

## HAPPINESS AND MEANING IN IMPRISONMENT: THE IMPORTANCE OF SUFFERING IN THE EXPERIENCES OF NICOLAE STEINHARDT AND VIKTOR FRANKL

Carmen STADOLEANU<sup>1</sup>

**ABSTRACT.** The paper describes the experiences of Nicolae Steinhardt and Viktor Frankl, both imprisoned despite their innocence, and their discovery of happiness and meaning through suffering and pain. Nicolae Steinhardt was a Romanian political prisoner of the communist regime and Viktor Frankl was a Jew imprisoned in the Auschwitz concentration camp. While in prison, Nicolae Steinhardt is secretly baptized and his life takes a very interesting turn. The discovery of God gives him access to the phenomenon of happiness and as he confesses, in prison he will live the happiest days of his life. Despite the miserable conditions, the pain, and the physical and mental torment, Steinhardt characterizes his happiness as ecstatic, passionate and life-changing. Under similar conditions, Viktor Frankl discovers the importance of suffering in determining the meaning of life. For Frankl, life always holds a potential meaning and “if there is a meaning in life at all, then there must be a meaning in suffering”. Therefore, through suffering and sorrow, and not in spite of them, Steinhardt and Frankl gain access to happiness and meaning.

**Keywords:** happiness; meaning of life; suffering; prison; imprisonment; purpose; pain; Nicolae Steinhardt; Viktor Frankl.

---

<sup>1</sup> Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Iași, Romania. Email: c.stadoleanu@gmail.com.



## Introduction

A life lived in detention is definitely a complex topic, it “both fascinates and repels”<sup>2</sup> and it is full of challenges and difficulties. In Gresham Sykes’ terms, prison is “a society within a society”<sup>3</sup>, an aggregate of people living together and having rules, traditions, values, dreams, aspirations, and dramas. However, the predominant elements in such a “society” are rather the negative ones, such as: “domination for the sake of domination alone”<sup>4</sup>, the sacrifice of the personal autonomy of the individual in order to prevent escape attempts, the “environment made harsh by man-made decrees”<sup>5</sup>, the rebellion, the apathy, the sabotage, the show-off<sup>6</sup> - all these, among many others, are part of this world in which it seems almost impossible to find happiness and meaning.

How could an inmate asset that he is having a meaningful life as long as he lives almost like an animal trapped in a cage, forced to leave his cell only rarely and under strict supervision, forced to live in miserable and bitter conditions and deprived of the activities of a free life? Likewise, how could the encounter with happiness happen in one of the most unhappy and hostile environments, in which pain and suffering lurk in every corner? Once in prison, the inmate loses both his autonomy and the comfort of living independently. He also loses the access to personal belongings and the boundless ties with his loved ones, entering a foreign universe, often brutal, cruel and almost Kafkaesque.

---

<sup>2</sup> Deborah H. Drake, Sacha Drake and Rod Earle, “Prison Life, Sociology of: Recent Perspectives from the United Kingdom”, in James D. Wright (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, Second Edition, Volume 18, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2015, p. 924.

<sup>3</sup> Gresham M. Sykes, *The society of captives: a study of a maximum security prison*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1958, p. xii.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 24.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 28.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*.

Also, an important element of life in prison is the frequent injustice which “can lead to resentment”<sup>7</sup>. Moreover, as studies show, deep resentment “can turn to hatred, then can be a major motivation to hurt other people”<sup>8</sup>. In this paper we analyze only the lives of the innocent prisoners, unjustly accused and imprisoned, victims of arbitrary decisions, such as political detainees convicted under Romania’s communist regime or victims of the Holocaust imprisoned in concentration camps, like Nicolae Steinhardt or Viktor Frankl. In other words, the lives of those who have not committed any kind of violence or harm. However, being imprisoned has negative consequences whether you are guilty or innocent – or maybe even more dramatic consequence when you are not guilty.

A study regarding the effects of imprisonment on wrongfully accused inmates has revealed that “the psychological impact of being wrongfully accused of a crime was described as extreme and long-lasting”<sup>9</sup>. Among those consequences, we mention: changes in self-identity, the struggle with stigma, depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, isolation, strain on relationships, frustration, the feeling of being betrayed, anger and so on<sup>10</sup>. At the same time, victims of the Holocaust “still bear the pain of their past in the form of various psychiatric symptoms”<sup>11</sup>. In such conditions, can a man be happy and find meaning in prison? Especially when he feels betrayed by the others, by his fellows and his neighbors who should be responsible

---

<sup>7</sup> Lifan Yu, Maria Gambaro, Mary Cate Komoski, Mengjiao Song, Jacqueline Song, Mark Teslik, Brooke Wollner and Robert Enright, “The Silent Injustices against Men in Maximum Security Prison and the Need for Forgiveness Therapy: Two Case Studies”, *Journal of Forensic Psychology*, Volume 3, Issue 2, 2018, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>9</sup> Samantha K. Brooks and Neil Greenberg, “Psychological impact of being wrongfully accused of crime offences: A systematic literature review”, *Medicine, Science and the Law*, Volume 61, Issue 1, 2021, p. 47.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 47-49.

<sup>11</sup> Efrat Barel, Marinus H. Van Ijzendoorn, Abraham Sagi-Schwartz and Marian J. Bakermans-Kranenburg, “Surviving the Holocaust: A Meta-Analysis of the Long-Term Sequelae of a Genocide”, *Psychological Bulletin*, Volume 136, Issue 5, 2010, p. 694.

for him, in terms of Levinas<sup>12</sup>? Both Nicolae Steinhardt and Viktor Frankl prove to us that they are able to overcome injustice, fear, harsh living conditions, and the feeling of helplessness and they neither become resentful nor lose their hope. Hope is an important element for meaning and happiness and despite the fact that for Camus „happiness is born of the absence of hope”<sup>13</sup>, we will argue that hope is essential for a life, especially for one lived in the cruel and difficult conditions of imprisonment - “hope is for the soul what breathing is for the living organism”<sup>14</sup>.

Utilitarianism, as conceived by its theorists, promotes the guidance of human actions by the principle of utility, which aims to maximize happiness and minimize suffering. According to Bentham, “by the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action [...] according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question”<sup>15</sup>. Moreover, a certain object has the property of utility if it “tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness, [...], or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness”<sup>16</sup>. Furthermore, according to John Stuart Mill, “Utility or The Greatest Happiness Principle” assumes that “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness”<sup>17</sup>. By happiness, Mill understands “pleasure, and the absence of pain”<sup>18</sup> and by unhappiness, “pain, and the privation of pleasure”<sup>19</sup>.

---

<sup>12</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, *Entre nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other*, translated from the French by Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 107. “All men are responsible for one another, and “I more than anyone else”.

<sup>13</sup> Albert Camus, “Le Désert”, *Noces suivi de L’été*, Gallimard, Paris, 1959, p. 71.

<sup>14</sup> Gabriel Marcel, *Homo Viator. Introduction to a Metaphysics of Hope*, translated by Emma Craufurd, Camelot Press, London, 1951, pp. 10-11.

<sup>15</sup> Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 2000, p. 14.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 15.

<sup>17</sup> John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 2001, p. 10.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*.

Against the utilitarian conception that opposes pain and suffering to happiness, we will try to offer in this paper a perspective in which happiness and suffering do not repel each other, but come to intertwine so strongly that through pain and suffering – and not against them – the human being finds happiness and meaning.

Nicolae Steinhardt describes cell 34 of the Jilava penitentiary as “a cavern, a canal, a subterranean gut, cold and deeply hostile, an empty mine, the crater of an inactive volcano, an image of a faded hell”<sup>20</sup>, in which the suffer of the detainees is so severe that it remains strongly impregnated in one’s memory. Torment is everywhere you look in prison, it accompanies you every step of the way. In describing an episode that happened at the Jilava’s infirmary, Steinhardt says that he does not remember who the man lying on the first bed was; however, it was “a man silenced by sufferance and filth”<sup>21</sup>. This description of the depersonalized man, dispossessed of his particular qualities, over whose memory time inevitably lies, but which is distinguished only by his suffering, seems to be a symbol of imprisonment. Viktor Frankl also describes the experience of arriving at Auschwitz, the concentration camp, as synonymous with depersonalization, uniformity, and loss of identity. The prisoners able to work, who were therefore not sentenced to death from the very beginning, went through the process of abandoning everything that set them apart from others – from their clothes, to their hair, and to handing over all their personal belongings: “No one could yet grasp the fact that everything would be taken away”<sup>22</sup>, Frankl writes, and further explains that all that remained for the prisoners at this stage was only their “naked existence”<sup>23</sup>.

---

<sup>20</sup> Nicolae Steinhardt, *Jurnalul fericii*, Editura Mănăstirii Rohia, Rohia, 2005, p. 38.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 136.

<sup>22</sup> Viktor E. Frankl, *Man’s Search for Meaning. An introduction to logotherapy*, Beacon Press, USA, 1992, p. 27.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 28.

## Nicolae Steinhardt and the odd encounter with happiness in prison

In this sordid, “almost surreally sinister”<sup>24</sup> place, Nicolae Steinhardt lives an unusual encounter with happiness - with the greatest and most complex happiness that, he says, he could ever experience: “I was going to know the happiest days of my entire life. How absolutely happy I had been in cell 34!”<sup>25</sup>. Despite the suffering, Nicolae Steinhardt’s experience is proof that happiness does not suppress pain; on the contrary, the two can coexist, and pain can even turn into happiness and increase it. “In cell 34, the joy [...] and the pain [...] mix so inextricably that everything, including pain, converts in ecstatic and lofty happiness<sup>26</sup>” – this is how Steinhardt describes his experience of happiness which, in Tatarkiewicz’s terms, is a form of psychological happiness<sup>27</sup>. From this point of view, the happiness experienced by Nicolae Steinhardt after his confession of faith, the Christian baptism, and the conversion to the Orthodox religion, in room 18 of the Jilava penitentiary, in complete secrecy, sheltered from the relentless eyes of the guards, but also the rebirth “from infested water and quick spirit”<sup>28</sup> is a very strong, intense and powerful feeling, capable of turning an entire human existence upside down. He describes his happiness as total and totalizing: “this happiness surrounds me, embraces me, dresses me, vanquish me”<sup>29</sup> or “I feel unutterable happy. [...].

---

<sup>24</sup> Nicolae Steinhardt, *Op. cit.*, p. 38.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 41.

<sup>27</sup> For Tatarkiewicz, there are (at least) four “notions of happiness”: (1) happiness as chance or good fortune that suddenly gets in someone’s way, significantly changing their life course; (2) happiness as a “particularly joyful or profound” experience, almost violently manifested, like a state of “bliss or drunkenness”; this notion of happiness is experienced by Nicolae Steinhardt as it will be described in this paper; (3) happiness as eudaimonia or as “the greatest measure of goods accessible to man” and (4) happiness as lasting satisfaction in relation to one’s own life, taken as a whole. See Władysław Tatarkiewicz, *Despre fericire*, traducere din limba polonă de Constantin Geambașu, Eikon, București, 2019, pp. 14-24.

<sup>28</sup> Nicolae Steinhardt, *Op. cit.*, p. 91.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 92.

The light surrounds me, it is a total happiness, and it suppresses everything”<sup>30</sup> or “More than anything else I am happy, happy, happy. [...]. The happiness not only that lasts forever but it is ever growing”<sup>31</sup>. This high intensity pleasant state, lived with such exaltation by Nicolae Steinhardt, illustrates, therefore, the happiness in a psychological sense, described by Tatarkiewicz, who explains that such phenomena are common mostly in three situations: the contact with art, with love and in the religious life. The latter presupposes the encounter with divinity in such a way that everything around fades away - even self-perception:

and the happiness, after softly embracing me, suddenly changes its tactics, becomes hard, jumps, falls on me like some avalanches that – antigravitationally – raise me; then, again, proceeds otherwise: sweetly, it rocks me – then finally, unsparingly, it replaces me. I am no more. I still am, but I don’t recognize myself<sup>32</sup>.

Nonetheless, it is not only the intensity that makes these feelings of exacerbated joy the object of happiness. For Tatarkiewicz, there is something more, and he explains his hypothesis relying upon the ancient ideas of the theologians who described the happiness in heaven as not more intense than the earthly, but more “extensive”<sup>33</sup>, in a sense that it is totalizing, it affects the whole universe of the individual, it “embraces” him, it “raises” him to haven, it “replaces” him, in Steinhardt’s words. According to Tatarkiewicz, the psychological notion of happiness has two hypostases - delight or relief<sup>34</sup>. Delight insofar as it is characterized by “mental intensity and excitement”<sup>35</sup>, making the subject experience something as a “madness of joy”<sup>36</sup>, and relief

---

<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 103.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>33</sup> Władysław Tatarkiewicz, *Op. cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibidem*.

in the sense that it produces an “overwhelming bliss”<sup>37</sup> and it is characterized by a “complete state of relaxation”<sup>38</sup>.

In the case of Nicolae Steinhardt’s experience, both situations emerge. When he writes: “I soak my so-called pillow with the sweet warm tears of happiness”<sup>39</sup> or “The world is different for the devoted believer overwhelmed with happiness - rich, new, inviting, captivating, euphoric - just like for an artist in moments of inspiration”<sup>40</sup>, he finds himself under the empire of deep, ardent, euphoric and exhilarating delight. On the other hand, when he states: “I went into prison blind [...] and I go out with my eyes open; I came in spoiled and pampered and I go out healed of vanity, airs, whims; I came in dissatisfied and I go out knowing true happiness”<sup>41</sup> he refers to a calm, deep, quiet, and comforting happiness that alleviates the old sufferings.

Last but not least, in Steinhardt’s experience it becomes clear the relationship between happiness and pain or suffering. Despite the uplifting experience caused by the sacrament of baptism, happiness does not nullify suffering, just as the suffering of the daily life in prison does not nullify the experience of happiness. Thus, the author writes: “The moments of suffering we experience, just like those of pleasure - if they are given to us - we experience as absolute time, out of temporality”<sup>42</sup>. Suffering, just like happiness, is a complete and radical feeling, without physical or mental frontiers. Tatarkiewicz points out that usually, human beings capable of great happiness are also the ones capable of great suffering<sup>43</sup>; the ability to experience strong feelings is not limited to those of a positive nature. Moreover, not only do happiness and suffering not cancel each other out, but they can be mutually reinforcing. For Tatarkiewicz, “when suffering turns into joy, then it merges

---

<sup>37</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>39</sup> Nicolae Steinhardt, *Op. cit.*, p. 42.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 336.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 316.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 223.

<sup>43</sup> Władysław Tatarkiewicz, *Op. cit.*, p. 73.



with it and becomes a positive component as a whole"<sup>44</sup>, which is confirmed by Steinhardt, for whom the misery of cell 34 merges with the exaltation of baptism, and "everything, including pain, turns into happiness"<sup>45</sup>.

It is clear that suffering is a part of human life, it is closely linked to one's fate. For Arthur Schopenhauer, the cause of suffering is nothing else but "an incongruity between our desires and the course of the world"<sup>46</sup> and, at the same time, suffering is closely linked to the very meaning of the human existence: "Thus the profound and serious significance of our existence hangs over the farce and the endless miseries of human life, and never leaves it for a moment"<sup>47</sup>. We can, therefore, connect the notions of suffering, happiness and meaning of life, insofar as suffering is, without a doubt, a component of life which has the power to enhance happiness and also reveal the meaning of an existence. For Nicolae Steinhardt, suffering is inextricably intertwined with happiness and has a purpose, he confesses, it contributes to give life a meaning: "I am overwhelmed by the belief that suffering has a meaning, that our lives cannot be meaningless"<sup>48</sup>.

### **Viktor Frankl and the discovery of the meaning of life in a concentration camp**

Viktor Frankl is "a survivor of one of the most appalling hells ever devised for human degradation and torment"<sup>49</sup> and he also argues that suffering is meaningful, insofar as the human being's response to the encounter

---

<sup>44</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 74.

<sup>45</sup> Nicolae Steinhardt, *Op. cit.*, p. 41.

<sup>46</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation. Volume II*, Dover Publications, Inc., New York, 1966, p. 158.

<sup>47</sup> Idem, *The World as Will and Representation. Volume III*, Project Gutenberg Ebook, London, 1909, p. 229.

<sup>48</sup> Nicolae Steinhardt, *Op. cit.*, p. 101.

<sup>49</sup> James Woelfel, "Viktor Frankl on Freedom and Responsibility in the Death Camps: A Critique", *Journal of Social Philosophy*, Volume 13, Issue 3, 1982, p. 16.

with suffering is decisive for the course of his life. If Nicolae Steinhardt experienced prison life as a political prisoner, Frankl knew the horrors of the Auschwitz concentration camp, from the perspective of the Jew deported with barbarism in one of the “death camps”. He was convinced that life “is potentially meaningful under any conditions, even those which are most miserable”<sup>50</sup>. On the other hand, if Tatarkiewicz observes the totalizing character of happiness, Frankl notes this aspect in relation to suffering: “suffering completely fills the human soul and conscious mind, no matter whether the suffering is great or little. Therefore the size of human suffering is absolutely relative”<sup>51</sup>, he explains. Happiness and suffering seem to have the same, or at least a very similar, nature. For Frankl, suffering is “an ineradicable part of life”<sup>52</sup> and “if there is a meaning in life at all, then there must be a meaning in suffering”<sup>53</sup>.

At the same time, the human being is gifted with inner freedom, and while the outer freedom can be easily lost, the inner liberty can be preserved - and it is important to be preserved - even when the outer freedom is taken. Viktor Frankl uses this hypothesis for arguing his opinion regarding the meaning of life: “It is this spiritual freedom - which cannot be taken away - that makes life meaningful and purposeful”<sup>54</sup>. Imprisonment robs the individual of his external freedom, but the human being still has access to happiness and meaning, precisely because the inner freedom cannot be taken away from him. Regardless of the terrible suffering, the human being is confronted with a choice, Frankl believes: the choice of becoming worthy of his own suffering, in Dostoevsky’s terms, carrying his cross with dignity and remain “brave, dignified and unselfish”<sup>55</sup> or, on the contrary, “forget his human

---

<sup>50</sup> Viktor E. Frankl, *Op. cit.*, p. 139.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 55.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 76.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 75-76.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 76.

dignity and become no more than an animal”<sup>56</sup> who fights for his survival. At the same time, every human life is unique and cannot be compared with any other, Frankl thinks, but all lives have in common the fact that they must find their “why”, their meaning, their purpose, in order to endure the “how” of the world, the misery, the difficulties, and the torment. The lesson of Viktor Frankl, as that of Nicolae Steinhardt, is that a high purpose makes suffering not only acceptable, but also a mean for happiness and meaning in life: “hidden opportunities for achievement”<sup>57</sup> lie in suffering.

Furthermore, when life has a powerful “why”, it cannot lose it, regardless of the external conditions, a fact confirmed by both Steinhardt and Frankl. Understanding the human condition, its limitations, and the importance of finding meaning in life are just some of the lessons we learn from reading Frankl’s book, *Man’s Search for Meaning*: “human life, under any circumstances, never ceases to have a meaning, and this infinite meaning of life includes suffering and dying, privation and death”<sup>58</sup>. Therefore, human life has intrinsic value and meaning not in spite of suffering, pain or death, but because of them, because of the rise above the human misery and the understanding that “suffering has a meaning”, as Steinhardt argued. In Husserl’s terms, it doesn’t even matter if life has a meaning in itself or not; what really matters is the way in which the human being reacts and behaves in the “world that is unpredictable”<sup>59</sup> and in which there is rational calculation, but also coincidence and chance (*Zufall*), as well as destiny and fate (*Schicksal*)<sup>60</sup>.

---

<sup>56</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 88.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 90.

<sup>59</sup> “Die Welt ist unberechenbar” (Edmund Husserl, *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie: Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instinkte, Metaphysik, Späte Ethik*, Husserliana XLII, herausgegeben von Rochus Sowa und Thoms Vongehr, Springer, Dordrecht, 2013, p. 286).

<sup>60</sup> *Ibidem*.

## Conclusions

Both Nicolae Steinhardt and Viktor Frankl question their very existence and as Alexandru Dragomir would say, they are serious about trying to figure out what their lives are about and how to live authentically and non-contradictory<sup>61</sup>. They remain stately in the face of the awful injustice and take their lives “seriously” and for these reasons, they don’t lose neither the meaning nor the possibilities of happiness. This is what Frankl had in mind when he wrote that “man is even ready to suffer, on the condition, to be sure, that his suffering has a meaning”<sup>62</sup>. For Viktor Frankl, suffering leads, as he confesses, to evolution and growth, but this does not mean that the human being should seek suffering or pain on purpose. On the contrary, what Frankl argues is that “meaning is available in spite of suffering” or even “through suffering”<sup>63</sup>. At the same time, Frankl believes that when an individual finds a meaning in his life, not only he will be happy, but he will also have the ability to cope with suffering. In Paul Ricoeur’s terms, we could argue that Steinhardt and Frankl “mediate” the relationship between happiness and suffering through *phrónēsis* or practical wisdom. Ricoeur believes that there is not an “absolute contradiction” between happiness and suffering, and the practice of „lying” the dying patients at the end of their lives in order not to make them suffer is just a misconception regarding the relation between happiness and suffer<sup>64</sup>. Through sorrow, Nicolae Steinhardt is able to feel genuine and sincere happiness in the middle of the hell, because the encounter with God through baptism, illustrated in his *Diary of Happiness* so vivid, passionate, and almost theatrical, despite the tragedy of the scene, gives his life a higher meaning.

---

<sup>61</sup> Alexandru Dragomir, *O teză de doctorat la Dumnezeu. Exerciții de gândire*, Humanitas, București, 2016, pp. 68-69.

<sup>62</sup> Viktor E. Frankl, *Op. cit.*, p. 117.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 148.

<sup>64</sup> Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, translated by Kathleen Blamey, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992, p. 269.

Jan Patočka thought that life needs to be understood “not from the viewpoint of the *day*, of life merely accepted, but also from the view of strife, of the night, of *polemos*”<sup>65</sup> and likewise seem to believe Steinhardt and Frankl. In Tatarkiewicz’s words, we can argue that both Steinhardt and Frankl “treat” suffering as a “sacrifice” and as a “blessing”<sup>66</sup> and through this, they both gain their “right” to happiness and meaning.

## REFERENCES

1. Barel E., Van Ijzendoorn M. H., Sagi-Schwartz A., Bakermans-Kranenburg M, J., “Surviving the Holocaust: A Meta-Analysis of the Long-Term Sequelae of a Genocide”, *Psychological Bulletin*, Volume 136, Issue 5, 2010, pp. 677-698.
2. Bentham, J., *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 2000.
3. Brooks S. K., Greenberg N., “Psychological impact of being wrongfully accused of crime offences: A systematic literature review”, *Medicine, Science and the Law*, Volume 61, Issue 1, 2021, pp. 44-54.
4. Camus A., „Le Désert”, *Noces suivi de L’été*, Gallimard, Paris, 1959.
5. Dragomir A., *O teză de doctorat la Dumnezeu. Exerciții de gândire*, Humanitas, București, 2016.
6. Drake D. H., Drake S., Earle R., “Prison Life, Sociology of: Recent Perspectives from the United Kingdom”, in James D. Wright (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, Second Edition, Volume 18, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2015, pp. 924-929.
7. Frankl V. E., *Man’s Search for Meaning. An introduction to logotherapy*, Beacon Press, USA, 1992.

---

<sup>65</sup> Jan Patočka, *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History*, translated from Czech edition by Erazim Kohák, Open Court, Chicago, 1996, p. 44.

<sup>66</sup> Władysław Tatarkiewicz, *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

8. Husserl, E., *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie: Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instinkte, Metaphysik, Späte Ethik*, Husserliana XLII, herausgegeben von Rochus Sowa und Thoms Vongehr, Springer, Dordrecht, 2013.
9. Levinas E., *Entre nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other*, translated from the French by Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998.
10. Marcel G., *Homo Viator. Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope*, translated by Emma Craufurd, Camelot Press, London, 1951.
11. Mill J. S., *Utilitarianism*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 2001.
12. Patočka J., *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History*, translated from Czech edition by Erazim Kohák, Open Court, Chicago, 1996.
13. Ricoeur, P., *Oneself as Another*, translated by Kethleen Blamey, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992.
14. Schopenhauer A., *The World as Will and Representation. Volume II*, Dover Publications, Inc., New York, 1966.
15. Schopenhauer A., *The World as Will and Representation. Volume III*, Project Gutenberg Ebook, London, 1909.
16. Steinhardt N., *Jurnalul fericirii*, Editura Mănăstirii Rohia, Rohia, 2005.
17. Sykes G. M., *The society of captives: a study of a maximum security prison*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1958.
18. Tatarkiewicz W., *Despre fericire*, traducere din limba polonă de Constantin Geambașu, Eikon, București, 2019.
19. Woelfel J., "Viktor Frankl on Freedom and Responsibility in the Death Camps: A Critique", *Journal of Social Philosophy*, Volume 13, Issue 3, 1982, pp. 16-30.
20. Yu L., Gambaro M., Komoski M. C., Song M., Song J., Teslik M., Wollner B., Enright R., „The Silent Injustices against Men in Maximum Security Prison and the Need for Forgiveness Therapy: Two Case Studies”, *Journal of Forensic Psychology*, Volume 3, Issue 2, 2018, pp. 1-5.