

“UNTIMELINESS” AND DE-(CON)STRUCTION. FOOTNOTES TO NIETZSCHE AND DERRIDA

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ABSTRACT. Although the title of the study contains even two questions, „who is Zarathustra?” and „who is the »Who«?”, it cannot be claimed that the main goal of this study is to answer them. In particular, it cannot be claimed that these questions are answerable at all. The questions serve as leitmotif for displaying the „untimely program” of Nietzsche and the deconstruction of Derrida, showing analogy aspects between them, which are related to the critique of western metaphysics and its language as well as to de(con)struction of the concepts of subject and identity.

Keywords: *untimeliness, deconstruction, critique of metaphysics, subject, identity*

1. The Philosophy of the Hammer: the Active Elimination of the Existing Values as Creative Power

„Ich sage euch: man muss noch Chaos in sich haben, um einen tanzenden Stern gebären zu können. Ich sage euch: ihr habt noch Chaos in euch”.

(Fr. Nietzsche)¹

“Where is the lightning that would lick you with its tongue? Where is the madness with which you should be inoculated? Behold, I teach you the overman: he is this lightning, he is this madness!”

(Fr. Nietzsche)²

“There is no such thing as the Nietzsche-text. This text demands interpretation in the same way that it argues that there is no such thing as an entity, only interpretations – active and reactive – of that entity. »To be Nietzschean« is a journalistic slogan that cannot cope with the names and pseudonyms of Nietzsche”.

(J. Derrida)³

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¹ Fr. Nietzsche: *Also sprach Zarathustra*. 19.

² Fr. Nietzsche: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. 7.

³ J. Derrida: *Nietzsche and the Machine*. 218.

Instead of the dialectical and idealist attitude and the philosophy of identity, Derrida is connected to the Nietzschean tradition, to the *philosophy of the hammer*, thus the Nietzschean “untimeliness” suggested as the destructive attempt of the metaphysical tradition appears as a kind of antechamber of the deconstructive operation. Nietzsche’s “untimely” programme emerges with the claim of demolishing the metaphysical tradition determining the European view, with the claim of turning away from its language, conceptual system, world view and self-view, from the Socratic dialectical tradition, with the claim of questioning the belief in the historicity of Western thinking, with the claim of demolishing the Christian-metaphysical status of the subject and the morals related to it, the undifferentiated concept of man of the Enlightenment and modernism, leading up to Hegel, as the herald of the dissolution of the subject, of the individual.

Nietzsche’s “untimely” programme emphasises the affirmation, the creative-affirmative power (*die schöpferisch-affirmative Kraft*),⁴ the revaluation of all values (*die Umwertung aller Werte*), theologically God’s death as the devaluation of values (*das Tod Gottes*), the will to power (*der Wille zur Macht*), the affirmation of change,⁵ the overman (*der Übermensch*), the critique of history (*die Kritik der Historie*), the eternal return (*die Ewige Wiederkehr*) as change,⁶ at the same time the impossibility

⁴ Fr. Nietzsche: *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. 90.

⁵ In G. Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche the return cannot be interpreted as the return of the identical. When we mention the idea of the eternal return as change, then we privilege Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche, according to which for Nietzsche “the eternal return is not the permanence of the same, the equilibrium state or the resting place of the identical. It is not the »same« or the »one« which come back in eternal return but return is itself the one which ought to belong to diversity and to that which differs”. The main affirmation is the affirmation of eternal return, that is, the affirmation of change. – Cf. G. Deleuze: *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. 46.

⁶ The eternal return is not the return of the *Identical*. Based on this, we turn away from the Heideggerian formulation, according to which the tenet of the eternal return (*die Wiederkehrlehre*) could be interpreted as the eternal return of the *Identical* (*die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen*). – Cf. M. Heidegger: *Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis*. See also: M. Heidegger: *Metaphysik und Nihilismus* 1. Die Überwindung der Metaphysik 2. Das Wesen des Nihilismus; M. Heidegger: *Nietzsche I, II*.

In Gy. Tatár’s interpretation the eternal return is not cyclical repetition either. – See: Gy. Tatár: *Az öröklét gyűrűje [The Ring of Eternity]*. The idea according to which the return is not the permanence of the identical, instead, the eternal return prevails as a selective thought, is perhaps the most emphatic in the interpretation of the already quoted Deleuze. K. Löwith also urges the interpretation according to which the eternal return is of an ethical character rather than interpretable as repetition. – See: K. Löwith: *World History and Salvation History*.

In line of the present assumption, the eternal return cannot be identified with the ancient idea of repetition, even less with the presumptions related to the scientific possibility of repetition, as it appears in G. Simmel. – See: G. Simmel: *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche*. The eternal return is not cosmology or scientific claim in P. Valadier’s interpretation either. – See: P. Valadier: *Dionüszoszt szemben [Dionysus Face to Face with the Crucified]*. 139–145.

of Zarathustra’s identity. It is already in *The Birth of Tragedy* that Nietzsche outlines *affirmation (die Bejahung)*, which can be regarded as the central concept of his philosophy, *saying yes (das Ja-sagen) to life* (Nietzsche against Socrates or Socrates: “life is sickness” against Nietzsche „Sokrates selbst war nur lange krank”);⁷ this is related to the Dionysian ideal, and can also be regarded as the preview of the overman. The essence of the Dionysian ideal consists in the “stirrings, which, as they grow in intensity, cause subjectivity to *vanish* to the point of complete *self-forgetting*”;⁸ it *transcends* “itself” through ecstasy and attains a kind of overman state.

For Nietzsche the overman, the revaluation of all values, the will to power, the declaration of God’s death, the affirmation of change, the critique of history, the idea of the eternal return, as well as saying yes to life, doing away with the erstwhile image of man and his system of values, with his view of history and affirmation will thus be the affirmation of a system [of (self-)view], of the change of a well-determined image of man, of the sinking into self-oblivion of the subject, of its active self-elimination. *Thus affirmation is but the affirmation of one’s own destroying*. For the elimination of the subject, identity and the value system related to the prevailing image of man, the *will* of one’s “own” death, of *one’s own destroying* is indispensable. Paradoxically, it is through the unviability of the subject and idea of man, the “break” of identity, Dionysus’s death and Zarathustra’s falling apart that life can be affirmed. “I love

It should not be ignored either that the Nietzschean concepts must be examined in their particular paradoxical aspects. Deleuze recognized correctly that “every Nietzschean concept lies at the crossing of two unequal genetic lines”. – G. Deleuze: *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. 193. This is what E. Joós also refers to when he expounds on the idea that “to interpret Nietzsche is to decipher the meaning of his paradoxes”. – E. Joós: *Látzat és valóság*. 40. This is also relevant in terms of the idea of the eternal return. Accordingly, the eternal return, as a paradoxical idea, can be interpreted in terms of turning against the absolute beginning and origin, and the absolute end, where the end is replaced by incompleteness, unfinishedness and postponement. In this symbolical sense, the idea of the eternal return turns against the linear view of time, at the same time against the linear view of historicity. This paradoxical, symbolical and selective concept of the eternal return can perhaps be associated with M. Kundera’s proposition according to which “the myth of eternal return that a life which disappears once and for all, which does not return, is like a shadow, without weight, dead in advance, and whether it was horrible, beautiful, or sublime, its horror, sublimity, and beauty mean nothing”. – M. Kundera: *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*. 2.

As Nietzsche emphasis: “ – if you ever wanted one time two times, if you ever said »I like you, happiness! Whoosh! Moment!« then you wanted *everything* back!

– Everything anew, everything eternal, everything enchained, entwined, enamored, oh thus you *loved* the world – ”

– you eternal ones, love it eternally and for all time; and say to pain also: refrain, but come back!

For all joy wants – eternity!” Fr. Nietzsche: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. 263.

⁷ Fr. Nietzsche: *Götzen-Dämmerung: Das Problem des Sokrates*. 66.

⁸ Fr. Nietzsche: *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*. 17. [Emphasis mine – L.Zs.]

those – the *changing* Zarathustra proclaims, Zarathustra who’s “heart transformed”,⁹ – [who] wants his going under”,¹⁰ who “wants to perish”,¹¹ “thus he goes gladly over the bridge”¹² – who do not want to preserve themselves”,¹³ “I say to you: your Self itself wants to die”.¹⁴

But who is the subject, the identity, the “own”, the I, *the man*, the “Myself”? Who is the “Who”? “Who” must be destroyed, and who is the “Who”, the man who wants his own destroying? In his work *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche raises the question “What is man?” in the following way: “Mankind is a rope fastened between animal and overman – a rope [Seil] over an abyss. A dangerous crossing [Hinüber], a danger on-the-way¹⁵ [Auf-dem-Wege]”.¹⁶ Zarathustra’s basic experience is that man is too poor in the state of *being on his way*, he is but the skin disease of the earth “»The earth,« he said, »has a skin; and this skin has diseases.

One of these diseases for example is called »Human being«¹⁷ (*Krankheit*),¹⁸ this is why he speaks of the big contempt and the big disgust. It is his incurable pain that “»Eternally he returns, the human of whom you are weary, the small human being« [der kleine Mensch]¹⁹ [...] »alas, human beings recur eternally! The small human beings recur eternally!« [...] All too small the greatest one! That was my surfeit of humans! And eternal recurrence of even the smallest–That was my surfeit of all existence! Oh nausea! Nausea! Nausea!”²⁰

⁹ Fr. Nietzsche: *Thus spoke Zarathustra*. 4.

¹⁰ Ibid., 8.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., 160.

¹⁴ Ibid., 24.

¹⁵ Ibid., 7.

¹⁶ Original text: „Der Mensch ist ein Seil, geknüpft zwischen Thier und Übermensch, – ein Seil über einem Abgrunde. Ein gefährliches Hinüber, ein gefährliches Auf-dem-Wege, ein gefährliches Zurückblicken, ein gefährliches Schaudern und Stehenbleiben. Was gross ist am Menschen, das ist, dass er eine Brücke und kein Zweck ist: was geliebt werden kann am Menschen, das ist, dass er ein Ü b e r g a n g und ein U n t e r g a n g ist”. – Fr. Nietzsche: *Also sprach Zarathustra* I. 16–17.

¹⁷ Fr. Nietzsche: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. 103.

¹⁸ Original text: „Die Erde, sagte er, hat eine Haut; und diese Haut hat Krankheiten. Eine dieser Krankheiten heisst zum Beispiel: »Mensch«”. Fr. Nietzsche: *Also sprach Zarathustra* II. 168.

¹⁹ Original text: „Mein Seufzen sass auf allen Menschen-Gräbern und konnte nicht mehr aufstehn; mein Seufzen und Fragen unkte und würgte und nagte und klagte bei Tag und Nacht: – »ach, der Mensch kehrt ewig wieder! Der kleine Mensch kehrt ewig wieder!« – [...] Allzuklein der Grösste! – Das war mein Überdross am Menschen! Und ewige Wiederkunft auch des Kleinsten! – Das war mein Überdross an allem Dasein!” – Fr. Nietzsche: *Also sprach Zarathustra*. III. 247.

²⁰ Fr. Nietzsche: *Thus spoke Zarathustra*. 177.

Zarathustra, the “herald of the lightning”²¹ (*Verkündiger des Blitzes*)²² proclaims, as a kind of Copernican turn, that God is dead (*Todt sind alle Götter*)²³ – *God as origin and centre is dead* –, and the overman must live: “You higher man« – thus blinks the rabble – »there are no higher man, we are all equal, human is human, before God, – we are all equal!

Before God! – Now, however, this God has died, but we do not want to be equal before the rabble”.²⁴

“Before God! – But now this god has died! You higher men, this god was your greatest danger. It is only now, since he lies in his grave, that you are resurrected. Only now the great noon comes, only now the higher man becomes – ruler! Have you understood these words, oh my brothers? You are frightened; do your hearts become dizzy? Does the abyss yawn before you here? Does the hell hound yelp before you here? Well then! Well now! You higher men! Only now is the mountain in labour with humanity’s future. God died: now we want – the overman to live”.²⁵

In the wake of God’s death, the hope in the afterlife vanishes, and on behalf of “the meaning of the earth” (*der Sinn der Erde*),²⁶ of the faithfulness to the earth, God is replaced by the “impossible possibility” of the overman, thus “becoming God” becomes a kind of human “possibility”.

“Behold, I teach you the overman! The overman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the overman *shall be* the meaning of the earth! I beseech you, my brothers, *remain faithful to the earth* and do not believe those who speak to you of extra-terrestrial hopes!”²⁷

Zarathustra marks out the overman to be the one Who must/should raise above the “small man”, the *petty man*. The petty man *will give his place to the Higher Man* (*der höhere Mensch*),²⁸ who must, in turn, be surpassed by *the overman* (*der Übermensch*).

Zarathustra regards the Higher Man as a kind of forerunner, *Whose essence is becoming active*. The Higher Man wants to reverse the values, that is, he wants

²¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

²² Fr. Nietzsche: *Also sprach Zarathustra* I. 18.

²³ Original text: „Todt sind alle Götter: nun wo l l e n wir, dass der Übermensch lebe”. – *Ibid.*, 102.

²⁴ Fr. Nietzsche: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. 232.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 232.

²⁶ Original text: „Der Übermensch ist der Sinn der Erde. Euer Wille sage: der Übermensch sei der Sinn der Erde!” – *Ibid.*, 14.

²⁷ Fr. Nietzsche: *Thus spoke Zarathustra*. 6.

²⁸ See about this Fr. Nietzsche: *Also sprach Zarathustra*, Book IV., especially the chapter entitled *Vom höheren Menschen*. 356–369.

to replace reaction with action, however, his enterprise is essentially mistaken, since he is not capable of becoming active. Due to his ambivalence and amphibian character, the Higher Man remains false, as his reactive essence, passivity, nihilism, bad conscience, resentment and the preservation of his will of nothing emerge, this is why Zarathustra tells his “Higher Men” that they are the false creatures of nature, the *failed ones*.

“Not for you do I wait here in these mountains, not with you shall I go down for the last time. You came to me only as an omen that higher ones are on their way to me”.²⁹

Zarathustra radicalises the claim of exceeding, surpassing man in the following way: “*I teach you the overman*. Human being is something that must be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? All creatures so far created something beyond themselves; and you want to be the ebb of this great flood and would even rather go back to animals than overcome humans? What is the ape to a human? A laughing stock or a painful embarrassment. And that is precisely what the human shall be to the overman: a laughing stock or a painful embarrassment”.³⁰

For Nietzsche, to surpass man, the elimination of even *the last human being* (*der letzte Mensch*)³¹ is unavoidable, and thus the man, indefinable but always defined somehow, will become exclusively something or someone that must be surpassed and *must be defeated*: “6,000 feet above the sea, and at a much higher altitude above all human affairs”,³² Nietzsche proclaims the “untimely” programme. The aim of the overman is to get rid of his precedence and the value system of his, *to get rid of his proto-himself*. The overman is the programme of surpassing man, which may imply *destroying even the most excellent man*: “Ever more, ever better of your kind shall perish”³³, Zarathustra claims. The one who wants *his own destruction*, defeats himself and becomes an affirmative power. Thus for Nietzsche it is less the definition of man and answering the question “*Who is man?*”, but rather the designation of “*Who?*” rises/can rise above him, how he can be surpassed, who gets *beyond*

²⁹ Fr. Nietzsche: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. 229.

³⁰ Fr. Nietzsche: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. 6.

³¹ Original text: „Seht! Ich zeige euch den l e t z t e n Menschen. »Was ist Liebe? Was ist Schöpfung? Was ist Sehnsucht? Was ist Stern?« – so fragt der letzte Mensch und blinzelt. Die Erde ist dann klein geworden, und auf ihr hüpfet der letzte Mensch, der Alles klein macht. Sein Geschlecht ist unaustilgbar, wie der Erdflöh; der letzte Mensch lebt am längsten”. – Fr. Nietzsche: *Also sprach Zarathustra*. 19.

³² Fr. Nietzsche: *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*. Edited by Dr. Oscar Levy. Nietzsche to Peter Gast. Sils-Maria, Monday, September 3, 1883.

³³ Fr. Nietzsche: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. 234.

good and evil, the critique of the metaphysical oppositional dichotomy –, "Who?" affirms, paradoxically by the will of his own destruction, saying yes to life. "Die at the right time: thus Zarathustra teaches it"³⁴, *the critique and de(con)struction of the image of man*.

There is a certain resemblance between Dionysus and "Zarathustra the dancer",³⁵ as well as the status of the overman, but evidently this is not identity, as neither Dionysus nor Zarathustra can be regarded as Overmen. In Paul Valadier's reading of Nietzsche he sheds light on Dionysus's figure by comparing him to the Crucified. The essential difference between Dionysus and the Crucified is that Dionysus *wants his own death*, just as Zarathustra *wants his own falling apart*, which is the basic condition of the affirmation of life. So that Dionysus can affirm life, he is subjected to the eternal return and wants the incessant return of his own death. The affirmation referring to one's own death must be constantly repeated, but with affirmation we always affirm change and never identity.³⁶ Dionysus as well as Zarathustra and the overman are the *affirmation of one's own destruction*.

Who is thus Zarathustra? Who is the "Who"? "And you too asked yourselves often: »Who is Zarathustra to us? How shall he be known to us?«³⁷ Zarathustra himself asks: "Who am I?"³⁸ Sutyák posits the question "who is Zarathustra?" like this: "Zarathustra [is the one who] created [...] morals, this fatal mistake: consequently, he is the one who must realise this mistake".³⁹ Thus Zarathustra is *the one Who* intends to do away with morals, with Western metaphysics as well as with himself, *Who* declares or points out the contradictoriness and randomness of the self.⁴⁰ Nietzsche defines Zarathustra as follows: "morality defeats itself with the power of truth and turns into its opposite, the I, this is my Zarathustra".⁴¹

Based on this statement, Sutyák draws two conclusions, on the one hand, that morals are defeated and turn into the Self. The morals are the opposite of the Self, the non-Self. On the other hand, the morals become the Self in Zarathustra. This means that first of all Zarathustra must become the Self. He is the first one who *must/should* become the Self, i.e. he is not a Self from the outset, however, it is not even sure – what is more, it is downright impossible, but questionable by all means,

³⁴ Ibid., 53.

³⁵ Ibid., 239.

³⁶ P. Valadier: *Dionüszoszt a megfeszítettel szemben. [Dionysus Face to Face with the Crucified.]* 139–145.

³⁷ Fr. Nietzsche: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. 110.

³⁸ Ibid., 116.

³⁹ T. Sutyák: *Hogyan lesz Zarathustra azzá, aki?* [How does Zarathustra become what he is?] 54.

⁴⁰ Fr. Nietzsche: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. 41.

⁴¹ T. Sutyák: *op. cit.* 54.

whether he will ever be, whether he can ever be the “Self”. Thus Zarathustra’s figure marks a process, the process of the so-called *becoming* oneself, but without the hope of attaining his goal, so remains the unfinished self-overcoming: “I am that *which must always overcome itself*”,⁴² as “my ego is something that shall be overcome”.⁴³ Zarathustra, “*the convalescent*”,⁴⁴ “must”, “should” *become* the Self, since he is *not himself*, or: he should break “(him)self” apart, because he is not a Self, but he cannot attain his goal either. Zarathustra is a *paradox*. He must traverse his “own” road(s) in order to *become* “himself”, and as man, to be *constantly destroyed*. He must want his own destroying and the incessant non-identical iteration of his own destruction – *the critique of identity and the subject*.

Who is thus Zarathustra? Who is he, as so-called “himself”? Who is he, as “one *becoming*” in the process of his story, not even linear due to the non-identical eternal return, where it is not the “something” but the *becoming* that will be important. *Who* will be the one who *becomes* “himself” if he falls apart? “*What*” or “*Who*” comes *after* the falling apart? Zarathustra’s “identity” and “himself” are split, and the question will be “*What*” or “*Who*” will be the one “*what*” or “*Who*” comes *after* that. If there were such a “*Who*”... In Nietzsche’s *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Zarathustra is but the proclaimer: “I, Zarathustra, the advocate of life, the advocate of suffering, the advocate of the circle”.⁴⁵

Zarathustra as a proclaimer points at a *beyondness*, through the revaluation of all values he (would) lead to another kind of value system and view. He is destined to become a teacher, however, this is doubtlessly a tragic destiny, “For your animals know well, oh Zarathustra, who you are and must become; behold, *you are the teacher of the eternal recurrence* – that now is *your destiny!*”⁴⁶ Zarathustra, belonging to the eternal return himself, states: “I spoke my word, I break under my word: thus my eternal fate wills it – as proclaimer I perish”.⁴⁷ Zarathustra – the key figure of the new tragedy, the new tragic hero – is the one whose fate is constant falling apart, the incessant defeat of his “Self”, at the same time the eternal return and eternal renewal of everything: “*For I love you, oh eternity!*”⁴⁸

“But the knot of causes in which I am entangled recurs – it will create me again! – to once again speak the word about the great earth of noon and human being, to once again proclaim the overman to mankind”.⁴⁹

⁴² Fr. Nietzsche: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. 89.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 173.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 174.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 177.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 178.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 185.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 178.

But how can Zarathustra be the proclaimer, how can he become a teacher by proclaiming something that is unspeakable, where the “*What*” and the “*Who*” are not adequate? “They do not understand me. I am not the mouth for these ears”⁵⁰ – says Zarathustra to the people. “Oh my brothers, have you even understood these words?”⁵¹ Zarathustra asks. How can one potentiality of the future be proclaimed? How can the *reactive* be replaced by the *active*, namely the destructive power affirming its difference? How can one state *aboveness*, *beyondness*, an “*after*”, a “*hyper*”, an “*über*”, an “*away*”? how can something that is “*plus d’une langue*” be uttered, what is more than language or even what is less than *language*?

Where does the path lead “*from here*” as far as “*there*”? “You go your way of greatness; here no one shall sneak along after you! Your foot itself erased the path behind you, and above it stand written: impossibility”.⁵² This is the reason why – for this impossible possibility or possible impossibility – Zarathustra is doomed to *failure*: “Sentenced to yourself and to your own stoning; oh Zarathustra, far indeed you hurled the stone, but it will fall back down upon *you*”.⁵³ Worthy of his tragedy, he cannot escape his fate, as it is interwoven with the proclamation of the tenet: “»What do you matter, Zarathustra? Speak your word and break!«”,⁵⁴ “»Speak and break!«”⁵⁵ Zarathustra, “the godless”,⁵⁶ affirms his own tragedy with his own destruction, just like Dionysus. Affirmation is the affirmation of the tragic fate, but it is not a painful *creative power* but one full of joy: “insofar as you kill, see to it, that you yourselves justify life”.⁵⁷ Zarathustra is similar to Dionysus and to the overman, who also wants his own death; both Zarathustra and Dionysus, similarly to the overman, embody the *pointing at beyondness*.

However, the essential question persists: how should we replace negation with affirmation? For Nietzsche the question of *affirmation* is strongly related to *nihilism*: how can the reactive powers, nihilism and the will of nothing be defeated? Nihilism can only be defeated by itself, *if it wants its own destroying*. This means turning negation into affirmation, where it is only affirmation that survives. Zarathustra, Dionysus and the overman rises at such a level of negation and destruction where the active elimination of every existing value is but creative power [(de)-Construction]. Thus the condition of affirmation is negation and destruction.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 10.

⁵¹ Ibid., 171.

⁵² Ibid., 121.

⁵³ Ibid., 124.

⁵⁴ Fr. Nietzsche: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. 116.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 147.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 137.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 26.

But to what extent does the triumph of active powers and the failure of nihilism, the overman, the revaluation of all values, remain in the “*beyond*”, in the “*after*”, in belatedness? Can overman be ready and completed? Is one single revaluation of all values enough? Is the single elimination of the hierarchically structured values enough? In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Nietzsche outlines the image of the overman, however, the overman is not accomplished in the work, alluding in this way to incompleteness, unfinishedness and unaccomplishment, to a “*beyond*”, which is just *beyond, that is, not present, it cannot be present – the postponement, belatedness and critique of presence*. The overman is conceived of as being projected into the future, therefore it *always* appears beyond man. The subtitle of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is: *A Book for All and None*. Who does Zarathustra address in fact? “*Who*” is the teacher and “*What*” is the tenet? Further on, “*Who*” listens to Zarathustra? To what extent does the display of the paradox of proclamation, of the leading *away* and *out*, that of *beyondness*, remain in the future, left in the “*after*”, as a kind of *belatedness*, or to use Derrida’s term, *postponement*? A new kind of sensitivity becomes the benchmark, namely the affirmation of *change* and *one’s own destroying and destruction*, but “*Who*” will be the one, will there be such a “*Who*” who affirms, *will he still be the “Who”*?

The Nietzschean basic concepts, such as the overman, the revaluation of all values, God’s death, the will to power, play, affirmation, change, the idea of the eternal return, turning against the linear view of time, the critique of history, beyondness, surpassing, etc., all in all, *Nietzsche’s “untimely” destructive philosophy of the hammer* and the question and questioning of “*Who*” points forward to aspects of deconstruction. Nietzsche’s radical turn in the conception of values, his “lack of truth” get beyond the opposition of *good* and *evil*, and his paradoxes can also be interpreted as a kind of proto-“*double bind*”, as a kind of proto-“*plus d’une langue*”.

2. Deconstruction as radicalised “anachronism” or the affirmation of “one’s own” destruction

“I don’t see the necessity of keeping the word »subject« at any price, especially if the context and conventions of discourse risk re-introducing precisely what is in question”.

(J. Derrida)⁵⁸

“What are we aiming at in the deconstructions of the »subject« when we ask ourselves what, in the structure of the classical subject, continues be required by the question »Who«”.

(J. Derrida)⁵⁹

⁵⁸ J. Derrida: “Eating well,” or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida. In E. Cadava (ed.): *Who comes after the Subject?* 99.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 100.

"How can we get away from this contract between the grammar of the subject or substantive and the ontology of substance or subject?"

(J. Derrida)⁶⁰

Derrida's deconstruction appeals to *transgression*, to "post-/after", to *what is coming*, to a kind of "beyond", and at the same time also to the paradox of "beyond and post-/after". But what does this "post-/after" that is yet to come "leaves behind"? "What" and "Who" will there be in this *post-/after*? Or can there be, must there be, will there be a "What" or "Who" in this *post-/after*? When does this "post-/after" begin? When does the "pre-/before" end? Or rather, to what extent this substantialist, binary opposition loses its validity? How far can we speak about the subject? Has the subject's metaphysical "transgression", the subject's "post-/after" arrived yet? When does this "post-/after" "start"? "Who" or "What" comes after the subject? Could there still be a "What" or "Who" in this *post-/after*? Can this "post-/after" be realised at all? "»Who comes after the subject« the »who« perhaps already pointing toward a grammar that would no longer be subjected to the subject".⁶¹

The "Who": In deconstruction, the idealistic, Greek-Christian metaphysical unity, identity of the "Who" tends towards the *différance* and the *trace*. The "Who" of the *différance* can never be Oneself "again", or at all (the problematic is concentrated precisely in this Oneself), if it could be assumed at all that it had or could have ever been "Oneself". In Derrida's deconstruction there is no identity, no unity, and nothing to restore. In deconstruction, "the singularity of the »who« is not the individuality of a thing that would be identical to itself [...]. It is a singularity that dislocates or divides itself",⁶² claims Derrida. "The trace is *noting*, it is not an entity, it exceeds the question *What is...?* and contingently makes it possible. Here one may no longer trust even the opposition of fact and principle, which, in all its metaphysical, ontological, and transcendental forms, has always functioned within the system of *what is*".⁶³ From a deconstructionist point of view, there is no element in itself, no identity, not even oneness, "there are" only the *traces of traces* and *différance*. There is no element in itself because "every signifier refers only to other signifier."⁶⁴ Geoffrey Bennington quotes Derrida's *Mémoires – pour Paul de Man*: "For if every element of the system only gets its identity in its difference from the other elements, every element is in this way marked by all those it is not: it thus bears the trace of those other elements".⁶⁵ The

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 101.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 100.

⁶³ J. Derrida: *Of Grammatology*. 134.

⁶⁴ J. Derrida/Bennington: *Jacques Derrida*. 49.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 74–75.

“elements” are thus *assemblages (faisceau), traces of traces, assemblages of traces, différances*. Nothing can be merely present or distant rather than *criss-cross*, for every trace is the trace of a trace, every text carries the trace of other texts, and every signifier refers to a signified which is different from itself, so *none of them is “Oneself” enough*. The deconstruction of the sign exposed also in *Of Grammatology* results in the fact that “there is no sign as such”.⁶⁶

Derrida considers that the root of the confusion in the conceptions of the subject is the fact that the various definition strategies *rehabilitated* the concept of the subject rather than exceeded it.⁶⁷ Speaking about the liquidation of the subject, Derrida explains that the word *liquidate* is highly misleading: “they tried to »liquidate,« they thought they could it, we will not let them do it. The diagnostic implies therefore a promise: we will do justice, we will save or rehabilitate the subject. A slogan therefore: a return to the subject, the return of the subject”.⁶⁸ Based on the discourse of Freud, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Lacan, Althusser, or Foucault on the subject, it can be “re-interpreted, restored, re-inscribed”,⁶⁹ but it cannot be liquidated, nor homogenised. According to Derrida, with regard to the question of the subject, “it would be perhaps necessary to give up before the impossible, that is to say, before the attempt to reconstitute or reconstruct that which has already been deconstructed”,⁷⁰ and we must ask what the concept of subject means for people, and how it is all connected to ethics, politics, justice, history, the law of ethics and justice, and power in general.

In Derrida’s deconstruction the subject is not adequate with itself, it is not the centre and origin of the world, but “the subject (the possible consciousness, self-consciousness of self-identity) is inscribed in language”.⁷¹ Thus the “*Who*” for Derrida is not “*Itself*” enough, what is more, it is not *Itself* at all, it is not an expropriated proper name, the “*Who*” does “no longer have *this* property”, but is an indefinite pronoun⁷² while at the same time, in deconstruction, the “different singularity” (*singularité différante*) “does not even correspond to the grammatical form »who« in a sentence wherein »who« is the subject of a verb coming after the subject”.⁷³ The I, “no longer as »I?« but as a »Who?,” the unknown and sliding being of an indefinite »Who?«”.⁷⁴ The question is, “if there is a subject, no, a »who, « before being able to ask questions about it? [...] the »who« might be there before, as the power to

⁶⁶ J. Derrida: *Of Grammatology*. 204.

⁶⁷ J. Derrida: “Eating well,” or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 97.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 98.

⁷¹ J. Derrida: *Of grammatology*.

⁷² J. Derrida: “Eating well,” or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida. 101.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 110.

ask a question [...] or else it might be [...] what is made possible by its power".⁷⁵ Derrida makes reference thus to Heidegger's *Dasein*, but also diverts from this possibility, and relates the "possibility" of the subject to be deconstructed to the *différance*, the *otherness*, and the *trace*.⁷⁶ Based on Derrida's criticism, the majority of the conceptions about the subject "a certain closing off—the saturating or suturing—of identity to self, and a structure still to narrowly fit to self-identification that today gives the concept of subject its dogmatic effect".⁷⁷ The "Who" and the "problem" of the subject always remains a "problem". "It should remain so"⁷⁸ – *the différance is the critique of identity and unity*.

On the "Who" as sign: "the subjective structure as the being thrown or underlying of the substance or the *substratum*, of the *hypokeimenon*, with its qualities of stance or stability, of permanent presence, of sustained relation to self, everything that links the »subject«"⁷⁹ is deconstructed. The metaphysical being as "being-there" is historically embedded: "all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the centre have always designated the constant of a presence: *eidos*, *arché*, *telos*, *energia*, *ousia* (essence, existence, substance, subject)".⁸⁰ Based on Derrida's deconstruction, logocentrism, the advancement of the *logos* is responsible for grasping the existence of the being as "being-there". This critical-deconstructionist intention is formulated against western metaphysics, and at the same time also against Heidegger's philosophy of the *Dasein*. When Derrida problematizes the relationship of sign and the *Dasein* in his *Grammatology*, he raises the idea that the *sign* is always conceivable from the direction of the *Dasein*, then he also points out that the question of the form "what is the sign?" is not relevant in the case of the sign either.⁸¹ The *différance* cannot be understood within the concept of the sign as "representation of presence".⁸²

The being and the terminology related to being uses a linguistics which closes itself within the language of a homogenizing, identifying "being-there". The question of being "has already slipped from that the precomprehended question of Being".⁸³ The word "being" is originally carved into any language, it anticipates and somehow also suspends philosophy. This is why for Derrida the *trace* does not want to be a "being" standing in the light of *différance*, of metaphysics. The complication lies precisely in the fact that the name "being" refers to some kind of "being-there",

⁷⁵ Ibid., 100.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 108.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 111.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 99.

⁸⁰ J. Derrida: *Of Grammatology*. 19.

⁸¹ Ibid., 88.

⁸² J. Derrida: *Différance*. 285.

⁸³ J. Derrida: *Of Grammatology*. 8.

because the language and being-in-language forces us to start always from the concepts of existence, being, to be, “being-there”. For Derrida, starting from “being-there” and presuming the “being-there” proves self-contradictory, just as the questions *Who...?* and *What...?*, for these also refer to “being-there”. This presumption demands a going-“beyond” the “age” of the logos, but the “beyond” does not stand in the light either.

From a deconstructionist point of view, the “being-there” is disturbed by the movement of the *différance*. The *procrastination, différance, dispersion, division* is only the appearance of a kind of “being-there” in a non-linear time and space. Coming-into-being in time can never be completedness, representation, formation, so it may never have identity, unity, “being-there”, but it can only be an ongoing event, and never a finite consequence. It is therefore less of a “being-there” than the ceaseless procrastination of the “being-there”, which is generated precisely by the ceaseless coming-into-being. “The strange movement of the trace proclaims as much as it recalls: difference defers-differs [diffère]”⁸⁴ – claims Derrida. The *différance* refers to an ongoing event, and not its consequence; that is, to coming, but not to completed-ness.⁸⁵ This way Derrida also encourages the transgression of the opposition between “being-there” and not-“being-there”.

By the *différance*, Derrida deconstructs the metaphysical conception of *being* and “being-there” when expanding on the difference between the terms *différence* and *différance*, where the difference between the “e” and “a” sounds almost disappears for hearing and seeing, so “it is not there” actually, “does not exist, and is not any sort of being-present (*on*)”,⁸⁶ it has no existence, no essence, therefore the *différance* itself does not exist, it is not present, it has no existence.⁸⁷ The “a” in the *différance* is what can never be performed, which is never displayed. The *différance* therefore “no longer refers to sensibility. But we are not referred to intelligibility either, to an ideality”,⁸⁸ “will sometimes be practically indiscernible from – those of negative theology. [...] *that it is not*, and, consequently, that it has neither existence nor essence., is not theological, not even in the most negative order of negative theology. [...] is always occupied with letting a supra-essential reality go beyond”.⁸⁹ Deconstructionally, the “**Who**” as *sign is no longer present* – the *différance is the critique of “being-there”*.

A Grammar that is no longer subordinated to the subject: Derrida changes the direction of analysis, suggesting that the terms of the history of philosophy and metaphysics (eidos, substance, identity, self, subject, oneness, origin, centre,

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 66.

⁸⁵ Cf. J. Derrida: *Differance*. 281.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 282.

⁸⁷ Cf. *Ibid.*, 282.

⁸⁸ J. Derrida: *Differance*. 281.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 282.

oppositions, "being-there", etc.) *must not be reformulated but deconstructed*. For Derrida, the "identity", the "subject" can be grasped by splitting, inner movement, by *différance*, by the trace, the trace of traces (*traces de la trace*), and dissemination, where the identity, the subject cannot be approached by the concepts of identity with itself, "being-there" with itself, but precisely by the non-coincidence, non-identity with itself. "An identity is never given, received, or attained; only the interminable and indefinitely phantasmatic process of identification endures".⁹⁰

The *double bind* of deconstruction and its critical terms extends to every "concept", breaking it into "assemblages" (*faisceau*), and settles over the language itself and metaphysical terminology, because by the language and the terminology of metaphysics we always start from the faith in being, "being-there", unity, identity, origin, beginning and the concepts of opposition. Deconstruction however is about to contradict this terminology. Derrida opposes the subjects of the questions "Who...?" and "What...?", and the kind of thinking that objectifies and takes as identical, "something", "being-there"; that is why he speaks about the need to exceed or extend beyond.

The terminology of deconstruction seems to contradict the questions referring to the subject, the substance, the identity and simply the being of "Who...?" and "What...?", and points at a different way of uttering and writing language. The deconstructionist approach to "identity", to "oneness", to the "subject", to the "Who" radically destructs any kind of idea of unity, identity and "being-there" and also their possibilities, it can be interpreted not as an ontological reappropriation,⁹¹ not as an appearance. The *différance* turns against "itself", it refuses to let it "become its own". It turns against itself as a concept and becomes a "assemblage" (*faisceau*), *becomes exposed to its own effect*. It falls into self-oblivion like the Dionysian ideal, it wants its own destruction like Dionysus and Zarathustra, and it is precisely its turning against "itself" – if it could ever be itself, for it is *never itself* and *never "being-there"* – that makes possible the unfulfilled possibility of expression of its special meaning – *deconstructive grammato(logy) intends to withdraw itself from logology*.

Something is nowhere: In Derrida's work *La différence assemblage (faisceau) of play* also has a key role, or more precisely the *differences and the being-in-play of the différence*. Semantically speaking, the play can be conceived as substitution, as "a field of infinite substitutions only because it is finite, that is to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a center which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions"⁹² – the *différance is the critique of the centre*. The movement of play is characterised thus by the *lack of the centre and a pure origin*, and is made

⁹⁰ J. Derrida: *Monolingualism of the Other; or, The Prosthesis of Origin*. 1.

⁹¹ Cf. J. Derrida: *Différance*. 282.

⁹² J. Derrida: *Structure, Sign and Play*. In: *Writing and Difference*. 365.

possible by their distance. In a deconstructionist approach the play is the play of “*being distant*” and “*being there*”, but it also reveals the impossibility of their conceptual or content-based purity and transcends the opposition of these, for the play of the *différance* exists already before these, “differences alone could be »historical« through and through and from the start”,⁹³ “the presence-absence of the trace, which one should not even call its ambiguity but rather its play”.⁹⁴ For Derrida, the concept of play also means to go beyond oppositions, such as philosophical-logical, empirical-logical ones.

The sides of the opposition can almost be held as fiction, because the sides of the opposition are also *différences*, one opposition is the *différance* of the other, and vice versa. The impossibility to grasp the difference between the “a” and “e” of *différ()*nce also leads to the conclusion that “We must be referred to an order, then, that resists philosophy’s founding opposition between the sensible and the intelligible”.⁹⁵ The concept of play also settles beyond the oppositions, beyond the line of philosophical-logical, empirical-logical discourses, “beyond” the line of “the opposition between activity and passivity than that between cause and effect or indetermination and determination, etc.”⁹⁶, *the différence is the critique of the confrontation of oppositions*.

In deconstruction, “the concepts of Being and truth, for which were substituted the concepts of play and interpretation, and sign (sign without present truth)”,⁹⁷ but it also strongly criticises the consciousness, the individual, the identity, the “proximity to Oneself”, and the “possibility of Oneselfness”. The play remains an antecedent, it never becomes readiness, “being-there”, unity, identity, it has no clear origin or centre, it cannot be described by oppositions. The play can be conceived precisely on account of there not being any kind of completeness, unity, identity, centre, origin. The field of play is “a field of infinite substitutions only because it is finite, that is to say, because instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a centre which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions”.⁹⁸ The possibility and movement of play is not enabled by completeness and unity, traceability to something, inexhaustibility or perfection, but by exhaustibility, finiteness, replaceability. **“Something that is not present, a being-distant, a lack, a something not being-there, which is nowhere.**

⁹³ J. Derrida: *Differance*. 286.

⁹⁴ J. Derrida: *Of Grammatology*. 72.

⁹⁵ J. Derrida: *Differance*. 281.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 291.

⁹⁷ J. Derrida: *Structure, Sign and Play*. 354.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 365.

Derrida summarises his conclusions about the play as follows: "There are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism".⁹⁹ For Derrida, the play seems to free itself or get rid of the premises of the logos. It stands opposed to Rousseau's negativity, the sad, negative and sinful concept of play, but it is not a serious play like it was for Heidegger, nor teleological, but aimless, similar to Nietzschean playfulness and affirmation, which is a joyful, destructive *statements and affirmation, de-constructionist action*.

But what is the meaning of the subject's "after", or Nietzsche's "pointing to *beyondness*" and the many programmes of *transcendence*? The "beyond" and "after" can only have its paradoxical effects. Neither the "after" nor the "beyond" are present, these are the transcendence needs of concepts, attitudes which always originally refer to these concepts and attitudes. The "after" always remains "after", just as the "beyond" always remains "beyond". They have no substantial content, no substantial "being-there". The "after" and beyond" always begins, but never finishes.

It remains a question that, inasmuch as the subject cannot be transcended, cannot be taken "beyond", but always only taken further, or moved on, the question can again be asked: the question of "Who?" in which we call and evoke the "Who?" over and over again. So, if the subject cannot be liquidated, but it *can be moved*, then which way can it be moved? And how does this movement affect the ethics, politics and rights of the subject? How does this movement affect the social sciences and the humanities, the ethical-political-legal discourses, all the discourses which presuppose some kind of concept of subject? How does this movement affect the ethics, politics and law of the subject and their relatively stable concept of subject?

3. De-ConstrAction

"Deconstruction is not »possible« if »possible« [...]. Deconstruction is an explanation *with*, an experience of the impossible. [...]. Deconstructing is not possible in someone's, a group's, a discourse's, an institution's mastering a methodology or technique applied to making something happen. This deconstructs. From this standpoint, what is called *deconstruction* in the sense of a relatively coherent set of discursive rules at a given moment in Western discourse is only a symptom".

(J. Derrida)¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Ibid., 369–370.

¹⁰⁰ J. Derrida: *Politics and Friendship*. 192.

„Ich würde zunächst sagen, dass die *différance*, die weder ein Wort noch ein Begriff ist, mir strategisch am besten geeignet schien, das Irreduzibelste unserer »Epoche« zu denken, wenn nicht zu beherrschen – das Denken mag hier das sein, was sich in einem bestimmten notwendigen Verhältnis zu den strukturellen Grenzen der Herrschaft ansiedelt“.

(J. Derrida)¹⁰¹

It is not easy to outline something that removes, or wants to remove itself from the possibility to being outlined or defined. However, it is not my purpose to define something that always tries to escape definition. The question is still how we should think about the “action” called deconstruction, which has increasingly defined the attitude of the humanities ever since the 1960s? According to the classic description of deconstruction, Derrida formed his conception known as deconstruction starting from the problems of the theory of language, literary theory and psychoanalysis. The action of deconstruction as “*plus d’une langue*”, with the elaboration of critical concepts like *différance*, *dissemination (dissémination)*, *double bind*, *negotiation (négociation)*, *trace*, *traces of the trace (traces de la trace)*, displays the need to demolish the attitude and linguistic apparatus connected to the tradition of language, metaphysical language, the metaphysical nature of the language and the linguistic nature of metaphysics.

The action of deconstruction as “*plus d’une langue*”,¹⁰² “more than a language”, that is “more than a multiplication”, which transcends and splits language, “more than language”, but also “less than one”, the “dispersal”, the belatedness, the “less than merely *one pure language*” displays the forceful critical wave of the western tradition of metaphysics. Deconstruction can be related to Cartesian scepticism, Husserl’s epoché, but it does not, cannot reach any certainty, any thesis. Deconstruction resists becoming any kind of theory, method, or system, it turns away from the German tradition of idealism, the philosophy of identity, the unity of I and non-I,¹⁰³ from Hegel’s dialectic: the conception of the identity of the identical and non-identical (non-A = A),¹⁰⁴ the claiming and restoration of identity.

Already Adorno in his ideology criticism and negative dialectic in the spirit of the Frankfurt School calls for renouncing the Hegel-related dialectical, identity-centred, totality-centred principles. Derrida also criticises Hegel, as well as dialectics. Although Hegel was the last philosopher in the tradition of European philosophy to construct a system, but Derrida acts against any kind of system or need for dialectic with the intention of deconstruction. Instead of system building, deconstruction is related to the unsuspending, the unfinished, the unclosed, the undecided.

¹⁰¹ J. Derrida: *Randgänge der Philosophie*.

¹⁰² J. Derrida: *Mémoires pour Paul de Man*. 116.

¹⁰³ J. G. Fichte: *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre*. 44.

¹⁰⁴ G. W. Fr. Hegel: *Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie*. 38.

The unfinished, the unclosed, the undecided can paradoxically refer to the acceptance of the certainty of the unfinished and the unclosed, and this could also work as a kind of certainty if we accepted it as a system, a method, a principle, and we could be certain of its certainty. This signals on the one hand the paradoxical effect of deconstruction, while on the other hand it points to the experience of another kind of thinking, one that resists any kind of system building.

Deconstruction is thus rather an *unfinished movement*, for it lends its presupposed "self" to "its own" effect instead of building a system. Derrida emphasises that deconstruction "of never being established as such and with that name. Of never being able to define the unity of its project or its object. Of not being able to either to write its discourse on method or to describe the limits of its field".¹⁰⁵ Deconstruction is therefore not a positive science, it is not organised as a system, it is not definitive, but its so-called "*end product*" is not the ruin. It cannot be its end product as long as it is incomplete.

That is, it is itself *différance*, *dissemination*, *double bind*, *negotiation*, *trace of traces* and *play*. Just as the *différance* always starts, but never ends, deconstruction can also never be completed as long as there is a conceptual system, as long as there is language. For this very reason, deconstruction shares no constructive intention of systematization, but this is not a negative category or a simple lack, but a kind of (*paradigm*)*shift* (if one could speak at all about a paradigm here), or rather as a kind of shift of a series: "the excess — but can we still call it that — is only a certain displacement of the series",¹⁰⁶ Derrida claims. Derrida's deconstruction can be seen thus as a revolt against the rule of the method, for it can be defined as lacking or going against,¹⁰⁷ or rather deconstructing all methodological necessities. Deconstruction

¹⁰⁵ J. Derrida: *Of Grammatology*. 4.

¹⁰⁶ J. Derrida: *Platos Pharmacy*. In: *Dissemination*. 104.

¹⁰⁷ It is essential to refer at this point to Gadamer's *Truth and Method*, because the supremacy of natural sciences over the "sciences of the spirit" (*Geisteswissenschaften*) is shifted by the critical wave of the methodological awareness of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, which is strongly connected to Gadamer's work *Truth and Method*. This work, in which Gadamer strongly criticises the supremacy of the concept of method of natural sciences over the *Geisteswissenschaften*, plays an important role in freeing from the effects of natural sciences. The great gap between methods, theoretical and practical procedures of the search for truth of natural and spiritual sciences are different approaches to knowledge as such. Although the natural sciences also try to take account of the multifaceted and relative nature of the so-called "objective" knowledge and the differentiation of the sciences and scientific problems, it is an unquestionable *scientific necessity* even today to reveal the ability to objectively know the reality and its authentic conditions of being. This approach makes science scientific, while its calling into question makes philosophy philosophical. From a philosophical perspective, cognition does not become philosophical on account of the grounding of "objective" knowledge, but on account of the revelation of the *relativity*, *multifaceted nature* of truth. The methodology of natural sciences is based on the epistemological approach, which lies in the need to reveal the "*permanent, necessary and general*" truth manifest in nature. The truths revealed by an epistemological approach are founded as universal, objective, eternal, ahistorical truths. This approach has its foundation in

is formulated as opposing the method and the structure, since the structure is precisely something that neutralises and always favours an essential centre.¹⁰⁸ Derrida's deconstruction is a *textual operation* against constancy, a need for escaping the method. The deconstruction is therefore not a method, nor a procedure or a technique which may lead to some kind of "truth" or "understanding", it has no kind of programmatic message, but it is characterised by *event-like-ness*. The "truth" is that "*there is no truth*".

The texts are event-like, process-like, encounters, deconstruction is thus event and progress, *a series of events* which tries to shift, dislocate, overthrow the established systems and the system as such. There is no dialogical relationship, adequate mode of writing, there is no unitary or non-unitary method, no standard system of thought is formed. Deconstruction does not, cannot reach the method, but deconstructs it, remaining at all times in an intermediate space between permanent formation and readiness.

rationality and the Enlightenment, and its essential element is the exploration of the boundaries. Rationality marks the form of this kind of thinking, defined by logic, conceptual thinking and causal knowledge. – Cf. V. Károly: *Bevezetés a hermeneutikába*. (Introduction to hermeneutics), 23–24. This approach to scientific knowledge has strongly left its mark on the methodology and self-view of "spiritual sciences" as well. Destructing all this, Gadamer claims that hermeneutics is the art of understanding, in such a way that the art is not hermeneutics, but understanding itself. By relating the hermeneutical attitude to art, Gadamer radically delimits the hermeneutical *approach* from the scientific *method*.

In addition, Gadamer's concept of hermeneutical experience is also a break-through, where experience appears in relation to historicity, and not as the measure of scientific, ahistorical "objectivity". The concept of experience of natural sciences restricts the experience to necessities, repetitions, while, hermeneutically, our experiences referring to the world and ourselves – and the experience as such – do not refer to the typical. The hermeneutic approach is based on the possibility to experience the *uniqueness, arbitrariness, incidence, and changeability* of things and phenomena, from which historicity is inseparable. Gadamer emphasises thus the dialectic, finiteness, openness and historicity of the experience. In his methodological criticism he points out that our ability to experience the truth in knowledge is *limited*, it is itself *finite*, and we may admit not only the experience, but also *our own finiteness* and limitations. The task of hermeneutics is therefore precisely to stress the unique manifestations, changeability and singularity. The experience therefore does not appear hermeneutically as something controllable and universally justifiable, but precisely in its particular singularity. Gadamer discusses two possible ways of experience: the *positive* and *negative* "possibility" of the experience. Positive experience is what proves our expectations or meets them, while negative experience is what we "gain". – H.-G. Gadamer: *Truth and Method*. Parth II. Chapter 4. Elements of a theory of hermeneutic experience. 267–383. This negative form of experience is *productive*, for it corrects or adjusts our previous knowledge, so it offers extra information. The real experience from a hermeneutical perspective is only the *negative experience*, the *experience of otherness*.

Derrida's deconstruction is also a revolt against the primacy and domination of the method, it is actually a radicalization of Gadamer's critique of the method, since deconstruction can be defined as lacking any methodological necessity. Derrida's deconstruction is an "unfinished motion", which cannot be regarded thus as a method, a procedure, an operation or a technique. Despite the many contradictions (and also many similarities) between hermeneutics and deconstruction, a defining characteristic of both is their criticism of, and opposition to, the method.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. J. Derrida: *Positions*. 278–279.

An important *assemblage* (*faisceau*) of deconstruction is the *negotiation* (*négociation*), which has no, can have no general rule, law, or method, but “there is” “[...] the impossibility of stopping, this means: no thesis, no position, no theme, no station, no substance, no stability, a perpetual suspension, a suspension without rest”.¹⁰⁹ In the interview entitled *Negotiations*, Derrida connects the status of deconstruction to *negotiation*, where *negotiation* is similar to the *différance*. An essential aspect of negotiation is that “it is always different, differential”.¹¹⁰

The deconstructionist *negotiation* is related to *decision*, while decidability to *undecidability*, for there must always be undecidability and unpredictability,¹¹¹ or else negotiation would be nothing more than mere *calculation*, simple *programming*, *trafik*,¹¹² *causality*. The deconstructionist negotiation is thus connected to decision and undecidability. Undecidability is what gives way to a certain possibility of ethical or political decision.¹¹³ Derrida expands on *negotiation* with help of the metaphor of the *knot* that reminds one of weaving, *rope*.¹¹⁴ *Negotiation* is like a *woven rope*, intertwined, *negotiation* is none other than deconstruction, and deconstruction is none other than *negotiation*.¹¹⁵

The assemblage of *dissemination* (*dissémination*) also bears the effects of deconstruction, the dispersal of *dissemination* “opens up a *snag* in writing that can no longer be mended, a spot where neither meaning, however plural, nor *any form of presence* can pin/pen down (*agrapher*) the trace. Dissemination treats, as doctors, that *point* where the movement of signification would regularly come to *tie down*

¹⁰⁹ J. Derrida: *Negotiations*. 13.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 17. „An essential aspect of negotiation is that it is always different, differential, not only from one individual to another, from one situation to another, but even for the same individual, from one moment to the next”.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 21. „The negotiation I am discussing is not simply a calculation. One calculates as much as possible, but there must also be a nonintegratable, incalculable part. [...] If one were sure of the calculation, it would not be an action or a decision; it would be a programming. There must be decision, there must be absolute risk, and thus there must be the undecidable. There is no decision without the undecidable. If there are no undecidables, there is no decision. There is simply programming, calculation. There must be political, ethical decisions, but these decisions are possible only in situations where the undecidable is a necessary dilemma [epreuve], the law”.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 13.

¹¹³ J. Derrida: *Ethics and Politics Today*. 298. – „The undecidability [...] is the condition or the opening of a space for an ethical or political decision”.

¹¹⁴ Derrida: *Negotiations*. 29. – „Negotiation as a knot, as the work of the knot. In the knot of negotiation there are different rhythms, different forces, different differential vibrations of time and rhythm. The word knot came to me, and the image of a rope. A rope with an entanglement, a rope made up of several strands knotted together”.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 16. – „So negotiation is constantly under way, the negotiation which is none other than deconstruction itself”.

the play of the trace".¹¹⁶ Derrida's work reveals that the status of deconstruction is connected to these critical-deconstructionist terms, meaning that deconstruction itself is *negotiation, double bind, dissemination, postponement* without an end product, *trace of traces, play* and *différance* without method and rule.

Another key term or *assemblage (faisceau)* of Derrida's deconstruction is the *différance*. Nietzsche already radicalises the concept of difference and *change*, also in the spirit of distancing himself from dialectic, just as Heidegger does with the concept of *difference* in his philosophy of destruction and difference.

Apart from Nietzsche's and Heidegger's philosophy of destruction and difference, Freud's psychoanalysis, especially the concept of *dissociation (Dissoziation-disassociare, »trennen, scheiden«)*¹¹⁷ has *left its trace* on deconstruction. For Freud, this concept refers to the splitting of the I (*Ichspaltung*), and later it has made its way into psychological language as the disintegration, fragmentation of consciousness. Freud's psychoanalysis goes through a radical change, as the I is no longer in control of itself, the authority of consciousness is questioned, the modern psychological status of the I is decentralised, and the unitary conception of the "I", the "*subject*" is broken.

The unconscious for Freud is not an entity hidden within itself, not a "being-there", not a "*Oneself*", does not substitute a "*Oneself*", it is not conscious, not a "being-there", but retroactiveness (*Nachträglichkeit*), not based on the opposition of "being-there"-"being-distant", but postponement, differing, created by differences. Derrida's conception of *trace* is also connected to Freudian facilitation,¹¹⁸ the question to differences between facilitating forces, the differences between facilitations, the question of difference: "there is no facilitation [Bahnung] without difference and no difference without a trace"¹¹⁹ – claims Derrida.

Another important point of contact between deconstruction and the *différance* is Saussure's structuralist theory of language. The instance of Saussurean language theory important for deconstruction appears in the turn that, instead of a system of *identities*, the language is a system of *differences*, "*in der Sprache nur Differenzen [es] gibt*"¹²⁰ – Saussure states in his work *Grundfragen der Allgemeinen Sprachwissenschaft*. In his interpretation of Saussure, Derrida emphasises the "play of differences",¹²¹ which is the sign's condition of operation: "the play of difference

¹¹⁶ J. Derrida: *Dissemination*. Outwork, Prefacing. 26.

¹¹⁷ S. Lüdemann: *Jacques Derrida zur Einführung*, quoting Freud: *Studien über Hysterie*, 32.

¹¹⁸ S. Freud: *Entwurf einer Psychologie*.

¹¹⁹ J. Derrida: *Différance*. 293.

¹²⁰ F. de Saussure: *Grundfragen der Allgemeinen Sprachwissenschaft*. 139.

¹²¹ J. Derrida: *Différance*. 291.

the functional condition, the condition of possibility, for every sign”.¹²² The system of language consists of differences, “this differences *play a role* in language, in speech as well, and in the exchange between language and speech. On the other hand, these differences are themselves effects”,¹²³ not being ready. Saussure’s semiology emphasises the sign’s arbitrariness and differential character, and the idea of *difference* is prioritised over that of *identity*. This approach is radicalised in post-structuralism, both in the philosophies of difference and in deconstruction.

The idea of difference joins together the theories of post-structuralism and the postmodern: the change for Nietzsche, *ontological difference* for Heidegger, the “continuous modification” in Husserl’s phenomenology,¹²⁴ the “pure difference” (*reine Differenz*) for Deleuze,¹²⁵ the *Differend* in the approach of the poststructuralist and postmodern Lyotard. Based on these, the difference becomes the “object” of research increasingly as *difference*, *differences*, *differentiated differences*, and the differences become ever more differentiated, not merely as the opposition or denial or unity and identity. The new concept of *difference* is formulated in opposition to metaphysics, in the spirit of the “transcendence” of metaphysics, as a critique, a “project” or need to transcend metaphysics.

Unquestionably, however, the various programmes to transcend metaphysics are also discourses embedded into the very spirit of metaphysics, and they can somehow only be that. Derrida emphasises that “difference remains a metaphysical name; and all the names that it receives from our language are still, so far as they are names, metaphysical”.¹²⁶ In spite of this the dialectical tradition, the German idealist tradition and the philosophy of identity turn into the differentiation of the *difference* and the *philosophies*, *destructions*, *deconstructions of difference* and the *post-structuralist and postmodern theories*, that is, the tradition of unity increasingly turning against itself.

Derrida’s deconstruction recognises not the *transformation*, the *modification*, the *difference*, but the *différance*. The *différance* does not refer to a concept, but instead of this, Derrida uses the word *assemblage (faisceau)*, claiming that the “the word »assemblage« seems more apt to suggesting that the kind of bringing-together proposed here has the structure of an interlacing, a weaving, or a web”.¹²⁷ This idea is not merely about a shift from one concept to another, but a critique of the language, a critique of the metaphysical nature of language, and the critique of the

¹²² Ibid., 281.

¹²³ Ibid., 286.

¹²⁴ E. Husserl: *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*. 29.

¹²⁵ G. Deleuze: *Differenz und Wiederholung*. 11–12.

¹²⁶ J. Derrida: *Differance*. 299.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 280.

conceptual system and the thinking pattern connected to the metaphysical nature of language, because when we speak of the critique of metaphysics, we also speak about the metaphysical nature and language and the linguistic nature of metaphysics. Derrida exposes in the semantic analysis of the French verb *différer* – and the Latin *differre* – that the *différer* refers, on the one hand to temporal and spatial difference, it means postponement, belatedness, evasive temporal mediation, procrastination, the “taking-account of time and forces in an operation”,¹²⁸ that is, it means *temporalization*, which “suspends the accomplishment or fulfilment of »desire« or »will«”.¹²⁹ On the other hand, it means *non-identity*, different otherness, it marks “of not being identical, of being other, of being discernible”.¹³⁰ *Difference* with an “e” cannot express temporization (*différer*), nor polemics (*différend*), that is why Derrida considers justified to use the term *différance*.

However, the difference between the expressions *différ(e)nce* and *différ(a)nce* disappears, it hardly appears for the eyes and the ears, therefore the *différance* does not appear, it practically *does not exist*.¹³¹ The situation is similar with the status of deconstruction as well. The concepts to deconstruct are circulating, but never end, never rest in an identity, never become permanent, never settle in a presence, never join a static meaning. One of the rhetorical questions often asked about deconstruction is where the always renewing “destructions” lead. What is the play about? The “nothing”? Less about a settled, identical, unitary, definable presence. Where does deconstruction’s undecidability or lack of foundation lead? What can this “lack of foundation” be a foundation of? Will deconstruction become its own purpose? Should one speak about the self-deconstruction of deconstruction? Does deconstruction deconstruct the “deconstructable”, then “itself” too? How, if it has no “itselfness”? Will anything remain of it, where the “anything” is only presupposed and becomes an object of renewing deconstruction? In opposition to Heideggerian destruction, the deconstruction founded on the unity of *destruction* and *construction* (*Einheit von Destruktion und Konstruktion*)¹³² does not claim for itself an explicitly constructive intent; however, deconstruction is actually *radically constructive*, for it tends towards a new, unfinished context by its demolition and disassembling, without this always yet-to-come context ever settling or completing. Moreover, de-(con)struction always overwrites the opposition of pure destruction and construction, deconstruction and construction.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 283.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ J. Derrida: *Excerpt from Différance*.

¹³² See M. Heidegger: *Sein und Zeit*. 6. *Die Aufgabe einer Destruktion der Geschichte der Ontologie*. 27–36.

The "context" of de-(con)struction no longer possesses identity, unity, "being-there", the possibility to be founded on oppositions, and thus it is almost a non-existent context but one that lends its presumes self to de-(con)struction at any time. This is probably the reason that deconstruction is an "unfinished movement", an *experience of the impossible*,¹³³ that is, "deconstruction is not »possible« if »possible«".¹³⁴ Deconstruction can be described as anarchical, since it discredits the *arche*, the *origin*, the *command*, – "Deconstruction is undoubtedly anarchic; it would be in principle, if such a thing could be said. It puts into question the arche, the beginning and the commandment [...]"¹³⁵ – while at the same time it is also constructive and radically creative. What could possibly express its constructive, or rather de-constructive nature better than its strong influence on the entire field of social sciences and the humanities?

What are the consequences if the movement and duplication of the *différance* "spread over onto every word and concept and displays them for what they really are, while also prevents them from being what they really are"?¹³⁶ There is no "entity" or "id-entity" to which the movement of the *différance* would not extend. The deconstruction and its critical *assemblages (faisceau)* lead/would lead, or point/would point at a kind of *beyondness*. From a deconstructionist point of view, the primary task is the demolition and dismantling of the *consciousness of identity, unity, "being-there", pure origin, the basis of conceptual oppositions, the identity of meaning, the "centre", the centralization, centrism, west-centrism, ethnocentrism, etc., the transcendence of the conceptual system of metaphysics and metaphysics-policy and the transcendence of the associated thinking, practice, and "institutional framework", and perhaps the "transcendence" of the transcendence. The assemblages (faisceau) of deconstruction are thus not only new expressions, but also operations and actions. In Derrida's deconstruction one can trace as the concepts analyzed "are becoming sheaves". In deconstruction perceived as the radicalization of the Heideggerian-Gadamerian destruction, for Derrida the emphasis is no longer on *reinterpretation*, but on *picking into pieces*. The deconstructionist critical assemblages (*faisceau*) call for the deconstruction of the "being-there", the unity and identity, and the metaphysics of the "being-there", or of metaphysics as the science of "being-there".*

These terms, called assemblages instead of concepts, are not positive, ready-made notions. They do no answer the question "*What is...?*", but deconstruct them, and deconstruct also the kind of questioning which already presupposes a "*what*" or a "*who*". The language of deconstruction seems to contradict the questions of "*What...?*" and "*Who...?*", the tradition connected to the logos and logological attitude which

¹³³ J. Derrida: *Politics and Friendship*. 192.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 22.

¹³⁶ Bennington/Derrida: *Jacques Derrida*.

necessarily speaks about some *Thing*.¹³⁷ Derrida's deconstruction points at one way of uttering and writing the language, attempting to shift somewhat the western European tradition of metaphysics. Just as deconstruction *is not* (es "ist" nicht), it cannot state that what there "is" ("ist"). What the terms *différance*, *dissemination*, *negotiation*, *trace*, *pharmakon*, and other critical term of Derrida "want to say" – if they have to say it – is something that comes *before the concept* ("vor" dem Begriff), *before word and name* ("vor" dem Wort), before the *something*, the "*what*" ("vor" dem "Etwas"), which has no being and "being-there".¹³⁸

Derrida proposes the deconstruction and dismantling of all the concepts which refer to some kind of "being-there", origin, centre, unity, identity, such as: "*eidos*, *arche*, *telos*, *energeia*, *ousia* (essence, existence, substance, subject) *alatheia*, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth".¹³⁹ The operation of deconstruction however also asks for the demolition of terminological and ethical, political, legal procedures: specifically the demolition of the unity- and identity-based conception of the *self*, the *subject*, *identity*, *culture*, or cultural identity, the deconstruction of ethical, political and legal systems based on these definitions, the deconstruction of ethnocentrism and centrisms like west-centrism or Europe-centrism.

All this highlights the critique and need for deconstruction of identificatory conceptual thinking and the related practices, connected to the need for deconstruction of a line of other concepts and practices: the deconstruction of the traditional formal perception of communication, consensus and cooperation, the deconstruction of human and political rights, social justice and west-centred democracy.

4. Appendix

4.1. "On this side and the other" of "Pre-/Before" and "Post-/After" From here to there? "Beyond"?

After all those said, the question on *metaphysics* and *transcendence* is repeatedly raised. What does the transcendence of metaphysics consist of? What does the "*meta*", "*beyond*", "*after*", "*post*", "*hyper*", "*über*", "*d*" consist of? What does the metaphysical language and the *plus d'une langue* consist of? The *plus d'une langue*

¹³⁷ J. Derrida: *Wie nicht sprechen?* 63. „Ein Logos spricht notwendig von etwas; er kann nicht vermeiden, von etwas zu sprechen; es ist unmöglich“.

¹³⁸ Cf. Ibid. 19. „Es »ist« nicht und sagt nicht dies, was »ist«. Dies, was die »*différence*«, die »Spur« und so weiter »sagen-will« – was von nun an *nichts sagen will* –, dies wäre »vor« dem Begriff, dem Namen, dem Wort, »etwas«, das nichts wäre, das nicht mehr dem Sein, der Anwesenheit oder der Gegenwärtigkeit des Gegenwärtigen [...] angehörte“.

¹³⁹ J. Derrida: *Of Grammatology*. 19.

which is "*more than one*", "*multiplication*", "*more than a language*", and also "*more than language*" that transcends and strains language, but at the same time "*less than one*", the "*dispersion*", belatedness, "*less than merely one pure language*", "*less than the language*"? The traditional language and conceptual patterns of metaphysics and political metaphysics outlines first of all the identity-centric, totalizing, hierarchical, hegemonic, ethnocentric approach to unity. All this has had a significant effect on the humanities, on western-European thinking and political culture.

This is the frame in which the conceptual systems, system-concepts, and definitions of the humanities, as well as ethical-political-discourses are equally formulated. The critical attempts that intend to transcend or surmount it will eventually also clash with the limits of this conceptual system and thinking, and stay within this pattern of thinking and language. Deconstruction encourages the demolition of metaphysical and political-metaphysical concepts and attitudes like: "pure origin", "pure-blood origin", "centre", "concepts of centre", "centralization", "centrism", ethnocentrism, west-centrism, Euro-centrism, "pure(-blood) cultural homogeneity", pure cultural identity, conceptual and semantic identity, "being-there", "actuality", "reality regulation", hierarchical and exclusionary oppositions, etc. This way it points at the limitations, ethnocentrism and hierarchic nature of some concepts and conceptual system and the ethical, political, legal, economic, cultural and social system built on these. Based on this, deconstruction works not merely as a theory of humanities, but has an active role in politics as well.

"From here", however, one can only refer to, or outline the need to deconstruct concepts and conceptual systems, but the processes of conceptual, linguistic deconstruction are *unfulfilled* developments of critical "breakthrough" attempts. The concepts to be deconstructed *are in circulation*, for our discourses would become impossible to be carried out without these concepts. Because of the supremacy of established conceptual systems it is inevitable in fact to keep these concepts as instruments, but the limits of their application must be established. It is impractical however to endow them with unconditional truth value or a strict, rigid meaning, but they should be used within the limits of their applicability, or in certain situations they must be given up. Deconstruction does not annihilate thus these concepts, indeed, that would be impossible, but *dismantles* them. Derrida himself does not think he has or could have escaped the language of metaphysics, thus even deconstruction undoubtedly dwells in the language of metaphysics, *but meanwhile always tries to deconstruct it*.

What does then this "*From here to there? 'Beyond'?*" means? What does transcendence mean? The "*beyond*" somehow always remains beyond, it can *never be there*, it will always be *postponed* and *belated*. Actually it can only be belated, it

can never *be fulfilled*, it has no real nature. It is less “there” than “not there”. This “not there” as a “there is” articulates in language as a *plus d’une langue, meta, after, beyond, post, hyper, über, di-*. As Nietzsche puts it: “One should speak only when one may not stay silent; and then only of that which one has *overcome* – everything else is chatter, »literature«, lack of breeding. My writings speak only of my *overcomings*”.¹⁴⁰ Wittgenstein’s often quoted concluding thought is also very expressive: “what we cannot speak about we must *Passover* in silence”.¹⁴¹ The “essence” appears in the “*transgression*”: “my propositions serve as *educations* in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used the *as steps* to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it). He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright”.¹⁴²

For Nietzsche, just as much as for Heidegger, Gadamer, Wittgenstein and Derrida, the destruction and deconstruction, the “beyond” of language and expression is delayed. Heidegger raises the also language-connected question whether “is there any possibility to explore and validate the language opened up through metaphysical thinking as the possibility of language’s saying-something-else?”¹⁴³ However, this is never a specific possibility with respect to a future that can be seen from the present, but only a way to refer to various needs of transcendence.

The *need of transcendence* is precisely about *what it cannot utter*, what is *beyond*, what is *postponed*, what is *belated*, which *goes beyond* the formal substantial logic and claim of being of the “*What...?*” and “*Who...?*”, what is *beyond* while language (or this language) is, which is more and less than language, which is “*plus d’une langue*”. The *beyond* always remains thus *beyond* in its belatedness, postponement, but the *beyond* has no substance in fact, it escapes identity, unity, “being-there” and formal logic, the essence of *beyond* is revealed thus simply by remaining *beyond*, therefore it can never be present, it cannot be “being-there”, it can never become real, it can never be “itself enough”, “there is no itself”. Therefore the important thing about the *beyond* is merely the direction.

4.2. *Excursive questions*

What happens with the discourses of the humanities, with political, ethical, legal discourses, which presuppose the existence and concept of the subject, the identity, *the culture*, or more precisely a concept of these which is hierarchical, hegemonic, ethnocentrist? As long as the subject, the identity, or *the culture* cannot

¹⁴⁰ Fr. Nietzsche: *Human, All Too Human*. 209.

¹⁴¹ L. Wittgenstein: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung*. 7.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 6.54.

¹⁴³ B. Bacsó: *Néhány megjegyzés a hermeneutikához és a dekonstruktivizmushoz*. 170.

work as concepts, then how can one build upon them hegemonic discourses and the supremacy of institutions connected to them? How can institutions and ethical, political and legal spheres work without the traditional and established concepts? Or what kinds of "systems" accompany "assemblages" instead of concepts? It seems inevitable to revise the humanities, metaphysics and political metaphysics in the *spirit* of postmodernism and post-postmodernism. What kind of shifts does the "di-" of *différance* bring about? What about the "post" or "posts" of the postmodern and post-postmodern? How far is it necessary to rethink that ethical, political, economic and legal context in which the supremacy of the unitary view of the subject, the identity and *the* culture loses its validity, just like the formal rhetoric of the "cultural variety" also structured on hierarchical basis? Further steps can be taken in the direction of the permanent *negotiation*/elaboration of the ethics, politics, economic policy and legal system of *alterity*, which is no longer in need of well-defined, established, prescriptive, hegemonic concepts and practices, but the destruction and deconstruction of these, a dynamic complex of context.

The various philosophies of difference, destructions, deconstructions and postmodern or post-postmodern theories point out the traps and indefensibility of concepts and conceptual categories and the systems built thereupon. By this these theories and tendencies, especially deconstruction, do not merely work as theories of philosophy, but seek a politically active role as well. All these ideas, destructions and deconstructions delineate the projections of a (*paradigm*)shift.

4.3. On quotation marks

Would it be possible to simply avoid the use of various concepts and terms, as if we did not know about their "existence", or pretend, believe that we could act as if we knew nothing about their "existence"? Is it not a suspicious endeavour to lengthily discuss concepts, combinations of concepts or terms that are articulated precisely in their destructionist-deconstructionist aspects? To annihilate these terms, would be a naive purpose and illusion altogether, for even these destructionist-deconstructionist motivations rehabilitate these terms in a way. Again, the aim is also not to establish one correct method to reveal the *correct* and *incorrect* modes of writing and discourse, of "*How does one need to write and speak?*" or "*How does one not need to write and speak?*" This is by far not the question. At first sight, it does seem that we are speaking about that which we "must not speak about", the always criticised, outdated, destroyed, deconstructed subject, identity, *the* culture, the capitalised "Diversity", etc. These terms must not be discriminated or beheaded, while it is clear that their avoidance would mean to avoid avoidance. How can one then use these terms and expressions? Why does one have to keep talking about

them? The aim is not to substitute these concepts with new ones, nor to set other “truths” in the place of the old terms, and it is even more of an illusion to aim at a universally valid potential new term or combination of terms. The guideline, if there is such a thing, if there could be one at all, *is not reinterpretation, nor redefinition*, but the productive conflicting motion of dismantling.

But how should we use these terms? Within quotation marks, referring to what we refuse to refer to? Or should we employ different typefaces? Should we put them in brackets or within quotation marks, like Heidegger with the spirit, or use strikethrough, simply rejecting them, refusing to accept them, and sustaining them not in their traditional forms? Or should we claim that certain terms in the traditional form are what they are, but in their non-traditional form they are not what they are? But then “*what*” are they? (However, the “*what*” and “*who*” are no longer relevant).

The way Derrida speaks about the use of quotation marks in his analysis of Heidegger, seems to prove that quotation marks remove the conceptuality of the term, “flanked with discriminatory signs, held at a distance by the procedure of quotation marks”,¹⁴⁴ and it would seem thus that “the same word, but also another”.¹⁴⁵ In connection to the problem of strikethrough, Heidegger claims that the avoidance, the strikethrough refers to a kind of impossibility of the denomination, which is also an “inability to open itself to the *as such* of the thing”.¹⁴⁶ These attempts or constraints of expression, being at the same time impossibilities of expression, seem to deprive these concepts of their conceptuality, or demolish, dismantle their conceptuality burdened with traditions. Is this deprivation, this weakening, this demolition enough? For the status of these concepts cannot be weakened, because they were questioned and deconstructed in their essence, therefore their one-time existence is rather the trace of disseminating, *différentiating*, negotiating traces. That is the reason why Derrida speaks about expressions “used in its deconstructed sense”,¹⁴⁷ with disseminating, non-static and non-identical meaning, which point to a different *direction*, point or intend to point *beyond* their earlier “self”. These concepts point *beyond* “themselves”, but lead to no target, send to no “truer” “Self”, they have no true or truer Self. The *beyond* renewed remains thus, for the time being, only a *question*, to which the “answer” is its *questionability*.

¹⁴⁴ J. Derrida: *Of Spirit*. Heidegger and the Question. 29.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 53.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 24.

5. Zarathustra returns

"Alone I go now, my disciples! You also should go now, and alone! Thus I want it! Indeed, I counsel you to leave me and guard yourselves against Zarathustra!"¹⁴⁸

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¹⁴⁸ Fr. Nietzsche: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. 59.

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