expressed through the common Nature of the Hypostases.

¹⁹ Let us not forget J. Lacan’s words: „L’impossible c’est le Réel” (Lacan, 1967).

a certain form of the purely void and absolutely abstract “a-dimensionality” or “intension” or “punctuality”. It is the reverse of Being, an analytic-reductive mode of referring to the multiple of Being. Although intuitively closer to the concept of **Immediacy**, Nothingness is itself here given as a mediation of a collapse or a fundamental destruction that leaves behind the inexistent surface of an implosion of the deep when it is thus conceived, as “a-dimensionality” or absolutely void and abstract “intension”.²⁰

But if the two concepts both appear as mediated, one through the immediate extension of the multiple, the other through the immediate collapse of the infinitesimally self-devouring fragmentation, then their common origin can only be the **Absolute Undetermined Immediacy**.

We have observed earlier that the reason why pure Being is a pure and absolute continuum is due to the absolutely immediate reflection of Nothingness. If this is the case — and our endeavour has apodictically brought us to this point —, the main issue of the whole discussion is precisely that of the absolute transmutation of Nothingness, the nature of its absolute reflection. Yet, since this very Nothingness has been reduced itself too as an absolutely mediated non-element in its immediacy of opposition against Being, what must be discussed is not the absolute reflection of Nothingness, be it absolute, as obtained through ontological fragmentation, but the self-division of the pure unbeginning of the **Undetermined Immediacy** as the pure point of *initium* for any original mediation, be it meontological.

²⁰ Paraphrasing Hegel, it can be said that the Nothingness just obtained here is the Nothingness of the elements whose annulment originated it. Yet, precisely because it was obtained by the annulment of pure and absolute Being, rather than of the world, the Nothingness obtained by suppressing Being preserves the converse effect of the meontological lack of extension. Thus, a form of mediation. In order to reach immediacy itself, any form of *representation* must be eliminated and only thus the suppression of the concept of Nothingness itself is reached. That which emerges then is nothing but pure and absolutely prior averting of reference and non-reference: the **Absolute Undetermined Immediacy**.

Also, speaking about the last hypotheses of modern (even postmodern) cosmology, we see in the attempts made by string theory, for instance, the claim to start from zero premises and to postulate a so-called “nothingness” as foundation of the original phenomenal world. However, as soon as one investigates what is understood in cosmology through this “nothingness”, one discovers that it is in fact a determined instantiation, with a hyperphysical phenomenology which manifests certain states subject to mathematical description. Generally speaking, the “nothingness” of physicists does not go beyond the concept of spatial or hyper-spatial void; and some of them have vacuous difficulties in understanding the differences between phenomena such as trans-specific causality or biological or quantic potentiality, on the one hand, and “absolute” genesis from nothingness, on the other. (Krauss, 2012, p. 73-74, 148-149). Such that this “nothingness” is not genuine “Nothingness” at all, but is rather a more peculiar hyper-space.

How can Nothingness reveal itself as an element of positiveness and set the original ontological continuum, instead of being the exponent of pure and absolute meontological dissolution, therefore of pure impossibility? In the absence of an intellectual (mystical) intuition, the answer to this question can only be ascertained somewhat schematically in the speculative analytics of the **Undetermined Immediacy**.²¹

During this endeavour, the thought regarding the steps of the brief speculative dialectic discussed above was essentially limited to *representation*. Thereby, every time a concept was articulated, the object designated by the concept represented a form of extension or substantiation: *representation* is by definition marked by the need of something concretely manifested, regardless of whether the object is or not radically abstract, in relation to empirical sensitivity — as is the case with the concept of pure Being or pure Nothingness.

But once we encountered the concept of **Undetermined Immediacy**, we may witness the complete suppression of any form of instantiation of anything manifest, of substance itself.²² Substance, or that which is manifest, is defined through the mediation of its enstasis or presentification. In other words, they are units, therefore (perichoretical, ultimately) syntheses of multiples. Thus, they are results, or if we wish, products of a primary activity belonging to a foundation horizon that, in its radical nature, cannot be merely an already established transmission of the manifest. But **pure and absolute Undetermined Immediacy** means the finality of suppressing any kind of content, extension, intension, dimensionality, a-dimensionality, singularity, unity, multiplicity, fragmentation, void, non-intentionality or substance.

²¹ Patristics never ceases to warn us against any endeavour of conceiving the Absolute Essence by untransfigured human thought. On the other hand, the same Patristics also uses arguments and human language and concepts through which, in response to heresies, formulates the articulation of the mystery. We believe that those precautions primarily address human *hubris*, which we hope to have left behind. Not least, the warning also refers to the adequacy of thought to an absolute Transcendence only evoked in the interjections of superlatives that merely deepen this distance. But we do not claim here to formulate a more detailed or more daring endeavour than the one already discovered by Patristic authors.

²² One may also find in Hegel such radical over-terminality, but as it ensues from the pages of the *Science of Logic*, it occurs somehow against the grain in relation to author's accents, after initially having been correctly addressed already starting with the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in whose **Preface** this concept is recurrently articulated. When Hegel discusses the pure unity between Being and Nothingness, he indicates that they are simultaneously absolutely different. However, their difference is actually *ineffable* (Hegel, 1966, p. 74). Thus, what is given, in fact, is their absolute identity and the fact that one passes into the other, while their difference remains unapprehensible; if one is to believe certain critical interpretations regarding Hegelianism, it would even remain without consequences. As we will demonstrate in a future study, it is precisely this unapprehensible definition that represents the ultimate drive of the speculative discourse in general and of Hegel's discourse in particular (Hegel, 1966, p. 64-75).

We therefore speak about the complete, radical, ontological disappearance of the *something* and of the *non-something* or about the absolute freedom from the horizon of any kind or of any stasis.²³

The absolute withdrawal from what is manifest into what is non-manifest, or rather into something over-manifest²⁴ leads to the suppression of all reference, therefore to the impossibility of common phatic access to this realm of ontological contiguity which is so concealed that not even the mystery of apophatism appears as satisfactory.²⁵ Rather, any mode of expression regarding the *Undetermined*

²³ In modernity, Karl Barth (Barth, 1964) is the one who raised the issue of the complete renunciation of any postulate concerning a positive knowledge of God. Sophistically overemphasizing God's absolute freedom from any instantiation and intelligibility, under the pretext of the super-intelligibility that is so often posited in the texts of the Christian tradition, Barth is willing to accept that all dogmatic formulations are nothing but pure voluntary relations of God to man. In Himself, the Transcendent could not be postulated through any kind of predication, however superlative, and regardless of the level of transcendence entailed by the predication. Thus, God definitively disappears and what appears in His place is a horizon of pure and absolutely unrelated arbitrariness that, just by "chance", through some kind of preferential "accident", initiated its determined and purely random communicability (the doctrine of the Holy Trinity becomes a kind of optional revelation, thus a version out of an absolute infinity) towards an equally accidental creature. Thesis that reinstates the ancient absolute distance between an absolute *deus otiosus* and a creature lost in its own foundational darkness, a result of the Darkness of a non-Foundation.

We believe that it is much too easily forgotten in this doctrine that any postulate of such a radical Transcendence already creates the premises of a super-hypostatization, because this very radical Difference will be marked in itself at the same moment and by the same movement by which it will absolutely differ from this marking. Which already calls upon Identity, no matter how over-determined. But we will investigate this paralogism that retains only one side of the absolute movement in another study. (Barth, 1964, p. 236-242; Scrima, 2005, p. 61-99).

²⁴ It has been argued in favour of using antinomic terms in discussions regarding apophatic transcendence (an idea to which we subscribe). At the same time, the terms using the idea of superlative (by possibly adding the prefix *hyper*) are demoted to establishing objective determinations, since they analytically entail the idea of correlation with something inferior (Scrima, 2005, p. 66-69, 77-81). In the above circumstance, choosing a formula that uses the superlative prefix does not indicate superiority in relation to an inferior category, but it means a fundamental coincidence between principle and occurrence, or better, said, between the principle and itself. It should hereby be emphasized that the focus is on the *transcendent* identity of the principle with itself, all the more so since the essence of the language used in this text regarding the concept of *Undetermined Immediacy* is built on the notion of speculative antinomy, as can be seen. Also in this antinomy that conveys the concept of immediacy, any of the versions expressing the absolutely immediate and indeterminate "apophatism" is equal to any other. — See also A. Bereschi: *Afterword* (Cusanus, 2008b, p. 575-576).

²⁵ Apophatism underlines God's indeterminateness by cancelling the predicates; but the divine over-Being still remains here as well as a self-established *something*. Yet, the *Absolute Undetermined Immediacy* is the pure anteriority of the non- or the over-non-establishment. Theologically, it only corresponds to the Hypostatical Origin or, in dogmatic terms, to the unknowable "abysses" "in the bosom of the Father" (John 1:18, KJV).

Immediacy will be a type of approximation in which the terminality of both representation and concept will occur, because within the **Undetermined Immediacy** occurs the absolute suppression or are played the stakes of its own “conditions” of (im)possibility. In a proper sense, the **Undetermined Immediacy** cannot be enlightened not even through the concept of absence or void, because the absence and the void are terms with an implicitly correlative meaning.²⁶ They lead to the meaning of suppressing **something**, which immediately entails *determination*, since it is spoken of the absence of *something* from a background or from a matrix or a membrane that is supposed to contain it or to which it is supposed to return; it does not lead to the idea of absolute suppression of anything, therefore of the matrix itself too, or of any kind of membrane or background. The **Undetermined Immediacy** is the absolute and pure suppression, without remnant, thus without any possibility of resuming the vanished elementariness within the parameters that comprised it or within similar ones. Within **Undetermined Immediacy**, one finds the definitive consumption of any substantiation and the compression of the absolute evanescence of any abstract intension, regardless of how narrowly confined “imprisoning”, void and a-dimensional it might be. Within **Undetermined Immediacy** both Being and Nothingness simply disappear in the non-margins of a non-abysse tighter than the sealed, never opened fissure of its own suppression.

There is no “moment” where **Undetermined Immediacy** would fail to be absolute immediacy. Thus, absolute suppression is not given in the **Undetermined Immediacy**, but it was never given, such that it has already been given in the non-suppression of the immediate absence of nothing. This suppression of unsuppressed suppression is the preceding point of the pure non-foundation as non-absence of the already suppressed absence and absolutely devoid of any passage. This pure immediacy, this unaltered stasis absolutely withdrawn in the perfect lack of content of a boundless realm which does not exist because it circumscribes no presence, no content, is its very conclusion before any beginning; a conclusion from which an eternal beginning springs through the deepening of the ineffable sealing of the unBeginning.²⁷

²⁶ J. Derrida appears to have taken the same path in his text *Différance* — the same pure and non-correlative suppression, the same absolute search for a unity without object; the same rejection even of apophatism, because it wouldn't be “radical enough”. However, Derrida's endeavour turns against his own intent when, from the “empty” sealed “tomb” of speech, *la différance* suddenly appears as... “temporization and spacing” — videlicet, from the trans-ontological towering of absolute rarefaction, he ends up making an unsuccessful crash landing in the realm of determined being where onticity is immediately founded within the formal conditions of the transcendental subject's intuition (time and space) (Derrida, 1972, p. 6-9).

²⁷ The Western texts or authors who examine in more general or more specific terms the issue of the **Undetermined Immediacy** can be briefly enumerated: Plato in his dialogues *Parmenides* and *The Sophist*; Plotinus in *Enneades*; Damascius in *Difficulties and Solutions of First Principles*; Dionysus the

— After all, it is both vapid and necessary to go over these language exhaustions through which we attempt to (dis)articulate the “normal perception” of substantiated and substantiating thought. But the radical overcoming or the death of *representation* compels us to breathe the substantiated ether’s voidness collapse of the predicative meaning speech form. —

This immediate unbegin collapse is immediately identical to itself, for no mediation disturbs its stasis. But it is the absolute self-division and self-mediation in itself, because it is immediately given as something immediate absolutely before its own immediacy (Hegel, 2000a, p. 39). — The concept of “immediacy” is crucial here, because it simultaneously presumes both the pure immediateness of pure coincidence, and the absolute immediateness of the collapse of immediacy itself as coincident instantiation, prior to actual collapse. Since it is precisely the impossibility to obtain content, something manifest or substantiated that indicates the immutable suppression of self-instantiation, thus its immediate exhaustion as prior to itself.

The hereby simple result is that ***Undetermined Immediacy*** is simultaneous absolute identity of the absolute non-particulateness of the absolutely immediate arrest in the pure vibrationless and extensionless result; and absolute self-differentiation in absolute extensionless self-precedence. This is the absolute non-point, the immutable and ineffable non-fissure through which and in which identity is irreducibly given in the factual impossibility of effective non-reduction — because here reduction is already accomplished exhaustion. Hereby factual identity is self-differentiated through and within the very absolute antecedence of the immediate exhaustion of “self”-precedence. And hereby factual identity is its own absolute remnantless self-division.

The entire concept of ***Undetermined Immediacy*** analytically engages the ultimate and over-terminal overlap between affirmative and negative, identity and difference, etc. Therefore, in this over-terminal and over-reductive overlap, the negative, both through its factual exhaustion and its factual identity ground and last but not least, through its immediate unfolded oneness with its absolute *initium* — (no longer) has any privative, rejective property or of bare ontological exteriorisation. It preserves its standing as ground of all distinctions. But distinctions do not hereby operate privatively, but effectively, namely as fulcra of actualising.²⁸ As in the old

Areopagite; The Holy Cappadocian Fathers; St. Maximus the Confessor; St. Symeon the New Theologian; Meister Eckhart; John Scotus Eriugena; Nicholas of Cusa; Jakob Boehme; G.W.F. Hegel; F.W.J. Schelling. Other discussions and attempts can be found in Martin Heidegger (Heidegger, 1957/1990) or Nikolai Berdiaev (Berdiaev, 1946/1999).

²⁸ Here, we would like to explain that the antinomy grounded by the concept of the ***Undetermined Immediacy*** for the determined intellect is no longer specific for any of the three types of antinomies identified by L. Blaga in the *Dogmatic Eon* (Blaga, 2013): dogmatic antinomies, dialectic antinomies

mythologies or traditions in which a character's experience of death implies a palingenetic value, the **Undetermined Immediacy** grounds the non-privative Negative of the Absolute; the distinctions are all mere *representational* anticipations of the absolute palingenesis established on Golgotha, which is the essential original achievement of the revelation of the non-privative Negative in onticity. — At the point where *representation-thought* established the sterile negative of privation or circumscription, thus the limited Negative, speculative thought formulates the concept of the unlimited or non-privative Negative through which, once exhausted, the opposite elements postulated as irretrievably excluding each other converge in a real oneness. This concept of the non-privative Negative or Nothingness comes from Christian theology that, without exhaustively expounding it, implies it as mystery of dogmatic formulations.²⁹ And this too is, evidently, in a direct correspondence with the concept of suppressing the negative through the speculative *Aufhebung* in Hegel — as exhibited in the **Preface** and chapter **Force and Intellect** in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, as well as in *The Science of Logic* (Hegel, 1966, p. 88-90; Hegel, 2000a, p. 9-49, 82-104). — The speculative is precisely the exhaustive turning point of the difference or of the negative, even at the level of an element contained in the phenomenological analysis through which exteriority or heterogeneity, the contingency of the elementary multiple is reflexively reversed and, thus exhaustively, onto itself; and this reflexive turn simultaneously and apodictically mirrors the absolute overlap between the identity and the difference of states or properties of opposite elements, which unveils the absolute speculative oneness (hereby simultaneously given with the reality of difference) of elements originally believed to be disjunctive, irreconcilable, and for whose unity or interaction one would either formerly call upon a perpetually disjunctive multiplicity of elements in a relationship of ontological “ordering”, either proclaim the most brutal reductionism to one of the

and a-categorical antinomies. Or, more precisely, the transcendence of the absolute seal of the **Undetermined Immediacy** reveals itself as absolute coincidence of all three types of antinomies. It is a dogmatic antinomy, because it is founded on the transfiguration of the Nothingness concept; it is an antinomy of speculative dialectic, because it is attained through the coincidence of opposite terms in a term that reprises them analytically and synthetically in a system of reflected exhaustion — we hereby use *speculative dialectic* in its Hegelian description founded by *Aufhebung*, not in the sense used by Błaga —; and it is an a-categorical antinomy, because it constitutes itself as a transcendence of opposite terms which are given as moments of this transcendence, as this a-categoriality is described by Nicholas of Cusa. — See also A. Bereschi's study quoted above (Cusanus, 2008b, p. 579-581).

²⁹ See the patristic works mentioned above. Each one of the Holy Fathers spoke about the birth of the Son from the Father, showing that it is ineffably and radically transcendent from any worldly or thought phenomenon. Therefore, essentially, it is fundamentally **non-privative** (The Areopagite, 1996; Cyril of Alexandria, 1994, p. 19-23; Basil the Great, 2001, p. 93-123).

spheres or states. Once this level was reached, as Hegel tells us, *representation* itself as a mode of thinking is completely removed from the speculative punctures of the contemplative articulations through its transformation, through its conceptual *metanoia*; and it's not natural, empirical, split thought that applies anymore instead of it or as its ground, but that which replaces it is the speculative experiential thought of the concept founded on exhaustion and unification with and through difference (Hegel, 1966, p. 597-621, 756-762; Hegel, 2000a). *Representation* should not be completely excluded as a tool; inasmuch as its foundation and dynamic coordinates have changed through the speculative endeavour, it is still legitimate and can be used inasmuch as the risks of its confusions are all disabled.

In the instances where *representation* has not yet been speculatively or contemplatively overcome, by definition the philosophic endeavour will be marked by the conceptual insolvency of *representations*. Thereby, discursive terms will always be caught in the mutual reduction or expansion of a dialectic devoid of destiny and, thus, without sense and rest. The aberrations of *representation-thought* will restlessly and worthlessly be carried through all kinds of ontological scenarios unable to overcome the stage of a hypothesis, thus of a phantasm. This is why a genuine metaphysical endeavour is immediately called upon here every time to identify the uncritically supposed hypothesis, namely to deconstructively uncover the assumptions underlying the flawed foundation of the theoretical edifice. However, in the absence of an irreducible landmark, as well as of the coordinates through which it is actualised in determination, all philosophy will be reduced to the continuous passing of the noetic spectre from one determination to another through the continuous criticism of the hypotheses that, pretentiously and academically, always claims to be culminating in a "(new) paradigm change" or, even worse, in the irrepressible hypothesis of a kind of "permanent revolution". The sterility of such damnation can only be equalled by the empty importance that thought bestows upon itself in its repeated unredemptive and correctional self-mortification.

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