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THE REGIME OF NETWORK-COMUNICATION AND THE PROBLEM OF EXPRESSION

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ABSTRACT. The major debate within A.I. theory at the end of the 20th century, on whether or not developing a computer with self-consciousness was feasible, was interjected by the philosopher John Searle, who aimed to abolish the idea entirely. His attack, making the case from a typical Cartesian perspective that aims to maintain a separated realm of subjective intentionality, falls however short, as he himself already accepts the underlying communicational paradigm of the information age, which renders obsolete his separation between an intentional subject and his outer linguistic expressions. This debate itself reveals the paradigm shift within 20th century communication theory, in which the gradual destabilization of unitary human subjectivity gives way to the network paradigm of communication, in which the intentional transfer of information is replaced by algorithmic rules of network relations, and the power-structure of social relations. In the following paper I will attempt to trace this shift and its potential breaking points towards a new paradigm, using Deleuzian theory to analyse the current state of communication.

Keywords*: communication, Deleuze, delirium, expression, network.*

The Diagrams of Informatics – Language as a Network of Algorithms

Anglo-Saxon philosophy accidentally offers us a profound intuition on communication, in the form of Searle's debate with the strong AI theorists. Answering to artificial intelligence theories in the matter of the Turing Test, John Searle conceives the mental experiment of the Chinese Room: imagine, if you will, that we are in a room where we have at our disposal various books of Chinese symbols, a language we ourselves do not know, and rulebook, written in our native language, which we can use to order the symbols in strings that (without us knowing it) constitute meaningful statements in Chinese. Let us then assume that we receive, from outside the room, written messages in Chinese, which we respond to, with the help of the rulebook, with added replies – from the person interacting

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with the entire device of the Chinese Room, we ourselves seem fluent speakers of the language, without us understanding anything we have done through our operations of symbolic manipulation[2]. What Searle tries to explain is that the algorithmic take on communication reduces language to syntax, eliminating the signified content, which for him means reducing the mental state correlate of a state of affairs to a syntactical variable.

In the debate on the idea of the Turing Test which Searle launches, we find in fact the confrontation of two perspectives on communication: one algorithmic, the other intentional. What these iterations of both theories assume however, as an implicit hypothesis, is that, in principle, all human communication can be understood as a vast set of algorithms which cover all (or at least the vast majority of) communicational situations, algorithms that can produce, whether employed by the human brain or a calculating machine, statements in such a matter that a sufficiently specialized software cannot be distinguished from a self-conscious human subject, capable of intentionality. Searle's objection does not address the validity of this hypothesis itself, but simply the hypothesis that such an artificial intelligence can be justly called „intelligent" in absence of intentionality, and in general to the assumption that, with the right calculating capacity and set of algorithms, any hardware can generate a mind in the same way that the human brain does (a central assumption for strong A.I. theory).

The dualism that Searle proposes between symbolic syntax and semantical content attempts, without it explicitly putting the problem in these terms, to save an older paradigm of communication: that of the transfer of sense, of mental content, between sender and receiver, through symbolic intermediation. Thus he would claim that in the absence of intentional content there is no language as such, because there is no mind that can conceive it as such. What A.I. theory implicitly assumes, through the very idea of the Turing Test, is that intentionality is redundant in relation to the symbolic. A computer could very well integrate all intentional content through additional symbolic variables and algorithmic sequences. The algorithms for the word „tree" for example, could cover not only the situations in shich this word can be used in a meaningful way, but also the parameters through which an object can be identified as such, and references to any number of additional algorithms that can make the machine's external components interact with the object in the proper situations. The challenge of informational sciences is thus to decompose intentional content at the level of symbolic syntax.

[2] Searle John. *Minds, Brains and Science*. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1984. p. 32-34

Because of this, programing languages are always frustrating to mind-body dualisms they persevere in a semiotic cycle, in which no symbol can be properly fixed upon the surface of intentional content, to which it can refer regardless of any other symbols. The break of the symbolic chain by the insertion of an element that could break the flow, and draw lines of flight, is no longer possible. We are left with the diagram of the Boolean decision tree, supported by bipolar transistors – a continuous articulation between algorithmic steps that closes the circuit in a vast loop. What appears as contingent in this system is the received content and the output effects, which are mere epiphenomena produced when external assemblages come into contact with the surface of the series of binary values that can or cannot satisfy an algorithmic sequence. The precision of the receiving apparatus and the efficiency of the emitting apparatus – in other words, the functionality of the interface – is a problem outside the semiotic system.

The syntax-content dualism is thus first reversed, as content becomes a matter of external contingency, and then eliminated: as far as the device interacts with its exterior, it does so by segmenting this exterior on multiple axes of variables, and by integrating these segments in a vast algorithmic network: the whole world is decoded and then recoded on a single plane of equivalence. Images are thus segmented into juxtapositions of pixels and recoded onto variable sets of colours, depth etc., the commands within a certain line of programming code are segmented into operational sequences and recoded as decisional graphs, the objects of economic analysis are segmented into sequences of production and consumption and recoded onto the monetary mass and so on.

All these axes themselves are then segmented into sets of variables that are recoded onto the octets that constitute the „atoms" of the information mass. In the opposite direction, these atomic units, in fact bifurcations which either stop (0) or allow (1) the flow of electrical current, constitute the circuit switches that give the electrical current its shape, that territorialise it, sequences which then operate themselves as circuit switches that outline the shape of the overall calculation within the algorithm.

This atomism is not in itself an essential characteristic of the system[3], but merely the effect of a minimum threshold at which the device can register data and code it. What is essential to the system is the logic of equivalence, which does the bulk of the work, as it reduces each quality to a variable, and assigns values to that variable. The imperative here is to overcome any surplus, any ontological complexity which would interfere with the informational structure: as long as different qualia return the same result in a certain function, they can be equated to the same value.

[3] Though, because of the fact that it cannot be technically overcome, it will come to characterise the limitations of the system

This value will constitute information for us, it will draw the decisional sequence for the string of algorithmic trees, and it will lead the electrical current through the circuitry of the processor (three effects of the same process, contained however immanently within its unfolding).

What's left at the end of Searle's structure, after this massive transcribing, is the singular psycho-somatic process which manifests itself when the thin film of the psyche interposes itself, as a plane of correspondence, between words and things. Here comes the divergence: Searle's position also assumes a similar operation of equivalence which produces information, but only in this case does communication, in the traditional sense, occur. Psychic experience is coded onto information, values which reference words, which are decoded afterwards into references to the psychic life of the receiver.

We find nothing of the sort in informatics. Here we only have one ontological register: a line of articulation between the network of circuit switches, an electrical flux's trajectory through the bifurcations of the transistors. A value will thus come to represent the shape of a certain segment of this line between circuit switches, with more ample processes being composed of longer circuits. Nothing is coded or decoded, there is no communication between signifying structures, but merely an articulation of circuit nodes.

This model has two important features. First the course of the flux which, in effect, articulates the network has a precursor, a certain situation of the nodes in certain position, which the flux must only close by connecting and articulating it, thus situating the completed network: from the moment a certain calculation starts in a particular node, it must cross a specific trajectory (with potential errors of course), which is not contained as a necessary determination either in the starting point (the input data), or in the sequences that orient the calculation process, but it their being situated together in a certain way.

Consequently, information is merely the relaying of this situation from its final accumulation point – we cannot say that there is any coding or decoding in any network node, as if the information would pass through stages of production. Information only exists as such within a closed circuit, as the terminal position of a particular configuration. Secondly, any connection of an external assemblage to the circuit cannot affect its results, except by introducing data in the receiving nodes (by operating as an input device), or by interfering with the circuit structure, dislocating it.

The Regime of Network-Communication – Language as a Social Game

We have only taken two theoretical steps: stating an obvious fact (the algorithmic nature of language within the analytical paradigm) and explicating this self-evident fact. Nonetheless we are far from Searle and the intentionally-charged

language of late Cartesianism. Admitting that our daily language is not (at least up to a degree of analytical finesse) anything other than a repository of all situational algorithms which linguistical interactions can presuppose, we face the problem of what exactly remains intact of the model of communication as the transfer of intentional content through the medium of signs.

The fact that in this situation, the mental content behind the message is put on the same playing field as units of language, leads us on the one hand to the possibility of conveying the totality of extra-linguistic processes through algorithmic structures, integrating them in the same networks with the utterances of language (the end-goal of cognitive science), and on the other hand to a strongly materialistic linguistics, in which the material aspects of the signs of language (the acoustic waves of the phonetic material, the written signs etc.) have an equal ontological status to that of the signified content – the consequence being that the signs of language interact with other objects in the world on ontologically equal-footing, an idea already long established, reinforced by Austin's work on „performative utterances"[4].

The idea that the signs used in communication can intervene in the causal chain in themselves, and not simply as mediators of the signified content, further undermines the image of the Cartesian mind, as an inexhaustible reservoir of intentionality which distinguishes the human brain from a sophisticated software. We are not attempting here, of course, to transpose a Boolean order over the world. Words, gestures, and so on, enter into common assemblages with human bodies and with the objects of the world, they are *situated* together in a certain way, and operated by a set of rules that prescribe their interaction – „the speaking of language is part of an activity or a form of life"[5]. The algorithm is nothing but a diagram of sequences that attempts to trace language game, it belongs to a paradigm of describing language, similar in this regard to the paradigm of the autonomous sender/receiver.

The usefulness of this way of looking at communication consists in the fact that it accentuates the functional value of each sign within the algorithm. Subjectivity is no longer the pole that draws with it the strings of communication, while holding beneath itself an obscure pool in which a message gets submerged, so that another may surface. The subject can only be detected in certain sequences, but only as subjectivity in general, as an algorithmic function. This in turn reveals in full view the social nature of communicational relations, and the social structuring of reality itself, through the sign-intermediation of the relationships between objects.

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[4] Austin, J.L. *Philosophical Papers*. Oxford University Press. Londra. 1970. p. 233-252

[5] Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*. tras. by Anscombe, G.E.M. Basil Blackwell. Oxford. 1986. p. 11

> „The language-function thus defined is neither informational nor communicational; it has to do neither with signifying information nor with intersubjective communication. And it is useless to abstract a significance outside information, or a subjectivity outside communication. For the subjectification proceedings and movement of significance relate to regimes of signs, or collective assemblages. The language-function is the transmission of order-words, and order-words relate to assemblages, just as assemblages relate to the incorporeal transformations constituting the variables of the function."[6]

What the shift from the paradigm of clear demarcation lines between emitting subject, the message and the receiving subject (the paradigm of communication as information transfer), to the paradigm of the situational network, an assemblage of material signs, bodies and objects, traversed by rules of social language games (the paradigm of communication as relationing)[7], accomplishes is the construction of a particular regime of communication, network-communication, which structures the social world. The autonomous subject is traversed and decomposed by sequences of code from every possible direction, he is no longer the neutral and monadic sender/ receiver, but assumes instead a series of social roles to which he is prescribed rules of socio-linguistical interactions:

> „In the course of a single day, an individual repeatedly passes from language to language. He successively speaks as "father to son" and as a boss; to his lover, he speaks an infantilized language; while sleeping he is plunged into an oneiric discourse, then abruptly returns to a professional language when the telephone rings. "[8]

This way of understanding language presumes crossing into a different regime of social life – the regime of network-communication does not merely propose a certain perspective on language, interchangeable with any other, but represents a series of theoretical coordinates of a historic change within the functioning of the social world. By destabilizing the communicational pole of the subject, and proposing in its stead a regulated network of social interactions through the mediation of algorithmic language-games, the regime of network-communication gradually dissolves the position of the subject of enunciation. By repeated cuts, the subject within the *cogito, ergo sum* of Descartes, suddenly finds itself to be a subject of the statement, a surface effect of grammar. Individual and collective subjectivities are thus born as effervescent points on the surface of the social network. A subject is a *finite mode*[9] *of situation* for its elements,

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[6] Deleuze, Gilles; Guattari, Felix. *A Thousand Plateaus*. *Capitalism and schizophrenia 2.* tras. Massumi, Brian. University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis. 1987. p. 85

[7] Codoban, Aurel. *Imperiul Comunicării. Corp, Imagine și Relaționare*. Idea Design&Print. Cluj-Napoca. 2011. p. 45-48

[8] Deleuze, Gilles; Guattari, Felix. *Ibidem* p. 94

[9] In the Spinozian sense of the concept – "By mode I mean the affections of substance, that is, that which is in something else and is conceived through something else" (Ethics, I,d5), see Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics, in *Completed Works* (p.213-382). Hackett Publishing Company. Indianapolis. 2002. p. 217

but, at the same time, the fluxes that push these elements towards the subject-mode of situation already foreshadow the subject, which floats as a force vector at the vantage point of these fluxes, at their cutting-edge (ensuring the effectiveness of the process of capturing the elements of the future subject as they come into form), then operating as the force that hold these elements situated together. We can find more thorough analysis of this in Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*, where he describes the process of subjectivation in depth[10], as well as his work with Guattari on the subjectivity of the celibate machine, which is diffuse, clotting together only in the points where a desiring-machine produces libidinal consumption (Voluptas) and traveling alongside this productive flow[11].

Insofar as our current discussion goes, it is sufficient to remark the incorporeal status of this subjectivity, placed in a feedback loop with the assemblage that generates it, and that it in turn generates – incorporeal because it does not effectively become embodied in any of its elements, and thus does not become a subject of enunciation. For example, although we may identify, within a series of images, the social status of an individual (through the commodities with which he individualises his body), this type of subjectivity no longer has a privileged form in which it can embody – the body and commodities' common mode of situating are a *presentation* of the subjectivity which gathers them together, and not an *incarnation*. Here we can see clearly the dynamic character of capitalism, per Marx's description, which brings out the contingent core in every old essence.

All signs operate in a similar manner – they do not *incarnate* onto any one instantiation (*lemon* is never this or that lemon), but rather *present* themselves through each of their instantiations (be it the graphical sign or phonetic utterance, the image or symbol that stands for the object, or the object itself). A sign already contains a mode of situating matter, which puts us, as subjects introduced into language, into a relationship with the material object thus constituted, while at the same time establishing the rules by which this relationship will function. A sign situates matter in a certain mode by establishing how we should relate to that particular compositum of matter, thus producing the elements of its object, and how we should relate to the object, thus becoming subjects of that object, the subjects of that specific statement, as well as establishing the rules by which that statement will take form – it constitutes the common situation of a subject and object as a statement with its particular grammar. The sign thus generates an assemblage, not

[10] Deleuze, Gilles. *Difference and Repetition*. Trans. Patton, Paul. Columbia University Press. New York. 1994. p. 70-128

[11] Deleuze, Gilles; Guattari, Felix. *AntiOedipus*. *Capitalism and Schizophrenia I.* Trans. Hurley, Robert; Seem, Mark and Lane, Helen R.. University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis. 2000. p. 16-21

through the signifying matter itself, which is already part of the assemblage, but as an incorporeal accumulation point, that unfolds the assemblage around it, that situates it together.

These signs do not operate as transcendental universalities – in the regime of network-communication the transcendental Subject which can utter such signs is absent, there is no God that can cast judgement. Each sign is thus a singular sign, placed however in relation with every other singular sign, all of them traversed by the forces of a trans-subjective, trans-situational grammar. Signs carry power, they operate as order-words[12]. We constantly have concentrations of power in the social world, be they local or global, passing or entrenched, despite the diffuse nature of the network we constantly see the formation of assemblages of power relations (what Foucault would call an apparatus). The explicit contingent and temporary nature of the new network of signs doesn't change in any way the workings of power through it – we can still say that "we give children language, pens, and notebooks as we give workers shovels and pickaxes."[13]

What is inherently oppressive in this system is its capacity to capture any new modes of enunciation. The enthusiastic apologists of the online medium for example, who foresaw new revolutionary potentialities for communication within the world wide web, did not even get a chance to discuss their predictions and analysis at length before these new instruments and idioms were greeted with open arms by the circuits of capital and mainstream communication. As the network-regime extends its reach to a global scale, global flows require local integrated structures to propagate, and these local assemblages require global flows to fuel them. In the end the interdependency of all assemblages draws a reactive-plane that circles the world, constituting the baseline off of which all network nodes emerge, which allows it to capture the new and integrate it into the dominant regime.

There are always errors, blockages and crises in the functioning of this regime , of course, but, just as information science and computer engineering have solved the issues with their networks, by developing algorithms which foresee and avert crises, and by integrating small errors in the normal functioning of the machine, so too do the science of economy and governance hope that, in the long term, their technical progress can consolidate a stable system, in which the myriad errors are already statistically accounted for, and the crises predictable and easily avoided. However this yearning to do away with history ends up clashing with the Real, because, while versatile and omnipresent, the regime of network-communication

[12] Deleuze, Gilles; Guattari, Felix. *A Thousand Plateaus*. p. 76ff.
[13] *Ibidem* p. 76

itself does not provide a place for the real. Anything given under a sign has already supressed, through the unity and self-identity of the sign, the discontinuity and self-difference of the Real.

The formulations of statistics and functions try to cover these deficiencies, but they themselves are reintegrated into the order of network-communication – we need only see the way in which any socio-economic statistic is reduced to the logic of identity by the majority force operating within society. These types of expressions are already the pre-signs of a different communicational paradigm. The irony is that the very resilience to change that the regime of network-communication exhibits, sabotages its chances of reconciliation with the manifestations of the Real. Between signs, outside and inside them, the Real produces (itself) unwaveringly, in an infinitely richer abundance than anything the regime of network-communication, even with its pretence of universal expansion, can hope to cover. To get a glimpse of where this regime starts cracking, we will focus on the slips in the normal functioning of its signs, following these breaches towards what hopefully will constitute a new form of expression.

The Problem of Expression – Language as a Means of Production

In the *plateau* on faciality, Deleuze&Guattari claim, from the very beginning, that "significance is never without a white wall upon which it inscribes its signs and redundancies" and that "subjectification is never without a black hole in which it ledges its consciousness, passion and redundancies"[14]. From here on they will analyse faciality as a "white wall/black hole system", "a chalk face with eyes cut in for a black hole"[15], taking up schizo-analysis in relation to the problem of effacement.

What they obtain is a mixed semiotics: on the one hand the modulations on the surface of the skin, on the other the processes of subjectification that operate beneath the depth of the eyes. They cannot be properly reduced to a single system of signification: outside the subject we still find gestures, an entire phenotechnical use of the head (which should not be confused with the face) – the fixed eyes, tilted ears, exposed fangs and so on.

At the same time we can draw the diagrams of subjective structures, and correlate them with a general grammar, without taking into account concrete acts of significance, except as accidental, contingent to grammar (the generative grammar

[14] *Ibidem* p. 167
[15] *Ibidem*

of Chomsky can be taken in this direction – even more so if we seek its fundamentals in evolutionary psychology, which reduces phenotype to an epiphenomenon of the genetic code).

Both systems work properly, without signifying anything: the interactions of animals remain problems of ethology, and not semiotics (there are two bodies situated together in a territory – but not two subjects), and the form of the signifier remains indeterminate without it being expressed in gestures and words. The modulation of matter into recognizable forms – its transformation into signifiers – takes place only when it is traversed by a subjectifying apparatus, and conversely, the structures of subjectivity are only concretely subjectified within the modulations of signs. We thus have subjective structure operating from the level of black holes, twisting the white wall, grabbing it from all sides and modelling it.

We can proceed even further, with some caution. The wall is not necessarily the surface of the skin, but can also be the surface of an utterance, or of writing. In the case of speech, between different words and their phonetic units, we have repeated drops into silence, not even a moment long, which nonetheless clearly punctuate the phonetic flow with small local variations.

We cannot however speak of discontinuity, except at the level of discourse, of the signifying chain, which is thus submerged into a wall of continuous sound: when we're in a public space, there is a barrage of voices, music, engines, honking horns, cups chinking, when we're in an intimate setting, we're still surrounded by the sounds of breathing, the rattle of old appliances, water running through the pipework, and from somewhere outside the distant roar of a vehicle, a bird chirping or rain dripping – even the most profound silence produces a phonetic effect.

In these plunges back into the wall of sound, the subject is registered, producing similar effects as in the case of faciality: it distances or narrows the gaps between sounds, it affects tonalities, thickens or thins consonants, lengthens or shortens vowels etc. All of these points to a composed plane of the subjectified discourse where we can unravel intentions, be moved by affects and from whence we can be traversed by power.

In the case of writing, things get slightly more complicated. Here the space between words, letters and inside the letters can certainly produce effects, but these can also be taken as the effects of the letters black cut on the white sheet of paper, the traces of ink produce on the surface of the paper the specific determinate shapes of the letters: their font, the distance between them, underlines, bolding, punctuation effects etc. Still the letters themselves are conventional ready-made objects, and no matter how much they're disfigured (here we could only invoke the experiments of Dada, or the hypergraphism of Isidore Isou), they seem to be stretched, squeezed, twisted, decomposed or spread out by a foreign machine. What happened to the black holes?

This problem has already existed, but only the lack of an immediate presence of the author in the case of writing reveals it clearly. Even if the holes in the face (pupils, nostrils, mouth) seem to pull the surface of the face with them, they are in no smaller measure determined by the skin that draws their frontier. Even by erasing them we could still conceive of an expressive smooth face folding in on itself. Properly speaking, they are both determined by a regime of faciality that does not however precede them (much in the same way that the origin of language does not precede actual spoken language, or in the way capital does not precede modern relations of production), but that both the white wall and the black hole take to be their fundamental presupposition, as a precondition that lifts the white wall as film above the animal head, and that pushes into the depth of the black hole until it creates a space for subjectivity.

This face that falls over the head, and constitutes itself as its signifying surface, individuating it, registering its subjectivity in its gaps, does not produce a clear central point – or rather it produces an indeterminate mobile one. It could be fixed as a "third eye", a pure and pathological subjectivity that the logocentric traditions of the East and West obsess over, but usually it glides between the gaze, the gesture, the open mouth, temporarily hanging on to one or the other, as partial determinations, small bases of operations from where it launches the signifying effects of the face.

This mark of singularity traverses in the same way the phonetic body of speech, trying to modulate the rough sounds of the larynx, or to seek, in mid-fall between sounds, the next word. It is not a subject we are dealing with here – that comes afterwards, as a filter that blocks specific expressions; here we find ourselves in the realm of the a-subjective, where the absolute difference inherent in the Real of the sound speaks. Coming back to writing, things become clearer: here the concrete subject has retired, leaving behind only what the author function can produce within the text, and the modulations of the signifying matter depend all of a sudden on the gaze of the reader just as much as (or even more than) the graphic construction of the writing.

'What an incomprehensible text!', 'What pointless verbosity!', 'What an absurd person!' are all potential replies at the chance meeting of two irreconcilable registers. At the level of each of them, and between them, however works difference as the productive essence of things, which brings forth an actualization out of the virtual background that is codetermined by the difference of the written text, the situation of the text and the reader meeting and the openness towards this unexpected meeting (as goodwill, wonder, hostility, marvel, recoil under the guise of indifference or resignation etc.).

The written text best reveals all of these things, precisely because it suppresses to a certain degree the frame of intersubjectivity, which relentlessly constrains its subjects to the rigors of a collective assemblage of enunciation (we speak in a certain way in schools, at the police station, between friends, between boys or girls, and as a result we become students, teachers, witnesses, snitches, accused, parents, children etc.). In writing was fixed (by reconstitution) under the spatial domination of the specious present (as William James calls it[16]), is set free, and opens up to repeated elaborations, re-readings, different dispositions and events outside the text begin permeating it, it becomes criss-crossed by numerous assemblages to which the author or reader connect, and becomes a virtual surface instead of rigid actuality.

However we mustn't fool ourselves: this does not automatically make the text a more liberated medium of language, nor does it rob speech of its expressive means. Over numerous texts we have interpretations locking down, through them the same power relations that envelope the rest of the social field, and the practice of writing and reading always accumulates a number of stock-phrases and clichés, repetition automatisms, which try to suppress the essential difference of words, by reabsorbing them into their order-word forms, reducing them to their lowest productive capacity. Nonetheless, writing exhibits a certain resilience, due to the fact that signs persist in their inscribed forms onto the page, and no matter the attempts at capturing its sense, it never ceases to differentiate and to accumulate new material outside of it: even banned or burned, it takes up its suppression as a mark of distinction which the remaining copies in circulation will bear. Its simple material persistence allows it an ample duration in which the Real beneath it can properly express itself.

In speech things appear differently. Here words once spoken are already captured and contextualized, they trigger immediate reactions and spark their reply, they are hurried, snatched from their process of differentiation, and only the labour of memory can soften their rigidity. More automatisms than products of spontaneity, and covering up their silence everywhere, they represent, despite their appearance, an attempt to spatialize and territorialize pure difference, fixing it in a situation of network-communication (neobehaviorism owes its recent success in discourse analysis through relational frames, to this very fact[17]). Speech is much more the realm of symptomatology.

[16] James, William. *Writings 1878-1899*. Literary Classics of the United States. New York. 1992. p. 266

[17] Cf. Hayes, S.C.; Barnes-Holmes, D.; Roche, B. (Eds.). *Relational Frame Theory: A Post-Skinnerian account of human language and cognition*. Plenum Press. New York. 2001.

At the same time, speech allows us to detect a phenomenon which writing, as a fully completed block of text, only presents as a trace, namely the act of differentiation. Here the tension between the Deleuzian interpretation of the gap and its psychoanalytic sources reveals itself. Deleuze's thinking, sealed tight against any intrusion of negativity, does not interpret the gap between signifiers as a bottomless chasm, over which we are carried by a primal Signifier, situated above the discourse, but as an opening in the signifying matter towards the production (differentiation) of the next element in the signifying chain. This does not mean that a Signifier above the discourse, a Master-Signifier, doesn't intervene, but simply that its role is to establish what can and cannot be said, appearing thus as a conjugating machine, indicating what path we should pursue. An algorithmic Decider, or a social-game Arbiter, this Signifier is simply generated by the flows of power within the social field (which, as we've seen with the sign in general, presupposes the existence of this very Signifier).

Deleuze's interest naturally goes towards barring this Signifier and the subjectivity it generates, towards effacing faciality and jamming speech – in general, towards deepening the gap, the undetermination of the space beside us, which would thus permit the purely temporal developing of the process of difference. Things are similar when it comes to lack (*la manqué*). The limits of a discursive assemblage, its essential incompleteness, that push it outside itself to branch to ever newer elements, thus constituting the essence of desire, does not present itself in Deleuze's philosophy as lack (except in the sense that the end of a series of differentiation retrojects its incompletable openness back onto the entire series). Desire does indeed have at its core the unfinished status of any assemblage, but this incompleteness is entirely positive: the absolute difference that operates at the level of each being constantly produces differentiations, destabilizing any determination and producing a vast residue that will not have been actualized. As Lacan would put it, there is no absence at the level of the Real[18].

In the ready-made discourse, this process of differentiation only leaves traces, which can be located in the gaps within language, that thus present themselves not just as empty spaces in which the subject that gathers together the signifying chain can inscribe itself, but as openings in which a signifier can always appear (for example the layers of marginalia on old books, often belonging to different authors, driving the process of differentiation, while at the same time dislocating the author's position). Beyond their function of cutting signs out of senseless undifferentiated

[18] Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-55. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. Cambridge Unviersity Press. Cambridge. 1988. p.313

babble, the gaps in language bear at the same time (as cuts within cuts – „the cut of Apelles" – as Agamben calls them[19]) infinitesimally thin breaches, through which a new enunciation, a new being, a new differentiation can come forth.

At the end of each segment of the signifying chain we find an opening, a leap into the void, where difference awaits as a productive surface. The Deleuzian predilection for delirium and dissociation attempts to block the attempt of any order from filling the open speaking position. In a pinch, we experiment with what he have at hand (hence his appreciation for Dada or Burroughs). But the end goal requires caution and pragmatism, Deleuze not pursuing some symbolic anarchy, but precisely the creation of a breech, a silence large and receptive enough to give way to the new – suspending the current fixed arrangement of a situation, to *make* the time in which the new, that element of novelty that restructures our situation in an revolutionary way, can be produced.

The productive function of delirium[20] consists in forming new circuits, attempting to give the Real the right to express itself in the suspended signifying chain, undermining the algorithms and automatisms of a socio-discursive regime with the pretence of universality. The expressivity that characterizes the inventions of delirium consists in their active character: unlike the formulas typical of order-words, which (re)establish the social order in a given situation, the expressions of delirium irrupt within the situation and open it in its totality, extending their effects on the elements that are situated together. Delirium is of course the name of pathologies of the signifying chain, but it is at the same time the process of dissolution of an established context, that makes room for an expression of the Real, through an statement that operates at the maximum intensity of performativity – as a performative utterance that allows for the re-situation of the assemblage from within which we speak.

Beyond this lie the problems of pragmatics: how to ensure a productive silence? How to stop the re-capture of the new? How to dodge the pathologies of old language games? A question may arise as to how can linguistic expressions that surpass their socio-discursive regime appear[21], however this problem is easily

[19] Agamben, Giorgio. *The time that remains. A commentary on the Letter to the Romans*. Trans. Dailey, Patricia. Stanford University Press. Stanford. 2005. p. 49

[20] Deleuze and Guattari use the schizophrenic delirium as a prototype for all the productive activity of language, but the concept refers to a number of ways in which language is used, that are already established: the delirium of oral storytelling, the profetic delirium, the poetic delirium, the philsophical delirium placed at the very limits of our knowledge etc.

[21] But, as we've already established, there is no language that has not already mobilized, as an incorporeal mode of situation, all the material fluxes of its given situation.

solved, when considering that a delirium is always a collective productive process, reaching its maximum potential of expression in a future event, which retroactively changes all past instantiations to repetitions of a final event that has yet to arrive. Insofar as we struggle philosophically with these issues, perhaps the most important question for a philosophical pragmatic approach to delirium is what arises within silence and where does it lead us?

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