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STUDIA UBB EDITORIAL OFFICE: B.P. Hasdeu no. 51, 400371 Cluj-Napoca, Romania,
Phone + 40 264 405352, Email: office@studia.ubbcluj.ro

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ARGUMENT *MISFORMING UNIQUENESS*

NOEMINA CÂMPEAN, FLAVIU CÂMPEAN

Searching for a theme of the conference, we kept stumbling on the problem of the status of the individual, which seems to have been either lost along the way, or absorbed by more strenuous philosophical inquiries, pertaining to the eternal quest of linking the Universal to the Particular, the singular to plurality. Both Metaphysics and Late Modern Thought reinvented their philosophical or sometimes anti-philosophical bases, seeming to actually hold back on the ineffable actuality of the living individual. Still, Philosophy is always bordering on a real that cannot be represented or positively signified, but is effective as such and philosophers have coined different concepts in order to grasp its negativity, like Kierkegaard's unique – *den Enkelte*, Heidegger's *Dasein* or maybe even Derrida's *différance*, to name only these. But the option of our philosophical discourse was rather for forms, as well as that of Modern science and Epistemology that developed as a bundle of theories about/ of forms. And they are still doing it to some extent, as even nowadays science finds it hard to unleash from the forms that have guided and recreated it. The Medieval controversy on the unicity or plurality of forms and its outcome only strengthened this option; for instance, Thomas Aquinas's argument of the univocity of forms and of the intellectual soul that comprises every inferior form is clearly emphasizing the preeminence and the uniqueness of a substantial Form over the imperfect accidental forms that are closer to the body. Of course, we strongly believe there is no point in asking ourselves over and over about the *why* of this inherent philosophical choice, of going back through to the origins of Philosophy or to the Christian doctrines that shaped it. All the more so that many others who were more advised have already done it and lost the bet and sometimes themselves. Nor does the question stand on the side of the "how" – how did Western Philosophical Inquiry develop the *eidōs* and how the *eidōs* in its turn shaped into philosophical Systems, into an unavoidable formalism, due to which we ourselves have tried to approach the theme. We think, or rather we can take a guess, that the philosophical approach of the individual – in the broadest possible sense – should naturally lead not to some formlessness, but to a *misforming* (*Ungestalt* is an artistic concept) of

uniqueness, that we've gotten used to simply mention in a slightly Hegelian manner within the frame of a History of Philosophy, but that cannot appear otherwise. That would exclude the repetition of the Unique Form and of the Hierarchy through which it becomes real and actual; and also the back and forth between forms and uniqueness, from the uniqueness of forms to the forms of uniqueness, with which the philosophical discourse identifies. That would also imply an authentic deconstruction and an ethical position towards individual life in its indetermination, through which one could get close to whatever may be not only a *différance*, but the unique negativity as an event, even as a poetry language that gives way to the Unique individual whom Kierkegaard called forth. A deconstruction that Arts and in some ways Music have undergone farther, judging by their achievements. Maybe Physics and Mathematics as well... But in Philosophy, the ethical stance should always be actual and real, it involves gesture, *praxis* and an existential position outside philosophical consciousness and inquiry. That's why we think we need to re-approach this tension of forms and uniqueness by way of the *misformed* individual, starting with ourselves in an assumed manner, with our own views on what Formalism and forms mean now to us and on how we can reconsider our difference to them.

The following four papers represent a part of the Proceedings of the **First Edition of the Conference of Philosophy and Humanities** – the panel of Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy, organized by the Ergo group in collaboration with the Department of Philosophy of the Babeş-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca, which was held on April 20-21, 2018. The theme is **Forms, Formalism and Uniqueness (I)**.

SYMBOLIC TAUTOLOGY, NON-SYMBOLIC PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE “STRUCTURE” OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

CRISTIAN BODEA¹

ABSTRACT. This paper revolves around a logic of thinking that the Lacanian psychoanalysis calls *the logic of the not whole*. Within the confines of this logic, tautology is not only a truth that needs no demonstration, but also the proof that the absolute truth is always missing. In a certain way, the evidence of things being self imposing, it is always easy to fall into the illusion that things exist by themselves. The effect of this illusion is *the thing itself (das Ding)*, claims Marc Richir. In order to avoid the illusion that tautology is creating, Richir indicates that although there are a variety of elements involved by this problem, there is one that underlines the whole development of truth: *Sache* as affair, or as “*something to be done*”. Put in other words, while *das Ding* is an answer, *Sache* is a question waiting to be answered. *Sache* is an empty space, or a gap, which corresponds exactly to *the logic of the not whole*. Because of the *Sache*, the meaning itself becomes a question to be answered. It becomes a *sense-in-the-making*, if we are to use Richir’s idea of *le sens se faisant* which is situated at the core of his non-symbolic phenomenology. Counting on *the logic of the not whole*, this paper is following the consequences that *Sache* and *le sens se faisant* have in language, with the first one corresponding to the concept of the unconscious.

Keywords: act, *jouissance*, knowledge, sense, thing(s), unconscious.

1. Introduction

Taken in its most general sense, as a repetition of the same idea using different means of expression, tautology will help us to formulate a particular conception about the symbolic register and its implications. It is a conception specific to the phenomenology of Marc Richir, according to whom the symbolic, namely language as not restricted to the spoken word, cannot express something really and totally new. Nonetheless, the same author suggests, there is a need for

¹ Babeş-Bolyai University, Center for Applied Philosophy (CAPH)

a contact with *something* (*Sache*) beyond language, if the opposite is to take place, namely if there is something new to be expressed in language.

Something is not to be confused with the thing itself (*das Ding*). *Something* is not the Thing, it is just *some* thing that escapes language. It can be *any* thing and it is of no consequence what it is, as long as it works. We are not concerned with its attributes. It just is.

This new approach regarding *the thing* is designed to surmount a certain megalomania Marc Richir finds within philosophy. This is also one of the reasons why he proposes his non standard phenomenology, as he calls it. I maintain that there are well-grounded reasons to call his phenomenology a non-symbolic one, instead. As long as his phenomenology is trying to go beyond language, a reduction of the symbolic is necessarily involved.

Since what is to be found beyond language and beyond the symbolic is not the thing (in) itself, and is not *nothing* either, to question the status of this *something* (*Sache*) beyond language becomes unavoidable. Furthermore, what is essential about this phenomenological *Sache* is the fact that it represents “what happens in thought when someone is thinking”².

In one of his seminars³, Jacques Lacan is talking about a “knowledge” not known. Obviously, it is an unconscious knowledge, or the knowledge of the unconscious, as he puts it. Is this knowledge of the unconscious what happens in thought when someone is thinking? This is the main question raised in our paper.

If indeed there is an affinity between *Sache* and the unconscious, it means that thinking can also be found beyond language, along with the unconscious. But, most importantly, it means that there can be thinking without the artificiality of the symbolic. How such thinking is even possible can be properly explained by using Marc Richir’s phenomenology and particularly his idea of the sense-in-the-making (*sens se faisant*).

Keeping this in mind, if there is thinking that cannot be formalized, does this thinking have any relevance for us? Psychoanalysis proves that it does. As long as people continue to suffer from mental illnesses, this unformalized thinking certainly causes all sorts of problems.

2. There Is No Sexual Ratio

The title represents my personal account in translating Lacan’s famous formula: “*il n’ y a pas de rapport sexuel*” introduced by him in 1970. Usually translated as: “There is no such thing as a sexual relationship”, this formula has a

² M. Richir, *Eikasia*, p. 67.

³ Cf. J. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*.

rather “mathematical” implication than, so to say, a sentimental one. That is the reason why I don’t think that we should translate *rapport* by using the word *relationship*. According to Lacan, it is not the sexual relation that is impossible, but the sexual proportion, namely a good parity between the sexes; a fact that has something to do with the structure of the unconscious, another famous Lacanian formula being: the unconscious is structured like a language.

Back to the first formula, it is resumed in *Radiophonie* as: “Il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel formulable dans la structure”⁴. So, there is no sexual ratio that can be caught up in a structure. This is the same as saying: there isn’t such a thing as a scale when it comes to the sexual. It always evades measurability and by that it evades any structure. Does this mean that it evades both the structure of the unconscious and that of the conscious?

When it comes to consciousness, it is not like we cannot speak about sex and sexuality – those times of purism and bashfulness are long gone. It’s something else that evades sexuality and that, says Lacan, is a matter of the real.

What is real with regard to sexuality is the *jouissance*.

As a consequence, when we say that there is no sexual ratio it means that when it all comes down to *jouissance* there aren’t equivalences between two human beings, whether these human beings are of different sex or not. In a sense, the question of sex is put aside, as sexuality and *jouissance* imply having a relation with the *difference* as such, namely with the *phallus*. That is what Lacan’s formulas of sexuation reveal.

For him, sexuation is a matter of choosing one’s own position (as far as we can name “choosing” something that is done unconsciously) concerning this master signifier that is the father, namely the one who has the phallus. I will not go deeper into details regarding the technicalities of these formulas of sexuation but the main point is that for someone who is entirely caught up under the law of this master signifier, meaning he is blocked over the question of difference, the side of his sexuation is the one of the man. On the other side of the formulas of sexuation, the side of the woman, there are to be found those who are *not wholly* under the authority of the phallus. The representatives of each gender, male or female, can be found on either side. As a result, the *jouissance* itself is the one that is divided: there is a male and a female one, corresponding to the logic of *the whole*, respectively to the logic of *the not whole*. Surely this logic is reflected by language and represents one way language is sexualized.

If language is sexualized, than *jouissance* can also be found in language. As *jouissance* is a matter of the real – without being the real itself though –, language necessarily pertains to the real as well.

⁴ J. Lacan, *Autres écrits*, p. 413.

According to Lacan, the real is the impossible.

Jouissance deals with this impossibility of the real which is to be found in language. Therefore language, in its *jouissance* dimension, is an *impotent* *jouissance* – I claim – meaning language is *tautological*. Of course there are also moments of fecundity in language, which is equal to say that language can sometimes be creative and full of sense. This implies that there are moments when language creates *something* entirely new and by the instrumentality of this creative act, it reveals the very impossibility with which it is in contact, namely the real.

If there is no sexual ratio, it is because of this real that makes impossible the sexual rapport itself. Returning to the question above: does this real that cannot be apprehended by any structure exceed not only the conscious but also the unconscious? This is the point where the idea of the phenomenological unconscious finds its place.

As long as the unconscious is seen as something structured, the impossibility of the real exceeds the unconscious itself. This means that what is present in this – let's call it by its name – symbolic unconscious, namely the symptom, is, in a way, nothing more than impotent *jouissance*; the symptom is tautological. This is a claim that raises the question regarding the relation between tautology and repetition, as the symptom is something that repeats itself, or, better yet, insists itself – I'll leave this question open.

So, there is this impenetrable core of the symptom in which psychoanalysis is interested, and which leads to the real unconscious – the phenomenological one, in other words. As this unconscious does not have a structure, what lies behind the impossibility of the sexual rapport is contained by the virtuality of the phenomenological unconscious. There certainly is *something* behind, but what exactly *is* cannot be formalised.

3. Phenomenological vs. Symbolical. Sense as *Sense-in-the-making*

According to Marc Richir, the phenomenological unconscious represents the register of the phenomenological freedom. This freedom being one that escapes the structure of any language, it is a kind of *anarchic* freedom, if by this term, anarchism, we employ a certain way of being without a unique principle. This assertion is in contradiction with what Lacan is saying about the *unitary trait* that reflects someone's way of being. But, once again, this only shows the difference between the phenomenological unconscious and the symbolic one.

Phenomenological freedom lays behind language, but not in the same way as the symbolical one does. One thing is to be free in the confines of a

structure, yet entirely another thing is to have unrestricted freedom, beyond any structure. This unrestricted phenomenological freedom is not without its own risks, since such a wild freedom can always bring someone on the verge of madness. Phenomenological freedom is the place from where something new can emerge; it is the very place of creativity. No wonder most of the great artists directly felt this danger that the phenomenological freedom brings about, and sometimes even fell apart because of it.

On the other hand, symbolical freedom offers a certain assurance in terms of one losing his mind; though the price to pay is that of the symptom.

Instead, to be without symptom, as Lacanian psychoanalysis indicates from time to time, is similar of being in this creative state that, nevertheless, can cause problems. To be without symptom is a problem connected to the question, raised by Lacan, of the real unconscious.

Bottom-line, what Richir named the phenomenological unconscious is the same as the one called by Lacan the real unconscious. And this point of convergence between non-symbolic phenomenology and psychoanalysis represents a guideline in constituting my argument.

Back to the phenomenological vs. symbolical, there still remains a *hiatus* between the two. The gap that keeps them apart is exactly the real / the phenomenological unconscious. And it is here, in this gap, that meaning takes shape. From a phenomenological point of view the sense is only sense-in-the-making or, as Marc Richir puts it, only a *presentment* of the sense to come.

Sense-in-the-making (*sens se faisant*) is a concept Richir uses in order to show that there is more to be involved in the sense/ the meaning, than the simple fact that it provides cognitive data to our conscious. Sense as sense-in-the-making engages not only unconscious dispositions pertaining to someone who uses language, but it also implies the fact that our body is caught up as well in this process. The body Marc Richir is referring to is the one Husserl names *Leib*, the body as *lived*, different from *Körper*, the body as "material" object.

Sense-in-the-making contains all this so called wild essences (*Wesen sauvages*) that remind us of a certain "synaesthesia" concerning sense formation. But this *state of anarchy* proper to the sense-in-the-making is coming to an end immediately after a sense is uttered. This doesn't happen gradually, but by a determined act that... (*de*)*terminates* the sense. It's an act that brings order into this state of anarchy, and particularly because of that, it is possible for *something* to be said.

This idea takes us back to the Lacanian psychoanalysis, for which the *act* is an important concept. To act is to have a certain relation with the phallus, and that *something* beyond language remains untold unless such a relation is

established. In the event that the relation with the phallus is missing, what lies beyond language becomes *a thing* that is present as such in hallucinations – the characteristics of the psychotic states.

4. Knowledge and to Know How to Act

With regard to knowledge, Lacan says that it is paranoid.

The paranoia being a state in which the phallus is problematic, as it is missing, the paranoiac tries to fill the gap of the missing phallus by creating empty images of it. It is only because of these creations that the paranoiac can enjoy something. He is delusional in his knowledge, that's why he creates a story conducted in such a way so that *the other* is to be blamed for the persecutory fact of the phallus that is missing. That which was meant to regulate, to give a *ratio* to the institution of meaning, is not doing its job, but on the contrary, makes things worse. That is why the paranoid needs to create his delusions: to give a meaning, namely to manage somehow to situate himself in language.

As there is no sexual ratio, he tries to compensate this lack, not by signifying it with the help of the phallus, as we all normally do. Instead, he tries to fill the gap as if he doesn't want to know about such an impossibility regarding the sexual. By his denial, the paranoiac is, in fact, very aware of the impossibility as such. What is for us (and by us I am referring to the majority of people, the neurotics) hidden by the indeterminacy of the unconscious, for the paranoiac it is "hidden" in the plain sight, so to say. It is there, hidden in his delusions.

But isn't it true that, in a certain way, we all try to forget this impossibility of the sexual? In other words, isn't it true that we all try to leave aside the fact that language is tautological and also the fact that saying something really meaningful is not a matter of plain volition? The answer is *yes*, and that's why Lacan postulates knowledge as being paranoid.

Knowledge is *paranoid* but not *paranoiac*. So, this doesn't mean that we are all paranoiacs but that in our way of thinking we kind of *act* like paranoiacs. It's like we don't really want to know about this impossibility and we wish it wouldn't be true. Nevertheless, we know it to be true, and we only *think* we have the phallus, without actually having it.

The phallus is operant for us. All that we can create is not a delusion but a fantasy. As Lacan says in *Ornicar*, "Knowledge is a fantasy that is only for enjoyment/*jouissance*". So, knowledge is a fantasy. That's why knowledge is paranoid (and not paranoiac).

As such that is, made for *jouissance*, knowledge still misses the *jouissance* as a whole, says Lacan. Because of this failure knowledge is the one that subverts the subject.

So, knowledge is a means of *jouissance*. This statement is also present as a chapter title in the edited seminar of Jacques Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*. What exactly is this *other side* of psychoanalysis? It represents, according to Lacan, the master's discourse, the same as the discourse of the philosophical tradition.

On the other side, concerning the philosophical discourse, there is to be found the discourse of the master: that's why Lacan is a non-philosopher. He is not exactly against philosophy as it is often pointed out; it's only that he is not a *master* (or, at least, that's what he pretends). This fact puts him on the other side of philosophy, on the verso, thus making him a non-philosopher.

Marc Richir, although a person for whom philosophy represents his *raison d'être*, is nevertheless critical of what he calls *the megalomania of the philosophers*. So, it seems both Richir and Lacan are on the same page regarding the master's discourse. Because what does this megalomania Richir is critical of involve, if not exactly the master's discourse?

It is easy to see that all this talk around megalomania or the master's discourse has something to do with the paranoia, or at least with the fact that knowledge is paranoid. Since being paranoid implies, as I mentioned above, a concealment (not a denial like the paranoiac's) of the fact that there is no sexual ratio, the phallus is not taken properly in its dimension of lacking. This means that it is quite easy for someone to think that he really has the phallus. To have the phallus is the main trait of the master discourse.

So, the master has the phallus (supposedly). If this is the truth of the master, then the truth of the psychoanalysis represents the fact that the phallus is lacking. That's why there is a certain analytic subversion at work, one that the psychoanalyst facilitates. What this subversion implies is nothing more than the castration of the master.

As I said before, knowledge itself is subversive. So, the cause of the master's castration is to be found in his own knowledge, not in the knowledge of the analyst. Since there is no parity between one's and the other's *jouissance*, there can be no parity between the two types of knowledge. What one knows is entirely something else than what the other knows. For the master the *jouissance* follows the path of the *whole*, while for the analyst the *jouissance* follows the path of the *not whole*.

As a paradigm for the master's discourse Lacan uses Socrates' dialogue with the slave (see Socratic dialogue *Meno*). When Socrates proves that the slave

knows something and all that remains for him to do is to extract the knowledge from the slave, he assumes for himself the role of the master. This represents the birth of the *episteme*, Lacan maintains.

The slave is the one who knows how to do things despite the fact that he doesn't have a theory about what he does. On the other hand, there is the master who knows things, but doesn't necessarily act upon it. He is a free thinker whose capital (the knowledge) is produced by the slave. But, Lacan says, it is not the work that produces *jouissance*, but the knowledge. To "know how to" is therefore a different type of knowledge, different from the knowledge that produces *jouissance*. But is this the type of *jouissance* the one that he, the master, is aiming at?

Around this question revolves the outcome of the analytical cure. If the answer is "yes", then the cure doesn't fulfil its purpose. If the answer is "no", then its subversive role was fulfilled. This means that the subject leaves the place where he was situated before, namely the place of the master, in search for the *other jouissance*.

To "know how to do things" doesn't simply produce *jouissance*, but the *other jouissance*. Indeed "words make love with one another", as André Breton says. Nevertheless, the signifiers don't. This means that to "know how to do things" operates strictly at the level of the signifiers, which are transcendental. It doesn't concern the words; that's why the *Other*, namely language, is barred.

5. Conclusion

When speaking from a non-symbolic phenomenology perspective, the place where the pure signifiers and the sense-in-the-making are to be found, the barred language indicates the *beyond* of the symbolic register. Marc Richir uses sense-in-the-making to emphasize the fact that sense is never fully presented to us. It contains this *Wesen sauvages*, this *wild essences* that remain utterly impossible to be put in words. Just like the signifiers.

Even though the signifiers cannot be formalized, they still exercise influence inside language. They are not to be found in words, but between words. Even so, they are there, the same way that the phenomenological is always present in the symbolic institution, according to Marc Richir. Regarding the Richirian symbolic institution, a certain type of passivity is needed. Better yet, an *active* passivity, as Husserl once stated regarding the synthesis.

Husserl's theory of intentionality as active or passive synthesis is not to be restricted to this dualistic view. There is also this active passivity that

involves the subject in *a non conscious way*, if I may say so. Because of this, the logic of the whole seems to be surpassed by Husserl. The fact that the *not whole* is comprised within the conscious leaves room for nothing else than the unconscious.

Anyway, Husserl is not a theoretician of the unconscious. But Freud – his contemporary (both attending Franz Brentano's classes at one point) – is. And his theory about sexuality places on the side of the unconscious both the passive and the active state of the subject; even though only for a short time, as he quickly renounce this dualistic view of his theory in favour of a unified one.

In other words, what I am trying to emphasize is that both these "fathers", one of Phenomenology, the other one of Psychoanalysis, found inside the framework of their own systems the *truth* Lacan is speaking of, namely that knowledge is in itself subversive. And this is exactly what makes them founding fathers.

According to Lacan, "knowledge is something spoken, something that is said [...] Knowledge that speaks all by itself – that's the unconscious"⁵. If knowledge is to be regarded as paranoid, then it is so only as long as it is spoken. On the other hand, when knowledge speaks by itself, it breaks the so called structure of the unconscious to go beyond, right into the realm of the real where the phenomenological freedom is to be found. This freedom implies a certain responsibility on the part of the subject, an acknowledgement of the sexual difference and, consequently, an acknowledgement of the missing phallus. This is done according to a certain innocence, not a maturity as we may think; it is an innocence placed by Richir on the side of the phenomenological unconscious.

I maintain that for Lacan, the real can be found in this place of the phenomenological unconscious, namely of the real unconscious. The real taken in this way implies an ethics of the real which is the one Psychoanalysis stands for. It's an acknowledgement of the fact that even though the phallus is missing, there still is something beyond language, namely the *Sache* (something). That's why any creation is not a creation *ex nihilo* but it has *something* to do with *some thing* that the language touches.

⁵ J. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, p. 70.

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MUSIC AND MATHEMATICS: SOME REMARKS ON THE IDEAS OF SPACE AND FORM

CRISTINA CRISTE*

ABSTRACT. Mathematics has been used to describe, analyse and create music for millennia. The use of specific mathematical apparatus is manifest in the organization of basic musical notions into forms or objects that inhabit a sonorous landscape. The collecting of musical units into a set constitutes a starting point for analysing a musical object under different mathematical structures, and although there is no unified approach, musical analysis and composition use geometry and discrete mathematics to describe different musical relations (particularly group theory) in the process of modelling the basic elements of music, such as scales, intervals, chords or rhythms.

Keywords: music, mathematics, sound, space, form

1. Introduction

In the last centuries, the description of basic music-theoretical terms underwent an increasing level of abstraction and generalization under the influence of profound changes in physics, but especially mathematics, an endeavour assumed by musicians, composers, and mathematicians.

This late involvement of mathematics is not synonymous with the Pythagorean tradition, still found in some musical interpretations, that music is number, or *sonorous number*. The new relation between mathematics and music¹ is rather found in the models offered by the first. In other words, music is not mathematics, but it is mathematical, such that the organization of musical sound can be described by a strict mathematical structure.

* Babeş-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca; Center for Applied Philosophy, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babeş-Bolyai University.

¹ Predominantly characterizing the 20th century, but found in previous centuries as well. For a more comprehensive approach in this regard, see J. Fauvel & R. Flood & R. Wilson (eds.), *Music and Mathematics. From Pythagoras to Fractals*; Arbonés & Milrud, *L'harmonie est numérique. Musique et mathématiques*.

Still, there is no unified mathematical perspective with regard to music, particularly a geometrical one, although there are theories more encompassing than others, 'encompassing' here referring to the depth and power of the mathematical tool and/or the breadth of the musical implications².

Such an approach acknowledges the fact that every object, including strings, vibrate at certain frequencies and that the waves dissipate, radiate away energy as heat and/or sound, without transmitting matter, through a medium such as air. If energy is not continuously supplied to the vibrating object, it will get to its equilibrium position.

2. Mathematical music

The movement of the wave is organized and described as a characteristic shape, further associated to a particular sound source. But the simple harmonic motion, characterizing the vibrating motion of sound is fundamental not only to music, but to the quantum mechanical motion of the atom as well.

In mathematical parlance, such a motion is called sine motion, while its every physical approximation, including the sound, is considered sinusoidal. And being based on the circle, "sine motion is a timeless description of motion having no beginning or end"³.

Music becomes possible in the process of distinguishing discrete events in this idealised motion, one further connected with the physically abstract notion of a *continuous flow of sound*. And such a discrete event is called *tone*, "probably the fundamental unit of musical experience"⁴, with music also described as a set of tonal structures.

The abstraction of the tonal space, allowing the spatial representations of tonal distance and tonal relationships, was first introduced as a conceptual diagram named *Tonnetz* (German for *tone-network*) by Euler in 1739, was further developed to explore the properties of pitch structures, and has even been used to visualize non-tonal triadic relationships (by Neo-Riemannian⁵ theorists).

When a tone, characterized by 3 sonic qualities - pitch, musical loudness, and timbre - is combined with the temporal qualities of onset and duration, it becomes a *note*. The combination of notes under the temporal dimension determines

² For example: D. Lewin, *Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations*; G. Mazzola, *The Topos of Music*; D. Tymoczko, *A Geometry of Music*.

³ G. Loy, *Musimathics. The Mathematical Foundations of Music*, Vol. 1. MIT Press, 2006, p. 7.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p.12.

⁵ The notion alludes to Hugo Riemann, the music theorist and composer, and not Bernhard Riemann, the mathematician.

three contexts of analysis: (i) *the musical score*; (ii) *the melody*, as notes performed in sequence; and (iii) *harmony*, when the focus is the simultaneous performance of the notes.

Pitch is an essential organizing principle, generally defined, not unambiguously, as the “auditory attribute of sound according to which sounds can be ordered on a scale from low to high (ANSI 1999)”⁶. The complexity of the analysis lies in the meaning of that “auditory attribute”. Acoustically, the pitch can also be represented by the logarithm of its fundamental frequency.

A sound has a pitch if its wave shape – represented as a Fourier series - is highly redundant through time. Otherwise, it is said, we hear noise. The existence of pitch already seems to involve a structure. So there is sound and there are sound structures.

Now, of course, there is always the question: when does sound become music? According to John Cage’s “4’33’”, any sound can constitute music. But what the notion of pitch already implies is that sound might represent structures different from what is generally called music. That being said, shaping the nature of their connection requires further distinctions.

The difference in pitch between two tones determines the interval, which is perceived regardless of the degrees of variations in sounds’ frequency, duration, timbre and amplitude. “Alterations of pitch in melodies – Helmholtz wrote - take place by intervals and not by continuous transitions”⁷.

The pitches create therefore an acoustic landscape determined by range, density and a subjective sense of distance characterized as height or width, constituting the *chroma*. The ‘subjective’ aspect is determined by the fact that a specific interval is experienced as *higher, lower or wider* than another.

Using the language of set theory⁸ to categorize musical objects and describe their relationships, a class of pitches is considered an unordered subset of n objects, an ordered subset is a permutation, and the basic operations are transposition and inversion. The approach is based on the idea, which started with Riemann in geometry and then Cantor in set theory, that the same mathematical object (the manifold, a set) could not only carry different structures – geometries, - but there could also be different notions of equivalence between objects and structures.

⁶ Loy, *op.cit.*, p. 13.

⁷ Helmholtz, *On the Sensations of Tone. As a Physiological Basis for the Theory of Music*, Dover Publications, New York, 1954 p. 250.

⁸ Not set theory per se. *Musical set theory* is a rather improper term, since such an approach is more related to group theory and combinatorics than to mathematical set theory. And even though one is able to use the vocabulary of set theory to talk about finite sets, there are many differences between methods and terminology in them. Musicians, for example, use the terms *transposition* and *inversion* where mathematicians would use *translation* and *reflection*.

The mathematical transposition translates the restatement of a melody at higher and lower pitch levels in a way that preserves intervals. Inversion represents another way to create variation into a musical piece while preserving the intervallic sound of a melody, but not the exact intervals.

An example of the way in which finite sets play an important role in music analysis, in addition to group theory, is Messiaen's *Chronochromie* (1960). Messiaen uses the term "interversion" to denote a particular ordering of permuted elements, and the term "permutation" to refer to this technique, added to the two-item list of *mathematical impossibilities* mentioned in his *Traité de rythme, de couleur, et d'ornithologie: the modes of limited transposition* (*modes à transpositions limitées*) and "non-retrogradable rhythms" (*rythmes nonrétrogradables*)⁹. The permutation is applied to a sequence of musical objects (pitches, durations, etc.) to obtain another sequence, but one has to choose among the great number of symmetries that a significant number of objects could determine. In the end, Messiaen creates a collection of rhythms obtained by the iterated application of a given symmetrical permutation to a collection of 32 durations.

A further determination within this range of available pitches, the *chroma*, involves the selection of a small subset of intervals that would become the pitch classes of a *scale*.

A musical scale can thus be defined as "an ordered set of pitches, together with a formula for specifying their frequencies", with each individual pitch called *degree*, and all degrees forming an "ordered set of names and positions for the scale pitches"¹⁰. Those pitch classes are replicated across the space of each octave, determining the gamut of pitches.

The diatonic scale, probably the most recognizable, known and influential of the scales, expresses but one of the many possible orderings of intervals. The chromatic scale extends the diatonic scale by breaking up the whole steps into half steps. Or, as Gareth Loy pointed out, the unique order of whole and half steps characterizing the extended diatonic scale – the chromatic scale –, "provides a crucial asymmetry that our hearing exploits in order to orient ourselves to the music we're hearing. If the interval pattern were not asymmetrical, it would be impossible for us to orient ourselves in the scale"¹¹. In the words of Pierre Curie, "it's the dissymmetry that creates the phenomenon".

And like a mathematician facing the choice of a geometry or other, in conformity with particular interests and circumstances, one is free to choose any

⁹ O. Messiaen, *Traité de rythme, de couleur, et d'ornithologie, Vol. I*. Trans. by Melody Baggech, Norman, Oklahoma, 1998.

¹⁰ Loy, *op. cit.*, p. 16, *passim*.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 17-18.

musical ordering that serves her needs, although diatonic ordering has had a considerable influence on the music around the cultures of the world.

We can visualise the pitch space of the 12-tone equal-tempered scale – which constitutes the dominant tuning system in the West – as a circle (the circle of fifths), or even as a spiral if we continue to add sharps and flats. The point to be emphasized is that the key structure can be characterized in terms of circularity.

But the orientation in the pitch space is not as straightforward as it seems, an aspect noticed in an early research by Roger Shepard¹² – hence the *Shepard illusion*, and it involves the difference in experimenting the chroma, on one hand, and the tone height, on the other. In playing a sequence of major fifths intervals on a piano, starting from the lowest tone, the sequence seems to ascend if one focuses on the tone height, but it appears to decrease by semitones if the attention falls on the chroma. Hence the auditory counterpart to the impossible staircases of Escher. Or the Necker cube.

According to Callender, Quinn and Tymoczko, it is possible though to measure musical distance in other ways than the intervallic conception, when we consider chords to be close or even identical, since each contains the same total collection of intervals¹³.

It is helpful to point out the fact that if we describe some notes to be close because the ratio of their fundamental frequencies can be expressed using small whole numbers, we have an *acoustic* conception of musical distance that, together with the intervallic one, represents a *perceptual* model of musical distance.

On the other hand, a *conceptual model* in the experience of hearing music is one that measures music melodically, using distance in log-frequency space, an approach based on the idea of *voice leading*, developed in recent years by Callender et al¹⁴.

That being said, when we hear a melody consisting of several pitches, what we actually perceive are the intervals between the individual notes, with the relationship between these intervals making a melody, more or less appealing.

In other words, if we consider the interval as the distance between two notes, we hear the distance. But since the interval could also be described as the numerical proportion between the frequency of the two different notes, it seems that we are prone to perceive somehow an exponential relation between pitch

¹² R. N. Shepard, "Circularity in judgments of relative pitch", in *Journal of the Acoustical Society of America*, 36/ 1964, pp. 2345-2353.

¹³ C. Callender & I. Quinn & D. Tymoczko, "Generalized Voice-Leading Spaces", in *Science*, Vol. 320, Issue 5873/ 18, Apr. 2008

¹⁴ *Ibidem* for the distinction among different conceptions of musical distance.

and frequency. “Frequency f goes up exponentially as pitch p goes up linearly: to double pitch, we must quadruple frequency”¹⁵.

The unison expresses identity, the octave expresses equivalence, but the singularity of the other intervals (minor, major or perfect) is determined by the subjective perception of *distance* (in terms of ‘higher’, ‘lower’, ‘wider’), despite significant variation in other sound properties, such as duration, amplitude, frequency, or timbre.

With regard to the frequency in the production of articulations in the emission of sounds, we get *rhythm*, the understructure of a melody, the distribution of pitch and intensity in sequences, or the organization of various dynamics of sounds and silence in time. As fundamental property of every perceived, aware, determined pattern of sound, its *presence* acknowledged at every level of encounter with a musical element (and not only), it represents a fundamental condition for a mathematical analysis of music. Due to its forms, it involves different types of temporality and, simultaneously, various ways of pacing the acoustic space.

As J. Arbonés & P. Milrud pointed out, “it is possible to compare this situation with the general mathematical problem of tessellating the plane, that is, when one has to tile an entire plane with regular geometrical forms. In our case, what we desire to cover completely is the sonorous plane”¹⁶.

We perceive therefore a movement through different forms determined as ratios (of frequency), and together they are shaping, at another level, the form of the melody, through rhythm. Forms creating and/or determining other forms.

The question is, is it possible to perceive the transformation of different forms or musical objects and their perception? The question involves several aspects:

- firstly, it is important to address the concept of continuity;
- secondly, it involves the composite notion of movement and change;
- and thirdly, it points to the context in which ideas of continuity and motion are valid events; in other words, it points to the musical space organized as score.

On one hand, there is a continuity when considering the passage from sound to music. On the other hand, there is another idea of continuity in the movement among the elements of a specific piece of music, irrespective of the temporal and spatial aspects; or between different sound patterns. David Lewin’s *transformational theory*¹⁷, in applying group theory to music, is particularly appropriate in the analysis of the musical motion.

¹⁵ Loy, *op.cit.*, p. 15

¹⁶ J. Arbonés & P. Milrud, *L’harmonie est numérique. Musique et mathématiques*. RBA France, 2013, p. 48.

¹⁷ See David Lewin, *Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations*, Oxford University Press, [1987] 2007.

In this second type of continuity, music becomes – it is becoming, it becomes in the specific movements and rhythm of its forms, even if such a form is silence – silence in all its musical distinctions (the types of rest; the hold or pause; fermata, or caesura). That is because as part of a composition, silence is determined in time, just like a unit fragment on the real line that simultaneously represents a set of infinite cardinality (of the continuum).

In mathematics, the analysis of the definition of continuity – from the $\epsilon - \delta$ definition, through that involving open intervals, open discs and then in terms of the set of open subsets - led to the institution of metric and topological spaces. This development proved that continuity, viewed invariably, depends not on distance, but on something more intrinsic.

Each level of abstraction in this development describes space as a collection of points with an added structure satisfying certain axioms, and with topology as the most abstract of these structures or geometries.

There are recent studies that “interpret a scale as defining a metric according to which adjacent scale tones are one “unit” apart; scalar transposition is just translation relative to this metric”¹⁸.

How did topology come into music? An example, analysed by Richard Cohn, Jack Douthett and Peter Steinbach, and Thomas Fiore is Beethoven’s *Ninth Symphony*, specifically the measures 143-176 of the second movement, which contain an extraordinary sequence of 19 chords. There are certain conversions by some functions of these chords with finally obtaining a graph that makes a torus, so the chord progression from Beethoven is a path on it. For a complete torus we would have needed 24 chords. Another example of music on a topological object is Bach’s *Musical Offering*, which contains a passage that is music on a Möbius strip.

Now returning to the abstract structures of the musical space, it is possible to describe some rigid and continuous motions named symmetries. They represent the transformations that leave a pattern in space unchanged, and they are modelled as functions acting on the entire space, meaning that every transformation must be applicable to every object.

In geometry, the study of an object, of a specific space involves the description of its possible transformations. Geometers study a space by describing its possible transformations. A musical space can be approached as a mathematical one, since an object, including a musical one, is defined by its symmetries. So we analyse those properties that remain invariant under its possible transformations;

¹⁸ C. Callender & I. Quinn, & D. Tymoczko, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

and a pattern in space by asking what transformations leave the pattern unchanged, what symmetries the pattern has.

Now symmetry, as Saunders Mac Lane notes, “is neither geometric nor algebraic; or perhaps both”¹⁹. Its essence, as Thyssen and Ceulemans pointed out, is “[T]hinking *difference* and *identity* together”²⁰. It doesn’t have to depend on numbers, and it basically shows that algebra and geometry have in common some underlying, more abstract, form: the abstract structure of a mathematical group, which is particularly important when applied to music because it allows us to see/conceive things that we otherwise would not be able to see. This property of groups to make visible the hidden connections and ultimately to reveal hidden connections among phenomena is probably not far from Paul Klee’ principle, “Not to render the visible, but to render visible”.

Group theory describes the way that sets and pitches relate and how they can be transformed from one to the other, it shows how different musical voices move against and through each other and, ultimately, how sound, including the silences, creates or is organized into a musical space.

The basic musical transformations – which constitute the elements of a group and can be used to analyse both tonal and atonal music – are: translations, rotations, reflections and glide reflections, although in practice, composers usually use only reflection on two lines and rotation through 180°. The transpositions and inversions (of intervals, chords, melodies, or voices in counterpoint) mentioned above also form a group in the mathematical sense of the word.

All these transformations form a group by the act of group composition, of interacting with each other.

Another way would be to take a set of functions whose inputs are major and minor chords and whose outputs are major and minor chords.

With regard to the dimensions of the space in which to study these transformations, they are described in terms of the basic theoretical musical concepts mentioned above. What varies are the dimensions chosen in a specific analysis. Most often, there are two dimensions - time and pitch, or loudness and pitch, although some focus on sounds defined by their continuously changing time, pitch and loudness, *i.e.* as points of a 3-dimensional manifold.

But there are some limits in the analogy. Helmholtz noted a difference between the geometric manifolds, where it is possible to compare distances between points everywhere (“*i.e.* we can freely move a rigid measurement body

¹⁹ Saunders Mac Lane, *Mathematics. Form and Function*, Springer-Verlag, 1986, p. 19.

²⁰ P. Thyssen & A. Ceulemans, *Shattered Symmetry. Group Theory from the Eightfold Way to the Periodic Table*, Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 33.

everywhere over the manifold”), and the physiological manifolds, the 2-dimensional acoustical manifold for example, where there is no comparability of distances between points everywhere, where “[T]wo sounds of the same pitch and different volumes are not comparable to two sounds of different pitch but the same volume”²¹.

In recent years, some researches²² proposed an approach that would subsume a great variety of previous geometric models. They started by expressing different musical terms as symmetries of an n -dimensional space, where each dimension representing a voice in the score and then creating specific mathematical spaces, singular quotient spaces, named *or bifolds*, by identifying (or “gluing together”) points in \mathbb{R}^n .

There are many musical examples²³ expressing these transformations that do not change the distance between two points in the plane, isometries that do not alter the scale of distances (the metric). We take a musical motif – and many tunes express an asymmetric one – as consisting of a set of notes described by a pitch over time, that is, a subset of \mathbb{R}^2 , the 2-dimensional space.

Rachmaninov’s remake of Paganini’s *Capriccio no. 24* for violin solo, *Rhapsody on a Theme by Paganini*, Op.43, creates a chromatic *inversion* by changing minor to major²⁴ (variation 18), although he follows Paganini’s score bar by bar. He also imposes a slight change in rhythm and, at one point, there is an octave jump.

Hindemith’s *Ludus tonalis* contains a rotational symmetry, through 180° : with the exception of the last chord, the final movement is the same as the first, but rotated through 180° .

Brahms’s *Intermezzo in E minor*, Op. 116, no.5 is an example that Callender et al. use to show how a symmetry, though hard to spot in the musical notation, but rather easy to hear, becomes obvious in the geometrical representation²⁵. The researchers identified two pairs of voice leadings, represented as vectors, to measure the similarity of musical progressions. And since “the two pairs of vectors are related by reflection, the figure also illustrates the Möbius strip’s nonorientability”²⁶.

²¹ See K. Mainzer, *Symmetry and Complexity. The Spirit of Beauty of Nonlinear Science*, World Scientific Publishing, 2005, p. 80, *passim*.

²² See C. Callender & I. Quinn & D. Tymoczko, *op.cit.*; R. Wells Hall, “Geometrical Music Theory”, in *Science*, Vol. 320, Issue 5874/ 18, Apr. 2008 pp. 328-329.

²³ See, for example, Wilfrid Hodges, “The Geometry of Music”, in J. Fauvel & R. Flood & R. Wilson (eds.), *Music and Mathematics. From Pythagoras to Fractals*, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 91-111.

²⁴ The A minor of Paganini theme becomes D \flat major.

²⁵ See the *Supporting Online Material* for Callender et al., *op.cit.*

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

3. Conclusion

Beyond the organizing ideas of rhythm, musical tone, pitch, loudness, timbre, musical note, interval, then melody and harmony, there is a continuous flow of sound permitting the configuration and the description of determinate, discrete patterns known as music. That being said, it should also be emphasized the fact that although the substratum of sound is present in music, it is present in the diversity of languages as well.

Still further beyond this underlying stream of continuously changing fluctuations there is the simple harmonic motion of vibrating objects, abstractly and mathematically represented by the ideal concept of the timeless sine motion. In other words, change and timeless form, constant ratios of continuous movement and perceived rest permeates the various manifestations of music and the act of its creation.

The employment of mathematics in analysing music unveils structures that are inherent in all its expressions. As a result, it is possible to underlie musical aspects otherwise less discernible, but also to secure a specific basis for the act itself of creation. What is more, the use of the same mathematical theories and models to pinpoint basic facts and principles in music and different sciences could constitute a starting point to various philosophical interrogations. It certainly refines Nietzsche's idea of music as a continuous endeavour to get to a specific intuition of things, to think the world in the most universal form of being.

The organization of vibrations as music into discrete patterns already delineates a specific, sonorous space, to be mathematically characterized by certain dimensions. The choice of basic musical objects delineates the space.

It is possible to acknowledge this space without the comfortable aid of time, particularly when we approach music through its notation. In its notational form and like any other scriptural act, including the mathematical one, it offers clues and indications to connections not 'visible' as such.

We meet then another way to perceive its articulations. But the question remains: is music grasped among its articulations, *articulation of forces, not of things*²⁷, or through them? The understanding of the passage from sound to music, to specific tonal structures, involves not only a thoughtful aesthetic interrogation, but also an epistemological examination regarding the cognition or perception of continuity.

²⁷ To reprise Deleuze's formula in his discussion of Cézanne. See Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon. Logique de la sensation*, Éditions du Seuil, 2002

Within this space with a determinate number of dimensions, to be chosen, a musical object is reduced, in its description, to a determinate set of points. But a point is also an idealized concept in mathematics, it doesn't have extension: the physical dot and the mathematical point are not identical. Considering Dedekind's definition of the real number²⁸ as a cut, 'gap' in the rational numbers, a "point" is a whole universe to someone who knows that it is actually a cut in the infinite set of rational numbers"²⁹.

In this complex process of abstraction, both music and mathematics curl around in their expressions such as to signal various registers of understanding. But their connection is just as salient in the moment when both come "alive", become "part of our experience", to use Keith Devlin's words: "the symbols on a page are just a representation of the mathematics. When read by a competent performer (...) the mathematics lives and breathes in the mind of the reader like some abstract symphony"³⁰.

So maybe the idea of music itself as a spatial structure of sonic forms developing in time is a construction by which one seeks to grasp movements at different levels of description, a process of discovery that must spiral through models that prove continuously incomplete.

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²⁸ He builds his abstract definition of number on the notions of set and mapping (*Abbildungen*) and defines the real numbers as cuts, 'gaps' in the rational numbers.

²⁹ J. Stillwell, *Roads to Infinity. The Mathematics of Truth and Proof*, A K Peters, 2010, p. 24.

³⁰ Keith Devlin, *The Language of Mathematics. Making the Invisible Visible*, W.H. Freeman & Co., 2000, p. 5, *passim*.

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ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY AS A RESOLUTION TO ANXIETY. A PSYCHOANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE FACE OF THE OTHER

LIVIA DIOȘAN*

ABSTRACT. Our perspective aims to fathom to what extent Emmanuel Lévinas's philosophical and Talmudic texts deliver a manner of assuming anxiety or a resolution of anxiety. To achieve this, we propose the Lacanian concept of the Name of the Father, and we use a reading of the Lévinasian corpus aided by the theoretical developments offered by mainly Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. We analyze the relation to the Face as a condition for the occurrence of the Other in his transcendence, from his height, as well as the interdiction against killing. The Face is simultaneously gaze and voice. We analyze the Lévinasian responsibility in relation to the Face as a resolution in the symbolic order of the radical anxiety in front of the Face of A-Elohim, in a face-to-face relation which could be a face-to-face relation with the text of the Torah that is the written trace of Infinity.

Key words: Other, Face, gaze, voice, anxiety, Name of the Father, Symbolic.

Introduction

In the context of 20th century phenomenology, considering the answer that the human being must offer to the interpellation made by the Other, Emmanuel Lévinas, influenced by his own background of phenomenology and Talmudic readings, proposes a horizontal, infinite responsibility of the human being, assigned and assumed upon entering subjective history, in response to a vertical call. Our interpretive perspective aims to fathom to what extent the Lévinasian text delivers a manner of assuming or a resolution of anxiety (*angoisse*), and to achieve this we propose the Lacanian concept of *Name of the Father*, and we use a reading of the Lévinasian corpus aided by the theoretical developments offered by mainly Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. While Lévinas constructs an entire "éthique

* Romanian Forum of the Lacanian Field, Centre for Applied Philosophy Babeș-Bolyai Cluj.

comme philosophie première”, for the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan the ethical problem is structured around the subject’s orientation towards the real. Not limiting ourselves to highlighting a correspondence or merely simple conceptual analogies between the two, we analyze the relation to the Face as a condition for the occurrence of the Other in his transcendence, from his height, as well as the interdiction against killing. The Lévinasian Face is simultaneously gaze and voice. Therefore, our hypothesis is to interpret the Lévinasian responsibility in relation to the Face as a resolution in the symbolic order of the radical anxiety in front of the Face of A-Elohim, in a face-to-face relation which could be a face-to-face relation with the text of the Torah that is the written trace of Infinity.

By exploring the Lévinasian corpus in order to elucidate the notion of the *face*, within the conceptual delimitations of the Face in relation to the *Illeity* and the infinite responsibility of any human being that sets out on the Abrahamic quest of his own subjective history in answer to an original call, we see how the gaze and the voice, as conceptualized by Lacan, are in the register of the object, in the sense that the subject’s enigmatic desire is correlative of a *beyond* in the symbolic order. There is a fundamental lack in the relation between desire and object, which is constitutive to the latter; in this sense, the face is gaze, but not just attached to the domain of the sight; likewise, it is voice or expression that speaks in silence, not being attached to any acoustic dimension. Thus, the Lévinasian face becomes the conjunction of gaze and voice as an empty space, as a limit of what could be thought or expressed in speech.

The Face as Gaze and Voice

Our hypothesis is that the infinite responsibility in front of the Face of the Other is a resolution within the Symbolic order of a radical anxiety, which Lacan calls Aleph¹, in front of the Real of the Face of A-Elohim.

Within the field of the visible, the Lacanian object *a* is the gaze. The subject experiences the object *a* as a desiring subject because *a* is an “object cause” of his or her desire. This object appears in the moment, in the fugacious gaze, it is something that fades in the very instance of its appearance. It is a lack of jouissance of the subject of desire and, at the same time, a *plus-de-jouir* that is attributed to the Other. The gaze as object *a* pertains to the lack and, given the fact that the gaze is reduced to the object *a*, it is also evanescent. It is impossible for the subject to catch the gaze because the gaze cannot be subjected to, nor

¹ Jacques Lacan, *Les Noms du Père*, lesson of November 18, 1963.

assumed by any subject. It is this situation that Lacan translated by the formula of the phantasy²: the phantasy is the inmost content of the subjective, yet, paradoxically, it is not accessible to the subject's experience. The gaze, as object *a*, is not the subject's gaze, but a gaze upon the subject. Where there is vision, there is no longer gaze and it is in this manner that the constitutive division of the visual field is founded. The scission between the eye and the gaze – in which the *scopic* drive is manifested – covers the scission between the register of the imaginary and that of the real. Visual perception, on the one hand, although supported by the symbolic, pertains to the imaginary and is produced also in the mirror. The *jouissance* of the gaze, on the other hand, pertains to the real. The subject feels observed, seen by the other whom he himself cannot see, and that is an embarrassing experience. Starting from such a conceptualization of the gaze, we shall try to read the Lévinasian Face, whose expression is “you shall not kill”, which comes from its defenseless eyes.

In his seminar about “transference”³, Lacan already announced that anxiety manifests by relating in a complex manner to the desire of the Other, in such a way that the anguishing function of the desire of the Other is that the subject does not know what type of object *a* would himself be for that very desire. But this is fully articulated in the human desire as function of the Other's desire only at the scopic level. It is this level that Lacan developed in his tenth seminar about anxiety⁴ and later in his eleventh seminar about the four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis⁵.

An anxiety linked to the fact of not knowing what object the subject is for the Other – anxiety that Lévinas solved through his conception of infinite responsibility – only works at the scopic level. Because, at the scopic level, the Other is a radical Other and there is a veil hiding a voracious desire of the Other, to which the subject is under no circumstances linked because the Lévinasian subject is in the register of the Same that is always inhabited by the Other as exteriority. The Lévinasian subject is only linked to the human other, to his neighbor. And thus, the residue, the object *a* of an anguishing “I do not know what object I am for the Other”, is essentially unknown. Not knowing what *a* is in

² In his fifth seminar, *Les formations de l'inconscient*, Lacan constructs his graph of desire and defines phantasy (*fantasme*) as the mask of desire. Then, during the next year, in the seminar *Le désir et son interprétation*, phantasy is placed between the two levels of the graph of desire: either above the message of the symptom or under the enigma of the desire.

³ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre VIII: Le transfert*, Paris, Seuil, 2001.

⁴ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire: Livre X. L'angoisse*, Seuil, Paris, 2004.

⁵ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre XI: Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse*, Seuil, Paris, 1973.

the economy of desire is the reason why at the scopic level – where the structure of desire is the most developed in its fundamental alienation – it is the most hidden and, therefore, the subject is the most protected from anxiety.⁶ Thus, the trace of object *a*, from the moment of its constitution, must be searched someplace else than at the scopic level.

For now, we shall refer to the face of the neighbor, as Lévinas conceptualized it, as gaze and voice. The transcendence is expressed in discourse and the voice can be seen without an image, therefore in the passing from the visible of the world to the audible of the language, the voice of the Almighty embodies itself. The translation into French, by André Chouraqui⁷ of the verse following the ten commandments speaks of the voices that the Jews see on the mountain, while the rest of the translations are rich in images, although the texts speak about voices, in plural, to which the voice of the *shofar* is added. So, the tension of that text lies in the fact of seeing the voices, not in listening to them.

Gaze

We shall first discuss the concept of “gaze”. In his tenth and in his eleventh seminar, Lacan speaks about the function of the eye and of the gaze in the structuring of the human desire. In the mirror stage, the idea is that through *i(a)* the image of the subject in the Other is without a residue, the subject cannot see what he/ she loses because in the framed image there is a beautiful shape, an *agalma* object. Yet, it is a shape that contains a trap because the place of the object *a*, reduced to a zero-point, is the “grain of beauty” that looks at me, says Lacan.⁸ In the scopic drive, more than elsewhere, the subject is trapped in the function of desire because the object is a stranger; *a* is the eye which in Oedipus’s myth equivalates to the organ of castration, while in the scopic drive, in which the Same meets the world as a representation that possesses him, we are talking about a lure and the subject is forced to confront something that is not the true *a*, but its complement, namely *i(a)*, the specular image which seems to fall from him.⁹

Yet, sometimes there is something in the gaze of the other or the neighbor, in Lévinas’s words, that looks at us – for example the inert eye of a thing – and it is then that anxiety emerges in the place of the desire that *a* used to

⁶ Cf. Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre X: L’angoisse*, lesson of July 3, 1963, p. 376.

⁷ *La Bible*, transl. by André Chouraqui, Desclée, Brouwer, 1985, URL: [http:// nachourachi.tripod.com/id91.htm](http://nachourachi.tripod.com/id91.htm). Here is the French translation: “Tout le peuple voit *les voix*, les torches, la voix du shophar, la montagne fumante. *Le peuple voit*. Ils se meuvent, et se tiennent au loin” (Exodus 20, 15, emphasis ours).

⁸ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre X: L’angoisse*, lesson of May 29, 1963, p. 293.

⁹ Jacques Lacan, *Noms du Père*, unique lesson of November 20, 1963.

command. What is essentially lacking from desire is nevertheless masked, that is the object *a* which cannot be specular or grasped in an image. It is in this very point that the relation between anxiety and desire is presented at the level of the eye in a masked shape that is linked to the luring functions of the structures of desire. Then the eye of a seeing subject appears to the Other the way it really is: impotent and weak.

The Lévinasian philosophical project is related to the Face because the Face is the condition for the Other to appear in its transcendence, from its Height, as well as condition for the commandment “you shall not kill”. The face gazes at me and concerns me, at the same time, if we were to translate the French verb *concerner*, that would be that “the Face gazes at me” and “calls me into responsibility”. In Hebrew, both in Biblical literature and in rabbinic commentaries, the grammar of the word “face (*panim*)” has only the plural form of “faces”, the same word being used for the “faces of the Thora” as well. The faces of the Thora resort to the uniqueness of each person along generations, to be able to exist as they are stateless and foreign. Therefore, only the biblical verse or the face of a person can create in the human being the metaphysical desire, as Lévinas names it, without him being led towards the verse or towards the other by any prior intention. The Name of God – or the first Saying – has an exceptional signification in the very traces that it leaves as verses and faces. The interruption of a discourse by the trace of Infinity (formations escaping discourse, holes, places of inscription of the Saying) is not equivalent to the end of words, but it reminds us of the fact that language, as language of the verse or language of the face, exceeds the possibility of conceptualization, it “escapes from any theme”¹⁰ and at the same time renews it. With *each* face that gazes at me, the commitment is also renewed; a commitment which traditionally is renewed by the shofar. And this shofar has the function of object *a* as well: the shofar must remind God of His promise against a total jouissance. Lacan says that the shofar has the function of barring the divine jouissance. Claiming culpability by means of the shofar is what in Lacanian psychoanalysis is called *demand*: in its despair, it evokes the Other. It is a demand that, with Freud, is oriented towards transference love and towards the great Other who could answer. There we can see the agalmatic dimension with its inherent goodness.

The transcendence of God may seem so far away that, for Lévinas, it becomes a feeling of absence. “His presence is expressed in His absence, beyond any nomination”¹¹. What is left, then, is only prayer and the practice of

¹⁰ Emmanuel Lévinas, *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger*, Vrin, Paris, 2001, p. 236.

¹¹ Emmanuel Lévinas, *A l'heure des nations*, Minuit, Paris, 1988, p. 57, about the Name of God and the testimony.

commandments (*mitsvot*) in front of God and in front of the people. But Lévinas also searches why and how God still comes to those who do not study and who ignore the meaning of prayer and *mitsvot*. And this happens in those miraculous moments – that cannot be explained by any causality – when man finds himself in a state of awakening in front of the vulnerability of the face of the other to whom he immediately answers: “God is not withdrawing Himself from the world, but man is closing himself in front of God, be it by a blink of an eye when he interrupts with the black of the suspension points the light of [God’s] vigilant gaze”¹². Then how can a man get to hear the infinite obligation as being the best answer that God gives him? Lévinas takes into consideration the story of Job in the menacing horizon of human suffering, especially in those moments when a human being, like Job, is betrayed by everyone, abandoned to his own despair until the edge of the abyss. It is such a life that is called to pray for the other: “Then you shall call, and the Lord will answer; you shall cry, and He will say ‘Here I am’ (*Hinneni*)” (Isaiah 58, 9). It is the same *Hinneni* that man, being called to responsibility, will say when he is in a face-to-face situation with the Face of the Other. “In our cultural heritage, the love for the other accompanies our religious life. This is the reason why it is only the second commandment, right after that of loving God”¹³. It pleads for a “directness of the impetus without return to self”. But Job also said “yet in my flesh I shall see God”¹⁴.

Although Lévinas agrees with Vilna Gaon’s criticism against Hassidic enthusiasm, he displaces the site of the trace of Infinity in the nudity of the face of the other man. Far from searching the enigma of the trace in the signs of a creating power, he speaks about the “opening of an abyss in proximity” or as a moment in which “when the face approaches, the flesh becomes verb and the comfort – Saying”¹⁵. This Lévinasian formula is different from that of the Book of John: “and the Word became flesh and dwelt among us” (John 1, 14). A flesh that becomes verb is a face that unpredictably imposes itself as word to a subject who was only thinking about himself. Lévinas describes the Face as an “epiphany” or a “revelation”, meaning an event which necessarily surprises any subject.

Yet, it can also surprise him as *Unheimlich*: for example, the most restful Face, the most soothing shape, the divine statue that can only be divine, would

¹² Emmanuel Lévinas, *Du sacré au saint*, Minuit, Paris, 1977, p. 101.

¹³ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Le Temps et l’Autre*, Paris, PUF, 1991, p. 106.

¹⁴ Job 19, 26. According to Hieronymus, who translated from Hebrew the *Vulgata* version and emphasized the prophetic dimension of these two verses. The Hebrew interpretation, to which Lévinas himself agrees, is that starting from what is hidden in one’s flesh, he or she can know and understand the height and greatness of God.

¹⁵ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence*, Martinus Nijhoff, La Haye, 1974, p. 120.

suddenly become animated, it could reveal itself as desiring. That would be an alarming strangeness. Sometimes, we can read in the Lévinasian Face the intuition of an appearance of this *Unheimlich*. And then the subject claims that responsibility is “coming” from the eyes of the Other. But the object *a* is born some place else, before the screen capture that hides it: the psychoanalytic praxis supposes the field of desire and this is born from the relation between the subject and the Other, an operation which leaves the object *a* as a residue.

Voice

The structure of the Other is linked to the void of his lack of guarantee. In this void resonates the *voice*, a voice articulated as imperative, which demands subjection or conviction. Therefore, the voice is not something that can be assimilated, but only incorporated.¹⁶ This is why it has the function of shaping the void and it is at this point that we must discuss about the shofar, that ritualic instrument from the synagogue which dates back from Abrahamic times. Its meaning is the possibility that for a moment it can substitute the word, thus shaping the place of anxiety, but only after the desire of the Other becomes commandment. In this way, it can bar the *jouissance* of the Other. And because it shapes the place of anxiety, the shofar can play its eminent function: solving anxiety as Lévinasian culpability; or forgiveness. The shofar is the claiming of culpability and what is important at this point of the relation between the subject and the face of the Other is something linked to the desire of the Other. The sacrifice is neither offer, nor donation, but its purpose is to capture the Other in the web of desire. And this is exactly what we can see in the ethical plan of an infinite responsibility in front of the Face.

The shofar – in relation to which we have put object *a* as voice – dates back from the Abrahamic story of the binding of Isaac, where the residue was precisely the roar of the ram that was sacrificed instead of him. Roar of the primordial beast, of all the “Elohims” ancestors of Abraham from the sixth day of creation onwards. The roar of the ram was not translated into commandment and written to the Tablets of the Law. Lacan puts the function of the voice as object *a* in the area of that part of *jouissance* which cannot enter in the symbolic order of the signifier. Although the Other is not completely deserted by the roar, its full of meaning law must not be accounted for this roar – because if it should, then it would truly be ferocious. The project of the Superego is precisely the instauration

¹⁶ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre X: L'angoisse*, lesson of June 5, 1963, p. 320.

of an Other supplemented by the voice¹⁷, to recover what escapes the Other so that the voice would represent a void in the Other. And this void makes possible the Saying that Lévinas refers to when speaking of the “expression” of the Face of the Other, the expression in his eyes. Because it is situated in the void of the Other, the voice of the Superego is mute, and yet it is the voice of an ethical subject, at least in Lévinasian texts. It is the voice of culpability of the hostage who bears an infinite responsibility, for instance the figure of an Other who demands the sacrifice of *jouissance*, which is a commandment impossible to fulfill.

It is here that both gaze and voice meet. It is the gaze of Isaac in front of the face of A-Elohim. In his interrupted seminar *Noms du Père*, Lacan says that anxiety appears at the level of the scopical drive – the subject sees that the Other wants to pull out his gaze – because the imaginary web, in which the subject wove his desire by seeing himself as a desiring subject in the gaze of the Other, is being torn off. The fact that the web is being torn off reveals the fundamental structure of the subject with object *a* and, therefore, reveals the radical anxiety, Aleph, which no longer has an object, not even an undetermined one. Isaac’s eyes are affected by what he sees when placed on the altar of sacrifice – and it is an event that would remain the source of his vision difficulties that led him to be deceived when giving the blessing to his son. Isaac sees the real face of A-Elohim and, by virtue of this, he moves farther than his father Abraham because in Abraham’s situation the symbolic overpasses the real, in a topological manner. Abraham’s anxiety is articulated in the symbolic register and Lévinas takes on the metaphor of a journey with no return which is the subject’s answer to the original call: the implications lead to infinite responsibility, hostage culpability in front of the call of the voice of the Superego coming from the face of the neighbor. At a different level, Isaac’s anxiety is without object, the real is perhaps more powerful than the truth, while at Abraham’s level the symbolic wins over the real and makes an inassimilable residue.¹⁸ In both the sacrifice of Isaac and the breaking of the bread a space is created, an empty space where the symbolic register can appear.

Lacan introduces the voice as object *a* as prior to the gaze with reference to hallucinated voices. In his seminar “Les formations de l’inconscient”¹⁹ there is already the voice of the Superego because there Lacan says that the place of the Superego is the place of the voice. By identifying voice and Superego, Lacan is

¹⁷ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre XVI: D’un Autre à l’autre*, lesson of March 26, 1969.

¹⁸ Cf. Muriel Mosconi, “La ligature d’Isaac. Une référence de Lacan”, in EPFCL, *Mensuel*, no 47, Dec. 2009, 51-57.

¹⁹ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre V: Les formations de l’inconscient*, Seuil, Paris, 1998, lesson of April 16, 1958, p. 333.

Freudian. But the Superego is an imperative which is detached from the symbolic laws of language. It is the law, but in an interrupted form. Moreover, this interrupted and parasite discourse can be assimilated with the voices. Nevertheless, *jouissance* is at the inmost of this imperative: “the Superego is the imperative of *jouissance*: *Jouis*”²⁰. And the subject’s answer can only be “*J’ouïs*”²¹. Here is a definition of the voice from the fifth seminar: “In the fully articulated signifier, there is always a passage, that is something beyond the articulated elements which, by their nature, are fugacious, dissipated. This passage from one another is the essence of the chain of signifiers. This evanescent passage becomes voice – I do not say significant articulation because it is possible that the articulation remains enigmatic, but [I say] that the voice supports the passage itself”²². Although in Lacan’s fifth seminar the voice is not yet isolated as object *a*, it still is an unassimilable residue that supports the passage, therefore it is essential to any articulation of the signifier.

But Lacan states that this commandment – “*Jouis*” – is impossible to fulfill because the Superego is a word, or, in the times of the fifth seminar and of the graph of desire, the equivalent of “*Jouis*” was the “*chevouoi?*” (“what do you want of me?”). The “strong voice” of this commandment has different values for the neurotic’s Superego on the one hand and for the psychotic’s hallucinatory delirium on the other hand. “When the Superego is formed, the strong voice operates as an Other manifested as real. Is it the same voice in the voice of the delirium?”²³

The French psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Jean-Jacques Gorog wonders what would the voice on the Sinai be without the Tablets of the Law. Instead of producing a divided subject, that voice would not leave the subject another option than to obey; consequently, when people who hallucinate are asked whether what the voice says is true and why they feel so compelled to obey they do not feel at ease precisely because it is a voice whose real existence cannot be contested.²⁴ The Superego, as Lacan described it, not only commands, but also urges to submission whenever the ideal advises silence. The ideal would be: “end

²⁰ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre XX: Encore*, Seuil, Paris, 1999, lesson of November 21, 1972.

²¹ *Ouïr*, in ancient French or in ironic expressions, means “to hear with one’s ears, to catch”. See Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre X: L’angoisse*, lesson of December 19, 1962, p. 96.

²² Lesson of April 22, 1958, p. 343.

²³ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre VI: Le désir et son interprétation*, Seuil, Paris, 2013, lesson of May 20, 1959.

²⁴ Cf. Jean-Jacques Gorog, “Le surmoi freudien composite et la *jouissance* selon Lacan”, *EPFCL, Mensuel*, no. 51, 2010, p. 23. We shall add here a definition of *akedia*, meaning “to reject the joy that can be produced by the *jouissance* of God to the point where one can obtain *jouissance* from this rejection. This is the peak of vice, vice of all vices, none other than that of the Superego, the obscene and ferocious voice”, see Michel Bousseynroux, “Le vice du vice”, in *L’en-je lacanien*, 2/ 2009, pp. 17-28.

with the symbolic, say nothing. What is that demonic force that propels us to say something, to learn, I begin to believe that it is the Superego"²⁵. The subject complains about it, but, at the same time, it is the reason why psychoanalysis can be carried out. The lack of Superego in psychosis would explain the difficulties that these subjects have, while for the neurotic the Superego stays the same.

Face-to-Face

The face of the other, of the neighbor, becomes in Lévinas's texts an "object" point that meets the subject and links him to his own desire, but at the same time the face is the impossible meeting with the gaze, it is the framed gaze, like in the window of the phantasy or in the way a veil conceals the lack (that is: what is not there to be seen); it is the distance between the defenseless eyes of the other and his gaze that can become a point of anxiety. The subject's relation to the face of the Other as gaze is mediated by the veil concealing the real, as the field of vision is bound to three realms: the imaginary of the mirror, the symbolic of the perspective and the real of the topology. In this sense, the scopic field always has a cross-cap structure, a topological surface that shows the real of the subjective structure in which the subject finds itself in an internal exclusion with respect to its object.

Moreover, the face is the one that calls, but this interpellation, arising from an immemorial past that calls to responsibility, produces a type of experience in which we say that the subject itself is called to answer while not yet being a subject, and therefore to enter the human order. This call occurs in an original opening – *Bejahung*, that contains the *ja*; "yes, I assume!", yes to a condition of possibility that exceeds the subject; we note that the opening is a donation – an opening in which the subject is chosen (*élu*), but at the same time it has to make a choice regarding its subjective structure – because the psychic structure emerges in the posture that the subject assumes in relation to the origin, the place assumed by the subject. For Lévinas, the subject enters the no-return Abrahamic journey by answering in the affirmative to this call: "here I am!", in a primordial face-to-face relation to Language, although by virtue of its answer and, therefore, in order to establish itself as an *I* after being interpellated as a *you*, it is necessary for the Other to withdraw, to become a *he*; whence Lévinas's concept of Illeity, or trace of the Infinity who in its almighty height commands, while being simultaneously weak and helpless in the guise of the poor, of the widow or of the orphan.

²⁵ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre XXIV: L'insu que sait de l'une bévue s'aile à mourre*, lesson of February 8, 1977.

The function of the face-to-face relation is to veil, to hide the gaze and to sustain a presumed existence and co-existence of the Other for it to remain a warrant of the subject. Because, Lacan says, there is a lack in the Other, there is a void made by its lack of guarantee, or the lack in the Other is a window to the unnamable real, to the signifier of the lack of the Other, which we find in Lévinas's Talmudic lessons by the name of Yahweh, unpronounceable because its vowels are missing, having been repressed. But this name has a name, Adonai, just like a nomination is also made by the symbolic, and Lévinas offers, in the admirable pages of *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence* or *Éthique et infini*, a resolution to the radical anxiety through responsibility as uniquely assumed culpability following an equally unique call.

The adventure of the subjectivity of the Same, about which Lévinas says that he sets out towards the Other on a no return journey – just like the adventure of the translation of the Torah from Hebrew to Greek – is like the testing of Abraham who also stands up and leaves “from his house” in response to a call. The test of the sacrifice of Isaac is also a response to a call, but in this test, Abraham meets God in the real, and this God is signaled by the only non-deceptive affect which is anxiety. The voice of the Other demanding the sacrifice of Isaac resonates in the void of his lack of guarantee. However, for Abraham the symbolic wins over the real, entailing a rest that is unassimilable, a trace of the Infinity as Lévinas calls it, but in this precise meaning of the radical anguish, this trace is the Face of the other. We can see here to what extent the early Lévinasian concept of *il y a* pertains to the real and how it can be encountered, though always veiled, at the level of the face.

The Text as Veil

Lévinas says that “the fact that Moses spoke to God face-to-face means that the Master and the disciple were both bend over the same Talmudic lesson, say the wisemen”²⁶. Thus, for Lévinas, the face-to-face relationship, the proximity of the Creator is proved neither through an immediate encounter, nor through some Hassidic enthusiasm, but in an ephemeral manner necessitating infinite study. But this kind of study cannot be reduced only to erudite science, but it will place together the word of the master and the word of the apprentice because both the Thora and the Talmud can be received only by means of incessant questioning. For Lévinas, answering is something specific to Occidental philosophy, while questioning is specific to Talmudic study. If the verses are abandoned by men, forgotten on the shelves of a library and no longer questioned, then not even the angels can save them. Only

²⁶ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Difficile liberté*, Livre de Poche, Paris, 1976, p. 47.

beings of flesh and blood can grow the Word from the fragile Biblical verses by continuous questioning, a questioning that is nourished with human joys and sorrows. It is always a question of language. And therefore, Lévinas maintains that face and verse are one and the same. With this, we are fully submerged in the symbolic register, in an undefined expansion of the time for comprehending, the second of the three instances of what Lacan calls *logical time*.²⁷

The Talmud begins with the register of listening²⁸ and the space of Talmudic discussion begins after the withdrawal of God which leaves an empty space where all interrogations can originate. There must be an empty space for the symbolic register to appear.

The veil is the text. The central place in the Temple is divided in two spaces that are separated by the veil: one side is the hidden space, the Holy of the holies, where only the high priest could enter once a year on the Yom Kippur day; this hidden space is where the Ark of the Covenant is placed, the place of one of the names of God, that which is unpronounceable, the Tetragrammaton; on the other side, the space where people could enter, a place for the name Adonai. A thick veil separates the two spaces, a veil that supports the abyss between holiness and alterity, between writing and reading, between the written Thora and the oral Thora. The analogy that we propose is that between the veil of the temple and the veil of the phantasy. When looking at the veil “with skillfully embroidered cherubim” (Exodus 26, 31), what one can see is at the same time visible and invisible, like the text.

Even if the text as such does not necessarily hide, under the word lies the invisible, under the Said there is the Saying. The meaning appears without appearing, manifests without manifestation, like the Face does. It dwells enigmatically the text, it is a withdrawal of the presence. The text contains more than it contains and the distance separating the visible and the invisible is infinite and manifested as transcendence. Hence the veil places the subject in a continuous attitude of interrogation.

In Talmudic tradition, the Midrash is the third of the four levels of study of the Thora, four traditional methods of exegesis in Judaism: the level of interpretation, meaning *commentary* in its traditional definition. In the story of the four rabbis, this level is represented by Ben Abouya, *A’her*: The Other or the heretic.²⁹ He who estranged himself from Judaism, who moved outside, is, in fact,

²⁷ Jacques Lacan, “Le temps logique et l’assertion de la certitude anticipée. Un nouveau sophisme”, in *Écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, pp. 197-213.

²⁸ Cf. Marc-Alain Ouaknin, *Séminaire*, unpublished, URL: <http://www.idixa.net/Pixa/pagxa-0509110911.html>, lesson of October 17, 2004.

²⁹ The story of the four rabbis (Ben Azzay, Ben Zoma, Ben Abouya and Akiba) who entered Heavens, corresponding to the four levels of interpretation of the Thora; see Marc-Alain Ouaknin, *Lire aux éclats. Eloge de la caresse*, Quai Voltaire, 1989, pp. 11, 29, 327 *passim*.

most suitable to interpret what lies inside. The study, the relation between man and book, is incarnated by A'her, the subject of in-between. Interpreting, the human being is installed in a continuous movement, but without return to the starting point, between being (*être*) and "unbeing" (*désêtre*), a distance between two words: one which was already there and another which will be invented in interpretation.

The Talmudic controversy opens only when between the two interlocutors a void opens from which God withdraws because such a void is the origin of all questions. Here, in this space, the question is always open, it does not wait for an answer; here the world opens again, originally, as if each day were the day of revelation.³⁰ We propose to link the veil of the text with the gaze, since both are supported by a void, the abyss between the two interlocutors.

At the scopic level, which is the level of the phantasy, we are dealing with the power of the Other, with the Height from which the Lévinasian Face looks at me, although this is the mirage of the metaphysical desire which, nevertheless, is an indestructible desire.³¹

The scission of the subject which is divided by castration will affect the field of vision and the reality which is constituted as a veil hiding both the phallic lack and the gaze that evades any perception. The visual reality of the neighbor is supported by his face, a veil which hides, as well as by the lack in the Other that is conjugated with the presence of the gaze. The signifier of the lack is called by Lacan the Name of the Father.

The Void

If the visual field can be seen in the three registers – the imaginary of the mirror, the symbolic of the perspective and the real of the topology –, if visual perception is in the register of the imaginary supported by the symbolic, and if the Face of the other, of the neighbor, relates to the impossible encounter with the gaze, being the framed gaze, then the Face is the distance between the eye and the gaze, the face of the neighbor is an object point which meets the subject and links him to his own desire, it is an analogue of the veil, of the veil of the temple. The scopic field has, at the same time, a cross-cap structure, which is a topological

³⁰ Cf. Marc-Alain Ouaknin, *Tsimtsoum. Introduction à la méditation hébraïque*, Albin Michel, 1992, p. 114.

³¹ The hole of the gaze on the face is at the same time brightness and hole of jouissance where, for the subject, the place of the Other can be found. And the iteration of the scopic drive – to see and be seen – has a Moebius structure which is articulated with the castration in the Other, where the scission of the subject is an effect of the scission of the eye, scission between eye and gaze. See Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre XI: Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse*, lesson of February 19, 1964, pp. 65-74.

surface showing the real of the structure where the subject is in an internal exclusion with its object.

The gaze as object a – one of the five forms of object a that Lacan conceptualizes: oral, anal, phallic, scopic, vocal – is the most appropriate to prove the agalma of the “object cause” of desire. The agalma shines in the light, it is a point reflecting the light, it deceives the eye, hence the expression at Isaiah 6, 9: “keep on seeing, but do not perceive” – which is later resumed in the Book of Matthew and in the Book of Acts. But the gaze is object of anxiety whenever the scopic drive reveals itself as death drive, if we carefully read Lacan’s tenth seminar. The gaze bears a mortifying jouissance. The two sides of jouissance – on the one hand pleasure, on the other hand too much pleasure, impossible to endure – make the object gaze both a somehow pictorial jubilation and object of anxiety, just like the two sides of the Gaze of Medusa: we know that it eventually petrifies. The verse “God has given them a spirit of stupor, eyes that they should not see” (Romans 11, 8) indicates the fact that it is not necessarily for the eyes to be pulled out, as Oedipus did because he wanted to pass to a scopic level in an authentic and mythical way. Oedipus’s sin was that of willing to know and this is something that must be paid in horror since what he eventually sees are his own eyes, a , on the ground.³² This would be the meaning of the expression “eyes that they should not see”. The gaze is always present in the feeling of anxiety. Freud speaks about scopic anxiety where the subject finds himself looked at by the Other of the Superego and cannot hide from that gaze.

The agalma of the signifier on the one hand, the signifier of lack in the Other, on the other hand, because agalma is always supported by a lack. What Lacan calls $-\phi$ ³³ gives an agalmatic shine to all objects of desire and hides the

³² See Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre X: L’angoisse*, lesson of July 3, 1963, p. 384.

³³ What does $-\phi$ mean? The transfer of the libido through the mirror is not-all (*pas-tout*), says Lacan, because there is always a residue, a ; but this residue is only lack and cause of desire. Yet, on the other side of the mirror there is another lack: the lack in any specular image which is characterized by the phallic lack $-\phi$, that is the one which polarizes, stimulates desire and has a function of attraction as well; the absence, the white of a desired image, is commanded by an elsewhere presence: at the level where a is. But this object a is not representable in a mirror. But when an object appears where there should be a lack $-\phi$, when the lack is lacking, it is what we called an alarming strangeness (*Unheimlichkeit*). But why the minus? Because $-\phi$ remains that part of the libido which was not put into an image, which remains as a reserve. Or, remaining is a reserve is proper to primary narcissism. Therefore $-\phi$ did not enter in the imaginary because it stayed at the level of the real of the body as organism, as a reserve. This $-\phi$ can be found in any virtual image as an attractive image. Or, what is lacking from the specular image is, in fact, that which makes it attractive and erotizes it: it is erotized only because what is lacking is that part of the libido which is hidden on the other side in real space. Thus, $-\phi$ stands for two things: on the one hand, for the fact that “not-all” libido is transferred in an image and, on the other hand, the fact that the image is “not-all” libidized.

horror of their real. Beyond the fully shaped agalma, there is a void that Freud did not conceptualize and that Lévinas only partially thematized, because the safety of the phantasy is fading, it is unraveled through the window towards the real. Since we are no longer in the context of “having” an agalmatic object, the gaze, but in that of the loss of being, the subject passes from the demand for a gaze in the phantasy to the becoming of the lost object, the voice. The agalma that made the object of the phantasy shine does no longer operate, the residue is cleaned by the shining of any phallic packaging in order to leave room for the cause of desire. Lacan links the object of the gaze with the object of the demand – be it educational – because the only place from where the object can fade is the gaze. And the analogue of the object of the demand is the concept of *trace*.

The void of the window is the lack in the Other – the lack as window towards the real, a hole through the subject’s relation to the world –, it is the hole left by the gaze as lost object. It is here that the subject places the mirror or the veil of the phantasy. The hole of the phantasy is equivalent to the hole of the real because the mirror always hides the gaze, while the phantasy shows it. Yet, the problem is that they are both deceiving since they both hide the hole in the Other and support a supposed consistency and a desired existence of the Other as warrant for the subject. But the void of warranty of the Other is linked to the void of memory of God, who could forget. This is the reason why the sound of the shofar is necessary, because it shapes the place of the subject’s anxiety after the desire of the Other took form of commandment – “you shall not kill” or “I am the Lord God”. It is why it can fulfill its function of solving anxiety as culpability or forgiveness.³⁴

“As if not”

For Lévinas, the Face is the impossible conjunction between the subject and that something that is the cause of his desire, but which withdraws because it pertains to a past that was never present. The face veils something that we wish to see but is impossible to see. Just like the atonement cover or the veil of the temple. The presence of the Face is correlative to the Saying that arises before any Said because it is something that was not lived, the fundamental trauma – which is the entry of the subject in language – is an experience without a subject, but which comes back as a *return*. Freud said that the trauma goes back to a prehistoric time, that it resides in the structure, and that what comes back as a return is the rest of the trauma, which was never apprehended in the discourse or the interpretation.

³⁴ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre X: L’angoisse*, lesson of June 5, 1963, p. 320.

The division of the subject in its Pauline form bears on the “as if not”³⁵, and the speaking subject has an indeterminate temporality underlying any determined temporality. For Lévinas, the ultimate test of the alterity of the Other, as a pulsation of the Other in the Same, derives from the structure of this temporality as a gap in the chronological continuity, and leads the subject to its unicity consisting of an infinite responsibility for his neighbor, as both stares Zosima and rabbi Amos affirm. But it also is a universal culpability, for all the others and for their mistakes, the source of this culpability lying at the level of the constitution of the phantasy and of the subject’s relation to desire. This subjective responsibility occurs in a logical time that is subsequent to the constitution of the subjective structure in answer to the original call which the radical Other addresses to the subject and to which the latter answers “Here I am”.

If the subject’s event of accepting before knowing – or “we will do and will obey”, an ethical act assumed following a donation – is intrinsic to the revelation as donation of the Torah, then for Lévinas this is the stake of the truth as cause, in the sense that God is set as cause of the subject’s desire, but if the latter finds it impossible to refuse the donation, culpability may settle in this field of ethics preceding knowledge because the human being is, already, in a relation to its neighbor - the only way of knowing God, as the revelation is illustrated by the practice of the commandments. Thus, the dimension of the revelation presupposes the truth bearing word, it is already discourse, and accepting before knowing relates to the liturgical reading of the scroll of Esther. We may introduce at this point the dimension of the Freudian Superego. Freud’s great invention from his second topic is the Superego, in fact the way he places the origin to the forefront in relation to the constitution of the subject. However, the imperative of the Superego is a commandment impossible to fulfill if we are in language, but it lies, as such, at the origin of everything we say by way of the notion of moral conscience.

The conceptualizing of the Lévinasian Face as *das Ding*, in the context of the subjectivity of the Other in the Same is analogous to the moment of the paradoxical and archaic menace that Freud speaks about, a normative moment which for Freud is coherent with the oedipal relation. “That which in the real suffers from the signifier” suffers so from the original relation that inscribes the man on the ways of the signifiers, inscribes itself in the Face which appears as *nihil*. Behind the phantasic veil lies the signifier of desire, something which must not be shown, because the unveiling of what is but nothing – that is the absence of what is veiled – is named by Freud’s Medusa’s head, or by the “horror” answering to the revealed absence.³⁶

³⁵ Giorgio Agamben, “Biserica și Împărăția”, in *Prietenul și alte eseuri*, Humanitas, București, 2012, p. 60.

³⁶ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire: Livre II: Le moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychanalyse*, Seuil, Paris, 1978, lesson of March 16, 1955, p. 196.

In conceptualizing responsibility, Lévinas appeals to the words of the Torah in which a permanence of an unpayable debt corresponds to the superabundance of God's blessing, because the more one pays the debt, the more indebted one is. The closer the subject is to the other, the bigger his responsibility is for the other. The interiority particular to the Lévinasian subject, in a responsibility for all the others in which he is irreplaceable, pertains to a lack of repose *per se* and, therefore, to a strangeness intrinsic to any place. A stranger to himself and to his place, no man is at home and in this "*incondition*" of stranger the man looks for the other, for the neighbor he is promised to, as each man is "his brother's keeper". For Lévinas, the paradigm of the subject lies in the figure of Abraham starting out on a *no-return* adventure, the adventure of a people as well as that of subjectivity. The people that was promised to Abraham received the Torah on Mount Sinai, and the subject knows that Infinity reveals itself to those who keep themselves *behind* (*sur la trace de*) the other, just like Ruth knows she will find the silent God if she walks behind Naomi.³⁷ If the suffering of the neighbor is a call to responsibility, then Ruth is in each subject whose election took place in an immemorial past that was never present.

One of the hypotheses we are proposing is that the voice and the gaze meet in the Face, therefore we analyzed the Hebrew ritual object called shofar that presents the voice in a separate form. The commandment "you shall not kill" as an expression of the other's face is only inscribed after the anguishing desire of the Other has been tamed, and the shofar may proclaim the culpability, which means that it can shape the place of anxiety, as we stated above. The shofar and the death of the father lie, in fact, at the beginning of the economy of desire. The culpability covers the anxiety stirred by the unassimilable residue in which the voice appears in the opening of the subject and of the Other as an object fallen from the subject and from the Other.

The voice resonates in the void of the Other, and the shofar's role is to shape this void, to put a bar to the jouissance of the Other and, so, to shape the place of the anxiety. The instauration of an Other supplemented by the voice is precisely the project of the Superego since, lying in the void of the Other, the voice is mute but, however, it is a voice of the ethical, of the culpability of the hostage and of infinite responsibility, in order to remind us the image of an Other demanding the – impossible to satisfy – sacrifice of the jouissance. The voice remains a residue irreducible to a signifier, a rest supporting the passage, being, therefore, essential for the articulation of the signifier. The Tablets of the Law are essential in the human structure, because otherwise the voice on Mount Sinai would not produce the divided subject.

³⁷ *The Ethics of the Talmud: Sayings of the Fathers*, apud Catherine Chalier, "Ruth", in Lin Yael (ed.), *Lévinas Faces Biblical Figures*. Lexington Books, Lanham, 2014, p. 103.

Conclusion

In the Abrahamic test of Isaac's sacrifice, the face is gaze, gaze of Isaac face-to-face with Abraham, in Lévinas's interpretation, gaze that stops the hand which had already consented to sacrifice, because the gaze and the divine voice unite in that eminent moment. But, if in Abraham's case the symbolic wins over the real and determines a unassimilable residue, Isaac's gaze is, at the same time, face-to-face with the real of God's face. Both Isaac's sacrifice and the breaking of the bread refer to the creation of a space for the occurrence of the symbolic order, in the empty place. The voice incorporates, instead of just being assimilated, which means that it can assume the function of shaping the void, while the language acquires, for Lévinas, an expressive function. The first saying is "God", and in the face-to-face structure of faith, the subject, exposed to the Other, already answers with a "Here I am". The Name of the Father is God, and the Said is the mode in which the human being reacts against or answers to that original face-to-face in which the Name calls the human being to speak, to the Said in relation to the origin. The human is stateless, the departure of Abraham takes place in two orders, on the one hand it is a departure towards "the land I will show you", and on the other hand it is "towards yourself".

The no-return way is related to the constitution of the being of phantasy that has in desire a function of meaning of the truth. The permanence of the study of Torah is a blessing in which the depths are always given in abundance, like a "much in little" proper to the unpronounceable Name of God which leads the subject to open itself towards the unknowable transcendence that surpasses it infinitely. The Name of God allows the man to be in relation with his neighbors by following the trace of the Infinity, because man can be a witness of the name, giving testimony about it and, by it, being a martyr in his infinite responsibility. This is the Lévinasian answer par excellence to the call of the Name. Any word becomes prophetic, being correlative of the participation of the subject – the receiver of the revelation – in the work of the God without promise, the God who "becomes idea" and who, being a stranger, only occurs if He is received; this God reveals himself in the prophecy, and this is the exceptional relation linking Israel to the Torah. Therein lies the interest in the biblical ethics.

The experience of the other, as a stranger, is also an experience of the strange. The subject was never present, as a subject, to the act of its election, so that the transcendence of infinity, as conceptualized by Lévinas, pertains to an irretrievable past that was never present. Therefore, the election can only be understood in terms of trace. Just that the trace as strange disturbs the order of

the world, the safety that was given to it by the window of the phantasy; it is an excess that shakes the veil hiding the unseen. The agalma of the signifier is counterbalanced by the signifier of a lack in the Other, and this happens because the agalma is always supported by a lack. The “objects cause of desire” have always had an agalmatic brilliance, the horror of their real being covered by a veil.

The lack in the Other or the void, window of the real, hole of the scopic relation of the subject with the world, is covered by the veil of the phantasy hiding the hole in the Other and offering it a presumed consistency as a warrant of the subject. The void of guarantee of the Other pertains to the lack of memory of the God who could forget about the covenant, so that the reiteration of the sound of the shofar becomes necessary, as well as its possibility to carry out its function of shaping the place of the anxiety as culpability.

The first word is the Saying, but for Lévinas this word is “the Name by which God signifies himself”. But the Saying is the one that translates the Saying into Said, and that’s how the untranslatable breaks right into the heart of the translation; the “still, small voice” which Elijah hears on mount Horeb, the original word, remains unspeakable, and the translation must be uninterrupted, just like the study. The proto-translation of the silence is Face, as trace of the passing of God whose Face is not to be seen and whose Name is not to be pronounced. “I Am that I Am” from the burning bush can provide a hint in this direction.

For Lévinas, face and verse are one and the same because the face-to-face of Moses with God doesn’t mean anything except that the disciple and the Master are looking together into the same Talmudic lessons, which means that the proximity of the Creator requires an infinite study. The biblical verses must be looked in the face, and the space of the Talmudic discussions starts from the withdrawal of God, who leaves an empty place that becomes the place of origin of any interrogation. The veil supporting the abyss between holiness and alterity, separating the Holy of the Holies from the nave, is an analogue of the text that hides without hiding, because beneath the word lives the invisible. The true face-to-face with God inscribes itself in the uninterrupted study of the written and oral Torah.

The Other, in the election, is the Saying preceding and constitutive to the Said, and in the original addressing of the Other, the meeting with the Other is not a fact of the subject, but it’s elicited by the call. The Saying has already withdrawn, leaving only its trace in the Said, but this is already a betrayal, and the problem of “in other words” is located in the passage from Hebrew to Greek. While the Hebrew bears the indelible mark of a revelation, the Infinity revealing itself in the Face of the other resides exactly in this Hebrew, original word, which the Same will never be able to translate in his own terms. The Hebrew – the scroll of the

Torah – is, in this sense, the proto-translation of silence.³⁸ The translation is irreversible also because it brings with itself a rest which is precisely the unpronounceable Name.

The Face reveals itself at the same time as a *person* and as *nothing*. In the nothing of the speaking eyes of the face, the Nothing of the infinity shows through, the brilliance of the transcendence reveals itself in the dark abyss of the eyes, which is the deepest darkness that produces blindness because of the brilliance of the Face. By way of *nothing*, desire masks the anxiety of what lacks, essentially, in the desire. The image of the face converts to the nothingness which we see in its eyes, hence its trait of *passage*, for the brighter the face is, the greater is the depth.

For Lévinas, the face talks from the nothing of its eyes, calling the subject to responsibility, on a no-return way. Also, without return is the stopping of Abraham's hand above the altar of the sacrifice, a stop according to the law of desire, which separates desire from *jouissance* and sets a covenant, reiterated by the shofar's sound. This covenant renews the original work, therefore the looking into the fragile verses, the meeting of the vulnerable face of the neighbor, the practice of the commandments, the rite and the liturgy all conjugate for the assuming of the symbolic that wins and lays a veil – in the feminine gender – over the real.

If the name of the Tetragrammaton is Adonai, if the name has a name, as Lévinas says³⁹, and if the context in which we place the Lévinasian ethical subject is that of the Lacanian Borromean knot, then, furthermore, there is a Name of the Name's Name – vis-à-vis the three Lacanian orders – as the Name of the Father takes over the function of naming *otherwise*.

The Lévinasian election pertains to the Name of the Father, that is, to a God to whose glory the subject bears witness in the continuously renewed moment of the offering. The substitution of Isaac, in the sense of the metaphor of the Name of the Father, achieves the primordial metaphor separating desire and *jouissance*. This assumes that in the cases of Abraham and of the Lévinasian subject, the symbolic wins over the real, determining a unassimilable rest. The Tetragrammaton is, in fact, the one in whose name Isaac is spared, the Tetragrammaton gives the blessing to Abraham for obeying his voice, the Tetragrammaton appears to Moses in the burning bush. "I Am that I Am" is a hole, a signifier of the lack of the Other that is, as such, unpronounceable. Moses puts

³⁸ Cf. Jean-Louis Chrétien, "La traduction irréversible", in *Emmanuel Lévinas: Positivité et Transcendance. Suivi de Lévinas et la phénoménologie*, PUF, Paris, 2000, pp. 309-328.

³⁹ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Au-delà du verset. Lectures et discours talmudiques*. Ed. de Minuit, Paris, 1982, p. 150.

the name of God in the place of this hole, that lies, in fact, in the place where the Other is called to guarantee the symbolic Other. The Name of God *is* the repression, and the consonants of the Tetragrammaton make the border of the “true hole” of the structure.⁴⁰ Where the subject waits for the divine guarantee – for an Other of the Other of the symbolic – there is nothing but a hole.

But, as the thematizing of the origin of the Saying is absent, the subject needs an analogue which we call phantasy. The crossing of the veil of the phantasy is not pertaining to the Name of the Father anymore, but to the Father who names, posing the problem of a different kind of experience, which is not an object of the present paper. Although we do not believe that the Lévinasian ethics goes so far as to propose a type of subject whose desire could offer a real guarantee for the concept of anxiety, the inquiry remains open precisely because this direction concerns the phenomenology post-Emmanuel Lévinas and the psychoanalytic experience.

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⁴⁰ Cf. Michel Bousseyroux, *Au risque de la topologie et de la poésie. Elargir la psychanalyse*, pp. 55-56.

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THE ABYSS OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS-TIME WITHIN THE CRYSTAL-IMAGE: KRZYSZTOF ZANUSSI AND WERNER HERZOG

ALEXANDRA NOEMINA CÂMPEAN*

ABSTRACT. The paper undertakes to analyze the specificity of Gilles Deleuze's concept of crystal-image in two films: *The Structure of Crystal/ Struktura kryszталu* (Krzysztof Zanussi, 1969) and *Heart of Glass/ Herz aus Glas* (Werner Herzog, 1976). The crystal-image offers an insight into the amorphous abyss of consciousness, but it also represents the natural culmination of image in the history of modern cinema. Whereas in Zanussi the crystal of time depicts the figure of the visionary that sees the "self-castration" of time, the non-actor of Herzog, with a hypnotic gaze and a heart of glass, is the only one capable of seeing the inner being of a landscape.

Keywords: image, crystal, time, present, past, virtual.

Introduction

Although they breathe time in a rhythm, cinema and image are never in the present; the image, like the face in its profoundness (*le visage* in French), is not presentified since its *before* and *after* coexist not in a chronological and linear expression, but in an internal time. Nevertheless, images in a film are shown at the present time, but always haunted by the memories of the past and by the possibilities of the future. As faces become time, they become death: the loss of the face (the loss of death) means that the only subjectivity within the image is time itself, *i.e.* a subjectivity which is not limited to the human: "... it is we who are internal to time, not the other way round (...) Time is not the interior in us, but just the opposite, the interiority in which we are, in which we move,

* Independent researcher; Ph.D. in Literature at Babes-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca, 2015. Published book *Strindberg and Bergman. Comparative Perspectives on the Pain of the Innocent*, Școala Ardeleană & Eikon Publishing Houses Cluj-Napoca, 2018.

live and change. (...) we are internal to time, which divides itself in two, which loses itself and discovers itself in itself, which makes the present pass and the past be preserved.”¹

The cinematic image confirms that time is not our interior, but the interiority that encircles our world; moreover, the image represents a repetition of experiences always new and different. “The cinema does not only present images, it surrounds them with a world”², a well-known statement that Deleuze sets at the beginning of his chapter about the crystal-image, claims that in each image, in every film, time is constantly changing or expanding in irrational flashbacks, reminiscences, spirals, bifurcations, fantasies, surreal juxtapositions or dream condensations. Time in modern cinema opens itself towards a thought (more like *a feeling of thought*) that stands outside subjectivity and makes the absence visible. An intriguing issue: Deleuze’s statement also postulates a special relation between an actual image and its virtual context – the crystal-image which mainly represents an “expressive-intensive symbol”³, a modulative autocatalysis. I will explain it in a few steps through two particular examples: Zanussi’s film from 1969 *The Structure of Crystal/ Struktura kryszталu* and Herzog’s film from 1976 *Heart of Glass/ Herz aus Glas*.

Actual and virtual. Reality of the virtual

The crystalline or the inorganic⁴ image, the union of an actual image and a virtual image to the point where they can no longer be distinguished, reveals how the direct image of time or the Proustian time appears in film, it is what Deleuze calls the real form of time, “la temporalisation de l’image”: “The direct time-image is the phantom which has always haunted the cinema, but it took modern cinema to give a body to this phantom”⁵. Returning to the subject of our chapter, for Deleuze, the virtual is not the opposite of the real, but of the actual and, furthermore, concentric circles of past and present compose the crystal-image, an “imagescape”, meaning a landscape of multiple simultaneous worldviews. The

¹ Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2. The Time-Image*, The Athlone Press London, 1989, p. 82.

² *Ibidem.*, p. 68.

³ Gregory Flaxman, “Introduction”, pp. 1-57 in *The Brain is the Screen. Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*, ed. by Gregory Flaxman, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2000.

⁴ Deleuze adapts the notions of “organic” and “crystalline” to his film critique from the German art historian Wilhelm Worringer – for more details, see *Abstraktion und Einfühlung* and *Formprobleme der Gotik*.

⁵ G. Deleuze, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

actual image reflects a virtual image that both highlights and covers the real – a simultaneous emergence of *naissance* (the French for birth) and *connaissance* (the French for knowledge), true and false, thought and un-thought, perception and recollection, physical and mental. At first glance, Deleuze writes about two possible time-images, one with reference to the past, the other one grounded in the presentation (of the present). The crystalline regime comprises time-images related to the present, but also a second category of images: “peaks of the present and sheets of the past” which are time-images related to the past. According to Gregory Flaxman⁶, there are actually three types of time-images: time-images of the present, time-images of the past, and a third kind, which brings together the before and the after in a becoming instead of separating them. We believe the image-that-becomes-and-endures is a constant in Zanussi’s film, since both images and characters penetrate and co-penetrate one another invariably.

Jan (the actor Jan Myslowicz) and Marek (Andrzej Zarnecki), the main characters in Zanussi’s film *The Structure of Crystal*, two men of science, examine and exchange faces in a mirror like Alma and Elisabet in Bergman’s *Persona* and, later, walking in a cemetery, they read the following lines written on a headstone epitaph: “I was what you are. I am what you will be. Remember me so that someone might remember you.” Zanussi sets in contrast not only the clothes of the male characters, but also their states of mind. The crystal formed by the two characters in Zanussi’s film, one cloistered/ solitary, the other one quite opposite, resembles a never completed honeycomb or an amphitheater with multiple faces, labyrinthine scenes. It represents an interpersonal and interchangeable crystal within an intellectual or *cerebral* cinema that objectifies the thoughts of the protagonists. Jan dedicated his last years to the research at the state meteorological station, he has a claustrophobic and reflective existence, complaining that the contemporary human is no longer absorbed by the idea of infinity, since it became a mathematical concept. When Kawecki tells him: “You have to do something. You’re in your best years”, Jan responds that “pausing for breath” has become a way of life for him and his family. Nevertheless, his existence is like a spiral that encloses itself in a snail or, in other words, he portrays a visionary figure that sees, according to Deleuze, the division of time within the crystal of time, the self-castration of time itself: to see the division of time signifies that the world becomes a “proliferation of reflections” (Ronald Bogue), crystallizing relations and dramatic tensions. The characters of modern cinema do not act, they are not theatrical, they simply see; their narration is reclusive and ascetic, without direction or resolution.

⁶ G. Flaxman, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

Therefore, Zanussi, alongside with other Polish directors like Agnieszka Holland, Andrzej Wajda and Krzysztof Kieślowski, is often associated with the *cinema of moral conscience*. Articulating an individual and, more importantly, a political choice, Jan belongs to this new race, he is a “pur voyant”. He doesn’t see the time itself, but the effects of time, he finds himself in the wound of time, in a image cut in two: a schizophrenic image par excellence. Deleuze writes: “It is time itself which arises in the crystal, and which is constantly recommending its dividing in two without completing it, since the indiscernible exchange is always renewed and reproduced. The direct time-image or the transcendental form of time is what we see in the crystal...”⁷ We should also add that: “the image has to be present and past, still present and already past, at once and at the same time. If it was not already past at the same time as present, the present would never pass on. The past does not follow the present that is no longer, it coexists with the present it was.”⁸ On the other hand, it is often difficult to decide what image is actual and what is its reflection, taking into account that the crystalline substance of this film is doubled by a crystalline sound, a kind of a glass bell that repeatedly interrupts the so-called narration of the film, the segmented time of the narration in imaginary pieces – time after time, scene after scene... but it is also a time that connects the created images by means of memory and thoughts.

The crystal of time announces the crisis of the (traditional) action-image that lasted until 1940 – it is the title of the first book of *Cinema 1. The Action-Image*; we may consider that modern cinema consists of a crystalline network of direct time-images that emerges from the metamorphosis of the movement-image. “Each film, then, is a kind of ‘image’ made up of movement-images and time-images (an image, that is, of the cinema), but at the same time the cinema itself is an image or ‘system of crystal-images’ – in other words, an image synonymous for Deleuze with modern cinema, such that this history depends on its own imagination of history as having culminated.”⁹ In addition, the crystal of time breaks the narration and functions like the image in a mirror, that is to say that the crystal-image contracts the object instead of dilating it. The narration in film, at the intersection of movement, montage and time, functions like a relation that speaks through filmic images (that derive from the Image in its general sense), signs and characters.

⁷ G. Deleuze, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

⁸ *Ibidem.*, p. 79.

⁹ Andras Balint Kovacs, “The Film History of Thought”, pp. 153-170 in *The Brain is the Screen. Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*, *op. cit.*

Representing, as we have seen before, our interiority, this form of time that the crystalline and pure cinema discovered is discontinuous and restores the possibility of an instant which can last forever – the eonic instant – although the character (each character has his own and different present) repeats the same words: “une fois de plus” (from *L’année dernière à Marienbad/ Last Year at Marienbad*, Alain Resnais, Alain Robbe-Grillet, belonging both to *le nouveau roman* and *la nouvelle vague*: “une fois de plus” actually means “un plus de rien”, since nothing happens); other repeated words: “Tu n’as rien vu à Hiroshima” (*Hiroshima mon amour/ Hiroshima my Love*, Alain Resnais and Marguerite Duras), “ingenting” (the Swedish for nothing in Ingmar Bergman’s films, stressed and ritualized). Repeated constantly, these opaque words disappear among the layers of the image or in the irrational machine of the memory – they represent an artifact of symbiotic imprints and impressions. In fact, Deleuze’s famous statement “the brain is the screen” refers to a cinema of the mind emerged directly from the thoughts of the characters, from their Unconscious, thoughts that are projected by a “camera-consciousness” into images in which the distinction between the real and the virtual is blurred: “The exploration of the nonchronological dimension of time became the vocation of cinema, of a cinema that demands more and more thought.”¹⁰ This hyperreality of thought involves the molecular body of the film, which is similar to the chemical formula of the crystal, *i.e.* a proliferation of visions, but a body created in a liquid form according to Deleuze’s concept of the “body without organs”, a literal/ schizophrenic relationship. The body of the time-image in film recalls, according to Deleuze, the “ceremonial body”¹¹: introducing the body into a glass cage or a crystal to the point that the visible body disappears. Thus, the time-image connects the visible-hidden-body to the unthought, the unseeable and the unsayable. Last but not least, the generic crystal also involves an ethical stake with reference to Poland’s national political perspective, combining (a twisted) social realism with moments of magic realism.

The crystalline substance of the heart

In Herzog’s strange film and abstract “essay” from 1976 *Heart of Glass/ Herz aus Glas* the implied dream of cinema lies in the glacial quality of the

¹⁰ Paola Marrati, *Gilles Deleuze. Cinema and Philosophy*, The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2008, p. 76.

¹¹ G. Deleuze, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-190. See also: “ ‘Give me a body then’ is first to mount the camera on an everyday body. The body is never in the present, it contains the before and the after, tiredness and waiting. (...) This is a time-image, the series of time. The daily attitude is what puts the before and after into the body, time into body, the body as a revealer of the deadline. The attitude of the body relates thought to time as to that outside which is infinitely further than the outside world.”

image, in its crystalline structure which is double by nature (Fr. *l'image biface, l'image mutuelle*) – the search for the alchemical red heart crystal doubled by the search of cosmic limits, universal powers: “I want to be that man who looks to the horizon and decides to set out to discover the shape of the Earth himself.”¹² As we have already mentioned, Deleuze argues that what the crystal-image ultimately presents is the most important operation of time: “The crystal always lives at the limit, it is itself the ‘vanishing limit between the immediate past which is already no longer and the immediate future which is not yet... [a] mobile mirror which endlessly reflects perception into recollection.”¹³ To briefly summarize the story, in a Bavarian village in the late of 18th century, a glass-maker dies and takes to his grave the secret of his ruby glass. The loss of an origin or of a memory is similar here to the transition to industrial modernity. The glass factory owner (the actor Stefan Güttler) tries to unearth the formula and to read Mühlbeck’s brain: without this formula no one will protect him anymore from the evil of the universe; moreover, the sun and the chaos of the stars are already hurting him: “I need a glass to hold my blood or it will drain away.” The human heart represents a container for the heart of the glass. Consequently, the loss of the alchemical secret implies the loss of the body which can no longer hold the blood nor stand the light of the sun since the light of the ruby glass has vanished. Similar to the time-image and to the crystal itself, glass has a fragile, soundless and immaculate (German) soul, descending traditionally from Goethe’s theory of colors, like *another* light from beyond; at the same time, the truth that lies in the heart of glass is the only version of truth: “I’m after something that you find in great poetry. When you read a great poem, you would instantly notice that there is a deep truth in it. You don’t have to analyze the poem in academic ways and all this. You know it instantly. It passes on to you and becomes part of your inner existence, and it’s the same thing in cinema. In great moments in cinema, you are hit and struck by some sort of enlightenment – by something that illuminates you, and it’s a deep form of truth, and I call it an ecstatic truth – the ecstasy of truth. And that’s what I am after, and I am after that in documentaries and feature films.”¹⁴ On the other hand, the immutability of the glass crystal puts viewers and actors in a psychedelic trance: the metaphor of the red lake in which all the ruby glass should be thrown away refers to a

¹² Herzog on Herzog, ed. by Paul Cronin, Faber and Faber, 2002, p. 133.

¹³ G. Deleuze, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

¹⁴ Werner Herzog, “Interview with Dave Davies” in *Fresh Air*, National Public Radio, WHYY, Philadelphia, 28 July 2005.

dreamy consciousness or a “somnambulistic absentmindedness”¹⁵ that must pass from ruin to metamorphosis, from the remnants of memory to the finished crystal when virtual becomes actual. In the same time, it is a somnambulistic or nostalgic passage into the sunset of a village, the sunset of a people, with inevitable allusions to the works of the German painter Caspar David Friedrich.

Most importantly, all actors (meaning non-actors, puppets with an estranged voice) performed under hypnosis and they were hypnotized by Herzog himself, apart from Hias (the actor Josef Bierbichler), the seer that descends from the mountain and walks into the valley below. Therefore, the gaze of the actors is liquid, unfocused and points far off into an unknowable or marble existence, outside the frame of the screen. Herzog wants to produce non-actors to play not in an anti-film, but in a nude film. All in all, these non-actors seem to embrace the sense of chaos and the blind destiny that Herzog develops not only here, but also in other films like *Aguirre, Wrath of God/Aguirre, der Zorn Gottes* (1972), *The Enigma of Kaspar Hauser. Jeder für sich und Gott gegen alle* (1974) or *Fitzcarraldo* (1982). In fact, only the visionary Hias, who resignifies the role of the blind prophet Tiresias or the chorus from the Greek tragedy, has a heart of glass since he is the only one capable of seeing the inner being of a(n indefinable) landscape – although Herzog describes himself as a non-Romantic –, a kind of hypnotized or apocalyptic crystal-image as he describes it: “I look into the distance, to the end of the world. Before the day is over, the end will come. First, time will tumble, and then the earth. The clouds will begin to race, the earth boils over; this is the sign. This is beginning of the end. The world’s edge begins to crumble... everything starts to collapse... tumbles, falls, crumbles and collapses. I look into the cataract.” According to Herzog, Hias and other specific characters from his own work, like Aguirre, Fini Straubinger, Stroszek, Kaspar Hauser, Woyzeck or Fitzcarraldo, are eccentric centers that do not fit in any pattern. In addition, looking into the cataract of time, Hias and Zanussi’s Jan, both characters outside the world, are witnessing the chaotic and ambiguous world, although they do not know what they witness – the reservoir of the virtual or, more precisely, the interstice of two kind of cinemas, two kind of in-between-time-images: the hallucinatory and the dream-like image. The crystal-image points to the residual traces of a labyrinthine and segmented time and, what is important to underline is the division or the pulverization of chronology implied by the crystalline dimension of the image –

¹⁵ Herzog on Herzog, p. 128.

the image like the two faces of the mirror, one reflecting light, thoughtful, the other one darkened and overshadowed, one face launched into the future, the other one collapsed into the past. In the event of the cataract, the seer (“le voyant, non plus l’actant”) becomes one with the screen of thought, a material and Bergsonian connection between the body of the brain and text of the body – text as script and language of thoughts in the European post-war cinema, for example Alain Resnais and the image of thought replicated *ad infinitum*.

The polished crystal

For Herzog, an artisan-metaphysician who conceives visions that become ideas, film is not analysis, it is the agitation of the mind. His crystal-image, shadowy, but in the same time translucent, descending from the painting of Georges de La Tour and with faces in close-ups like the ones in *La passion de Jeanne d’Arc/ The Passion of Joan of Arc* (1928) by Carl Theodor Dreyer, is, as Deleuze writes, the greatest in the history of cinema. Even so, the mirror in Zanussi’s film absorbs not only the actuality of the character, but also his virtuality¹⁶, undergoing a process of continual exchange, made up as we have already seen of layers of the past and peaks of present. Deleuze again: “Zanussi attempts to bring the whole cinema under the influence of these various aspects of an uncertainty principle.”¹⁷ Besides, the actor is caught in a pure optical situation and he embodies a character which looks mesmerized into the abyss of the time by means of a mirror that is filmed by the lens of the camera. Finally, the mirrored lenses reveal the double crystalline appearance of the image that gives birth to a new Real beyond the actual and the virtual, but also to a renewed heart, ideal and organic, present and simultaneously absent, always making reference to a transfigured past, since the past overtook the present in modern cinema. A modern cinema, both narrative and “dysnarrative”¹⁸, creating mental images independent of any logic and in the same time searching for “the soul of the cinema” that Deleuze was interested in.

¹⁶ As Deleuze defines it: virtual – the aspect of reality that is ideal, but nonetheless real.

¹⁷ G. Deleuze, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

¹⁸ For Alain Robbe Grillet, dysnarrative does not mean the rejection of the narrative, but the suspension of the narrative and of the traditional mechanism of identification.

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ENACTIVE THEORY OF RADIOLOGY IMAGING: IMAGES AND LANGUAGE AS DIAGNOSTIC TOOLS

MINDAUGAS BRIEDIS*

ABSTRACT. The article is based on research conducted at Le Bonheur Children's Hospital, Radiology Department (Memphis, Tennessee, USA). It examines embodied cognition embedded in radiological diagnostics relating image perception with normative judgment constitution. The research follows the causal thesis in that it is possible to grasp categories and causality via visual experience (causal impressions) and language (causal verbs), which in turn heavily depends on strategies of the enaction of imaging technology and intersubjective corroboration. In this way the pre-reflective and intersubjective constitution of categorial fulfillments of diagnostic experiences is disclosed by phenomenological ethnography of radiologists' praxis showing how professional knowledge is structurally interrelated with certain kinesthetic and kinetic experiences, multilayered image apprehension and enactive metaphors.

Keywords: Enactivism, Phenomenology, Radiology, Diagnostic Imaging, Causality

"We define something by its style of becoming, not by its already given forms."
(Deleuze, *Cinema II*).

Introduction: Phenomenological Ethnography of Medical Imaging

Medicine with both its scientific and practical aspects as well as giant leaps in technology development offers a rich field for applying ethnography and extending phenomenological ideas in experimentally unaltered life-world conditions. Radiology as one of the most developing branches of medical image-based diagnostics rests heavily on a specific type of imaging which is still evolving and has multiple modalities. Maybe it is because technologies and praxis are evolving so fast, radiologists' experiences conditioned by this imaging as well as medical and biological knowledge

* Professor Mykolas Romeris University Institute of Humanities Ateities g. 20, LT-08303 Vilnius, Lithuania.
Phone: +37061497823. Email: mbriedis@mruni.eu

and determined pragmatic tasks was poorly investigated. Historically phenomenological ideas were applied to the field of psychology and psychopathology (Binswanger, Frankl, Boss, Fuchs, etc.), especially from the “patient’s perspective” rather than the therapist’s perspective. Although even when the “diagnostic perspective” was concerned, investigations took the form of psychophysical experimenting (looking for sensual “thresholds” in visual experiences) or Gestalt psychology (Nodine and Kundel 1987; Oestmann 1988; Andriole 2011; Maeda 2013, etc.). Both had their respective success (for example, famous “Gorilla” experiments (Drew 2013) but our aim is to show that phenomenology especially in its embodied enactive self-interpretation via ethnographic methodology may expand the understanding and even aiding of image interpretation in radiology. Although we cannot answer all questions that such an ambitious goal presupposes, hopefully we will provide a comprehensive framework to deal with them.

Phenomenological ethnography enters the field of everyday praxis of radiologists. In that respect it differs from any experimental approaches and relies on first person observations of radiologists’ interpretation of images. Here radiologists’ lived experience (*Erlebnis*) of the diagnostic process is brought to the researcher’s attention in a step by step analysis, talking through important but usually un-reflected points, trying to embrace all the details of actual praxis with its epistemological, social and environmental specifics. This does not mean that the vocabulary of psychophysics or Gestalt psychology cannot be recognized and used in phenomenological settings; on the contrary, the insightful findings of such approaches concerning perceptual patterns, visual coping, etc. might and need to be re-contextualized via phenomenological ethnography. This “re-contextualization” includes concentrating on the pre-perceptual (affective) genesis of the perceptual acts and also on the perceptual “objects,” conceived as pragmatic affordances determined by the specific mode of givenness (Imaging). Finally, phenomenological ethnography stresses the specific character of region concerning knowledge, which is very important in medical praxis, oscillating between anatomical, histological and biological generalities. What are the essential characteristics of diagnostic process? How does imaging determine the appearance of diagnostically relevant data? What are the perceptual and cognitive acts that correspond to such modes of appearance and ground diagnostic outcome?

Despite the unearthly character of surroundings created by the macabre abstractions of imaging, radiologists like any social subjects are immersed in the “natural attitude” in terms of concentrating on the task at hand and not on the experiential processes that lead to the more or less successful accomplishment of that task (Dreyfus 2014). When asked to reflect about the actual performance radiologists

sometimes compare it to a dream like undifferentiated state.¹ Medical literature for that matter is more specific but draws heavily on few explanatory schemes, which contradict phenomenological observations. Diagnostic process is usually described as based on the ever accumulating storage of relevant normal and abnormal cases (images) and diagnostic outcome is due to the inference on the basis of successful retrieval and comparison of those cases from the professional storage (Lawson and Daniel 2001; Balogh et al. 2015, etc.). Such a retrieval might be innate or learned. Although I understand how concepts may vary from discipline to discipline, it looks like this summary of diagnostic mechanism describes representational and inferential model of image-based diagnostics, which may not correspond with the phenomenological ethnographic data. In order to gather such a specific, experiential, first-person data phenomenology uses the method of phenomenological reduction, which differently from natural sciences and/or psychology does not reduce the phenomena at hand but in contrast suspends all unnecessary conditions for that phenomena to show itself in full depth.

1. Enaction of Radiology Images

1.1. Three Levels of Apprehension

In *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis*, Husserl characterizes apprehension in this way. Apprehension is an “achievement of consciousness” that enables the “merely immanent content of sensible data, the so-called data of sensations or hyletic data ... to exhibit that which is objectively ‘transcendent’” (Hua XI, p. 17). The outcome of apprehension is certain aspect, angle, position of the object at hand. Concrete diagnostic task or sub-task will work as an instruction for how to perceive a sensual data, how to approach sensual features localizing and identifying them. Then apprehension which defines the right adumbration of an object is a cognitive capacity in the midst of perception, it is already an interpretation of sensations in the perception of relevant objects.

When we look at the picture, according to Husserl, we are “using” Image-consciousness to relate two levels of apprehension – *Image-Object* (image which we perceive) and *Image-Sujet* (that which serves as the true referent of a picture, the content of an image), while the physical substrate usually remains purely transparent for the layperson. Although radiologist operates also on the so called first level of apprehension radiologist evaluates the quality of radiologist image

¹ From phenomenological point of view such states do not mean that this person is not mindful because phenomenology does not equate mindfulness with attention (Jacobs 2010). Contemporary phenomenology views skilful coping as mindful and social (Gallagher 2017b).

which also include patient positioning correct for each projection, that the images were not blurred and that optimal image density would be visualized. Patient positioning is guided by normative categories, such as straight, left-right, up-down, etc. During the quality check of an image is done reflectively, radiologist avoids fixing onto objects or spaces between objects, instead, she tries to see it as a continuum of impressions. If poor quality interrupts the process of visual search without previously being checked, it is kinesthetic sensations as the feedback about the quality of the process that force radiologist to adapt bodily position (In the case of radiology eye movement is predominant kinesthetic sensation, but also head movement, hand-eye coordination, distance between the screen, gestures) or to stop the whole visual search or change the modality of differential diagnostic judgment (uncertain, probable, most likely negative, etc.).

Second and third level of apprehension (Image Object and Image subject or content), due to the abstract and minimalist character of medical imaging, demand another skillful coping because Image Object does not correspond to some exact original beyond the image and the Image content is not an entity but rather a complicated process of biological abnormality. On the one hand, Radiologist may focus on the Image Object (which is not an everyday practice of experiencing images), concentrating on the basic features as they are presented via image modification, intuiting diagnostic situation beyond sensually given data. On the other hand, knowledge and anticipation of Image Subject enables to reframe visual field and capture just basic clues, such as localization and texture changes needed for the intuition of complex categorial situation, which transcends visual field (see further).

Switching apprehension levels in medical diagnosis shows that the ability to neutralize the conflicts between these levels as well as kinesthetic feedback about the level of motor "maximal grip" (Ponty 1962) are the parts of radiologists' professionalism. Knowledge of radiologist enables to apprehend sensations in a way to get the adumbration needed for diagnosis. But while discrete features might disclose the complicated scenario (basic features) of the disease it is more common for radiologist to form an anticipation which would transcend the sensual content given by image but nevertheless guide her act and motor intentionalities (apprehension and movement). Following Aristotle (1901) and Husserl (1973) we call this kind of anticipatory structuring categorial, meaning that the confirmation (or canceling) of diagnostic anticipations, while founded in sensual data, rest on complex categorial relations peculiar to medical and biological regions of knowledge (Smith and Grenon 2004).

In radiology an image never stands alone, it is supplemented by other images (usually, earlier checks), clinical guidance and general patterns of particular pathology. This means, that radiologist is able to apprehend "relational aspects" (Blederman 1988) of an image, when certain features disclosed by the image make

sense only in relation to spatiotemporal anatomical and/or histological changes (see further). Radiologist may directly sense such higher order properties as symmetry or homogeneity (Treisman 1986). Locating a feature is separate operation from identifying it and could logically follow instead of preceding identification. The identification works for discrete features, but *conjunctions* (categorical structures) are grasped initially as localisations. When conjunction is localised (usually, as *dis-location* in medicine, i.e. deviation from norm) a lot of visual stimuli becomes unattended and registered only on a feature level (for example, words in relation to sentences). Distractors might be identified without being localized and have behavioural effects even being unattended. Experienced radiologist locates conjunctions while reducing unnecessary features via variation (factual, depending on imaging modality) and skilful framing. Light might be thrown on the main focus feature but others as horizon, as spatial relations, makes possible the localisation of categorical conjunction. This grasp of conjunction is an impression of categorial causation being founded in basic features. These are few examples:

Spiculous/round

Dislocated/in place

Bright/dull

Vertical/horizontal

Oversized/undersized

Examples of apprehending conjunction via the experience of dis-location (also see Figure 7):




Figure 1. Chest CT.

When several masses detected in the lung parenchyma tissue, radiologist can relate them together in suspicion of metastasis (black arrows). Although features (identification) of pulmonary vessels and metastatic tumors are virtually the same, pulmonary vessels, visualized also as masses (white arrow) are in typical location and have continuation on the next slice (image), if enacted by radiologist, when metastatic tumors are located atypically or dis-located. Finally, secondary (metastatic) tumors, detected by the enactment of this image presuppose the primary tumor which may be situated elsewhere, for example, in kidney or breast.




Figure 2. Mammograms.

Spiculated mass on the left MLO mammogram (reader's right) in the upper lateral quadrant of the breast (black arrow). Tissue superimposition imitating mass near the nipple (white arrow). Tissue superimposition may seem as cancer although radiologist grasps real cancer because it is experienced as separate (from other structures), later experience being founded in the (causal) impression of spiculated contours (see further).

1.2. Experience of Causal Categories via Radiology Images

Dis-location/identification experiences show that, as Husserl suggested already in *Logical Investigations*, sensual affection that awakens and motivates categoriality and modalization is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the grasp of a categorial situation (*Sachverhalte*); it is the grasp not of objects but of

very categorical and even causal relations in the process conditioned by the regional (medical, biological) ontology. The biological realm of medicine consists of things possessing extensive and intensive magnitudes, being in states at particular moments in time, and undergoing mutations or perpetuations of state according to causal laws.²



Figure 3. Abdominal X-Ray.

Radiologists' description of the categorical norm and the experience of dis-location: "Hilgenreiner's line is the horizontal line which is drawn through the upper margin of the triradiate cartilages. Perkin's line is the vertical line drawn from the most lateral edge of the acetabular roof and perpendicular to Hilgenreiner's line. In a normal hip, the ossified capital femoral epiphysis is positioned medial to Perkin's line and inferior to Hilgenreiner's line (i.e. inferior-medial quadrant). In a subluxated hip, the epiphysis is positioned lateral to Perkin's line and inferior to Hilgenreiner's line (i.e. inferior-lateral quadrant). In a dislocated hip, the epiphysis is positioned within the upper-outer quadrant (i.e. lateral to Perkin's line and superior to Hilgenreiner's line). If the capital femoral epiphysis is not ossified, the medial edge of the proximal femoral metaphysis is utilized".

² "Cause" does not have a clear-cut meaning in mechanics. In the latter, we have instead a whole theory, called dynamics, consisting of several concepts (mass, force, momentum, elasticity, viscosity, etc.) and a set of equations for their application, which together cover the causal aspects of mechanical events. To talk about *the* cause of an event is therefore quite pointless (Runeson 1983: 34).

Husserl mentions the “universal causal style of nature” in correlation with human habits of apprehension. Nature has its “style of appearing”, which is basically causal, and this determines, for example, at least some habits of the radiologist, habits of interpretation (Moran 2011: 69). The radiologist habitually grasps the whole causally determined deviation from a biological norm, and this experience resonates with the traces of a causal impression left on her body after everyday interactions but which has been extended to the categorial apprehension of biological causality. Everything empirical must embody these categories, but it is only normative social anticipations that determine what categories will be detected in the empirical realm. Check this report:



Figure 4. Abdominal X-Ray.

Radiologists’ report: “An enteric tube is in place with the distal tip in the fundus of the stomach. There is a “double bubble” sign with a moderately dilated stomach and markedly dilated proximal duodenum. Normal situs without visceromegaly is noted. No abdominal mass or abnormal intra-abdominal calcifications are seen. No pneumatosis, portal air, or biliary air is identified. No free intraperitoneal air is seen on this supine examination. The included bony structures are intact. No pathology is seen at the included portion of the lung bases. An upper gastrointestinal examination is recommended for further evaluation”.

Enacted by imaging causal impressions (bubble, dilation, being intact, etc.) found the categorial experience of human or cancer intervention. This categorial pattern leads radiologists visual search and serves as the main strategy of image apprehension until the examination of unattended areas (because of “satisfaction of search” danger), but the findings of this subsequent examination have a modality as “less likely”.

A category articulates the object as relational; it enables the discourse to express, in a syntactically formed expression, the categorial object, rather than merely naming the underlying object. The diagnostic objects possess causal properties, that is, properties that, while sensible, are grasped either as the effects of the causal agency of other objects or properties that produce effects in other objects. Medical imaging varies and presents those properties that are the effects of other objects, as well as those properties that can causally affect other things. The material thing, then, is the identity in the manifold of its sensible appearances and properties, and it is the identity in the manifold of causal relations. Husserlian categorial intuition (apprehension of categories) in radiology is an accomplishment of embodied cognition and social normativity: it depends on the enaction of empirical imaging tools. Categories must be enacted; the radiologist grasps diagnostic categories by enacting imaging modality, performing visual searches, navigating, measuring, changing perspectives, and even imaging modalities. Enaction means that the radiologist grasps causal categories of biological deviation not by pictorial consciousness, but by action—the externalization of memory by the enaction of imaging technology and image-consciousness. I call those founding experiences of categorial intuition *causal impressions*.³ The crucial epistemological question now is the following one: Is it possible to experience causality via imaging?

While experimenting with visual stimuli, Albert Michotte (1963) showed that imaging is able to convey the experience of causality as direct and not inferential. What is a causal relation, according to Michotte? The relations of pushing, pulling, lifting, stopping, moving, supporting, hanging from, and preventing something from happening should be considered as modes of causation: they are specific ways of causing something else to happen. Causality always has a

³ The very word impression (“to be imprinted”) probably belongs more to the tradition of Proustian subjectivism than phenomenology; still it signals a non-representational stance and the importance of sensual content of embodied cognition. Impressions are based in real kinematic experiences, although the images are given “as if” they were real. An “impression of cancer” then would be more kinematic than visual, i.e. first, it would be localized according to the categorial spectrum of possible pathology, and then identified (although sometimes localization remains the whole degree of identification). Phenomenologically, localization discloses the genetic origination of the static identification. Identification would come first if we were to live in a static, eternal act.

structure, which reveals itself passively as categorial intuition not only through higher-order cognitive concepts. This is how image-consciousness and the experiential impression of causality stimulates the scientific one.




Figure 5.

This perception of causality in turn reveals the radiologist's body as motivated such that perception and self-apprehension (kinesthesia) go together. Michotte showed that while people perceive causality in abstract conditions, they still found this experience in everyday motor coping schemas. According to Michotte, all social interpretations and communications rest on basic kinematic impressions, that is, impressions of motion that correlate with bodily schemata of impressions of the interactions with physical objects. Kinesthetic systems are formed from worldly experience, so we perceive ourselves as combining impacts on and from various things. These constitutive experiences are also part of visual perception. Hence, causal relations may unfold in a great variety and the experiences of it does not need perception of a direct contact. This prepares us to view medical imaging as the setting for the embodied and intersubjective enaction of basic categorial impressions that ground diagnostic knowledge. At this point, it is crucial to distinguish between quantitative and qualitative causal categories.

Categorial causal forms in the medical-biological realm can be divided into two main groups: quantitative mechanical and qualitative biological.

Quantitative causality (broken bones, dislocated organs, etc.): impressions of ampliation, pushing, bursting, penetration, enforced disintegration, obstruction and others.

Qualitative causality (cancerous processes): change in a property of an object without the visual perception of impact, impressions of temporal sequences of disease development—order/disorder, growth/reduction, formation/deformation, action/reaction, etc.

Perhaps the best way of demonstrating the possibility of quantitative causal impressions was delivered by Michotte's followers, for example, Tremoulet 2000, Scholl 2000, who showed that rather abstract visual stimuli can motivate the impression of animated action, even emotional charge (see Figure 6).




Figure 6.

They showed that even inorganic structures under some visualization may be taken as possessing some animated, i.e. goal-oriented, meaningful, emotionally charged intentions and actions. If we apply this idea to medical imaging, we may speculate that the biological objects presented by medical images disclose themselves as belonging to some higher-order processes and structures. As organic parts of biological processes, some entities are taken as animated beings

endowed with “primary subjectivity”, which includes teleological interactions with the environment and participation in greater narrative processes (for example, metabolism⁴).⁵

1.3. Causal Impressions and the Enaction by Measuring




Figure 7. Abdominal MRI.

Measured abnormal masses – on the left (to the reader) there is a intraparenchymal mass *in* the liver, *surrounded by* liver tissue, suspected metastasis. On the right *in* the abdomen – the metastatic mass *behind the* spleen, *between* the spleen and the abdominal wall.

Categorical intuitions need to be enacted by technology in order to turn them into signs of exact (not “more or less”) normative value. Hence, after initially grasping dis-location (*in*, *surrounded by*, *behind the*, *between*, etc.) the professor sets the first dot on the border between the spleen and the suspicious mass and draws the thin green line until he fixes the second dot on the abdominal wall by unclicking the right mouse button. Small numbers under the line appear instantly after the fixation movement and show the exact measure—the sign now can be compared with the standard. As I see it, the line connects two points of relation, which earlier made up the categorial impression “too wide”, or we might also say, more generally, experience of dis-location as “something’s wrong”.

⁴ See on phenomenology of metabolism in Barbaras (2010).

⁵ See more on the relation between animacy impressions and diagnostic process in part 2.

Radiologists' report (see Figure 4):

I do measure several parts of anatomy. For example, the width of a dilated bowel loop, **if it is markedly dilated** (small bowel or large bowel...the large bowel is the colon). One could have measured the width of the dilated proximal duodenum in this case, but it is not necessary. Stating that it is **markedly dilated** is sufficient as it is a component of the 'double bubble' sign.

I would measure the size of a mass in the abdomen or in an organ (e.g. the liver). I would also measure the size of a lesion in a bone. One can also measure the distance of the distal tip of an endotracheal tube from the carina (the branching point of the trachea into the right and left mainstem bronchi). This is commonly done. The Cobb measurement tool is commonly used to measure the angle of a curve in the spine (i.e. scoliosis).

I like the measurement tools that we have on our PACS system. I would prefer different methods of deleting measurements/angles, but it takes many requests for a wish to be accommodated by the vendor.

Consciousness of images, according to Husserl, gives us, for example, shapes and shades that are more or less straight, circular, dense, transparent, etc.⁶ In radiology imaging this "more or less" experience is very intense. There are no sharp boundaries between objects, hence their experience relies on (categorical) intuition which transcends perceptual givenness. If, however, categorial experience is not enough radiologist must enact other means of diagnosis, i.e. measuring.

The example above is just another "enactive proof" of the primacy of categorial experiences. It concerns how and when a radiologist enacts the measurement technology. Before the measurement and interpretation of imaged objects as "signs", there is an experience of categorial relation ("too wide", "dislocated", "obstructed", etc.), which is always "more or less" ("something is wrong"). In the highly abstract environment of radiology imaging, there is simply no possibility to grasp clear signs only via measurement techniques, so the continuity of shades must be eliminated by the categorial intuition (radiologists' experience) and not semiotics of isolated features signs. This "more or less" character of radiology imaging demands the primacy of categorial intuition. If it were otherwise, then the so-called "secondary interpreter" (CAD, computer aided detection) would perform radiologists' tasks far more efficiently. Although CAD is useful in double-checking diagnoses—for example, breast cancer—it may well detect tumors in an image of the sky.

⁶ See in this regard, Husserl's reflection on Galileo's scientific approach in "Crisis" (Husserl 1970).




Figure 8.

However, the radiologist may translate an impression into a sign via measurement. Measuring is the compound operation of enaction by which categorical impressions of medical images are translated into signs, and as such they are compared to socially established “ideal” types. Although an individual radiologist experientially grasps the subtle gradation of imaged objects, the normative evaluation (almost) always remains within the horizon established by institutionalized science. The radiologist does not seek an absolute identity, an ideal representation, because, following Husserl, it is precisely these ideal forms that are missing from the sensible qualities. Sensible qualities for the radiologist are impressions of categorical causality, not the material stuff for filling in the platonic *eidōs*. So, in the life-world, the sense qualities are not signs of *eidōs*, but actual experiences of (categorical) “things”. The sign is a matter of measuring science, not life-world experience, and though the latter can follow and confirm the former, it does not apply the ideal form of cancer to the appearance of cancer.

Measuring by enaction is yet another tool in completing the normative identification of an abnormal situation, but it is preceded by the experiential grasp of dis-location. Identification of those marginal points of categorical relation is a

secondary, more reflective operation, which demands good hand-eye coordination (unlike the visual enaction of categorial impressions). Enaction by measurement does not usually create a causal impression because it is rarely an affirmation of that impression (which might boost the causal impression for the novice radiologist); instead, it is already a step of data processing as the translation of categorial impression into non-sensual sign, signitive expression (Husserl 1973). Such processing enables impressions to be externalized up to the level of medical standardization and diagnostic propositions.

We can put this in even stronger terms: if to mathematize nature requires that we treat sensible qualities as signs, then to mathematize nature betrays what Husserl has called, in Ideas I, “the principle of all principles”, and this is the core principle of phenomenology and, indeed, of philosophy in general (Husserl 2014). This principle instructs us to accept as evidence only what is intuitively (not semiotically) given. Although signs are sensual, they do not provide the experience of causal relations as images do. They can point to the latter, but they cannot be the source of it. Measurement may boost the externalization of professional memory and the experience of causal relation when the feedback is poor and modalization is uncertain—for example, in cases of an inexperienced radiologist, a lack of visual perception skills, poor image quality, a lack of clinical information.

If, by way of feedback, the radiologist experiences poor affordances and modalization of categorial impression—such as “doubt”—then enaction of measurement becomes an extension of that impression and delivers the experience of (normal or abnormal) causal relations.⁷ If, as in our case, affordances are intact and modalization is “certain”, then measuring becomes a distinct, secondary act by which the professor accomplishes “higher-order” tasks. From this he can compare this particular measurement with the standard, and use it in diagnostic propositions.

1.4. Amodal Completion and Visual Search Patterns

Bringing together causal impressions, categorial patterns and search patterns strongly suggests that the basic principle of image apprehension in accordance to visual search patterns in most cases of radiology is *amodal completion*.⁸ Amodal completion is not a visual pattern, it is a mechanism who brings categorial intuitions and visual search patterns together. For example, this form of completion of the black shape behind the gray occluder was referred to by Michotte as *amodal completion* (Michotte et al. 1991). While medical images are altered in order to highlight the


⁷ If there is a lack of perceptual and clinical information concerning particular image radiologists’ decision still depends on many other factors, for example, emotional wellness of a patient and federal funding for the screening program, so she may ask to show up for the next examination after six months instead of a year.

⁸ See, in this regard, Nanay 2007.

essential relations between relevant objects, they are very poor concerning perceptual information so radiologist still needs to skillfully apply motor and apprehension schemas in order to amplify complicated causal patterns. Amodal completion fulfills not only discrete features of partially hidden objects but also causation, temporality and social importance and even empathy for primary subjectivity.⁹

Amodal completion is in dialectical relation with categorial form. On the one hand, by imagining it completes perceptually obstructed pieces of pathological process or human activity (for example, when the end of *esophagus* is “wrapped around” in order to control reflux) which determines categorial situations. On the other, categorial intuition directs which entities and/or relations need to be completed. “The world” of biological processes is perceived by radiologist as a surrounding plenum, even though only part of it is in view at any time. Visual patterns of radiologist may be influenced by the general biological regularities, for example top-down structure of a blood flow and looking for the “travelling tumors” (examples of angiogenesis, metastasis). Also amodal completion depends on the degree of the sense of guidance, that is technical quality of an image and clinical information that accompanies an image. I argue that completion is accomplished by quantitative and qualitative causal impressions. Here are few examples how visual search rests on categorial experiences.

Causal Assymetry



Figures 9, 10. Abdominal X-Ray and Bone X-Ray.

⁹ The term “amodal completion” is coined out of and balances two other terms – amodal perception and modal completion. It is better to say completion than perception because the whole is grasped as causal categorial relation, temporal span.

Causal asymmetry pattern consists in experiencing one phenomena as caused by the other without any perceptual evidence of a direct contact and qualitative similarity. In the figure 9, perception of a lower density mass in the upper body area means the obstruction of the intestines in the lower area. Figure 10 represents broken bone due to the bone tumor.

Common fate is another example relevant to radiology. Here objects that *move* in the same way tend to be grouped together. Sekuler and Bennett (2001) presented an extension of *common fate* to grouping by common luminance changes. They found that when elements of a visual scene become brighter or darker simultaneously, even if they have different illumination throughout, observers have a powerful tendency to group those elements perceptually, which is the occasion in radiology (see Figure 11).



Figure 11. Chest CT.

Because of the knowledge of categorial unfolding of cancer radiologist can relate several masses together in suspicion of metastasis, although features of a single (primary) tumor and metastasis (secondary tumors) are virtually the same.

These examples illustrate how *visual search* patterns are guided by the initial categorial intuition.¹⁰ It is necessary to add that because of the danger of the *satisfaction of search* errors visual search patterns in radiology must be switched after accomplishing the initial search in order to seek for “secondary findings”.¹¹ Finally, it is crucial that in radiology these Gestalt type patterns work

¹⁰ It is possible in this context to discuss other Gestalt principles of grouping (such as *similarity*, *proximity* or *closure*) as well.

¹¹ For example, after the *Eventration* is diagnosed, expectation of *Hernia* as a secondary finding (when the primary one is *Eventration*) guides subsequent visual search.

because they are normatively contextualized (due to the knowledge of particular pathological categories and clinical information) and personalized by the enaction of imaging technology, which means that there is a dialectical relation between the knowledge of pathological categories and the enaction of imaging technology. On the one hand, radiologist chooses imaging modality, perspective and even the temporal sequence of diagnostic images according to a particular pathology, but at the same time enactive operations disclose those portions of image material which confirm categorial relations. Obviously, the full overview of visual patterns relevant to radiology deserves a separate study.



Figure 12. Chest X-Ray.

Diaphragmatic eventration is a congenital condition in which a portion or all of the diaphragmatic muscle is deficient. Where the muscle is absent, a thin membrane replaces the normal diaphragmatic muscle.

1.5. Neutralization of Conflicts between the Enaction of Apprehensions

Switching between apprehension levels demands from the radiologist a strong mechanism of conflict resolution. A “switching pattern” might be disrupted for a number of reasons, whereby the radiologist experiences feedback in the form of a conflict.¹² The reasons for this may be the lack (or surfeit) of affordance of concentration (managing switching patterns) resulting in abandoning the

¹² By “switching pattern” I mean both the enaction of imaging and other diagnostic technology (templates, recorders, etc.) and changing levels of image apprehension.

diagnostic process and returning it to clinicians or a technician, a diagnostic mistake, a lawsuit or emotional disturbance.

For medical images, the consciousness of conflict (*Widerstertbewusstsein*, Hua XXIII) is very peculiar, because conflict may appear on or in between any level of image apprehension. Conflicts also depend on enaction strategies—some are more likely while others almost never interrupt the diagnostic process. Such conflicts include:

Between the unreal character of an image and one’s actual surroundings (image apprehension and marginal surrounding);

Between abstract image and real referent (suspension of a natural attitude by image affection);

Between the first and second levels of apprehension (quality of an image);

Between the second and third levels of apprehension;

Between clinical information (guidance) and the whole image apprehension (ownership);

Between different sensory modalities (vision, touch, audio);

Between different enaction tasks (seeing, reading, typing, speaking, scrolling, etc.);

Between 2D and 3D modifications of image apprehension;

Between categorial experience and measurement.

As we have seen, these binary oppositions, in truth, are possibilities for “switching patterns”, but they may also take the form of a severe conflict. This also means that the lack of “anesthetic” affection by medical imaging and intersubjective corroboration may gravely affect the prosthetic enaction of diagnostic tools. For example, this could result in the inability to keep to the relevant thematic attitude at every conscious moment of the diagnostic process.

The notion of thematic attitude and thematic field (Gurwitsch 1957) is of crucial importance to the evaluative abilities of the radiologist. Thematic attitude, unlike the natural one, must demarcate a certain region of interest (Smith and Grenon 2004) and fulfill this interest according to the material ontology of this particular region of being.¹³ If the thematic perspective is loose, the evaluator will have some trouble in deciding what should be counted as relevant, and an impractical orientation to the world, or rather part of it, would appear. It is known in psychopathology, where the whole world as the horizon of horizons may become

¹³ For Husserl, the “material ontology” is one whose scope is restricted to a particular kind of thing. The limitation is grounded in a determinate and essential material content. At the highest and most general level, this determinate material core is a region; at lower levels it is a genus and then a species” (Drummond 2007).

a challenging experience, a sort of “affection by reality” (Murakami 2005), whereby without the sense of thematic concern, one can lose the ability to organize larger units of meaning. Hence, as with neurotic disorders (though to a much smaller degree) possible mistakes by the radiologist can fall into several categories, depending on what is causing a “weakening” of the thematic field. Such a process of losing perspective might be *synchronic*—when simultaneous features of the surrounding spatial context confuse the evaluation—or *diachronic*—when the evaluator fails to use previously acquired information to respond to a familiar context.¹⁴ Therefore, there are several ways for elements from the margins to penetrate a thematic field and eventually shift its significance. In the radiological context, it is possible to conceptualize such a shift in a few ways:

- The horizon of expectations is too vast. Instead of focusing on one (such as shade or shape), it is as if the *evaluator* takes all the possibilities into *simultaneous consideration*. Several things can appear simultaneously (*fragmented perception*);
- Further mistakes can be provoked when an unusual perceptual strategy and/or attention to strange and irrelevant things occurs;
- The “break down” of a diagnostic process can also show itself as the prolonged concentration on a particular fragment, thus lacking the structural necessity to scan other fragments (“staring”), replacing a thematic object (category) with some fragment (feature), (*selective attention*).

In one way or another, diagnostic mistakes originate in an inability to switch apprehensions:¹⁵

It is worth noting that the gap between a failure of diagnosis and neurotic disorder is not always so vast because the disintegration of context influenced by marginal experiences can be followed by intense emotional inadequacy, and emotions are also modes of *attentionality*.¹⁶ On the other hand, a radiologist’s sensitivity to reasons (not marginal causes, but thematic motivational context), i.e. the capacity to *individuate* relevant objects and the capacity to *discriminate* between relevant and irrelevant relations (categories), actualize the *telos* of her perception—to see appropriate motivational function in the diagnostic object’s properties. Many of these dangers concerning the diagnostic process, and even the radiologist’s psychic wellbeing, depend not so much on her knowledge as on the way this knowledge is guided (externalized) by the enaction of diagnostic tools.

¹⁴ See, in this regard, Embree 2004.

¹⁵ In order to be able to collect groups together, compare them, and think them together in a single act, which at the same time does not simply merge the two groups, quickly catapults us into the domain of symbolic thought. Husserl’s early conclusion was that many concepts require mental acts that are directed upon other mental acts (“Philosophy of Arithmetic”, Hua X).

¹⁶ See, in this regard, Leder 1990.




Figure 13. Chest CT.

These are examples of how malignant masses were missed by radiologists because of the unusual location—e.g. close to pleura or bronchos where the radiologist is used to seeing such large structures as organs and eventually misses small ones.

An inability to switch apprehensions may have various causes: inexperience; redundancy; fast pace; strong sense of guidance; satisfaction of search, etc.

2. Animacy Impressions and the Enaction of Radiology Images by Language

In this section I will present the analysis of some language to which radiologists are introduced by learning and use in formal and informal communication, but also during the enaction of images.¹⁷ Of course, the problem of the relation between experience and language permeates all disciplines, and philosophers continue to debate which comes first. On the other hand, common sense would tell us that propositions – for example, diagnostic judgments – come rather late, only *after* some experiential factual data is gathered by the senses of the diagnostic subject. This is problematic though, because, first of all, what I mean by language in diagnostic praxis is not homogenous. There are, for example, *causal verbs*, which may need to be enacted and serve as tools to apprehend a certain pathological causality (Wolff 2002). On the other hand, there is also a *narrative moment* in medical diagnostics concerning the general biological and pathological processes. Moreover, I will argue that diagnostic praxis might be just on the verge of something new concerning perceptual and linguistic practices. Now I will examine various ways in which language relates to the diagnostic process:

¹⁷ On the relation between language and enaction see Bottineau 2010.

- The effects of language on experience and attention – for example, via causality, time, etc.;
- Words and linguistic patterns are tools created to cope with and solve diagnostic situations – for example, they found mnemotechnics;
- Narratives provide an additional set of abilities for the professional;
- Intersubjectively established language concerning radiological phenomena normatively situates the diagnostic perception.

Narratives are produced socially in shared practices. They are passed on to novice radiologists early on in their professional life, along with countless images of pathological processes (for example, cancer). Narrative language in cancer diagnostics includes many causal verbs, which connect categorial situations through which the process of disease unfolds as a whole. For example, in descriptions of the nature of cancer, a lot of animated, anthropocentric, and narrative language is deployed:

Malignant tumors are ambitious. They have two goals in life: to survive and to conquer new territory – metastasizing.

Metastasis is the process by which a tumor cell leaves the primary tumor, travels to a distant site via the circulatory system, and establishes a secondary tumor (primary tumors somehow keep smaller ones intact, removing primary ones might foster others to grow).

Cell division, growth and death. Change in the structure of regulation of proteins. Cells respond to the DNA damage via several mechanisms. Translocation, amplification, unregulated cell growth, loss of heterozygosity, gene silencing, chromosome instability, caretaker genes, suppressor genes, stimulation, invasion, attachment of cells.

It was suggested to kill the tumors, by starving them of a blood supply. Cancer cells feed and travel via blood vessels.¹⁸

Examples above show how many causal verbs are used in cancer narratives (“prevent something” would be a causal verb, while “in order to conquer new territories” would be a narrative one).

The use of anthropomorphic expressions (e.g. conquer, fight) amplifies causal impressions of biological processes (pushing, growth, relocating) to the level at which they are transformed into *animacy impressions*.¹⁹ Let me stress

¹⁸ These expressions come from various sources, both written and spoken, published as scientific publications or posted as internet articles.

¹⁹ Animacy: perception of an abstract shape *as* being alive, creating damage, etc. We see inanimate things behaving *as* active, passive, good, bad, aggressors, etc. Animacy brings in a hermeneutic narrative based on bio movement and causal impressions.

that this is not such a unique thing in the scientific world – for example, biochemists reason about the molecular structure by using their bodies to imagine relations between parts of the molecular structure (Myers 2008).²⁰ Animacy impressions mean that biological or even mechanical processes are endowed with a kind of “primary subjectivity”: teleology of being, active interactions with environment, and narrative unfolding – all of which, according to Hans Jonas, may be seen in the process of *metabolism* (Barbaras 2010). Animacy impressions amplify causal impressions, because the experience of primary subjectivity connects various causal events to a greater teleological whole. The impression of animacy adds a qualitative (subjective) dimension to causal impressions, thereby stimulating new diagnostic concepts (or rather intermediary verbs) and connecting causal impressions to narrative language, which is the basis for propositional diagnostic judgments.

Let us further illustrate these ideas by briefly considering the history of medical language. As we know, as one of the great historic professions, medicine has a special relation to ancient languages, such as classical Greek and Latin. I argue that these great traditions appear in contemporary medicine not simply out of respect for tradition, but because they serve as meta-tools for individual radiologists, for example, as mnemonic strategies. For example, lissencephaly (λίσσηγκεφαλία, pr. lissengkephalia), from the classical Greek word *lisso* (λίσσός) meaning smooth and *encephalon*, a disorder characterized by smoothness (lack of folds and grooves) of the brain, hydrocephalus (υδροκέφαλος, pr. hidrokephalos), from classical Greek word *ύδωρ* (*hydor*) meaning water + *kephale*.

While the name of the pathology sounds sophisticated, it also hides a very complicated net of relations between causal impressions and narrative language. Every such case includes several structural ingredients, namely a name, a thing and/or tool, and a contextual meaning that relates to a Mythic understanding. Now I state that names, things, and tools here already presuppose the knowledge of usage and/or possibilities to move, which rests on causal categorial impressions. So the name of pathology is never neutral; it opens a horizon of teleological coping and within a greater usage setting (Heidegger 1978). It already carries a definite number of movement-usage meanings and possible directions. This is how ancient terms amplify causal impressions in

²⁰ This can also be turned around and used in learning situations – e.g. getting others to move allows them to see relations. See, in this regard, the paper on enactive metaphors by Gallagher and Lindgren (2015).

image apprehension and constitute animacy impressions.²¹ Under animacy impressions, apprehension of causality is modified – for example, the impression of causal relations in pathological process may be understood as based on a differentiation of functional roles (labor, defense, communication, etc.). Mythic understanding as the horizon for such modification amplifies, for the radiologist, basic causal connections in image apprehension, presupposing optimal motor skills. Moreover, it also gives a sense of narrative direction and professional identity (Gallagher 2017a).

Structure of the experience motivated by causal verbs:

Name (classical Greek/Latin)

Thing/location/tool/weapon/building/natural site/element

Causal impressions, affordances for navigation

Animacy impressions (sense of primary subjectivity in pathological processes)

Myth (narrative logic, general sense of right action and justified goal, “because of” motives)

This scheme presents how the network of meaningful connections and impression amplifications constitute a powerful tool for mnemonic strategies, based on:

- Names as commands. The name functions performatively, as a command, and it makes the command clear;
- Nouns as verbs. Deleuze (1990) argues that we need to think of all nouns as verbs, a green thing as a “greening”, a tree as a “treering”. The same holds for the term “image”; it is an imaging, and with the content of medical images (see the example concerning pointing to shades above).

Learning the name of something, instead of naming it, is crucial in connecting the radiologist to the already sedimented knowledge of the medical tradition. In this way, medical names and/or nouns connect the radiologist to the dynamics of causal relations and causal impressions, and invites synchronization of movement (coping and searching patterns). Actually, everyday language also tries to convey narrative medical information via names – for example, “measles rush” – but, of course, this is not at the level of understanding causal relations and preparing to follow as in the case of professionals.²²

²¹ Animacy impression is basically the phantasy (“as if”) modification of causal impression. As such, it is also a neutralization of a *natural attitude* claim to view such animated processes as having “real” ontic status. Rather, it serves epistemological needs.

²² “Stroke” is yet another perfect example of language being situated in between everyday and medical worlds.

A (body) scheme (Gallagher 1986) helps not only to understand anatomy and pathology, but also to act in the correct way under certain (categorially-narratively disclosed) circumstances. According to Gallagher, shared experiences open a space in which to act, and narrative provides additional sets of skills (2017a). Therefore, embodied cognition in radiology comes to the radiologist synchronizing causal impressions with affordances opened up by the narrative understanding of an image. Deciphering the meanings of these ancient terms affords a glimpse into not only our medical heritage, but also the intersubjective, historically, and socially sedimented horizon within which individual diagnostic intentions originate. As such, this scheme connects individual perceptions with a general “language game”. Let’s look at how basic stages of cancer progression are presented in medical discourse, combining causal and animated impressions with narrative logic:

1) Immortality: Continuous cell division and limitless replication; 2) Produce ‘Go’ signals (growth factors from oncogenes); 3) Override ‘Stop’ signals (anti-growth signals from tumor suppressor genes); 4) Resistance to cell death (apoptosis); 5) Angiogenesis: Induction of new blood vessel growth; 6) Metastasis: Spread to other sites (first four present at cancer progression at the molecular and cellular level but other two are accessible by imaging) (Gutchner and Dietrich 2012).

In classical narrative theory, action begins just when the balance of a normal state or process (for example, mortality) is disturbed (Greimas 1976). It needs a hero (subject, perhaps tumor suppression genes) who emerges and aims to reestablish the status quo. Some of these actions might be attributed to non-human figures, natural forces, etc. Narrative forms of these heroic accomplishments are universal, but their sense is fulfilled only in the concrete act of experience, when self-constitution of the experiential ego occurs alongside place, time, and other relations, and expresses these in terms of *causal verbs*, the latter being verbs that signify motion and other vital information – such as goal-orientation, insistency, and not always involving a change of location (e.g. tremble, shrink, mix, burst, etc.).

Biological interactions as complex objects (causal relations) of medical imaging are such that presuppose the “as if” will to power impressions (animacy impressions). Objects under the radiologist’s gaze turn into syntactic agents, which in turn “meet” the (diagnostic) subject. At the same time, the diagnostic gaze is transformed into the pragmatic tool for the subject – he frames, reframes, closes up, distances, differentiates, and modalizes. In this way, the radiologist transforms a complex articulated object disclosed in an imaginative synthesis into a propositional meaning – for example, “it is fortunate that this tumor is benign”.

It is possible to look at transformed visual intentionality via notions of narrative cognitivist categories, such as chasing, the urge for joining, domination, etc.

Predictive behavior of bio-organisms sustains narrativity, wherein the radiologist sees them acting according to obstacles and possibilities disclosed by the narrative, and the radiologist is inclined to think that this is the same narrative for everyone. Then the thing retains its identity not so much of itself, but rather because of collective perspectives or other professionals. The sense of a common world then is dependent upon others – physicians who know the narrative and bio-organisms who enliven it. New findings in cancer studies might negate some things or add new ones, but the general structure of collective sustenance of narrativity and the impressions of animacy will remain.

Conclusions

Radiologists' diagnostic environment is affected by various modes of medical imaging and regional knowledge (basic abnormal progressions or categories). This modifies strategies of embodied enactive cognition and presupposes the ability to manipulate several apprehensions based on the same image.

In radiology visual search patterns follow categorial ones which in turn are founded in causal impressions. Radiologist knows (from pathology studies and clinical guidance), for example, structural and process changes concerning *eventration* or *hernia*, that is how after normal state of interrelations is disturbed, the experience of new causal categories appear. Therefore, she relates necessary fragments of an image according to these categories, not the other way around. On the other hand, causal impressions, which found categorial intuition, are produced by the enaction of imaging technology.

The meaning of a diagnostic image also may be constituted by the enaction of an image by language, such that would amplify causal and animacy impressions. This means that there is some embodied intersubjective ground for interpretation and communication of diagnostic images even before the visual search and empirical transmission of information occurs.

The whole body of this research suggests that images and language relevant to radiology should be viewed as diagnostic tools rather than representations.

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BIO-POWER: A CRITIQUE OF "LEGITIMATE VIOLENCE"

ROXANA-ALICE STOENESCU*

ABSTRACT. The present research examines what forms violence has taken along rationalisation processes. To be able to work out this core, it is necessary to deal with the bio-power first. By analysing the development process of bio-power the Implementation of its disciplinary and regulatory technologies becomes apparent. On the basis of this the Altered forms of violence become clear within modern society. The impact this has had on modern society and the reason it became possible will be examined in detail in the following. Finally, it should be emphasised whether the term 'bio-power' is still relevant today. The aim of the present Paper is to determine the importance of 'violence' in today's life of modern societies and how violence is spread today.

Key-words: Bio-power, Violence, totalitarianism, surveillance, Terrorism

Introduction

In order to understand violence nowadays, the present research examines how the concept of power has evolved since the processes of rationalisation and secularisation in Europe. The present concept of power or power conception become comprehended by considering the category of violence and its forms of change throughout time, since power can be understood only in relation to violence. This investigation will examine first the different transformation processes of power which modern society has undergone in the context of the historical processes - such as the rationalisation process. The rationalisation process is Characterised by secularisation and social differentiation¹. As a result of these modernisation processes, the concept of violence too changed subsequently, as new forms of power and thus also relations of domination have occurred.

* Faculty of International Relations and European Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca.
<http://euro.ubbcluj.ro/de/dr-roxana-stoenescu/> E-mail: lenasvincent@yahoo.com

¹ Cf. Luhmann 1985.

On this basis, the 'violent relations' manifested in modern society in different social and political areas are set in connection with the concept of power. As it turns out, 'power' is above all based on an over-dominance in the sphere of the private sphere, i.e. is 'omnipresent' in the daily life and work of society members.

Secondly, it is examined why 'power' was able to penetrate into the 'private sphere' of the individuals and why it became 'omnipresent'. Thus, questions about present-day violence and social 'emancipation' in modern society can be raised.

1. The monopoly on violence

To understand the evolution of the concept of power towards a space of social and political violence, it is worth taking a closer look at the dictatorships of the 20th century. They show how political and economic violence could develop in a way that in which these could extend 'power' from public space to the private sphere. It examines how the concept of power has changed as a result of modern perceptions of violence. Furthermore, it shows what a momentous consequences this has for the 'modern' person. The investigation is based on the thesis that the 'bureaucratisation of power' was created by 'rational violence' using 'knowledge' as an instrument to legitimise totalitarian² rule relationships. A fitting theoretical basis for the modern concept of power is provided by Michel Foucault's approach, which coined the term bio-power or bio-politics. This bio-power uses the instruments of power such as disciplinary and regulatory techniques, these function as mechanisms of modern state apparatus that first 'discipline' and 'sanitise' the individual as a 'body' through various institutions, control and monitoring bodies. The goal was to become 'sociable' in order to be able to dedicate itself to the regulation of the population, which is treated as a species, organism and living beings. Other theoretical foundations are Hannah Arendt's works, which deal with concepts such as power, violence, total rule, and terror.

Arendt distinguishes the concept of power from that of violence through the fact that her 'power' means the ability to associate or connect and act with other people. It takes place wherever people 'do something' together or empower a person in their name (i.e. that of the group), while 'violence' is a means or instrument of domination. It occurs in the absence of 'power', that is, whenever there is "no political action". Violence then occurs as an instrument

² Ibid.: "From the very beginning, this term 'totalitario' meant something that stood in contrast to 'total' in a similar contrast as 'revolutionised' to 'revolutionary'. That means that, "totalitarian" has to be understood as the process of the "toleration - unwillingness" claim enforcement of domination, the ability, therefore, at any time to establish the state of emergency inside or outside the law. This process of power over the superior power to omnipotence is "totalitarian".

when, for example, 'political changes' take place, i.e when "anarchy-the absence of power" prevails. According to Arendt, violence is not legitimate in relation to power and can only implement its goals or relationships through "coercion", in order to bring about power or domination over someone. However, this must also be delineated in Weber's view of "violence" that derives from the "legitimate power or violence"³ of the state which has "the monopoly of the legitmate use of physical force" and is a law-abiding force, since it upholds the "order" and therefore has and is able to have the 'ruling power' on its side and can be understood as 'uniform' - as a unity of power and violence. Thus, 'civil violence', that is, the violence of the people or of the citizens as parallelisation to the "legitimate violence" is considered 'forbidden violence' and is therfor called by Arendt "civil disobedience". Recent approaches, such as those of Marc Crépon speak nowadays of the "violence of the indignant"⁴, as it occurs, inter alia, through the anonymous movement.

Walter Benjamin's criticism of violence also refers to the "legitimate law-abiding force" which stands in contrast to the 'forbidden violence' and can be understood as a legal criticism and as a critique of the 'law-preserving and law-setting force' as 'law-setting violence'. Thus, 'civil violence' is ambiguous and therefore plural and can also be understood as the driving force from which each new political system emerged since this is about the violence that fights for the 'establishment of a new order'.

The paradox however is that 'violence' or tyranny possesses or exerts no 'power' per se, since power can exist of its own accord and only legitimacy is needed, while violence can only be implemented through the means of 'coercion'. According to Arendt, out of tyranny, the reign of terror can arise when it has eliminated all its enemies but continues to hold on to "power" by maintaining central control over the state apparatus. Unlike the dictatorship, it does not pursue the exclusion of an 'enemy' but the control of all areas of life, in which all members of society, even the supporters of the 'dictatorship' can be declared or 'denounced'. Arendt concludes that the "total rule" lives on the claim of a "total, so all areas of life comprehensive, radical transformation of society" and due "to an anxious terrorist regime only paralysis, stagnation, sometimes even retrogression 'remains' which she calls the "atomisation of society".⁵

The racial ideological attitudes and the resulting homogenisation and repression policies of the dictatorships of the twentieth century, which emerged

³ The interesting fact here is that in German the term is "legitimate Violence" - „legitime Gewalt" and not "power" in the sense of "Macht".

⁴ Crépon/Worms 2015.

⁵ *Ibid.* Kollmorgen 2006: 17. "The "hyper-politicisation" became - as H. Arendt put it early on - the "atomisation of society", that is to say, in the Arendtian sense a politically free system of rule (Arendt 1951/86)."

from the historical context of capitalist and imperialist developments, and as modernisation stages, represent an extremely important and defining factor for today's understanding of power and the changed 'power relations' Europe must be understood as. The investigation of the establishment of ideological, dictatorial and totalitarian rule practices in the modern societies of Europe serves the fundamental understanding of the bio-power/"bureaucratisation of power" by the force of 'technical rationality'. Technical rationality served the purposes of rational labor, social organisation and political power preservation by becoming the embodiment of various political ideologies, and is therefore the bearer of Europe's social modernisation process, which needs to be further explored in the context of the seizure of totalitarian regimes.

2. The rise of Bio-power

The "education" of modern man also included the sanitation of the late medieval cities and the people living in them, who were increasingly plagued by poverty and spreading diseases and epidemics due to the rapidly increasing urban populations. To counteract these problems,

The growing state power in the form of urban, territorial or national authorities tried to make the solution of the burning / acute poverty and begging problem an integral part of their good policy, since at that time policy did not designate any institution, but the good order of the community. It was all about forcing healthy beggars to work, if necessary with punishment, and to educate the beggar children to work in time.⁶

Out of this problem of order, penitentiaries and workhouses were built throughout Europe in the late 16th century. Their inmates were disciplined with beatings and violence and forced to work in meager catering. For example, men often used to grate tropical color wood (*Rasphuis*), women to weave or knit. One working day in the Pforzheim Penitentiary lasted from four in the morning to nine in the evening, with four approximately one-hour meal breaks, for a total of 13 hours, followed by a night's rest. Reinhard says that the importance of *discipline* obviously fluctuates between *education* and *castigation*, with the latter often contributing to the former, leaving only the castigation in modern criminal law. The penitentiary was after Reinhard in contrast to the prison a particularly hard and dishonorable prison sentence, which was abolished in Germany in 1969. According to Reinhard, the concentration camps of the SS were also imprisoned in this tradition, as the cynical slogan "*Arbeit macht frei*" ("Labor makes free")⁷ reveals.

⁶ Reinhard 2006: 433.

⁷ Reinhard 2006: 433.

Foucault, who has dealt more extensively with the topic of *workhouses*, describes in his book *Madness and Civilisation*, that since the Renaissance, the leprosores stood empty until the 17th century, until they were put back into use, and there 'internees' as formerly Leprosy patients were isolated from the rest of society, which also had political, social, religious, economic and moral meanings.⁸ Especially as these hospices, internment, detention centers or penitentiaries were both ecclesiastical and public institutions: "the help and the punishment", in which the state and the church through "the establishment of the absolute monarchy and the strong revival/resurgence of the Catholic faith in the Counter-Reformation" were both in competition with each other as well as complicit for the public order.⁹ At the beginning of the 17th century, according to Foucault, in England was

the obligation to establish trade, workshops, factories (mills, spinning mills, weaving mills), which give the inmates of such establishments work and support [...] but the development of this bridewells is not very considerable, therefore they are gradually becoming from the prisons to which they belonged, absorbed. (John Howard, *États des prisons, the hôpitaux et of the maisons de force*, 2 vols., Paris 1788, Vol. I, p. 17; original English, London 1777) [...] In contrast, the workhouses were more widespread and come from the second half of the 17th century.¹⁰

Foucault writes that just a few years after its founding, only the L'Hôpital général de Paris accommodated 6,000 people, or about 1% of the population.¹¹ The reason for the creation of these penitentiaries was to combat the economic problems of the time such as unemployment and 'idleness'. A new work ethic and also the dream of a new city should be established, in which, through the authoritarian forms of compulsion, the moral obligation should coincide with civil law.¹² Thus, in the course of industrialisation, the modern bourgeois state takes

⁸ Foucault 1978: 76-77.

⁹ Cf. *Ibd.* ff.

¹⁰ *Ibd.*: 78: "At the end of the 18th century, the number of *workhouses* in England totaled 126. [...] After a few years, a whole network covered Europe (England, Holland, Germany, France, Italy, Spain - all early capitalist countries) – hospitals, prisons, penitentiaries held behind the same walls, ransomed persons, youths who disrupted their family's wellbeing or squandered their fortunes, captivating vagrants and the mentally ill. [...] So, what is the reality of this whole population, which was almost enclosed from one day to another and stricter banished as the lepers, asks Foucault.

¹¹ *Op. cit.* Lallemand 1902 – 1912: 262, In Foucault 1978: 79.

¹² *Ibd.*: 80: "behind this was the condemnation of idleness. [...] From the beginning (royal edict of April 27, 1656) the hospital was charged with the task of preventing beggary and idleness as the source of disorder. In fact, this was the last major measure since the Renaissance to put an end to unemployment or at least begging. (See footnote: From a spiritual point of view, misery was considered a threat to the Apocalypse at the end of the sixteenth century and early seventeenth century "J.P. Camus). The Parliament of Paris had decided in 1532 to arrest the beggars and force them to work in the sewers of Paris. [...] The crisis intensified because on March 23, 1534, the poor scholars and the needy were

over the organisation of work within capitalistically developed societies. Economics takes up the modern realm of labor in which people produce their goods and commodities, that they need to live and maintain. Here, the free market replaced the ancient understanding of private *oikos*.¹³ The relationship between the 'private' and the public space is changing, as the work with the emergence of the capitalist modes of production of the bourgeoisie has been pulled out of the 'hidden' into the public and people began to show themselves as working beings.

As work no longer takes place in the private sphere, the public is gradually becoming a political and economic space.¹⁴ In the context of the capitalist mode of production, which developed in the wake of mercantilism and in the context of the division of labor or collective work, the 'Estates Assembly' slowly developed into a modern parliament.¹⁵ The biological - organic life of the people, which until then had been in the organisational form of the family, became 'public' by means of the 'inorganic state organisation' and at the same time a 'mechanistic life' - an 'apparatus'.

This could be achieved through state construction such as that of Hobbesian "Leviathan", in which the violence in "nature" and the natural state of man is located. The violence in Hobbesian state of nature refers to the "fear of death" and the "loss of property", that is, the absence of "rights" that could protect the "life" and "property" of man. For this reason, people create a 'contract' among themselves, become 'citizens' and place themselves under a sovereign power that protects their lives and property.¹⁶ This theory is followed by Rousseau's social contract¹⁷, which comes into force through the consent of each individual who have joined together to form a sum of individual wills. As soon as the social contract and its regulations, such as the guarantee of freedom - as 'civil liberty' - are violated by the non-observance of the contracting parties, the original rights of the state of nature come back into force, the state prior the mutual consent to the social contract. In the state conceived by Rousseau, there should be no superior authority, since the state may consist only of equals, which form a 'moral whole' and consist of as many members as the assembly has votes and corresponds to a representative parliament.

ordered to leave the city. [...] The religious wars multiplied this suspicious crowd, where peasants expelled from their lands, dismissed soldiers or deserters, unemployed, poor students and the sick were. When Henri IV besieged Paris, it contained more than 30,000 beggars among less than 100,000 inhabitants (See. Platter, *Description de Paris* 1899.)

¹³ Arendt: 43; gr. Οικία: the house, that means the entire household and private life in antiquity; ιδιον designates in the life of the Greeks; what the citizen called his own.

¹⁴ Cf. Arendt 2002: In antiquity, this was the area of freedom and was called polis, which was considered political.

¹⁵ See Habermas 1990.

¹⁶ Hobbes 2008.

¹⁷ Rousseau 2003: 17.

This is intended to portray an act of 'social unity' in which the individual is considered a communal and political being and in the manner of Rousseau corresponded to a republic, which should guide the common good of society members. The members of the social contract should form a 'whole' - a people, consisting of individual citizens.

In doing so, the social grouping was based on mutual commitment, on the one hand of the state - as a public authority and an instance of a popular sovereign over the contracting citizens by the protection of their rights. On the other hand, the individual citizen endeavors to respect the contract with the sovereign. The *social contract* of both contracting parties is justified by the common interest that exists in the preservation of peace. *Sovereignty* is, in the sense of Rousseau, the exercise of the common will, which is the common interest of citizens and is made up of the sum of the special interests that constitute the private interest of the citizens. The public welfare of the society, which is to be transferred to a sovereign by transmitting the power of the people, is being pursued. The people are subject to the law, whose author it is and which represents the cornerstone of the democratic political system and its constitutions of the state, as for example in the Basic Law. Art 20. was anchored: All state power comes from the people. The 'public power' became a representative parliament, by developing from the stands politically institutionalised organs, which formerly consisted of professional associations and organisations and developed into the sphere of bourgeois society.¹⁸ From then on, modern *society*¹⁹ and the 'public' emerge, which has developed from the broad strata of the bourgeoisie as an extension and as a complement to the sphere of small-family intimacy.²⁰ In this formerly communal private sphere of necessities, the means of violence were used to rule the family. However, since this area was now transferred to the public, the state could claim "the monopoly of legitimate physical violence."²¹ At the same time, this means that the spillover of 'violence' has widened, especially as it affects public space - as "legitimate violence" and persists in the "privacy of the invidues" in the form of 'forbidden violence' - known as domestic violence, for example. Through the urbanisation and industrialisation (early capitalist countries) in the course of Western modernisation and rationalisation processes, the transition from the feudal society of absolutist rule to the modern disciplinary power of capitalistically organised bourgeois society or even industrial society is marked. The absolutist rule was still a 'natural' order, which was under a 'sovereign power', in which the state was perceived as an

¹⁸ Cf. Habermas 1990: 19-25.

¹⁹ Latin-Romanian Dictionary, see lat. *Societas*, - atis; - community, union, alliance, association; in the sense that people are together subject to life and its necessities; the human bond caused by the need to work and to be mortal. In short: the necessary human coexistence that is guided by biological impulses and constraints.

²⁰ Habermas 1990: 68, see also 69-70.

²¹ Dahrendorf 2006: 6/Weber 2006.

organic body as a “*corpus mysticum*” and the sovereign, monarch or prince as the head of this ‘body’. This changed, among other things, with the increasing technical development, in which came the opinion that the state is an ‘apparatus’ - an artificial mechanism and a technical order. In parallel with the advancing developments of the secular sciences, there has also been a change in the way society is perceived, as it has been transformed from agrarian and manual forms of work to industrial practices and working methods through “disciplinary techniques and the sanitation of the working world”. Thus, one increasingly began to divide the working people into economic classes.²² This was crucial for the modern understanding of violence, because Marx saw in the inequality and injustice of social conditions, the discrepancy between poverty and wealth, the source of all violence leading to the historical class struggle. The topic of ‘social violence’ remains topical to this day and is especially concerned with the question of ‘justice’ or problems of equal rights or social exclusion. At the same time as the classes but also gender segregation was made, they also began to subdivide the people according to their biological characteristics, categorise and thus classify them. This was accompanied by the separation of the ‘working’ and thus ‘unfree’ and therefore ‘lower’ people from the ‘political’, ‘free’ and thus ‘higher’ people. As a result, the inversion and at the same time separation from ‘private’ and ‘public’ space took place, since the concept of ‘privacy’ first constituted itself in relation to property.²³

According to Habermas, wage-earners were forced to exchange labor as commodities, while private owners, as commodity owners, traded with each other by exchanging goods. Thus, only the owners were their own masters and only they were entitled to the public use of their reason by means of political voting rights and thus admitted in the ‘public’.²⁴ Therefore, only those were called to represent the community, which acted in order, from which all others living in the “state of nature”²⁵ were decided and cared for. The individual therefore participates in politics since then only through his ‘representatives’²⁶, since all ‘working’ people - who possessed nothing but their labor power, were regarded as ‘disorderly souls’, as the ‘nature – people’ guided by their passions and impulses, who can not embrace their reason and therefore need a superordinate, now secular ‘order’ of their community so that the ‘property’, which is composed of life, freedom and possession, could be protected from each other.

It can therefore be said that the modern ‘public power’ and its legal system has assumed the form of a ‘bureaucratic state’ through the emergence of

²² Voegelin 2008: 103.

²³ Habermas 1990: 96.

²⁴ *Ibid.*: 136.

²⁵ Cf. Rousseau 2003: 19 and Hobbes 2008: 132-138; 138-150, 150 -164.

²⁶ Cf. Voegelin 2008: 103.

the bourgeoisie, since it was primarily a matter of protecting the 'property' of the possessing 'bourgeoisie'. Locke binds the state or constitutional law namely to a *common consent* and Montesquieu led it par excellence back to the *raison humaine*. As a result, political consciousness is fundamentally possible and articulates in a bourgeois public the demand for general and abstract laws as a counterforce to absolute forms of rule. In addition, only public opinion ensures the legitimacy of these laws.²⁷ Thus, while J. Locke laid the foundation for the modern understanding of "property and private possession" with his philosophical theory, Marx identified in J. Locke's famous work "life, liberty and estate" the 'political emancipation'²⁸ which should lead to new forms of violence.

2.1. Knowledge as an instrument of Bio-power

Parallel to the progressive modernisation processes and thus the developments of the sciences in Europe, an ever more clearly recognisable idea of the human races arises. Not least thanks to Darwin²⁹ and the newly developed natural sciences since the late seventeenth century, which began to develop biological and geological taxonomies and systematics. Important representatives were Linné and Buffon.³⁰ With the invention of the microscope³¹ it became possible to classify scientific discoveries accurately and to design systematic orders from variables and grids or classification methods.³²

For with the separation of body and mind through modern science, the senses became, for example, parts of a more or less well-functioning machine 'body'.³³

²⁷ Habermas : 72.

²⁸ *Ibid.*: 75.

²⁹ Simmel 1908: 392-393: "The struggle for existence: that is, the natural struggle for existence of all living things with the optimistic prediction that an automatic selection of the most capable will take place and the unlimited possibilities inherent in the conception of evolution, the descent of man from animals, out of which the new science of humanity Eugenics was born."

³⁰ Reinhard 2006: 410.

³¹ *Ibid.*: 98-99: "On the one hand the microscope (Antoni van Leeuwenhoek), on the other hand two different telescopes (Galilei and Kepler / Scheiner) were invented: the eye wanted to seize the big and the distant as well as the very small one. With the spread of the central perspective through the Italian Renaissance distance to the object and thus an essential prerequisite of modernity was created. "(Nelson) The human with his senses was solved from an overall context in which things are not only present, but mean something and point something behind them. Now the world has also been disenchanting by a third-objective third between the human being, his soul and his senses, in the form of ever new technical - visual aids of all kinds [...]. (Havelange). "

³² Foucault 1974: 171-175; 178-179.

³³ Reinhard 2006: 99: „Foucault wrote of the *looks that look without being seen*; raised to the system in the draft jail by Jeremy Bentham in 1791, which received the notable name *Panopticum* for the overseers could see everything. "

The classification systems clearly separated humans and animals;³⁴ nature was measured and ordered by means of certain combinations of features. Plants were assigned to specific plant families and animals and humans were divided into species, genera and breeds. Science came to the conclusion in the 20th century that man too was divisible into different 'races'. During the period of European colonisation of the world,³⁵ from about the end of the 15th to the middle of the 18th century, European explorers believed that this 'fact' was confirmed, as it affected people of different 'racial characteristics' such as physique or Skin color met. In connection with the respective native culture and ways of life one arrived at the 'logical' conclusion of a hierarchisation of the different human races.³⁶ From a strictly biologicistic and radically eurocentric perspective,³⁷ one constructed a connection between phenotypic traits that, for example, were believed to be signs of underdeveloped intelligence and the 'degree of civilisation' of a population group, thus providing the supposed evidence of the truthfulness of racial theory. The race theory considered dark-skinned humans for

³⁴ Lorenz 1983.

³⁵ Reinhard 2006: 390-391: "A balance of colonialism amounts to the continuous cultural westernisation of the world. [...] The westernisation of ecosystems through the spread of European agriculture has been indispensable, but not without damaging consequences. The world food industry is unthinkable without the crops, American origin, such as corn or potato, and the world's raw materials and energy industries are no longer without mining and oil. Above all, however, large parts of the world are involved in state-of-the-art production processes, in the marketing of their products and in intercontinental financial transactions of the highest degree. Everywhere in the world, layers, groups and structures of Western style are in line with this economic world. This includes a state that at least formally conforms to the standard model of the Western modern democratic nation-state. Above all, however, we have an increasing standardisation of the worlds of life not only of the elites, but more and more of the masses before us."

³⁶ Lipphardt/Patel 2007: 44-48.: „Two important documents are cited here: 'races' of humans are traditionally regarded as genetically uniform but mutually different. [...] However, recent advances based on the methods of molecular genetics and mathematical models of population genetics show that this definition is completely inappropriate. The new scientific evidence does not support the earlier view that human populations could be classified into separate 'races' such as 'Africans', 'Eurasiers' [...] or any larger number of subgroups. [...] This document emphatically states that there is no scientifically reliable way to characterize human diversity with the rigid terms of 'racial' categories or the traditional 'race' concept. There is no scientific reason to continue using the term 'race'. UNESCO-Workshop 1996: 71-72. „For centuries scholars have sought to comprehend patterns in nature by classifying living things. The only living species in the human family, *Homo sapiens*, has become a highly diversified global array of populations. The geographic pattern of genetic variation within this array is complex, and presents no major discontinuity. Humanity cannot be classified into discrete geographic categories with absolute boundaries. Furthermore, the complexities of human history make it difficult to determine the position of certain groups in classifications. Multiplying subcategories cannot correct the inadequacies of these classifications“. American Association of Physical Anthropologists. 1996: 569-570.

³⁷ Cf. *Ibid.*

example as direct descendant of the primate and precursor of the 'white' human. The result is the 'science' of eugenics and with it the biopolitics,³⁸ in which the genealogical features³⁹ and the biological characteristics become more and more important.⁴⁰ In addition, the attention of the eugenics and politicians increasingly focused on preventing the 'mixing of races'. 'Purebred' people were considered per se as 'superior' so politically on the one hand, a rapprochement with the colonised population was prevented and legitimised on the other hand their exploitation.

Foucault says that:

beginning with the 17th century, political power has taken over the administration of life by, first of all, conceiving that the body was a machine, that through its dressage, the increase of its abilities, the exploitation of its powers, the increase of its usefulness and his erudition, expressed his integration into effective and economical control system, since one operated political anatomy of the human body.⁴¹

Secondly, from the middle of the eighteenth century, people concentrated on the

Generic body that is thwarted by the mechanics of the living and underlying the biological processes, where reproduction(s), birth and mortality rates, health status, lifetime, longevity and all its variational conditions have become the subject of intervention and regulatory controls: Bio-politics of the population.⁴²

The discipline of the body and the regulation of the population form the two poles around which the power to life has been organised, which serves the

³⁸ Euchner 2001: 379: „The advances in gene research in the twentieth century not only led to the current promises of genetically purged humanity, but they also transformed Darwinian evolution into the strictly gen theoretical discipline *sociobiology* (with the "central theorem" of Inclusive fitness, see 382) and *biopolitics*. Darwin himself had only vague ideas about genetic factors that could support his heredity and selection theory. But the rediscovery of *Gregor Mendel's* theory of inheritance in 1866, the recognition that the basic elements of the chromosomes, termed "genes" by the Danish geneticist *Wilhelm Johansen* in 1909, cause a new phenotype through mutation, finally the study of the form and the chemical Properties of the genes allowed a redefinition of inheritance theory and thus the Darwinian selection theory." (See this success story, to the discovery of the double helix form of the chemical basis of genes, the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) Ridley 1999: 50-68.

³⁹ *Ibd.*: 381: Richard Dawkins characterisation of the people, which extends to the view that they are: „survival machines-robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes.“According to Dawkins, there is no genetic basis for every pattern of behavior, as tradition and education play a significant role in the field of culture.

⁴⁰ Arendt 2009: 393-396: "The notion of inheritance is coupled with the concept of achievement."

⁴¹ Foucault 1979: 166.

⁴² *Ibd.*

subjugation of the body and the control of the population, which characterises this bio-power.⁴³

It is important to understand that the nation-state reached its limits in its economic development during this time, because the economic process stagnated due to lack of growth and less capital accumulation. The national economies are experiencing in this time that their economic growth is over, if no new markets are tapped or opened up, because it lacked resources and sales markets, in order to be able to continue the production processes to this extent. In fact, the condition of steady economic growth is the constant progression and increase of production through the development of new resources and markets. Despite their accumulated capital surplus, European nations came into an economic crisis at the end of the 19th century. The countermeasure was to expand the national market simply by expanding, or colonising. The surplus flowed into the discovery, colonisation and subjugation of other lands by 'opening up and developing' a new market, where on the one hand resources such as coal, steel, oil, natural gas and ores, which were urgently needed in European industries, and on the other hand could mine gold and diamonds.⁴⁴

In order to be able to maintain the capitalist economic system and the nation states of Europe, the European expansion efforts were constantly pushed forward. The population of the colonised territories became cheap labor or slave labor, which was legitimised by the concept of 'lower races' described above. The extermination of the native population and the subsequent resettlement were also part of the colonial practice of the Europeans, since slavery was neither part of the social question for Europeans nor for Americans and according to Arendt; played virtually no role.⁴⁵

Arendt concludes that this has eliminated the "strongest and perhaps most dangerous of all revolutionary passions - the passion of compassion".

It is clear that racial thinking reached its peak here and could be imported back to Europe from outside. Racial ideologies contributed to the legitimacy of nation-state policies by helping to construct the "foreign" outside and within state borders and to strengthen the supposedly "right" national identity. The concept of the 'other' or the "stranger"⁴⁶ was the antithesis of their own nation, imbued

⁴³ Ibid.: 166-167 See also „Power and knowledge processes take the processes of life into their own hands.“ 168-169.

⁴⁴ Cf. Hannah Arendt 2009: 428 ff.

⁴⁵ Arendt 2014: 90-91.

⁴⁶ Cf. Schütz 1971: 53-69. See his theory of the *recipe system* - "Rezept-System" of cultural and civilisation patterns as patterns of adaptation and application.

with the 'national spirit', which was also strongly bound to the physical⁴⁷. The nation not only represented a specific territory in which one spoke a common language, but at the same time adopted the idea of the 'body', as occurs, for example, in Th. Hobbes's political philosophy, and was previously attributed to the state apparatus.

In the Middle Ages and early modern times, the state was considered a body, not only metaphorically, but by representation as a kind of "human being of higher order." [...] "When human beings are understood as machines in the 18th century, then they immediately emerge the idea of the state as a machine."⁴⁸

The idea of the nation legitimises itself on the basis of the idea of a closed body, in which certain groups, however, have experienced social exclusiveness through their difference from national similarities. Arendt states that:

The political-legal equality of all before the law was guided by a growing similarity of social and material circumstances. However, the more similar the circumstances, the less the average political mind can grasp the differences that exist in reality, the greater will be the inequalities between individuals and groups.⁴⁹

The spirit and the body belonged to the nation, the children belonged to the nation, the men committed their life to the nation. Belonging to the nation was defined and legitimised from a strongly biologicistic perspective. However, Arendt states that the nation's political conception, based on a historical unity of

⁴⁷ Cf. Reinhard 2006: 58: [...] „The conception of the body of the Middle Ages included the idea of the church as *Corpus Christi mysticum* [...] as a juridical person... [...] That is why the corresponding social structures, which certainly existed, like guilds, cities, estates, cathedral chapters were called *corpus*. [...] Renaissance architects developed city plans from the human figure [...] like their ancient model Vitruvius as from the harmony of the limbs and organs. [...] With such representations, however, they are not only linked to antiquity, but also to medieval images in which the cosmos was inscribed in the body of the man of God, Christ.. (Reudenbach in Schreiner/Schnitzler; compare Ramaswami in Duden/Noeres 57-76) [...] Instead of the state that did not yet exist, the king stood with his two bodies, the mortal human and the immortal political. In this way, the idea of the person-independent continuity of a nascent state power was conveyed. [...] such ideas amount to a politically quite effective *organic* conception of the state, a hierarchical functionalism of different organs, a natural, irrational, human will - and above all majority voting, which was not subject to political order. It is well known that such concepts lived further into the organic conception of the Catholic social doctrine with their professional social order and the European fascists of the 20th century, if they wanted to build the state from corporations."

⁴⁸ Cf. Reinhard 2006: 57-58: „In the Middle Ages and the Early Modern period, the state was considered a body, not only metaphorically, but by representation, as a kind of human being of a higher order." [...] "When man was understood in the 18th century as a "machine", then immediately appeared the idea of the state as a machine."

⁴⁹ Arendt 2009: 138.

territory, people and state, was not sufficient to establish a 'unified' sense of nationality, so that 'foreign' populations were more or less compulsorily 'assimilated'.⁵⁰ Biopolitics as a "political-biological power technique" of a strongly authoritarian policy and the unified national construct derived their legitimacy from each other. One of the goals of this policy(s) was above all in the construction of a common enemy (image). On the one hand, this held together the 'community' and, on the other hand, it served 'economic growth and profit', as it could force the 'enemy' into unpaid labor to fulfill the promise of 'modernisation'.

As one can easily see, repressive homogenisation measures based on biopolitics serve less to enforce their ideological content than to legitimise and strengthen one's 'own' political and, above all, economic power.

2.2. Bio-power and the age of total rule⁵¹

Although the National Socialist and Communist dictatorship resembled each other in form, they differed completely in their ideological content and purpose as well as in their political and economic implementation; namely, the "brown dictatorship" pursued a racially motivated claim to the world power, while the "red dictatorship" relied on socialist class struggle and political economy.⁵² Both operate with the means of bio-power or bio-politics, which corresponds to a concept that Foucault coined in his book *The Will to Knowledge* and the lecture of

⁵⁰ Reinhard 2006: 381-282: „Jürgen Osterhammel (2001: 222 or 1998) describes six different demarcation practices or ways to deal with the stranger: 1. Inclusion or integration; 2. Accomodation, 3. Assimilation or complete acculturation – which amounts to a total alignment of the stranger with the "own", through mission or xenophilia, which crushes the stranger because it wants to liberate him from his otherness (see Menzel), or through tacit habitual acceptance of the new practice, or even deliberate decision for it on the part of the stranger; (Arendt uses this term, however, in an ironic grotesque sense, as an allusion to the sixth form of the actual Extermination) 4. Exclusion, 5. Segregation, 6. Extermination by physically exterminating the stranger or at least by destroying his cultural identity, such as the forced assimilation of Australian Aborigines, as it was practiced until recently." [...] According to Reinhard, "conflict-free cultural contact tends to be the exception, as cultural contact usually results in cultural conflict, in that hard power in the form of military or economic coercion (hard power after Joseph Nye 2002) even plays a greater role than soft power (soft power attractiveness from foreign cultural patterns).“, See also Arendt 2009: 289-290.

⁵¹ "The term totalitarianism was coined in 1923 by the fascist critic Giovanni Amendola when he criticised the actions of Mussolini's fascist hordes as a new phenomenon of political behavior, calling it a "sistema totalitario", that aspired to absolute and uncontrollable rule in politics and administration." [...] "We can then speak of a totalitarian rule, if it combines the overcoming of the separation of powers, the abolition of party pluralism and control of power by secret ballot, and the elimination of independent judicature, with simultaneous, complete control over the means of power, legitimised by an ideology, which is aimed at the radical implementation of a new social model." See Funke 1996: 152-153.

⁵² Funke 1996: 155.

March 17, 1976.⁵³ Foucault defines the concept of bio-power as modern power and government technology, which has extended its political-economic sphere of influence to the social sphere since the 18th and 19th centuries.

Bio-power intervened in the private space, as it increasingly devoted itself to the biological. Through biological-political techniques of discipline, bio-power not only began to control 'life' but to "make it".

The interest of organic power began to focus more and more on the 'species – man' and 'life', after the human being or the "bodies" of the individuals were already 'sanitised' and 'trained' by the disciplinary power. Through the techniques of rationalisation, such as the classification, monitoring or serialisation of individuals, an entire surveillance and control system was created to serve the economic and political benefits of bio-power. The interest of the bio-power towards death shifted and played a less and less important role since the 15th and 16th centuries.

Death still played an important role for the sovereignty power, especially in the public sphere, as witnessed by the ritualised executions, tortures and processions performed to enforce the 'regulatory power' of the monarch, prince or sovereign.

Until the 18th and 19th centuries, 'death' and physical violence still belonged to the public space and was only with the advent of bio-power, left to the private sector. Thus, the 'life' now became a public affair of bio-power.

Due to the exclusion of 'death', 'life' was 'sanitised' and 'death' tabooed and anonymised, because for the bio-power, "making life" is important.

Through the categories "make life" and "let die," the bio-power can 'use' the population in the interest of 'their' conservation and reproduction as an instrument of the capitalist system.

However, by being able to determine 'life', one also decides who should be 'left to die' and thus decides on 'death' as well.

Giorgio Agamben, in the introduction to his work *Homo Sacer*, explains that for Foucault, man is used as a species and individual of the biopower: "as simple living bodies for the use of their political strategy".

The Bio-power created "appropriate technologies" a "disciplinary control" over the population, by training them to "docile body" to help capitalism to its "development and triumph." Agamben sees in modern biopolitics, similar to Arendt, the shifting of political interests, which are now more focused on the "bare life", as *zoe* and *bios* are now increasingly coinciding.⁵⁴

This reveals to Agamben the "hidden foundation on which the whole political system rested."⁵⁵ Agamben states that the process of development of

⁵³ Foucault 1999: 276-305.

⁵⁴ Aristoteles. 2010: [1095a32- b19], [1095b 19- 1096a 9]. Cf. also Agamben 2002: 11.

⁵⁵ Agamben 2002: 19.

modern democracy involved the process of “disciplining” and “sanitising” human beings, because the state power made the “human being as a living being” his object and the human being himself as a living being is no longer presented as an “object, but as a *subject* of political power.”⁵⁶

In order to better understand the psychology of these “bureaucratic power structures” of totalitarian rule, Foucault's analysis of “*Discipline and punish*” can be used. Foucault uses the idea of J. Bentham's *Panopticon*⁵⁷ to illustrate power and disciplinary practices involving numerous techniques and institutions for measuring, controlling, and ameliorating the *abnormal*.⁵⁸ Like the Panopticon, the totalitarian system, as it becomes clear in National Socialism, creates:

A network of power structures in which each individual is supervised by 'power' by establishing a conscious and permanent state of visibility within society, which ensures the automatic functioning of power, albeit juggling that power is visible but must be invisible (secluded), visible as the society constantly sees and perceives the structures of power through the institutions and their executors (such as the SS or the secret police), from whom the individual is spied and controlled, secluded inasmuch as the individual may never know whether he is being monitored or not, but he must be sure that he can be monitored at all times.⁵⁹

Crucial here is, according to Foucault, that the

Panopticon is a machine for divorcing the couple to see / be seen, and thus automates and de-individualises power, with the principle of power less in a person than in a concentrated arrangement of bodies, surfaces, lights, and looks;

⁵⁶ *Ibd.*

⁵⁷ Foucault 1976: 256-257: “Bentham's panopticon is the architectural shape of this composition. Its principle is known: on the periphery an annular building; in the middle a tower pierced by wide windows opening to the inside of the ring; the ring building is divided into cells, each of which extends through the entire depth of the building; they each have two windows, one inward, which is directed towards the windows of the tower, and one to the outside, so that the cell is penetrated by light on both sides. It is therefore sufficient to set up a supervisor in the tower and to place in each cell a lunatic, a sick person, a convict, a worker or a pupil. In front of the backlight, the small prisoner silhouettes in the cells of the ring can be clearly seen from the tower. Each cage is a small theater in which each actor is alone, completely individualised and constantly visible. The principle of the dungeon is reversed, more precisely: of its three functions - locking in, darkening and concealing - only the first is maintained, the other two fall away. The full light and the gaze of the overseer capture better than the darkness, which also protected. Visibility is a trap. [...] Everyone is securely locked in his place in a cell where he is exposed to the eyes of the overseer; but the side walls prevent him from making contact with his companions. He is seen without seeing for himself; he is an object of information, never a subject in communication.”

⁵⁸ *Ibd.*: 256.

⁵⁹ *Ibd.*: 258-259.

in an apparatus whose internal mechanisms establish the relationship in which the individuals are trapped.⁶⁰

This is a specific:

type of implantation of bodies in space, the distribution of individuals in their relationship to each other, the hierarchical organisation, the arrangement of centers of power and channels, the definition of instruments and intervention tactics of power and this type can be used in hospitals, factories, schools and prisons, so whenever you are dealing with a variety of individuals to whom a task or behavior is to be imposed, the panoptic scheme can be used.⁶¹

Panopticism is the metaphorical transmission of the bureaucratisation of power and its structures:

the generalisation of discipline, and the multiplication of disciplinary institutions, through an ever-expanding network, into the entire body of society, by taking control of time and space through its parceling form and allowing society to become programmable for its systemic functions.⁶²

After these disciplinary techniques were implemented in society, bio-power in the form of initially totalitarian regimes could consolidate to modern democracies. That may sound contradictory, that the same 'power' - the bio-power, which initially instilled itself through totalitarian systems of rule, should be the same power that 'lead' democratic systems of rule. This becomes understandable, however, when one realises that the bio-power - which concentrates on "making life" was created at the same time as the process of secularisation arose. This means that after the 'political power' disempowered the ecclesiastical world order and ascended to secular order, it needed legitimacy, which 'explained' its rule with its "rules of order" and with its institutions and "laws".⁶³

The 'new power' needed the legitimacy more and more urgent, since the contradiction of the bourgeois modern state and its 'power relations' became more and more visible. The contradiction was according to Arendt, on the one hand, that "the freedom and equality of all" was proclaimed and, on the other hand, the "inequality" between the classes, the sexes and especially the races,

⁶⁰ Ibid.: 259.

⁶¹ Ibid.: 264.

⁶² Ibid.: 268-269.

⁶³ Cornelius Castoriadis 1984: 197-220.

continued to increase. In order to be able to maintain this 'order system' and to be able to justify their claim to 'rule over man and over life', it required a legitimisation of power, which could no longer be derived by religion and the 'divine' determination. Man's 'nature' needed a 'worldly' - secular explanation. This explanation was found in science, which could now take the place of religion. The secular sciences now took the place of religion to 'explain' the prevailing conditions of life, of man, and of nature. It was also possible to explain the contradictions between postulated values and political practice, which on the one hand consisted in proclaiming a general freedom of the citizen and on the other hand in imperialism and slavery. The modern sciences have been able to explain the conflicting principles such as 'ownership' on the one hand and the expropriation of other cultures and civilisations and the exploitation of their territories for resources on the other. Thus, the two totalitarian systems of power of the twentieth century found in the historical materialism à la Marx and in the racial theoretic approaches the appropriate - scientific legitimisation of their bio-political violent measures and homogenisation efforts.

Conclusions

Such repressive rule practices, as the exploitation of the people by power, are already being discussed in Plato. In the first book of the *Politeia*, Plato's and Socrates' counter-speech Thrasymachus sees in the righteous nothing but the "advantage of the stronger" [338c].⁶⁴

Plato illustrates in his dialogue that what is conducive to the superior or what is beneficial to the state can be interpreted by the latter as the "just".

Governments, especially totalitarian regimes or arbitrary rule, interpret this as a "just" law, which is conducive to maintaining their power and privileges, and can thus make "injustice" legal - since it is the "legitimate power" of the state. Injustice but also violence can thus be legitimised in a despotism by state legalisation. Racial discrimination or expropriation processes are examples of state-legalised "injustice" and 'state violence', especially in totalitarian regimes. Such power practices are legitimised in the name of common 'identification' features such as religion, culture or civilisation, even in the name of freedom, nation, race and not least in the name of 'democracy' and are a typical instrument of bio-power for the purpose of securing their power.

It can be concluded that Foucault's concept of bio-power has lost none of its acuteness. The regulation techniques of bio-power, such as the "serialisation,

⁶⁴ Platon 2006. See book eight & nine.

monitoring, hierarchy, control, record and reports" have only increased further when one looks at modern communication technologies and social media such as Facebook, Instagram, etc. Indisputable is the economic benefit that the bio-power gains from this for itself. From this it can be seen that the bio-power, through the means of 'technology' could extend their political-economic influence even deeper into the 'private life' of the individual. This is held together politically by identity-creating factors and terms - such as the common 'democracy' and the construction of enemy images, through terms like 'terror'. Such bipolar constructions, as the 'friend-enemy-image', were previously used by totalitarian regimes.

The difference here is that today's enemy model, compared to the 'class enemy' (of Bolshevism) or the 'xenophobia image' under National Socialism, is not directly concretised. For example, today's enemy image - in the form of 'terror' - is an anonymous, unknown and therefore abstract enemy that can not be grasped, which increases the danger that anyone can be declared an 'enemy of the system or the bio-power'.

It was also one of the most engraving marks and dangers of totalitarian rule, since everyone could be declared an enemy of the system or of the power. Today's 'victim' can become the 'perpetrator' of tomorrow. Questionable are these 'good-evil' – 'fair-unfair' metaphors and their contained positive and negative connotations, as can be seen from the concepts of 'good' and thus 'civilised' and 'peaceful' democracy, which can be associated with the 'Own' and on the other side the 'evil' 'unknown' – and thus 'stranger' 'terror' from the 'Middle East'.

"To use the old idiom: they (words) 'mean' things. Therefore, we grasp the phenomena of meaning by recognising how the words associate with their designata. And this can ultimately be explained by the fact that the mind uses them as names or hallmarks of things (or ideas) [...] the meaning of a word consists in what it signifies. Meaning is designation, designation"⁶⁵

The 'classification' into 'good' and 'bad' or the up and devaluation of these terminologies is not only to be criticised here, but to be regarded as a danger, as it feeds left- or right-wing populism and serves the maintenance of political and social violence.

By recognising, collecting and deciphering the "sleeping language and its signs",⁶⁶ by reviving them, the attempt is made to shed some light on modern forms of violence. In a hermeneutic sense, language serves as a vehicle for communication, and is thus a tool of knowledge. But it can easily be used as an

⁶⁵ Taylor 1988: 55.

⁶⁶ Foucault 1994: 65.

instrument of 'violence'. According to Foucault, the relationship to the texts is of the same nature as the relationship to things; here and there you pick up signs. This is about "putting our image of the empirical world on solid foundations in the form of clear, unambiguous definitions of our basic concepts," to recognise reality as it really is and not as it seems.

Rational thinking, which strives for a cognition of the world, therefore tries to establish representations. Words are an indispensable tool because they allow us to deal with groups of ideas at the same time, rather than constructing our picture of the world, so to speak piece by piece.⁶⁷

Furthermore, bio-power operates with the construction of enemy images, which are intended to motivate their political and economic action by using (ecological) terms with biologically/socially degrading and classifying terms, as one can easily see from the notion of the 'wave of refugees', which comes from the right-populist camp.

Here, the 'refugees' are not only referred to as 'foreign', which are 'socially' and 'culturally' excluded by the fact that they are on the run and thus not 'sedentary', as the 'nomads' and have therefore no 'possessions'.

This is also associated with the danger of an ecological catastrophe - a tsunami wave - and thus not only 'negatively charged' but also declared a 'danger' par excellence. This example illustrates how 'terms' and their inherent meanings, can establish very specific representations and thus construct 'reality'.

In this context, Charles Taylor speaks of a "dimension of linguistic action that forms the centerpiece of a theory of meaning" and "is considered something that provides possible or actual images of an independent reality, within which possible or actual information about reality is coded."⁶⁸

The significance of the bio-power and its understanding of violence today emerges through the representation of its developmental process, which in turn - by using words to formulate representations - consists of the generation of representation.⁶⁹ Based on this theory of meaning, it is thus possible to determine the place occupied by the concept of 'violence' in the modern life of modern societies.

On this basis, of 'terms' such as 'anonymous terror', the tools of bio-power are growing, ultimately serving to increase the control, regulation and discipline of the population and in the face of today's communication technologies or better control surveillance systems, which are increasingly becoming part of private life the question of the "emancipation" of citizens can be raised.

⁶⁷ Taylor 1988: 54.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*: 58.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*: 60, 63.

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IS RELIGIOSITY HELPFUL FOR PATIENTS WITH HEART FAILURE? IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICAL ETHICS

ANCA DANIELA FARCAȘ¹, LAURA ELENA NĂSTASĂ², CRISTINA ANETA TÎRHAȘ³

ABSTRACT. The present study aims to underline the current discussions on the religiosity-health outcome relation, highlighting the tensions that may arise in the course of the medical practice on the following questions: a) Is religiosity itself an (independent) factor capable to affect the outcome of patients with heart failure, or is the association between religiosity and health benefits mediated by other social and psychological factors?; b) To what extent do religious beliefs conduct to illness avoidance or acceptance and to adequate treatment commitment, in other words those beliefs support or contradict the medical approach?; c) What measures on social policies and medical counselling level would be more effective and appropriate for the Romanian system?; d) In which of the following policy areas could the bioethical dimension be more flexible and efficiently integrated: the doctor-patient relationship, the steps of the medical act, the curative decision making and/or the long-term support of the patient? A large understanding and evaluation of the ethical and legal frame regarding the patient's information, treatment and healthcare is required for the medical practitioners as long as the shared decision making between patient and clinician is one based on modern medical principles followed by clinicians.

Key words: coping, religion/spirituality, support, health care, medical ethics.

Introduction

The role of religiosity in healthcare has been highlighted by many specialists (sociologists, psychologists, physicians, theologians, representatives of health policies organizations, etc.). The ability of religion experienced at individual level to provide a

¹ Internal Medicine Department, Faculty of Medicine, *Iuliu Hatieganu* University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Cluj Napoca Emergency Clinical County Hospital Cluj-Napoca.

² Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, *Transilvania* University of Brasov, 29 Eroilor Blvd., Brasov 500036, Romania. Email: lauranastase@unitbv.ro

³ Faculty of Social and Political Science, *Avram Iancu* University, Cluj-Napoca

sense of life and to engage psychologically and socially in support of professionals in the realm of medicine, health counselors, psychologists and medical sociologists, derives from multiple mechanisms of individual engagement (coping, resilience, social adjustment) between his/her struggle in the context of illness and the achievement of individual wellness. At the social level, religion offers the framework for social control, assures the homogeneity of values and attitudes, and - morally - legitimizes the support of the community in the case of illness of a member. So, in a competitive, materialistic and stressful world, religiosity offers a way to achieve a sense of spirituality at the individual level, while the community obviously empowers the effect of religion by its own principles (human life as a positive value, altruism, mutual help in community through emotional and social support etc.), thus legitimizing them.

Scholars (Oman & Thorensen, 2002) have proposed several perspectives from which religion as a spirituality pathway can influence health: (i) the 'psychobiological' perspective - claims that spirituality in health outcomes is manifested by psycho-neuro-immunological or psycho-neuro-endocrine mechanisms; (ii) the 'psycho-behavioral' route of interpretation - considers that religion as an anchored spirituality may influence health by certain psychological characteristics, stronger motivation on care and social support; (iii) the 'super-empirical' assumption - assumes that religiosity as a dimension of spirituality functions as a high empirical trigger to health, based on established health behaviors and psychological states; (iv) 'any pathway' - a broad view through spirituality / religion combines the four patterns of their psychological and social indicators (psychological states and tested psychological and social influences). We consider that the latter perspective on the relationship between religiosity as a spirituality dimension and psychosocial indicators in terms of demonstrated benefits on health outcomes can offer a better insight on this matter.

The study is structured in two main parts. The first part focuses on the empirical knowledge regarding the relationship between religiosity / spirituality and other elements of social support and illness / health, in order to clarify the meaning and the multiple influences on social and spiritual (religious) aspects of health in general, and cardiovascular health in particular. The second part focuses on the bioethical implications of the relationship between the treatment and care of long term (cardiovascular) patients in the light of religious aspects, pointing out the need for an integrated approach of the significant variables involved in the bio-medical and psycho-ethical domains of medical act, treatment and support. In this respect, the current approach on the medical practice encourages clinicians to involve medical ethics in the "traditional" evidence-based perspective. Therefore,

the resources will be used more reasonably and will meet the expectations of the today patient (Kirkpatrick, Fields, & Ferrari, 2010).

Religiosity and / or social factors? A map of overlapping influences

Religion as an individual experience has five basic components: intellectual, ideological, public and private ritualistic, and religious experience / experimentation. These components can be aggregated by two dimensions: the ideological-experiential (as a source of individual motivation) and the ritual-community (individual engagement in social relations in the community - as an external motivation - and support offers from the religious community). Such mixed categories could be seen as ways of activating personal religious constructs and their intensity describes the likelihood of a central position of the constructivist-religious system in personality (Huber & Huber, 2012). Since Romanians attach great importance to religion as a support in everyday life, as indicated by the national barometers, this analytical route deserves to be investigated more closely by addressing chronic patients, especially patients with cardiovascular disease.

Medical studies (Farcaș, Stoia, Anton et al., 2017) largely demonstrated that the prognosis and evolution of heart failure patients depends on both physical factors (clinical, hemodynamic, biological, etc.) as well as psychosocial factors: anxiety, depression, stress and perception of stress (Farcaș & Năstasă, 2014). The last decades have brought an increasing focus on the impact of psychological and socio-economic factors both in the evolution of patients with heart failure and in the quality of their lives (Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996). In this light, among the psychological factors, the interference of the religious dimension is important to be considered throughout medical process ((Farcaș & Năstasă, 2011) and ethical management in hospitals (Agheorghiesei & Copoeru, 2013).

A convincing series of data supports the major negative effects of stress and negative emotions (depression, anxiety, anger) on health, healing or life expectancy (Goideșcu, Farcaș, Anton et al., 2017; Kubzansky & Thurston, 2007; Russ, Stamatakis, Hamer et al., 2012; Segerstrom & Miller, 2004). At the same time, social support has been shown to protect against illness and increase longevity (Hemingway & Marmot, 1999; Holt-Lunstad & Smith, 2012; Schwarzer & Rieckman, 2001). Religiosity influences the type of support and care that patients receive once they return home, and also affects their commitment to medical treatment. The existence of a religious community will provide a very important social and instrumental support to the patient at home (household

services and care, psychological support, the encouragements to make medical checks regularly etc.).

But systematic studies proving the benefits of religiosity through direct mechanisms of health in its objective parameters are relatively inconclusive and even contradictory. Literature reviews indicate very weak ties in measurable parameters - associations being mainly produced by intrinsic psychological / subjective mechanisms - between religious adhesion and health benefits. Some researches in the area of heart disease and hypertension show no significant statistical associations between health and religion variables as "taken for granted" (Medscape, 2010; Richard & Sloan, 2002). This relationship seems to be mediated by different social factors (often superposed with religiosity), other than religion itself, such as: social and financial status, familial and communitarian context, cultural and psychological background, psychological characteristics of the individual etc. (Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996).

There seems to be a generally assumed evidence: at the subjective level, the empirical findings show that both patients and caregivers declare various benefits from spirituality and religiousness by the involvement of better coping with illness consequences, lower perceived symptoms, and increased quality of life (Butter & Pargament, 2003; Chang, Noonan, & Tennstedt, 1998, Farçaş & Năstasă, 2011; Pargament, Koenig, & Perez, 2000).

At the objective level, different studies based on epidemiological trends and statistics, morbidity and mortality in different types of societies point to the conclusion that the lack of / decreasing social support increase the levels of disease and mortality. With or without a healthy lifestyle and other protective factors (housing, medical care, poverty / welfare), literature suggests that familial-social isolation has become an indicator of poor prognosis in health outcomes and mortality, both on short and long term (Cockerham, 2007; Wenger, 1984). The role of social network seems to be essential for these results, facilitating the share of care and resources.

Relations between the treatment and care of heart failure patients in the light of religiosity/spirituality aspects (bioethical implications)

The set of religious beliefs and practices are commonly used by patients to deal with illnesses and other stressful changes in life. Studies have shown that patients with terminal illnesses have mostly unsatisfied spiritual needs, so care for patients with chronic illnesses also requires attention to these needs (Koenig, 1998). Failure to do so can negatively affect health and increase mortality

independently of mental, physical or social health (Ehman, Ott, Short, Ciampa, & Hansen-Flaschen, 1999; Pargament, Koenig, Tarakeshwar & Hahn, 2001).

Patients' religious beliefs / spirituality can affect (even opposed to) decisions about medical treatments, influencing their compliance, especially in serious medical conditions (Balboni, Vanderwerker, Block et al., 2007; McCord, Gilchrist, Grossman et al., 2004). Also, religious beliefs of physicians often influence the medical decisions they make and affect the type of care they provide to patients, including decisions on the use of palliative or analgesic medication (Curlin, Lawrence, Chin & Lantos, 2007), and those decisions are often not discussed with the patient, an issue which raises other deontological problems. In this context, doctors need to be aware of all the factors that influence health and healthcare of their patient, so along with information on smoking, alcohol use, etc., they should ask for information regarding various life beliefs of individuals, and also about their religion. An intimate dialogue between physician and patient is necessary to ensure that the patient recognizes that there are complex compromises to be done (involving the recognition of diagnostic uncertainty, advance care planning and preparation for aggravation and/or death) when faced with medical decisions for both the clinician and the patient.

Bioethics deals with the moral issues raised by medical research and practice; every stage of man's existence has a deep ethical significance. Bioethics has four basic principles:

- 1) respecting patient autonomy - recognizing an individual's right to self-determination. Under these circumstances, the medical team provides the patient with all the information necessary to make a decision, helping the patient understand and apply this decision, but the team must be sure that the decision was freely taken by the patient and not imposed by another person. At the same time, the team must respect the choice made by the patient, even if it does not agree with it, and can intervene only if there are suspicions about the nature of the available information to the patient, his/her ability to understand and if the decision was forced. Respect for autonomy also requires recognizing the patient as a distinct personality, who has his/her own purposes, beliefs and reasons for making choices and planning the future. Thus, respect for the patient's autonomy goes hand in hand with human dignity.
- 2) well-being - the physician must act in the best interest of the patient to prevent harm and contribute to the well-being of the patient.

- 3) non-harm - the first thought of the doctor should be to avoid harming the patient ("do not harm" - *primum non nocere*), then do good;
- 4) justice - requires medical staff to treat each person equally, regardless of race, sex, marital status, social status, economic status, religious belief of the patient, etc.

Despite these general regulations, it is not easy to make a distinction between an ethical and a legal approach in the field of medical practice. The practitioners should face different constraints due to both legislation and rules of their system (Tay & Tay, 2010) and social-cultural requirements of the individuals (values, beliefs, attitudes, preferences, and goals – in other words, a patient-centered health care – see Lampert, Hayes, Annas, et al., 2010) in the shared / informed decision making process and in the course of the treatment.

The decision making process in the medical act should involve clinicians who fully inform the patient about the risks and benefits of treatments, taking into account patients' goals, values and desires (Lauridsen, 2013). Making joint decisions that require regular discussion between clinician and patient with chronic illness, such as advanced heart failure patients (Tanner, Fromme, & Goodlin, 2011), about patient preferences and promoting high-quality and shared decision-making health care is the best and most appropriate means of implementing patient-centered health care.

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ACTUALITY AND “UNTIMELINESS” IN THE DISCOURSE ON THE REFUGEE CRISIS THE CASE OF HUNGARY¹

ZSUZSANNA LURCZA *

ABSTRACT. The figure of the refugee and asylum seeker, hidden from the masses, de-humanised, deprived of existence and rights, are in sharp contrast with their representation in the Hungarian mass media and in visual and textual materials of the Hungarian Governmental Information, which constructs a manipulated, extremist and xenophobic, ideologically biased reality. In this sense, the discourse on the refugee crisis has an “actual” and an “untimely” form. The first chapter of the paper is an ideology-criticism analysis, aiming at the deconstruction of the ideological subject-construct of the contemporary refugee existence. This analysis focuses on the Hungarian political language used to refer to the European refugee crisis since 2015, primarily the political questionnaire entitled “National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism” and the text and poster campaign of the “Governmental Information” related to it, with references to the later, 2017 “Let’s Stop Brussels” campaign, 2016 Hungarian “Migrant quota referendum”, 2017 “Soros-plan” Consultation, and materials of the information campaign “Wirtschaft Zusammen Integrationsinitiativen der Deutschen Wirtschaft” in Germany. In the second part, this contemporary constructed form of refugee and asylum seeker existence is paralleled with its untimely discourse.

Keywords: refugee crisis, Hungarian political language, ideology-criticism, the untimeliness figure of the refugee, new (in)human condition.

Introduction

By the end of 2015, according to the data of UNO-Flüchtlingshilfe, there were as many as 65.6² million refugees around the World – and even more –, a number never seen since the Second World War, who became “useless” for world

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* Visiting researcher at the University of Kassel, 34125 Kassel, Kurt-Wolters-Str. 5.
Email: lurcza_zsuzsa@yahoo.com

² UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency: <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html> (Downloaded 13.01.2018)

politics. Out of this number 17.2³ millions live the jungles of refugee camps and accommodation centres – as a sort of a post-colonial continuity – as technical management of political consequences,⁴ outlining the increasingly present refugee existence as a new stratum and category of the society. All these developments outline and actualize the idea, that the refugee – as Giorgio Agamben claims – is the only figure, which makes “the forms and limits of a coming political community”⁵ visible; it is therefore necessary “to build our political philosophy anew starting from the one and only figure of the refugee”.⁶ According to Agamben, the basic categories of the political systems in Western societies are no longer the “friend” and the “enemy,” but rather the “bare life” and the “political existence”. The contemporary European refugee crisis radicalizes this issue,⁷ and at the same time encourages us to analyze the deprived, excluded and impossible life form of the refugees in all aspects of human life, and at the same time to critically examine their ideological techno-political discursive subject-constructs, analysing their various power discourses, revealing their linguistic abuses, and thus give voice to the covert and suppressed discourses. Giving back, by this, the socially active, protesting, critical, “engaging” function of philosophy, or at least a kind of philosophy, for the present, for *actuality*.

I. Deconstructing the Extreme Discursive Subject of the Refugee

“Language is not a neutral medium for communication but rather a set of socially embedded practices. The reverse [...] is also true: social interactions live linguistically charges lives. That is, every social interaction is mediated by language – whether spoken or written, verbal or nonverbal.”

(L. Ahearn)⁸

³ In addition there are 5.3 million Palestinian refugees registered by UNRWA, 10 million stateless people, and 189 300 refugees resettled. Ibid.

⁴ As Michel Agier claims in the Documentary film “Neue Heimat Flüchtlingslager” 2015.

⁵ Giorgio Agamben: *Homo sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998. 16.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ for its diversified perspectives including “questions the nomadic, migrating and commuting in light of wearable technologies and their infrastructures” see Tincuta Heinzl and Lasse Scherfig: Nomadic, Migrating, Commuting, Wearable Technologies and Their Infrastructures. In: *Studia UBB Philosophia* Vol. 62 (2017), 3. 6.

⁸ Ahearn, M. Laura: *Living language. An introduction to linguistic anthropology*. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. 3.

“The smartest way to keep people passive and obedient is to strictly limit the spectrum of acceptable opinion, but allow very lively debate within that spectrum.”

(Noam Chomsky)⁹

The leading political programme of the Hungarian government on the refugee/migration crisis (fight for definition)¹⁰ is the 2015 “National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism”. The title of the Consultation¹¹ already betrays the ideological nature of the political rhetoric by the term “national”, which marks the government’s ideological nation-building construction, in which the decisive place is given not to the citizen, the inhabitant, but to the “nation”. This happens through a new kind of government communication based on (emotional) identity construction in the framework of a seemingly common task and purpose. The name “consultation” creates the impression that there is indeed a possibility for consultation, for the discussion and confrontation of opposing viewpoints, as well as for an active participation in the political life. However, the choice of the subject and the way of discussion is a propagandistic, manipulative, mobilizing and militaristic semantic strategy and communications form (of the direct marketing type), capable of creating moral panic. The first meaning of the noun “consultation”, based on the Hungarian Interpretative Dictionary,¹² is “request from an expert”, which is not adequate in the case of a manipulative direct marketing strategy as a political questionnaire, addressed to the masses. The stigmatising noun “terrorism” is the keyword and leitmotif for intimidation and an all-encompassing existential panic, which intends to influence thinking, feelings, and actions. The term terrorism – a Latin loanword – actually means terror, horror,¹³ but its meaning derived from the French *terreur* means terrorism, the

⁹ Noam Chomsky.

¹⁰ „Interpretationsangebote sozialer Wirklichkeit mit impliziten Handlungsfolgen“ – Josef Kopperschmidt: Soll man um Worte streiten? Historische und Systematische Anmerkungen zur politischen Sprache. *Liedtke* 1991: 70-89. 83.

¹¹ The fifth “political questionnaire” institutionalised by the second Orban government, which are direct marketing campaign letters sent to every Hungarian household.

¹² Institute for Linguistics of the Hungarian Academy of Science (ed.): *Hungarian Interpretative Dictionary*. Academy Publishers, Budapest, 1959-1962.

¹³ At this point we arrive at the problem of the definition of terrorism. The term is (ideologically) polysemous. Its undifferentiated interpretations and definitions embedded into various contexts seem to get blurred with the ambitions and self-legitimizing language of power networks. The boundary between terrorism and war, terrorism and revolution, terrorism and common crime, terrorism and political violence, terrorism and fight against terrorism is blurred. The fight against terrorism often becomes a slogan arguing for the privatisation of war, or for profit-oriented “self-defence strategies” and humanitarian aid, “without pointing at the often very broad frontier territory between various forms of radical ideas and the irregular armed political conflict.” In: Szilveszter Póczik: *Az iszlám forradalom (The Islam Revolution)*. 13. IDRResearch Ltd./Publikon Publisher, Pécs, 2011.

rule of terror as well. At this point it seems to threateningly juxtapose and also organically connect the political discourse to the problem of *immigration* (Dysphemism), i.e. refugee crisis.

The refugee crisis appearing in Europe in 2015 is termed in the Governmental Information as “migration pressure”. The focus of the discourse, especially in the introduction letter and in the questionnaire of the Consultation preceding the Governmental Information, is terrorism paralleled with “migration pressure”, as a *red herring*-type distraction. The thematisation of terrorism is embedded within an intimidating, ethnocentric and exclusivist construction of social reality. The refugee crisis is completely excluded from the discourse, while the defence mechanism against immigration paralleled with terrorism is meant to justify the exclusionary legal modifications and the building of the “border barrier”.

The introduction letter of the questionnaire outlines a deterrent actuality: “Europe was shaken by an unprecedented act of terror. In Paris the lives of innocent people were extinguished, in cold blood and with terrifying brutality”.¹⁴ The first three and the sixth question of the questionnaire also refers exclusively to terrorism:

„[1] We hear different views on increasing levels of terrorism [negative condition description]. How relevant do *you* think the spread of terrorism (the bloodshed in France [metaphor], the shocking acts of ISIS [metonym]) *is to your own life?* [Answers:] Very relevant, Relevant, Not relevant”¹⁵ – irrelevant parallel.

The EUROPOL report (EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report – TE-SAT) says that terrorism includes the following categories: Islamists, separatists, leftist anarchists, rightists and single issue terrorists. The “Islamist” is a category that must be deconstructed, for it presents one type of terrorism as overlapping with a world religion of more than one billion members. The question may be asked: why is there no Christian terrorism? Jacques Derrida also wonders whether the “letting die” attitude (J. Derrida, G. Borradori: Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides – a dialogue with Jacques Derrida. By Jacques Derrida with Giovanna Borradori. In G. Borradori (ed.): *Philosophy in a time of terror: dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003. 108.), the ignorance of several hundreds of millions who are starving, or are HIV positive, or live on territories afflicted by Ebola without proper cure, should not be considered terrorism, a deliberate terrorist strategy. The question is also valid with respect to the refugee crisis starting in 2015: the ignorance of the several million deaths in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria (who could be regarded as victims of the anti-terrorist fight). Just as it is unclear what can be regarded as terrorism at a given time, it is also unclear what the fight against terrorism is. It is yet another question whether the series of illegal wars fought in the name of the anti-terrorist struggle cannot be regarded as a legal terrorism of some sort. There is a need for the deconstruction of the extremist rhetoric of “terrorism” and “international terrorism”, its war-legitimizing, intimidating and hatred-inciting status.

¹⁴ For English version of the introduction letter and questionnaire published from Prime Minister’s Office see: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/national-consultation-on-immigration-to-begin>

¹⁵ Ibid.

“2] Do *you* think that *Hungary* could be the target of an act of terror in the next few years? [Answers:] There is a very real chance, It could occur, Out of the question.

3] There are some who [who are they? – argumentum ad verecundiam – reference to unidentifiable authority] think that mismanagement of the immigration question by Brussels [metonym] may have something to do with increased terrorism. [In a deontic meaning: the migrants are {potential} terrorists.] Do you agree with this view? [Answers:] I fully agree, I tend to agree, I do not agree”.¹⁶ – Complex question: a). “Brussels” handles “immigration” (refugee crisis) the wrong way. b.) The wrongly handled immigration (refugee crisis) is related to the spreading of terrorism.

“6] There are some who believe that Brussels’ policy on immigration and terrorism has failed (metaphor), and that *we* therefore need a *new approach* to these questions. [flagword: suggesting a positive meaning; type of argument: institution X has dealt with it this way – this is wrong, we do it differently / correctly.] Do you agree? [Answers:] I fully agree, I tend to agree, I do not agree”.¹⁷ – Complex question: a.) Brussels’ policy on the problem of immigration (refugee crisis) and terrorism has failed. b.) A new approach is needed.

The questionnaire conspicuously uses repetitions, makes ceaseless references to terrorism, generates a sense of endangerment and fear, suggests an identification of events, people or institutions with imminent danger, contains many expressions and metaphors with negative connotations or parallelisms with tragic events: “strengthening terrorist actions”, “the spreading of terrorism”, “the bloodshed in France”, “the alarming actions of ISIS”, “the target of terrorist actions is Hungary”, “wrongly handled migration”, and the verb “has failed”.

The questions are strongly distorting, and define the subject and result of the Consultation from the very start. Supposedly a different kind of formulation of the questions could have resulted in a different conclusion of the Consultation (e.g., “How important do you consider to help people fleeing from war and terror?”). At the same time, the questions are just for appearance, they are selective, subjective and “informative”, or more exactly manipulative, rather than exploring one’s opinion. The language and logic of the questions is also worthy of attention: they are complex, and they formulate presuppositions and claims. They are also aggressive and dangerous, they leave no space for the respondent to actually express his or her opinion. Another problem with the questions is that

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

giving a negative answer to them might be “risky”, suggesting that the respondent is an “enemy” of their country or themselves, as they do not want to “live a secure life” and “wish harm” to their country.

The indefinite pronoun “*different*” (sokféle) in the first question merely makes reference to the existence of several “views”, but does not list them, covering up thus the possibility of presenting other kinds of discourses. The “views” (vélemény) is used in the sense of “opinion”, which is a subjective expression of somebody’s thoughts or beliefs at a given time, a judgment, claim, suspicion or supposition based on probability. Through these means, the questions are presented as opinions, where one’s own “opinion” can be understood in fact as a manipulative popularisation of one’s own ideological discourse, and the construction of an extreme reality.

Terrorism appears in the first question in relation with one’s *own life*, and in the second question as *which targets Hungary*. Both questions suggest the intimidating deontic meaning that one has to face an extreme situation in which one’s life and country is / could be threatened by terrorism. The third complex question suggests the deontic meaning that “Brussels” is responsible for the spreading of terrorist attacks. The claim of an organic connection between “terrorism” and “immigration” in the third question also creates the impression that immigration (i.e. refugee crisis), similarly to terrorism, threatens the respondent’s existence. This parallel also prepares the field for the supposition that the strategies to tackle “terrorism” and “immigration” (i.e. refugee crisis) must also be similar, meaning that immigrants (asylum seekers and refugees) must also be eliminated and fought against.

References to the events of Charlie Hebdo use and amplify the negative association constructed in the media that the entire life sphere of members of the western society has been jeopardised: its fundamental values, such as freedom of speech, democracy, culture, homeland, and ultimately their physical existence. Making this reference also creates the possibility of identification, since after the actuality-constructing media coverage of the event the whole world chanted “Je suis Charlie”. The reference to ISIS brings this impression even closer. Another aspect to be mentioned is the use of the relative pronoun “who” (“there are some who”) – there are no (authentic) sources listed for the information presented as objective –, suggesting that there are “those people” with an unknown “them” behind them.

The “European Union” is replaced in the questions by “Brussels”, although the EU and Brussels are not an identical entity. Hungary is also a member of the EU, therefore the respondent could identify with it in some respects. However,

this cannot be said about a metonymical “Brussels”, which creates here the impression of a distant, strange, “extra-national” power, and stigmatises the use of the EU concept. This is the general rhetoric of the April and May 2017 “Let’s stop Brussels!” Consultation and billboard campaign.



Figure 1. “Let’s stop Brussels! National Consultation 2017”.

The “Let’s stop Brussels!” Consultation continues and increases the criminalisation of the refugees, asylum seekers, and their identification with terrorism, as well as the construction of the sense of endangerment. This Consultation contains six questions. These, in addition to openly attacking “Brussels” and non-governmental organizations, also deal with the problem of “illegal immigrants” in one question, and the criticism of the international organizations of migration aid in another one. The second question of this Consultation asks: “In recent times, terror attack after terror attack has taken place in Europe. Despite this fact, Brussels wants to force Hungary to allow illegal immigrants into the country. What do you think Hungary should do? (a) For the sake of the *safety of Hungarians* [flagword] these people should be placed under supervision (felügyelet) while the authorities decide their fate. (b) Allow the illegal immigrants to move freely in Hungary”.¹⁸ The deontic meaning of the propagandistic question above can be reconstructed as follows: 1. There are more

¹⁸ English version of the questionnaire of “Let’s stop Brussels!” Consultation see: <http://hungarianspectrum.org/2017/04/02/national-consultation-2017-lets-stop-brussels/>

and more terrorist attacks in Europe. (2. The terrorist attacks are committed by immigrants, as it becomes more evident later from the billboard campaign of the Hungarian “Migrant quota referendum” in 2016).



Figure 2. “Did you know? The Paris terrorist attacks were carried out by immigrants Referendum 2016. October 2.”



Figure 3. “Did you know? More than 300 people were killed in terrorist attacks in Europe since the start of the migrant crisis”

3. Brussels wants to force Hungary to let illegal immigrants in.¹⁹ (4. If we let illegal immigrants in, they could commit terrorist attacks in Hungary as well.) 5. Brussels wants to force Hungary to subject to the possibility of future terrorist attacks on its territory. In addition, “security” is a flagword which grounds the language of the consultations, which are fixed in social awareness as a result of, and associated with, governmental measures, in a positive sense, as the (single) safeguard of security.

A decisive phenomenon in the text of the introduction letter and questionnaire of the “National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism” and the Governmental Information is the way the problem is formulated: the thematisation of terrorism and immigration versus the avoidance to thematise the refugee crisis, the quality of the terms used, the conscious mixture of terms with different meanings: the repeated, frequent use of “illegal border crosser”, “migrant”, “illegal immigrant”, “immigrant who illegally crosses the border”, “economic migration”, versus the avoidance to use the terms refugee and asylum seeker. The text contains no such terms as “citizen”, “stateless”, “refugee” or “asylum seeker”, terms that could imply that these people have some kind of rights or are entitled to claim rights; they are only described as having illegal qualities. This value-deprived language use is meant to influence how the public opinion thinks and acts about it, and what status it attaches to the people described in these terms. The undifferentiated, multi-sense use of the term “immigrant” is at the same time ambiguous and misleading. Is it intentional never to clarify what this political term means in its various uses? This ideological polysemy makes it possible to merge various semantic fields: immigration and terrorism, immigration and refugee crisis, immigration and groups with a migrant background. The purposeful exchange of various terms favours the extreme reality-constructing discourses of the power structures, and this is what legitimates the deconstruction of concepts and attitudes. The various terms and names are attached to radically different political and legal procedures. The terms with negative connotation (e.g. terrorist) come to the forefront, enjoy large media coverage, and are present in the political discourse, while other terms (such as asylum seeker and refugee) get no publicity.

The subjects of the Consultation – as viewed by the technical-medial-political mechanism of the government – are not refugees, nor potential asylum

¹⁹ The logic of the “National Consultation on immigration and terrorism” from 2015 will be radicalised in the further „Migrant quote referendum” in 2016 and Consultations.

By the Referendum we can also find the governmental billboard campaign with the following phrase: „Did you know? Brussels wants the forced resettling of a city's worth of illegal immigrants into Hungary”

seekers, and do not need any humanitarian aid, they only started out in the hope of a better life. The discourse on refugee crisis gets thus distorted, focusing, instead of humanitarian aid, on a defence strategy, on the “migration pressure” and “modern-age migration period” that has put the country at risk, on crime and violation of the law, criminalizing and alienating the asylum seekers, and constructing the image of an enemy at the same time. All these discourses and extreme rightist argumentations produce a xenophobic and ethno-centric reality, which functions as a *pseudo-actuality*, a programmed actuality, an “ArteFakt”, a “reality” that has its own constructors and censors.

1.1. The introduction of the Governmental Information about the Consultation

The Governmental Information publishes the result of the Consultation with the following slogan and performative, activating call: “*People have decided: [synecdoche: not all people, only a part of the people, who are non-representative for the entirety of citizens]²⁰ the country must be defended*”, as also written on the “informative” billboard-campaign of the Consultation.



Figure 4. “Governmental Information. People have decided: the country must be defended. National Consultation on immigration and terrorism”

²⁰ 8 million posted questionnaires were filled in by 1 million 58 thousand people

“The country must be defended” is a euphemistic call, because the “defence” strategy of the Consultation targets precisely the rejection of help, the introduction of exclusionist law amendments, and the building of a “border barrier”.

After the slogan, the introduction of the Consultation informs the reader, formulating and at the same time constructing the reality: “A never before seen migration pressure [a metaphor referring to an external, alien force, enhanced by the term “migration”, coming from a foreign language] is weighing down on *Europe*, and on *our country* as well. The past few months have witnessed a drastically [negative adverb] increasing number of people illegally entering ([Dysphemism], that is, asylum seekers) Hungary. By the middle of October more than 380 thousand people have crossed the border illegally. The EU is also responsible for this situation, because it has encouraged the migrants to leave their country and head for Europe. This is a question that *greatly determines our daily life and our common future*. If we fail to take action, we shall not recognize our own country in a few decades’ time [false dilemma]. For these reasons, the *government* has started a consultation about migration and terrorism”.²¹

The introductory part of the Governmental Information contains references to the extraordinary situation and illegality, as well as intimidating and pressuring phrases: “never before seen [...] pressure”, “drastically”, “illegal”. The Consultation is legitimate because the present situation determines and even endangers the “common future”, because, as a negative connotation, an activating and mobilising element, it gives the impression that “If we fail to take action, we shall not recognize *our own country* in a few decades’ time”. This, based on Austin’s speech act theory, can be understood as a threatening illocution. The respondent has to face a false dilemma here, which heavily restricts the possible options, while it also works as an “all or nothing”, a black-or-white argument: we either accomplish our programme, or “we shall not recognize our own country”, meaning that the programme of the Consultation must be accepted! This is also a sort of political/poetical exaggeration, a hyperbole, and also shadowboxing.

Elements that suggest division are also notably present (“*our*” *common future*, “*our*” *country*) between “Us” and “Them”, the “Hungarian people” and the “immigrants”, or the “Hungarian people” and “Brussels”, the “EU”. Besides the concrete formulation, this aspect is also enforced by the use possessives, and the integrative, first person plural communication: “our country”, “our daily life and our common future”, “if we fail to take action”, “we shall not recognize our own country”, “our own life”, “we cannot allow”, “we have the right to protect our

²¹ The full text of the Governmental Information was accessible through the link: <http://nemzetikonzultacio.kormany.hu/>

culture, language and values”. The horror of negative elements is topped by references to steadiness, as the dangers listed threaten our “daily life”.

1.2. Results of the Consultation presented in the Governmental Information

The introduction of the Governmental Information is followed by the results, published by the Prime Minister’s Office: “The *Hungarian people* (*high-value word*) consider that the issue of migration is important for their own lives. This is *proved* also by the fact that *more than 1 million people filled in and sent back* the questionnaire. The results show that *the people’s opinion is clear: Hungary must be defended* [metaphor – militarised language use]. *More than 90% of the respondents agree that the EU’s migration policy* [(dysphemism), i.e. refugee policy] *has failed*, therefore stricter regulations are needed. The *vast majority of the people* think that the first step to take is to send back the migrants as soon as possible [(euphemism), i.e., expel them] who crossed the border illegally [(dysphemism), i.e., asylum seekers]. Hungary and Europe cannot accept everyone”.²² – Euphemism: Hungary will not accept anyone. Here, instead of “Brussels” (EU), the term “Europe” is used, because the EU (despite the varying attitude of the member states) does not outright reject the acceptance of refugees. The term “Europe” wishes to neutralise this aspect.

The paragraph about the results starts with the “Hungarian people” and “their own lives”. The term “Hungarian people” that has a central role in the government’s ideological dictionary is contrasted with the illegal foreigner. The “Hungarian people” is a repetitive *high-value word*, which reminds the respondents that they are “Hungarian”, and exclusively Hungarian (and not of any other nationality or members of other ethnic groups living in Hungary, whether or not they have Hungarian citizenship, residence permit, or permanent residency or inhabitancy in Hungary). People living on the territory of the country are thus important for the government merely because of their being Hungarian, as national subjects. The repetition and emphasis of the term “Hungarian people” also marks the marginalization of various social groups and structures.

The results of the Consultation repeat the formulations of the questionnaire, this time as the people’s opinions. This shows that the previous “(statement-like) questions” of the government now appear as a legitimate political-legal practice. The speech act and normative statement emphasised in bold, “**Hungary must be defended**”, has a mobilising, but at the same time also intimidating effect. The phrase “has failed” is also repeated several times, introducing and legitimising the “stricter regulations”.

²² Ibid.

The Governmental Information – as a demonstration that the majority is supporting it – also emphasises on the basis of the responses that the “opinion” of the people is “clear”. The following expressions and phrases suggest that the government’s decision is taken based on a unanimous agreement: “proved”, “the people’s opinion is clear”, “more than 90% of the respondents,” “the vast majority of the people”. However, this demonstration is questionable, as the ideologically biased political questionnaire of the Consultation is manipulative, and it does not apply the professional principles of a poll, there are often two answers about acceptance and one about rejection, and the evaluation criteria are also unknown. The authenticity of later consultation is further questioned by the fact that the November-December questionnaire of the “Soros-plan” Consultation can also be answered online, but the online questionnaire lacks the basic security and authenticity controls.²³

1.3. Government measures presented in the Governmental Information

The government has taken the following measures to tackle the problems raised by the National Consultation: 1. “The government’s position is clear: the frontiers of Europe and Hungary must be defended by all means! [metaphor]. The cabinet has decided therefore to build a temporary **technical border barrier** [(euphemism), actually a 4 m high, 175 km long razor wire fence] on the Hungarian-Serbian and Hungarian-Croatian border. In order to handle [(euphemism), i.e. the rejection to “handle” it] the migration situation, the government enforced the police, and made military intervention possible at the southern border”.²⁴

The warning of the introduction “must be defended!” is repeated and increased in a new context, where the phrase “by all means” is left purposely ambiguous and may entitle for anything, may confirm the legitimacy of any indefinite, unknown future plan. The term “clear” is also repeated, now in relation to the government, “harmonising” the position of the people and the government. The government’s measures come as a comforting element relieving the tension: “building the border barrier”, “handling the migration situation”, “enforcing the police”, “make military intervention possible”. The impression created by the first point of the measures is full military preparedness, which offers protection against illegality and terrorism, and ultimately, implicitly, against the enemy.

²³ The questionnaire can be accessed on the webpage <https://nemzetikonzultacio.kormany.hu/>, it requires 3 short stages to fill in: 1. “authentication” with the following data: first name, last name, e-mail address, age. However, the truthfulness of the data is not controlled; anything can be written in the system. Any number of answers can be sent in from one single IP address.

²⁴ Ibid. <http://nemzetikonzultacio.kormany.hu/>

Military preparedness is also meant to justify the generated atmosphere that the respondent is in a life-threatening situation in many respects: their own physical existence (existential context), the security of their country (security policy context), its fundamental values and culture (cultural context), fundamental rights (legal context), and subsistence (economic context) – and this threat is what must be fought against. The identification of the asylum seekers with potential threat in the mass media also appears in a different context, in which asylum seekers are represented as carriers of viruses and infectious diseases (health context). In addition, the semantics of government measures suggests the positive connotations of security, protection and conservation, compared to which the EU becomes a symbol of irresponsible and failed politics.

The military-warfare rhetoric calls for a multi-front fight in the text: on the one hand, for protection against immigrants (asylum seekers) and terrorists, and on the other hand, for a kind of war of freedom against “Brussels”. The double-front fight as an allegory covertly also constructs another dimension of meaning. It covertly calls on the freedom struggles in 19th and 20th century Hungarian history, the 1848 and the 1956 revolutions, the latter triggered by the Soviet invasion. There is an implicit suggestion for drawing a parallel between the Soviet occupation and the limitations of sovereignty implied by the EU membership, although the two situations are radically different: the Soviet occupation was a military invasion following a lost war, but the EU membership was a voluntary choice of the country. The negative semantic connotations of the “EU”, “Brussels” as the source of troubles, the EU as a political failure, and the fight against it are also referred to by the following formulations: “The EU is also responsible for this situation”, “it has encouraged the migrants to leave their country and head for Europe”, “the EU’s migration policy has failed”, and the countries of Central Europe “cannot afford to be affected by the flawed politics of Brussels”; from the introductory letter of the Consultation: “Brussels and the European Union are not capable of handling the question of migration in an adequate manner”, “Brussels has failed in the handling of migration”,²⁵ “Hungary must take its own path”. The allegory of the war of freedom culminates in the Prime Minister’s ideological 15 March 2017 speech.²⁶

The defensive war rhetoric is apparent in the text through the following textual units: “A never before seen migration pressure is weighing down on Europe, and on *our country* as well” (allegory of invasion), “If we fail to take action, we shall not recognize *our own country* in a few decades’ time”, “Hungary

²⁵ <https://theorangefiles.hu/2015/05/19/national-consultation-on-immigration-and-terrorism/>

²⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1YGZoG8XnuU>

must be defended", "the frontiers of Europe and Hungary must be defended by all means", the cabinet "has decided to build a temporary **technical border barrier** on the Hungarian-Serbian and Hungarian-Croatian border", and the government "enforced the *police*, and made *military* intervention possible at the southern border", "the modern-age migration can be stopped", "the southern security border barrier is functioning", "we cannot allow them [...] to jeopardise the jobs and security of Hungarian people", "we have the right to protect our culture, language and values", "we cannot allow". Reference to illegality: "the number of people illegally entering Hungary has drastically increased", "more than 380 thousand people have crossed the border illegally", "stricter regulations are needed", "send back the migrants as soon as possible who crossed the border illegally", "the tension is relieved by stricter laws." Based on all this, the text constructs the impression that the refugee crisis, its interpretation and solutions can only be conceived in the framework of military action and criminal law, and definitely not in a humanitarian perspective.

2. "The tension of the migration is relieved [(euphemism); actually, the rejection of the asylum seekers] by stricter laws. Based on recent laws, the illegal crossing of the border and the damaging of the border barrier is a criminal act, and human trafficking is punished more strictly. Criminal acts are evaluated out of turn, illegal immigrants [asylum seekers] will face prison or expulsion".²⁷

Point 2 proves continuing and increasing government measures meant to "relieve the tension" through amendments to the Penal Code. This point outlines how linguistic structures and discourses relate to state political and legal acts, how they become the legal constructors of social reality. Following the amendments, "The Government is entitled to establish in a decree the list of origin countries declared secure by Hungary on a national level, and secure third countries." Based on this, since 2015, Serbia counts as a secure third country, the applications of asylum seekers coming from Serbia are never reviewed, and the applicants are rejected.

Since these amendments, the illegal crossing of the border barrier is a criminal act, for which the perpetrator can be punished with imprisonment for up to three years. "For cases of this criminal act the law orders imprisonment from one to five years, two to eight years, and in the aggravated cases from five to ten years". Damaging the border barrier and impeding the building of the fence are also crimes. The concept of "crisis situation caused by mass migration" is introduced, asylum seekers may hand in their applications before they enter the territory of Hungary, in the transit zone, during a procedure at the frontier.

²⁷ Ibid. <http://nemzetikonzultacio.kormany.hu/>

Another amendment is that a soldier's use of "rubber bullets, pyrotechnic articles, tear gas grenades, interceptor nets shot to the target with firearms or other launching devices do not qualify as firearm use" in a crisis situation caused by mass migration. The term of "crisis situation caused by mass migration" is used as a new, legitimate overwriting of existing laws, and a justification of new, yet unknown strategies. Agamben's formulation is pertinent in this respect: „Heute ist die Krise zum Herrschaftsinstrument geworden. Sie dient dazu, politische und ökonomische Entscheidungen zu legitimieren, die faktisch die Bürger enteignen und ihnen jede Entscheidungsmöglichkeit nehmen. [...] Die europäischen Bürger müssen sich klarmachen, dass diese unendliche Krise - genau wie der Ausnahmezustand - mit der Demokratie inkompatibel ist“.²⁸

The legal interpretive framework that penetrates the Consultation moves the emphasis from the humanitarian catastrophe and moral responsibility to the illegality and criminality of the "migrants", under the effect of the criminal law, and ultimately within the framework of the "state of exception". The Amnesty International reports that by the end of 2015 "over 900 people were prosecuted for "illegal border crossing" and subjected to expulsion proceedings".²⁹ Finally, as an embellishment, the details of the amendment also reveal that "who obtains asylum cannot be expelled".³⁰ But how can one obtain asylum? The criminalisation of illegal border crossing and the closing of the borders as well as the amendments impose limitations and make it impossible to seek asylum.

3. *"Hungary has proved* [metonymy: "Hungary" instead of the "Government of Hungary", a new meaning is constructed: the respondents can more easily identify themselves with Hungary] that the modern-age migration can be stopped [negative metaphor]. The southern *security border barrier* [an excluding fence] *is functioning, it successfully fulfils the role* assigned to it by the *government, it stops illegal border crossings*".³¹

Point 3 is an argument for the correctness of the procedure. It only contains the success of the government's measures, expressed in positive expressions: "has proved", "is functioning", "successfully fulfils its role", "stops" illegality, therefore the problem is solved.

Point 4 repeats and summarises everything said before, and ends the Consultation: 4. "We cannot allow [We] the illegal immigrants [Them] to

²⁸ Giorgio Agamben in FAZ from 25.05.2013.

²⁹ Amnesty International Report 2015/2016. *The State of the World's Human Rights*. 180. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/2552/2016/en/> (accessed: 20.07.2017).

³⁰ Ibid. <http://nemzetikonzultacio.kormany.hu/>

³¹ Ibid.

*jeopardise the jobs and security of the Hungarian people. We have the right [argument of the legitimacy and correctness of their procedure] to defend [“Our” own] culture, language and values [as opposed to “Theirs”]. The countries of Central Europe, which have only recently recovered from the economic crisis [argumentum ad misericordiam], cannot afford to be affected by the flawed politics of Brussels”.*³² – The Central European countries, the Visegrad Four, receive a special status here: as suggested by mass media channels, these appear as a new unit opposed to the EU, as a possibility of an alternative political community within the EU which is legitimised precisely by the existing both theoretical and practical weak points in politics, e.g. in relation to the question of the union and national sovereignty.



Figure 5. Government billboard from 2015: “We don’t want illegal immigrants. Governmental Information. Hungarian reforms work!”

The speech act “we have the right to defend our culture, language and values” is repeated and it has a mobilising and legitimating character; the warnings “we cannot allow”, “cannot afford” are also repeatedly used. All this draws the attention to an “extraordinary” situation where “Our” culture, language and values have been jeopardised as opposed to “Their” culture, language and values, suggesting a possible clash of civilisations. Consequently, we must defend

³² Ibid.

ourselves against the opponents, the source of danger, actually the enemy. The phrases “we cannot allow”, “we have the right” are also performative statements mobilising for the constructed truth and for the fight against the constructed injustice. Point 4 presents the government’s position as sacred, and the appeal to fear and feelings is also a general aspect.

The sense of being threatened is increased and a new element is introduced: the “illegal immigrants” who jeopardise the people’s security also endanger their jobs and consequently subsistence, causing social insecurity. In addition, the flagword “security” can be easily activated in this case also because of the rising need for security, and gains its force precisely from insecurity and the fear about insecurity. Points 4 and 5 of the questionnaire present the asylum seekers as “economic migrants” [“megélhetési bevándorlók”: subsistence migrants], who jeopardise the “Hungarian people’s” jobs and subsistence, where the attribute “economic” [“megélhetési”: subsistence], implicitly refers to their “uselessness” and profit-seeking intention. This is described in details in the introduction letter of the questionnaire: “Economic migrants” [“megélhetési bevándorlók”: subsistence immigrants] cross our borders illegally [deontic meaning: they are criminals], and while they present themselves as asylum-seekers, [deontic meaning: they are cheaters], in fact they are coming to enjoy our welfare systems and the employment opportunities our countries have to offer [to profit from us]. In the last few months alone, in Hungary the number of economic migrants [“megélhetési bevándorlók”: subsistence immigrants] has increased approximately twentyfold [now the cheater criminals are profiting from us twentyfold]. This represents a new type of threat – a threat which we must stop in its tracks”.³³ – Intimidation, enemy-building, mobilization, militarization through aggressive speech act. This “new” type of threat means also that we are not prepared for managing it, and we are vulnerable. But we must decide *now* about managing the threat, and the consultation is offering a way to do this: “We must make a decision on how Hungary should defend itself against illegal immigrants”.³⁴ This way is that one which is identical with the government’s visions, and the two groups are “They”, the illegal economic immigrants and “We”, the Hungarian People: “We shall not allow [integrative, mobilizing speech act] economic migrants to jeopardise the jobs and livelihood of Hungarians”.³⁵

The questionnaire also mirrors this opposition presented as a conflict of interests, or even as a struggle for subsistence: “12] Do you agree with the

³³ Ibid. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/national-consultation-on-immigration-to-begin>

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

Hungarian government that support should be focused more on *Hungarian families and the children* they can have, rather than on immigration? [Answers:] I fully agree, I tend to agree, I do not agree”.³⁶ – Here the integrative “we” for Hungarian families and Hungarian *children* and “they” for the immigrants (and the immigrants’ *children*) is also used.

In the introduction letter presented, apparently factual and unambiguous statements will be questioned in the questionnaire.

„4] Did *you* know that economic migrants [“megélhetési bevándorlók”: subsistence migrants] cross the *Hungarian* border illegally, and that recently the number of immigrants in Hungary has increased twentyfold? [Answers:] Yes, I have heard about it, I did not know.

5] We hear different views [which ones?] on the issue of immigration. There are some who [who are they?] think that economic migrants [“megélhetési bevándorlók”: subsistence migrants] jeopardise the jobs and livelihoods of Hungarians. Do you agree? [Answers:] I fully agree, I tend to agree, I do not agree”.³⁷



Figure 6. “Governmental Information. If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away the jobs of the Hungarians! National Consultation on immigration and terrorism”.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

In this context the billboard of the “National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism” warns that “If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away the jobs of the Hungarians!” Since the language of the billboard campaign is Hungarian, the addressees of this campaign are primarily the “Hungarian people” rather than anyone else.

However, this prohibition gives way to a different rhetoric, namely that the refugees and those who come to Hungary live on the taxpayers’ money. The alternative is offered in point 10 of the questionnaire: “10] Do *you* agree with the concept that economic migrants [“megélhetési bevándorlók”: subsistence migrants] themselves should cover the costs [i.e. {forced} community service] associated with their time in *Hungary*? [Answers:] I fully agree, I tend to agree, I do not agree”.³⁸ The procedures applied by the government, as seen in points seven, eight and nine of the questionnaire, offer an alternative to these dangers:

“7] Would you support the *Hungarian Government* in the introduction of more stringent immigration regulations [an exclusionary anti-refugee politics], in contrast to Brussels’ lenient policy [stigma]? [Answers:] Yes, I would fully support the Government; I would partially support the Government; I would not support the Government.

8] Would *you* support the Hungarian government in the introduction of more stringent regulations, according to which migrants illegally crossing the Hungarian border could be taken into custody [{Euphemism}, i.e. imprisoned]? [Answers:] Yes, I would fully support the Government; I would partially support the Government; I would not support the Government.

9] Do *you* agree with the view that migrants illegally crossing the Hungarian border should be returned to their own countries within the shortest possible time?”³⁹ – must be rejected, expelled back to “their own country” (which could be a war zone).

This type of argumentation is in contrast with the German campaign “Wirtschaft Zusammen Integrationsinitiativen der Deutschen Wirtschaft”, which is a reaction to the refugee crisis beginning in 2015.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.



Figure 7. from the campaign “Wirtschaft Zusammen Integrationsinitiativen der Deutschen Wirtschaft.”⁴⁰

In connection with arguments of the type “they take away Hungarians’ jobs”, one should mention the report entitled *Factors, directions and prospects of migration to Europe, increasing since 2015* of the Migration Workgroup of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The analysis answers the question whether the migration leads to the lower employment or wages of Hungarian employees as follows: “such negative effects can only be perceived in the short term, and only for some groups of Hungarian employees. In contrast, in the medium term (approx. in 4-6 years) immigration will be beneficial for Hungarian employees, because it has a positive effect on the average income level of the host countries”.⁴¹ It should also be highlighted that “only 2.3% of the population living in Hungary are migrants, and the proportion of people coming from non-European countries is a mere 0.3%. [...] In the mirror of the numbers, the appearance of an exaggerate proportion of labour force and population of

⁴⁰ To see the full campaign material: <http://www.wir-zusammen.de/home>

⁴¹ MTA Migrációs Munkacsoport: *Az Európába irányuló és 2015-től felgyorsult migráció tényezői, irányai és kilátásai* (Migration Workgroup of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: *Factors, directions and prospects of migration to Europe, increasing since 2015*). 46. http://mta.hu/data/cikkek/106/1060/cikk-106072/_europabairanyulo.pdf (accessed: 15.07.2017.)

‘foreign culture’ is very distant in time”.⁴² In addition to mentioning the positive effects of migration, the report also formulates the important insight that the need for migration is actually a constraint of Hungarian economy: “The low level of pre-2015 migration cannot be sustained in the long term, the demographic prospects, the population decrease, the sustainability of the pension fund show a forcible need for migration”.⁴³ The report also states that “by our 2015 knowledge the best »proactive« solution for alleviating the lack of labour force increasingly threatening the Hungarian economy is to accept immigrants looking at the labour-force market”.⁴⁴ The political recommendation of the report is that “the government create the system of institutions and support that is capable of accepting larger groups of migrants who wish to stay in Hungary”.⁴⁵

II. The untimeliness figure of the refugee

“One can subscribe to Jonathan Benthall’s hypothesis of an opposition between the flows of humanitarian aid moving from the north to the south and the flows of undesirable migrants moving from the south to the north.”

(Michel Agier)⁴⁶

„[...] what is happening on the world scale today is the extension and greater sophistication of various form of camps that make up a mechanism for keeping away undesirables and foreigners of all kinds – refugees, displaced, ‘rejected’. In a world context dominated by the national and inter-governmental obsession with controlling mobility and frontiers, it is possible to draw up an inventory of these camps.”

(Michel Agier)⁴⁷

⁴² Ibid. 49.

⁴³ Ibid. 53.

⁴⁴ Ibid. 63.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 68.

⁴⁶ Michel Agier: *Humanity as an Identity and Its Political Effects (A Note on Camps and Humanitarian Government)* *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development*, Volume 1, Number 1, Fall 2010, pp. 29-45.

⁴⁷ Michel Agier: *Managing the Undesirables. Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government*. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2011, 3-4.

In the context of the policies and media discourses around the refugee crisis and “migration pressure”, there is an increasing level of conflict, enemy creation, exclusion, polarisation, and cover-up of problems. Although most of the refugees arriving to Europe and Hungary come from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq,⁴⁸ the events that triggered the refugee crisis are left in the background, or are not discussed at all. Covert wars and illegal attacks on these countries: in case of Afghanistan more than 220 000 victims according to Physicians for Social Responsibility “Body Count” data,⁴⁹ in case of Iraq “the war has, directly or indirectly, killed around 1 million people”,⁵⁰ in case of Syria more than 480 000 victims so far.⁵¹ A drastic number of victims died in the attempt to flee from war or unstable areas, according to *Migrants Files* data “over 30,000 refugees and migrants died in their attempt to reach or stay in Europe since 2000”.⁵²

There is no mention of the neo-colonisation context of the connections of military action and humanitarian aid (or “Responsibility to Protect”, “reconstruction”, “stabilization,” “securing human rights” or “democratization”, “global war on terror”) with natural resources, with the fights over oil and gas pipelines, over still existing “colonies” and markets, or geostrategically and energetically important territories, which has left behind an immense destruction, chaos and radicalisation. There is also no mention of the fact that the refugees from so-called “failed states” are vulnerable not only because of armed conflict, oppressive regimes, and terrorist organisations, but also because of climate change, extreme poverty, economic crises, and increasing social inequality. Another fact that is always overshadowed as well is that “gemäß den Untersuchungen des Stockholmer Institutes für Friedensforschung (SIPRI) die fünf ständigen Mitglieder der UNO-Sicherheitsrats, eigentlich zuständig für den Weltfrieden, zugleich die fünf größten Waffenexporteure sind. [...] Neben den fünf Vetomächten im UNO-Sicherheitsrat gehören die NATO-Länder Deutschland, Spanien, Italien und die Niederlande gemäß SIPRI zu den zehn größten Waffenexporteuren der Welt”.⁵³ One more aspect that is left in the background is that the threatening reality-construction increasingly gives way to an Orwellian vision of control. In the shadow of the language and rhetoric of terrorism, generating fear is fundamental. In addition to the terrorist threat, the private sphere is gradually liquidated, and it seems we could give almost anything to preserve the illusion of security. It is again a time of wire-tapping, data storage,

⁴⁸ Ibid. 27.

⁴⁹ Body Count: <http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/body-count.pdf> 15.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ <http://www.iamsyria.org/death-tolls.html>

⁵² <http://www.themigrantsfiles.com/>

⁵³ Daniele Ganser: *Illegale Kriege. Wie die NATO-Länder die UNO sabotieren. Eine Chronik von Kuba bis Syrien*. Orell Füssli Verlag, Zürich 2016.

the giving up of the private sphere, and the limitations of civil liberties. Extremist parties, anti-immigrant, anti-refugee groups, anti-“Islamic” and “Islamophobic” groups gain more and more ground. Society looks thus increasingly polarised, binary, schizoid and frustrated, and the bravely idyllic vision of a heterogeneous, hybrid, multicultural Europe and West is less and less present. Multicultural cohabitation seems to be pushed to the background, giving way to a psychophantomatic state, which leaves *almost* everybody a loser, while millions of people are destroyed and debilitated by armed conflict, the privatisation and financing of war, by the fights over geostrategically and energetically important territories, in the contemporary geopolitical context.

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Hannah Arendt, Edward Said, Giorgio Agamben, Homi K. Bhabha and Seyla Benhabib formulate deeply insightful analyses and descriptions about the condition of being a refugee, covering the time from the second decade of 20th century, when the international law started to codify the relationship between refugees and host societies. J. Derrida in his democracy-critic also emphasises that “through the expulsion or deportation of so many exiles, stateless persons, and immigrants from a so-called national territory already herald a new experience of frontiers and identity - whether national or civil”,⁵⁴ and a new form of slavery is rising. Slavoj Žižek also describes that “with the new epoch of the global capitalism, a new era of slavery is also rising. Although it is no longer a direct legal status of enslaved persons, slavery acquires a multitude of new forms: millions of immigrant workers [...] who are de facto deprived of elementary civil rights and freedoms; the total control over millions of workers in Asian sweatshops often directly organized as concentration camps”,⁵⁵ and many refugees are in a similar situation. Michel Foucault speaking about the Vietnamese refugees, “boat people”, showed that they are placed in a “Heterotopian” space, “somewhere else”, in “other places”, where multiple exclusions take place. “The ship is the heterotopia par excellence”,⁵⁶ and the “refugees are the first to be confined outside”.⁵⁷ Agamben formulates that according to *bare life* a new class of society is outlined, which is excluded from the sphere of political existence. Similarly to

⁵⁴ Jacques Derrida: *Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*. Routledge, New York and London, 1994. 101.

⁵⁵ Slavoj Žižek: *We Can't Address the EU Refugee Crisis Without Confronting Global Capitalism*. In. <http://inthesetimes.com/article/18385/slavoj-zizek-european-refugee-crisis-and-global-capitalism>

⁵⁶ “Heterotopias,” radio broadcasts on France Culture, December 7-21, 1966.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

Foucault and Agamben, Michel Agier created the concept of “hors-lieux”, “off-places”, and the phenomenon of the ghetto as “place of banishment” (“ban-lieu”), as a kind of extraterritoriality in Zygmunt Baum’s terminology.⁵⁸ In the term of Engin Isin and Kim Rygiel “a group of ‘abject spaces’ on borders, in zones, and in camps can be observed, where they are ‘neither subjects nor objects, but abject’.”⁵⁹

Despite the common features like De-humanization and De-justification, the new (in)human classless or out-class society of the refugees includes complex and differentiated groups, and represents a large spectrum of persons, beyond the stateless and persecuted persons, the war refugees, poverty refugees, economic refugees, climate refugees, internally displaced persons; another category is the group of people in emergency (living in war zone, starving from hunger etc.). For these groups, it is extremely difficult or inaccessible to obtain the refugee status, creating either “the world of ‘illegal and clandestine aliens’ and ‘nonsuit immigrants’ (or ‘closed files;’ in the UNHCR term for those who no longer have the right to anything)”⁶⁰ or the word of the camps, be it self-installed or official. The “more fortunate”, who live in official refugee camps, become the inhabitants of an ambiguous system of institutions which becomes totalitarian, as a humanitarian totalitarianism of a sort, where the bureaucratic and totalitarian organisations like the UNHCR, following a globalised economic and political agenda, supplement a certain western political strategy.

All these ideas outline a new class, or better said, a classlessness or out-class part of the global society, where the rights are radically injured or people are totally de-justified. Based on this, a de-humanisation takes place, whereby the lives of millions of human beings become worthless, just a rational calculation, a technical management, or is nullified. This condition takes place in the frame of a “state of exception” – as Agamben claims – which seems to be permanent, “which has become the rule”, an “endless emergency” in terms of Agier. All this development shows the contemporary new (in)human condition: (i) the sacrificable life (the many millions of people dying in illegal wars, by chemical weapons etc.), (ii) the life unnecessary for politics: the residents of the camps (which are managed by the totalizing bureaucratic biopolitics), (iii) the ambiguous space and institution of the global network of camps, (iv) the loss of the fundamental rights for a broad

⁵⁸ Michel Agier: *From refuge the ghetto is born. Contemporary figures of heterotopias*. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2011. 265-292.

⁵⁹ Isin, Engin, and Kim Rygiel. Of Other Global Cities: Frontiers, Zones, Camps. In Drieskens, Barbara; Mermier, Franck and Wimmen, Heiko (eds.): *Cities of the South: Citizenship and Exclusion in the 21st Century*. London, Saqi, 2007. pp. 170–209.

⁶⁰ Michel Agier: *Ibid.* 287.

section of society, (v) the automatic de-justification of further generations (generations born in camp), (vi) the refugee as a consumer, as a new market and sector (because of the need of the infrastructure and goods necessary for surviving in refugee camps), (vii) anonymous test subjects for new technologies, (viii) the mass of potential victims of human trafficking, prostitution, sexual exploitation, forced labour, transplant commercialism, etc.

It can be concluded that, as long as the following things do not change: 1. a profit-oriented humanitarian aid, 2. humanitarian indifference, 3. market-colonising capitalist economic strategy, 4. financing of war or dictatorial and autocratic, extremist regimes and groups, 5. an attitude indifferent to durable peace and stability, 6. a (geo)political context that closes eyes to any kind of violations of human rights, and 7. a strategy that counterweighs increasing social imbalance then the refugee crisis or “migration pressure” of today is *merely an initial stage* of the refugee crisis, migration and humanitarian catastrophe started by the disintegrating Middle-East and African countries or “third world countries”. However, the currently ongoing phenomena, instead of any constructive development, and instead of the systematic or non-systematic liquidation of the factors that produced and fostered the problem, only show a general social mistrust and the radicalisation of extremism.

Moreover, the current situation seems to suggest that the EU is either forced to engage itself, by its rules and fundamental principles, to “solve” the refugee crisis (in which case the “solution” is in fact improvised and illusory), or it must give up or radically reformulate its fundamental values and rights, questioning or at least challenging its constructed vision and legitimacy.

Translated by Czintos Emese