Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia

George Bondor, Dansul măștilor. Nietzsche și filosofia interpretării (The Dance of Masks. Nietzsche and the Philosophy of Interpretation), ed. a 2-a, reviz. (second edition, revised), Editura Spandugion, București, 2020

Vasile Cătălin BOBB — Tue, 30 Apr 2024 00:00:00 +0000

In the very first page of “Note on first edition” there is a remark not to be missed by a quick reading. The Dance of Masks. Nietzsche and the Philosophy of Interpretation is an extract or, in Bondor’s words, “the processing of the doctoral dissertation” called From Metaphisics to Hermeneutics. Fredrich Nietzsche. In other words, the philosophy of interpretation or the dance of masks is not only the “path” from metaphysics to hermeneutics but, to a certain extent, “the final point”. Of course, the leading figure that takes us on this journey with, I might add, in my eyes not in Bondor’s, no final destination is Fredrich Nietzsche. But, setting apart my one idiosyncrasies, we must see how George Bondor constructs the road, mediated by Nietzsche, from metaphysics to hermeneutics or, better yet, from metaphysics to interpretation (and, perhaps, we might also see what all these has to do with the “dance of masks”).

Knowledge, Opinion, Belief: The Dialectical Challenging

Ana BAZAC — Tue, 30 Apr 2024 00:00:00 +0000

This paper is written in the continental tradition – facing the analytic one – and advocates the knowledge first thesis, reviewing the entailment thesis (where believing is knowing, because to know entails to believe). It starts from the ancient distinction between knowledge and opinion and develops criteria for distinguishing knowledge, opinion and belief. The demonstration necessarily arrives to the kinds of beliefs and thus, to the relationships between knowledge and these kinds. While the distinction of kinds of beliefs leads to the understanding of why the knowledge belief problem did appear in epistemology, the analysis with this distinction is not rigid and can be approached dialectically. This standpoint is aiming at contributing to the debate of knowledge belief problem and to warmer relations between the continental and the analytic philosophy.

The Grammar of Faith. Ludwig Wittgenstein on Madness and Religious Faith

Attila M. DEMETER — Tue, 30 Apr 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Ludwig Wittgenstein repeatedly called religion and faith “madness”, “folly”, etc. However, this does not mean that he considered it irrational or meaningless. Rather, he saw in it a way of thinking and speaking, a “language-game”, that was not explicitly rational, but nevertheless meaningful, and in which there were “entirely different connections” than normal between individual statements. Nor can the language of faith be regarded as conventional, according to Wittgenstein, even if approached from the point of view of the nature of the statements it contains. If, for example, we think that theological statements are factual statements (as if they refer only to existing things or objects), then this language immediately becomes meaningless. The aim of my study is to analyze the “grammar” of this language (the language of faith or religion), using Wittgenstein’s notes from different times, paragraphs of his published works, comments made during university lectures, etc., and to describe the correct use of words in it.

Intentionality and Autonomy in Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Comprehensive Analysis of Conscious Decisions and the Transcendental Ego

Ioana A. GEOMOLEAN — Tue, 30 Apr 2024 00:00:00 +0000

This essay embarks on a thorough exploration of Edmund Husserl’s seminal contributions to the philosophical discourse on consciousness, with a particular focus on the dynamics of conscious decisions within the framework of phenomenology. By delving into Husserl’s nuanced examination of consciousness—its temporal structure, the nature of self-awareness, and the foundational concept of intentionality—the analysis reveals the intricate ways in which Husserl posits the transcendental ego as the nexus of meaning, judgment, and perception. The discussion illuminates how Husserl’s theory of intentionality and the intentional act’s matter and quality serve as the cornerstone for understanding the will’s engagement with the world. Through a detailed exposition of Husserl’s ideas on the phenomenological reduction, the essay articulates the active role of consciousness in constituting reality and the ethical dimensions underpinning the exercise of free will. The paper argues that Husserl’s insights into conscious decision-making challenge conventional views by framing free will within the contexts of knowledge, ethical deliberation, and the ego’s autonomy. This essay contributes to the ongoing dialogue between phenomenology and contemporary philosophy of mind by highlighting Husserl’s profound impact on our understanding of consciousness, agency, and the existential significance of human decisions.

Intralinguistic Motivation for Pluralism about Truth

Joseph ULATOWSKI — Tue, 30 Apr 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Critics of the scope problem that motivates pluralism about truth have argued that it is a pseudo-problem. If the criticism is correct, then truth pluralism is left unmotivated and potentially bankrupt. In this paper, I argue that closely related to the scope problem is another problem, which I call “the scalar problem.” If the property of truth is sensitive to how an agent expresses the truth predicate within a single linguistic discourse and different agents or groups of agents express truth differently within that discourse, then there are different ways of being true within the same linguistic discourse. Given this possibility, even if the scope problem fails, truth pluralism remains fully motivated.

Helmuth Plessner’s Philosophy of the Work of Art in Anthropological and Phenomenological Perspective

Jaroslava VYDROVÁ — Tue, 30 Apr 2024 00:00:00 +0000

This paper aims to explore the theme of art in Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology and show the possibilities of its use in the analysis of artistic creation and artwork. The article is divided into three parts: in the first part, it presents the background of Plessner’s anthropological project and the intersection of his philosophy with Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. This strategy enables the synergy of both approaches which can be used for reflection of art. The second part displays the scope and ingenuity of Plessner’s approach through a selection of texts where he addresses art. And finally, the third part delves into a functional elaboration of the anthropology of an artwork, specifically, using Max Beckmann as an example, into the question of anthropological foundations in art making, and the question of new form in art. For the latter question, I use the approach to architecture as an example relying on corporeality and Umwelt as guiding concepts. This analysis provides, on the one hand, description of anthropologically significant phenomena of artistic production of the first half of the twentieth century, and on the other hand, reveals functional determinations of corporeality, the world, and resonance with the world, the so-called equilibrium, which can be used to understand the artwork, and artistic production in the creation of a new form in art.