

PHENOMENOLOGY AND IMAGINATION IN HEIDEGGER'S INTERPRETATION OF KANT*

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ABSTRACT. The purpose of my contribution is to provide an overview of development of Heidegger's account of imagination with a special focus to the affinity between phenomenology and psychology. (I.) Firstly, I reconstruct how – by his reading Husserl and Aristotle – the early Heidegger got to know the function of imagination as it can open the realm of the things themselves. (II.) Secondly, I investigate that in his Kant-book, Heidegger gave up his plan to further think the viewpoints envisioned by Husserl and the Neo-Kantians, and he entirely transformed his previous concept of imagination by the chapter on *Schematism*. My core thesis is that Heidegger's account of imagination is concerned with the emergence of schemes of our thinking, that is to say, Heidegger went beyond the psychological Kant-interpretation, and at the same time he turned to discover the field of phenomenological unconscious.

Keywords: imagination, schemes, thought, understanding, Kant, Heidegger, phenomenology, unconscious

I. Phenomenology and Imagination in the Early Heidegger

Husserl's Affinity to the early Heidegger: Human Imagination and Phenomenal Horizon

At the very beginning Heidegger still focused on Plato's account of imagination along the notion of *phantasia* and *eikasia* in his 1924/25 lecture course on Plato's *Sophist*.² In that time Heidegger more or less followed the

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² Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes* (Plato: Sophists), Ed. Ingeborg Schüßler. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1992, 58 §, 399–341.; 276. [hereafter: GA 19] Bibliographical note: Heidegger's complete works are cited with the abbreviation GA (*Gesamtausgabe*, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, from 1975 onwards) followed by volume number, comma and page numbers. Other works published outside of the *Gesamtausgabe* are cited with full bibliographical data at their first occurrence, then with abbreviations. All emphasis is original unless to quotations otherwise specified.

Husserlian viewpoint in which this issue was thought within the problem of intentionality (directedness-toward; *Ausgerichtetsein-auf*). 1. For Husserl, imagination firstly appeared by analogy with the *image* consciousness based on the *model of perception* (1895–1905), and later 2. in parallel with the *reproductive time* consciousness based on the *model of memory* (from 1909 onwards). As already quite young thinker, by reading Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and his *Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness*,³ Heidegger got to know the problem how imagination can become a subject matter of philosophical analysis.⁴ Although Plato did not discuss directly the imagination itself, he introduced its concept in contexts of his various dialogues (e.g. in *Timaeus*, *Republic*, *Phaedo*, *Sophist*).

It is important for Heidegger that at this point Plato distinguished the noun *eikasia* as imagination from the *phantasia*. The word *eikasia* stems from the Greek *eikon* (icon), and in Heidegger's view it may be translated with the word "imagination". In the four levels of human knowledge Plato regarded *eikasia* as the lowest level of knowledge, yet it means the foundation of all understanding. *Eikasia* is a thinking activity which is capable of seeing an image as an image, namely, the soul possesses a human ability to ascend from sensation to intellectual knowing, from perception to contemplation. Plato attempted to clear the being of non-beings in the case of poetry as mimetic acts (*μίμησις*), in this sense he was interested here only in the relation of mode of being of image (as image) to what is presented (imaged thing), but Plato was not interested in the phenomenon of "image-ness" or "pictoriality" (*Bildlichkeit*).

According to Heidegger it is impossible to clear the phenomenon of knowledge through the phenomenon of image. This is what Husserl has already demonstrated in his critique of the classical image-theory and of the doctrine of the immanent objects in *Logical Investigations*. As Heidegger mentioned, Husserl had made a distinction between image object (*Bildobjekt*) and image subject (*Bildsujet*) with regard to „the critique of image-theory“ in Appendix to §11 and §20 in the Investigation V in *Logical Investigations*.⁵ 1. The *image object* (*Bildobjekt*) means the appearing or photographic image itself which can be seen e. g. as an image hanging on the wall. 2. The real thing or person who is represented and depicted by the image (or photograph, picture) is the *image subject* (*Bildsujet*). 3. Finally, the

³ See Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*. Bd. I., Bd. II/1., Bd. II/2. (Logical investigations). Ed. Ursula Panzer. Halle, 1901; 7th reprint ed. Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen 1993, (henceforth: LI) Bd. II/1, V. § 19. § 21, § 23, § 28 and see further Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen Ergänzungsband II.*, Ed Ursula Melle. Springer, Dordrecht, 2005, 131–178.

⁴ See John Sallis, *Einbildungskraft – der Sinn von Sein* ("Imagination – The Sense of Being"). In: *Heidegger und der Sinn von Wahrheit*, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 2012, 131–152. Here: 131. ff.

⁵ Husserl, LI II/1. V, 421–425. (= Hua XIX/1, 436ff.)

experience of the *image-thing* (*Bildding*) i. e., the physical thing (*das physische Bild*) involves the materials (paper, canvas etc.) from which a thing is made.

According to Husserl, imagining is a non-derivative act of the consciousness, awareness that itself is unmediated by images and constitutes any kind of awareness of objects. In fact, Husserl devoted his attention to the question whether the operation of imagination can open the realm of *the things themselves*. At least Husserl saw an essential connection between the imagination and the opening of phenomenological horizon in which the things present themselves to us so they are. So to say, imagination is a crucial point for answering the fundamental questions concerning consciousness. The purpose of Heidegger is to grasp the imagination in terms of the opening up and 'constitution' of the basic horizon to human experience and understanding.

Imagination from Aristotle's Ontology of Thing

After this starting point, in his 1927 summer semester course on *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (see especially in §11, and 61, 107ff, 151.) Heidegger worked out the imagination from Aristotle's ontology of thing as well. Heidegger argued that in medieval metaphysics a regress to the subjectivity had pertained to the understanding of Being, and this regress to the subjectivity had been centred on the *poiesis* as producing (*Herstellen*). Naturally, the word *phantasia* can be regarded as imagination but instead of connoting something like imitation, likeness and image, it is associated with a process of bringing something into light. According to Heidegger, one of the most original meanings of the term *phantasia* comes from the verb *phainetai* (to appear or to be appeared). Aristotle treated the nature of imagination and its role in various aspects of human life (e. g. in rhetoric, memory, dreams and reminiscence) in his work on *The Soul* (*De Anima*). Insofar as the *logos* is to bring something into light so that something can be non-perceptively accessible, the *logos* is considered to contain a *phantasia*. *Phantasia* is a possibility for presenting something, together with the possibility to distinguish something (*krinein*). *Krinein* is the possibility that we can make a division between the one and the others for the *logos*. Consequently, both *phantasia* and *krinein* are fundamental to the way that the human being lives in *logos*.

In this poetic production (*Herstellen*) the people already always look ahead to an image, and based on this anticipating image we can form the thing to be produced. This pre-image (*Vorbild*) or proto-typical image is even what the Greeks called *eidos* and *idea*. In this way the *eidos* as an image is connected with the imagination. As Heidegger claims: "The anticipated look, the proto-typical image,

shows the thing as what it is before the production and how it is supported to look as a product. The anticipated look has not yet been externalized as something formed, actual, but is the image of imagination, of fantasy, *phantasia*”.⁶

John Sallis points out that this pictorial foreseeing or prevision (the image of imagination) in the event of producing is no accidental from a Heideggerian viewpoint but belongs to the structure of production, so to say, it forms its centre. Sallis formulates simply that the event of production is dominated by imagination.⁷ For Heidegger, however, this structure becomes important insofar as not only the production but – by analogy with this – the sense of Being is also determined by a relatedness to fore-seeing. Imagination which forms the horizon of the ontological understanding of Being in Heidegger, operates as a looking ahead to the *eidōs* (the essence) from Aristotle’s viewpoint. What Husserl regarded as seeing of essences (*Wesensschau*) or as a way how essences show themselves to us, it is due to the work of imagination, since it is the Being as *eidōs* what is pre-cepted (*vorgenommen*) and anticipated in imagination. The anticipating imagination is to render the thing (the Being) in a way – first of all in its actualization how a being already was before all really production. This pictorial sight differs from the sight by any producing. The *eidōs* means the factual thing only as it was before all production, this is an absolute a priori one what is former than all temporal. Aristotle speaks of the soul’s eye that sees the being, that is, in the process of producing, that which the thing was is already sighted beforehand. Firstly, the production takes this image temporal and real through the imagination. According to Heidegger, this close relation between time and imagination has already been involved in the ancient Hellenistic ontology.

In his Kant-book of 1929, Heidegger gave up the idea of thinking further the neo-Kantian and Husserlian viewpoints, and he reviews the imagination from an entirely new direction: from the direction of the chapter on Schematism and of the problem of Temporality. Heidegger believes that Kant was the first who revealed a fundamental idea, namely the interrelatedness between *time and imagination*.

II. On Imagination in Heidegger’s Kant appropriation of 1929 and phenomenological unconscious

As Matthias Wunsch notices, the reason why Heidegger’s Kant-book of 1929 (*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*) is an important volume is that he

⁶ „Das vorweggenommene Aussehen, das Vor-bild, zeigt das Ding, was es vor der Herstellung ist und wie es als Herstelltes aussehen soll. Das vorweggenommene Aussehen ist noch nicht Geprägtes, Wirkliches entäußert, sondern es ist das Bild der Ein-bildung, der φαντασία”. (Heidegger, GA 24. *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. Ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1975, 150.)

⁷ Sallis, „Einbildungskraft – der Sinn von Sein”, 135.

could firstly overwrite the psychological understanding of the Kantian notion of imagination by means of his criticism of the Neo-Kantians.⁸ Kant did not elaborate a unique theory on the power of imagination, at the same time he articulated it in his several works (such as for example in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Critique of Judgment* of 1790, the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* of 1766 and the *Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View* of 1798). He first succeeded in setting out the conceptual foundations of question and its decisive philosophical function, thus, his reflection always remains a reference point for other philosophical approaches. Kant writes in his *Critique of Pure Reason*: “Imagination [*Einbildungskraft*] is a faculty for representing an object even *without its presence* in intuition.”⁹

In his *Anthropology* as well as in the first *Critique* Kant distinguishes the ways of the poetical, mathematical and transcendental imaginations, however, transcendental imagination has only pivotal, absolute philosophical relevance, for it is the condition of the possibility of finite human knowledge. Imagination as “*Einbildungskraft*” serves cognition because it is regulated by understanding, but Kant refers to another form, too, when he uses the word *Phantasie* (fantasy or fancy in English). Imagination becomes mere fantasy only if cognition lost its dominance over it and so it leads to involuntary or unintended visions and visualizations. Fantasy, for Kant, is “our good genius”,¹⁰ at the same time it cannot avoid to be a wishful thinking which is dangerous, and it takes no place in the field of philosophy but psychology has a great deal to do with it, therefore Kant distanced himself from fantasy as “*Schwärmerei*”, as dreamy enthusiasm. To fantasize when we are awake means that man confuses his fantasies with real experiences and he lives as a visionary (*Phantast*), that is, for Kant, fantasy approaches madness.

The word “*Schwärmerei*” describes a transgression, a pseudo-transcendence of the boundaries of human reason. In the chapter *Doctrine of Dialectics* concerning the traditional realm of *metaphysica specialis* (psychological, cosmological and theological ideas), Kant revealed transcendental illusions through which we let ourselves to divert from the use of reason based on experience and it holds out hopes to us that we can expand the scope of our pure reason beyond the limits of all possible experiences. The metaphysician who claims that he has received immediate inspiration and been familiar with divine powers is a fantast, a dreamer.

⁸ Matthias Wunsch, *Einbildungskraft und Erfahrung bei Kant*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 2007, 22.

⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer – Allen W. Wood. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, 256. B151 and cf. B233 (hereafter: CPR both in notes and main text body)

¹⁰ “Phantasie ist unser guter Genius oder Daemon” (See AA XV., 144., in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*. Hrsg. von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (later: Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin) [= Akademie-Ausgabe]. Reimer Verlag (later: De Gruyter), Berlin, from 1900 onwards.)

However, Kant is also aware of that understanding needs imagination and the liberation of imagination from this service, but from a philosophical sight Kant is better interested in „imagination without fantasy” with two types of which he has explicitly dealt: these are the reproductive and productive imaginations. With the words of Dorthe Jørgensen, “the point was ...that cognition, morality, taste are all lost if imagination does not play together with understanding”.¹¹ Finally, Kant attributed a decisive role to the power of imagination in favour of clearing the objectivity of knowledge.

In his famous Kant-book of 1929, Heidegger focused on the theoretical philosophy Kants and the Schematism chapter in his critique of reason. Heidegger explored how far Kant had reached in the field of metaphysics in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and in this respect, the humanness of reason, i. e., the finitude became essential. He saw the very core of Kant’s ontological sight in the chapter on Schematism. The task of Schematism is to describe how knowledge of being is generated by the interplay of two complementary faculties of understanding and sensibility (*Verstand, Sinnlichkeit*) or concept and intuition (*Begriff, Anschauung*). While the synthesis of knowledge clearly traces back to the activity of understanding in the chapter on Transcendental Deduction of Kant; on Heidegger’s view, synthesis only emerges from the operation of schematism by dissolving the intuition and thinking in a “common root”. It is the imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) that is responsible for this schematism operating in experience as a „common root”. Imagination appears as not an accidental activity but as a fundamental form of our relation to being, and as such it proves more decisive for life than rationality.

Schematism would not be without the operation of imagination, in other words: we can think at all, because the emerging and forming of Schemes become possible by imagination. What Kant called schematism is the process of *world-forming* (*Weltbildung*) in Heidegger. By means of imagination operating in schematism Heidegger described the *world-forming* character of our finite human being, which was nothing else than uncovering the transcendence. For Heidegger, the operating of imagination was neither just another name of the human subjectivity nor a new human skill, but the way of avoiding the subjectivity itself. Heidegger’s account of imagination is located on a meta-level, i. e. within the framework of imagination he turned to apriori levels beyond all consciousness and unconsciousness of human.

¹¹ Dorthe Jørgensen: “The philosophy of imagination”, in *Handbook of Imagination and Culture*, Eds. Tania Zittoun – Vlad Glaveanu. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, 30.

Transcendental Imagination as a "Formative Center" (die bildende Mitte)

According to Richardson, the transcendental imagination (*transzendentele Einbildungskraft*) is a crucial operative factor in Heidegger to such a degree that the acceptance or rejection of his Kant-interpretation depends on this alone.¹² This conception was critically called a "root-thesis" by Wunsch and a "monism of imagination" by Cassirer.¹³

Kant noted that imagination is to be an "indispensable function of the soul" (*unentbehrliche Funktion der Seele*),¹⁴ but „to us unknown root" (*uns unbekannte Wurzel*),¹⁵ "the disquieting unknown" (*das beunruhigende Unbekannte*),¹⁶ "without which we would have no cognition at all but of which we are seldom even conscious".¹⁷ Heidegger added that while the place of each other component is properly arranged in Kant's system, "the transcendental power of imagination is homeless (*heimatlos*)".¹⁸ There is no fixed taxonomic place of the imagination in the system. Heidegger gave two arguments by way of illustration:

Argument 1

In the first ("A") edition of CPR (1781) Kant thought that the three original capacities or sources of the soul are no other than the "sense, imagination and apperception" which contain the conditions for all possible experience and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty.¹⁹ After that, in the second ("B") edition (1787) Kant changed the imagination's location within the faculties of cognition,²⁰ and he thus located the imagination within the sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) which is distinguished as a lower faculty of cognition from the higher faculties like understanding, judgment and reason. Consequently, Kant eliminated the new role of imagination, and it was no longer the *faculty for synthesis* but only the *faculty for representing* an object without its presence, so to speak, the faculty for producing images from oneself where images are not borrowed from experience.

¹² William J. Richardson, *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 4th Ed. Fordham University Press, New York, 2003, 121 f.

¹³ Wunsch, *Einbildungskraft und Erfahrung bei Kant*, 31. ff.; Ernst Cassirer, "Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik: Bemerkungen zu Martin Heideggers Kant-Interpretation" (Rezension), in *Kant-Studien* XXXVI/1931: 1–26. Here: 16.

¹⁴ Heidegger, GA 3. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, ed. F.-W. von Hermann. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1991, 160.

¹⁵ Heidegger, GA 3, 161.

¹⁶ Heidegger, GA 3, 162.

¹⁷ Kant, CPR A78, B103

¹⁸ Heidegger, GA 3, 136.

¹⁹ Kant, CPR A94, A123

²⁰ Kant, CPR B151–152

Argument 2

Similarly to Schopenhauer, Heidegger accepted the A edition of CPR. Here, on the one hand, the *Transcendental Aesthetics* did not discuss imagination, in spite of the fact that it belongs to the side of sensibility, on the other hand the *Transcendental Logic* has already dealt with it, but the imagination would be no place in *Logic* in a strictly sense. It is no accidental for Heidegger that imagination came to be a crucial point of the system in the chapter of *Deduction* where it turned out to have an operative-systematic function in the first *Critique*, but Kant only later analysed the actual process of imagination in the chapter on *Schematism*.

For Kant, the role of A-Deduction lies in justifying the fact that there is a valid objective experience of the things, in Heidegger's formulation, an inner possibility of transcendence. The two ways of justification run as follows:

The first way begins "from above" with the understanding and leads down to the intuition by exploration of imagination with regard to the pure apperception. The second way proceeds "from below", from intuition to pure understanding when beginning from intuition the role of imagination is revealed to us.²¹ The justification cannot be conducted by way of logical deduction, rather it is by discovering the united whole as a *pure synthesis* between the two sources of experience. On both ways of Deduction it turns out that either transcendental apperception or intuition can never be the final point, because both they presuppose the pure synthesis,²² so the opposition of two sources of knowledge gives place to a trichotomy. Kant spoke of something hidden *productivity* beyond both understanding and intuition that would be the foundation of all synthesis. Transcendental imagination is not simply a faculty of mediality which would make contact between the two sources of experience as an external factor, but the source and foundation of both, it is, for Heidegger, the formative center (*die bildende Mitte*) of the critique of pure reason, i.e., a common root („gemeinschaftlichen [...] Wurzel"),²³ a basic faculty (*Grundvermögen*).²⁴

It does not mean that the pure thinking and the pure intuition would be a product of mere imagination or only merely something imaginary, but it means that the synthetizing power of imagination is necessary for the inner possibility of ontological knowledge and transcendence. It would be "merely imaginary" what is not real in a factual-empirical sense, but the transcendental imagination is not directed toward the beings at all. It cannot become fantasies and dissolve into

²¹ For more detail about both the first (Kant, CPR A 116–120) and the second way (Kant, CPR A 120–128).

²² See Kant, CPR A 118

²³ Kant, CPR A15 /B29, see further Heidegger, GA 3, 137.

²⁴ Kant, CPR A 124

appearances (*Schein*), insofar as the transcendental imagination is never at work in the field of the empirical ability of fantasy. Kant called the transcendental imagination *synthesis speciosa* in order to distinguish it from each other function of the “*Einbildungskraft*”, so it what is formed by transcendental imagination can never “merely imaginary” against reality, the operation of imagination has in fact nothing to do with the ontic appearance (*Schein*). The transcendental imagination has no role in forming (*bilden, einbilden*) any adequacy or non-adequacy to the reality (fiction, illusion, mere appearance, etc.), but it moves in the dimension of the “possibilities” and of the possibility of making-possible.²⁵

The decline of the faculty of transcendental imagination necessarily entails the decline of the human ability to experience (or transcend in Heidegger's view) and its malfunction. However, we can never lose our transcendental faculty, because Kant spoke about no accidental human activity working sometimes but about a basic faculty (*Grundvermögen*) whose entire collapse cannot happen unless human nature changes. It raises the even more worrying question whether this faculty may be overstimulated in direction of an excessive-hyper activity, and if so, what kind of consequences or dangers this may have. At this degree of difficulties Kant stopped to discuss the problem. Kant's astonishment is mirrored in his re-writing the *Deduction* in the second edition of the *Critique* (1787), while no longer regarding the transcendental imagination as a basic faculty but only as a medial stage which is of secondary significance in comparison with the faculty of understanding. The B-Deduction culminated in the synthetic unity of the apperception rather than the transcendental imagination. It only happened later by the experience of the *sublime* in the *Critique of Judgement* that Kant returned to the difficulties being in the field of imagination. Heidegger himself spoke of the higher level of imaginative work where the transcendental imagination “is broken up into more original »possibilities«,”²⁶ at the same time its „strangeness... cannot disappear. Rather, it will increase with the growing originality”.²⁷ Heidegger agreed with Kant that in this realm there is something “excessive”,²⁸ in a later formulation by Heidegger, “overwhelming forces” (*Übermächtigen*) manifest themselves.²⁹

The German term “*Einbildungskraft*” signs that the task of the high-level operation of this faculty is to educate, to become a self-formation and the process

²⁵ Heidegger, GA 3, 140.

²⁶ Heidegger, GA 3, 140.

²⁷ Heidegger, GA 3, *ibid*.

²⁸ Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, trans. James Creed Meredith. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2007, (§ 27) 87 ff.

²⁹ Heidegger, GA 26. *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, Ed. K. Held. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1978, 13.,cf. in note 211, and see further Heidegger, GA 27, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Ed. Otto Saame–Ina Saame-Speidel. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1996, 383.

of human forming (*Bildung, Einbildung*). A peculiar non-connectedness to the beings can be found in the power of imagination, therefore it participates in the formation of no reality, but only in the *look-forming (Anblickbilden)*, in this respect the imagination is named as ability to give intuitive and present (*subjection sub aspectum*). The problem of look (*Spezies*) leads to the core of the possibility of making-possible in Heidegger, while to the core of symbol in Cassirer. According to Kant, the danger of transcendental illusion (*Schein*) cannot be excluded in the field of transcendental imagination either, and even Kant interrupts his discussion, after having worried about being illusions not only in the field of phenomenal experiences (the immanence) but in the transcendental logics as well, and here they are more threatening, as in the best case we can just unveil the illusions and determine their place, but they cannot be soluble. Illusion remains in the place of illusion (now already recognized as a real illusion), but the reality may hardly be visible. Transcendental imagination is a *productive* power, but can never be an ontically creative one, because it conducts (a priori) independently of all experience, no creating any objective reality.

Transcendental Imagination and Pure Intuition (Anschauung)

For Heidegger, intuition (*Anschauung*) constitutes the authentic essence of knowledge what has priority. “The knowing – as he writes – is primarily intuiting.”³⁰ It is fundamental for this account of intuition that Kant’s metaphysical ground-laying must be determined by the thought of finitude. Following Kant, Heidegger also assumed a basic difference between the divine and the human nature that is accompanied by two modes of intuition. He proposed that, beyond the finite human intuition (*intuitus derivativus*), another mode of consciousness called *intuitus originarius* may be possible what differs from humans, although it is inaccessible for us. The presenting of finite intuition is no “creative” flow like a divine intuition at all which creates the beings themselves in the intuition, but it only forms the look of the objects, thus it is here about nothing intuition which allows the being itself to stand forth (*Ent-stand*) but only about intuition which means the presentation of the same being as object (*Gegen-stand*) in its objectiveness (*Gegenständlichkeit*).³¹ The significance of intuition lies in the fact that the finite intuition must be affected by objects, and hence we have need of it as the ability to be receptivity without it excluded the possibility of knowledge.

³⁰ Heidegger, GA 3, 21., 27.

³¹ Heidegger, GA 3, 31–36.

Intuition means the immediate encounter with a singular, by contrast, the result of thinking is a concept which is always universal.³² According to Heidegger, this „general”, conceptual presentation serves the intuiting itself and is a *mediate knowledge* of the object, i.e., the representation of a representation of it. All thinking is only service which itself is more finite than the intuition, because in that it lacks the immediacy of finite intuition. “Its representing requires the indirection [*Umweg*] of a reference to a universal...This circuitousness [*Umwegigkeit*] (discursiveness)... is the sharpest index of its finitude.”³³ Divine knowing is always intuition which first creates the being as such in intuiting, but it cannot require thinking. Of course, only through the unity of intuition and thought can human knowledge spring forth, namely finite knowing has its essence precisely in the original synthesis of the basic sources. In spite of differences there is a common denominator, if both are a presentation (*Vorstellung*) in their nature and can be described as modes of the representing of something (*Weisen des Vorstellens von...*).³⁴

However, Kant did not speak of the intuition in a conventional sense which would be directed to the objectiveness, namely, he conceived of the intuition neither empirically nor psychologically, but his attention returned to its innermost transcendental characteristic. Intuition is not “sensible”, because it would be in its nature empirical, but rather, because our human being is finite, Kant was the first who attained the ontological concept of sensibility which is not sensualistic, in this respect Kant left us open the possibility of a non-empirical sensibility. There is an original mode of the human intuition which is prior to any possible experience and never refers to the forming of the objects themselves, but refers to the pure look of objectivity in general instead, its essential role lies in the original institution (the forming) of transcendence. The two types of pure intuition for Kant are Space and Time. Their nature are the “*exhibitio originaria*”.³⁵ In contrast to the divine intuition, human intuition is a faculty of formative power whose unity is a sight caught in the image-giving imagining (*im Bild-gebenden Einbilden*),³⁶ in other words, Space and Time what are intuited in the pure intuition have an *imaginative character*.³⁷ What kind of faculty is pure intuition? Or, what means this imaginative character of the forming (*die imaginative Bildung*). According to Heidegger, we receive a response only if we ask about the character of *what is intuited* in pure intuition. Some interpreters deny that anything

³² Kant, CPR A51, B75 and see Richardson, *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 116 ff.

³³ Heidegger, GA 3, 29. f.

³⁴ Heidegger, GA 3, 148.

³⁵ Heidegger, GA 3, (§ 28) 141.

³⁶ Heidegger, GA 3, (§ 28) 142.

³⁷ Heidegger, GA 3, (§ 28) 143.

is intuited in pure intuition, insofar as it what is intuited may only be the “form of intuition”. As forms to be intuited, Space and Time are indeed intuitions without objects, but yet there are something what is only intuited in them. Forms of intuition are “Something”, but certainly not “objects”. In description by Kant, what is intuited in pure intuition is an *ens imaginarium*.³⁸ As things, “Nothing” can be intuited, but rather, Space and Time are the forms (*Formen*) of the pre-forming (*Vorbildung*), they form the pure look (*reine Anblick*) which serves as horizon for the empirically intuitable things.³⁹ The pure look what is intuited is not real (in the sense of objective reality) but “the formative self-giving of that which gives itself” (*das bildende Sichselbstgeben des sich Gebenden*).⁴⁰

Pure intuitions are formative powers in the sense that “they pro-pose (*vorstellen*) the look of Space and Time in advance *as totalities* which are in themselves manifold”.⁴¹ Pure imagination itself formatively gives the looks (the images) from out of itself. Heidegger highlights that this pure look formed in intuition cannot be mere illusion (*Schein*), this imaginative character of Space and Time has nothing to do with the negative meanings of the Hegelian term *Schein* (as illusion, fiction and appearance). It is important that Kant treated the relation of pure intuition and imagination in the ground-laying of metaphysics, not in aesthetics. Pure intuition must catch a sight of the whole, however it is a special whole, therefore this *unified whole* must allow itself to be seen in advance *in* this togetherness of *its manifoldness*, therefore Kant here spoke about no synthesis but rather a “Synopsis” in pure intuition in which this unified whole is not the universality of a concept.⁴² The *pure syn-opsis* refers to the real phenomenal character of pure intuition, namely that, even if we only focus on the things, as pure looks, Space and Time simultaneously manifest for us. It means a limit-experience on the limits of phenomenological consciousness and unconscious.

“[Only] the pure intuition, as preliminary forming of an unthematic, pure look, makes it possible that the empirical intuiting of spatio-temporal things... does not first need to intuit space and time in the sense of an apprehension”.⁴³

As a matter of fact, Heidegger’s conception was not an isolated event, in retrospect at this point, he continued Paul Natorp’ and Edmund Husserl’s controversy which had burst out at the turn-of-the-century after the publication

³⁸ Kant, *CPR* A291/B347

³⁹ Heidegger, *GA 3*, (§28) 143.

⁴⁰ Heidegger, *GA 3*, 141.

⁴¹ Heidegger, *GA 3*, 141.

⁴² Heidegger, *GA 3*, (§ 28) 142.

⁴³ Heidegger, *GA 3*, (§ 28) 145.

of the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*. This debate arose together with the problematization of being and possibility of *intuition*: with the concept of “viewing” (*Anschauung*). Natorp and the Neo-Kantians rejected the possibility of intuition, by contrast, at the root of Husserl’s investigations, the intuition appears as a source of knowledge. As a new finding, Husserl distinguished between two kinds of intuition: (1) *categorial intuition* involves seeing the essence (*Wesenschau*), and (2) *sensuous intuition* belongs to the perceiving of external things. While in seeing the essence, the mode of the givenness of conscious experience is given to our consciousness in its completeness as a whole; the perceiving of external things is only given fragmentarily. For Husserl, the fragmentality of perceiving the things — the fact that the things’ perception is unable to provide a whole, unmediated and intuitive knowledge of the things — shifts the focus to the limits of phenomenality. Thus at this point, on the limits of phenomenality, Kant assumed the difference between divine and human experience, and Heidegger basically adopted the insight from Husserl’s legacy that the intuition does not play a fundamental role in viewing of the reality for the Neo-Kantians, but rather, the concepts turn into productive forces by which objective reality is organized.

Transcendental Imagination and Theoretical Reason

The Neo-Kantians understood Space and Time as logical „categories”, and consequently dissolved the Aesthetics in Transcendental Logic, thus the synthesis of knowing was traced back to the activity of understanding. Following the chapters on *Schematism* and *Deduction* against the Neo-Kantians, Heidegger tried to explore that both pure thinking and theoretical reason originated from the transcendental power of imagination. If imagination belongs to the Sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*), then according to the followers of modernity, it seems to be unacceptable how a lower faculty of cognition could be an “origin” – not only a “substratum” – for the higher faculty of reason. According to Heidegger’s counter-argument, it is here about neither lower nor higher faculties but about an alive dynamics of experience and transcendence without isolation.

The weak point of the above-cited argument is no other than Heidegger avoided to make a difference between the understanding and the reason, the categories and the ideas which Kant carefully differentiated. (1) The pure concepts of *understanding*, the categories are analysed in *Deduction* by Kant, and Kant’s aim is to justify the objectivity of experience in direction of the things. As a result of this discussion, the unity of self-consciousness makes all experience possible. (2) By contrast, the pure concepts of *reason* (the psychological, cosmological and theological ideas) which goes beyond the field of all possible experiences are articulated in *Dialectics* by Kant. In *Dialectics* concerning the

traditional realm of *metaphysica specialis* (the psychological, cosmological and theological ideas), Kant revealed the transcendental illusions through which we let ourselves to divert from the use of reason based on experience and it holds out hopes to us that we can expand the scope of our pure reason beyond the limits of all possible experiences.

Heidegger distanced himself from the transcendental logics where the opposition of two spheres (*phenomena and noumena*) meant solution in Kant's system, and hence he neglected these distinctions, in his view the foundation of *Deduction* is rooted in the *Schematism*. Heidegger surely followed Kant against Spinoza, because Kant never regarded philosophy as a sphere that could open access to a *mundus intelligibilis* (to a reality beyond all experiences). In Kant's view, it has become emphatic that the categories as the pure concepts of understanding are *notios* (i.e., with the help of them we think of concepts [such as God, immortality and freedom] which extend over our all experiences). The reason why Kant's *notios* are problematic to him is because they do not imply the schemes of time, that is, any factual or concrete relations of time that are concerned with the knower. The chasm between the world of appearance (*phenomena*) and "being-in-itself" (*noumena*) is in fact unbridgeable.⁴⁴ Instead, for Heidegger the solution means that the categories are inherently schematized, and hence include the concepts of time as well from which can be dissociated only through abstraction.⁴⁵ On Heidegger's view, the event of ontological understanding may be considered only if we understand how time and change are built into our schemes, and how schemes of our thinking can be broken into pieces or modified by temporality. This is a happening which, from a Heideggerian perspective, can never be evoked by the subject. Accordingly, the notion of the truth is, of course, not eliminated but preserved its validity in Heidegger. Truth exists, but Heidegger was more interested in the experience of truth *regarding its relation to the reality*. Instead of absolute (indisputable, transcendent) truths, he asked how transcendence (the emergence of the meaning of Being) can be involved in human being. Heidegger explored how far Kant had reached in the field of metaphysics in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and in this respect, the humanness of reason, i. e., the finitude has become essential for him.

Kant specified the traditional problems of metaphysics in his moral philosophy, nevertheless in his second *Critique*, Kant's *notio* is no longer the knowledge of the theoretical reason but a *postulatum* (*Heischeurtheile*) of the practical reason, and thus it does not extend the realm of our knowledge, but it serves as a regulative function for our morality (i.e. for how knowledge should be used).

⁴⁴ Heidegger, GA 3, 53.

⁴⁵ Heidegger, GA 3, 86.

According to Heidegger, such a distinction of understanding and reason ought not to be phenomenologically allowed, because Kant himself also suggested that we should regard the human understanding and the reason not as separated faculties but as various (*noumenal* and *phenomenal*) uses of the same activity. Pure understanding and pure reason never exist in themselves, both only provide form together the essence of the human thinking. The pure understanding would be in itself the figure of the “*I think*”, but its essence lies in the reason, in the “faculty of ideas”, for “without reason we have »no coherent employment of the understanding«”.⁴⁶ Heidegger still added the argument that Kant was even who dissolved or precisely absorbed the traditional-formal logic into his *Transcendental Logic*.⁴⁷ This is the reason why Heidegger saw to be necessary for examining *the full essence of thinking (das volle Wesen des Denkens)* in regard to the power of imagination. We can recognize the true role of the imagination in our thinking only if we try to thematize whether “this logic can delimit the full essence of thinking or can even approach it”.⁴⁸ In Kant's system, the logic was regarded as a starting point. Within the realm of the logic, imagination has not truly place or essential function, therefore he has given up the role of the transcendental power of imagination in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787).

Heidegger maintained that we should have thought the essence of thinking from itself rather than from out of the logic. For Kant, the essence of thinking can be found in the judgement (*Urteil*) what is the real form of the objective knowledge. The thinking (*Denken*) is the process of the activity of judging in which conducts the understanding (*Verstand*).⁴⁹ Instead of the activity of judging, Heidegger called the thinking as a “faculty of rules” (*Vermögen der Regeln*).⁵⁰ This definition sheds light on the way that the rules can be *the function of the unity of understanding*, in this respect, the essence of the pure thinking lies in the “pure self-consciousness”, compared to which the judgment is already – for Heidegger – a derivative form as the part of the formal logic. The place of the event of pure thinking is in the transcendental *Schematism*. It depends on the unified horizon of our schemes how we used to think and on what we can think. Heidegger points out that “the understanding does not bring forth the schemata, but [only] »works with them«,”⁵¹ that is, the origin of *Schematism* cannot be

⁴⁶ Kant, *CPR* A651/B679; see further Heidegger, GA 3, (§ 29) 152.

⁴⁷ Heidegger, GA 3, (§ 29) 149.

⁴⁸ Heidegger, GA 3, (§ 29) 149.

⁴⁹ Kant, *CPRA* 51, B75

⁵⁰ Heidegger, GA 3, (§ 29) 149.

⁵¹ Heidegger: GA 3, (§ 29) 151.

found in pure reason. Naturally, Heidegger is also aware of that Kant entirely excluded the power of imagination and their interrelation as well from the field of theoretical reason.⁵² But, after Kant had distinguished the transcendental function of imagination from its other (e. g. poetical, mathematical) functions beforehand, Heidegger missed with good reason the consequent development of this viewpoint.

However, for Kant the „judgement” had more significance than what is later permitted by Heidegger. Kant intended not only to absorb the general logic into *Transcendental Logic* but to lead from out of it to the field of a new “logic”. We today would be able to name Kant’s *Transcendental Logic* as a heuristic logic, and in fact, Kant discovered something what might be revelation for his contemporaries. The judgement, which stands by itself, has its own operating field in the *Transcendental Logic*. While Heidegger criticized the Kantian logic, Kant went beyond a merely formal logic in both the power of judgement and his *Transcendental Logic*.

To do the formal logic is to do everything by rules, but in the field of *Transcendental Logic* we need judgement, namely the faculty of applying rules. According to Kant: “General logic contains, and can contain, no rules for the faculty of judgement”.⁵³ Any logic cannot give prescriptions as to how to operate the subsumption under rules, and hence the general logic can only recognize *in abstracto* the generality, but cannot refer to the field of experience, finally the logic is reduced to the analysis of the empty form of knowledge. By contrast, the faculty of judgement is a peculiar talent that cannot be taught but only practiced.⁵⁴ It is possible that a ruler who might very well know the universal rules yet might still not to be able to apply them correctly to concrete cases. The judgement *in concreto* belongs to the universality expressed by rules, it means the multiplicity of knowledge rather than a synthetic knowing, in other words: this is a faculty of new experiences (or discoveries). The activity of the faculty of judgement is described in the *Analytic of Principles*. The principles are a priori synthetic judgements which make all sciences and experiences possible. This chapter goes beyond the logical process of understanding. Heidegger claimed that the power of *Transcendental Logic* did not truly reveal itself, because Kant adopted the laws of formal logic in the new realm of *Transcendental Logic* too. As a matter of fact, the proceeding of *Transcendental Logic* was similar to the general logic, it seems “to have as its peculiar task to correct and secure the faculty of judgement by means of determine rules in the use of pure understanding”.⁵⁵ After this outcome of the *Transcendental Logic*, the chapter on *Schematism* also lost its *in concreto* relations.

⁵² Kant, *CPR* A 570/B598

⁵³ Kant, *CPR* A 132/B171

⁵⁴ Kant, *CPR* B172–173/A133–134

⁵⁵ Kant, *CPR* B 174/A135

In Heidegger's reading, a serious problem of the critique of reason follows from this logical viewpoint:

In Kant's system, we cannot give account of the Schematism of our thinking, i.e., of how schemes come into being and how the horizons of thinking are transformed. Kant's aim was to justify the objectivity of experience, at the same time he failed to think about the *inner historicity of experience* and the concept of a *historical a priori*. In experience, it is the always repetitive factor (the *a priori*) what can be described and comprehend by schemes, thus we can derivate everything from the understanding as Kant did. However, the chapter on *Schematism* did not deal with the essential question how the schemes can change in our mind and how the emergence of new schemes is possible. Any experience may be considered only if we understand how time and changes are built into our schemes. Historicity remains hidden in the *Schematism* written by Kant. The justification of objectivity and the logical processes of experience are never enough to explore the real (life-) experience (the past, the history or the narrative identity etc.). This Schematism of thinking is rooted in deeper than the rules or the laws, according to Heidegger, it can be regarded as an event of *world-forming* (*Weltbildung*), hence, due to this in fact that we can see the reality *as a world*, not only as a chaos and we have a world-intuition. In this respect Heidegger spoke of a "temporal Schematism" in which he intended to have access to *the historicity of understanding* and the *thinking of a historical a priori*. Kant finally returned to the empirical viewpoint of the period before his *Critiques* when the power of imagination was discussed as a process of *Vorstellung* (abstract representation or idea-forming), in this aspect, it has already been put at the heart of interest in the Cartesian tradition. In other words, it was conceived as a mode of perception derived from „seeing“, thus, imagination was a secondary skill which depended upon the sensory perceptions.

However, Kant had a good reason for the elimination of the role of transcendental imagination: all operative functions of the imagination involve the serious danger that the problems of empirical imagination will also generate themselves again and again in the field of transcendental imagination. Kant wrote about these dangers in his *Critique of Judgement*: in experience of the *sublime*. The problem may be written as follows:

If the transcendental imagination becomes a centre, i.e., a common root of the knowing faculties, the cognitive faculties lose their power over imagination, and there is no longer form, figure, concept, therefore it remains no more "imagination without fantasy" what had a philosophical significance for Kant, but rather this imagination itself also turns into fantasy. It means that the insight into

infinity is a kind of gap for the transcendental imagination, and the whole enterprise of the *Critique* may be collapsed because of the imagination. There is no antiserum (*pharmakon*) against falling back on dogmatism and the doctrine of errant metaphysics. In the first *Critique*, the prolongation of imagination led to mere dreamy enthusiasm (*Schwärmerei*) or *wishful thinking* against which the young Kant had already struggled as well, and had regarded the critique of reason as the most effective antiserum.

Kant was aware of the fact that in the field of the schematism, imagination can lose not only concepts and cognitions but also the schemes themselves, if it has run over everything in its schematization without concepts. Kant re-defined the imagination, but this revision serves the establishment of the limits of knowledge in order to make room for faith. Naturally, Heidegger rejected any notion of the unconscious, however, as it may be seen, it doesn't mean that there would not be any place for a phenomenological unconscious in Heidegger's thinking on imagination.

Imagination and Respect for the Law/Moral Feeling– Critique of Pure Reason

In the Davos debate Cassirer argued that imagination was considered as belonging to the *Schematism* within the theoretical philosophy and *expelled from the ethics*. Cassirer says in the *Davos Disputation*:

In the ethical, however, he [Kant] forbids the Schematism. ...There is a Schematism of theoretical knowledge, but not of practical reason. There is in any event something else, namely, what Kant calls the Typic of practical reason. And he makes a distinction between Schematism and Typic.⁵⁶

According to Cassirer, Kant kept the imagination out of ethics. By contrast, according to Heidegger's main counter-argument, imagination cannot be reduced to the *Schematism* if imagination has no fixed taxonomic place in the Kantian system. Against Cassirer, Heidegger added that while the place of each other component is properly arranged in Kant's system, "the transcendental power of imagination is homeless (*heimatlos*)".⁵⁷ It is most important that the chapters of both *Schematism* and *Deduction* centering around the imagination point forward at the *Critique of Practical Reason*, by leading to the problem of freedom which

⁵⁶ Heidegger, GA 3, 277.

⁵⁷ Heidegger, GA 3, 136.

allows us to see an interference between the first and the second *Critiques*, therefore imagination contributes to the emergence or the origin of practical reason. Transcendental imagination cannot be excluded from the field of *practical reason and pure morality*, because the possibility of practical reason can be traced back to the theoretical reason where transcendental imagination is a foundation for all knowing, not only a vehicle of that. Kant's thesis is that the practical reason is not another, peculiar faculty in relationship to the theoretical reason but a practical use of that in any moral activities. The theoretical reason is related to the sciences, to what can be known, while the practical one is related to what ought to be done (*Sollen*).

For Heidegger in the field of *the practical reason* there will be the phenomenon of *respect (Achtung)* where, in a constitutive manner, the imagination participates in forming the emergence of practical reason. Respect means a sensibility for the moral law, i.e., it is even that in which the law first becomes accessible to us. *This respect, however, depends on the imagination.* It happened within imagination that Heidegger basically developed the phenomenological analysis of "the respect for laws" as a moral feeling (*Gefühl*). Both (in his book *Delimitation*) John Sallis and (in his article *Tense*) Jacques Derrida investigated the role of imagination in the field of practical reason. Kant, however, opened an entirely new perspective in this field, insofar as the practical reason is the sphere of pure morality (*personalitas moralis*) where himself-concept gains its own fulfilment, neither in empirical self (*personalitas psychologica*), nor in the original synthetic unity of apperception (*personalitas transcendentalis*). The freedom of self-consciousness is more than the individuality or the Self-constancy, an individual self will be free only if this self can be regarded as a self-determination or as a "giving oneself the law" (*Selbst-ständigkeit als Selbstbestimmung*).

For Kant, the self as a moral self-consciousness lives its freedom not in the absence of dependence on something, but in undertaking the moral binding, that is, in commitment to the law. It is this core-structure of the moral "I" what Kant also calls the *person(ality)*. This moral self-consciousness does not exist from the beginning, but springs from self-education and -cultivation through freedom, while ascending from sensuous to pneumatic sphere. This means the same that one can leave behind the world of particularities and ascend to the general principles of humanity. "Kant places this freedom as autonomy exclusively in man's pure reason."⁵⁸ In Heidegger's formulation: "susceptibility" to the moral law, that is,

⁵⁸ Heidegger, GA 42. *Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809)*, Ed. I. von Schuler. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1988, 145.

“respect constitutes the essence of the person as the moral self”,⁵⁹ only this respect makes possible that we can recognize the moral laws, in other words, the respect will be the way how moral laws will be first accessible to us. Of course, this respect does not serve to the foundation of the laws, respect cannot create laws, the law as such is a law in itself as well, at the same time the respect as a pure feeling is a mode of Being-self-consciousness, namely the mode of that for which the law as such can manifest itself. As a feeling the respect belongs to the side of sensibility opposed to the categories, but the formative center of both goes beyond both of them toward the imagination and the temporality. They in themselves can never become ontological knowledge but only through the time and the imagination. The pure feeling of respect is the way we experience the law itself as a law and first share in it, on the one hand; but having a feeling of respect is a kind of “Self-feeling”, too, so it always also refers to how “the feeling I” simultaneously feels itself herein, on the other. In respect before the laws, therefore, the respecting I itself must also become manifest in a determinate way. In this respect before the law, both the law and, at the same time, myself as acting self also must become manifest.

“In respect before the law, I subordinate myself to the law”, in a way that “in submitting to the law, I submit to myself as pure reason. In this submitting-to-myself, I elevate myself to myself as the free creature which determines itself. This peculiar, submitting, self-elevating of itself to itself manifests *the I in its »dignity«*. Negatively stated: In respect before the law, ...*I cannot despise myself.*”⁶⁰ Heidegger’s aim was to radicalize Kant’s enterprise when having linked the feeling of respect to the imagination, and his question went beyond the *subjectivity* of our moral self toward the *finite transcendence* of our moral self and toward the place of its origin.

Heidegger, Imagination and the Unconscious

After a Swiss physician and psychiatrist Medard Boss had introduced him to Freud’s insights, in his *Zollikon Seminars* between 1959 and 1969, Heidegger explicitly first dealt with the problem what Freud called the “Unbewusst” (unconscious) and “Repression” (repression). Unlike Husserl and Freud, Heidegger avoided appealing to the term “consciousness” or “unconsciousness”, saying that both of them are derivative, not primary component in our human existence. According to Heidegger, Freud’s thinking was one of the victims of the positivist scientific

⁵⁹ Heidegger, GA 3, 157. in § 30

⁶⁰ Heidegger, GA 3, 159. in § 30 [Italics added – L. Zs. M.]

world of view. For example, it is no accidental that consciousness “has been in use only since the eighteenth century”.⁶¹ Then, he adds:

Consciousness always presupposes Dasein, not conversely. Knowledge and consciousness are always already moving in the openness of the Da. Without this, they would not be possible at all.⁶²

Moreover, Heidegger writes in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*:

[The aim is] *not to describe the consciousness of man but to evoke the Dasein in man...*⁶³

Heidegger denied the existence of the classical Freudian opposition, instead of that, he focuses on Brentano's concept of intentionality. Of course, this does not probably mean that it would be no room for a kind of notion of “unconscious” and “conscious” in Heidegger's thinking. No referring to the consciousness, Heidegger spoke of a basic human awareness (*Besinnung*) or the wholeness (*Ganzheit, Einheit*) of our human being. Similarly, he rejected the Freudian concept of the unconscious, however, he maintained that there is something “unspoken” or “unthematical” aspect in our understanding, that is, human understanding always contains a kind of hiddenness, of incompleteness, in this respect, Dasein not only can but has to have an unconscious. Naturally, it is about a phenomenological unconscious rather than a Freudian unconscious in Heidegger's account of Dasein. In classical Freudian psychoanalysis, the unconscious is not accessible in itself through conscious reflections, but it only manifests itself in dreams, associations, fixations, repetitive actions and so on. For Freud, the unconscious is not a second form of consciousness, but a separate system governed by different rules. Against Freud, phenomenology attributes the “unconscious” to the structure of consciousness itself, more precisely to the structure of intentionality, therefore the “unconscious” is an inferior form of consciousness. For this reason, a phenomenological hidden aspect is always different from a Freudian conception of the unconscious.

Undoubtedly, Dasein has indeed a part that is un-conscious, but Heidegger has to do with a *preconscious* (*Vorbewusst*) that is not repressed, but is simply not conscious at a given moment. This non-conscious has two levels:

⁶¹ Martin Heidegger, *Zollikon Seminars: Protocols—Conversations—Letters*, ed. Medard Boss, trans. with notes and afterwords Franz Mayr and Richard Askay. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001, pp. 225–226.

⁶² Heidegger, *Zollikone Seminars. op. cit.*, p. 207.

⁶³ Heidegger, GA 29/30, 258.

(1) The first level is ontological. According to Richardson,⁶⁴ the *apriori structures* of our human being, or in other words, the horizontal schemes of our thinking always include an unconscious as a part of the givenness of the human condition. Imagination belongs to that notion of the ‘unconscious’ which is not identified with the Freudian unconscious contra consciousness but makes these modes of being possible.

(2) The second level is the everydayness where Heidegger’s discussion has explicitly turned to explicate an *inadequate/inauthentic* relationship with the Self through the notion of *das Man* and the possibility of its failure to stand by itself. Appearances involve concealment what Heidegger presented as an inauthentic denial or distortion performed by *das Man*. As a negative side of the being-with-others Heidegger identified the dictatorship of the *They* (the *Anyone*) and a mass-media-instituted public sphere in which the “subject” of everyday world is called the neuter (the *They*) and the human *Dasein* loses himself.⁶⁵ In this everydayness, as Heidegger says, “the other can become one who is dependent and dominated even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him.”⁶⁶ It doesn’t mean so much that we grow up thrown into our own historicity and never begin to think of the world with *tabula rasa*. Rather, this critique by Heidegger focused on how prevailing fore-meanings and prejudices had a serious impact on our life *beyond all personal morality (conscience) or against our morality* too. Our life can be determined by the dictatorship of publicness in a way that in this everydayness no one is himself, in the impersonal world of *They-self*, “Da-sein is dispersed in the they and must first find itself”.⁶⁷ The young Heidegger criticized the public sphere what is the *They-world* from the side of language. The rootlessness of language (the idle talk and the public interpretedness) generates a human relation to the world which is prone to miss the access to the phenomenon and to lead to the unspoken dictatorship of publicness over the things, but the problem of language would already be the matter of a further investigation.

⁶⁴ Richardson, W. J., “The Place of the Unconscious in Heidegger”, In *Heidegger and Psychology. Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, Ed. K. Hoeller, (special issue), 1988, 176–198. Here: 180.

⁶⁵ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 17th ed., Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1993, 169. Translation: Idem, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 1996, 27 §, 119. (hereafter: SZ, 169 (In English: 119.))

⁶⁶ Heidegger, SZ, (§ 26) 122. (In English: 114.)

⁶⁷ Heidegger, SZ, (§ 27) 129. (In English: 121.)