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BOOK REVIEW

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INTRODUCTION

MICHAL LIPTÁK[*], JAROSLAVA VYDROVÁ[**]

Phenomenology originated in the tradition of transcendentalist philosophy, but very soon—already in the works of the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl—it focused on the issue of the body to the extent previously unheard of in transcendentalist philosophy. Crucially, phenomenology never considered a body to be just a kind of tool or mean to be used by "spirit" or the "soul"; rather, the body was analyzed as imbued with an intentionality of its own. Already in Husserl's works, the most basic structures of our thinking, even the basic logical principles, can be gradually traced back to their roots in bodily experience, perception, or sensation. Later phenomenological philosophy has developed these initial insights in a more detailed manner, and a rich philosophy of the body has arisen in the phenomenological tradition.

The thematic volume *Hand – Work/Labor – Matter* is a contribution to this phenomenological philosophy of the body. In general, five studies opening this issue present phenomenological investigations of the body at work. In this work, the body is not just another tool we use. Rather, the body is already who we are. This work of the body is simultaneously a negotiation of our relationship and access to the world; it delineates possibilities for both our practical engagement and our theoretical understanding. The body is co-extensive with the world, and it straightforwardly not only responds to the world as matter but also discloses the world as a matter, too. Any phenomenological investigation of the body at work is therefore always a reflective philosophical investigation as well, a certain retracing of our steps in our self-understanding which ultimately reveals the primordial conditions of our thinking and action.

The first two studies focus more particularly on the phenomenology of the hand. The hand can be a leading clue for a phenomenological analysis of the broad field of haptic experience. Various intentional determinations of our corporeality

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belong here: the conscious or unconscious assessment of force, distance or radius of movement, immersing the hand in the matter, grasping, stroking, scratching, striking, shredding, throwing. Our body relates to each of these actions in a different manner.

A hand discloses not only a nature of the matter which we touch and work with, but also of the matter which we think and imagine. The imagination of matter is based on our own touches. The work of the artist with the matter and the capturing of the matter in the work of art are two different intentional acts, and yet they are linked to the unifying experiences with the matter. How shall one, on the one hand, capture the unformed matter in the work? And how shall one, on the other hand, materialize an image? How does touch translate into words with which the poet, essayist or philosopher describes the lived or imagined experience?

The analyses of the phenomenality of the hand open the dimension of the meaning of the work or labor, too. Latin "*labor*" or French "*travail*" point to the meanings of exertion, toil, or drudgery. A hard-working laborer knows the vibrations accompanying the struggles with the matter, for example, when drilling the ground, rock, or other hard surface. The task of the worker does not have only its political dimension but also a dimension of a particular anthropological experience, which inscribes itself to the life of community. The heterogeneity of manual work mirrors the social structures of schemes as well as the particular culture in its geographical and historical contexts.

As for the studies in the phenomenology of the hand in this volume in particular, Anton Vydra tackles the relationship between the engravings of Albert Flocon and the philosophy of Gaston Bachelard. It may seem counterintuitive that there are any links between such a concrete action as an engraving and a highly abstract undertaking such as philosophy, but Vydra shows that this is indeed a case in Bachelard's philosophy. There are notions used to describe theoretical thinking which are derived from the work of the hand—for example, we say we "grasp" something, or in German the word for "concept" is *Begriff*. Vydra shows, with Bachelard's assistance, that these should be understood to be more than metaphors. Inspired by Flocon's engravings, Bachelard developed his original method of philosophizing, one that is not "grasping"—where "grasp" implies firm control or possession—but one that is more akin to gentle touching, one that is responsive to the matter in the very same way engravings are responsive, one that lets itself be guided by the matter itself. An engraving is shown to be at the roots of Bachelard's *phenomenotechnique*.

Jaroslava Vydrová focuses on the work of the hand in crafts and art. Developing the investigations of the body in Husserl's works as well as in the work of the architect and theoretician Juhani Pallasmaa, she makes the case that the hand

should be considered as "thinking"—that the practical "handling" of the matter and the special tactile experience are crucial for our self-understanding. Vydrová analyzes several examples from sculpture, crafts, and architecture to support her case. She contrasts these examples with the intervention of "hands-free" technology in the very same fields, when, for example, woodcarving—which was previously done by hand—can now be more efficiently done by a machine, or when sketches of architectural blueprints are no longer drawn by hand but are computer generated. She interprets this gradual loss of handwork as a loss, the consequences of which are broader than may be initially apparent—as a result, it is a loss that changes the way we think and understand ourselves.

The remaining three studies focus on the relationship between the body and technology in various fields. In his study Michal Lipták investigates this relationship in the field of music, with a particular focus on electronic music. Starting with "classic" works in phenomenological aesthetics by Husserl, Ingarden, Merleau-Ponty, and Dufrenne, and complementing them with case studies of a pioneer of electronic music, Pierre Schaeffer, Lipták analyzes the function of the body within music. The body is presented as a reservoir of types which allow us to easily recognize music *qua* music. The erasure of the body from music is then disclosed as a subversion of the established typology and, therefore, as fundamentally an avant-garde technique. Electronic music is thus interpreted as a kind of music where this avant-garde technique suddenly succeeds, so to speak, in one stroke. This instant loss of the body is troubling, but it also opens up new possibilities; therefore, the deficiency introduced through technology is interpreted as potentially positive and creative, too.

In his study, Jon Stewart likewise addresses the issue of the development of technology and the body, this time in the context of labor. Specifically, Stewart proceeds by means of close reading of Engels' *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, which he presents as a Marxist phenomenology or phenomenology of the body *avant la lettre*. Stewart argues that far from simply documenting the negative health effects of industrial labor on the workers in 19th century England, Engels disclosed the ascent of industrial labor as drastically altering the way we relate to the world and the way we understand ourselves. This change, which has vast political and social consequences, is rooted in the different interpretation of the body in industrial labor. While the body was once understood—for example, in the work of a craftsman—as a psychophysical unity through which we express ourselves and relate to the external world, in the factory the labor of the body becomes particularized, and the body becomes a cog in the machine, repetitively—and in a way inhumanly—performing a single simple task. Whereas craftsmanship requires skill and specialized long-term training of the body, factory work requires

just simple physical stamina that exceeds what the human body is capable of. Industrial labor therefore damages the body and causes grave health problems, even to the point of reconfiguring the physiology of the body itself. Moreover, the psychological problems that arise with the long work hours attending a machine in a factory are even much more thoroughly damaging and dehumanizing.

Finally, Peter Šajda investigates the relationship between the body and technology in warfare, analyzing the development of Ernst Jünger's thinking about a fighter. Šajda identifies three lines of thought in Jünger. First, he considers the natural "will to fight," a primordial emotion-based drive to survival which directs the fight in the heat of the battle. This will to fight can be coupled, however, with a service to an idea, which is what Jünger in his second line of thought identifies with a knight. While the specific ideas may vary, the knights are united in a "metaphysical community" of knights by means of their manner of fighting, where the primordial, emotionally driven (for example, hate driven) savage fight is tempered, and as a result the manner of fighting is "noble." Knightliness is only possible in a war between professional armies. Thirdly, and finally, this knightly fight is opposed to the doctrine of a "total mobilization" which turns every worker—both combatant and non-combatant—into a component of a global war machine. This "total mobilization"—whereby a ground for it was undoubtedly prepared by the industrial transformation of the body in factory, as analyzed by Stewart in this volume—initiates a search for a unifying ideology driving such mobilization, which ultimately dissolves the metaphysical community of knights.

All five studies of this thematic volume *Hand – Work/Labor – Matter* show not only that the phenomenological investigation of the body is fruitful but also that it can serve as an entry point for phenomenology to penetrate surprisingly varying fields. For example, Vydrová suggests links between the phenomenology of the hand and robotics, while Šajda shows how phenomenology can be useful for an analysis of warfare. Moreover, the phenomenology of the body can be productive in finding a common ground with philosophical schools that may be otherwise seen as antagonistic to phenomenology. In this regard, Stewart makes convincing case for phenomenological Marxism, while Lipták suggests a connection between phenomenology and critical theory. Aside from tackling their specific topics, therefore, all these studies together make a general case for continuing the fruitful research in the phenomenology of the body and for encouraging far-reaching dialogues between such a phenomenology and various other fields and philosophical schools.

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HAND AND ENGRAVING: FROM FLOCON'S ENGRAVINGS TO BACHELARD'S PHILOSOPHIZING

ANTON VYDRA*

ABSTRACT. This text deals with the relationships between the phenomenalizations of hand and engraving art, especially against the background of Gaston Bachelard's philosophical commentaries on the works of Albert Flocon. Special space is devoted to the interpretation of Flocon's engraving of two hands in connection with Escher's similar lithography. Another thematic field is the role of the tool and the hand equipped with the tool. However, the central axis of this thinking is the interconnection or intertwining of body and matter, the interactive relationship between human being and matter, between visual observation and dynamic haptics, which require a certain force and thus also experience the back pressure of matter. The conclusion of the text draws attention to a specific engraving, such as writing, especially the writing of a philosophical text, as we read about it in Bachelard's book *The Flame of a Candle*, the last word of which is—surprisingly—engraving.

Keywords: *poetics of touching, engraving, instrumentality, resistance of matter, work of art*

See, I have engraved you on the palms of my hands...
Isaiah 49:16

The relationship between hand and engraving is age-old. Ancient cultures (Phoenician, Jewish, Arabic and Ethiopian) interpreted the image of engraving or etching in stone or metal as an image of a just and unchanging decision of a ruler or even God. What is recorded in hard materials, resisting the changes of time, here acquires the force of a strict law with eternal validity for all to whom it may concern.

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Another type of long-lasting engraving record with a similar force of validity was tattooing, scratching the emblem—on the hand, palm, shoulder, or other part of the body. Such a sign could not be washed away by water; it remains visible and lasting. Moreover, if the emblem is engraved in the palm of your hand, a clasped hand—an ancient symbol of ownership and power—protects it. The palm is thus also an image of assurance and safety.

Thus, engraving in its original form indicates something permanently recorded or expressed on the surface of hard or relatively durable material. Later expressions for scratching and writing (Greek *graphein* or Latin *scribere*) also carried the meaning of carving characters, especially on some board or plate. Most similar expressions are derived from the same stem of a word meaning "to scratch", "to notch", "to etch"—for example, German *kerben*, "to cut", but also *graben*, "to dig", or *gravieren*, "to engrave".

Engraving entered art as an artistic style first through the formation of ornaments in goldsmithing and jewelry, but it was not until the 15th century that the carving of characters into hard materials became an artistic technique of creating images. Alsace engraver Martin Schongauer was one of the first important artists working in this field with his one hundred and sixteen engravings. Schongauer took over this type of artistic representation from "masters of playing cards" (which were the first engraving attempts to transfer the same image onto multiple paper cards). His *Temptation of St. Anthony by Demons* (c. 1485) was an inspiration to Michelangelo[1] and Hieronymus Bosch due to the fantasy animals depicted on this plate. His work also significantly influenced Albrecht Dürer, who—together with Lucas van Leyden and Marcantonio Raimondi—is one of the greatest masters of engraving technique in the history of art. The final product of these artists is both the engraved image itself on some type of plate (on the stamp) and also the imprint (*impressum*), which can be repeatedly transferred (copied, reproduced) thanks to painting the stamp, say, on paper—the actual *engraving* being the final result Other than that, the printing of patterns was not known before; where patterns occurred, they mainly concerned the imprints of selected shapes on textiles within dyeing and "fashion design," especially between the 12th and 15th century.[2]

[1] Giorgio Vasari mentions this in a chapter on Michelangelo Buonarroti, where he talks about how Michelangelo created a copy of an engraving by a certain 'Martin the German' who became famous and depicted Saint Anthony being beaten by devils. Giorgio Vasari, *The Lives of the Artists*, trans. Julia Conaway Bondanella and Peter Bondanella, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 418.

[2] See Arthur Mayger Hind, *A History of Engraving & Etching: From 15th Century to the Year 1914*, New York: Dover Publications, 1963, p. 19.

Over the following centuries, the art of engraving improved, embracing forms of chiaroscuro, portraiture, landscape painting, and finally also cubism (Louis Marcoussis is a good example). One new characteristic of engraving was the production of nonlinear perspectives, one adopted mainly by Albert Flocon (real name Mentzel), followed by Patrice Jeener and at the same time by M. C. Escher. Flocon also co-authored a book with André Barre on a curvilinear perspective (in a photograph known as the "fish-eye" view).[3] Non-linear geometries also interested French philosopher Gaston Bachelard at the time, and so a friendly relationship quickly developed between Flocon and Bachelard, and several years of cooperation between them began.

This paper will discuss Flocon and Bachelard, and in doing so we may formulate our basic question differently: the point may be not why several engravers (not only in the 20th century) were interested in the subject of the hand, but how they were interested: how did they deal with the subject and what did the philosopher Bachelard say about this "how"? In the following sections, we will touch on four key topics: first, we will thematize Bachelard's idea of the so-called "dreamy hand". From there we will move on to Flocon and the interpretation of his two-hands engraving in connection with the theme of intertwining body and matter. Next, we will turn our attention to a hand equipped with a tool ("tooled hand") in relation to various hard materials and finally we will conclude by pointing out why Bachelard could afford to speak of his life in a quite stylized way as an engraving. Thus, our crucial and central question will be: What kind of engraving is created by the tools of a philosopher?

But is not doing philosophy in the manner of engraving just a metaphor, just a pretty picture? Are we to understand it to mean that the philosopher seeks to immortalize his ideas in books or in human minds? Or that his arguments, constructed according to the principles of strict logic, are like chisels in the hand of an engraver? Or are we, on the contrary, to see philosophy as a mere engraver's pastime, playing more with images than with concepts, or that it seeks out and depicts only certain paradoxes and illusions of language? Surely this would not be enough.

Bachelard saw engraving as the contact of the human body (the hand) and matter through the tool. The hand exerts pressure on the chisel and the chisel penetrates the hardness of the matter. The intertwining of subjectivity and objectivity that Maurice Merleau-Ponty spoke of is enriched in Bachelard's work, in the spirit of his notion of *phenomenotechnique*, by the tool that makes the world give itself to subjectivity in a different way. The painter applies the paint (brush, pencil) to the canvas while the engraver permeates the matter.

[3] Albert Flocon, André Barre, *La perspective curviligne*. Paris: Flammarion, 1968.

The result of the engraver's work is *reproduction*, and we must remember, when we hear this word, the importance Bachelard attached to the prefix *re-* in several of his texts. The result is not a single auratic image, but a stamp that can be used for further impressions. It is as if we create a method whose repeated application produces (begets) ever new images though not necessarily identical ones.

Bachelard, moreover, was sympathetic to Flocon's connections between realism and abstraction, the geometrized world merging here with the life-world, rigorous science with poetics. But before this connection between the engraver and the philosopher can be demonstrated, we must begin with the engraving itself. From there we gradually arrive at engraving as a philosophical method *sui generis*.

First Impression: A Dreamy Hand

All of us know the dreamy look of dreamers, but how does a hand dream? Gaston Bachelard uses this term both in the text about Louis Marcoussis' engravings and in his commentaries on the works of Albert Flocon. In Marcoussis' case, however, he is primarily interested in the issue of perspective: the perspective of the engraver, but also the perspective of the characters he depicts. Writing about one of Marcoussis' engraving from his collection *Devins* (*Divinations*, 1940), namely *Les osselets*, he describes a young woman who dreamily looks out of a window while supporting her chin with her right hand and playing with a little bone (*astragalus*) in her left. This is not a new topic at all: a similar girl can be found in a painting by Eugène Ernest Damas from 1887, while in many ancient or medieval paintings or sculptures depicting girls, we can see women or children playing with astragals. However, Marcoussis' engraving is different: the girl does not seem to be playing with her knucklebones; only one of them is lightly held, perhaps she is gently twisting it in her left hand. Bachelard writes: "This knucklebone is a natural bone and carries the cipher that nature has carved into the hard animal stone. Its S, its cavity and its delicate border speak to her dreamy hand, while her dilated pupil sees the future, she is thinking about... "[4]

It is a hand that is said to be dreamy here, dreaming of touching a specific matter, a material with a specific shape. The point is not that this hand was equipped with some special *cogito*,[5] it is rather one of the functions of the *cogito* of the

[4] Gaston Bachelard, „L'œuvre de Marcoussis," in *Le droit de rêver*, Paris: Quadrige/PUF, 1970, p. 64.

[5] Words attributed to Immanuel Kant, that the hand is a visible part of the brain, have been quoted many times in various places, but there is no direct reference to the work in which such words occur.

depicted girl. She dreams with the help of her hand, which gently reads information from matter with her palm. This is not a question of divination, but rather the sensitivity of human contact with *materia*.

Marcoussis' hands are an important element in most of his engravings (as with Flocon and Escher). For example, an engraving called *La table tournante* (*Turning Table*), from the same collection, depicts five pairs of hands. Or in the engraving *Le pendule* (*Pendulum*), a hand reaches from heaven to earth, on which the whole future depends. Next, we can find the hand of an old man in the engraving *Le vol de oiseaux* (*Bird's Flight*) or another old man looking for a horseshoe in the painting *Le fétichiste* (*Fetishist*) from 1943. In all these cases, the hand is Marcoussis' crucial subject, the thing which expresses the intended emotion.

The image of a hand that reads information from the environment, reads data from matter as a sensitive device capable of "touching the still liquid matter of the future,"[6] is not at all atypical in the middle of the 20th century. As an object of interest, it is present not only in the visual but also in the literary arts, as pointed out by Hans-Jörg Rheinberger in a book devoted to the connections between Gaston Bachelard and Albert Flocon.[7] However, there were also various other uses of the subject of the hand in the middle of the 20th century.

Escher's famous lithograph *Drawing Hands* was created in 1948 while another of his lithographs, *Hand with a Mirror Ball*, is from 1935. Of course, Flocon was creating his engravings at the same time, but the hand fascinated others during this period: Bachelard's great friend and novelist Henri Bosco wrote *Malicroix* in 1946, in which chiromancy, divination from the hand, is one of the main themes. Even on the literary periphery of former Czechoslovakia, in relation to the great centers of artistic life, Dominik Tatarka writes in 1944 *The Miraculous Virgin*, where the narrator says about one of the characters after seeing the painter Tristan painting an ethereal woman, Anabella, that "he placed the horror of a possible caress in his fingertips"[8]. With this he could stretch his imagination so as to touch the object of his desire and dreams.

The poetics of the dreamy hand are in the 20th century the poetics of a hand caressing, stroking; of a hand that gently touches or penetrates a mass; of a hand that leaves a foreign body, another body or a certain substance free to touch or act upon it; a hand that collects, sorts and evaluates information by—so to speak—touching; a hand holding a tool (such as a burin or *stylus*) or at least a pen or pencil.

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6 Gaston Bachelard, „L'œuvre de Marcoussis," in *Le droit de rêver*, p. 65.

7 Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, *The Hand of the Engraver. Albert Flocon Meets Gaston Bachelard*, trans. Kate Sturge, Albany: SUNY, 2018.

8 Dominik Tatarka, *Panna zázračnica*, Bratislava: Tatran, 1992, p. 91.

But these poetics of the hand are also combined with the poetics of the rough, working, processing hand, creating new forms, struggling with matter. Gaston Bachelard points out this aspect of hand poetics both in his interpretation of Albert Flocon's work, for which he wrote several accompanying texts to his collections,[9] and in his analyses of dreams of a resistant matter. We will discuss these later, but for now, let us stay with the dreamy hand.

How does a hand dream? How does manual, haptic, or tactile dreaming work? There is a difference between dreaming and cognition, rather like with the Jung-Bachelard doublet of *anima* and *animus*. Cognition works with understanding, with grip, with concept. The Latin term *conceptus* comes from the verb *capere*, which means to grasp something (as in the German *Begriff*). The term *apprehension* has the same semiotic connotations, which refer to the simple grasping of an object by the cognitive mind. The metaphor of grasping, therefore, is linguistically strongly connected with a human's cognitive power. To know an object thus means to hold it firmly in one's hand, to have it in one's power, to grasp something that had previously escaped the mind, which was incomprehensible and unsustainable. Thus, by cognition, we seize the object of our intentions. Bachelard combined cognitive ability with the masculine *animus*, which forms one part of our consciousness.

However, what about dreaming dominated by the feminine *anima*? According to Bachelard, dreaming also touches something, but it does not hold. Rather, it resembles stroking, gently touching an object, or more accurately, placing a hand near a dream object to see what happens when you come into close contact. He does not want to grasp the dream yet; he does not need to understand his object rationally. The dream thing is not even an object that would lie in the palm of a dreamy *cogito*, but in a strict sense it is a touching thing or even matter, *materia*, pure affection—by touching it, we are touched.[10]

The ungrasping hand is thus an image of dreaming, an image of *cogito* that touches matter with respect. Note, by the way, how much this image differs from the hands depicted in works of socialist realism or fascist artistic propaganda, where the hand always firmly carries, for example, a scythe, a hammer, a flag, a banner, a

[9] A compact overview of the basic topics of these texts can be found in the study Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, „Gaston Bachelard and the Hands of Albert Flocon," in *Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso*, 4(8), 2016, pp. 205-221.

[10] Richard Kearney writes in his newest book on touching: "But if touch is something we do to the world, it is also something the world does to us. It works both ways. As we reach out a hand, touch is what first *affects* us, in a concrete, personal manner. From the beginning, flesh is charged with attraction and retraction.„ Richard Kearney, *Touch. Recovering Our Most Vital Sense*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2021, p. 40.

weapon, or holds another hand. And even when such a hand is empty (a saluting, summoning, agitating, mobilizing, cramping, greedy hand), it impresses the viewer with its robustness, strength, violence. It is a hand that refuses to show any weakness, decay, or passivity.

And let us to look at the dreamy hand: it may not necessarily be loose and helpless, it also engages in subtle struggles with matter and its resistance and may use a tool that aggressively digs into matter. This, though, is not necessarily a political manifestation of the violence of power, but rather the ability to shape, re-shape, or take something, peel it off or expose it. The violence of the dreamy hand is different from the violence of the grasping hand and follows the function of peculiar knowledge. As Delia Popa suggested: "But where understanding is disarmed, distracted or powerless, the hands can still seek new ways of doing things, exploring the dark nooks of things, taking the rough edges as landmarks and inventing nuances of touch and sight that theoretical intelligence itself cannot conceive."[11]

In order that the hand dreams lucidly, so that it may indulge in waking dreams and not dissolve in night dreams, it must retain at least a little waking consciousness, a weakened *cogito*.[12] But what does that mean? When Gaston Bachelard criticizes Sartre's phenomenology and its purely visual intentionality focused on objects, he tries to enrich it with haptic intentionality, which no longer focuses on the object, but rather penetrates matter. Bachelard puts his corrected version of "material phenomenology" or "directed phenomenology" (*la phénoménologie dirigée*) against Sartre:

> Classical phenomenology likes to talk about visions. Consciousness is thus associated with direct intentionality. Therefore, it is attributed by excessive centrality. It is the center from which the lines of research diverge.[13] [...] We are right in front of a cultural situation where phenomenology cannot simply return 'to the things themselves,' because the working consciousness (*la conscience au travail*) must be freed from the initial instances of research. Scientific thinking does not ultimately begin as a preliminary designation (*désignation préalable*). It aims beyond things—to matter. It begins in a way

[11] Delia Popa, „La portée pratique de l'imagination : dialectique et matérialité," in Jean-Jacques Wunenburger (ed.), *Gaston Bachelard. Science et poétique, une nouvelle éthique?,* Paris: Hermann, 2013, pp. 328-329.

[12] See Róbert Karul, „Zasnenosť ako forma vizuality (Bachelard a šťastná melanchólia)," in *Filozofia*, 61(1), 2006, pp. 46-52.

[13] Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'imaginaire. Psychologie phénoménologique de l'imagination*, Paris: Gallimard, 2010, p. 28: „Intention is at the center of consciousness: it focuses (*vise*) on the object, it constitutes it as it is."

> with negation: it denies the object in favor of discovering matter."[14] Bachelard thus distinguishes between classical phenomenology (*the phenomenology of the object*) and the phenomenology that abandoned the object, *the phenomenology of matter*.[15]

However, the phenomenology of matter is, in principle, the phenomenology of the hand and the instrument, the phenomenology of touching, working, digging, etching. Let us take a closer look at his "reading" of Flocon's engravings.

Matter and Hand in Albert Flocon

The dreamy hand is again the topic of Bachelard's text *Matter and Hand* (*Matière et main*) dedicated to Albert Flocon. The dreamy hand here is challenged thanks to the "rivalry of delicacy" by the paper itself, its graininess or fiber.[16] Rivalry presupposes struggle, coping, resistance, conquest. In Bachelard's case, such performances of hand-to-matter use are always related to dreams of the will to overcome something provocative,[17] in contrast to dreams of rest, which passively submit to materials and their effects. This is the difference between the contemplative and the active hand,[18] as well as between the manual-visual (silently "observing hand," descriptively following the shape of the object) and the manual-haptic appearance (normative-acting, working hand in interactive contact with matter).

Bachelard understands engraving as an art which cannot lie; it is primitive, prehistoric, and pre-humane, and he finds it in its original form in the conch shell, which pushes its shape into matter.[19]

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[14] Gaston Bachelard, *Le matérialisme rationnel*, Paris: PUF, 1963, p. 11 and 24.

[15] In this sense, it is good to compare the passages from *Le matérialisme rationnel* (p. 37) and from *La terre et les rêveries de la volonté* (Paris: José Corti, 2004, pp. 112-116), in which this distinction can be found.

[16] Gaston Bachelard, Matière et main, in *Le droit de rêver*, p. 67.

[17] As Valeria Chiore realizes, „provocation and will hold each other and refer to each other, reciprocally." Valeria Chiore, „Force, provocation, volonté: paysages. Notes d'un philosophe pour un graveur, entre ontologie des éléments et phénoménologie de la parole poétique," in *Ideação*, 25(1), 2011, p. 126.

[18] Cf. Gaston Bachelard, *La terre et les rêveries de la volonté*, p. 47, where he talks on the one hand of resting as being contemplative, and on the other hand of being resistant as being in action.

[19] Gaston Bachelard, „Matière et main," in *Le droit de rêver*, p. 68.

For the French philosopher, engraving is associated with acts of awakening sleeping matter, with the challenge to a struggle, which he also calls *anthropocosmic*.[20] According to him, every engraving "bears witness to power," "it is a dream of will, it is the nervousness of constructive will." [21] A copper, wooden or other hard plate thus becomes a soil that needs to be cultivated, furrowed or at least dug into—with a spade. "Engraving," writes Bachelard in a commentary on Flocon's *Spanish Castles* (*Châteaux en Espagne*), "is the moment of work, the moment when work begins, in which the project takes shape, in which form takes on a look."[22]

We may not necessarily follow the chronology of Flocon's work and especially those of his works in which the hand (the artist's own hand) becomes not only the object of depiction but also the object of second order, but these examples offer us several ways to understand both Flocon and Bachelard. This is best seen in an engraving from 1949, on which we see two hands engraved: one is the realistically depicted artist's hand holding a burin, the other is an abstract, a cubist[23] sketch that the artist's hand is currently engraving (it could also be an image of the artist's own hand). We may immediately remember Escher's *Drawing Hands* from the same period. However, Flocon's hand does not draw but it engraves, this hand remaining faithful to the profession of its creator and bearer. The hand is a frequent subject in Flocon, especially in the *Traité du Burin*. But let us stay for a moment with Flocon's engraving of a hand engraving another hand.

What is presented to us here? There are two hands: one engraving, the other engraved; one working, the other processed. Unlike Escher's hands, which are both shown in the same plan, although not strictly mirrored (on one we see a thumb and forefinger in the foreground, on the other we see a distant hand starting with the little finger), Flocon's hands are shown in two completely different plans. The creator's hand (the right hand) is shaded, almost realistically captured, facing the viewer with the inner part of the palm, in which we see the artist's tool—a

[20] Gaston Bachelard, „Introduction à la dynamique du paysage," in *Le droit de rêver*, p. 71.

[21] Ibid., p. 72.

[22] Gaston Bachelard, „*Châteaux en Espagne*," in *Le droit de rêver*, p. 108.

[23] It is worth noting that in the 20th Century, the topic of cubistic art was attractive to several areas of philosophical reasoning thanks to the attention it paid to abstraction. This was especially true of phenomenology, as Jaroslava Vydrová pointed out when arguing that „cubism is not an imitative art, is neither naively photographic nor a mirror of reality, but instead depicts deformations, deflections, hyperbolae, curvatures, disorders and de-colorations…" And as she adds in relation to our topic: „For the Cubist artist, body, tactile experience with the object in space is also important and forms part of the constitution of space." Jaroslava Vydrová, „The Intertwining of Phenomenology and Cubism—in the Analyses and Works of Art of Czech Artists and Theoreticians," in *Horizon*, 5(1), 2016, pp. 219 and 222.

spade. The other hand (the left)—since it is meant to evoke a painting—is a cubist sketch. We see its outer part and the artist shapes it from the base plate, which is indicated by a small crack at the tip of his spade.

Escher's hands not only draw, but actually *draw* each other *on paper*. In contrast, Flocon's hand *engraves* the other hand, apparently *on a wooden plate*, and intertwines the concrete, more figurative hand with the abstract, cubist hand.[24] What surprises us perhaps the most is a small detail: the index finger of the creator's hand intersects with the little finger of the hand being created. This overlap is ambivalent: as if, on the one hand, the created little finger had been detached from its base and, at the same time, as if, on the other hand, the creator's index finger had sunk into the matter of the wooden stamp and merged with it. As the burin digs into the plate and removes pieces of wood from it with gentle movements to create the contours of the ring finger, the creator's index finger seems to penetrate the mass "under the skin" with calm ease, while the burin remains clearly above the little finger. We do not find this element in Escher, but in Flocon it is eloquent. Is there a penetration through matter? Or is it a fusion and intertwining of the creator and the created work? Several simply sketched lines even pass through the index finger of the engraved hand, suggesting that it, too, has absorbed itself deeper and deeper into the matter from which it was born.

We also cannot forget that Escher's hands work with the resulting image (drawing on a piece of paper), with which nothing happens. But Flocon's engraved hand is still just preparing a stamp, which would need to be applied by color later, then printed on paper, and only this imprint will be called an engraving. So, the left hand on the stamp becomes the mirror-right hand on the engraving. But this is the story that the image itself shows us. However, if we looked at the real Flocon stamp, everything would be inverted. To see the creator's hand as right, Flocon had to engrave it on the stamp as left. That would still be a common motif. It is more complicated with the other hand, which, in order to appear to us as the left hand, had to be engraved as the right hand, and this would also appear when the Cubist hand was imaginarily struck on paper. Creation of an engraving showing the work on the engraving, expressing the artist's immersion into matter through the image of a hand that merges deeper into matter, is reminiscent of Bachelard's famous *cogito* to the second, third or fourth power: I think that I think that I think—and so on.[25] If Flocon's object is a hand, then the Cubist hand is in relation to the real hand,

[24] M. C. Escher was influenced by cubism, too, but there was only a short period in his life when he devoted himself to that kind of depiction: in 1920-1921 he created four cubist engravings of seated nudes. He never tried to connect abstract forms with concrete ones to the extent that Albert Flocon did.

[25] Cf. Gaston Bachelard, *La dialectique de la durée*, Paris: Quadrige/PUF, 2001, pp. 98-103.

a hand squared or even cubed. If its object is an engraving, then the Cubist hand is an engraving squared, or one to the third power. In short, from Flocon's real hand, we move on to a realistically depicted hand, which then loses its realism in pure geometric shapes, so that it finally dissolves completely in formless matter. And from real engraving we descend again to figurative engraving. There is certainly some Platonism in this, but also there is Albert Flocon's inconspicuous ingenuity.

While Escher offers us a touching and playful illusion of two hands, Flocon playfully expresses a different, much stronger idea. Escher's engraving is captured in the horizontal plane, but Flocon's has verticality: from the shape it descends deep into a mass. Is not such verticality a fundamental element of engraving art? Is it not a big topic in Bachelard's philosophy? Flocon did not just show us two hands, he showed us a fundamental feature of his art: penetration through matter.

If we need other proof, let us look closely at the mass engraved in Flocon's cycle *Traité du Burin*. Or we can observe the intertwining of the human body with the body of a tree or landscape as a female body in the *Paysage* collection. Earth, matter, body—three greats, converging, intertwined themes that connect Bachelard with Flocon, a philosopher with an engraver, text with an image.

Hand Equipped with a Tool

Bachelard is also fascinated by something else, however: strength, resisting matter, work, digging into matter, and developing new forms. The engraver changes both the form of the material (copper, wood, stone...) into which he carves a shape and the material on which he then presses his work. Pushing, imprinting, *impressum*, is also a matter of exerting pressure, overcoming the resistance of a substance such as paper, the structure of which is thus disturbed.

The reinforcement, not just the extension of the hand, is a tool: for example, a spade, a burin, a stylus. Here we come to Bachelard's concept of a hand equipped with an instrument, a "tooled hand" (*la main outillé*), as we find in his *La terre et les rêverie de la volonté*. Bachelard describes an instrument first as the "coefficient of aggression against matter," against the "hard thing": "Things are too strong for an empty hand."[26] Here, Bachelard develops reflections on the dynamic imagination, which is passive when it remains purely in the field of visuality but is immediately activates when one takes up a tool, such as a burin. In this moment, the innocent difference between the No-Self (the world) and my own Self turns into a challenge,

[26] Gaston Bachelard, *La terre et les rêveries de la volonté*, p. 40.

a provocation, and therefore Bachelard writes that: "true dreams of will are dreams equipped with tools (*rêveries outillées*)".[27]

One thing is to calmly observe a piece of matter (wood or stone) that lies in front of me and around which my gaze can orbit like a satellite. Another thing is when we try to dig into this wood or stone—firstly, with a bare hand, then with a hand armed with a sharp and hard tool. This is time when the peaceful innocence of wood or stone ends. When I hit a concrete slab with a hammer and chisel, or when I cut it with a diamond wheel on my angle grinder, I suddenly feel the back pressure of a fabric that up to now has only been observed and whose hardness I expected but did not experience. Bachelard calls this experience a "dynamic existence", an "existentialism of power."[28]

But how does all this relate to engravings? We come to this when Bachelard borrows an analysis of the three types of instrument use from Andre Leroi-Gourhan, which is described in his book *L'homme et la Matière*. The first type is a precise but not too energetic application of a knife or razor to wood, for example: the cut will be precise, but does not require much force from us. The second type consists of chopping wood with a knife, which reduces accuracy but increases energy performance. The third type is the work of an engraver who puts his burin on a wooden plate with one hand, while holding a hammer in the other which he then pushes into the burin: "Two hands appear here in their respective privileges: one has strength, the other skill. Already in this differentiation of hands, the dialectic of the slave and the master is being prepared."[29] Bachelard realizes that this third type of work using both hands but with differentiated performance does not apply just to work such as kneading soft dough, but also to work with hard materials. Let us critically note, however, that this differentiation may not be exclusive: if an engraver or carver holds a wooden board with one hand and pushes or digs into it with the other, pressure and back-pressure are exerted by two hands, both taking on the privilege of strength and ultimately skill, because even the hand holding the wooden board must exert an adequate, more or less gentle back-pressure against the burin.

To dig into matter means to understand in fullness its nature. Bachelard illuminates this by quoting one of John Ruskin's childhood recollections in which he describes digging a pit in his family garden, something which his mother did not understand and rebuked him for. There is a moral rule forbidding children from digging pits in gardens; from drilling or digging in the ground. Bachelard aptly

[27] Ibid., p. 41.
[28] Ibid., p. 43.
[29] Ibid., p. 48.

remarks: "Here is the stem of the paradox of a child who had a garden but did not find nature!" The difference can be seen in a child who plays with a stick which his father carved for him and a child who holds a small knife in his hands and makes his first cuts into hardwood. Even if he does not find a skill for carving skill and art in himself, he will understand, at the very least, what resistance of matter is. Bachelard develops this difference in the dialectic of the expressions "vis-à-vis" (*vers*) and "against" (*contre*), the first of which is strongly visual, the second dynamic and incorporated into the movement of the hand against matter.

The tool in the hand is therefore not only an extension of the body, but also its weaponry in the struggle with matter. But what if such a tool becomes a pen for a philosopher to write his texts with?

Conclusion: Philosophers' Engravings

In the final passage of *The Flame of a Candle*, Bachelard writes of his own "primordial engraving," the engraving of a worker, a scientist. "This picture, I am sure, needs no caption. [...] This primordial engraving bears the mark of solitude, the characteristic mark of a type of solitude."[30]

We can well imagine this somewhat stylized pose of an aging philosopher behind his desk (his whole world) lit by an electric lamp. At this special moment, he asks himself whether it is possible to work scientifically again in his solitude: "Yes, how does one experience adventures in consciousness by remaining alone? Could one discover adventures in consciousness by descending into one's own depths?"[31] The depths of one's own self are, according to him, deposits of dreams, not of existence, because existence dwells always above, in the working mind, in more abstract thinking. This is a nostalgia for the original life of an undreaming scientist: "It would be necessary in turn to re-engrave the engraver—to re-engrave in each vigil the very existence of the solitary man in the solitude of his lamp—in short, to see everything, think everything, say everything, write everything from the perspective of primordial existence."[32]

The notion of *re-engraving* is crucial here: Bachelard understands a scientific mind working under terms of re-organization, re-construction, re-reading, re-writing.

[30] Gaston Bachelard, *The Flame of a Candle*, trans. Joni Caldwell, Dallas: The Dallas Institute Publications, 1988, p. 75-76.

[31] Ibid., p. 77.

[32] Ibid., p. 77.

The prefix *re-* is typical of his theory of a new scientific mind and he returns to it with his notion of re-engraving. There is not an eternal and immutable engraving of human being; there are only his various re-engravings.

But why does he write in this situation that we need to add more shadow to the chiaroscuro of old images? What does it mean? What can we see in chiaroscuro painting with more shadow? Where do objects hide and what remains for our sight? The sole figure is the philosopher of sciences sitting before a blank page at his table, looking like a dying little flame. This is the primordial engraving of his life: a philosopher at his table lit by a lamp, surrounded by shadows and darkness.

But is it not strange that Bachelard does not talk about image or self-image, about painting or drawing, about photography of himself, but repeatedly about engraving and re-engraving of the engraver? Does he understand his own philosophical profession as a kind of engraving art? I think so. Primarily, he is a writer. Let us note that Bachelard still wrote by hand (at the end of his life, by ankylosed hand). This takes us back to the old terms for notching and scraping: *graphein* and *scribere*. At the beginning of Boëthius' *De consolatione philosophiae*, its author tells us that he recorded his cries *stili officio*, with the help of a stylus on some board.[33]

Writing as carving characters: this is an image very close to Bachelardian thinking. All the allusions of Albert Flocon suddenly come to mind here: verticality, the intersection of hand and matter; the skill of the engraver and the skill of the writer; the effort, the work, the elaboration; the struggle with matter; the struggle with the blank page. Writing texts is a form of engraving rather than painting by brush, and a philosopher works here with horizontal and vertical lines, with shapes, shadows, pressure, and the back-pressure of *material*. His work is an elaborating of matter rather than a representation of it.

And when Bachelard speaks intimately and autobiographically about his *table d'existence*,[34] we know that it is not only his table that becomes an existential

[33] Boethius, *De Cons. Phil*. I, 1, 1. Notice, that *stylus* in the Roman period was not only a writing instrument, but also a weapon substitute due its form. Allegedly Quintus Antyllius, according to Plutarch, Saint Cassianus and John Scotus Eriugena were all killed by *styluses*. For Romans, carrying *styluses* circumvented Roman laws and norms about carrying weapons in public space. See Alexei V. Zadorojnyi, „'Stabbed with Large Pens': Trajectories of Literacy in Plutarch's *Lives*," in Jeroen Bons, Ton Kessels, Dirk Schenkeveld, and Lukas de Blois (eds.), *The Statesman in Plutarch's Works, Volume II: The Statesman in Plutarch's Greek and Roman Lives,* Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2017, p. 114, n. 6.

[34] Jean Libis writes about this passage of the text: „The existential table is the center of maximum existence, and the working man is completely ready to return to his engraving, that is, to the life frame in which he fixes himself. Nevertheless, Bachelard is not naive and has never intertwined a dream space with a real socio-professional, with civic and political space. [...] Death is near, it seems

space for him, but also his personal, existential engraving plate into which he engraves the signs of his own life.

> Yes, it is at my table of existence (*à ma table d'existence*; alternatively: at my existential engraving plate) that I have known maximum existence, existence in tension—tending toward an 'ahead,' toward a 'further ahead,' toward an 'above.' All around me is rest, tranquility; only my Being-seeking being strains in its improbable need to be another being, a more-than-being. And thus, it is that with Nothing, with Reveries, one believes one will be able to make books.[35]

Finally, there is a nostalgic sigh: "But is it time again for me to find the worker whom I know so well and return him to my engraving?"[36] The last question of *The Flame of a Candle* is written vis-à-vis his approaching death. There are no more words, no more signs, no more etches. What remains is a silence after the question.

In this final, almost triumphant climax, Bachelard acquires the artistic skill he admired so much during his lifetime and transforms it into his own philosophical activity which knows both soft, feminine substances (dreams) and hard, masculine substances (science, rationalism, exactness). The great dialectical moments of his philosophy are thus revived in his grand finale: *anima* and *animus*, soul and spirit, the concrete and the abstract, contemplation and action, passivity and activity, visuality and resistance, sight and pressure, innocence and power, eye and hand, dreaming and thinking, image and concept. And this is precisely the moment when we find ourselves directly in front of Bachelard's own existential engraving, in front of his own intimate anthropology.

Bachelard was fond of one of Flocon's engraving. It shows a bottle with a postage stamp inside which a cathedral is trapped. The bottle is standing on the seashore, with a glass and a conch shell beside it, and a burning out cigarette on top of the shell. It is the drama of the vertical and the horizontal that was so typical of Flocon's other engravings. For Bachelard, it was this drama of the whole scene that was essential. As if the cathedral in the bottle wanted to gush out through the narrow neck like geyser. It mixes calm and restlessness, relaxation on the beach

to be whispering from the texts, and the dream house is no longer enough to protect the intimacy of the philosopher." Jean Libis, *Gaston Bachelard ou la solitude inspire*, Paris: Berg International Éditeurs, 2007, p. 127.

[35] Gaston Bachelard, *The Flame of a Candle*, p. 77-78.

[36] Ibid., p. 78.

with tension in the bottle, the undulating sea to the left of the bottle, and its calm clean geometric lines to the right of it, or the clouds on one side, the brilliant sun on the other.

I am convinced that for Bachelard it was this play between horizontality and verticality that fascinated him in the engravings, which is always disturbed by the various folds. All his philosophy follows similar motifs as the hand of the engraver. The philosopher becomes the central figure of calm and restlessness, peace and conflict, silence and drama. If we read Bachelard's books on philosophy and the history of science, it is always some "event of reason" that from time to time disturbs the horizontal calm movement of history and shifts it to another plane. If we read his books on imagery and dreaming, it is "poetical sentences" that suddenly jolt him out of his peaceful writing. Folds and spirals enter it all, too, like the famous staircase in Rembrandt's painting *The Meditating Philosopher*, which Bachelard mentions at the beginning of *The Flame of a Candle*. And it is just beyond these horizontals, verticals and folds that the very engraving of Bachelard's philosophical writing is revealed.

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POSSIBILITIES OF A HAND: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT. Our starting point is a phenomenological analysis of the concepts of hand and possibility in relation to human realization and expression, whereby the problem of hand and its movements can be followed in this framework in its peculiarity and uniqueness. With regard to possibility, we follow a certain shift in Husserl's concept of possibility towards practical possibility, as well as some selected passages in his texts concerning corporeality and constitution. This phenomenological starting point is connected to the question of stimulation (potentiating) of the hand in the creative process; we draw upon insights in texts of a Finnish thinker and architect Juhani Pallasmaa and on examples from fields of art, technology and handicrafts. The goal of the text is the return to the hand and the revival of the sphere of original realization of the man, as opposed to uniformity, excess of impulses, tendency to manipulate or, on the other hand, desensitization, whereby we want to open up a space for stimulation of creativity and deepening of the experience on this basis, whose starting point is, precisely, the phenomenological analysis.

Keywords: *body, touch, possibility, creation, craft, Edmund Husserl, Juhani Pallasmaa*

"When I was growing up, all the women in my house were using needles.
I have always had a fascination with the needle, the magic power of the needle.
The needle is used to repair the damage. It's a claim to forgiveness."
Louise Bourgeois

"…it is the craft entering into the body…"
Simone Weil[1]

In many ways, hand is in a peculiar position with regard to bodily constitution of the man and his development—both evolutionary and ontogenetic. It is a subject-matter of many anthropological, social philosophical, psychological, and

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[1] Robert Storr, *Intimate Geometries: The Art and Life of Louise Bourgeois,* The Monacelli Press, 2016, p. 526; Simone Weil, *Intimations of Christianity Among the Ancient Greeks,* Routledge, 1987, p. 101.

generally philosophical investigations.[2] We can mention *Éloge de la main* by Henri Focillon, the tooled hand of Gaston Bachelard or *Thinking Hand* by Juhani Pallasmaa. The attention paid to touch disrupts the idea that we quickly accept the prominent position and function of visuality among the senses.

Precisely the movements of the hand and its gestures disclose the double constitution of the body as lived body (*Leib*) and physical body (*Körper*); the double character or reversibility of experience where the touching hand becomes touched, which is one of the crucial phenomena in which phenomenologists are interested. Even here, however, the approaches develop into various directions, such as, for example, investigation of the psychophysical intertwining (*Leibkörperlichkeit*), the sensual synesthesia, being in the world (and relationship to the outer reality) and, last but not least, intersubjectivity. In the following text we will pursue both concepts—hand and possibility—within the phenomenological analysis which links the human realization to an expression, so that we will observe *the hand* and its movements in their peculiarity and uniqueness. With regard to *the possibility*, our starting point will be the shift in Husserl's conception towards practical possibility and we will follow selected passages in his texts on corporeality and constitution (Hua-Mat VIII, *Ideas II*). This will allow us to put into play the question of stimulation (potentiating) of the hand in the creative process, as found in the texts of the Finnish architect Juhani Pallasmaa. The central motive will be the return to hand and the revival of the original realization of a man. Can we—*vis-à-vis* the uniformity, excess of impulses or, on the other hand, desensitization, with which we so often hitherto meet—open up a new space for stimulation of creativity on this phenomenological basis?

Let us begin with two contrasting examples originating in vastly different interests in hand and touch, although it is precisely the hand and its sensing which links them in the end.

1. Robotics. First contacts of a man with the environment and himself or herself are given by means of touch, placement of the body and movements of the body. An embryo is in constant contact with the environment formed by the womb. Gradual development of the limbs perfects the movement in such a way that the body touches the environment or itself. It is the tactile and proprioceptive area which is the first sensual area developed in a child, and it is the most stimulated

[2] See two collective monographs: Raymond Tallis, *The Hand. A Philosophical Inquiry into Human Being,* Edinburgh University Press 2003. Zdravko Radman (ed.), *The Hand, an Organ of the Mind: What the Manual Tells the Mental*, MIT Press, 2013, with a foreword by Jesse J. Prinza appropriately called "Hand manifesto."

one, too (movements of mouth, face and legs are significant). Matěj Hoffmann[3] works in the field of robot development (iCub humanoid robot) and concerns himself with bodily interactions in the natural and artificial sphere; his starting point is precisely an observation of the movements and reactions of children in early childhood to the touch. He follows the linkages of touching of the body, vision, but also touches in cases of blind children. The formation of the bodily schema is a complex, multilayered system—multimodal dynamic system—where "understanding by building" is crucial, precisely during the perception by touching and the feeling of touches; during the touching the movements gradually develop and perfect themselves, and they support further modalities. Hoffman's starting point is that *touching oneself* is important for the formation of the body schema and therefore for the robotics, too. This touching, however, cannot be captured by purely causal, mechanistic schemas. If we could understand this phenomenon in its complexity, it would be a technological breakthrough, too. From the other side we could say that if we cannot penetrate the processes operative in the self-touch, we cannot proceed further in the technological domain either.

2. Haptic sculpture. Another project appears in contrast to this. Maria Bartuszová was an outstanding sculptor working in eastern Slovakia. The haptic side stands out in her works. Part of her work is dedicated to visually impaired and blind[4] children who could have touched her works and disassemble and assemble them as a kind of haptic puzzle. The visual side recedes to the background even for those who look at Bartuszová's sculptures and observers feel invited to touch them, to perceive the haptic aspects of the objects such as roundness, softness, smoothness. The white colour of objects frees from the visuality even more and reinforces the feelings of delicacy and softness. During the touching the ovoid object at the same time merges with the hand, it falls into the hand, it adheres to the shape of the palm and the folds of the fingers when grasped. The subtle experiencing of the movements of the body, its being in the country, nature, the access to the chosen materials—this all leads the artist to creation of so-called biomorphic plastic, a plastic of life forms. Bartuszová worked with various materials, but mainly with plaster cast into elastic forms such as, for example, balloons. Or, on the other hand, she pressed parts of the objects or body to the material. Her haptic sculptures are

[3] Matěj Hoffmann, "The role of self-touch experience in the formation of the self," in *The Development of the Self*, Workshop at IEEE ICDL-EpiRob, Lisbon, 2017, 1; Cf. Matěj Hoffmann's personal web, URL: https://sites.google.com/site/matejhof/home.

[4] In a similar way as Constantin Brâncuşi exhibited a round object (*Sculpture for the Blind*) covered by the cloth so that it is only accessible to the touch.

called organic or gestural.[5] They speak to us in the same way in which Merleau-Ponty enters into a dialogue with a thing, when the viscosity of a honey represents "a particular way the world has of acting on me and my body."[6] A sculpture's character does not need to be primarily visual, but both during its creation, as during its reception, the haptic matters may stand forth. The creative process does not necessarily have to be subject to intent and purpose, but it can be left to work of a matter or nature itself—as is the case here.

Where do these examples lead us? Our preliminary observation points to the fact that touch is a peculiar sense which plays an important role in our contact with the world, which happens also through touching, grasping or pointing, which manifests itself both in active and passive way and presents itself as holistic experience including touch background, whole-body skin perception, proprioception, kinesthesia. A hand here becomes a leading clue, a starting point for the anthropologically significant actions in the field of technology and art, too. Another aspect linking both abovementioned projects concerns the experiencing and movement of the hand in children as a significant example, whereby special attention is devoted to blind children.

The development of simultaneity of the movements in children, the grasping and touching and/*contra* seeing, the position of the body, these all put into play their own bodily situation. The expression "putting into play" is not accidental here. It points us to a level of interpretation which leaves free development options—both iterative and creative—to the touch and hand, which does not reduce them only to chain of stimuli and reactions. Thanks to this, we can track anthropological features of the self-realization of the man, the need to affirm, instigate and fulfil the anthropological essence.[7]

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[5] Cf. Gabriela Garlatyová (ed.), *Maria Bartuszová*, Košice: Archív Marie Bartuszovej, 2021. Lucia Stach Gregorová, "Zažiť niečo skutočné," in *Jazdec,* 12(40), 2021. Maria Dziewańska (ed.), *Maria Bartuszová: Provisional Forms,* Museum of Modern Art in Warsaw, 2015. One can link Bartuszová's work to disturbing sculptures of Louise Bourgeois (cf. Mária Danielová, *Mysl ruky. Proměny textilního média v kontextu médií umění 20. století*, Olomouc: Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci, 2018, pp. 42f.).

[6] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception,* London, New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 62.

[7] Elena Várossová states: "There is not meaning of the human history (…) as something outside the man, above or below him, but it coincides with the need to self-realization of the human species, and incessant affirmation, 'potentiating' and totalization of his anthropological essence." Elena Várossová, "Zmysel dejín a naše dejiny" [The Meaning of History and Our History], in *Filozofia*, 24(1), 1969, p. 6.

Edmund Husserl and the Hand

The progress of the sensorimotor capabilities proceeds through various changes and is especially dramatic after the birth, for example, when the child sucks the breast milk, and when during the first weeks and months it perceives the world by means of touches of mouth, limbs and coordination of the hand (limbs) and mouth.[8] The crucial experience is the birth itself and the radical whole-body experience of the child and the mother, when the movement of the child through the birth canals reconfigures the subsequent bodily situation of a newborn. This experience affects the further psychosomatic development, too, it supports immunization and stimulates the subsequent development by means of touches of the skin of the child and the body of the mother. If Husserl speaks of the birth as the limit constitutive case (*Limesgestalt, Limesfall*),[9] it is connected with the opening of the sphere of potentialities which the body gets in its disposal. In another and contrasting way, another limit case is non-moving body which is only "thinkable".[10] This is reflected in the Husserl's conception of possibility—and, more broadly, in his conception of subjectivity and corporeality—as a delineation of the possible area of human life and its achievements. As J. N. Mohanty points out with regard to modalities, "in the later writings he talked more of 'open possibilities' and 'motivated possibilities' than of 'pure possibilities' as ideal objects."[11]

In Husserl's texts in which we can find multiple examples of the thematization of the birth, early childhood, body of the mother, and so on, there are other significant practical examples which put the hand in the limelight.

> As a worldly I, I have formed my lived body as a lived body... I train it or myself in special ways—as a carpenter, locksmith, etc., I learn the "hand movements," that is, my hand refines itself as an organ in certain directions, and so does the whole lived body in different directions of activity.

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[8] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929 – 1934), Die C-Manuskripte* (Hua-Mat VIII), ed. D. Lohmar, Dordrecht: Springer, 2006, p. 326.

[9] „In ihm vollzieht sich seine Welt, sein Ich, und seine strömende konkrete Gegenwart ist sozusagen der Mutterleib, in dem sich aus ein embryonalen Urkeim durch embryonale Stufen hindurch schließlich die erstkindliche Weltausbildet und zur Geburt kommt" (Hua-Mat VIII, p. 74). Cf. examples of sucking breast milk (p. 326).

[10] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book. Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution* (Hua IV), trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer, [1952] 1989, p. 289: "An immotile Body, one that only senses, is thinkable as a limit-case, but the question is then whether immotility does not signify the null-point of movement as paralyzed Body—and that is indeed the case." It is then a null point of motivation (p. 119).

[11] Jitendra Nath Mohanty, *Logic, Truth and the Modalities. From a Phenomenological Perspective.* Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999, pp. 160-161.

> The physical and mental strength can again temporarily decline, I can get out of practice and to have to train myself again to get back to the old level. Or I can get sick, hurt my finger, get burned, etc.; my physical lived body (*körperlicher Leib*) must have a normal constitution so that I can "do something" with it, in general and in particular, so that I am not reduced in my already acquired strengths, and not only strengths of the physical organs for external world practice, but also "mental" (*geistiger*) strengths...[12]

Corporeality is thus inscribed into the life of subjectivity in the form of development of spiritual life, too, which manifests itself by development of various types of action, but also by works which are products of its striving, spontaneity or various types of labours, crafts and activities. The body with its organs is then a sedimentation of "I can" in various typical forms of action.[13] Such movements can be—thanks to the self-sensing, too—further improved, refined, modified, and through them the complex motoric of the hand and body is developed. This motoric is subsequently linked to ever more competent and goal-directed striving, acting and practice, which leads to creation of the cultural environment shared with the others.

The movements of the hand—which are our primary interest here—thus produce a "topography" of possibility as possibility of our body and bring Husserl's phenomenology to the reflection of different relations such as possibility–object, as well as possibility–act or possibility–aim. This extends the scope of investigation of the possibility further. These relationships can be identified in specific analyses of types of objects, intentionality, motivation or action. Modal situation is thus structured and complex and seen in perspective of its unique dynamism and genesis. The significant turn in this conception takes place when we turn from the *object* towards the *act*, which concerns the intentionality extending the scope of what practical, act or activity, actually mean. As Nam-In-Lee puts it, "action or activity, *in the original sense of act*, is nothing, if not practice" where "the whole stream of consciousness turns out to be a unity of practical intentionalities."[14] Moreover, tactile experience is irreplaceable here: "I want to maintain that tactual possibilities, along with the tactual background, are indispensable to a sense of reality and belonging—they connect us to things. The sense of reality presupposed by sight depends on them; without our experience of potential touch, what we see would not appear as 'there'."[15]

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[12] Hua-Mat VIII, p. 156; see also p. 399.

[13] Cf. Hua-Mat VIII, Text 79. „Der Leib mit seinen abgegliederten Organen ist eine Sedimentierung von Vermögendes in solchen und solchen typischen Formen Tun-Könnens" (Hua-Mat VIII, p. 345).

[14] Nam-In Lee, "Practical Intentionality and Transcendental Phenomenology as a Practical Philosophy," in *Husserl Studies,* 17(1), 2000, pp. 53 and 55 [*my emphasis*].

[15] Matthew Ratcliffe, "Touch and the Sense of Reality," in Zdravko Radman (ed.), *The Hand, an Organ of the Mind: What the Manual Tells the Mental,* Cambridge, London: MIT Press, 2013, p. 148.

In order to link this with the work of hand, we can continue with Merleau-Ponty's example, that hands are "the centre-point of the 'intentional threads' that link him to the given objects." In other words: "The workbench, the scissors, and the pieces of leather are presented to the subject as poles of action; they define, through their combined value, a particular situation that remains open, that calls for a certain mode of resolution, a certain labour."[16] The objects, tools and materials as part of an intentional arc or body schema lead us to some work as a possibility of an expression in the context of our realization. They open the possibilities to us. In the first-person experience a single action—even in an elementary form of repetition, learning or training—participates holistically in the life situation as an intertwining of the body and the tool. We can mention here the special example of the needle with which Louise Bourgeois worked when she repaired the tapestries and which remains present in her whole sculpting work as a specific phenomenological tool (*la main outillée*) by which she creates the topography of her own life situation.[17]

New networks of the interconnections of body, works and other actions are created in situations in which a man as a lived body in the spontaneity of his or her actions finds himself or herself, whereby it is not causally predetermined, but they can be potentiated by the body schema as an open sphere of possibilities, as a beginning of a certain "play" of the new situation, as self-improvement, self-perfection or revival of the actions, or as a discovery of new possibilities. Of course, the opposite holds true as well, that certain situations can close themselves before us as incomprehensible or deficient, if we—due to various reasons—cannot take full advantage of their potential, or if disorders intervene in the structure of perception (as pointed out by M. Merleau-Ponty). Alienation, physical and psychic injuries, traumas, hygienic risks during pandemic but also fatigue, loss of sense for creativity,

[16] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception,* trans. Donald A. Landes, London, New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 108-109. "… the subject placed in front of his scissors, his needle, and his familiar tasks has no need to look for his hands or his fingers, for they are not objects to be found in objective space (like bones, muscles, and nerves), but rather powers that are already mobilized by the perception of the scissors or the needle, they are the center-point of the 'intentional threads' that link him to the given objects" (p. 108).

[17] In her book on the transformation of the textile medium in the 20th century, appropriately called "Hand's Mind", M. Danielová—following Gaston Bachelard—phenomenologically analyses the work of L. Bourgeois: "needle *à la main outillée* in her textile objects is not a simple technological mean", but it has a complex meaning of the labour, therapy, craft, medicine and transgression; it is a tool of her "phenomenological wish" to cope with her existence. Cf. Mária Danielová, *Mysl ruky*, pp. 67 and 68.

disgust, excess of impulses, and so on, likewise affect our bodily configuration in the situations or in lived experience, respectively, in fundamental ways.[18]

In the same way the child learns by touching itself—as pointed out by Hoffmann—so do peculiar bodily configurations open themselves to an adult by means of possibilities of a hand. Together with Husserl's C manuscripts we can refer to passages in *Ideas II*:

> Man, in his movements, in his action, in his speaking and writing, etc. is not a mere connection of linking up of one thing, called a soul, with another thing, the Body. The Body is, as Body, filled with the soul through and through. Each movement of the Body is full of soul, the coming and going, the standing and sitting, the walking and dancing, etc. Likewise, so is every human performance, every human production.
>
> Each work, each product, each action expresses an activity and is characterized as work, as act: one sees how the cigar is rolled, one discovers therein the expression of a manipulation and, on the other hand, the "visible" aim. The handwriting, each stroke in it, its "*ductus,*" bears the stamp of the operative spirit. In short, products and works are again psycho-physical unities, they have their physical and their spiritual aspects, they are physical things that are "animated."[19]

Corporeality thus manifests itself in various ways in its expressive aspect. The tool and, subsequently, the creation, become part of this expression. Precisely the experience of touch as a starting point of interpretation, as pointed out by Matthew Ratcliff, allows us to understand the perception in the context of intertwining of the man's being in the world, since it allows us to grasp how both man and world are interlinked and constitutively close.[20] The body is here an original organ, or "the original object (*Urobjekt*) with expression and as participating in all expression,"[21] respectively. The movements of the body, the tactile experiences, the work of the hand which we follow here especially closely, express the connection of the man and

[18] Cf. Natalie Depraz, "Phenomenology of the Hand" in Radman (ed.), *The Hand, an Organ of the Mind*, p. 196: "Stroke is not an *affleurement*, but a *façonnement*. Furthermore, contrary to Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's sensitive neutral descriptions of the hands, Levinas's and Sartre's are clearly 'eroticized' and therefore 'situated': it is not an 'I' who touches by stroking an 'other,' but a 'man' who lightly touches or presses on the 'desired woman,' as Sartre expressively writes."

[19] Edmund Husserl, *Ideas II,* pp. 250 and 333.

[20] However, he also warns against overinterpretation of this point of view. Cf. Matthew Ratcliffe, "Touch and Situatedness," in *International Journal of Philosophical Studies,* 16(3), 2008; Matthew Ratcliffe, "Touch and the Sense of Reality," p. 134.

[21] Hua-Mat VIII, p. 401.

the world as a peculiar commonality; they express the mutual acting upon, belonging and potentiating, which is opened up precisely thanks to the experience of touch.[22] In other words, it presents the movement of a man in the sphere of possibilities, which is a sphere formed by actions, works and gestures. This can be expressed more concretely in an anthropological perspective which we will follow in the next part of the text: it concerns coping with ourselves, our biological limitations as well as cultural possibilities, culminating in form of a meaningful, existential attitude.

Juhani Pallasmaa: Hand and Creative Project

If the hand and the tactile experience is a good starting point for the interpretation of the interweaving of the man into the world and into intersubjective relationships, then this starting point is likewise appropriate when we look at the process of creation itself. We want to follow this point of view also in order to find possibilities of the potentiating of the hand, either in form of cultivation or in form of interconnection into lived experience. Concerning modalities of particular behaviour opened by hand and touch we can follow up with Juhani Pallasmaa's conception presented in his works *The Eyes of the Skin* (2012) and *The Thinking Hand* (2009). For us his effort is in line with the starting points of potentiality and corporeality as presented in the previous part of our text, implicitly and explicitly inspired by phenomenology and devoted to the first-person perspective. It is based on restoration of the importance of work of hand in the creative process of architect, artist, craftsman, as well as the attentiveness and appropriation to "hand matters" which we are losing in our practical as well as in theoretical approach because of technical, virtual surplus in our life, mass production, tendency to objectify what is perceived as well as to objectify our own body, to see the matters of human being in third person perspective. Taking up the examples of craft and artistic activity which arise from manual activity, Pallasmaa emphasizes genuine connection between hand, eye and mind. Creative activity is based on training, improvement of skill, condition of the hand, its physiological state (*körperliche Leiblichkeit*), as well as on spontaneity, trying and mental possibilities (*leiblich-seelische*). Examples from the beginning of our text like children's first experiences of touching and perceiving, or blind children with

[22] "The possibility of these kinds of contact is inextricable from the possibility of meaningful activity, from having any kind of practical project, and thus from any sense of participation in the world. Together they comprise a sense of connectedness and communion that is far richer and more diverse than what might be achieved through abstract perception of force." Matthew Ratcliffe, "Touch and the Sense of Reality," p. 150.

their experiences of small sculptural objects, represent for us exemplary leading clues into the field of perception and action offered by our hands which entangles us in the world and opens for us new situations and corporeal configurations. In other words, it constitutes our approach to the world as well as to our own self.

Moreover, in a creative attitude of artist or in flux of play, not everything is subordinated only to purposive ability, but it often takes a step away in favour of free sketching by hand or trying; hand gives way to material, playing an instrument gives way to rhythm and melody, capturing shapes gives way to the object itself or the depicted landscape. The creative work of the artist or craftsman also includes invention, uncertainty of the result, experiment, lived experience, which make the project an open activity. This open action contains certain paradoxes. The frivolity of the experiments and improvisation are sometimes more effective than thought-through following of and submission to a purpose. In the anthropology of an actor, Helmuth Plessner mentions another aspect belonging to the creative process, referring to Max Liebermann—"Zeichen ist Weglassen." During the performance of the play the issue is not a submission to the rules or copying but one's own individual mastery of the role and gesture.[23] Further, Pallasmaa agrees with David Pye, who stresses the craftsmanship with risk in contrast to craftsmanship with certainty, when the result leads and to some extent is beyond the craftsman's control. "All the works of men which have been most admired since the beginning of our history have been made by the workmanship at risk, the last three or four generations only excepted."[24] We could also say, that craftsmanship and skill return us to the original experiences, to pre-scientific world of everyday experience from which new, innovative, theoretical (science) and practical realizations of a man developed (for example, construction of ships). We can refer here to Husserl's *Krisis*, whereby he in these experiences sees a possibility of revival or reactivation of sense; thereby a way out of dead ends or crisis of science.[25] Closely linked to technical skills is a determination to meet new challenges, hope, but also ethics of

[23] Helmuth Plessner, "Zur Anthropologie des Schauspielers" (GW VII), in *Ausdruck und menschliche Natur*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2016, p. 416.

[24] Juhani Pallasmaa, *Thinking Hand: Existential and Embodied Wisdom in Architecture*, New York: Wiley, 2009, p. 72.

[25] Cf. Hua VI, annex III., where the existential structure is referenced, the corporeality, the presence of things in practical context, where "it is clear that in the life of practical needs certain particularizations of shape stood out and that a technical praxis always [aimed at] the production of particular preferred shapes and the improvement of them (…) Measuring belongs to every culture. (…) We can always presuppose (…) the art of design for buildings, of surveying fields, pathways, etc." Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (Hua VI), trans. D. Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, [1938] 1970, pp. 375f.

the tool with which a craftsman never loses a personal contact. Therefore Pallasmaa draws attention of the architecture students to the necessity to draw by hand (as opposed to working with computer), to the particular experience with various materials (in contrast to distancing of an architect from the production or from the natural materials), and he also mentions the saying of Tapio Wirkkala, that one must have " 'eyes at the fingertips' referring to the subtlety and the precision of the tactile sense of the hand."[26]

If in phenomenological perspective we have seen an emphasis on the practical possibility and openness of corporeal situation, in the case of Pallasmaa we find in the worm of a craftsman/architect a connection to complex of existential possibilities rather than predominance of theory. Together with T. S. Eliot he rather asks: "Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?"[27] Therefore, he draws attention, first, to *embodied knowledge*, which is different from conscious activity or conscious attention. Artistic work comes into tension with verbalization, theory, language. It is the embodied knowledge that can solve other contradictory tensions, too: functionality–liberation from function, learning–un-learning, because forgetting is as necessary as remembering at a certain stage of creation. "The moment of looking at the world or at a specific task as if neither had been encountered before, *that* is the creative instant of mind."[28] By handling some activity or by iteratively repeating activities we also occur in special corporeal situation. By swimming, learning to ski, dancing etc. conscious attention or knowledge step back into the background. If we think about the activity we are performing, we disturb the activity, even with the risk of falling or stopping. In craft activities, such as crochet, hands precede conscious attention, they work faster than eyes and independently. A certain body memory arises when an artist draws or sketches; a memory of the hand or the muscles which manifests itself in expression. Pallasmaa calls this touch drawing (elsewhere he speaks of sensual or embodied thinking) and we can contrast this approach to computer drawing. The issue is not only the mechanicality, but that repeated training of the hand becomes habitual, it makes this action more precise and allows one to confront oneself with his or her possibilities, error,

[26] As well as the "end of a paintbrush" according to Randall Jarrell; cf. Juhani Pallasmaa, *Thinking Hand*, pp. 54 and 83. Pallasmaa is critical with regard to currently used materials: "Scaleless sheets of glass, enamelled metals and synthetic plastics—tend to present their unyielding surfaces to the eye without conveying their material essence or age." Juhani Pallasmaa, *The Eyes of the Skin. Architecture and the Senses*, 3rd Edition, New York: Wiley, 2012, p. 34.

[27] Juhani Pallasmaa, *Thinking Hand*, p. 141.

[28] Ibid., p. 143. Iterative return to beginning is often present in Husserl's work, too, since it concerns the phenomenological method itself, and also concern the thinking about the meaning of the phenomenology itself.

deficiencies, uncertainty, which is manifested either on the side of an author and his or her perception (touching of the object, world) and on the side of the work and exploration of the new possibilities of depiction.

The second aspect pointed out by Pallasmaa is the so-called *tacit knowledge*,[29] which represents a silent dialogue, a silent communication taking place in the creative process which leads to a unique configuration of the work of art or artefact. It is a communication with a tradition that has been sedimented, for example, in craft, communication between the work and the audience or product and user (the work is created for and through others, Sartre; the work is part of cooperation, discourse and in some extent, work overlaps the author himself—wisdom of knowledge by Kundera), and then there is communication between the poem/ novel and reader, building and dweller. Another level of this relationship is formed by the material and the craftsman as well as a creator and his or her field. To put this more precisely, if we speak of communication in tacit knowledge, this notion of communication still points to processes of grasping, but here we should more appropriately speak of consonance or responsiveness.

The creative process carries within itself the potentialities for the realization of the project, as well as risks of failure. Here is a space for a possible input of critical phenomenology as thinking about the particular experience of subjectivity, its situations of crisis and renewal, or regaining of the sense of creation and life. This is also a space for restoration of material and manual experiences.[30] It is a paradox that the move towards craftsmanship, the return to the manual actions and rudimentary technologies, which we can see in artistic projects of 20th century in various regions, allows one to effectively work with alienation and social situation or role. To Maria Bartuszová—whose work was limited by Communist regime in former Czechoslovakia, inconspicuous and until now not fully appreciated, what reflects also the situation of artist–woman–mother — we have linked the work of Louise Bourgeois, whose starting point was poor female labour during restoration of tapestries. Mária Danielová in her

[29] Cf. detailed description with appropriate examples in Juhani Pallasmaa, *Thinking Hand*, pp. 145-146. We can mention here a cooperation between Gaston Bachelard and Albert Flocon which offers insights into work of engraving as a resistance of matter on the one hand and discovering the basis of world on the other, as "the ideal form of the story without words, the distilled story. And it is because the engraving 'tells' nothing that it obliges you, the musing spectator, to do the talking." Gaston Bachelard, *The Right to Dream,* trans. J. A. Underwood, New York: Orion, 1971, p. 83. Concerning this fruitful cooperation cf. analyses in Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, "Gaston Bachelard and the Hands of Albert Flocon," in *Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso*, 4(8), 2016, pp. 205-221.

[30] Cf. Delia Popa, Iaan Reynolds, "Critical Phenomenology and Phenomennological Critique," in *Studia UBB. Philosophia*, 66(1), 2021, pp. 12f.

analysis legitimately brings in this context the work of Constatin Brâncuşi, too, who switches not only materials (plaster or clay is substituted by wooden beams) but also tools (spatula and sculptural stand are substituted for an axe); he thus switches his position as an academic sculptor for the action which reminds one more of a woodcarver.[31] This transformation affects the studio, too, which becomes a workshop (or a playroom as it is by Bartuszová). The tension and contradiction between craft and art production which arises in the history is here turned over into new form of cooperation and support in such a sense that where art distances itself from the reality in unconvincing experiments it is the craftsmanship that can mean a return to authenticity of the material, tool and experience itself.[32] Such a process is thus an effort at "reparation" with regard to both the object and the tool, which is no longer only reduced to a form of a mean but becomes a hand with the tool. This is linked to the effort to cope with one's own existential feelings, danger and one's own being. Concerning the phenomenology of the hand, Natalie Depraz speaks of its therapeutic possibility, the deepening of feeling and attention during "handing" interaction, of self-cultivation of the "intrasubjective phenomenology of the hand" which is directed towards care of the self and care of the others.[33] This is reflected in cases of works and creations produced by the handiwork, either in art, architecture or crafts, when they can affect the quality of life, the depth of experience, or transfer the existential knowing and values.

Conclusion

We have opened the question of relevance of phenomenology as a question of approach to the body in special case of hand and touch, and as such it casts light on open situation as existential, practical, creative, playful one. Hand matters and hand activities entangle us into the world and into relations with things, tools and other people in original way. They also become a leading clue for the anthropologically significant actions in field of technology and art arising in the cultural history.

[31] Cf. Mária Danielová, *Mysl ruky*, p. 69: Danielová quotes Moholy-Nagy from his text from Material to Architecture: "He, an educated academic sculptor—as a primitive, a Negro woodcarver." (Quoted in Czech in Danielová's *Mysl ruky*).

[32] Mária Danielová, *Mysl ruky*, p. 9.

[33] Natalie Depraz, "Phenomenology of the Hand," pp. 197-200. Cf. Juhani Pallasmaa, *Thinking Hand*, p. 104: "Pleasurable objects and buildings mediate an experience of the processes by which the object or structure was made; in a way, they invite the viewer/user to touch the hand of the maker."

This does not mean, however, that it cannot appear in inappropriate or limited forms. Hands may be—and often are—subject to a tendency to manipulate or destroy. The tendency of alienation can lead to objectification and instrumentalization which miss the lived potential of experience in the favour of impersonal or alienated one, subordinated to labour, economic relations and articulated in technical or artificial body-image.[34] But on the basis of experience and lived body connected to hand work we can see its potentiality not as originally derived from the outer (socially construed) or causal-physiological phenomena. We mentioned thus examples of sculptors and architects vis-à-vis their existential and creative situation struggling with them and creating own artistic attitude on the base of lived experience of hand creation. This we find not only as phenomenologically close, even significant.

In other words, the dominance of visuality, technology, dismissing of body in the creative process is here seen not as social critique but—through Pallasmaa's texts—in a deeper sense in the overall existential situation of a man and his life attitude anchored in the tactile experience. The return to the crafts and handiworks can help us to revive and strengthen this sensual situatedness. It thus concerns the relation to one's own corporeality and possibilities of hand which is analyzed in phenomenological perspective. Based on that, we can draw two intertwined conclusions. There is an significant mutual relationship which takes place in the experience: by my situatedness in the world and by my corporeal situation, through creative activity I attune myself to the world and sense the world, and the world provides this creative effort with a significance, an "aura".[35] At the same time art, craft activities open an important creative realm for human development—Pallasmaa also speaks about the preservation, protection—of a true and independent experience.[36]

[34] N. Depraz warns us not to "neglect the importance of aesthetic and ethical contemplation, either of Nature or of persons." Natalie Depraz, "Phenomenology of the Hand," p. 188.

[35] This is elaborated in several contexts, including tactile experience and work of hand, in Pallasmaa's texts: *The Eyes of the Skin*, pp. 13 and 69. Cf. *Thinking Hand*, p. 104. R. Karul, in several texts, develops the notion of aesthetic experience as its continuation in ordinary life, in common perception. "The aesthetic act does not necessarily end with the creation of a work; it ends, in general, with a new perception." (Róbert Karul, "Baldine Saint Gironsová – znovuobjavenie estetického aktu" [Baldine Saint Girons – La redécouverte de l'acte esthétique], in *Ostium* 8(3), 2012), URL: https://bit.ly/3w2khvo.

[36] Juhani Pallasmaa, *Thinking Hand*, p. 148.

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BODY, MUSIC AND ELECTRONICS: PIERRE SCHAEFFER AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF MUSIC

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ABSTRACT. The article presents a phenomenological investigation of body and music, with particular emphasis on electronic music. The investigation builds on theoretical framework developed in phenomenological investigations in art by Edmund Husserl, Mikel Dufrenne and Roman Ingarden. It is guided beyond these analyses by investigations of particular musical examples in avant-garde acoustic and electronic music. In the former case it tackles music from which body is being consciously erased. In the latter case, the erasure occurs instantly. This negative approach elucidates the function of body in music. In case of electronic music, the article focuses on writings and music of pioneer of *musique concrète*, Pierre Schaeffer. Central argument is that electronic music always has been and still is defined by absence of body, here phenomenologically considered as *Leib*. As a consequence of the phenomenological elucidation, it is ultimately shown that erasure of body has been one of the avant-garde music's crucial techniques, and that this avant-garde residue remains in electronic music as such, both experimental and mainstream.

Keywords: *Schaeffer, Husserl, phenomenology, music, body, aesthetics*

It is a truism to say that body and music are intertwined, and it is likewise generally recognized that body is not a simple mean of translation of music created in the mind into physical sounds. Yet, when it comes to questions of what is the particular function of the body in the music, what it does, what it actually brings into music, the issue gets more opaque. Phenomenological aesthetics, as developed by philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty, Ingarden, Dufrenne, and also Husserl,[1] shall

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[1] While Husserl has never written a book on aesthetics, he has written continuously on the subject a lot. For example, first texts in *Hua XXIII* date from 1898, last appendices to *Krisis* concern art. And one must agree with Crowther when he says about *Hua XXIII* that "within nearly 600 pages (and, in fact, over 700 in the English translation) there are enough relevant arguments to yield a short monograph on aesthetics, one, indeed, with highly original content". Paul Crowther, *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Consciousness and Phantasy*, Routledge, 2022, p. 1.

be particularly well-positioned to address and answer these questions. Particular investigation of phenomenon of body and music is, however, mostly lacking in the texts of these authors.

Nonetheless, they do develop a theoretical framework which will allow us to investigate the relationship between body and music properly. And in order to get into heart of the matter, we can let the actual music guide ourselves, since it is certainly true—as Merleau-Ponty points out—that art can be ahead of philosophy that investigates it.[2] Or it can serve as a leading clue, to use Husserl's term.[3] In this text, the phenomenological analysis follows the particular musical examples where body is being consciously erased or excluded. While this may seem a paradoxical undertaking given that the topic is music *and* body, it will prove a fruitful undertaking. This is, in part, because there is certain affinity between such music and the notion of phenomenological reduction whose purpose is to elucidate the phenomena—an affinity which will at one point be expressed explicitly. But the argument in favour of such investigation can be put more simply: erasure or exclusion of the body from music sharply highlights what the body actually does when it is present and to the degree it is present.

In the first section, I will therefore briefly overview the aesthetic conceptions of Husserl, Ingarden, Dufrenne and Merleau-Ponty. The crucial notions developed there will be those of typology or schemata on the basis of which we identify sound as music. Then I will focus on the first set of examples: avant-garde acoustic music in which the body is deliberately erased. We will see how typology is re-configured in such music, whereby the situation will be explained by Husserlian distinction between *Leib* and *Körper*. In the next section, I will focus on second set of examples—on electronic music, where this erasure of the body happens in an instant. In particular, I will focus on music of pioneer of electronic music, Pierre Schaeffer.[4] Schaeffer's writings will feature prominently, too, although they will not be followed canonically. Including Schaeffer in phenomenological analysis is especially useful, though, since Schaeffer himself claimed an affinity to phenomenological method:

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[2] For example, with regard to literature, Merleau-Ponty claims that "for its own part, literature has been in advance of the interest shown in it by the philosophy of language". Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France, 1952-1960*, Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 12.

[3] For succinct exposition of Husserl's notion of a leading clue [*Leitfäden*], see Anthony J. Steinbock, *Home and Beyond. Generative Phenomenology After Husserl*, Northwestern University Press, 1995, pp. 42-48.

[4] Though it can be noted that Schaeffer did not compose the first piece now considered electronic *musique concrète*. Work *The Expression of Zaar* by Halim El-Dabh, from 1944, predates first published Schaeffer's piece, *Étude aux chemins de fer*, by four years. I am thankful to James Kopf for this reference.

> For years, we have time and again been doing phenomenology without realizing it, which is better, all things considered, than talking about phenomenology without doing it. It was only after the event that we recognized the concept of the object postulated by our research in the definition given by Edmund Husserl, with an admirable insistence on precision to which we are far from aspiring.[5]

In these sections we will gradually see, with help of theoretical phenomenological framework, what the body does in the music. In the short final section, I will once again reconsider relationship between body and music *vis-à-vis* proliferation of electronic music, which has long left the confines of academic avant-garde, and I will conclude briefly by looking at the inherently experimental nature of electronic music.

Music and Body in Phenomenological Aesthetics: A Very Brief Overview

Concerning the relationship of body and music, not much is actually useful in "classic" phenomenological texts. Much of the discussion there is focused on the questions of ontology of the musical work. Husserl, for example, considers the existence of Beethoven's *Kreutzer Sonata* itself to be ideal, persisting as identical through various performances.[6] This brief mention of ontology of musical work is subjected to critique by Ingarden, who claims that we should distinguish between ideal and intentional objects (his use of the term "intentional object" does not mirror Husserl's use of the term in the sense of noema),[7] whereby the musical work, being dependent on and originating in subject's intentionality, shall be considered an intentional object.[8] Much of this discussion concerns relationship between score and performance, which, however, is from the point of view of phenomenology a red

[5] Pierre Schaeffer, *Treatise on Musical Objects*, University of California Press, 2017, p. 206. Stahl, in turn, references Heidegger on this point, claiming that "electronic music, emerging primarily out of influences from the Schoenberg/Berg/Webern school in the 1950s, adopted a strikingly Heideggerian attitude towards sound". Gerry Stahl, "Attuned to Being: Heideggerian Music in Technological Society," in *boundary 2*, 4(2), 1976, p. 638. Stahl's text is inspiring, but leaps to soon towards social critique (employing Marx and Adorno alongside Heidegger) and is dependent on interpretation of electronic music as a subset of avant-garde music, that is, as a peculiar social practice. By grounding analysis of electronic music in phenomenology of body and phenomenological aesthetics, though, we will see in the end—leaning towards Benjamin in his late debate with Adorno concerning mainstream art—that even "pop" electronic music keeps a certain critical potential.

[6] Edmund Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Martinus Nijhoff, 1969, p. 21.

[7] Cf. Roman Ingarden, *On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism*, Martinus Nijhoff, 1975, p. 67.

[8] Roman Ingarden, *The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity*, MacMillan Press, 1986, pp. 116ff.

herring—what a phenomenologist must focus on is musical piece as sounding, heard and perceived aesthetically, and not on the score as a contingent means of historical preservation of the musical piece.[9] And while Ingarden analyzes the musical piece as "intentional object"—in a sense of incomplete musical work in itself, which concretizes itself only in aesthetic perception, with "places of indeterminacy" filled in by aesthetic qualities—he was mistaken in identification of the score with musical work itself, and of the aesthetic concretization with performance, respectively.[10] Husserl's or Ingarden's focus on the relationship between score and performance had much to do with their conservative tastes in classical music, rather than with a necessity of phenomenological analysis.

Ingarden was actually forced to backtrack on phenomenological significance of the score precisely when Zofia Lissa challenged him with *musique concrète*, where distinction between score and performance makes no sense.[11] This backtracking was justified, but it caused him to miss the actual distinction between electronic and acoustic music, which lies in the function of the body.

Productive analyses stemmed from Husserl's analysis of time consciousness and passive syntheses, especially since Husserl used perception of music prominently to demonstrate his notions of retention and protention (or primary recollection and primary anticipation).[12] The takeaway is that speaking about music would make no sense without retention of the just heard and certain passive anticipation of the further course of the musical piece which may be fulfilled or disappointed, whereby on that basis we can, for example, judge the piece as harmonic or dissonant, respectively, or even judge it to be a result of some mistake or failure.

Dufrenne further explained this structure of anticipation, fulfilment and disappointment by positing the existence of harmonic and rhythmic schemas as prerequisites for understanding of a musical piece *qua* music:

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[9] I explain why the issue of performance and score is, phenomenologically, a red herring in Michal Lipták, "Roman Ingarden's Problems with Avant-garde Music," in *Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics*, 50(2), 2013, pp. 190ff. Another detailed argument, though more from musicological point of view, with which I agree, can be found in Bruce Ellis Benson, *The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue: A Phenomenology of Music*, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

[10] I have provided detailed arguments for this in Lipták, "Roman Ingarden's Problems," pp. 190-199.

[11] Zofia Lissa, "Some Remarks on Ingardenian Theory of a Musical Work," in Piotr Graff and Slaw Krzemień-Ojak (eds.), *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1975, p. 132. For Ingarden's response in this part, see mainly Roman Ingarden, "Uwagi do Uwag Zofii Lissy," in *Studia Estetyczne*, 3, 1966, p. 119.

[12] Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, Kluwer, 1991, pp. 40ff.; see also Edmund Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, Kluwer, 2001, pp. 610-612.

> We can reach [the musical object] only by participating in it through an act of imagination which is defined by the schema and which is the first stage in an act of understanding, for the rational aspect of the musical object is already present in the schema. Counting and measuring are schemata in which imagination serves as a prelude to understanding.[13]

Dufrenne posits these schemas as a kind of spatiality within music, and in particular "spatiality experienced by the body upon hearing the music".[14] A body is involved, since spatiality for Dufrenne also denotes externality with regard to consciousness:

> These schemata are both means of access to the work and constitutive elements of the work. In this way, they contribute to the work, considered as duration, consistency and plenitude—consistency and plenitude which call forth spatiality insofar as space signifies externality to consciousness as well as the reality of the object. For this reason, music, though a temporal art, does not exclude space.[15]

Situation would be put slightly differently in writings of Husserl and Ingarden, while ultimately reaching similar conclusion. Considering the musical object *qua* aesthetic object as experienced in neutral attitude,[16] and qualifying time of musical piece perceived aesthetically as quasi-time torn out of objective temporal nexus,[17] the question would not be whether there are schemata guiding our musical perception,

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[13] Mikel Dufrenne, *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience*, Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 262.

[14] Ibid., p. 272.

[15] Ibid., p. 264.

[16] Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, Martinus Nijhoff, 1983, p. 277.

[17] Ingarden, *Work of Music*, p. 70. In the same way, a literary work of art is quasi-temporal; see Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, Northwestern University Press, 1973, pp. 233-241. Referring to Husserl's writings, what Husserl qualifies as temporal with the prefix "quasi-" are objects of imagination, which are approached in an imaginative or neutralized mode of consciousness, as opposed to positional consciousness. "The object of imagination is present to consciousness as temporal and temporally determined, enduring in time; but its time is a *quasi-time* […] *it is a time without actual, strict localization of position*." Edmund Husserl, *Experience and Judgment*, Routledge, 1973, pp. 168f. Similarly, with regard to dance as art, Sheets-Johnstone writes that "the audience is aware of the dancer's body not as an actual body, but as a center of force which presents changing linear designs", and speaks of a dancer's gesture, of such a linear design, as "a quasi-real visual-kinetic form. […] The areal design of the body is an imaginative visual-kinetic form which does not actually exist." And she concludes that "in dance, movement as movement does not exist. In dance, movement appears as a revelation of sheer force emanating from a body which appears as a center of force". Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, *The Phenomenology of Dance*, Temple University Press, 2015, pp. 98-100, 120.

but rather what motivates us enter the aesthetic attitude and remain in it. Put simply: when do we quit musical perception because it is, for example, just a random noise? Or what makes us listen to some sound as music? For Ingarden, it is a "certain rationality, and in particular a *rational perspicuity*"[18] of the sound, a certain rational configuration of aesthetic qualities, or aesthetically valent forms.[19] Husserl's approach is not in conflict with Ingarden on this point. While Husserl would not refer to "rationality" as a defining aspect of music, his notion of protentions commits him to teaching of fulfilment or disappointment of anticipation, and this teaching likewise presupposes certain schemata which allow us to recognize future fulfilment and disappointment as fulfilment and disappointment.[20] Overarchingly, he would explain the motivation to enter into aesthetic attitude through notions of type and typology [*Typus*; *Typik*].[21] There are certain types of sonic phenomena which invite us to perceive themselves aesthetically, whereby the types are at the same time both *a priori* and intersubjective, that is, historically changeable. Dufrenne builds on this understanding and particularly struggles with this apparent contradiction, but concludes that a notion of certain historically determined *a priori* correctly explains the aesthetic experience:

> Without a constantly contingent encounter with the work of art, that is, without a history of art, there would be no history of affective categories, since they would remain within us as unawakened. They would not be absent but, instead, implicit and unused. The *a priori* is actualized only through the *a posteriori*.[22]

There is a clear reference to Kant's schemata in Dufrenne's use of the term, and as Lohmar explains, Husserl's notion of type serves the same function in his transcendental phenomenology as do the schemata in Kant's transcendental system.[23] As a result, thus, despite differing terminology, Husserl, Ingarden and Dufrenne are not that

[18] Ingarden, *Work of Music*, p. 96.

[19] Roman Ingarden, *Ontology of the Work of Art*, Ohio University Press, 1989, pp. 65f. For succinct elucidation of "aesthetically valent qualities", also elsewhere translated as "aesthetically valuable qualities", cf. Roman Ingarden, "Artistic and Aesthetic Values," in Margolis, Joseph (ed.), *Philosophy Looks at the Arts*, Temple University Press, 1987, pp. 130ff.

[20] Which is not to say that there are not important differences between Ingarden and Husserl in other aesthetic matters. A significant difference, for example, concerns the interpretation and scope of modification of neutrality, as I have analyzed in detail in Michal Lipták, "How can we Err in Aesthetic Judgements?" in *The Yearbook on History and Interpretation of Phenomenology*, 2, 2014, pp. 113f. However, it is not necessary to tackle these differences here.

[21] See e.g. Husserl, *Experience and Judgment*, pp. 124ff.

[22] Dufrenne, *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience*, pp. 495f.

[23] See Dieter Lohmar, "Husserl's Type and Kant's Schemata. Systematic Reasons for Their Correlation or Identity," in Don Welton (ed.), *The New Husserl. A Critical Reader*, Indiana University Press, 2003, pp. 93ff.

distant from each other, and it is fitting that Dufrenne in particular concludes his treatise of phenomenological aesthetics by introducing the abovementioned notion of historic *a priori*. And, indeed, even body is let into play by Dufrenne when introducing the notion of schemata, but the function of body is not developed further. Ingarden, for his part, speaks of musical work as the only type of work of art which consists of a single stratum,[24] that is, it is a "purely qualitative particularity".[25] While he does not refer to Kant in this place, it is clear that such qualitative particularity or individuality implicitly presupposes schemata (which he terms "rational") according to which it is established; otherwise there would be nothing to distinguish between non-musical sequence of sounds and music.

Merleau-Ponty's brief description of music as "too far on the hither side of the world and of the designatable to depict anything but certain sketches of Being—its ebb and flow, its growth, its upheavals, its turbulence",[26] implicitly invokes the body as that which is ultimately intertwined with world as flesh. But this statement is actually dismissive of music: there is as if too much body in it, and not enough distance to either allow contemplation or flesh out the engagement with the world. In this, Merleau-Ponty ultimately channels Kant's dismissive attitude to music.[27]

What all these phenomenologists have in common is that—when they are not occupied with red herring of the ontology of the score—they do approach music from the point of view of a listener. There are fundamental reasons for this: a musical object exists necessarily as the aesthetic object, which means aesthetically valuable object,[28] and the musical object presents itself as aesthetic object only to aesthetic

[24] For a concise overview of Ingarden's teaching on strata, see Jeff Mitscherling, *Roman Ingarden's Ontology and Aesthetics*, University of Ottawa Press, 1997, pp. 129-139.

[25] Ingarden, *Work of Music*, p. 64.

[26] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and Mind," in Toadvine, Ted and Lawlor, Leonard (eds.), *The Merleau-Ponty Reader*, Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 353. To be fair to Merleau-Ponty, in an unpublished note he wrote down that "music, like painting, is to the sensible world what the philosophy is to the entire world". Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Two Unpublished Notes on Music," in *Chiasmi International*, 3, 2001, p. 18. However, in the published texts he sought to distinguish the two alongside abovementioned lines.

[27] "If [...] one estimates the value of the beautiful arts in terms of the culture that they provide for the mind and takes as one's standard the enlargement of the faculties that must join together in the power of judgment for the sake of cognition, then to that extent music occupies the lowest place among the beautiful arts (just as it occupies perhaps the highest place among those that are estimated according to their agreeableness), because it merely plays with sensations. The pictorial arts therefore far surpass it in this respect." Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 206.

[28] Husserl explicitly claims that "all art is 'aesthetic'; it is delight in what is seen *in concreto*." Edmund Husserl, *Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925)*, Springer, 2005, p. 654. We will see later that Ingarden likewise considers aesthetic value as *conditio sine qua non* of existence of a work of art.

perception, that is, to the listener. A musical performance, though genetically prior, appears as derivative phenomenon in this sense. The sounds produced by a person improvising with an instrument, for example, require aesthetic perception in order to be recognized as music. That does not mean that aesthetic perception "turns" the sounds "into" music, but rather that only in aesthetic perception is the musical piece originally given, and that is thus where—according to principle of all principles[29]—should the phenomenon of music be studied. And insofar the musician is aware of performing the musical piece, there is an aesthetic perception always co-present alongside the playing.[30] This is succinctly captured by free-improv musician Mike Bullock reflecting on his performance:

> The border between performer and audience is porous, at least as far as perception of improvised music is concerned. The performer is simultaneously an audient; s/he also continues to be a performer, even at the moments that s/he is not making sound. So why not consider audience a form of performer?[31]

Phenomenologically, however, such complete reversibility between performer and listener cannot be justified. Phenomenology of music, approaching the phenomenon from the point of view of the listener, could apparently very well work without concerns for the body. As opposed to theatre or dance, body is simply not a part of an aesthetic object;[32] it is present there in peculiar way which will be elucidated

[29] Husserl, *Ideas I*, pp. 44f.

[30] That does not mean that the decisions an improvising musician is doing are some quick active judgments of the shape of improvised musical piece performed until now. Similar as a sportsman or sportswoman enmeshed in the game, the passive syntheses are involved. Cf. Seth Vannetta, "A Phenomenology of Sport: Playing and Passive Synthesis," in *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*, 35, 2008, pp. 68f. But the passive syntheses are thoroughly transformed by neutrality modification and any perception co-present alongside the playing, even if on the margin of the attention, is thus aesthetic perception. For Husserl's account of a body of an actor in a theatre play, see Husserl, *Phantasy*, p. 616ff. In case of a dancer, Sheets-Johnstone speaks of her body as "virtual body" or "body as symbol", which is nonetheless "related to the dancer's pre-reflective awareness of the body"; which means, in other words, that it is the sphere of passive syntheses which is transformed in dance as aesthetic object. Sheets-Johnstone, *Phenomenology of Dance*, pp. 35f. However, Sheets-Johnstone opposes in this manner dance against sport, which in her opinion can be analyzed as reduced movement, and "analyzed apart from the lived experience, as a functional unification of objectively determined space-time coordinates and vector quantity of the actual force expended". Ibid., p. 123.

[31] Mike Bullock, "Listening into the BSC," in Bhob Rainey (ed.), *Manual*, NO Books, 2011, p. 88.

[32] When analyzing the performance of folk string bands in Slovakia, Ambrózová suggests that the criteria are developed which would be "reflecting the movement patterns and the way of handling the musical instrument with the right and left hands". Jana Ambrózová, "The Rhythmic Accompaniment in Traditional String Bands in Slovakia: The Analysis of *osminový duvaj*," in Sonja Zdravkova Djeparoska (ed.), *Tradition and Transition*, ITCM NC Macedonia, 2020, p. 106. This is

below, but it is not, so to say, *reel* part of it. The questions of musical virtuosity can be effectively addressed through Merleau-Ponty's notion of *habitus*,[33] in the similar way sports or handicrafts are tackled.[34] But none of this is crucial for phenomenological analysis of musical piece as aesthetic object. After all, precisely the electronic music performed a crude "reduction" by cutting the body out of the proceedings thoroughly—and yet, the pieces resulting from electronic composition are no less musical pieces.

In the phenomenological investigations disclosed above, we shall let ourselves guided by the notion of passive protentions and, mainly and as logically related, by presupposition of certain types or schemata guiding these protentions, which is what all these "classic" phenomenological accounts, despite their different terminology, have in common.

Erasing the Body in Acoustic Music

When we speak of a body here, it must be understood not as a kind of inanimate object which I animate or move, but as a psychophysical unity[35] or, more precisely, something Husserl later calls bodily-mental [*leiblich-seelische*] unity:

> The body [*Leib*], which we apprehend as expression of spiritual life, is at the same time a part of nature, inserted into the universal nexus of causality, and the spiritual life, which we grasp through the bodily [*leiblichen*] expression and understand in its nexus of motivation, appears, in virtue of its connection with the body [*Leib*], to be conditioned itself by natural processes and to be apperceived as something of nature. The unity of body [*Leib*] and spirit is a two-fold one, and, correlatively, a two-fold apprehension (the personalistic and the naturalistic) is included in the unitary apperception of the human.[36]

mostly a reflection of limits of standard music analysis *vis-à-vis* particular socio-cultural situation of folk music which is its essential aspect, and it does not undermine the separation of aesthetic object and body in music; however, it nonetheless points to interesting intertwining of body and society, with the aesthetic being a kind of central meeting point.

[33] Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Routledge, 2012, p. 139.

[34] For initiating ideas with regard to phenomenology of crafts, see e.g. Vydrová's text in this issue. Jaroslava Vydrová, "Possibilities of a Hand: A Phenomenological Perspective," in *Studia UBB. Philosophia*, 67(1), 2022.

[35] Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, Kluwer, 1989, p. 257.

[36] Husserl, *Ideas II*, p. 259.

This notion of unity, as well as distinction between *Leib* and *Körper*,[37] must be kept in mind when we speak of body in the following text. The decisions of the performer can be result of long intentional deliberations, but ultimately they must become embodied, expressed through body as "*organ of will*" [*Willensorgan*].[38] The body of the performer therefore always presumes such psychophysical unity.

We can say that the behaviour of a body in music can be two-fold: opaque or transparent. As such, these notions are, however, idealized end points of a continuum, and we should be speaking of relative degrees of opacity and transparency.

By the body being "opaque", I mean that the body of the performer is drawing our attention to itself. This drawing of attention can happen when we are listening to different performances of the same piece, but also when listening to the piece we have not heard before and also in the improvised pieces,[39] simply by virtue of letting ourselves guided by certain types of experience, certain types of aesthetic objects. There may be, for example, certain rashness to the gesture or certain hesitation in the musical line which draws our attention and invites certain aesthetic valuation. We are invited to determine the sense of such unexpected deviations, and the sense can be manifested in positive or negative aesthetic valuation. The deviations may impress us, force us to reconfigure our expectations, our types, our schemata. But they may also very well be signs of a bad performer, who commits mistakes during performance.

Such issues are kept to minimum when body is transparent. There are no gestures that strike us as peculiar, no unexpected deviations. Rather, the music is performed in a way perfectly, according to certain established typology. Whether this results in a work of art which is considered artistically valuable, or whether the good works must not surprise us in some way, shock us in some way,[40] is not something that needs to bother us at this point.

The situation is complicated by the fact that transparent performance may appear as opaque if the deviations from the typology are contained within the work itself or within the framework or "philosophy" of improvisation (see, for example,

[37] Husserl's notion of *Leib* is sometimes translated as "lived-body", "lived body" or—as is the case of English translation of *Ideas II*—as the Body with capital "B". In contrast, *Körper* can be translated as "physical body" or body with lowercase "b". In this text, whenever Husserl's concepts are referenced and the distinction must be sharply drawn, either the original German is included in order to avoid confusion, or German words "*Leib*" and "*Körper*" are used directly.

[38] Husserl, *Ideas II*, p. 159.

[39] Benson's cited work is basically a continuous—and impeccable—argument why there no strict dividing line between composition and improvisation exists. Among other things, I fully subscribe to his criticism of idea of *Werktreue*. Benson, *Improvisation*, pp. 3ff.

[40] Dufrenne in this regard speaks about "provocation of astonishment". Dufrenne, *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience*, p. 409.

John Zorn's game pieces), as is the case in avant-garde music. For example, Irvine Arditti performs Cage's technically extremely difficult *Freeman Etudes* (1977-90) as they are written, therefore in as transparent way as possible. For a listener, though, they come off as random (and the score is, actually, generated by random processes), and there may actually be little difference between a virtuoso like Arditti playing such an extremely difficult piece, and a dilettante playing random notes.

Objectively, therefore, the source of the deviation may not be only in a performer's body. Similar aesthetic perception can be thus achieved both in cases where body is opaque, or where body is transparent. On the other hand, perfect harmony between the piece and the body can be achieved only when body is transparent.

However, as I said, transparency is more of an idealized aspiration. There is always certain peculiar expression, certain gesture, which remains and which is perceptible by the trained or attentive listeners.[41] Nevertheless, avant-garde music in 20th century was fascinated by exploring the impossible and investigating the dead ends. I will therefore firstly look into avant-garde musical pieces which sought not only transparency, but erasure of the body.

Within avant-garde music, we will once again consult John Cage in more detail. He often recounted his visit to an anechoic chamber, which has been a formative story which concerned his effort at sonic erasure of his body, and subsequent failure:

> It was after I got to Boston that I went into the anechoic chamber at Harvard University. Anybody who knows me knows this story. I am constantly telling it. Anyway, in that silent room, I heard two sounds, one high and one low. Afterward I asked the engineer in charge why, if the room was so silent, I had heard two sounds. He said, "Describe them." I did. He said, "The high one was your nervous system in operation. The low one was your blood in circulation."[42]

This experience gestated into his most (in)famous piece, *4'33"*, which calls for any number of performers on any instruments to do nothing—to remain silent. It must be added that Gann questions the biological source of sounds that Cage heard—he suggests it was actually tinnitus.[43] Whatever it was, the point is that the body cannot be erased sonically. Interestingly, Husserl suggests that tinnitus is an

[41] See, for example, the attentiveness of the ethnomusicologist's ear. Cf. Ambrózová, "The Rhythmic Accompaniment," pp. 105ff.

[42] Quoted in Kyle Gann, *No Such Thing as Silence. John Cage's 4'33"*, Yale University Press, 2010, pp. 162f.

[43] Ibid., p. 164.

example of "null point of accommodation" [*Null der Akkomodation*] which points ultimately to the presence of my body [*Leib*], "but prior to all this insertion in the body [*Leib*] something like that is in itself a null character".[44] Cage found similar link:

> There is no such thing as an empty space or an empty time. There is always something to see, something to hear. In fact, try as we may to make a silence, we cannot... Until I die there will be sounds. And they will continue following my death. One need not fear about the future of music.[45]

One could hear here the anguish of Beckett's Unnamable: "Ah if only this voice could stop, this meaningless voice which prevents you from being nothing, just barely prevents you from being nothing and nowhere."[46] However, an effort to completely erase the body can be found in recording of Cage's late piece, *One*[7]. This piece is instrumented for "for any way of producing sounds" and it is a reduction of an earlier piece, *Four*[6], where "performers on unspecified instrumentation choose twelve different sounds each, with fixed amplitude, overtone structure, etc., and play within flexible time brackets".[47] Wergo liner notes for Liebner's recording of *One*[7] specify:

> The fixed time brackets show exactly when a musician should begin a pitch or tonal event and when it should come to an end. With the flexible brackets, it is left to the interpreter to decide within a predetermined time frame when an instrument enters and when it falls silent.[48]

Given the "instrumentation", the existing recordings of *One*[7] are, as expected, vastly different. A recording by Cage himself from 1991, released in 2009 (Mode, 200), exists. It is a "vocal" performance and Cage selects sounds such as humming, snoring or shouting. However, we will look at recording by pianist Sabine Liebner released in 2014 (Wergo, WER 6797 2). Liebner plays both on the keys, inside the piano, and on the piano's body, and she is using both her hands and little electronic machines placed on the piano's body or strings. The selected sounds include playing keys themselves, tremolos, knocking on the piano's body, stroking the strings, rattling

[44] Husserl, *Ideas II*, p. 325.

[45] Quoted in Gann, *No Such Thing as Silence*, p. 162.

[46] Samuel Beckett, "The Unnamable," in *Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable*, Everyman's Library, 2015, p. 424.

[47] "Four[6]", in *John Cage Trust*, https://johncage.org/pp/John-Cage-Work-Detail.cfm?work_ID=89 [accessed on 19.12.2021].

[48] "One[7] / Four[6]", in *Schott*, https://en.schott-music.com/shop/one7-four6-no323748.html [accessed on 19.12.2021].

sounds cause by machines inserted on the strings, and so on. The sonic events are interspersed by longs stretches of silence going sometimes for a minute or more, and as a result, the 30 minute piece is extremely sparse.

Any room for the performer's expression in this music is not only basically excluded, but conceptually undesired; and this holds irrespective of the fact that the actual sequencing of sounds is chosen by the performer, that as written the piece is indeterminate. When listening to this recording, the listener hears series of events arranged somehow objectively. The body is absolutely detached from the sounds as a potential source. When the performance is seen live, the "virtuosity" of the body comes off as negative only; it involves a certain sort of asceticism, which means that no undesired sound should be emitted by the body aside from those required by the objective sequencing. The non-existence of the body, which Cage found unattainable in the anechoic chamber, is here infinitesimally approached by means of contrast of sonic events from which the body is completely excluded.

In other words, the virtuosity of the body is here reduced to its rigidity, to the slowness of the movement, to its silence, to its non-performance. However, such a body, whether seen live or imagined when listening to the piece, is not in the musical piece as it is delimited phenomenologically—as a neutralized aesthetic object. With regard to imagining, in particular, Dufrenne correctly claims—building upon his critique of Sartre's notion of imagination and its role in aesthetic experience—that imagination's role in aesthetic perception is "modest"; it may stabilize the images or extend an understanding, but it is not proper part of aesthetic perception, of the world of an aesthetic object which "exists in comprehension or intension, not in extension".[49]

Phenomenologically speaking, thus, what we have in Liebner's performance of *One*[7], when perceived as an aesthetic object, is series of sonic events separated by long stretches of silence from which any sort of expression is excluded. Body only exists as imagined, and in imagination it is negated, catatonic, and infinitesimally dead.

This issue with body can be likewise precisely analyzed in so-called non-idiomatic free improvisation—whereby I will use the music of Boston free-improv collective The BSC as an example—which stems directly from Cage's indeterministic compositions,[50] since improvisation involves a body by definition. "An improviser can never ignore the body, because at some point, all operations must occur through the body."[51] Non-idiomatic improvisation, however, strives for radically new music that is, as name implies, free from all idioms. This involves suppression of crucial bodily tendencies in improvisation, "dissolving and rethinking natural inclinations":[52]

[49] Dufrenne, *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience*, pp. 360f.
[50] Aaron P. Tate, "Reconstructing the History and Methods of the BSC," in Rainey, *Manual*, p. 32.
[51] Ben Hall, "The BSC and Recent Approaches to Collective Improvisation," in Rainey, *Manual*, p. 84.
[52] Tate, "Reconstructing," p. 48.

> Intuitions and instincts—or what BSC members repeatedly referred to as "natural tendencies" (or in James Coleman's terminology, "body-time")—are precisely what the BSC have actively worked to undo, rethink, and redeploy.[53]

As an example, there is a natural tendency to follow up a drone played on a tape with a similar prolonged sound on a trumpet. Such reaction is, however, obvious and expectable. The point is to avoid this. Therefore, the body cannot be excluded in improvisation, but it is consciously manipulated against its own tendencies. Such "free improvisation" is in a way the unfreest kind of music-making. This conscious manipulation is most apparent in case of vocalist Liz Tonne, because she has nothing but her voice—that is, her body—to work with:

> Liz Tonne's range of vocal timbres is rooted primarily in a single technique, which she originally learned as an exercise in vocal flexibility. "I try to let [my voice] be as loose as possible, and try not to have any judgment of the sound." Essentially, the voice is allowed to relax in a way that reduces control over specific intonation but allows the singer to concentrate on the physical vibration of the body. A note is sung on whichever vowel sound is the most relaxed position for a given register. The note warbles and moves around the central note, rather than settling on a note, which would require more precise control from the singer. The intention is to feel the resonance in the abdomen constantly, while gradually adding resonances in the skull as her voice moves up the scale.[54]

Speaking in Husserlian terms, we could say that typically understood virtuosity—where we could imagine, for example, Liszt's virtuoso piano pieces—involves training of body as *Leib*. There are objective obstacles to my ability to play the piece, objective limits of my body, but in training I am trying to overcome these limits. In doing so, *Leib* conquers *Körper*. My body as dead object posing as an obstacle to performance, unable itself to perform, becomes, when properly trained, a lived body able to perform. There are, of course, some outside limits beyond which a human body as such cannot be trained, but, recognizing these limits, we could—following Canguilhem's analysis of the somatic[55]—call this kind of virtuosity a normal virtuosity.

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[53] Ibid., p. 53.

[54] Mike Bullock, *"The Kind of Music We Play": A Study of Self-Idiomatic Improvised Music and Musicians in Boston* [doctoral dissertation], Rennselaer Polytechnic Institute, 2010, p. 78; quoted in Tate, "Reconstructing," p. 72.

[55] Georges Canguilhem, *On the Normal and the Pathological*, D. Reidel, 1978, pp. 132-135.

Tonne counters this notion of virtuosity. In Husserlian terms, we would say that she tries to use her lived body as a physical object, as *Körper*. And because it is *Leib* itself that is used as *Körper*, nothing should remain from *Leib* if this operation succeeds. Similarly, nothing should remain from Liebner's slow-moving, rigid body *qua Leib* if she succeeds in performance of *One*[7]. And remaining *Körper* is only imagined, not co-present in the musical piece as an aesthetic object. Hall calls whatever "virtuosity" that is contained in this laborious approach a virtuosity of non-fixity or non-movement.[56]

The problem here is that if phenomenological aesthetics are right, a success here should cause a breakdown of aesthetic experience. Much more straightforwardly: such "music" may not be perceived as music at all. In Dufrenne's understanding, an aesthetic object is "a quasi subject".[57] Aesthetic object is defined by its depth which "must be sought in the object's power to express, through which it is the analogue (as a result of being the proxy) of a subjectivity".[58] And pursuing this analogy further:

> To possess depth means to situate oneself on a certain level where one becomes sensitive throughout one's being, where a person collects himself together and commits himself. Having such depth can best be understood in contrast with those ways of being indifferent, detached, or superficial when the subject is not really himself.[59]

Aesthetic object subjectifies itself,[60] but inexpressive aesthetic subject can desubjectify itself and thus invite indifference. This is aesthetically more catastrophic than if the music is ugly, horrifying or repulsive. As Ingarden further reminds us, being indifferent means that

> no aesthetic object [is] constituted at all. A real object which was intended by the artist as a work of art is then completely irrelevant to us aesthetically; we pass it by without any aesthetic excitement, since the original aesthetic emotion does not begin at all. If we did not have at our disposal some external information that the object in question is supposed to be a work of art, it would never occur to us to occupy ourselves with it aesthetically. We then sometimes judge such a "work of art" negatively, by criticizing it; but we do so unjustly, since it warrants no aesthetic judgment whatever but only indifference.[61]

[56] Hall, "The BSC and Recent Approaches," p. 83.
[57] Dufrenne, *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience*, p. 393.
[58] Ibid., p. 411.
[59] Ibid., p. 403.
[60] Ibid., p. 415.
[61] Ingarden, *Cognition*, p. 212.

Turning to Husserl's notion of type to describe this situation, we could say that successful non-idiomatic improvisation or successful indeterminate composition destroy the types that function as motivational foundation of an aesthetic experience, whereby aesthetic experience should then be impossible. Moreover, we see that this work of types is necessarily linked with the quasi-subjectivity of musical work; and this also means that musical work is, in a peculiar, indirect way, a quasi-*Leib*, indirectly co-present in the piece. We see that one of avant-garde methods is removal of this quasi-*Leib*, its reduction to *Körper*. And if it succeeds, there is in return no modified, neutralized quasi-*Körper* in such non-idiomatic musical work; *Körper* can be, at best, extraneously imagined.

Insofar this kind of avant-garde music realizes its ambitions, it ceases to be music. Insofar it succeeds as music—which in my opinion it does—it always does so because it fails to realize its ambitions completely, and the residua of the pursuits of these dead ends are beautiful in a kind of quixotic way. We see, however, that investigation of body and music leads us stubbornly to questions of what the music actually is. I have sketched the ways in which the avant-garde music operates through failures elsewhere.[62] Moreover, Kopf is certainly right when he concludes that "if we speak of a 'border between the musical work and a succession of uncoordinated sounds and noises', we should understand that this *border does not, by necessity, phenomenologically exist*".[63] It does not, indeed, exist by necessity. It does exist, though, as malleable, fluid border; it does exist in a contingent way in a given space and time. Avant-garde music is risky precisely because it walks on this border as a tightrope walker, and in the end it either pushes the boundaries or falls beyond the boundary it tries to push. According to its own criteria it fails either way, but pushing the boundaries allows it to regroup and try again, while falling beyond the boundary destroys it as a music. And not even existence pieces like *4'33"* can ensure by necessity that this latter risk of destruction will no longer exist.

The resulting anxiety will be apparent in writings of Pierre Schaeffer. The situation he found himself in, once he developed technologies to produce electronic music, was one of instant success of this avant-garde effort at erasure of the body. What he sought to do was to take advantage of this situation in order to produce music that is radically new, but at the same time he consciously sought to undermine this instant success; he sought to produce music recognizable as music. This involved, surprisingly, a desire to return to body, too.

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[62] Lipták, "Roman Ingarden's Problems," pp. 199ff.

[63] James M. Kopf, *Investigations Concerning Music and the Soundscape: Heidegger, Ingarden, Reik* [doctoral dissertation], The Pennsylvania State University, 2021, p. 146.

Electronic Music Without a Body

The earliest dating of electronic music may be in 1910s, when Futurist painter Luigi Ruossolo developed the noise-generating instruments called "*intonarumori*", although the importance of these noise-machines for avant-garde electronic music is a bit doubtful. Benjamin calls Futurism as such the "reactionary attempt to sever technologically constituted forms from their functional contexts and turn them into natural constants—that is, to stylize them".[64] Other examples of uses of non-musical pre-recorded or machine sounds in music followed—aside from Ruossolo's *intonarumori* there were, for example, airplane propellers used in Antheil's *Ballet mécanique* (1924) or sine-wave test recordings used in Cage's *Imaginary Landscape No. 1* (1939). However, these works contained electronic noises alongside regular acoustic instruments. There were also electronic instruments such as *theremin* and *ondes martenot*, both invented in 1928, but these were instruments to be played, so they did not erase the body.

For the proper beginnings of electronic music, we should look to works in institutions such as *Groupe de recherche de musique concrète* (GRMC), founded in 1951 at *Radiodiffusion française nationale* by Pierre Schaeffer and Pierre Henry. What Schaeffer in particular sought to do was to compose music that is completely electronic.

Schaeffer coined the term "*musique concrète*", concrete music, for his approach, since the musical piece is composed directly, without mediation, on the medium of a recording, which otherwise is only one of the devices ensuring the preservation of a musical piece.[65] This contrasts with abstract music,[66] which preserves the musical piece indirectly through the device of score, which has to be interpreted—turned into an actual musical piece.[67] However, Schaeffer considers an electronic music that is "performed" according to a score akin to abstract music, too.[68] From the other side, improvised music could also be considered an abstract

[64] Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 558. Another founder of Futurist movement, Filippo Marinetti, "was one of the founding members of the Italian Fascist Party". Richard Taruskin, *Music in the Late Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 178. Stahl adds that Italian Futurists "ended up glorifying precisely those social phenomena which must be criticized". Stahl, "Attuned to Being," p. 656.

[65] For phenomenological analysis of notion of a "preservation" of a musical piece, see Lipták, "Roman Ingarden's Problems," pp. 190-194.

[66] Schaeffer, *Treatise*, pp. 27f.

[67] Ingarden calls performance in this case a "concretization", but this is incorrect *vis-à-vis* the peculiar meaning the notion of "concretization" has in Ingarden's aesthetics in general. See Lipták, "Roman Ingarden's Problems," pp. 194-199.

[68] Schaeffer, *Treatise*, p. 143. Possibilities of scores for electronic music were outlined at the beginning of *musique concrète* in 1950s, for example, by Boulez: "Score-notations will relate to the lengths of

music, since no matter how unstructured the improvisation, it points to the would-be score at least implicitly.[69]

The distinction between "abstract" and "concrete" music, however, will not lead us far. In the first place, not only improvisation, but also *musique concrète* can be converted into the score, as shown, for example, by Wehinger's ex-post 1970 score to Ligeti's *Artikulation* (1958), [70] rendering such distinction meaningless. And as Taruskin notes, justification for distinction between "abstract" and "concrete" may have been more modest, seeking actually to differentiate between individual period practices within the field of electronic music.[71] It would be therefore useful not to follow Schaeffer's distinction between abstract and concrete, and focus on his practice of electronic music and his later theoretical reflection of this practice.

The technique that Pierre Schaeffer discovered in 1940s is similar to what would be later called sampling. He used pre-recorded sounds, and earliest experiments were done with locked grooves on vinyls, but soon Schaeffer moved to use of a magnetic tape, which allowed for much easier and thorough manipulation. In order to produce compositions, the tape was slowed down or sped up, and then cut up in order to isolate some sounds and glued together with other sounds. The various methods of cutting up and gluing together (for example, cutting the tape diagonally in 45° angle) were used in order to produce various transitions between the sounds.

Schaeffer believed such music was radically new. The novelty lies in the total absence of body in music-making—with consequences for absence of aesthetic typology which interest us here. Boulez, calling this one of the most radical developments in history of music, marvels at the crumbling of obstacles: "Everything that was a limitation becomes unlimited, everything one thought 'unmeasurable' suddenly has to be measured with absolute precision."[72] Schaeffer, however, with the same breath simultaneously mourns this absence:

recorded tape. With a few conventions defining, for each work, the material used and the tablature that corresponds to it, the notation will be as readable as that of any ordinary score." Pierre Boulez, *Stocktakings from an Apprenticeship*, Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 138. Stockhausen also scored his first electronic pieces. Cf. Taruskin, *Music*, p. 190.

[69] "It is impossible to escape the influence of the past in the improvisations of the present. For improvisation is a kind of 'composition' in the sense of 'putting together'." Benson, *Improvisation*, p. 136.

[70] The idea that Wehinger's "*Hörpartitur*" is actually a score has been criticized by Taruskin, who calls it "more a sort of parallel objet d'art". Taruskin, *Music*, p. 52. However, since music as heard phenomenon comes phenomenologically first, every score is phenomenologically secondary and serves the purpose of either analysis or of a historically contingent mean of preservation of the piece. I have tackled this issue in detail in Lipták, "Roman Ingarden's Problems," pp. 190ff. Wehinger's *Hörpartitur* can easily function as an analysis of Ligeti's piece.

[71] Taruskin, *Music*, pp. 187f.

[72] Boulez, *Stocktakings*, p. 158.

> In concrete music, glue and scissors are simply a test of patience, where the intellect alone is involved. How prone to err the intelligence is, cut off from both an interior melody and an external projection of its melody in and through the muscles of others! And how we would love to rediscover somewhere that happy muscular difficulty, the safeguard of a well-crafted performance![73]

Of course, when we speak of absence of body, this must be further qualified. Body is present here in form of trained fine motor skills, comparable to skills of a surgeon or a watchmaker. This holds even for much of the digital electronic music, as long as sound editing software is used; in electronic music that is based solely on algorithms,[74] body is excluded completely. But even if body is present, it is not present as a body of a musical performer. This means, in particular, that all the intuitions and instincts, all the natural tendencies, regardless of whether they function as conductors of expression or as obstacles to be dissolved, are excluded.

Schaeffer's *musique concrète* was soon theoretically challenged by school of *elektronische musik* developed mostly in studio in Cologne under auspices of Karlheinz Stockhausen; the difference being mostly that Stockhausen initially insisted on using purely electronically produced, sinusoidal sounds which did not exist before the technological inventions of the machines.[75] Schaeffer, on contrary, used—and continuously expanded, too—vast archive of pre-recorded sounds, which included both field recordings and recordings of musical performances. However, this distinction is not important for this investigation, since it concerns different efforts to achieve radically new sounds, without involvement of the body. Schaeffer did not use the recorded sounds as they were, but manipulated them in order to estrange them or make them unrecognizable. He called this approach

[73] Schaeffer, Pierre, *In Search of a Concrete Music*, University of California Press, 2012, p. 175. It should be added that Boulez is likewise aware of some loss, too: "The disappearance of the performer would be nothing to get worked up about, if some part of the 'miraculous' in music did not go with him." Boulez, *Stocktakings*, p. 161. Moreover, ways to involve the body have been certainly found later. As Hall writes of Stelzer: "Even when playing what could potentially be the least corporeally involved instrument—the tape deck—Howard Stelzer manages to invent new ways to involve the body. I've seen him take the performativity of consumer grade electronics to new levels, hoisting up a leg to slow down an errant deck that needed reprimand and for which an extra appendage was necessary. These were the moves of the trick D.J. but without the gimmickry." Hall, "The BSC and Recent Approaches," p. 84. This is, however, as will be explained further below, a reverse process of erasure of body from acoustic body, but similarly laborious. Schaeffer and Boulez, on other hand, capture very well the disappearance of a body in an instant at the inception of electronic music, an instant disappearance which will never cease to trouble electronic music.

[74] See e.g. Iannis Xenakis, *Formalized Music*, Pendragon Press, 1992, pp. 277ff.

[75] Schaeffer, *Treatise*, p. 496. Cf. also Boulez, *Stocktakings*, p. 152. This *elektronische musik* is what Taruskin suggests Schaeffer may have been opposing by his use of the adjective "concrete".

acousmatics,[76] by which he meant separation of the sound from its source. In case of using recorded musical performances as source material, they are thus likewise separated from the lived body of the performer.

According to Schaeffer, acousmatic approach should lead us to "reduced listening", where Schaeffer directly references Husserl's phenomenological reduction. He asks:

> Could we, by freeing ourselves from the ordinary, "throwing out the natural" as well as the cultural, find an authentic *sound object*, the offspring of the *époché*, that, if possible, would be accessible to every listener?[77]

When Schaeffer speaks of sound objects, he does not mean sound as a kind of physical object, analyzed, for example, by an oscilloscope. "The fact is that in reality the physical signal is not *sound*, if by this we understand that it is taken up by the ear. It belongs to the physics of elastic media."[78] Sound objects are thus to be understood as phenomena, as what we hear.

Schaeffer further distinguishes *sound objects* from *musical objects*. Musical objects are always sound objects, or assemblies of sound objects, but they are capable of triggering an aesthetic perception.

Schaeffer then sees his function as two-fold. One is the vocation of experimenter, whose goal is to achieve complete typology of sound objects as phenomena of perception.[79] The other is the vocation of a composer, whose goal is to find such an arrangement of sound objects that the resulting total sound object could be called, and would be perceived as, a musical work. Early in his research, in 1952, Schaeffer disclosed the situation in following way:

> Meanwhile, we are reduced to constructing new works, either by following an instinct that takes much more account of instrumental contingencies than personal aspirations, or by applying experimental structures from which, as I have said, we must expect experiments rather than works.[80]

Constructing typology of sound objects through experiments is precisely what Schaeffer intends by "doing phenomenology"; it is a phenomenology in practice, phenomenology which results not only in much richer description of sonic

[76] Schaeffer, *Treatise*, pp. 64ff.
[77] Ibid., p. 213.
[78] Ibid., p. 211.
[79] See, for example, schema of foundational typology of sound objects in Ibid., p. 351.
[80] Schaeffer, *In Search*, pp. 176f.

phenomena compared with very rough examples used by Husserl, Ingarden or Dufrenne, but moreover in formalization and categorization of such phenomena, thereby doing as much justice to Husserl's idea of phenomenology as rigorous science as is realistically possible.

But as we see, for Schaeffer this typology of sound objects is not an end in itself: "The object is made to be useful, I was saying. Useful for what? For making music. The whole question is how to go from sound to the musical."[81] With regard to music, the function of this typology is two-fold: on the one hand, one is to get better grasp of sound as phenomenon, and inquiry into sound objects shall provide the composer with more materials. On the other hand, its function is also critical: the goal is to destroy established, unreflected prejudices which not only cause the music to get stuck in repeating "natural tendencies", but which also hinders communication with other cultures. Schaeffer puts this in following terms:

> In sketching out a "generalized" music theory, going way beyond the immediate needs of present-day composers, we had two applications in mind: one concerns musics that are "different" from our own (ancient or non-Western), where it is our contention that the present way of deciphering them is poor, crude, and inaccurate as long as we apply the Western frame of reference to them; the other concerns musics yet to be invented, which clearly preoccupy musicians of our time.

And he adds that "this new way of looking at music might enable us to explore musical civilizations".[82] Stahl correctly notes that this music "hopes to re-educate our ears".[83]

However, organizing sound objects into musical objects is itself a sort of experimentation,[84] but one that is much more difficult to rigorously organize or formalize. When Schaeffer rejects serial organization—used by Stockhausen in Cologne or suggested by Boulez in GRMC[85]—as a substitute for musical composition,

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[81] Schaeffer, *Treatise*, p. 538.

[82] Both quotes in Ibid., p. 480. It may be noted that aside from being an electronic music pioneer, Schaeffer was also a co-founder of important ethnomusicological label Ocora.

[83] Stahl, "Attuned to Being," p. 654.

[84] Schaeffer honestly calls it as such, for example with regard to quasi-fugues he called *biludes*. Schaeffer, *In Search*, p. 141.

[85] Boulez, *Stocktakings*, pp. 135-138. Boulez considers serial organization to be solution to Schaeffer's worries: "To date, *musique concrete* has mainly displayed a curiosity about and appetite for sound objects, without great concern to organize them." Ibid., p. 136. In a way, Boulez solution to these sound objects may have been directed by his more generalized notion of "formants"—building blocks of musical works—which could correspond to Schaeffer's "musical objects". Cf. Ibid., p. 17. Later, Boulez—

he resorts, simply said, to experimenting with what sounds good, hoping that work with sound objects will have sufficient transformative effects on his compositional practice. "Too original" sound objects are, for example, useful for purposes of inventing a typology, but in musical composition one will strive for "golden mean between the too ordinary and the too original".[86] Elsewhere, Schaeffer will use a help of a kind of anachronistic device—a programme in music, which was the case of *Symphonie pour un homme seul* (1949-50),[87] composed in collaboration with Pierre Henry. In principle, however, as we have seen above, Schaeffer ultimately relies on "instincts", to the point that he mourns the absence of a body which would be conducive for the instincts within this newly discovered sphere of sound objects. But there is also some implicit hope that, because the instincts cannot be introduced in this kind of music through body, instincts will be refracted through all these theoretical and, especially, technological innovations, and result in music that is both aesthetically valuable and radically new.

Put this way, this almost contradictory conundrum, however, concerns only musical production. The solution, for Schaeffer, ultimately lies in a phenomenology of musical perception—which, as has been mentioned above, is a natural habitat of phenomenological analysis. Crucial here is his notion of *allure* [*l'allure*], which Schaeffer formally links to sustainment of the sound, but which can be best defined as a "life" or "behaviour" of sound itself as a phenomenon, as it gives itself to a perceiving subject. One result of Schaeffer's countless experiments—his phenomenology in practice—is that it is due to the allure that human and non-human sounds can be distinguished, and that these sounds are distinguished pursuant to a set of identifiable qualities. A longer quote shall be excused here, just to show the detail into which Schaeffer's phenomenological investigation of allure went:

> The action of the [...] hand, the finger vibrating on the fingerboard, the vibrato, reveals the sentient presence through an *allure* that can in turn be described independently of profile or mass: it will be *broad*, *dense*, *ample*, *tiny*, or again, *generous*, *brilliant*, never *irregular* or *mechanical*. [...]

who cooperated with Schaeffer, for example, on *Cinq études de bruits* (1948)—became very dismissive of Schaeffer's experimental approach, calling it, among other things, "a musical flea market, where the bric-à-brac alas conceals no hidden treasure". Ibid., 227. For Boulez, the most intriguing way forward was electro-acoustic music, where he achieved best results much later in his piece *Répons* (1981).

[86] Schaeffer, *Treatise*, p. 388.

[87] Schaeffer, *In Search*, pp. 48-58.

> This is a very common question asked by man about any object, musical or otherwise: "natural or artificial? craftsman or machine? wood or plastic?" With the musical object it is allure that gives the answer. In allure, perception focuses on everything that can reveal the presence of the differentiated, the living.
>
> What seemed only to be a second-order dynamic aspect of sound is therefore linked to a fundamental question. We immediately distinguish a very regular vibrato played by a violinist from another produced by a machine: where form is concerned, the difference between the two is not great. However minimal it is, it is immediately seized on and interpreted by a faculty of perception that seeks to know if the event, dependent on natural laws, is totally predictable, if it is the product of human will or merely of chance. We must not think for one moment that this endeavor is beyond the capacities of the ear: in the domains into which the ear is led by ancestral training in decoding clues, it is capable of grasping second- or third-order information very easily and shows extraordinary skill in deducing from the smallest fragment of sound whether its origin is human or mechanical, its character predictable or random.
>
> The allure that gives equilibrium to a tangle of small events, the *fluctuation* characteristic of a living agent, is a central class or type in all modes of sustainment. On the two sides we will put predictable mechanical *order* on the right, and the unpredictability of chance, *disorder*, on the left.[88]

The implied mean sphere between mechanical order and disorder of chance may seem, at first glance, to invoke phenomenological notions of optimum[89] or normal,[90] but these notions refer to the phenomena that are settled, to the fully formed noematic sense. Normal allure of sound produced by humans is linked to this sense of normality, but in a peculiar way as a normal resistance of the body, which is—finally—what we should understand when Schaeffer wrote in his diary about "happy muscular difficulty". This is thus unsettled normality, but it is happily unsettled, in a sense of interrogating an open but known horizon. It is thus not "unsettling"; what is unsettling is complete cutting off of horizons, which requires a complete reconfiguration on our part.

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[88] Schaeffer, *Treatise*, pp. 443f.

[89] Cf. Husserl, *Analyses*, pp. 61f.; or e.g. Husserl, Edmund, *Thing and Space. Lectures of 1907*, Springer, 1997, pp. 286f., 319-322.

[90] Cf. Husserl, *Ideas II*, p. 63ff., for links between notion of "optimum" and "normal". For detailed analysis see Steinbock, *Home and Beyond*, pp. 138-147.

It could be said that confronted with discovery of electronic music—music without body—one could follow two strategies. First strategy is the reconstruction of this normal resistance of body by mechanical means, which for Schaeffer practically means "to deceive the listener about origins"[91] of sound. Aesthetic success of such music, the transformation of sound objects into musical objects, then lies in the success of the deception. Second strategy lies in expansion of typology that triggers aesthetic perception. This strategy in electronic music aligns it partially with acoustic music disclosed above, which pursues erasure of the body from music which objectively must be produced by a body. Throughout the history, this alignment has been sometimes demonstrated quite straightforwardly, too, for example in works such as *Piano Phase* (1967) by Steve Reich, where the pianist ostentatiously mimics the tape-loop; in Kraftwerk's "*Mensch-Machine*" utopia; or in music of bands such as Elektro Guzzi or Nisennenmondai, which perform the most mechanical minimal techno live on instruments, whereby they likewise try to deceive the listener: but now to convince her that there is nothing human in such music, that the body turned completely into automata. But, in general, this expansion mostly proceeds by certain osmosis between technology and body. Schaeffer, for his part, could not choose between these strategies; or, rather, attenuated the one with the other when he felt he went too far. It is at this crossroad where we shall now leave Schaeffer.

Body in a New Key

We have seen how hard composers and performers worked within acoustic music to arrive at radically new avant-garde music, which for them involved, naturally, the erasure of body as residue of natural instincts and tendencies. This, in particular, meant erasure of *Leib* as peculiar form of normal resistance—an obstacle one needs to work with, and which is the source of musical expression. We have seen that within electronic music, through absence of body, this radically new situation appeared as a default, but that problem was felt in opposite way—rather than working within this easily conquered field, the concern was that results will not be musical at all. In acoustic music, this worry was not felt that strongly—in part because letting the body perform in concert hall even in absurd, non-musical manner, was always to be ensured as "artistic" by virtue of presence of such spectacle in some

[91] Schaeffer, *Treatise*, p. 444.

cultural institution.[92] In electronic music, the danger was felt always quite clearly, though, that such music may be dismissed as pointless machine hiss. Therefore, electronic music worked in opposite direction: reconstruction of this normal resistance, reintroduction of these natural tendencies, even if it had to proceed by means of deception.

Technology, in any case, seeps into typology inevitably. The very first of Schaeffer's noise etudes, *Étude aux chemins de fer* (1948), contains mechanical repetition just by virtue of the locked grooves used for its creation. White noise, sine waves, impossibly cut attacks or impossible density,[93] perfect glissandi, mechanical rhythms, glitches—these all further penetrate the music and, using Husserl's terminology, establish themselves intersubjectively as types able to trigger aesthetic experience. It still holds that absence of body is the only defining feature of electronic music; however, this absence no longer means absence of types. In other words, it no longer causes a collapse of aesthetic experience.[94]

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[92] Intriguing bonds between performer and audience can be formed even through completely absurd endeavors. I here recall, for example, wonderful conceptual art of Bruce Naumann; for a kind of demented dance performance, see his short film *Walking in an Exaggerated Manner Around the Perimeter of a Square* (1968). See also La Monte Young's series of "musical" pieces called *Compositions 1960*.

[93] Such impossibly cut attacks actually help to distinguish MIDI recordings of Ligeti's and Xenakis' piano works, which is the only way to perform them at proper tempi, from their human renditions. Cf. Iannis Xenakis, *Music for Keyboard Instruments — Realised by Computer*, NEOS (NEOS 10707), 2008; and György Ligeti, *György Ligeti Edition 5: Mechanical Music - Barrel Organ; Metronomes; Player Piano; 2 Player Pianos*, Sony Classical (SK 62310), 1997.

[94] The full implications of this extension of typology are, obviously, vast, and ultimately beyond the scope of the article. To use Kopf's term, this extension may announce the invasion of "xenomusic", non-human music which entirely questions the notion of music as something that is ours. However, when Kopf considers particular examples of xenomusical elements, he considers both avant-garde music—for example, Brötzmann and Bennink's site-specific free improvisation *Schwarzwaldfahrt* (1997)—and traditional, "ancient" music, namely that of Mbuti people of central Africa. Kopf, *Investigations*, pp. 136ff., 207. Many other examples can be found, of course. Local geography intervened in the traditional Slovak hay songs [*trávnice*] of peasants, where voices negotiated with the valleys they needed to traverse (and the aesthetically troubling issue is then that these hay songs sound a lot like Belorussian work songs as released on Schaeffer's label Ocora (C 560210, 2006); it is troubling, since Belarus is mostly a windy flatland and geography should thus be negotiated in different ways). The ultimate question in this regard would be whether "xenomusic" is discovered by avant-gardes, or whether it is our primordial sonic environment which we have lost throughout the history. In other words, the extension can likewise be interpreted as a kind of return that is initially painful but later develops into hedonism. Phenomenological investigation of body and music here suggests that "extension" is indeed the proper term, taking the lived body as primordial phenomenon to which lifeworld is correlative; and it would maybe allow us to interpret the earliest musicians precisely as experimenters; whereby it would be the anthropological meaning of particular experimentation that would mark the difference between early musician negotiating with her natural *milieu* and electronic

Where does this leave us as far as relationship between body, music and aesthetic experience is concerned? The starting point, in acoustic music, was that while body was not present directly in the aesthetic object, it was present there indirectly as quasi-*Leib*, where *Leib* appears as reservoir of types, as natural resistance, that grounded the aesthetic object—or that was capable of turning pure sound into music. But *Leib* is no longer the sole reservoir, machines join it. What is the effect of this extension of grounding of music beyond body?

One may tend to muse, alongside Baudrillard, about hyperfunctionality in which body and technology become a "single, large synchronous machine".[95] Phenomenological analysis, however, requires us to be more cautious with regard to such sweeping conclusions. Husserl's phenomenology offers us here a possible

musician negotiating the industrial *milieu*. That also means that—against Stahl, who claims that "music probably had its origins in mimesis, in imitation of natural sounds" (Stahl, "Attuned to Being", p. 642)—I would make case rather for "reverse mimesis", where nature is interrogated from within music, on the basis of types established within musical performance. When Stahl marks "bodily rhythms" (Ibid.) as other potential source, however, this aligns with phenomenological investigation of body and music, but these two sources of music must be distinguished. Schaeffer, for his part, also differentiates between nature and body as potential sources, and claims that latter is the probable source. See Schaeffer, *Treatise*, p. 24.

[95] Jean Baudrillard, *Simulation and Simulacra*, The University of Michigan Press, 1994, p. 118. As a side note, one may mention that Baudrillard arrives at notion of hyperfunctionality in analysis of Ballard's novel *Crash* (1973), where further curious links can be found. There is a remarkable passage in *Crash* during narrator's sexual intercourse with crippled Gabrielle, where her multiple wounds and scars—results of many car accidents—become "the templates for new genital organs, the moulds of sexual possibilities yet to be created in a hundred experimental car-crashes". James G. Ballard, *Crash*, Fourth Estate, 2014, p. 146. One is reminded here of Deleuze's and Guattari's distinction between neurosis and psychosis: "Yet it would never occur to a neurotic to grasp the skin erotically as a multiplicity of pores, little spots, little scars or black holes, or to grasp the sock erotically as a multiplicity of stitches. [...] Comparing a sock to a vagina is OK, it's done all the time, but you'd have to be insane to compare a pure aggregate of stitches to a field of vaginas. [...] Is it still a question of a comparison at all? It is, rather, a pure multiplicity that changes elements, or *becomes*. On the micrological level, the little bumps 'become' horns, and the horns, little penises. [...] [This is] art of molecular multiplicities." Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 27. "Molecular multiplicities", of course, return many times—as a crucial theme, a kind of *ritornello*—in *A Thousand Plateaus*; but most significantly for us, they also return when Deleuze and Guattari tackle Luciano Berio's electronic musical work *Visage* (1961), where pre-recorded voice of Cathy Berberian is manipulated beyond recognition: "The sounds accelerate the deterritorialization of the face, giving it a properly acoustical power, and the face reacts musically by in turn inducing a deterritorialization of the voice. This is a molecular face, produced by electronic music. The voice precedes the face, itself forms the face for an instant, and outlives it, increasing in speed—on the condition that it is unarticulated, asignifying, asubjective." Ibid., p. 546. Where hyperfunctionality implies absolute control, absolute submission, the total marriage of body and technology—not a product of *Crash*, of course, only greatly exemplified in it—similar operation may likewise disrupt these implications by promise of deterritorialization, a certain destructive, schizoid liberation.

solution by means of notion of "reactivation",[96] which does not commit us to claim the complete intertwining of body and technology, but, at the same time, it allows us to take stock of some of the intertwining throughout the history of modern music. Following this Husserl's teaching, we would say that no matter the generation and osmosis of *Typik* between and among the acoustic and electronic music, there is always an option to reactivate the natural tendencies of acoustic music and—more significantly for us—to reactivate the strangeness of electronic music as an instant avant-garde victory in a quest to erase the body in search of radically new, counterintuitive, irrational music.

But here one must always, with the same breath, recall Adorno's reproach against phenomenology of art, especially against the implicit search for source: "Art [...] is not what it was fated to have been from time immemorial but rather what it has become."[97] While Adorno's criticism is based more on a caricature of phenomenology rather than phenomenology as actually practiced, these words should caution us against a tendency to disregard historical development as phenomenologically irrelevant. The truth is that in contemporary electronic music, not only deception is sometimes total, but—much more significantly—even where it is not, the body is transformed in new ways. Against the previously mentioned examples we should add an obvious example of electronic dance music—whose one iteration is, symptomatically, called "electronic body music", better known as EBM—where we see that mechanical rhythms of locked grooves have soon moved the bodies in different ways, or that spontaneous rhythmic transition, which have come to be known as "Amen break", have been cut up and disjointed in myriad forms in jungle or breakcore loops, and these stammering machines have again moved the body in dance and have newly trained the playing of drummers. When *vis-à-vis* this empirical evidence I maintain that absence of body is still useful as defining characteristic of electronic music, and when I maintain that this absence persists as a possibility of reactivation, I mean by that that electronic music has still not lost its avant-garde roots, its experimental edge, even in its popular manifestations. That means that electronic music always offers an irrevocable option to defamiliarize the music itself—at least for a fleeting moment—that it still in an instant, by means of technological shortcut, introduces problems which in acoustic music are only laboriously fought for by avant-garde techniques. No amount of readymade solutions, accumulated over the history of electronic music and now often literally encoded in music-making software, can completely cover up the existence of the

[96] Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Northwestern University Press, 1970, pp. 361ff.

[97] Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, Continuum, 2002, pp. 351f.

unsolvable problem in the heart of electronic music; the fact is that—short of complete deception which, however, completely eschews what is peculiar in electronic music—this central problem lacks the ultimate solution, because the ultimate solution only lies in "natural tendencies" of the body. Put yet differently: this phenomenology of electronic music would lead us to conclusion that every electronic music, even the most conform one from the point of view of established contemporary genres, holds a certain subversive potential. It also confirms and grounds Stahl's statement that electronic music maintains an "experimental *élan*".[98]

I thus wonder whether Benjamin's misdirected hopes which he put in film may not yield fruit when imagined as statements on electronic music. Take these statements on film:

> Unfolding [...] of all the forms of perception, the tempos and rhythms, which lie performed in today's machines, such that all the problems of contemporary art find their definitive formulation only in [its] context. [...]
>
> Only [it] can detonate the explosive stuff [...] accumulated in that strange and perhaps formerly unknown material which is kitsch. But [...] abstraction can be dangerous. [...]
>
> [It] today articulates all problems of modern form-giving—understood as questions of its own technical existence—and does so in the most stringent, most concrete, most critical fashion.[99]

Could *it* be, rather, an electronic music? Could electronic music live a secret double life in contemporary mass culture, exist both as pacifier, mind-cleaner for tired workers—partying, for example, in industrial Detroit to sounds of nascent techno music—and as avant-garde's Trojan horse, carrying the seeds of subversion? This phenomenological account certainly points to that direction, and provides an experiential ground for Benjamin's theses. However, at the same time, such phenomenology always simultaneously describes the mechanisms of pacification. What is important is that it discloses a rupture that cannot be healed and that is always a potential source of tensions. It remains to be seen whether these tensions will be creative.

[98] Stahl, "Attuned to Being," p. 650.
[99] Benjamin, *Arcades*, pp. 394, 396, 530.

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NOTES TO A MARXIST PHENOMENOLOGY: THE BODY AND THE MACHINE IN ENGELS' *THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND*

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ABSTRACT. In his *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, Friedrich Engels outlines systematically the miseries of the workers in England in the context of industrialization. A key to his argument concerns the interface between the human body and the machine. In this article I argue that Engels provides a kind of a phenomenology of the body in his analyses of the relation of the worker to the new machines. The limited secondary literature on Marxism and phenomenology has not been attentive to the detailed attention that is given to the body of the worker in this book.

Keywords: *handwork, machines, technology, Industrial Revolution, Friedrich Engels, factory work*

In 1845 Friedrich Engels published *The Condition of the Working Class in England* at the age of 24.[1] The work has become a classic study of the social conditions created by the Industrial Revolution. It is the fruit of meticulous research that Engels did while working in his father's factory in Manchester for almost two years, from November 1842 to September 1844. The book's documentation has stood the test of time and holds up well to the scrutiny of modern research. On its pages one can sense the zeal of a young man who had recently converted to the cause of communism. This work was an important inspiration for Marx in the development of his theory of political economy.

The Condition of the Working Class in England is a powerful indictment of the effects of the Industrial Revolution that had radically transformed society over a historically short period of time. In his Preface, Engels explains to his fellow

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[1] Friedrich Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England. Nach eigner Anschauung und authentischen Quellen*, Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1845. (English translation: *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, ed. by David McLellan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.)

countrymen that it is important to study the condition of the workers in England since this was where the Industrial Revolution started and where in his time it had advanced the furthest. It is especially important to understand the dynamics at work in this context so that it will be possible to identify them when they come to Germany, which was then just beginning the process of industrialization. Only with an understanding of this process will it be possible, he claims, to avoid the most negative consequences of industrialization. Further, Engels notes critically that the German theoreticians of socialism and communism are largely uninformed about the actual conditions of the workers. For this reason, their theories risk being overly abstract and not addressing the actual problems encountered in industrial labor. Engels thus presents a detailed and colorful picture of the many ills from which the working class in England suffered.

One of the most important features of the Industrial Revolution is that handwork was replaced by machines.[2] This shift had monumental consequences for the workers and society in general. With industrialization many kinds of handwork became superfluous over time, leaving countless craftsmen in a dire situation since they could no longer earn a living by their trade. They were thus obliged to flock to the large manufacturing metropolises in hope of finding employment in the factories whose machines had replaced their labor. Since the machines required little physical strength, their introduction opened the workforce for women and children. This was a double boon for the factory owners since women and children could be paid considerably less, and the increase in the size of the available workforce drove down the wages of the male workers. Engels' study documents clearly the exploitation of the female workers and the horrors of child labor.

In works such as the *Grundrisse*, that is, the *Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy* and *Capital*, Marx draws on Engels' study in order to develop a comprehensive theory of capitalism. He too traces the movement from handwork to machine manufacture and outlines how the machines created an entirely new form of labor which was detrimental to the workers themselves on many levels. Like Engels, Marx goes into elaborate detail, tracing step-by-step the way in which the machines were created and how the workers interacted with them in the production process. It should be noted that these works by Marx all draw on Engels' *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, which brought the issue to his attention.

Some work has been done trying to connect the Marxist tradition with the later development of phenomenology. Most of this research dates from the last

[2] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, pp. 167f. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, pp. 144f.)

decades of the Soviet Union and the Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s,[3] and interest in this connection has tapered off in recent years with only a few notable exceptions, such as the recent anthology, *Marxism and Phenomenology: The Dialectical Horizons of Critique*.[4] Most of the studies that try to link the two traditions focus on social theory. Taking this research as my point of departure, I wish to argue that Engels provides a kind of a phenomenology of the body in his analyses of the relation of the worker to the machine in *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. To date the secondary literature has given little detailed attention to the body of the worker in the writings of either Engels or Marx, and no attention has been given to the phenomenological dimension of this early work by Engels.

One pioneering work on the general topic of the connection between the two traditions is the article by Husserl's student, Ludwig Landgrebe, entitled "The Problem of Teleology and Corporality in Phenomenology and Marxism."[5] In this work Landgrebe connects Husserl's account of the experience of the body as movement and motion (in Husserl's jargon, *Kinästhese*) with Marx's notion of sensuous activity.[6]

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[3] William McBride, "Marxism and Phenomenology," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, vol. 6, no. 1, 1974, pp. 13-22. Thomas Nemeth, "*Capital* and Phenomenology," *Studies in Soviet Thought*, vol. 16, nos. 3-4, 1976, pp. 239-249. Marx W. Wartofsky, "Consciousness, Praxis, and Reality: Marxism vs. Phenomenology," in *Interdisciplinary Phenomenology*, ed. by Don Ihde and Richard M. Zaner, Dordrecht: Springer, 1977 (*Selected Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy*, vol. 6), pp. 133-151. Bernhard Waldenfels, Jan M. Broekman, Ante Pažanin (eds.), *Phänomenologie und Marxismus*, vols. 1-4, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977-1979. (Partial English translation as *Phenomenology and Marxism*, trans. by J. Claude Evans Jr., London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984. Shirley R. Pike, *Marxism and Phenomenology*, London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986. A forerunner of this research was the work of the Vietnamese philosopher Trân Duc Thao, "Marxisme et phénoménologie," *La Revue internationale*, no. 2, 1946, pp. 168-174. (English translation: "Marxism and Phenomenology," trans. by Nicolas de Warren, *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, vol. 30, no. 2, 2009, pp. 327-335.)

[4] Bryan Smyth and Richard Westerman (eds.), *Marxism and Phenomenology: The Dialectical Horizons of Critique*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2020.

[5] Ludwig Landgrebe, "Das Problem der Teleologie und der Leiblichkeit in der Phänomenologie und im Marxismus," in *Phänomenologie und Marxismus*, ed. by Bernhard Waldenfels, Jan M. Broekman, Ante Pažanin, vol. 1, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977, pp. 71-104. (English translation: "The Problem of Teleology and Corporality in Phenomenology and Marxism," in *Phenomenology and Marxism*, ed. by Bernhard Waldenfels, Jan M. Broekman, Ante Pažanin, pp. 53-81.) See also Noé Expósito and Agata Bąk, "Phenomenology and Marxism according to Landgrebe: On 'The Problem of Teleology and Corporeality in Phenomenology and Marxism,'" *Analecta Hermeneutica*, vol. 12, 2021, pp. 1-14.

[6] This refers to the first and fifth of the "Theses on Feuerbach," where Marx criticizes Feuerbach of dwelling in abstract thinking and failing to grasp practical, human-sensuous activity. Karl Marx, "Thesen über Feuerbach," in *Marx-Engels-Werke*, vols. 1-46, ed. by the Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus, Berlin: Dietz, 1956-2018, vol. 3, pp. 5-7. (English translation: "Theses on Feuerbach," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. by Robert C. Tucker, New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978, pp. 143-145.)

As the title indicates, he tries to establish a necessary link between teleology and corporality both of which appear in the work of Marx and Husserl. Landgrebe singles out Husserl's late unfinished work, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* and *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology*, among others for comparative analysis with Marx's early works and *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. The article is primarily about Husserl, and the comparison with Marx is quite limited, covering only the last few pages. Landgrebe focuses primarily on Marx's conception of nature and fails to recognize the importance of the accounts of the interaction between the human body, tools, and machines that are given by Engels and Marx. The connection that he wants to establish between phenomenology and Marxism is not grounded in any close reading of the texts and remains little more than a suggestion.

The Czechoslovak philosopher Jan Patočka was inspired by Landgrebe's attempt to connect Marx with Husserl's later philosophy.[7] He saw Husserl as a possible tool to explain and correct the development of Marxism into ideology and absolutism in the Soviet Union. He believes that Marx did not sufficiently develop a theory of subjectivity, which can be found in Husserl. His criticism was that Marx unfortunately remained within the Hegelian paradigm of seeing everything in terms of a historical process.[8] Thus, Marx conceived of the idea of the nature and the experience of work as something determined by this process. If the workers were conceived as an immanent part of a historical development, then there was no transcendent aspect, which would be necessary for the development of freedom and subjectivity. Patočka thus echoes Husserl's criticism of Hegel's historicism.[9] According to Patočka, Husserl's concept of transcendence is what is needed as a corrective for Marx. As was the case with Landgrebe, there is no real attempt to explore Marx's analyses of the tool or the machine, and no real mention of Engels' contribution at

[7] For a useful overview see Ian H. Angus, *Groundwork of Phenomenological Marxism: Crisis, Body, World*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021, pp. 165-168.

[8] Jan Patočka, "Intellectuals and Opposition," in *Thinking After Europe: Jan Patočka and Politics*, ed. by Francesco Tava and Darian Meacham, London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016, pp. 15-18. See also Jan Patočka, *An Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology*, trans. by Erazim Kohák, Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 1996, pp. 165-168. Jan Patočka, *Body, Community, Language, World*, trans. by Erazim Kohák, Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 1988, pp. 71-76, pp. 85-86. Jan Patočka, *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History*, trans. by Erazim Kohák, Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 1996, p. 27, pp. 144-147. See also Francesco Tava, "The Heresy of History: Patočka's Reflections on Marx and Marxism," in *Thinking After Europe: Jan Patočka and Politics*, ed. by Francesco Tava and Darian Meacham, London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016, pp. 183-200.

[9] See Jon Stewart, "Hegel's Phenomenological Method and the Later Movement of Phenomenology," in the *Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and Phenomenology*, ed. by Cynthia D. Coe, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, pp. 457-480.

all. Instead, the connection that is made is rather general. In a sense it can be said that Patočka's goal is not to establish a relation between phenomenology and Marx but just the opposite, that is, to show how they are fundamentally at odds with one another. By contrast, I wish to explore in more detail the role of an *avant la lettre* phenomenology of the body in the thinking of Engels and Marx as a supplement to the previous research on the connection of phenomenology and Marxism.

A more important and more recent study is Ian H. Angus' *Groundwork of Phenomenological Marxism: Crisis, Body, World*.[10] In order to establish the connection between phenomenology and Marxism, this work compares bodily movement or kinaesthetic action, as understood in Husserl's phenomenology, with the idea of living labor as understood by Marx. In contrast to Landgrebe, Angus sees the importance of the role of technology in the discussion. He refers to this as Marx's "ontology of labor."[11] Angus' account is very rich and insightful. However, he devotes his analysis exclusively to the first volume of Marx's *Capital* and fails to recognize the importance of Engels' discussion of industrialization in *The Condition of the Working Class in England* as a phenomenological analysis. This will thus be my focus in the present article.

The interest in Marxism and phenomenology might in some ways seem *natural* since both Marx and Engels were in Berlin in their youth and were zealous readers of Hegel.[12] They were both familiar with Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and were influenced by his account of the lord and bondsman relation in the "Self-Consciousness" chapter. However, the relation between Hegel's conception of phenomenology and that of the later tradition of Husserl and others is by no means a straightforward matter.[13] So it does not follow that the interest in Hegel's phenomenology means that Marx and Engels can be automatically associated with

[10] Ian H. Angus, *Groundwork of Phenomenological Marxism: Crisis, Body, World*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021.

[11] Ibid., e.g., pp. 161ff., pp. 178ff.

[12] See Jon Stewart, *Hegel's Century: Alienation and Recognition in a Time of Revolution*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021, pp. 143-178, pp. 258-281.

[13] See Jon Stewart, "Hegel's Phenomenological Method and the Later Movement of Phenomenology," in the *Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and Phenomenology*, ed. by Cynthia D. Coe, pp. 457-480. Jon Stewart, "Hegel's Philosophy of Religion as a Phenomenology," vol. 75, no. 5, 2020, *Filozofia*, pp. 386-400. Alphonse De Waelhens, "Phénoménologie husserlienne et Phénoménologie hégélienne," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, tome 52, no. 34, 1954, pp. 234-249. Frank M. Kirkland, "Husserl and Hegel: A Historical and Religious Encounter," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, vol. 16, no. 1, 1985, pp. 70-87. Quentin Lauer, "Phenomenology: Hegel and Husserl," in *Beyond Epistemology: New Studies in the Philosophy of Hegel*, ed. by Frederick G. Weiss, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975, pp. 174-196. Tanja Staehler, *Hegel, Husserl and the Phenomenology of Historical Worlds*, London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019.

Husserl's phenomenology. For the purposes of this paper, when I talk about phenomenology here, I am thus using the term in the sense of Husserl and his twentieth-century followers and not that in Hegel's sense.

The interest in Marxism and phenomenology might also in some ways seem quite *unnatural*. The historical orientation of the theories of Engels and Marx, which they inherited from Hegel, would seem completely antithetical to Husserl's approach (as Patočka is keen to point out). Husserl wanted to bracket things such as the social or historical context in order to study the phenomena themselves as we experience them. By contrast, for Marx and Engels, seeing phenomena such as the industrialization of labor, alienation, exploitation, etc. in their historical context is precisely the key to understanding these things. From this perspective, it would seem that we are dealing with two incompatible methodologies and paradigms of understanding. However, I submit the descriptions of labor and the body given by Engels can be understood as phenomenological. The key question is the temporal perspective. If our focus is on the development of the modalities of labor over time, this would seem to preclude a Husserlian analysis. However, if we stick to the descriptions given by Engels of the experience of the worker abstracted from the temporal or historical process, then this can be seen as something approaching a Husserlian methodology. Of course, I do not deny both elements are present in Engels and, indeed, in this article. First, Engels contrasts the nature of labor from the time *before* the industrial revolution, which was dominated by craftsmanship, and the time *after*, when labor was organized into factory systems. This aspect corresponds to the social-historical perspective. But, second, he also gives a detailed analysis of the experience of the factory worker on its own terms, which can be abstracted from the social-historical side. This aspect would amount to something closer to a phenomenological analysis. If we focus on this side, I wish to show that an *avant la lettre* phenomenology of the body can be found in Engels and also in Marx. This is an exploratory paper in the sense that I wish to see how far this thesis can be pushed, while of course being well aware of its limitations.

In *The Condition of the Working Class in England* Engels outlines systematically the miseries of the workers in England in the different spheres. A key to his argument concerns the interface between the human body and the machine. It might seem at first glance that the shift from handwork to machine work was an unqualifiedly positive development, marking a vast improvement with regard to the amount of labor expended to make a given product, but in fact the working conditions created by the factory system meant that there was much *more* work for those fortunate enough to have a job at all. More importantly for our purposes,

it also meant that the nature of the work was transformed,[14] which thus changed the immediate phenomenological experience of work. Industrialization resulted in unhealthy and dangerous work conditions, which had an immediate effect on the body of the worker.

In the book Engels takes a systematic approach to the subject. He begins by examining the conditions of the different kinds of industrial proletariat. This is the logical place to start since the creation of manufacture and factories was the reason for all the changes. Once industrialized manufacture was established, it had a knock-on effect in many other areas as well. The rapid increase in machine-manufactured goods created an insatiable need for large quantities of raw materials that were necessary for production. Thus, the number of workers employed in coal and metal mines in turn vastly expanded to meet the increased need. This is the second topic that Engels treats. These factors in turn had an impact on agricultural production, which Engels explores next. Finally, the need for increased labor in the different spheres caused a wave of immigration from Ireland as Irish workers precipitously rushed to try to find employment in the new factories that had quickly sprung up.[15] In the following I will focus on Engels' analysis of the use of machines and factory work. This means that it will be necessary to omit an account of the other troubling spheres of labor in the nineteenth century that Engels also treats, such as mining or agriculture. I will supplement his account by analyses of the same topics from different texts from Marx, highlighting his special focus on the human body and demonstrating how he too was attentive to the phenomenological aspects of what it is to inhabit a body and to experience the changes in the body caused by working with machines. At the end of the article, I will offer some brief reflections on the relevance of Engels for future research in phenomenology.

I. The Replacement of Handwork by Machines

All forms of production require specific instruments, the most basic of which is the human hand. After the hand come simple tools, then more complex tools, and then machines of increasing complexity. In all these cases the tools and machines supplement and enhance the limited abilities of the human body. This movement

[14] Karl Marx, *Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*, Erster Band, Buch I: *Das Produktionsprocess des Kapitals*, 2nd improved edition, Hamburg: Otto Meissner, 1872 [1867], p. 483. (English translation. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1, *The Process of Capitalist Production*, trans. by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, New York: International Publishers, 1967, p. 461.)

[15] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, p. 32. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 32.)

would seem to be a natural progress that does not change anything fundamental regarding the nature of the work itself. A machine is simply a particularly complex tool or instrument. Engels, however, shows that this is a mistaken view. At the beginning of *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, he traces the origins of the Industrial Revolution and how it radically transformed the nature of labor. Machines introduced into the textile industry in the second half of the eighteenth century were irresistible since they made it possible to produce products far more quickly and efficiently, resulting in production on a vast scale theretofore unseen. For Engels, the key shift was between the immediate handwork of the preindustrial era, where master craftsmen worked directly with the raw materials with their own hands, and the use of the new machines, which worked on the materials, while the role of the worker was relegated to one of attending to the machines. According to Engels, this was the very root of industrialization that changed everything.

Machines were created by observation of the practices of the craftsmen working with their tools. The inventors tried to come up with ways to mechanize the movements of the craftsmen during their work. In *Capital* Marx explains, the "machine is only a more or less altered mechanical edition of the old handicraft tool."[16] The act of a person working with a saw is mirrored by a sawing machine, and the act of a person using a knife is mirrored by a chopping machine, etc. In this way "[t]he machine proper is therefore a mechanism that, after being set in motion, performs with its tools the same operations that were formerly done by the workman with similar tools."[17] As machines were further developed and increased in size, the mirroring of the work of the craftsman, although less recognizable, was still present:

> The operating part of the boring machine is an immense drill driven by a steam-engine….The mechanical lathe is only a cyclopean reproduction of the ordinary foot-lathe; the planing machine, an iron carpenter, that works on iron with the same tools that the human carpenter employs on wood; the instrument that, on the London wharves, cuts the veneers, is a gigantic razor; the tool of the shearing machine, which shears iron as easily as a tailor's scissors cut cloth, is a monster pair of scissors; and the steam-hammer works with an ordinary hammer head, but of such a weight that not Thor himself could wield it.[18]

[16] Marx, *Das Kapital*, Erster Band, p. 387. (*Capital*, vol. 1, p. 373.)
[17] Marx, *Das Kapital*, Erster Band, p. 387. (*Capital*, vol. 1, p. 374.)
[18] Marx, *Das Kapital*, Erster Band, p. 401. (*Capital*, vol. 1, p. 385.)

The enormous scale of these machines gave them the appearance of giants, but in the end the basic functions that they were performing were derived from the work of the craftsman and his basic tools. It is now the machine that possessed and operated the tools, while the humans were reduced to looking on.

When the tool is taken out of the hand of the craftsman and made a mechanism of a machine, the dynamic of the interface between the individual and the external object that helps him in the production is changed radically. By giving up his tools, the worker is also obliged to hand over to the machine his skill to operate the tool, thus depriving him of what was once his most important asset on the labor market.[19] All of the workers are leveled to the same low value. Now specialized skills merely amount to minding different machines. Humans become necessary parts for the smooth and continuous running of the machines. Marx explains, "Machinery… transform[s] the workman, from his very childhood, into a part of a detail-machine [*in den Theil einer Theilmaschine zu verwandeln*]."[20] Workers become readily replaceable without any interruption of the production. The individuality of the worker is lost, and the idea that workers are human being gives way to the idea that they are interchangeable parts of the overall factory system, like screws, nails, sheets of metal, etc.

The machine itself has a body that, although it looks like something very different, is modelled on the human body and its capabilities to use tools. The machine has, so to speak, arms and hands for cutting, sawing, weaving, etc. The tools, by contrast, were equipped with handles, and grips suitable for use by the human hand, and therefore it was natural to see them as extensions of the human appendages. However, with machines this was no longer necessary, and the tools could be activated mechanically with no attention to the requirements and limitations of the human hand. As will be seen below, this attempt to match the movement of the human body to create a machine later becomes inverted as the workers were forced to model their movements on the requirements of the machines. In the first instance the human body had a defining impact on the design of the machines, and then later the machines had a defining impact by changing the physical body of the worker compelled to attend it.[21]

An individual craftsman was limited in the number of tasks that he could perform at the same time. His limitation consisted in the fact that his body had only two hands and two feet. By contrast, mechanisms could be built with multiple "hands" doing several tasks simultaneously. Moreover, the human body represented

[19] Marx, *Das Kapital*, Erster Band, p. 441. (*Capital*, vol. 1, p. 420.)
[20] Marx, *Das Kapital*, Erster Band, p. 443. (*Capital*, vol. 1, p. 422.)
[21] Marx, *Das Kapital*, Erster Band, p. 444. (*Capital*, vol. 1, p. 422.)

a natural limit to the amount of time that the craftsman could work. He always needed to stop, rest, eat, drink, and sleep. By contrast, the machine, run by water or steam power, never grew tried and could continue indefinitely. The body of the machine was thus infinitely more powerful and durable than the human body could ever be. The machine could have multiple mechanisms, each performing specialized tasks simultaneously. This eliminated the previous division of labor among the craftsmen who were specialized experts for the individual jobs. The use of ever larger machines with increasing abilities to perform individual parts of the job meant that the hands of the craftsmen were no longer relevant for the production, and the owners could thus cut expenses by employing fewer workers whose jobs had been rendered superfluous. In the world of machines, the specialized skills of the old craftsmen no longer had any market value.

From the perspective of the entrepreneur, the goal was to turn the raw materials into a product that was suitable for sale. The challenge was how to do this at a cost that was as low as possible. In the preindustrial era, this process was under the control of the craftsman and his family. In industrial manufacture, this is taken out of the hands of the craftsman and given to machines and the complex system surrounding their use in the factory. Marx explains this transformation as follows in the *Grundrisse*,

> But, once adopted into the production process of capital, the means of labour passes through different metamorphoses, whose culmination is the machine, or rather, an automatic system of machinery…set in motion by an automaton, a moving power that moves itself; this automaton consisting of numerous mechanical and intellectual organs, so that the workers themselves are cast merely as its conscious linkages.[22]

It is the machines that work and actually create the product, and the job of the humans is simply to keep them running. Marx continues,

> In no way does the machine appear as the individual worker's means of labour. Its distinguishing characteristic is not in the least, as with the means of labour, to transmit the worker's activity to the object; this activity, rather, is posited in such a way that it merely transmits the machine's work, the machine's action, on to the raw material—supervises it and guards against

[22] Karl Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, in *Marx-Engels-Werke*, vol. 42, p. 592. (English translation: *Grundrisse, Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. by Martin Nicolaus, London: Penguin, 1993, p. 692.)

> interruptions. Not as with the instrument, which the worker animates and makes into his organ with his skill and strength, and whose handling therefore depends on his virtuosity.[23]

There is thus a fundamental difference between the craftsman's relation to his tools and the factory worker's relation to the machines. The machine is not a tool under the direct control of the worker. Rather, the machine is the master that dictates and determines the activity of the worker. The active agent has changed from human to machine.

The hands of the machine, so to speak, replaced the hands of the worker. Prior to the introduction of machines, the textile business was the domain of self-employed individuals and their families: "Wife and daughter spun the yarn that the father wove or that they sold, if he did not work it up himself."[24] This provided a comfortable living and a large degree of freedom since the weavers could work as much as they wanted and take time off when they pleased. They had complete control over the production process. Moreover, they usually lived in the countryside and worked at home under healthy conditions. There was no need to spend time travelling to their workplace. The development of large machines and factories, however, led to centralization and urbanization. This meant that workers streamed to the large cities in search of employment. As a result, they ended up in overcrowded workers' ghettos with very poor, unsanitary living conditions. They were obliged to live in shabby dwellings near the factories since, given the large number of workers required, there was a scarcity of available housing. The low wages of the workers also limited what they could afford to pay in rent, thus forcing many to take lodgings that were very small or dilapidated.

The beginnings of the process of industrialization can be found in the spinning machine of John Wyatt that was invented in 1735. This allowed weavers to spin without using their fingers. This efficiency of this was increased with the creation of the spinning jenny in 1764. The work of spinning was usually carried out by a single weaver with a spinning wheel that had a single spindle. The spinning jenny, by contrast, had as many as eighteen spindles, which worked on their own, with only an operator of the machine.[25] Now it was possible to produce yarn quickly and cheaply, and this more effective form of production led to a drop in prices of

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[23] Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, pp. 592f. (*Grundrisse, Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, p. 692.)

[24] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, p. 11. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 15.)

[25] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, pp. 14f. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, pp. 17f.)

textiles. Due to their low prices, textile products became increasingly popular, resulting in an increased demand. Alone, the craftsmen could not compete with the quicker and more efficient machines run by a group of operators. The capitalists reduced the number of operators by making use of waterpower as the source of energy to run the machines. Marx explains, "Another explanation of the difference between tool and machine is that in the case of a tool, man is the motive power, while the motive power of a machine is something different from man, as, for instance, an animal, water, wind, and so on."[26] This replaced the human labor which was previously required since the spinning wheel and the loom were operated by hand. But a single spinner with a single spinning wheel and a finite amount of physical strength and energy was no match for the spinning jenny run by waterpower.

Further inventions such as the spinning throstle, the power loom and the steam engine increased productivity and minimized the need for actual weavers even more. Engels explains,

> With these inventions, since improved from year to year, the victory of machine-work over handwork in the chief branches of English industry was won; and the history of the latter from that time forward simply relates how the handworkers have been driven by machinery from one position after another.[27]

As machines became larger and more sophisticated, capable of performing an increasing number of tasks, it was clear that there was no way back for the craftsmen, whose way of life had been rendered antiquated. The craftsman's perception of himself and his own body was changed from being something positive and capable to being something negative and useless. His skilled hands and personal creativity no longer possessed any value. In the world of machines, he struggled to redefine himself in a positive manner.

II. The Dehumanization of the Workers

The rise of manufacture had a polarizing effect of dividing people into the rich and the poor, while the middle class slowly disappeared.[28] With its need for a large workforce, industrial manufacture created a clearly defined working class with

[26] Marx, *Das Kapital*, Erster Band, p. 385. (*Capital*, vol. 1, p. 372.)

[27] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, pp. 17f. (*Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 21.)

[28] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, p. 35. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 34.)

its own distinct problems and interests—the proletariat.[29] By contrast, the owners of the machines and the factories made large profits and became increasingly wealthy. They thus came to form a much smaller, but no less well-defined social class. Society became split, and class antagonisms arose. The introduction of machines thereby transformed the social order, reconfiguring society as a whole.

The new class of proletariat lived an impoverished existence since the wages that they were obliged to accept were so low. There was no chance of social mobility, and the workers were condemned to an existence in the factories.[30] Since the factory owners were the ones who possessed the machines, they held all the cards. It was impossible for a factory worker ever to save up enough money from his low wages to dream of buying a machine of his own and setting up his own factory. The workers were thus trapped in a miserable cycle of perpetual poverty and uncertainty of employment that was impossible to break out of.

Engels recounts in hard numbers the vast increase in the production of different kinds of textiles that took place in Britain in the second half of the eighteenth century. This brought with it an enormous amount of capital since the products, now readily available at cheap prices, were sold in vast quantities on the large domestic and foreign markets. Correspondingly, the number of people employed in the textile industry grew exponentially during this period. This would all seem to be a development worthy of praise and admiration, a great victory for technology, but there was a heavy human price to be paid for this success.

We tend to think of humans as the creators of tools which they use as means to further specific ends. The tools are extensions of the human body and allow us to do things that the body alone would be incapable of. For the handworker this was also the case. But an inversion takes place when machines are introduced. It is in this context where the phenomenological aspect of Marx and Engels comes out most clearly. Marx explains as follows in *Capital*,

> it is not the workman that employs the instruments of labour, but the instruments of labour that employ the workman. But it is only in the factory system that this inversion for the first time acquires technical and palpable reality. By means of its conversion into an automaton, the instrument of labour confronts the labourer, during the labour process…that dominates, and pumps dry, living labour power.[31]

[29] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, p. 28. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 29.)

[30] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, pp. 28f. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, pp. 29f.)

[31] Marx, *Das Kapital*, Erster Band, pp. 445f. (*Capital*, vol. 1, p. 423.)

When a craftsman is working with a tool, he has control over it and is the *subject* who determines its use, qua *object*, in the work. The situation is reversed with the worker's relation to the machine. The machine becomes a subject, and, as Marx explains, "it is the machine which possesses skill and strength in place of the worker, [and] is itself the virtuoso, with a soul of its own in the mechanical laws acting through it."[32]

An important part of this dynamic concerns the need to establish long working hours. The machines are very costly and thus represent the central outlay and asset of the entrepreneur. They regularly become outdated and need to be replaced by new, more efficient models. Thus, from a cost-benefit perspective, it is in the capitalist's interest to get the maximum use from each machine that is purchased. Since the machines depreciate, time is the enemy. This means that there is a strong financial incentive to keep all the machines constantly running. Moreover, when stopped, they are not producing, and, in addition to the depreciation of the machines, the capitalist is losing potential revenue. The need to keep the machines running gave rise to extremely long working hours and the creation of the night shift, which allowed production to continue around the clock. Owners and managers were reluctant to stop the machines even for a short time to clean them, which meant that the workers were obliged to do so while the machines were running. This resulted in numerous accidents and injuries to the workers.

Since the imperative was to keep the machines running, it was the machines themselves and their needs, so to speak, that dictated the work. The workers had to adapt themselves to the machines. The workers were now the means that the machine needed to fulfill its end. Marx explains, "The worker's activity, reduced to a mere abstraction of activity, is determined and regulated on all sides by the movement of the machinery, and not the opposite."[33] The workers were no longer regarded as humans, but rather their bodies were seen as an extension of the machine. This is just the opposite of the earlier, more intuitive principle of handwork, where the tools were extensions of the human body. Marx explains, that while for the handworker "the movements of the instrument of labour proceed from him, here [sc. in industrial manufacture] it is the movements of the machine that he must follow… In the factory we have a lifeless mechanism independent of the workman, who becomes its mere living appendage."[34] The body of the workers is

[32] Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, p. 593. (*Grundrisse, Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, p. 693.)

[33] Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, p. 593. (*Grundrisse, Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, p. 693.)

[34] Marx, *Das Kapital*, Erster Band, p. 444. (*Capital*, vol. 1, p. 422.)

used by the machine just like another cog or lever. Humans become an accessory to the machines. Engels explains, "The industrial revolution…[made] the workers machines pure and simple, taking from them the last trace of independent activity."[35] The dehumanization of the workers is an important element in industrial production.

The factory system was complex and involved a number of different elements working together: the regular acquisition of the raw materials, the purchase of the machines, the management of the workforce, the transport of the product to the markets, etc. From the perspective of the owners all these elements needed to be attended to at all times. It was an elaborate system, and with each rubric the owners needed to assure themselves that they were keeping their expenses down as much as possible. This means that the workforce, that is, human labor was reduced to a part of the calculation. Engels writes, "the human being, the worker, is regarded in manufacture simply as a piece of capital for the use of which the manufacturer pays interest under the name of wages."[36] Human labor is thus regarded as just an expenditure, and this reduces humans to a specific price that accords with the availability of the number of workers on the labor market. This dynamic encourages the owners to disregard the workers as fellow human beings and to think of them more in terms of a monetary calculation. This naturally leads the owners to be generally indifferent to the fate of the workers or their own wishes regarding the work itself. All of this is simply wasted breath for the owners who are best served by docile and obedient workers who operate the machines for the long hours required and never make a complaint about the difficulty of the work or the low wages. In short, the best situation for the owners would be if the workers could be as much like the machines as possible. The health and safety of the workers were not regarded as an imperative but instead as a part of the overall calculation of expenditures and profits. If safety measures were too costly, then the owners were tempted to cut down on them by dropping them from the budget, regardless of the consequences for the workers.

Since the workers lost control over their work and became the slaves to the machines, they felt a sense of alienation towards the machines which confronted them as "an alien power."[37] This is a part of Marx's well-known theory of alienation.[38] The machines were not like tools, extensions of the human body that were

[35] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, p. 14. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 17.)

[36] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, pp. 33f. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 33.)

[37] Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, p. 593. (*Grundrisse, Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, p. 693.)

[38] See Stewart, *Hegel's Century: Alienation and Recognition in a Time of Revolution*, pp. 150-154.

zuhanden in Heidegger's terminology. Tools were used by the craftsman in an immediate and unreflective manner. Heidegger's frequent use of the handworker using tools to illustrate his concept of *Zuhandenheit* is well known. By contrast, the machines were rather *vorhanden*, the objects of curiosity, puzzlement, and reflective thought. The individual worker was dwarfed by the machine, and his work appeared tiny and insignificant in the big picture. As an individual he no longer had control over his work, which now appeared completely meaningless since his contribution to the final product was so small.

III. The Machine and the Human Body

It is highly stressful for the workers to keep up with the machines, which never grow weary. One dares not miss a beat, lest one fall behind in feeding or attending to the machine. Engels explains the tyranny of the machine as follows,

> Moreover, he [sc. the machine operator] must not take a moment's rest; the engine moves unceasingly; the wheels, the straps, the spindles hum and rattle in his ears without a pause, and if he tries to snatch one instant, there is the overlooker at his back ….This condemnation to be buried alive in the mill, to give constant attention to the tireless machine is felt as the keenest torture by the operatives, and its action upon mind and body is in the long run stunting in the highest degree.[39]

Engels explains in detail the extensive system of fines and penalties that the factory owners imposed on workers for a vast number of seemingly minor infractions.[40] Many of these were aimed at keeping the machines running at all times. Fines were thus exacted for workers who left the machines unattended by taking unauthorized breaks or stepping away for a moment to relieve themselves. Female workers in an advanced state of pregnancy were fined for sitting down to take a brief rest.[41]

A. The Physical Effects

Engels did extensive research to document the vast array of health problems that workers experienced as a result of the poor working conditions. What is

[39] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, p. 216. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 185.)

[40] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, pp. 218-221. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, pp. 187-189.)

[41] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, pp. 220f. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 189.)

particularly interesting for our purposes is that in the interface between machines and workers, the machines in effect *reshaped* the human body. By making constant repetitive movements over long hours, the workers developed serious health issues that literally changed the form of the natural human physiology. Engels cites multiple labor reports and testimonies from physicians about the negative physical effects of working in the factories. He describes how working with machines for long hours resulted in contortions of the skeleton, leaving large numbers of workers crippled: "This distortion usually consists of a curving of the spinal column and legs."[42] Engels recounts how his own personal experience squares with the official medical records of experts asked to report on the health risks of factory workers: "I have seldom traversed Manchester without meeting three or four of them [sc. crippled workers], suffering from precisely the same distortions of the spinal columns and legs as that described, and I have often been able to observe them closely."[43] Engels describes in detail how the factory work had changed the form of the human body:

> It is evident, at a glance, whence the distortions of these cripples come, they all look exactly alike. The knees are bent inward and backwards, the ankles deformed and thick, and the spinal column often bent forwards or to one side… Other deformities also have proceeded from this overwork, especially flattening of the foot.[44]

By adapting their movements to the needs of the machines, the worker suffered irreparable physical damage. Simple tools are made to conform to the structure and limitations of the human body. This allows the one using the tool to remain in control. When working on one's own, one can put down a tool at any time. However, machines have their own demands and make no allowance for the natural form of the human body. It is the humans who must adapt themselves to the machines. In the preindustrial system the craftsman could simply take a break or stop when he got tired; however, in the factory system the worker was forced to work long hours with only a very small number of short breaks. With no possibility of stopping, the human body was not given the chance to recover from the disabling movements, and over time they produced fixed physical distortions. For the worker, this was a new experience of the body that came with industrialized labor.

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[42] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, pp. 188f. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 162.)

[43] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, p. 190. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 163.)

[44] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, pp. 190f. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 163.)

The deformities are only one part of the many negative physical symptoms that result from working in the factories:

> In cases in which a stronger constitution, better food, and other more favourable circumstances enabled the young operative to resist this effect of a barbarous exploitation, we find, at least, pain in the back, hips, and legs, swollen joints, varicose veins, and large, persistent ulcers in the thighs and calves. These afflictions are almost universal among the operatives.[45]

Although the symptoms in these cases fall short of outward deformity, nonetheless they also evidence that the work with the machines changed human physiology. The work stunted the growth of the child workers who were most all underweight.[46] This was not just a problem with the delicate bodies of children but also with young adults, who, at the height of their physical prowess, could not escape these symptoms and the long-term consequences for their health. The cause of these ailments was the need to stay on one's feet for long hours and to match one's movements to those of the machine. With all these health problems, factory workers were rarely able to continue working after the age of 45.[47] With the workers thus forced into early retirement, their financial future after this time was highly precarious.

Working with machines likewise took a serious toll on the female workers, again causing numerous physical deformities. Engels explains,

> The influence of factory work upon the female physique also is marked and peculiar. The deformities entailed by long hours of work are much more serious among women. Protracted work frequently causes deformities of the pelvis, partly in the shape of abnormal position and development of the hip bones, partly of malformation of the lower portion of the spinal column.[48]

As a result of this, the female workers suffered from more difficult pregnancies and childbirth. They had a greater incidence of miscarriage than women who did not work in factories. Pregnant women also felt obliged to continue to go to work up

[45] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, p. 191. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 164.)

[46] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, p. 196. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 168.)

[47] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, p. 197. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, pp. 168f.)

[48] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, p. 198. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, pp. 169f.)

until the last minute before delivery since they could not afford the loss of wages or feared losing their jobs completely if they were gone for too long. Likewise, they were pressured to return to work as quickly as possible after giving birth.

Engels also recites a long list of abnormalities in the growth and development of girls who worked in the factories.[49] His account clearly demonstrates how the deformities and injuries of the girls mirror the machine's requirements:

> Another effect of flax-spinning is a peculiar deformity of the shoulder, especially a projection of the right shoulder-blade, consequent upon the nature of the work. This sort of spinning and the throstle-spinning of cotton frequently produces diseases of the kneepan, which is used to check the spindle during the joining of broken threads. The frequent stooping and the bending to the low machines common to both these branches of work have, in general, a stunting effect upon the growth of the operative.[50]

For each requirement of the machine, there arises a corresponding physical change in the young girls charged with operating it over long periods. In all these cases of men and women, the work with the machines gave them an immediate experience of their bodies that they had not previously known. The new industrial work conditions changed the phenomenology of the body.

Newton's third law of motion states that "To every action, there is opposed an equal reaction."[51] This could be seen in the changes to the body that were suffered by all the workers. The design and structure of the machine required certain specific forms of assistance from the worker, pulling levers, feeding the machine, etc. In themselves these were not particularly complex or difficult; however, when these movements were repeated at length over several hours, the body could not keep up. When the workers, despite their fatigue and bodily pain, were nonetheless forced to continue with the work by the overseers, then what began as aches in the arms or legs became permanent deformities of the body.

The most dramatic changes to the body came not over time but immediately in the form of industrial accidents that took place precisely in the interface of the machine and the human body. Engels recounts instances of workers losing fingers,

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[49] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, pp. 199f. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 171.)

[50] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, pp. 201f. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, pp. 172f.)

[51] *Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and his System of the World*, vols. 1-2, trans. by Andrew Motte, ed. by Florian Cajori, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1934, vol. 1, p. 13.

arms, legs, and feet to the machines.[52] It was not uncommon for laborers to die from being maimed in the gears. Child workers were especially vulnerable to get caught up in moving straps that carried them at high speeds, throwing them into the machines or against walls, resulting in immediate death. The incidence of these kinds of accidents was very high, which made the factory as dangerous a workplace as a mine. In cases where the worker was maimed and thus incapacitated for any further labor, the owner initially had no legal responsibility to offer them compensation, and the disabled workers were left without any means to support themselves.

B. The Mental Effects

The negative results of working with machines not only concerned the body but also the mind. Although Engels spends less time on it than on the physical problems resulting from industrial labor, he nonetheless recounts several serious mental health issues that also arose among the workers. As noted, the laborer's mental experience of work in a factory was substantially different from what it had been in preindustrial times. The handworker took pride in his product and was motivated to do his best job in making it, thus demonstrating his particular skill and expertise. The handworker's product thus reflected the personal effort of the maker, which was in itself a gratifying reward for the labor. In a word, the worker can identify with his product. By contrast, with machine work, the worker is alienated from the final product since his contribution to it is negligible.[53] Moreover, it does not belong to him as something that he can use, sell, or dispose of as he likes. The handworker was thus naturally more interested and engaged in the work than any machine attendant could be.

The nature of the work with the machines demands little mental power. It does not facilitate the development of the mind or the cultivation of new skills. Engels explains,

> The supervision of machinery, the joining of broken threads, is no activity which claims the operative's thinking powers, yet it is of a sort which prevents him from occupying his mind with other things… Thus it is, properly speaking, not work, but tedium, the most deadening, wearing process conceivable. The operative is condemned to let his physical and mental powers decay in this

[52] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, pp. 202f. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, pp. 173f.)

[53] Karl Marx, "Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844," in *Marx-Engels-Werke*, vol. 40, p. 512. (English translation: "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. by Robert C. Tucker, p. 72.)

> utter monotony, it is his mission to be bored every day and all day long from his eighth year…. There is no better means of inducing stupefaction than a period of factory work.[54]

Working with machines over long periods of time diminishes the mental capacity of the workers. It requires just enough attention that one cannot step away from it for even a moment, yet it requires no intelligence or power of thought that would make it interesting and engaging. Marx describes it as a kind of "torture, since the machine does not free the labourer from work but deprives the work of all interest."[55] The factory system treats humans like milling mules, whose lives are spent walking in a circle every day, and not being allowed a moment's break, constantly being urged on by the whip of the overseer.

Working in factories had an especially pernicious effect on children since they never developed the mental habits of learning and thinking and ended up physically incapacitated and mentally burnt out at an early age. Engels mentions attempts of the government to impose requirements on the owners that children employed in their factories receive some minimal form of education with a specific number of hours of schooling each week. But little was done to enforce this, and the owners could easily set up *pro forma* schools where the children just whiled away the time or were "taught" by wholly unqualified and even analphabetic instructors.[56] All that was necessary to meet the official requirements was a signed paper by one of the owner's lackies testifying that the child had been in school for the required number of hours each week.

Mental health was also an issue when it came to the uncertainty of the work in the factories. In contrast to the work of the independent craftsman, which could be continued for so long as he had the desire and the energy, the work of the machine operator was more precarious. Since work in the factory was not skilled labor, there was a large potential workforce for the owners to choose from. This meant that the owners could readily fire people, always knowing they would easily find replacements. Even in the best cases, the factories were known to have periodic layoffs of workers, due to the introduction of new machines which made numerous jobs redundant.[57] There was thus a great competition for even the worst of positions with the lowest pay. The tenuousness of the worker's situation understandably caused stress and

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[54] Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, p. 216. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 185.)

[55] Marx, *Das Kapital*, Erster Band, p. 444. (*Capital*, vol. 1, p. 423.)

[56] Marx, *Das Kapital*, Erster Band, p. 418. (*Capital*, vol. 1, p. 400.)

[57] Marx, *Das Kapital*, Erster Band, p. 485. (*Capital*, vol. 1, p. 462.)

anxiety about the future, which led to a general sense of demoralization. Here too it is evident that industrial labor radically changed the phenomenological experience of work.

IV. Engels' Phenomenology of the Body

It should be noted that Marx and Engels, despite their condemnation of the working conditions in the factory, were not critics of technology or the factory as such. They were neither Romantics nor Luddites who wished to return to a preindustrial era. Their goal was rather to make use of the new technological developments for the benefit of all and not just for the class of owners. They believed that if the factories could be collectively owned and run by the workers themselves, then the horrors of industrial labor could be eliminated. This would develop into more meaningful work that the workers could enjoy and identify with. In a communist society no one would be obliged to work long hours for meager pay under very dangerous work conditions.

The theories of Marx and Engels are often written off today as irrelevant. It has been claimed that the collapse of the Soviet Union has conclusively demonstrated the unviability of the social-economic model that they proposed. It has also been argued that their understanding of capitalism was based primarily on the nineteenth-century model of factory labor, which has largely disappeared. In most places the greatest evils that they describe, such as child labor and long working hours, have been eliminated due to more rigorous legislation and enforcement. The critics ask then if Marx and Engels have anything to say that pertains to the world as we know it today. This topic is, of course, far too broad to be addressed here. However, I do believe that their ideas are relevant for the ever-growing field of modern phenomenology.

We can see in Engels' *The Condition of the Working Class in England* and the subsequent works of Marx a phenomenology of the body in their analyses of the experiences of industrialized labor. Specifically, their attentiveness to the shift from the work experience of the craftsman to that of a factory worker is insightful with respect to the immediate perception and lived experience of the body. The analysis of the changing role of the hand in the work process suggests a useful supplement to the current research in the phenomenology of the body.

It might be argued that today the term "phenomenology" is attached to most everything. There are books written on the phenomenology of pregnancy, drug addiction, poverty, architecture, colonialism, etc. While some scholars might be understandably worried about a deflation of the term, there can be no doubt

that the extension of the phenomenological methodology into certain areas such as religion, education, and media studies has proven highly fruitful and insightful. This broader use of phenomenological approaches accounts in large part for the enormous expansion of the field in recent decades. The phenomenology of the body has proven to be one of the most valuable of these approaches. In this context, it is clear that Engels has something to contribute with his first-hand experience with and acute observation of factory workers and machines in his own time. This is an area that will, I believe, pay rich dividends for future research.

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FROM A KNIGHT TO A MASS WORKER: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ERNST JÜNGER'S VIEW OF THE FIGHTING INDIVIDUAL

PETER ŠAJDA *

ABSTRACT. In the article I first examine Ernst Jünger's thematically structured memoir *The Fight as Inner Experience* in which he depicts the individual soldier as a committed knightly fighter who is willing to sacrifice his life for an idea. Subsequently I analyze Jünger's treatise *Total Mobilization* in which a largely different picture of the fighting individual emerges: a conformist member of the working mass who performs unquestioningly tasks assigned to him by the collective. I explain the reasons for "the victory" of *the worker* over *the knight* and highlight important shifts in Jünger's thinking as well as its ambiguities.

Keywords: *conflict, enemy, metaphysical community, knight, worker*

Ernst Jünger is well-known for his naturalistic descriptions of the events on the fronts of World War I which he witnessed first-hand as a German soldier. His autobiographical novel *Storm of Steel* (1920)[1] represents alongside Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1928) the most prominent German literary testimony to the tragic world conflict. Jünger, who was wounded multiple times and received for his bravery the rare decoration *Pour le Mérite*, discussed his turbulent participation in the German war effort in several publications in the first half of the 1920s.[2] In the present article I examine first the thematically structured memoir

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1 Ernst Jünger, *In Stahlgewittern. Historisch-kritische Ausgabe*, ed. by Helmuth Kiesel. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2013 (English translation: *Storm of Steel*, trans. Michael Hofmann, New York: Penguin Books, 2016).

2 Rolf Peter Sieferle, *Die Konservative Revolution. Fünf biographische Skizzen*, Berlin: Landtverlag, 2019, p. 203. In this article I am building on the ideas I presented in my book *Existencia medzi konfliktom a ľudskosťou. Filozofia existencie a konzervatívna revolúcia* [*Existence between Conflict and Humanity: Philosophy of Existence and the Conservative Revolution*], Bratislava: Post Scriptum, 2021.

The Fight as Inner Experience (1922)[3] in which Jünger focuses on the individual soldier whom he depicts as a committed knightly fighter who is willing to sacrifice his life for an idea. Subsequently I analyze Jünger's treatise *Total Mobilization* (1930)[4] in which a largely different picture of the fighting individual emerges: a conformist member of the working mass who performs unquestioningly tasks assigned by the collective. I explain the reasons for "the victory" of *the worker* over *the knight* and highlight important shifts in Jünger's thinking as well as its ambiguities. In this examination crucial aspects of Jünger's philosophy of conflict come to light.

I. The Fight as a Natural Given

In *The Fight as Inner Experience* Jünger reflects on his experiences from the fronts of World War I and analyzes the phenomena of fighting, war and the enemy. Although his reflections are based on concrete events and experiences, ultimately they lead to general conclusions.[5] Issues pertaining to human nature, self-defense, self-sacrifice and community formation are discussed at length. Jünger resists the temptation of interpreting the war in a one-sided way and grasps this complex and tragic phenomenon in its deep contradictoriness. On the one hand he describes courage and heroism, on the other hand the devaluation of man in technological

[3] Ernst Jünger, „Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis," in *Betrachtungen zur Zeit* (*Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 9, *Essays I*), Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2015, pp. 11-103.

[4] Ernst Jünger, „Die Totale Mobilmachung," in *Betrachtungen zur Zeit* (*Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 9, *Essays I*), pp. 119-142 (English translation: "Total Mobilization," trans. Joel Golb and Richard Wolin, in Richard Wolin (ed.): *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998, pp. 119-139). In the article I refer to the German original. Direct quotations are taken from the English translation.

[5] In *Storm of Steel* Jünger follows a chronological line and in *The Fight as Inner Experience* a thematic one. In the latter work he presents short chapters focusing on different aspects of the war experience. For more detail on the structure and content of the work see Thomas Weitin, "Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis (1922)," in Matthias Schöning (ed.): *Ernst Jünger Handbuch. Leben – Werk – Wirkung*, Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 2014, pp. 59-63. Inspirational interpretations of the work and its context can be found in Milan Horňáček, „Der Sprachbegriff der konservativen Revolution im Frühwerk Ernst Jüngers (1920 – 1934)," in Natalia Żarska, Gerald Diesener and Wojciech Kunicki (eds.), *Ernst Jünger – eine Bilanz*, Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2010, pp. 112-129; Thomas Pekar, „Vom nationalen zum planetarischen Denken. Brüche, Wandlungen und Kontinuitäten bei Ernst Jünger," in Matthias Schöning and Ingo Stöckmann (eds.), *Ernst Jünger und die Bundesrepublik: Ästhetik – Politik – Zeitgeschichte*, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012, pp. 185-204; Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Der konservative Anarchist. Politik und Zeitkritik Ernst Jüngers*, Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach Verlag, 1962; Thomas Weitin, *Notwendige Gewalt. Die Moderne Ernst Jüngers und Heiner Müllers*, Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach Verlag, 2003.

warfare and the destruction of human life. Jünger develops his line of thought both at the level of individuality and collectivity, but it is the former that is at the center of his scrutiny. The leitmotif of his explorations is the ambiguous inner experience of the fighting individual: "The individual, who sensed in this war only negation and his own suffering, but not affirmation and a higher movement, lived through it as a slave. He had no inner experience, only an outer one."[6] While examining the individual's experience of war both as negation and affirmation, suffering and higher movement, Jünger chooses to emphasize the positive moments which were largely suppressed by anonymous technological warfare and postwar mass mentality. On the basis of these moments he develops the concept of knightliness and the notion of a metaphysical community of knightly fighters.

Jünger describes the fight both as a natural given and a higher movement of the idea. From the first perspective, the fight is a necessary component of both the animal kingdom and human society. The fighting instinct is proper to man and while we are able to regulate it, we are unable to rid ourselves of it completely: "The true source of war lies deep in our chest and all the horror that from time to time fills the world, is merely a mirror image of the human soul."[7] Despite moral and cultural formation man is still characterized by pugnaciousness that can be seen in an overt form in the animal kingdom. The fighting instinct is a natural disposition aimed at one's own survival. Its dysfunction can result in self-destruction, as evidenced by the extinction of animal species that developed for too long without natural foes. Jünger provides the example of the dodo which did not prove itself in the fight for survival after new animal species had arrived on the island of Mauritius, since it had not developed defensive strategies.[8] Under normal circumstances, human society limits the fighting instinct through conventions and norms, but it becomes prominent in situations when the power of shared values decreases. In such situations the animality, which is latently present in man, erupts and becomes evident: "In the fight…an animal rises from the bottom of the soul like a mysterious monster."[9] Jünger's references to animality, boiling blood and the activation of basic instincts highlight man's irrational stirrings, which are expansive and without rational guidance result in primitive thirst for blood and the desire to destroy. These are expressions of the will to kill.[10] Jünger maintains that the initial waves of the war swept away subtle rational distinctions and created a space for "the rebirth of barbarism,"

[6] Jünger, „Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis," p. 103 [*translations are my own unless otherwise noted*].
[7] Ibid., p. 43.
[8] Ibid., p. 42.
[9] Ibid., p. 15.
[10] Ibid., p. 16.

"intense outbursts of sensuality," and "the rediscovery of violence."[11] The war brought to the forefront elements of human nature that seemed marginal in peace times, especially its death drive.

The situation in which fighting unfolds requires the maximalization of one's strength and uncovers such levels of personality that are hidden under normal circumstances. One needs to invest his whole person in the situation, as the fight prompts him to reach the utmost limits of his capacities. The appropriation of the *will to fight* is a fundamental prerequisite for being not merely a passive participant in the events but rather their active shaper. This will is not just a precondition for the individual's self-defense and self-formation, but also constitutes the "center" of the nation which assumes responsibility for its own existence in a situation of conflict.[12] Jünger claims that the war unleashed a large amount of accumulated energy and at the time of its eruption overshadowed even the most noble values.[13]

When describing the irrational dimension of fighting Jünger pays close attention to the encounter with the enemy in which intense emotions are released. During the preparation for this encounter the fighter experiences a broad spectrum of positive and negative impulses, ranging from belonging and camaraderie to anguish and horror. The explosive mixture of emotions is aggravated by the long tense stay in the trenches. Even though the encounter with the enemy is primarily marked by the fear of death, it also includes a liberating moment: "The view of the enemy brings alongside great horror also liberation from heavy unbearable pressure."[14]

During the encounter *a primal relation* is constituted,[15] which emerges from the depth of two fighting individuals, of whom only one can prevail. This relation is characterized by dynamics that slip into oblivion in peaceful times, as they appear unnecessary. In the confrontation with the enemy deep animal layers of human personality come to the fore. The individual discovers "a terrible dream that animality dreams in him" and that connects him with prehistoric times when hordes of primitive humans fought for survival on vast steppes.[16] The blood and the animal instinct prompt the individual to cast himself upon his enemy and defeat him in a merciless struggle. A glimpse of the enemy's face mobilizes unsuspected destructive potential. Jünger speaks of the reign of "other gods,"[17] when primitive power and the desire for destruction replace the usual rules of human coexistence.

[11] Ibid., p. 35.
[12] Ibid., p. 41.
[13] Ibid., p. 98.
[14] Ibid., p. 17.
[15] Ibid., p. 16.
[16] Ibid., pp. 17-18.
[17] Ibid., p. 35.

The proximity of the enemy and the permanent awareness of the possibility of a fight narrows one's life perspective. The individual, who previously performed a broad variety of actions, is focused on a limited number of steps that ensure the continuity of the military operation. One's inner experience is also substantially narrowed, as it reflects the one-dimensional focus of the war. The enemy represents the central moment of this experience, despite the fact that immediate contact with him as a human being is relatively rare.[18] He permeates one's conscious and subconscious processes and paralyzes mental and emotional actions: "In a context when thinking and action are reduced to a single pattern, also emotions coalesce and adapt to the dreadful simplicity of the goal, which is the destruction of the adversary."[19] The enemy becomes the target of a chaotic mixture of emotions and thoughts which are directed against him without regard for his personal uniqueness.

II. The Fight as Service to an Idea in a Metaphysical Community of Knights

The fight is not merely an outburst of basic instincts and waves of irrational stirrings, but it is also a clash of opposing ideas. Jünger interprets the conflict of rational designs as a higher movement. He points in this direction already when discussing the fight as a natural given, as he speaks of *the deep reason of blood*.[20] Although he does not elaborate on this concept, it clearly expresses the connection between the rational and the irrational dimension of the fight. Jünger describes the fight as "God's judgement over two ideas"[21] and the last rational instance for the resolution of a dispute that cannot be resolved by peaceful means.

A certain tension emerges in Jünger's descriptions of *the idea*. On the one hand, he places it at the metaphysical level and attributes to it an independent dynamic, on the other hand, he presents it as a conviction of the fighting individual. Jünger explores the abstract metaphysical form of the idea when analyzing the will that drives the fighting individual in moments of intense anguish. The paralyzed individual is able to act only because "a higher will supports him."[22] Although his own will revolts against the higher will, the latter is more powerful. Jünger explains similarly the way in which the idea permeates individual soldiers. He has little illusion about the soldiers' motivations and claims that they are mostly concerned

[18] Ibid., p. 96.
[19] Ibid., p. 16.
[20] Ibid., p. 79.
[21] Ibid., p. 49.
[22] Ibid., p. 89. For more detail on Jünger's interpretation of the connection between the idea and the fight see Michael Großheim, "Kampf/Krieg," in Matthias Schöning (ed.), *Ernst Jünger Handbuch. Leben – Werk – Wirkung*, Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 2014, p. 332.

with their own needs and do not understand the essence of war. They consider war an external process, succumb to the manipulation by the mass media and interpret the course of war in a fragmentary way. Nevertheless, even the existence of such soldiers is permeated by the idea which uses them as "material for its own purposes, without them even knowing."[23] We encounter here the concept of unconscious service to the idea which operates in soldiers despite their neither understanding nor accepting it.

Jünger is, however, mostly interested in conscious service to the idea by those who understand it and have adopted the fight as an inner experience. They are willing to "sacrifice their personality for the idea"[24] and subordinate the individual good to the collective good, which is represented by the idea. Importantly, Jünger does not attribute to the idea any concrete content emphasizing solely the act of the individual's submission. He focuses on *the form*, not *the content*: "to die for one's conviction is the highest thing"[25] regardless of the conviction's content. The radicality of this view is most clearly manifested in the claim that even death for an erroneous conviction is great heroism.[26] The decisive factor is the individual's commitment to the idea and his readiness to give his utmost.

Jünger describes conscious service to the idea as *knightliness*. The soldier, who is devoted to the idea he is fighting for, uncovers gradually the essence of the fighting spirit.[27] In this process he sees ever more clearly that the fight is not merely an instinctive matter but can be "ennobled by knightliness."[28] This means consciously serving the idea and recognizing its presence in every fighting individual who is radically committed to it. This has far-reaching consequences, as the individual knight does not stand alone, rather a transfrontal metaphysical community of knights is formed. This community relativizes the external frontlines between the different fighting parties.

As we have already pointed out, the proximity of the enemy provokes a number of irrational reactions in the fighting individual. A dynamic emerges, however, that is contrary to the irrational desire to destroy the enemy. Jünger highlights the fact that while influential noncombatants – statesmen, intellectuals and journalists – spread hate against the enemy, this negative attitude is not common among soldiers.[29] The proximity of the enemy leads to a paradoxical

[23] Jünger, „Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis," p. 81.
[24] Ibid., p. 100.
[25] Ibid., p. 100.
[26] Ibid., p. 101.
[27] Ibid., p. 49.
[28] Ibid., p. 50.
[29] Ibid., p. 49.

solidarity between the fighting parties. Although in direct combat they seek to defeat each other, they refuse to *degrade* each other.[30] Especially during ceasefire, respect for the enemy is shown in various ways.[31] The shared life on the frontline and acts of courage connect the enemies while distancing them from their compatriots in the rear: "How much the man on the frontline despised the whole supply machinery in the rear. He felt closer to the fighting adversary…Every hate cry is suspicious, it is weakness. Only courage recognizes courage!"[32]

Jünger interprets the solidarity with the enemy as an expression of knightliness and a higher movement of the idea. The soldier, who fights passionately for his cause, considers the idea more important than himself.[33] His commitment is radical, and he encounters the same radicality in the enemy, with whom he thus gains common ground.[34] Even though their goals are contrary and resolute fighting is aimed at vanquishing the other, the idea unites them in a metaphysical community of knights. They respect the fighting spirit manifested in all committed individuals, including the enemy. Through the community of knightly fighters the constructive dimension of the fight is manifested. The contrariness of their purposes does not prevent them from jointly forming the course of history: "The fight is not merely destruction, it is also a male form of procreation; thus, even the one who fought for errors did not fight in vain. Today's and tomorrow's enemies are united in manifestations of the future that they create together."[35] Individuals, who perceive the fight as inner experience, collaborate on forming the future despite the fact that externally only that which divides them is apparent.

Availing ourselves of the reflections developed above we can claim that *the form* unites the enemies while *the content* divides them. They are united by courage and dedication, as well as by faith in something that transcends them. Although they fight against the content of the other party's faith, they respect the faith itself.[36] The unambiguous disposition of dedication and faith brings the knightly fighter closer to the enemy—who thinks and feels similarly—while distancing him from soldiers and civilians on his own side who do not share this disposition. The pithiest expression of Jünger's *formalism* is the slogan "It is not essential *for what* we fight, but *how* we fight."[37] This slogan reflects the dedicated individuals'

[30] Ibid., p. 62.
[31] Ibid., p. 49.
[32] Ibid., p. 54.
[33] Ibid., p. 53.
[34] Ibid., p. 51.
[35] Ibid., p. 50.
[36] Ibid., p. 50
[37] Ibid., p. 74.

intensive service to the idea and points to their metaphysical community which transcends the division into friends and enemies. This community may be manifested in a physical way—through helping the prisoners of war or paying the last respects to the fallen enemies[38]—but it persists even in moments when there is no opportunity for such manifestations. In this context Jünger highlights an important distinction between a political enemy and a private adversary: one fights against the former out of principle, not for personal reasons.[39] The metaphysical community with the enemy is thus not hampered by personal antagonism.

The most compelling images of the metaphysical connection between the knightly fighters are found in Jünger's descriptions of the soldiers' physical clash during an attack. Alongside naturalistic descriptions of the destruction of human life Jünger describes also the fighters' positive bond which does not cease to exist even in merciless life and death combat: "[W]hen we clash in a cloud of fire and smoke, we are united, we are two parts of a single force…The one who understands this, affirms both himself and the enemy and lives simultaneously in the whole and in its parts."[40] The image of enemies as two parts—or two poles—of a single force corresponds to the dynamic of content and form in Jünger's reflections. From the point of view of content, the enemies are antipoles that negate each other. From the formal point of view, they are parts of the same force, since they both consciously serve the idea and respect its presence in all knightly fighters. In the former sense they are hopelessly divided, in the latter sense they are fatefully united.

Jünger's poetics of the metaphysical bond of knightly fighters is disrupted by a fact whose significance steadily increases. Despite emphasizing the role of the individual in modern warfare Jünger admits that the unprecedented rise of military technology changes the character of the fight in a decisive way.[41] Soldiers imagined the fight and the enemy differently: instead of a direct confrontation with other human beings they were flooded with waves of deadly steel and gas. Rolf Peter Sieferle points out that in the initial phases of World War I an outdated image of war was common: "a heroic, fast and colorful campaign, similar to the Napoleonic Wars or the Franco-Prussian War, with short fierce clashes, with movement and

[38] Ibid., pp. 46-47, p. 49.

[39] Ibid., p. 87. See also Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007, pp. 28-29. Schmitt makes a similar distinction but it is of a later date. Jünger and Schmitt knew each other's works and corresponded for over a half century.

[40] Jünger, „Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis," p. 97.

[41] For more detail on Jünger's view of technology see Olaf Schröter, *„Es ist am Technischen viel Illusion". Die Technik im Werk Ernst Jüngers*, Berlin: Köster, 1993; Helmuth Kiesel, *Ernst Jünger. Die Biographie*, Munich: Pantheon Verlag, 2009; Thomas Rohkrämer, *Eine andere Moderne? Zivilisationskritik, Natur und Technik in Deutschland 1880 – 1933*, Paderborn: Schöningh, 1999, pp. 301-338.

courageous attacks."[42] Jünger describes the transformation of the image of the enemy caused by extensive use of military technology: "Sometimes we forget that we fight against people. The enemy appears as an enormous impersonal force."[43] In another passage he even claims that "the fight of the machines is so tremendous that man almost completely disappears in it."[44] The efficiency of machines facilitates an unprecedented scope of destruction.

Jünger's descriptions of the enormous extent of annihilation of human life overshadow his compelling descriptions of the knightly fighters' respect for each other. The use of machines may still be determined by humans, but technological warfare changes man himself. Jünger maintains that the individual is *the vanquished* of his age.[45] The mass, which originated in the milieu of industrial operation of military technology, has been placed on the pedestal. Knightly virtues have been replaced by the mediocrity of the mass of workers to whom the production and operation of impersonal destructive machinery was entrusted. In *The Fight as Inner Experience* Jünger still views this development as negative but in the works from the 1930s he takes a much more ambiguous stance.[46]

III. Total Mobilization: The Rise of the Working Mass

Jünger continues his reflections on the nature of the fight in *Total mobilization*[47] in which he presents new perspectives. The virtuous knightly individual is relegated to the background and the uniform collective of the working mass becomes the main protagonist. Jünger interprets World War I as a decisive historical event in which "the emergence of the great masses" became evident and it led to "the great surging forth of the masses."[48] This trend did not abate when the war came to an end, on the contrary, it was strengthened and the 1930s were marked by movements

[42] Sieferle, *Die Konservative Revolution. Fünf biographische Skizzen*, p. 190.

[43] Jünger, „Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis," p. 96.

[44] Ibid., p. 102.

[45] Ibid., pp. 54-55.

[46] See especially the works *Total Mobilization* and *The Worker*.

[47] For the different editions of *Total Mobilization* see Ulrich Bröckling, "Die totale Mobilmachung (1930)," in Matthias Schöning (ed.), *Ernst Jünger Handbuch. Leben – Werk – Wirkung*, Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 2014, p. 100. For the polemics that the work provoked see Uwe-K. Ketelsen, „'Nun werden nicht nur die historischen Strukturen gesprengt, sondern auch deren mythische und kultische Voraussetzungen.' Zu Ernst Jüngers *Die totale Mobilmachung* (1930) und *Der Arbeiter* (1932)," in Hans-Harald Müller and Harro Segeberg (eds.), *Ernst Jünger im 20. Jahrhundert*, Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1995, pp. 77-95.

[48] Jünger, „Die Totale Mobilmachung," p. 128 („Total Mobilization," p. 128).

of "the uniformly molded masses."[49] Wolfgang Kaempfer points out that "[in] *Total Mobilization* objective trends of the epoch, which prompt society to constantly prepare for war, overshadow subjective radicality and aggression."[50] Jünger's view of the dominance of the working mass is ambiguous: on the one hand, he considers it a dangerous manifestation of unfreedom and conformism, on the other hand, he does not see any alternative and thus accepts it as a given.

A key concept in Jünger's treatise is *total mobilization*, with the help of which he explains both the uniqueness of World War I, the weakening of the individual and the strengthening of the mass. This concept relates to the unprecedented mobilization of human and material resources that ultimately led to the elimination of traditional distinctions between war and peace, combatants and noncombatants. No fighting party was ready for this challenge, but those who mastered it, won the war. Even they, however, did not succeed in gaining full control over total mobilization: partly they control it, partly they are "thrown" into it.

When describing total mobilization Jünger highlights the differences between World War I and earlier conflicts. He describes the wars of the nineteenth century as limited conflicts which normally took place under the leadership of monarchs. A certain financial sum was set aside in the form of "a fixed war budget" which limited the extent of military operations.[51] Armed confrontations of regular armies on battlefields constituted the core of the war and in the end determined its outcome. General conscription implemented in Germany represented only "a *partial* measure,"[52] since it applied to a part of male population. Although armies grew in size and the emphasis was shifted from professional soldiers to conscripts, the fundamental framework of war was not altered.[53] A decisive change took place in World War I which due to technological and social progress became a world revolution.[54] Jünger views the progress as ambivalent but considers its lack the decisive cause for Germany's defeat. Uncritical belief in progress[55] became a fundamental mobilizing

[49] Jünger, "Die Totale Mobilmachung," p. 141 ("Total Mobilization," p. 138). In the late 1920s a series of crucial works were published that examined the situation of the contemporary man from a philosophical-anthropological perspective. Cf. Jaroslava Vydrová, "The Intertwining of Phenomenology and Philosophical Anthropology. From Husserl to Plessner," in Peter Šajda (ed.), *Modern and Postmodern Crises of Symbolic Structures. Essays in Philosophical Anthropology*, Leiden: Brill, 2021, pp. 41-62.

[50] Wolfgang Kaempfer, *Ernst Jünger*, Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1981, p. 1.

[51] Jünger, „Die Totale Mobilmachung," pp. 124-125 („Total Mobilization," p. 126).

[52] Jünger, „Die Totale Mobilmachung," p. 124 („Total Mobilization," p. 125).

[53] Jünger, „Die Totale Mobilmachung," p. 125.

[54] Ibid., p. 122.

[55] Jünger claims that "progress is the nineteenth century's great popular church—the only one enjoying real authority and uncritical faith." Jünger, „Die Totale Mobilmachung," p. 123 („Total Mobilization," p. 124).

impulse of the forces that formed the victorious masses of the world conflict. At the same time, the dark side of the progress became evident with its lack of rationality and humanity.[56]

In World War I new forces took part in the fighting process and conditions for total mobilization were created. The *war of knights* was replaced by the *war of workers* and the *army on the battlefield* was overshadowed by the *army of work*.[57] War became a vast work operation, in which new ways of armament, supply and transportation were implemented due to technological achievements. From the financial point of view, the conflict expanded significantly due to the accessibility of war credits. The fighting nations were transformed into enormous factories that continuously produced war material. Mass work processes were designed to achieve an advantage over the enemy in the production of key goods. Compared to the limited mobilization of military forces in Bismarck's Germany World War I brought about the mobilization of broad social strata which participated in different ways in the saturation of the needs of technological warfare. Although the fighting parties were not ready for such a colossal mobilization of working masses, the outcome of their technological-economic competition became a key factor of the final victory.

The worker-oriented character of technological war transforms the individual into a standardized participant of mass processes. Civilians safeguard supply operations and the organization of the rear area, soldiers manage the lethal machinery in the theater of war. The increasing power and range of technologies eliminates the traditional division into combatants and noncombatants, since powerful artillery, air and navy attacks strike also unarmed individuals and civilian targets.[58] The fact that the threat to human life is not limited to the fighting zone but concerns in an increasing measure the rear area prompts the fighting parties to intensify the mobilization of working masses. Partial mobilization turns into total mobilization which is to a large extent an anonymous process that is out of human control: "Total mobilization is far less consummated than it consummates itself…it expresses the secret and inexorable claim to which our life in the age of masses and machines subjects us."59

Jünger reiterates the fact that extreme mobilization of human and material resources for the sake of war did not end with the capitulation of the Central Powers. The total character of the mobilization of working masses is manifested precisely in

[56] Jünger, „Die Totale Mobilmachung," pp. 122 and 140.

[57] Ibid., pp. 126 and 128. In earlier works Jünger expressed regret at the fact that modern technology eliminated romantic features of heroic combat. Cf. Sieferle, *Die Konservative Revolution. Fünf biographische Skizzen*, p. 196.

[58] Jünger, „Die Totale Mobilmachung," p. 128.

[59] Jünger, „Die Totale Mobilmachung," p. 128 („Total Mobilization," p. 128).

the fact that it is not bound to a concrete military conflict. It takes place also in the postwar period and substantially determines "the state of peace." Armament continues and the collaboration of military and industrial structures deepens. Society adapts to permanent work processes that prepare it for war, which strengthens the mass and weakens the individual. World War I did not exhaust all the possibilities of mobilization, and therefore it is still underway despite peace declarations.[60]

A key claim in Jünger's deliberations is that the ability of mobilization turned out to be an even more decisive factor of victory than the development and production of technology. This ability was most clearly manifested in "progressive" countries that managed to efficiently appeal to masses and turn them into working collectives on the basis of a widespread belief in progress.[61] The combination of the watchwords of progress and human rights created a persuasive rhetorical basis which due to its universality prevailed over particular watchwords of the enemy. The incorporation of the themes of humanity and peace into war propaganda proved to be an efficient instrument in spreading progressive ideas.[62] Seen from a structural point of view, states based on egalitarian principles carried out a faster mobilization of working masses than monarchies with complicated structures. In the conflict between the Western *civilization* and the German *culture* the former prevailed, since it corresponded better to the demands of mobilization.[63]

Jünger identifies several interconnected factors that contributed to Germany's defeat in World War I. Above all, Germany implemented only a partial mobilization, as its elites insufficiently grasped the zeitgeist and did not manage to persistently motivate the masses of potential workers. A considerable part of German human resources focused on activities that did not contribute to the implementation of total mobilization. National elites relied on the power of *old* symbols which were modernized with *foreign* elements.[64] Slogans, such as "for Germany" were popularized but were emptied out when their interpretation was not persuasively anchored and directed.[65] References to tradition appeared untrustworthy, since the elites did not identify with them wholeheartedly. Official ideology was "simultaneously timely and untimely, resulting in nothing but a mixture of false romanticism and inadequate liberalism."[66]

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[60] Jünger, „Die Totale Mobilmachung," p. 127. Ulrich Bröckling points out that in *Total Mobilization* Jünger succeded in connecting various motifs of his political thought and integrating them in a powerful image of "war as a normal state of society." Cf. Bröckling, „Die totale Mobilmachung," p. 100.

[61] Jünger, „Die Totale Mobilmachung," pp. 129 and 130.

[62] Ibid., pp. 130, 131, 134, 136.

[63] Ibid., p. 134.

[64] Ibid., pp. 131-132, 135.

[65] Ibid., p. 135.

[66] Jünger, „Die Totale Mobilmachung," p. 133 („Total Mobilization," p. 132).

In Germany a consensus on total mobilization—which would enable military, political and cultural elites to use mass working processes for the sake of victory—was not reached.

His diagnosis of the causes of military defeat leads Jünger to the conclusion that Germany does not have at its disposal an alternative to the ideology of progress and the civilization of working masses. The ideological mixture which German elites offered to the fighting individuals and collectives proved to be inconsistent and inefficient. The disintegration of "non-civilizational" structures during and after the war signals the power of modern working masses that possess a developed technological foundation.[67]

Unprecedented successes of progressive movements suggest that in the given historical moment there is no other way of appropriating the zeitgeist. Jünger lists among progressive movements such different paradigms as Americanism, Bolshevism, Fascism, Zionism, and national liberation movements of Africa and Asia. He recommends that Germany join "progressivist optimism" with a clear awareness that the mask of humanity conceals an absolutist face.[68] The fact that the interwar period brought about a tremendous rise of working masses is indubitable, therefore it is to be accepted as the point of departure. At the same time, it is necessary to uncover the reality that hides behind the recruitment slogans about progress and humanity. Jünger maintains that the rise of working masses necessarily includes a systematic suppression of the individual: "forms of compulsion stronger than torture are at work here; they are so strong, that human beings welcome them joyfully. Behind every exit, marked with the symbols of happiness, lurk pain and death."[69] Jünger's apocalyptic vision does not contain normative reflections on how to tackle the negative effects of massification. Except for the fatalist acceptance of the zeitgeist he only calls on the individual to "[step] armed into these spaces."[70]

IV. The Weakened Individual *vis-à-vis* the Deceptions of the Mass

When comparing the works *The Fight as Inner Experience* and *Total Mobilization* we see the shift of Jünger's focus from the knightly individual to the working mass and the deepening of his resignation.

[67] Jünger, „Die Totale Mobilmachung," p. 140.

[68] Ibid., pp. 139 and 140.

[69] Jünger, "Die Totale Mobilmachung," p. 141 ("Total Mobilization," p. 138).

[70] Jünger, "Die Totale Mobilmachung," p. 141 ("Total Mobilization," p. 138). Jünger will develop his apocalyptic vision of the mass society of workers in *The Worker*. Cf. Ernst Jünger, *Der Arbeiter. Herrschaft und Gestalt*, Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1932.

In the first work, the key protagonist is the knightly fighter, whose personal disposition represents a decisive factor of the conflict's course. This individual fights for an idea that he considers more important than himself, thus bringing into the conflict rationality and creating a metaphysical connection with the similarly disposed enemy. Military conflict is characterized by a tension between irrational animal insticts and rational effects of the idea with most soldiers following the former without adopting a truly conscious attitude to the war. The committed knightly fighter, who consciously serves the idea, forms his own attitudes and regulates the natural fighting instinct. He recognizes the same disposition in the enemy, with whom he shares a metaphysical bond that can be manifested through visible gestures of respect. This formal connection exists despite fundamental differences in content between the ideas that the individuals fight for. The shared disposition brings the enemies closer to each other and distances them from "friends" who do not share it. Conscious service to the idea does not mean the end of enmity, since the conflict continues until the dispute is resolved. The metaphysical community of knightly fighters does not eliminate the fighting instinct but provides it with a rational framework. The fight represents a divine judgement over competing rational designs that are fundamentally at odds. The fact that in the end only one of them prevails does not depreciate the individual fighter's effort. The metaphysical bond persists despite the different measure of the ideas' veracity: the enemies shape the course of history together. The poetics of the individual knights' fight for the idea and the metaphysical overcoming of the division into friends and enemies is disrupted by the rise of the working mass that produces and controls the technical part of the war. The individual disappears in the enormous fight of the machines, and technology conceals the human face of the enemy. Jünger insists on the key role of the individual knight while admitting his defeat in the confrontation with the working mass and its technological basis. The idealized vision of the knights jointly building the future is swept away by an avalanche of lethal war material.

In *Total Mobilization* the personal disposition of the individual fighter does not play a substantial role anymore. As a *knight* representing fighting virtues he has no place in the industrial-technological conflict. As a *worker* he has no uniqueness and his personal disposition is standardized. If the individual is to contribute to the victory of the collective, he must fulfill the tasks assigned to him by the collective. He must become an efficient component of the mass. Although the increasing uniformity of working masses brings about the rule of conformism and unfreedom, the victory of mass societies in World War I paralyzed alternative social structures. Egalitarian progressive societies succeeded in achieving total mobilization of human and material resources while more traditional societies relied on particular

watchwords and achieved only partial mobilization. Mass movements represent an adequate expression of the zeitgeist, and their victorious campaign continues even after the war. Even though the knightly individual is the victim of this campaign Jünger does not expect a coordinated effort of such individuals that would lead to an emergence of an alternative social project. However, Jünger's resignation—which consists primarily in recognizing the dominance of the mass and in the vision of progressive standardized Germany—is not absolute. He demands that the individual unmask the manipulation to which he is exposed, as the watchwords of massification rely on dangerous illusions. Yet, Jünger does not suggest a constructive attitude that the individual should adopt after the illusions have been unmasked. The mass apocalypse becomes destiny.

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TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN: THE ONTOLOGY OF MONEY IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF DAVID HUME AND ADAM SMITH

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ABSTRACT. This paper analyses how the so-called metallist theory of money gave way to functionalism in early modernity. Theoretical metallism held that something, in order to perform the role of money, must bear some intrinsic value. Functionalism, on the contrary, endorsed a social ontology of money claiming that anything could perform that role as long as it was accepted as a means of payment. The paper argues that the early modern discovery of the so-called quantity theory of money played a key role in this transition, since this was the idea to question the inherent valueproofness of commodity money for the first time in history. According to our claim, commodity money was gradually replaced by fiat currencies after the former was no longer was regarded as more valueproof than the latter, and this theoretical struggle is clearly documented by Hume's and Smith's respective remarks on the subject.

Key words: *quantity theory of money, theoretical metallism, theoretical functionalism, Luis de Molina, John Locke, John Law, David Hume, Adam Smith*

0. Introduction

As for their political economies, David Hume and Adam Smith are mostly regarded as two sides of the same coin: they are often – although mistakenly – regarded as the originators of the so-called quantity theory of money, or the idea that the quantity of money supply is a determining factor of prices. This observation was the main reason why they both rejected the then dominant idea of mercantilism, and endorsed laissez-faire principles instead: while mercantilists claimed that countries, in order to prosper, should hoard up as much precious metal from their trading partners as possible (and hence, should strive for maximizing the export of goods to foreign countries while minimizing their flow in the opposite direction), Hume and

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Smith realized that the higher quantity of gold or silver would eventually increase prices as well, and hence, their accumulation should not be an end to be pursued by any government[1].

So far, so good. However, there seem to be considerable disagreements concerning their underlying views on the nature of money itself. While sometimes both Hume and Smith are referred to as theoretical metallists[2], there are equally good reasons to regard them as functionalists as well[3]. The idea of theoretical metallism holds that something, in order to perform the role of money, must bear some intrinsic value: this entails that commodities like salt or ebony can be used as money because of their intrinsic (use) value, but the same does not apply to stones or pebbles that are intrinsically worthless. Hume undoubtedly seems to endorse this idea in a number of occasions (which can be seen from his recurring objections against paper money for instance), while it also seems to be consistent with Smith's labour theory of value (according to which the ultimate source of value is labour, and by consequence, one is ought to get payed for his labour or goods with some equally valuable thing).

Functionalism, on the contrary, holds that anything can be considered as money as long as it can *function* as money (namely that it can fulfill the roles of a medium of exchange, of a store of value or of a unit of account etc.). Commodities like salt or ebony, in this case, can function as money as long as they are smoothly accepted as means of payment and turn out to be valueproof etc. Fuctionalists, hence, endorse a social ontology of money (meaning that the only prerequisite for something, in order to qualify as money, is to be accepted as a means of payment by a group of people), and a number of interpreters claim that both Hume and Smith can be regarded as representatives of this idea.

The aim of this paper is to show that the functionalist interpretations are mostly correct in the case of Hume and Smith, which can be seen by their – albeit reluctant – endorsement of the idea of paper money. Since paper money (often called as „counterfeit money" by Hume) bears no intrinsic value, their usage should have been rejected by both thinkers had they been in fact theoretical metallists.

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[1] Mark Thornton, „Cantillon, Hume, and the Rise of Antimercantilism", *History of Political Economy* 39/2007, 453–480.

[2] Regarding presumed Hume's metallism, see: Joseph Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis*, Allen & Unwin, Great Britain 1981. 117-126.; For Smith's metallist reading, see: Ian Simpson Ross, *The Life of Adam Smith*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, 297.

[3] Regarding Hume's presumed functionalism, see: George Caffentzis, *Civilizing Money - Hume, his Monetary Project, and the Scottish Enlightenment*. Pluto Press, London 2021, 119-150. For Smith's functionalist reading, see: Siegfrid G. Karsten, *Dialectics, Functionalism, and Structuralism, in Economic Thought*. The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 1983/42, 179-192.

However, this is not the case. In the *Wealth of Nations* Smith clearly admits that paper money can be used as currency, and – as George Caffentzis recently discovered – Hume must have come to the same conclusion as well by the time of the 1764-edition of the *Political Discourses*[4]. However, while I claim both thinkers to be functionalists, I must also call attention to their reluctancy in this field, which might be due to the dangers inherent in paper money, and most respectively, to the lessons learned from the disastrous effects of John Law's failed experiment with paper currency in France.

Our train of thought will be the following: (1) in order to highlight the importance of the quantity theory of money in Hume and Smith, we will briefly outline the major milestones in the formation of this idea. As we have already adumbrated, neither Hume nor Smith can be rightfully claimed to be the discoverer of this highly influential hypothesis (the earliest formulations of which can be found in the works of some Spanish Jesuit theologians almost two centuries before them) but still, they undoubtedly added some important contributions to it. While the main concern of the earlier Spanish scholars – along, as we shall see, with John Locke – was to preserve the value of money by keeping its quantity and metallic content more or less constant, beginning with John Law's functionalist theory, the attention of scholars began to shift towards how paper money can give a stimulus to an economy. (2) One of the important observations Hume and Smith made was that inflation was not necessarily detrimental, but it could have positive consequences as well. For this reason, as we shall see, both Hume and Smith advocated inflationary policies, the underlying principle of which was the moderate but constant increase of the money supply. And since they both acknowledged that precious metals may sometimes be scarce, they admitted that paper money could make good service to the „happiness" of any country.

1. The Origins of the Quantity theory of Money

1.1. The Salamanca School

The earliest formulations of the quantity theory of money can be found in the works of Martin Azpilcueta (1491-1586) and Luis de Molina (1535-1600)[5], who found themselves in the midst of the so-called „price revolution" (approx. 1525-

[4] George Caffentzis, *Civilizing Money - Hume, his Monetary Project, and the Scottish Enlightenment*. Pluto Press, London 2021, 207.

[5] Majorine Grice-Hutchinson, *Early Economic Thought in Spain, 1177–1740*. Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 2016, 129.

1618), during which the yearly rate of inflation could even reach the shocking highs of 1 or 1.5%[6]. Although such figures would certainly put a smile on the face of any contemporary economist, back in the day this was considered as a highly tormenting problem in the field of political economy, the causes of which were yet to be found out. It took the above-mentioned doctors of the Salamanca School to discover that the influx of Peruvian silver was – at least partly – to blame for the rise in prices, since the latter were determined by the quantity of circulating money[7].

In his *Handbook of Confessors and Penitents* (*Manual de Confessores y Penitentes*, 1549), Azpilcueta claimed that „the lack of money reduces the price of everything" in cases when the volume of goods increases and that of money does not. He tried to unfold this idea by the metaphor of a small man appearing even smaller when placed next to someone very tall, and by this he probably meant that the value of something (the small man) will seem to be even smaller if there is a high quantity of it (the tall person). Stuttering as it is, this analogy can be considered as the first ever definition of deflation, since Azpilicueta rightly observed that the above-mentioned sensual deception could reduce the market price of certain goods. Moreover, one can easily infer from this definition that the opposite (namely: inflation) will occur if (a.) there is an abundance in money, or (b.) there is a shortage in goods.

But even more fortunately, in his *On Justice and Law* (*De Justitia et Jure*, written between 1593 and 1609), Luis de Molina gave much more eloquent formulations of the above-mentioned concepts.

It should be noted […] that the concourse of customers and the shortage of goods increases in the price of a certain good [*concursus emptorum et penuria mercium auget pretium rei*]; while, on the contrary the lack of customers and the abundance of goods decreases it [*paucitas contra emptorum et copia mercium minuit pretium*][8].

Although the terms, deflation and inflation do not yet turn up in this work (the first instances of their usage in the economic sense only took place in the 19th century), Molina already gave definitions to them subtle enough even compared to the standards of some modern handbooks[9].

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[6] Douglas Fisher, *The Price Revolution: A Monetary Interpretation*, The Journal of Economic History 1989/49 Cambridge University Press, 883-902.

[7] So much that In his The Fable of the Bees, Bernard de Mandeville sarcastically said that for Spain and Portugal money is the commodity produced: „Spain and Portugal, that are yearly supplied with new Gold and Silver from their Mines, may forever buy for ready Money as long as their yearly increase of Gold or Silver continues, but then Money is their Growth and the Commodity of the Country" Bernard de Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 2010, 108.

[8] Luis de Molina, *De Justitia et Jure – De Contractibus,* Balthasar Lippius, 1602, 238

[9] However, the term concourse or concurrence (*concursus*) deserves some attention here, since it was an essential concept of early modern theories of causation: during the so-called *De Auxiliis* debate, which took place between compatibilist and libertarian theologians (and on which occasion

1.2. Debates in Britain about the Desirable Quantity of Money: John Locke and John Law

It was, hence, due to the discoveries of 16th-century Spanish thinkers that the inflationary and deflationary effects of money supply were common currency already by the time of John Locke took the ungrateful task of monetary reform in England. Locke dedicated two major treatises specifically to these questions: his *Some Considerations of the Consequences of Lowering the Interest and Raising the Value of Money* (1691) and his *Further Considerations Concerning Raising the Value of Money* (1695). These writings bear witness to Locke's debate with secretary of

Molina published his metaphysical magnum opus, the *Concordia* in 1588), the disputing parties agreed that each and every effect came to pass as a result of the concurrence of different causes (*concursus causarum*). For instance, in order to light a fire, one needed the *concurrence* of air, some flammable material and an agent willing to ignite a match etc. Among the debating parties it was consensually accepted that in the case of such physical events, the effect will necessarily come to pass, if all the aforementioned prerequisites are given (*omnibus requisitis positis*)[9].

The only question unsettled was whether the same applied to free causes (namely: humans) as well or not: the compatibilists (mostly made up from Dominican theologians) held that if every necessary prerequisite of an action is given, even free agents cannot do otherwise, that to carry out this action. If, for instance, all the necessary prerequisites of a sinful deed (the to-be victim is present, and the agent has malicious intentions etc.) are given, that deed will be mournfully but necessarily carried out. On the contrary, the libertarians (including Molina himself) claimed that even in such situations, humans, as free agents still had the capacity to withhold their concourse and thereby refrain from such actions. Althoug the agent will be tempted or disposed to sin, but he will not necessarily obey this temptation.

But to what extent does the seemingly distant field of metaphysics can highlight Molina's dismal science of political economy? First, since, for Molina the term concourse means the voluntary participation of some agent in some action, from which he could always refrain. This is the reason why the phrasing „*the concourse of customers* (*concursus emptorum*)" has to be taken at face value, since it suggests that prices rise and fall due to the voluntary assistance of market agents[9]. Second, Hume also uses the same terminology when speaking about the mutual benefits of economic competition: somewhere at the beginning of his Essay, *Of Money*, he claimed that

„there seem[ed] to be a happy *concurrence of causes* in human affairs, which check the growth of trade and riches, and hinder them from being confined entirely to one people"[9].

What Hume has in mind here is the self-regulating mechanism of free markets: if country A gains competitive advantage over country B, wages in country B will decrease, whereby the competitive equality is restored between them. Hence, for Hume – the same way as for Molina – the „concurrence of causes" means the sum of all market activities, all carried out voluntarily. But for hume, this „concurrence of causes" is also a „happy" one, and as a result, each participant ends up in mutually beneficial states. The latter corollary reveals that Hume's presuppositions were radically novel to his Spanish precursors (the Spanish Jesuits never spoke with such optimism about the self-regulatory capacities of markets), but still, the fact that they employed the same phrasing can highlight the common conceptual framework they both employed in order to describe economic phenomena.

treasury, William Lowndes on how the problem of clipped or debased coins should be solved. As it is well-known, clipping (or cutting off a coins circumference in order to extract some of its metallic content) had been common practice among financial fraudsters for a long time, but by the end of the 17th century the volume of this swindle began to endanger the entire monetary system of England. The main problem was that, while the face value of coins was supposed to reflect the quantity of silver inherent in them, as the result of widespread clipping the two values moved further and further away from each other. Moreover, as this fact became common knowledge among market participants, trust in the value of money started to decrease, while prices took the opposite direction[10].

While Lowndes intended to keep the clipped coins with their original face value (as a result of which the face values would have no longer represented the real metallic content of the coins), Locke insisted on reminting them, and restoring their original content of silver, which was presumably due to his fear that, once trust in the coins' value becomes feeble, inflation would necessarily follow.

This is the view, which was severely criticized by John Law, who, in his *Money and Trade Considered* (1705) was the first to expressly hold that value had nothing to do with the metallic content of coins.

Mr. Locke and others who have wrote on this subject, say, the general consent of men placed an imaginary value upon silver, because of its qualities fitting it for money[11].

According to Law, it is highly implausible that objects endowed merely with an „imaginary value" could remain in circulation and keep being accepted as means of payment for such a long time in history and by such a huge variety of peoples. Why would, for instance, agent A accept P payment if he cannot be sure that B will later accept P from him at the same value? As opposed to this idea, Law proposed that the value of silver coins was not imaginary, but silver as raw material had to be differentiated from silver as money: while silver as a raw material bears a certain amount of intrinsic value, silver as money also bears an „additional value" simply because of the fact that it can function as money due to its ability by which it can facilitate exchange. Thereby, according to Law, no matter how little intrinsic value some coins contain, their additional value will still make them desirable for people, and as a result, they will remain trustworthy in their eyes.

[10] George Caffentzis, *Clipped Coins*, Automedia, New York, 1989, 57-82.

[11] John Law, *Money and Trade Considered,* R. and A. Foulis, Glasgow, 1750. 14.

2. Hume and Smith: Between Metallism and Functionalism?

Although Law's critique on Locke seems to be convincing for several reasons[12], when put into practice, his theory proved to be disastrous. The Banque Générale of France, established by him in the command of Philippe, the Duke of Orléans, started issuing paper money by which Law intended to cover the public debt amassed during the previous wars waged by the country. What Law had in mind was similar to what is called today as *quantitative easing*, whereby central banks buy government bonds in order to cover the latter's expenses. But, contrary to Law's expectations, trust in paper money evaporated soon, and hyperinflation followed resulting in one of the most severe economic crises of the 18th century[13]. Hence, for an impartial spectator of contemporary monetary policies, Locke's old-fashioned but sober approaches must have seemed more desirable to Law's hazardous innovations. Still, Law's posthumous critiques on Locke are invaluable because they represent the first instance of the metallist-functionalist debate.

2.1. Hume, the functionalist?

At first sight, Hume and Smith really seem to endorse theoretical metallism. In Hume's case, one major symptom of this is his often-recurring criticism of paper money. Caffentzis enumerated four main reasons why Hume presumably opposed this idea: according to him, Hume (1) feared that paper money would drive precious metals out from circulation (which is simply the application of Gresham's law, holding that „bad money drives out good money)". Second, (2) he worried that paper money would facilitate credit so much that it would become dangerous. Third, (3) he held that paper money would never be accepted as a means of payment by foreigners, and hence, it would be useless in international trade. And most importantly, (4) he was afraid that paper money would cause inflation[14].

[12] By applying to the „general consent of men", Locke clearly contradicted to what he had claimed in the first book of his *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, namely that such common consent never existed, and this, for him, proved that innate ideas did not exist either. The denial of general consent was, hence, a crucial point of Locke's empiricism, and revoking it – something he seems to be doing in the *Some Considerations* – would have had a devastating effect on his system.

[13] John Micklethwait, Adrian Wooldridge, *The Company – A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea,* The Modern Library, New York, 2003, 28-32

[14] George Caffentzis, *Civilizing Money - Hume, his Monetary Project, and the Scottish Enlightenment*. Pluto Press, London 2021, 203.

Caffentzis establishes each of these claims on quotations taken from different writings by Hume, and he certainly has a point regarding the first three questions. Moreover, it is certainly true that Hume was reluctant to come to terms with the idea of inflation, but, solely from this fact, one should not infer that he rejected it altogether. While on the one hand, Hume – in his essay *Of Money* – claimed that by increasing the money supply, the economy will suffer disadvantages due to the rise in prices, but he also observed the quasi-miraculous phenomenon, that people tend to spend more money even if prices are up, and by propping up aggregate consumption, they make the economy prosper:

[…] we find that in every kingdom, into which money begins to flow in greater abundance than formerly, everything takes a new face; labour and industry gain life; the merchant becomes more enterprising [...]. *This is not easily to be accounted for*, if we consider only the influence, which a greater abundance of coin has in the kingdom itself, by heightening the price of commodities, and obliging everyone to pay a greater number of these little yellow or white pieces for everything he purchases (Hume 1752).

Although „not easily to be accounted for", but the previous observation even led Hume to the conclusion that

[t]he good policy of the magistrate consists only in keeping [the quantity of money], if possible, still increasing; because, by that means, he keeps alive a spirit of industry in the nation, and increases the stock of labour, in which consists all real power and riches. A nation, whose money decreases, is actually, at that time, much weaker and more miserable, than another nation, who possesses no more money, but is on the increasing hand (Hume 1752)

But what makes, for Hume, the highly counter-intuitive fact that increased prices can make an economy prosper reasonable? The answer is to be found in a later part of the same essay, where Hume speaks about the necessary prerequisites of *trade*. Here, similarly to Smith, he enumerates division of labour, which makes it necessary for people to exchange their goods with each other (since, being specialized in certain crafts, they will certainly have a surplus from certain goods, and lack of some others), and also mentions money, which makes is possible for them to trade.

[…] men, content with the productions of their own fields, or with those rude improvements that they themselves can work upon them, have little occasion for exchange, at least for money, which, by agreement, is the common measure of exchange […]. But after men begin to refine on all these enjoyments, and live not always at home, nor are content with what can be raised in their neighborhood, there is more exchange and commerce of all kinds, and more money enters into that exchange[15].

[15] David Hume, *Political Discourses*, R. Fleming, Edinburgh 1752, 47.

If taken at face value, the phrasing „more money enters into that exchange" seems to be puzzling, since it suggests that money is only an accidental property during the process of exchange. And naturally, Hume held that money was invented after exchange of goods became customary, and only because barter was so inconvenient for them: money is something that „men have agreed upon to facilitate the exchange of one commodity for another" (Hume 1752) – as he says in the beginning of the same essay. Chronologically, hence, exchange came first and money second. But it is important to note that ontologically the two are equally indispensable, since trade, as we know it, would cease to exist without either of them[16]. Hence, what Hume formulates here in a descriptive manner, is rather a normative assumption that could be reformulated as follows: *if* there is more exchange and commerce of all kinds, then more money *should* enter into that exchange.

What we intended to show in this section so far is that Hume, although reluctantly, kept an eye on Law's observations, and, unwillingly, but he admitted to the usefulness of inflationary policies. But how much was Hume a functionalist? As we have already mentioned, Caffentzis observed that Hume added a corollary to the 1762-edition of the *Political Discourses*. And here, in the essay *Of Balance of Trade* we already find a full-scale endorsement not only of inflationary policies, but also of the employment of paper money.

It must, however, be confessed, that, as all these questions of trade and money are extremely complicated, there are certain lights, in which this subject may be placed, so as to represent the advantages of paper-credit and banks to be superior to their disadvantages. That they banish specie and bullion from a state is undoubtedly true; and whoever looks no farther than this circumstance does well to condemn them; but specie and bullion are not of so great consequence as not to admit of compensation, and even an overbalance from the increase of industry and of credit, which may be promoted by a *right* use of paper money[17].

[16] The same idea turns up in Law's treatise as well: There are, however, traces of Law's theory which nevertheless found their way to the thinking of Hume and Smith as well. One of the main reasons behind Law's policies of quantitative easing was the underlying assumption that money has a civilizing effect. „As money increased, the disadvantages and inconveniences of barter were removed; the poor and idle were employed, more of the land was laboured, the product increased, manufactures and trade improved, the landed-men lived better, and the people with less dependence on them". Or as he continued, „Domestic trade depends on the money. A greater quantity employs more people than a lesser quantity. A limited sum can only set a number of people to work proportioned to it, and 'tis with little success laws are made, for employing the poor or idle in countries where money is scarce […]". John Law, Money and Trade Considered. Glasgow, R. and A. Foulis, 1750. 19, 20.

[17] David Hume, *Political Discourses*, R. Fleming, Edinburgh 1752, 50.

What Hume recommends here is, hence, the moderate use of paper money. Although this functionalist stance does not necessarily follow from his claims on behalf inflation, but they are not contradictory to them either. However, this clearly shows that Hume's metallist interpretations are highly questionable.

2.2. Smith, the functionalist?

Although Smith seems to be much more straightforward in his endorsement of theoretical metallism, a similar ambiguity – to say the least – can be observed in his works as well. On the one hand, Smith famously held that the ultimate source of value was labour:

[i]t was not by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased […]. [And the value of money], to those who possess it, and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable them to purchase or command[18].

While Hume did not (explicitly) endorse such a labour theory of value, for Smith it was undoubtedly a decisive idea. The hardship it rises – from our point of view – can be formulated as follows: if labour creates value, and value is payed for with money, money has to be valuable in order that the exchange remains just.

Theoretical metallism, at first sight, might easily be able to solve this hardship: if money is something that is intrinsically valuable due to its metallic content, the vendor will be fairly compensated by it for the labour he performed. However, the problem is that according to Smith's own price theory, such fortunate outcomes only seldom occur in practice, and for this reason, in Chapter 7 of the *Wealth of Nations*, he drew a distinction between *natural price* and *actual price*. He defines the former as [w]hen the price of any commodity is neither more nor less than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the land, the wages of the labour, and the profits of the stock[19].

As opposed to this, he defines the latter as a price „at which any commodity is commonly sold"[20]. It is clearly visible, that in the hypothetical example of the vendor getting compensated for his labour by the metallic content of some coin, he

[18] Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Random House, New York 1994, 22.

[19] Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Random House, New York 1994, 83

[20] Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Random House, New York 1994, 84.

receives a natural instead of a market price for his services. But Smith also admitted, that in practice, this is seldom the case, and in fact people mostly buy and sell either cheaper of dearer than what the idea of natural price would entail.

What determines the above-mentioned phenomenon is – according to Smith – the money supply, since, in agreement with Hume, he held that the quantity of money in circulation is the decisive factor of real prices.

[T]he exchangeable value of every commodity is more frequently estimated by the quantity of money, than by the quantity either of labour or of any other commodity which can be had in exchange for it[21].

If, by consequence, money is abundant, then prices will rise and vendors will get payed more than the natural price. On the contrary, if there is a scarcity of money, market agents will likely receive less compensation for their labour.

All this means that the main argument against paper money applies to commodity money as well, since they are both unable to serve as a reliable measure of value of labour due to the continuous change of their quantity and to the resulting volatility of their value. To put it another way: Smith clearly understood that the quantity theory of money applied to both kinds of currencies, and this might be the underlying reason why commodity money no more seemed to him any more desirable than paper money. In fact, by chapter 2 of book 2 of the Wealth of Nations, Smith clearly endorses the idea of paper money on the grounds that the „additional value" of paper money, generated by the demand for this currency will eventually preserve its worth. Here, he brings up the example of some American colonies which successfully employed this kind of currency during the payment of taxes, claiming that, when the quantity of such money is properly adjusted to the quantity to be payed, this additional value will secure the overall worth of such banknotes.

This additional value was greater or less, according as the quantity of paper issued was more or less above what could be employed in the payment of the taxes of the particular colony that issued it[22].

3. Summary

As it can be seen, Smith not only borrows the term, „additional value" from Law, but endorses his overall idea of paper currency as well. As we have also seen, Hume, although reluctantly and on different grounds, did the same with fiat money. From all this, we can infer that, in the 18th century, the traditional metallist approach

[21] Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Random House, New York 1994, 53.

[22] Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Random House, New York 1994, 435.

to the ontology of money slowly gave way to an entirely new, functionalist attitude, which held that as long as something was accepted as a means of payment by a group of people, it could fulfill the role of money.

The aim of this paper was to show the slow transition from one approach to the other. According to our claim, the early modern discovery of the quantity theory of money played a key role in this process on the grounds that it made the inherent valueproofness of commodity money questionable for the first time in history. As we have seen, the theoretical endorsement of commodity money was gradually replaced by fiat currencies after the former was no longer regarded as more valueproof than the latter, and this process is documented by David Hume's and Adam Smith's respective remarks on the subject.

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L'AMOUR ENTÉNÈBRE

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ABSTRACT. The Darkness of Love. This text defends the idea of the philosophical evil as opposed to purely psychological and/or sociological evil. Philosophical evil is an evil that forces action and reflection in all matters. Love, in the contemporary world, is a victim of this evil and it has been plunged into darkness by mediatizing approaches that drive us to despair. The objective here is to give substance to the concept of love by enlightening it again and taking it out of the vision that is either too relativist or too absolutist in which it has been confined.

Keywords: *love; evil; subject; Nietzsche*

RESUME : Dans ce texte, est défendue l'idée du mal philosophique qui s'oppose au mal purement psychologique et/ou seulement sociologique. Le mal philosophique est un mal qui oblige à une action et une réflexion dans tous les sujets. L'amour, dans le monde contemporain est victime de ce mal et il a été plongé dans les ténèbres par des approches médiatisantes qui nous désespèrent. L'objectif est ici de lui redonner substance en l'éclairant à nouveau et en le sortant de la vision soit trop relativiste soit trop absolutiste dans laquelle il a été enfermé.

Mots-clés : *amour ; mal ; sujet ; Nietzsche*

Une nuée divine couvrait le Tabernacle
durant le jour et un feu y brillait la nuit.
Exode. XL. 2 Péquoudé.

Le rôle du philosophe est double, selon nos analyses, il doit d'une part déterminer les pathologies philosophiques qui détruisent la santé du monde et d'autre part sortir les êtres (quels qu'ils soient : concepts, personnes ou groupes) des ténèbres pour les faire entrer dans une certaine clarté qu'il ne faut pas confondre avec la solution simple mais qui n'exclut pas la limpidité du propos.

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Cette clarté (ou limpidité qui pourrait prendre pour modèle cette lumière dans la nuit dont il est question au Livre de l'Exode) ne peut en aucune manière se prétendre dogmatique ni idéologique. Elle ne peut être que propositionnelle. En effet, le philosophe fait des propositions qui peuvent (et doivent être discutées). Il pose des questions, propose des réponses mais ne saurait en rien prétendre clore le débat par les questions qu'il pose.

S'il n'est pas ainsi ce n'est pas un philosophe (à notre sens toujours) c'est un idéologue.

Le sujet que nous souhaitons traiter ici est celui de l'amour. C'est un thème central car aujourd'hui toutes les familles sont construites autour de ce terme. De plus, le fondement même du droit et de l'éthique se trouve en lui.

Pourtant ce concept est flou. Il est - comme beaucoup d'autres dans notre post-modernité - enténébré et c'est donc une certaine clarté (provisoire) et nullement dogmatique que nous proposons d'apporter sur la question.

Ce flou est le produit de deux tendances contradictoires qui ont l'air de s'opposer mais qui se complètent car elles s'alimentent mutuellement :

- La première est représentée par une école sociologique, philosophique et littéraire française qui prétend que nous serions en train de vivre la fin de l'amour, que l'amour ne durerait que trois ans[1], qu'il serait devenu impossible. Cette école séduit surtout l'élite intellectuelle et managériale du monde occidental qui semble en faire son miel.

-La deuxième est plus médiatique et plus que l'élite c'est le peuple essentiellement qu'elle vise à travers séries, journaux et magazines. Elle est à l'opposé, en nous montrant des couples heureux, des histoires romantiques et des hommes et des femmes ensemble et fiers de s'aimer sur une simple rencontre.

Entre ces deux options (la simpliste romantique et la ténébreuse cynique) où trouver la vérité ? Sans doute dans un juste milieu comme toujours. Mais ce juste milieu est difficile à trouver car le concept est aujourd'hui flouté, enténébré par plusieurs données de fait qui ne peuvent être ignorées et sur lesquels il nous faut à présent revenir.

[1] Les auteurs qui soutiennent cette thèse sont nombreux. En sociologie E Illouz, *La fin de l'amour. Enquête sur un désarroi contemporain*. Seuil 2020. En littérature, la vague a débutée avec A. Cohen dans *Belle du Seigneur*. Gallimard 1968. Le lien peut être discuté mais dans l'interview qu'il a donné à B Pivot notamment Cohen a spécifié que son livre était l'anti Anna Karénine. Voir une assez intéressante analyse du roman sur le sujet même si l'on peut nuancer certaines idées. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MbcS1ptos8g. Quoi qu'il en soit comme il l'a déclaré, Cohen veut en effet rendre grâce, dans son texte à la vision romantique de l'amour. Solal et Arianne ne pourront en effet que mourir isolés pour l'avoir vécu. Les textes de M Houellebecq reprennent ce crédo en le radicalisant car c'est bien sur la fin de l'amour sur lequel il ne cesse de gloser. Plus particulièrement encore F. Beigbeder. Grasset. 1997

I) Les éléments contemporains qui rendent l'amour difficile à construire.

Comme nous l'avons indiqué, certains soutiennent aujourd'hui qu'il y aurait une forme de disparition de l'amour elle-même favorisée par un certain environnement de séduction et de consommation.

Ainsi M Houellebecq dans les Particules élémentaires fustige-t-il cette génération post soixantuitarde qui serait aux commandes de la société occidentale. Cette société aurait selon lui fabriqué deux catégories de consommateurs du sexe : d'un côté, il y aurait les hyper privilégiés qui pourraient avoir autant de relations qu'ils souhaitent et qui évoluent dans un climat totalement libéré mais vide sur le sujet ; de l'autre, il y aurait une plus grosse part de la population vivant de plus en plus dans la paupérisation qui ne connaîtrait que la solitude et la misère sexuelle.

Cette solitude de la masse (et cette indigence sexuelle) serait ainsi, pour certains penseurs marxistes, favorisée par le grand capital qui y gagnerait beaucoup. La solitude étant un moyen plus commode pour affaiblir les individus alors que le couple serait un moyen de les rendre plus forts.

Face à cette critique sociale, des auteurs dénoncent une fin de l'amour provoquée par la technologie : la logique des réseaux sociaux ayant de plus en plus développée une grande facilité à faire des rencontres qui ne pousserait pas les individus à s'inscrire à la fois dans l'effort et la durée qui seraient les composantes de l'amour sincère et durable.

Alors qu'en est-il ?

Sommes-nous en train d'assister sous le double coup de marteau du capitalisme financier et d'internet à une disparition de l'amour ? Et si oui pourquoi ?

Pour répondre à cette question, il nous a semblé dans un premier temps intéressant de nous pencher sur un malaise indéniable à propos de l'amour et sur lequel il faut dans un premier temps revenir. Ce malaise est polyforme.

En premier lieu, il est lié au mouvement d'égalisation des rapports homme/femme qui a créé une nécessité d'établir de nouvelles formes de relations que l'on peine encore à trouver et des difficultés à construire le couple. Autrefois, la situation était simple et les rapports aisés à déterminer. L'homme était chargé de s'occuper de la vie sociale et la femme s'occupait de la vie domestique. Des rapports de force assez clairs étaient fixés entre les uns et les autres et la vie professionnelle de l'homme imposait son rythme au foyer. Plusieurs sociologues ont noté les difficultés qui existent aujourd'hui pour beaucoup de couples à coordonner les agendas, à trouver des lieux d'habitation en rapport avec les espaces professionnels des uns et des autres. De plus, cette égalité tend à créer des exigences qui de part et d'autre semblent de plus en plus difficiles à déterminer dans les deux sexes.

En deuxième lieu, le malaise trouverait sa cause dans une forme d'injonction paradoxale fort bien dénoncée par F de Singly dans un livre qui s'intitule , le soi le couple et la famille[2]. En effet, dans ce texte, de Singly évoque une forme de difficulté dans nos sociétés et qui serait liée au fait que l'on demande désormais aux individus d'aller dans deux directions opposées. La première serait d'aller vers une affirmation de soi qui développe d'ailleurs de plus en plus des phénomènes de honte chacun ayant le sentiment de ne jamais pouvoir réaliser son soi idéal. Mais de l'autre, ce soi ne pourrait se concevoir sans une vision extérieure, celle d'un autre partenaire qui aiderait à la construction de l'identité. Ainsi dans nos sociétés explique de Singly, les célibataires seraient mal perçus en ce qu'il serait trop centrés sur eux-mêmes. Un certain bonheur pourrait naître ainsi de la conversation intime dont ils seraient privés. Mais ce même bonheur serait ainsi de plus en plus difficile à construire du fait des exigences continuelles de réalisation de soi.

En troisième lieu ce malaise serait ainsi accentué par le développement des réseaux sociaux qui l'alimenterait selon J. C. Kauffmann dans un livre qui s'intitule Sex@mour[3]. Pour lui, face à cette difficulté, les couples trouveraient ainsi aisément le moyen de ne pas s'engager en restant dans un monde virtuel qu'autoriserait parfaitement internet et les réseaux sociaux. Comme l'écrit Kaufman « l'expérience multiple du possible de la rencontre sur un site favoriserait ces logiques d'indétermination des désirs partagés d'individus oscillants continuellement entre désir de solitude et envie de construire une relation. Comme il le note « le possible s'avère d'une telle densité qu'il en devient auto-suffisant ». Cet enfermement dans le possible serait ainsi une variante du bovarysme qui ne serait rien d'autre qu'une forme de rêve jamais réalisé d'une relation idéale et idéalisée.

On ne vivrait pas dans l'amour réel mais on jouerait ainsi à l'amour. Pour aller dans ce sens, dans un texte intitulé Intimités amoureuses à l'ère du numérique, Amaranta Cecchini[4] a notamment étudié un jeu qui s'appelle « second life », jeu dans lequel les individus s'inventent de fausses relations amoureuses sans jamais se rencontrer et se marient et auraient des enfants avec des avatars. Cette plongée de l'amour dans le virtuel serait donc une des manifestations contemporaines du malaise dans l'amour. L'enfermement dans le virtuel c'est en effet l'ignorance du réel et l'abolition du choix et de l'engagement qu'il impose.

[2] F. de Singly, *Le soi, le couple, la famille*. A Colin 2016

[3] J. C. Kaufmann. *Sex@mour.* Livre de poche 2011

[4] A. Cecchini. *Intimités amoureuses à l'ère du numérique*. Ed Alphil. Presses Universitaires Suisses 2018

Qu'en est-il et quelle serait la cause de ce malaise ? Faut-il la trouver dans une évolution d'internet ou une pression du capitalisme contemporain ?

La thèse que nous voulons soutenir à présent sur le sujet est qu'à notre avis, les causes des difficultés sont plus profondes et plus en lien avec la philosophie. En fait l'amour - reste une représentation culturelle - selon nous et elle évolue selon les époques.

Or il semble que comme de nombreux concepts fondateurs (l'école, l'entreprise, l'université, etc.), l'amour dans notre monde contemporain est en crise. C'est cette crise qui serait en fait à l'origine du malaise car nous ne parviendrons plus sur ce sujet (comme sur beaucoup d'autres) à trouver un nouveau modèle qui nous unirait et qui notamment unirait femmes et hommes entre eux mais aussi en allant au-delà des différentes couches sociales et culturelles.

Le sentiment de décalage et de grande inégalité ne proviendrait pas (seulement) d'une pression du capitalisme ou de la bulle internet (qui ne sont que des effets et des épiphénomènes et non des causes) mais plus de ce nouveau flou autour des concepts.

II) A l'origine du malaise, une crise de l'idée même d'amour et une augmentation du flou sur le sujet

Le mot de « crise » est aujourd'hui utilisé de manière confuse et constante sans que nous sachions plus trop à quoi il renvoie réellement. Cependant ici, c'est dans le sens d'une incapacité à nous mettre d'accord les uns les autres sur ce que l'on doit entendre par ce terme ; c'est en le prenant comme signifiant doute profond sur ce qu'il représente que nous souhaitons utiliser ce concept riche de sens.

En effet, lorsqu'il devient difficile de résumer une idée claire sous un concept aussi important que celui d'amour et de ce qu'est aimer, il devient de plus en plus difficile de créer des relations et des rencontres fructueuses entre les individus.

Or nous avons vu à quel point - et ce même dans nos sociétés - la rencontre et l'échange demeurent fondateurs. Or l'amour est, pourrions-nous dire le modèle par excellence de la rencontre et de l'échange. S'il est en crise c'est tout l'ensemble du système de la rencontre et de la relation qui en est affecté.

Or il est indéniable qu'il existe une crise au niveau de ce concept et qui s'explique par des considérations purement historiques que l'on peut plus aisément résumer sous ce que J. F. Lyotard appelle la post-modernité[5] et qui n'est rien d'autre qu'une difficulté de nos contemporains à constituer un récit commun sur l'amour.

[5] J. F. Lyotard, *La condition post-moderne*. Editions de minuit 1979

En effet, sur ce sujet, comme sur beaucoup d'autres, il n'y a plus un mais des récits multiples sur le sujet. Dans une récente étude sur la sexualité, un sociologue a d'ailleurs montré que cette diversité des visions de l'amour se reflétait aussi au niveau d'une diversité de plus en plus grandissante des pratiques sexuelles[6].

Cette diversité (ou cette crise) est venue comme pour tous les concepts d'une remise en cause d'une idée reçue et que l'on pouvait trouver chez les Modernes.

En effet, lorsque l'on lit J. J. Rousseau dans l'Emile sur le sujet, il ne fait aucun doute qu'il faut distinguer ce qui est « bas » dans l'amour (à savoir le sexe) qu'il appelle l'instinct et l'amour qui est la partie haute et qui ne serait possible que si l'on possède la sagesse et les lumières requises.[7]

Pour passer du bas vers le haut, Rousseau préconise une certaine éducation qu'il propose d'ailleurs de donner à ses élèves Sophie et Emile.

On sait à quel point cette vision de l'amour moral a causé de nombreux dégâts et notamment parmi les femmes. Et l'on peut dire que, dans son texte intitulé Métaphysique de l'amour, Schopenhauer est celui qui va rappeler à quel point en réalité, l'amour même romantique n'est rien d'autre qu'un désir sexuel. Cependant pour Schopenhauer, le désir sexuel n'est autre que la pulsion de la vie à se réaliser[8].

En conséquence, sous l'effet de celui que l'on appelle le père des penseurs des soupçons, l'occident est passé de l'amour éthéré, romantique et bannissant le corps à un amour sexuel et qui n'avait son origine et sa source que dans le sexe.

On peut imaginer l'ampleur des dégâts que cette affirmation a pu causer. Schopenhauer a rappelé à ses concitoyens qu'ils étaient des bêtes de sexe mais qu'ils dissimulaient cette « libido » sous de majestueuses envolées romantiques et lyriques.

On sait à quel point, cette théorie a influencé notre monde contemporain.

Michel Houellebecq a tellement été influencé par cet auteur qu'il lui a consacré un texte. Toute son œuvre est en effet imprégné en creux par cette idée que l'amour est mort et qu'il n'y a que du sexe entre les hommes[9].

Mais c'est surtout la psychanalyse qui a le plus été influencée par cette prégnance du sexe dans les relations humaines. Freud considérait d'ailleurs que Schopenhauer était l'un des plus grands philosophes qui ait existé et dans son œuvre

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6 M. Bozon, *Sociologie de la sexualité*. A Colin 2018

7 J. J. Rousseau, *Emile ou de l'éducation*

8 Dans *Le monde comme volonté et représentation*, A Schopenhauer consacre un long chapitre à la question de l'amour. I l'intitule *Métaphysique de l'amour*. Livre IV. Trad. A Burdeau

9 Je remercie Jacques Amar pour ces remarques sur ce point. Il m'a signalé en effet que M Houellebecq avait même écrit un seul livre de philosophie sur cet auteur dont il m'a toujours paru comme une évidence qu'il était schopenhauerien sans jamais avoir lu ce texte. Pour ceux qui souhaitent creuser le sujet. Michel Houellebecq, *En présence de Schopenhauer*. L'Herné 2017

c'est certainement un des rares qu'il a pu citer. On sait en effet que - pour la psychanalyse - la pulsion sexuelle est au cœur de cet animal développé qu'est l'homme et l'amour est rarement étudié sous son angle « romantique » par Freud. On sait aussi que pour lui, toutes nos pathologies viennent de ce que précisément cette part animale est souvent bafouée, méprisée, meurtrie par une morale trop intrusive.

Cette théorie (marquée par la philosophie de Schopenhauer) a, on le sait, considérablement influencé l'évolution actuelle de nos mœurs et une certaine érotisation indéniable de nos sociétés. Elle a provoqué une première crise car alors que les anciens schémas étaient construits sur l'ancien modèle, il a fallu à nouveau trouver des nouvelles manifestations de l'amour mais nous n'y sommes que très peu parvenus.

Les désirs se sont libérés (et la femme avec eux) mais dans le même temps : les institutions et les cœurs sont restés en retrait : alimentant et constituant la crise et le malaise. Comme l'a chanté la jeune Angèle, les femmes ont considéré qu'elles étaient plus que des animaux.

Pourtant le désir - avec sa force - désormais appelé « pulsion » ou « libido » est devenu la réalité si ce n'est la seule réalité amoureuse. La logique des Tinder et autre meetic, ainsi que la banalisation des images pornographiques ainsi qu'une certaine libéralisation sexuelle a certainement été inspirée par ce mouvement et ces évolutions. Les tabous se sont peu à peu levés mais le malaise n'a pas disparu et il est possible qu'il a même augmenté.

De plus, corrélativement à cette « libération », une contre-réaction à tendance conservatrice s'est opérée pour contrecarrer cette libéralisation du sexe. Cette contre-réaction a tendance conservatrice, est selon nous, assez bien représentée par Michel Houelbecq qui surfe dessus mais surtout, elle a eu des effets encore plus néfastes qui ont eu pour effet de créer des malaises encore plus profonds en mettant certaines femmes (surtout mais aussi certains hommes) dans des formes de prison morale de plus en plus difficiles et lourdes à supporter.

De plus cette montée de la morale a eu pour effet de séparer de plus en plus les femmes des hommes dans certains cas en multipliant des discours de rejets de la gente masculine de la part d'une partie d'un groupe militant féministe assez bien représenté par la tendance « balance ton porc », illustré notamment par la chanson de la jeune Angèle qui (dans un certain flou voulant dénoncer les violences faites aux femmes), commence son clip en débutant sa chanson par les paroles suivantes « ils parlent *tous comme des animaux,* de toutes les chattes ça parle mal ». Insinuant ici sans doute qu'il faut mettre tous les hommes dans le même panier. Personne n'a réagi sur cette affirmation et cette chanson est devenue le « tube » d'une génération de femmes se sentant humiliées au quotidien de l'évolution de certains hommes...

A cette attaque contre la relation homme/femme s'est ajoutée (nous l'avons indiqué) un autre mécanisme de répression morale exercée cette fois contre la femme dans certains milieux intégristes soit d'une certaine bourgeoisie soit au contraire dans certaines approches religieuses.

Ce triple mouvement contradictoire (libération sexuelle, montée de la guerre des sexes dirigée contre les hommes et moralisme persécutant les femmes) n'a pas manqué de créer de multiples logiques de culpabilisation tant chez les hommes que chez les femmes. Il a plus encore obscurci et enténébré des esprits qui étaient déjà très confus. Mais de plus, il a certainement favorisé le développement de logiques prédatrices et de violences dans les rapports de couples.

Ces formes de violences psychologiques qui touchent les femmes mais aussi les hommes, ont très bien été analysées par M. F. Hirigoyen dans son maitre livre sur la question[10].

Dans ce texte, cette psychanalyste nous montre que le pervers narcissique joue avec sa proie qu'il maintient sous son emprise. Mais cette emprise est elle-même favorisée par le sentiment de culpabilité de la victime. Ce sentiment de culpabilité est lui-même favorisé par une histoire personnelle du sujet mais aussi par ce climat accusateur et moralisateur évoqué plus avant et qui semble s'accentuer et se développer dans nos sociétés en réaction à la trop grande libéralisation des mœurs de certains d'entre nous.

Certes, les amours toxiques ont toujours existé. Platon les dénonce dans le Phèdre en montrant notamment comment l'amoureux pathologique ne cherche toujours qu'à rabaisser celui qu'il prétend aimer. Il n'en demeure pas moins, qu'il semble que la crise et le flou actuel autour de ce que peut être l'amour ainsi que les tendances réactionnaires mises en évidence ne font qu'accroitre le mécanisme.

Alors face à cette évolution que faut-il faire ? La chanteuse Angèle citée plus avant se plaignait du flou dans lequel sa vie semble évoluer. En effet sa chanson elle-même évolue dans un certain flou. Le succès qu'elle a pu rencontrer s'explique certainement par la domination de ces tendances obscurantistes qu'il s'agit à de dénoncer en apportant précisément de nouvelles lumières sur l'amour et c'est selon moi une des tâches majeures à laquelle il nous faut nous atteler.

Cependant le flou ne touche pas que la jeune chanteuse à succès. Il nous concerne tous. Un mauvais brouillard entoure ce si beau sentiment et il n'a pas grand-chose à voir avec la douce nuée qui entourait le Tabernacle durant l'exode des fils d'Israël.

[10] M. F. Hirigoyen, *Le harcèlement moral. La violence perverse au quotidien*. Syros 1998

Il faut sortir de cet épais brouillard pour sans doute revenir vers cette douce nuée et pour cela retrouver une forme de lumière.

III) Sortir de la crise en éclairant à nouveau l'amour tant au niveau individuel qu'au niveau collectif. Désenténébrer l'amour.

La seule manière, selon nous, de sortir de ce malaise est certainement d'apporter de nouvelles lumières sur le sujet et il semble que la philosophie doit jouer un rôle conséquent en la matière car le mal n'est pas seulement sociétal ni individuel : il est global à la fois conceptuel, individuel, métaphysique et social.

De ce fait, cette lumière n'est pas simple à apporter tant la crise semble profonde sur la question et tant les dialogues féconds semblent difficiles à mettre en œuvre sur un sujet au cœur duquel évoluent également les considérations politiques, économiques et religieuses.

En effet, il importe ici sans nul doute de partir à l'exploration profonde des souffrances qui peuvent exister sur le sujet.

A ce sujet, Y. Amar écrit :

> La dénonciation du faux permet d'explorer les raisons de cet inconfort et met en évidence les mécanismes mêmes qui engendrent ces souffrances en nous[11].

Si nous le suivons, il est donc nécessaire d'aller vers l'authentique pour trouver la lumière mais elle n'est pas évidente à apporter tant au niveau individuel que collectif.

En effet, au niveau psychologique, tout le monde ne peut s'improviser thérapeute et lorsque l'on vit une relation « toxique » il est périlleux de vouloir s'instaurer thérapeute. Les connaisseurs sur la question nous conseillent même de nous sauver plutôt que de vouloir sauver l'autre. De plus, nous sommes souvent impliqués dans les situations que nous vivons et le triangle de Kartman montre que l'on peut aisément passer du statut de sauveur à celui de victime voire de bourreau.

Au niveau plus collectif, éclairer serait trouver une réponse acceptable à ce qu'est l'amour. Il y aurait beaucoup pour reconstruire sur le sujet. Mais pour démarrer sur la question, il me semble que la réponse la plus féconde pour débuter un travail est celle que Freud a proposé à la fin de sa vie dans le Malaise dans la civilisation.

[11] Y. Amar. *Grandir ensemble*. Ed. Le relié 2020

Pour lui, il ne peut y avoir d'amour s'il n'y a pas de préférence. En effet, l'amour est lié au cœur habituellement et le cœur est le domaine de la préférence. Il reprend ainsi une idée de son philosophe préféré qu'est Schopenhauer qui soutient qu'en amour il ne saurait y avoir de choix.

Dans sa fameuse métaphysique de l'amour, il écrit en effet

> Pour aimer, il n'est pas besoin d'attendre longtemps, de réfléchir, de faire un choix ; il suffit que, dès le premier et l'unique coup d'œil, il se rencontre une certaine conformité, une certaine concordance mutuelle ou que, dans la vie courante, nous avons coutume de nommer une sympathie de sang, qu'excite en nous une certaine influence spéciale des astres...[12]

Le choix est lié à la volonté alors que la préférence est une forme d'inclination qui ressemble à ce que les Anciens appelaient l'*hexis* qui est parfois aussi traduite par une disposition.

L'amour est une disposition, une hexis vers quelque chose ou quelqu'un. Inclination qui nous dépasse quelque part.

Dans la pensée grecque, il existe deux types de dispositions. Il y a les bonnes et les mauvaises. Il y a donc parfois de mauvaises inclinations qui éloignent de l'excellent et du droit pour nous et par rapport à nous. Les bonnes, chez Aristote, sont celles qui vont vers l'excellence ou l'*arété* que l'on peut traduire par l'arrête ou le fil d'or qui relie deux être mais aussi peut-être le monde en son ensemble.

En conclusion, nous avons pu voir qu'il existait bien un malaise à plusieurs facettes à l'égard de l'amour. Ce malaise favorise indéniablement des pathologies qu'il convient de dénoncer. La seule solution serait ici de revenir et d'aller vers un éclairage, une illumination nouvelle sur la question tant au niveau pour chacun de soi mais aussi au niveau collectif. Mais cet éclairage comment l'effectuer ?

Il ne faut sans doute pas trop préjuger de nos forces et nous rappeler que nous ne sommes qu'hommes et que l'amour est précisément un sentiment d'abord humain. Le mal et la pathologie viennent souvent de cet oubli.

IV) Le premier éclairage proposé : l'amour humain qui n'est ni divin ni bestial mais qui est nuée du jour et lumière du soir : physique et moral, absolu et relatif.

Dans la postface qu'il a rédigée à son grand texte qu'est la culture du narcissisme, C Lasch a écrit :

[12] *Le monde comme volonté et représentation*, précité. *Métaphysique de l'amour*.

> Les meilleures défenses contre les terreurs de l'existence sont les conforts simples de l'amour et du travail et de la vie familiale qui nous relient à un monde indépendant de nos désirs et répondant à nos besoins. C'est grâce à l'amour et au travail...que nous pouvons échanger un conflit émotionnel dévastateur contre un malheur ordinaire...Mais notre société tend soit à dévaluer les petits conforts soit à en attendre un peu trop. Nos critères d'un travail créatif et rempli de sens sont trop élevés pour survivre à la déception. Notre idéal de l'amour véritable pèse trop sur nos relations personnelles. Nous demandons trop à la vie, pas assez à nous-mêmes[13].

D'aucuns pourraient critiquer cette position « réactionnaire » du grand sociologue américain. Cependant il faut bien reconnaître que la trilogie amour-travail-famille qu'il propose demeure plus intéressante et moins contraignante et absolutiste que la trilogie pétainiste du travail-famille-patrie qui substantialisait la nation au détriment de l'individu dans toutes ses dimensions tête-cœur-corps et faisait de lui un sujet aux ordres des puissants.

Toutefois cette approche quoi que sympathique qu'elle soit met au même niveau le travail, l'amour et la famille. Elle doit donc de ce fait être nuancée selon nous ;

En effet l'amour est une valeur qui est à placer au-dessus du travail et de la famille. En effet désormais, nous l'avons indiqué, c'est l'amour qui fonde la famille puisqu'il construit puis cimente le couple qui demeure le socle premier de celle-ci et ce même lorsqu'il s'est déchiré. Car lorsque c'est la haine qui a remplacé l'amour les familles recomposées ne sont malheureusement que des familles en permanente décomposition.

Il en de même pour le travail. A l'heure où celui-ci se fait rare et où de nouvelles formes de métier apparaissent, nul ne pourra résister à la vague s'il ne fait pas un métier qu'il aime profondément.

En conséquence le travail et la famille ne sont rien sans amour. Ils comptent et sont importants mais ils demeurent seconds par rapport à lui qui est bien premier.

De plus, c'est uniquement sur le terrain psychologique que Lasch se positionne. Cela constitue une des limites de son travail - par ailleurs remarquable - car il avait dénoncé lui-même cette dictature du thérapeutique

Il a eu raison sur ce point car les maux de notre sociétés ne sont pas que psychologiques. Ils ne sont pas que sociologiques ni que métaphysiques. Ils forment un tout. Nous avons choisi d'appeler ce tous des maux philosophiques et c'est ce

[13] C. Lasch. *La culture du narcissisme*. Trad. M Landa, Champs Flammarion 2018, p 388

philosophe médecin que Nietzsche appelait de ses vœux dans la préface du gai savoir qu'il convient de remettre en œuvre.

A un mal philosophique il faut donc apporter des réponses philosophiques et l'éclairage que l'amour requiert doit tenir compte de cette donnée.

En effet, dans la tradition occidentale c'est au philosophe qu'il a été assigné cette mission de relier les différentes formes de savoir. Or les pathologies de notre époque touchent tout autant l'individu que le collectif et tout autant notre rapport au temps présent que notre rapport à l'être en général. Ce sont donc des problématiques essentiellement philosophiques.

Tel est bien le cas de l'amour à qui il convient de redonner sa place : la première dans l'analyse et la recherche philosophique selon nous et qu'il convient de désenténébrer philosophiquement.

Cela passe en premier lieu par le rappel de cette sentence de ce sage de l'amour qu'était Salomon nous a enseigné dans l'Ecclésiaste. L'homme ne peut prétendre toujours aimer. Il y a un temps pour aimer et un temps pour haïr, nous dit-il.

En conséquence, il ne saurait être question de parler de « fin de l'amour » tout simplement parce que ce temps existe et existera toujours. Cependant l'homme ne peut prétendre ni à l'absolu ni au relatif sur le sujet. Il est des temps où il est nécessaire d'aimer et d'autre où l'amour n'a pas lieu d'être. L'amour universel pour tous et en tous lieux est un leurre. Freud a eu raison de parler de préférence à son sujet.

Cependant l'amour n'est pas non plus que le sexe ou que le plaisir du corps. Il y a quelque chose de plus en lui et il va faire que deux êtres s'attacheront l'un à l'autre et que ce seront ces deux êtres là et pas deux autres. Il y a en lui quelque chose d'exclusif et d'irrationnel.

Si nous pouvions l'éclairer à ce stade de notre recherche, nous dirions que l'amour ne peut être conçu, selon nous, que sur la forme d'un absolu-relatif. Il ne faut pas le confondre avec ce qu'il n'est pas mais il ne faut pas pour autant le prendre pour ce qu'il n'est pas. Il n'est qu'un sentiment qui touche d'abord l'homme et il est donc bien humain trop humain.

De ce fait ne tombons ni dans l'idéal (plan-plan romantique et décorporé que les romans ou films à l'eau de rose nous vendent à son sujet) ni dans le rejet cynique que l'élite contemporaine voudrait nous « vendre ».

L'amour est possible mais c'est une exception parce qu'il est du domaine du beau. Or ce qui est beau est rare et difficile. Il demande effort et clairvoyance continuels.

De ce fait, il n'est jamais acquis et puisqu'il est vivant il peut toujours mourir. Cependant l'amour n'est pas la mort. Il est du côté de la vie.

De ce fait, il ne saurait être qu'un horizon et nul ne peut prétendre l'avoir atteint en totalité. Comme tout horizon, il s'éloigne dès qu'on pense l'avoir approché. Mais il ne faut jamais le perdre de vue si l'on veut arriver à bon port.

Cet horizon suppose en premier lieu de se rappeler qu'il ne peut y avoir d'amour qu'en paroles au risque de galvauder ce terme mais qu'il doit aussi se réaliser en actes. En deuxième lieu, que cet amour ne peut exister sans réciprocité car sinon il n'est que souffrance. En troisième lieu qu'il ne saurait exister si l'on attend de l'autre un absolu.

L'amour est cette forme d'excellence dont Aristote nous parle dans l'éthique à Nicomaque, un juste milieu par rapport à soi. Mais ce que n'a pas vu le stagirite c'est qu'il est le juste milieu par excellence qui relie deux êtres à priori distingués l'un de l'autre. Ces deux êtres peuvent êtres un sujet humain et un objet, un sujet humain et un sujet divin, deux sujets humains entre eux. Dans tous les cas, il n'a évidemment pas la même forme et c'est en ce sens qu'il est relatif. Mais il est relatif aussi car il dépend de l'histoire et des possibilités de chacun. Il se pense toujours par rapport à soi-même et non en fonction d'un idéal ou d'un modèle.

C'est à partir du moment où l'on veut modéliser l'amour que l'on se désespère de le voir disparaître. L'amour modélisé c'est l'amour routinier et c'est donc l'amour mort ou l'amour mort-vivant et l'amour fantomatique.

Cet amour c'est le contraire de ce qu'il est puisqu'il est mort et produit la mort alors que l'amour est central parce qu'il est le cœur et au cœur même de la vie.

La nuée qui recouvre le terme aujourd'hui n'est pas cette nuée divine qui recouvrait le Tabernacle et dont les commentateurs nous disent qu'elle apportait la fraicheur et le Cantique des Cantiques (ce grand livre de l'amour) qu'elle était mêlée de myrrhe et d'encens et de toutes les poudres du parfumeur[14].

L'amour c'est en effet une oasis dans le désert de nos vies et un ensemble de parfums qui s'accordent les uns aux autres pour donner de la lumière qui redonne substance à la vie. Ce n'est pas ce nuage de ténèbres qui obscurcit le monde. Certes, il est difficile à trouver et complexe à mettre en œuvre. Mais trop souvent aujourd'hui certains confondent complexité et confusion. Or l'un est précisément le contraire de l'autre. Celui qui a compris toute la complexité du monde sait à quel point celle-ci peut être aussi claire qu'un nuage empli de douces fraicheurs et de douces odeurs qui relient et non qui séparent.

[14] *Cantique des Cantiques* 3.6

En conséquence, comme le rappelle le texte cité en exergue et extrait de l'exode l'amour c'est la beauté du jour et celle de la nuit. Le jour il est ce qui offre la fraicheur et les odeurs de la nuée. Il est donc corporel et physique. La nuit, il éclaire. Il est intellectuel et moral.

Le bon amour, le vrai amour n'est pas « platonique ». Il n'est pas « sexuel ». Il est l'un et l'autre. Il conjoint l'un et l'autre car il est la vie qui est jour et nuit, hiver et été, le tout dans une continuité permanente qui ignore les mécaniques froides et qui chaque jour évolue avec le temps qui passe.

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ON LEARNING LOGIC IN 17th CENTURY TRANSYLVANIA[1]

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ABSTRACT. The purpose of this paper is to provide a glimpse on the method and content of teaching logic/dialectic in the Principality of Transylvania in the 17th century from the perspective of Miklós Bethlen with references to two important local scholars: Pál Keresztúri and Janos Apáczai Csere, who is better known as being the first Hungarian encyclopaedist. In addition to this, the paper will contain for comparison a short survey of what Jan Amos Komenský had to say about teaching logic.

Keywords: *Logic, dialectic, teaching method, Miklós Bethlen, Pál Keresztúri, Janos Apáczai Csere, Jan Amos Komenský*

I.

Miklós Bethlen (1642-1716) was a Hungarian Protestant writer and statesman, the son of János Bethlen (1613-1678), the chancellor of Transylvania between 1659 and 1678. As it becomes obvious from his extant autobiography (Bethlen 2004), Miklós Bethlen had, given the polymathic intellectual climate of the age, many other interests: languages, educational method, architecture, etc. In his youth, he was subject to the application of educational reforms initiated in Transylvania by figures such as Janos Apáczai Csere (1625–1659) or Jan Amos Komenský (Comenius, 1592–1670), but also lesser known educators such as Pál Keresztúri (1594?–1655).

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The developments regarding educational methods in Hungary and Transylvania were linked to what was happening in the West. For example, in addition to foreign professors who were teaching at institutions of higher education – Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588–1638), Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld (1605–1655), and Philipp Ludwig Piscator (?–1647) in Gyulafehérvár (today Alba-Iulia), Jan Amos Komenský in Sárospatak – the local intellectuals studied and/or were in touch with their Western colleagues such as some of the members of the Hartlib Circle (cf. Murdock 1996, Hotson 2020). In terms of knowledge dissemination between the center and the periphery, instead of translational, monographic or systemic purposes, the endeavors of influential figures such as Janos Apáczai Csere are often seen as an adaptation of knowledge to the needs and wants of the periphery (Pallo 2006, 780): "These textbooks adapt universal knowledge to the local intellectual, pedagogical, institutional, very often political environments. By their help, universal knowledge translates into a specific local knowledge without losing its universal character." It can be reasonably inferred that something at least similar happened in the case of the study of logic or dialectic.

In this paper, my aim is to offer a glimpse of what and how was being taught within the fields of logic and dialectic around the middle of the 17th century in the Principality of Transylvania from the perspective of Miklós Bethlen, especially his relationship with the first Hungarian encyclopaedist, Janos Apáczai Csere. The latter is not celebrated for an innovative contribution to a specific field of knowledge, logic and dialectic not excepting; contrariwise, it is a known fact that more celebrated logicians – however still marginal from the point of view of classic histories of logic (such as, for instance, Kneale 1962) – were present and active in Transylvania around that time, e.g. Alsted and Bisterfeld. There was a strong and vital link between the displaced scholars of the Heborn Academy and, one the one hand, Jan Amos Komenský in Sárospatak (cf., for example, the three letters to Bisterfeld in 1652–1653), on the other hand, Janos Apáczai Csere (cf. Murdock 1996, 72, 79, et passim; Szentpéteri 2008, passim; Almási 2015, 2–3; Hotson 2020, 352–353). Bethlen follows his teachers in deploring the sad state of the Transylvanian *elite* in terms of learned competence. Following Pal Keresztúri, some standard reasons are invoked by Bethlen: lack of a competent teaching staff, lack of a proper educational method, the custom of viewing school as useless and early abandonment. The results are derided in general lines: for example, the nobles of Transylvania do not possess even a mediocre knowledge of Latin even though they spent almost twelve years learning it; a reasonable logical knowledge is lacking as a consequence of absurd laws, contradictory with each other in many cases, doubled with incompetent legislators, judges and lawyers. The boys are brought to school in an "asinine state"

and they leave school twelve years later being "even bigger asses", this time all the more dangerous, since the destiny of their community lies in their hands (Bethlen 2004). Something similar is said by Janos Apáczai Csere when he underlines in his *Oratio de studium sapientiae* (*A bölcsesség tanulásáról*) that without serious studies in dialectic and logic the people of Transylvania risk looking at things like "a dumb calf stares to a new gate." (Apáczai Csere 1976, 38-39)

The study of logic in Transylvania needs to be considered in the light of the Ramist influence on its teaching, related to a utilitarian purpose. As will become apparent later, one of its applications was in the context of local theological disputes.

Histories of logic and argumentation, again, do not give much credit for originality even to such significant figures as Pierre de La Ramée (Petrus Ramus, 1515–1572), not to speak about Ramists, semi-Ramists, post-Ramists and scholars who taught logic at the "periphery", such as was the case of Alsted and Bisterfeld. For example, in William and Martha Kneale's *The Development of Logic* Ramus is mentioned as an essential member of the Humanist cohort (among Valla, Agricola, Vives and others) that led a charge against the reputation of medieval logic (cf. Kneale 1962, 300–306); in Józef Maria Bocheński's *History of Formal Logic,* Ramus is mentioned few times as perhaps the first historian of logic ever, having at the same time, however, an overactive imagination. As Father Bocheński does not forget to say, Ramus counts even the patriarchs of the Old Testament among logicians. Bocheński, however, definitely oversimplifies when he counts Ramus – and perhaps also Bartholomaeus Keckermann[2] who "seems to have given only a cursory reading to most of the logicians he cites" – among Humanists (Bochenski 1961, 4–5, 255). The situation seems to improve for Ramus at least in a more recent, collectively written scholarship on the history of logic (cf. Ashworth 2008). However, in the cases of Alsted, Bisterfeld or Apáczai Csere, the situation is the same: no mentions. In general, Humanists and Ramus are usually mentioned in the histories of logic just because historiographical necessity requires it, but not because they are considered important in themselves.

II.

The two most influential figures regarding educational reform in Transylvania in the 17th century were the native Janos Apáczai Csere and the better-known Moravian Jan Amos Komenský. The educational methods of both influenced the curricula of the schools from the Principality of Transylvania. And this is natural, not

[2] On Keckermann, see the comprehensive study of Facca 2005.

only because of the physical presence of both in the region during the middle of the 17th century (Komenský in Sárospatak; Apáczai Csere in Alba-Iulia/ Gyulafehérvár and Cluj/Kolozsvár), but also because of the parallels between the two. Miklós Bethlen in his *Autobiography* (*Gróf Bethlen Miklós önéletírása*; Bethlen 2004, 72 sqq) offers a relatively detailed account of his early studies in the Principality, before going abroad to further his studies in the West (Heidelberg, Utrecht, Leiden, etc.). While his relation to Apáczai Csere is evident and direct, his relation to Komenský appears to be only mediated by another of his teachers, considered extremely important by Bethlen himself, Keresztúri Bíró Pál, who was influenced by Komenský.[3]

The first teachers of Miklós Bethlen were Mihály Naményi and Mihály Fogarasi, about which we do not have much extant knowledge. Afterwards, he started to study under Pál Keresztúri, who has also been the teacher of his father, János Bethlen (1613-1678), the Chancellor of Transylvania between 1659 and 1678. His initial studies consisted of Latin and Hungarian. In 1652, the pupil and the teacher were both in Gyulafehérvár (today Alba-Iulia). As recounted by Bethlen, the methods used for teaching so far, especially by Fogarasi, implied various forms of punishment which he resented, and which he was fortunately spared under Pál Keresztúri. During this time, Bethlen also had another tutor, Bálint Békési, but he and his fellow students preferred to attend Pál Keresztúri's lectures, and thus János Bethlen agreed to leave him under the tutelage of Keresztúri until 1655, the year when Keresztúri died. Bethlen insisted that the method and teachings of Keresztúri were not well received in Transylvania because of the "arrogance of the educated and the ignorance of the uneducated" (Bethlen 2004, 73). Pál Keresztúri was well known locally not just as a teacher, but also as a preacher. As others, he travelled abroad (Germany, the Netherlands, England, etc.) to further his studies, and his good relationship with the princes of Transylvania ensured his appointment to important teaching and academic administrative positions in the Principality. He was also known as a fervent debater on political and confessional issues, studies of dialectic being highly relevant in this respect (for more details about his life and education see Dénes 2001). The pedagogical context in which Pál Keresztúri was formed has already been influenced by Ramism regarding methods and contents, the Hungarian puritans being open in adopting Ramus' educational reform proposals

[3] Regarding Bethlen's education under Keresztúri Bíró Pál, the details are taken from Bethlen 2004 – Part I, Chapter 8 and 9. For his studies under Apáczai Csere, see Bethlen 2004 – Part I, the last part of Chapter 9 and Chapter 10). Regarding a possible contact with educational works by Komenský during Keresztúri's tutelage he states that he have not yet had an opportunity to study works by the Moravian educational reformer (Bethlen 2004, 77). For his studies under Keresztúri, see Bethlen 2004, 72–80.

it is to be expected that this also happened with regard to the particular case of the teaching of logic (cf. Dénes 2001, 47–48, 78). It is most important to emphasize the way in which logic was taught, that is, together with other basic studies of grammar and rhetoric (i.e. *trivium*), with an orientation towards accumulation of encyclopaedic knowledge and with the final purpose of preparing the student to grasp theological topics and eventually developing a debating ability as Pál Keresztúri himself did (see e.g. Dénes 2001, 51).

First of all, as indicated, Keresztúri did not employ violent means in order to educate his pupils preferring to praise them and reward them with fruits and gifts to give them more freedom while conversing in both Hungarian and Latin (Bethlen 2004, 74–75). This reminds us of Komenský's view on avoiding violence in education. In fact, Keresztúr's actual motto, recorded by Bethlen, was Comenian: "*Omnia sponte fluant, absit violentia rebus*" (Everything should flow naturally, violence should be absent from things). The examples and texts chosen for study were rather fun to read so that the pupils will not get eventually bored (Bethlen 2004, 75). This, again, reminds us of Komenský's *Schola ludus seu Encyclopaedia viva*, the didactic play written in 1654 and composed to be performed at the gymnasium in Sárospatak as a pedagogical tool.

Keresztúri also preferred to start with teaching the children reading and writing (via syllabication) in their native Hungarian, based on the principle that a child learns to read faster in a language he or she knows and understands already before in speaking and listening (Bethlen 2004, 74). Reading was taught in parallel with writing, the words to be learned being written down by the pupils in both Latin and Hungarian on paper and thus the memorization process was reinforced. This principle reminds us the method of Komenský's famous *Ianua linguarum reserata* (first published in Leszno, 1631), which provided the student with the mother-tongue and Latin (or other foreign) text in parallel columns, and also the later *Orbis sensualium pictus* (written in Sárospatak, 1652–1654, and first published in Nuremberg, 1658).

Keresztúri used to jump from one language to the other and then back. Instead of rote learning he employed a more flexible method (Bethlen 2004, 75): he used to teach things from "smaller to greater", illustrating his teachings usually by particular examples (Bethlen 2004, 74). So, in the case of grammar, he did not insist on theory, but rather examples and practice, using the *Colloquia* by Corderius and an illustrated Bible (Bethlen 2004, 75). After the students acquired the rules by this method, he continued with the direct study of texts, chosen depending on the learnt vocabulary (Bethlen 2004, 75). At this level, he started to focus more on dictating, the most complex practice being that the dictation was in one language while what the student wrote down was in the other. Also, the students were being

introduced to basics of composition, furnished with several words based on which they wrote their own piece (Bethlen 2004, 75). He then proceeded to prosody and the writing of poetry (Bethlen 2004, 75–76).

When it came to other foreign languages, the order was to be one by one, moving from one to another after mastering a good deal of basic vocabulary (e.g. after learning Latin, the Bethlen had to learn 1000-2000 words in *walachian*, i.e. Romanian, and so on, Bethlen 2004, 78). As regards to the other disciplines of the classical *trivium*, it seems that he considered it inopportune, at least at that level, instead, students were to actually get acquainted with other things such as natural studies of things together with names, genera, species and specific qualities, and only thereafter to pass on to rhetorical and poetic compositions (Bethlen 2004, 76; cf. the same order of studies in Komenský). The next item in the order of teaching Keresztúri taught his pupils were logic, philosophy and theology (Bethlen 2004, 76; for more on logic/dialectic see below, section III). Finally, at some point Keresztúri considered that it was an opportune moment to teach Bethlen rhetoric by way of examples (Bethlen 2004, 78).

With regard to the *quadrivium*, it seems that Keresztúri only taught the first part of arithmetic, while the others were taught to Bethlen later by Janos Apáczai Csere (Bethlen 2004, 78). Now, let us pass on to the content of his logical teaching.

The teaching was not done using textbooks, but rather excerpts. Bethlen recognized excerpts from Aristotle or Aristotelian authors; he also mentions Ramus and the *Logica* of Keckermann (Bethlen 2004, 77). The organization of these excerpts was in the form of questions and answers, this being the method of teaching of Keresztúri in logic, metaphysics or theology. Bethlen gives several examples of the didactical practices in logic: "*Quaestio: Quid est genus?*/ What is the genus? *Vel species?*/ Or a species?/ *Responsio*/The answer was the definition" (Bethlen 2004, 76). And these were learned by a modified form of repetition, employed also in teaching syllogistic, the next step in the teaching of logic after the elements were grasped by the pupils (Bethlen 2004, 77). After these, the students needed to master the writing of arguments (equivalent to the writing of poetry in language studies) on given topics. Bethlen adds jokingly that the arguments he produced could be compared to those of Raimundus Lullus (Bethlen 2004, 77). Keresztúri's instruction in logic had a quite practical purpose and result, the ability to debate in public. Bethlen recounts that Keresztúri was derided by his contemporaries because of his methods, but was eventually vindicated in public debates in which Bethlen himself, Keresztúri's pupil at the age of 12–13, participated (among others, in front of Bisterfeld and Prince Rakoczi), and in the end Bethlen received the nickname of "the little philosopher" because of his grand dialectical ability at such an extraordinarily young age (Bethlen 2004, 77–78).

III.

While in the case of Pal Keresztúri we do not have extant writings dedicated to the study of logic *per se*, the situation in the case of Apáczai Csere is more fortunate. Apáczai Csere was obviously very close to Keresztúri and it seems that his position in Cluj, towards the end of his comparatively short life, was obtained by the intervention of the latter, and this happened after Apáczai Csere had entered into a conflict with the local professors of Alba Iulia, where he was teaching for a time after his return from abroad. After Apáczai Csere came home, he received the Professorship of poetics in Alba Iulia; however, instead of teaching the customary contents of the curriculum, using the *Georgics* of Vergil, he began to teach physics, astronomy and geography, which made him a successful professor who attracted many students. Bethlen writes that this brought him the enmity of Bisterfeld (although the *Hungarian Encyclopedia* is dedicated among others to Bisterfeld too) and also other professors, and at some point he was even threatened to be thrown out of the tower of Alba Iulia (Bethlen 2004, 83).

After Keresztúri, Apáczai Csere was the other great teacher that Bethlen admired the most and it seems that he himself received praise from his teacher being called *optimus* and *charissimus discipulus* (Bethlen 2004, 83). Apáczai Csere was the one who brought order upon the chaotic knowledge, *confusum chaos*, that Bethlen acquired up to that point. He managed this via systematic public and private teaching: theology via William Ames (Guilelmus Amesius, 1576–1633), philosophy via René Descartes (Renatus Cartesius, 1596–1650) and Hendrik de Roy (Henricus Regius, 1598–1679), arithmetic via Petrus Ramus, and geometry via Adriaan Metius (1571–1635). It seems that at some point they had problems in acquiring instruments for the teaching of mathematics (Bethlen 2004, 84–85).

Regarding the teaching of logic in the case of Apáczai Csere, we can consider the following two sources: *Magyar Encyclopaedia. Az az, Minden igaz es hasznos Böltseségnek szép rendbe foglalása és Magyar nyelven világra botsátása* (The Hungarian Encyclopedia. That is, the right arrangement of all true and useful wisdom given to the world in Hungarian), published in Utrecht, 1653–1655; and *Magyar logikácska, mellyet a kitsindedek számára irt Apatzai Janos, egy a' tudomány dolgában meg kivántatot tanatstsal egyetemben* (A Short Hungarian Logic, which was written by Janos Apáczai for the young students, along with an introduction to science), published in Alba Iulia, 1654. Apáczai Csere is quite open when it comes to mention the sources of his textbook:

> "Thus, according to the diversity of subjects, the authors I follow are: in metaphysics Cartesius; in logic, Ramus and Amesius; in arithmetic, Ramus, Snellius, Schonerus; in geometry it was only Ramus (because it is a crime to confuse his method (...) the dichotomies (...) were mostly omitted from the so called twelfth edition in Hanover. I had to wonder whether such a systematic writer had forgotten his own method so much; I only realized later that it was the publisher's fault); in general science Cartesius and Regius; in astronomy, Copernicus, Cartesius, Regius, Phocylides, Alstedius, Scribonius; in geography, hydrography and music, Alstedius; in meteorology Cartesius, Regius and Scribonius; in anthropology, Scribonius and Regius; Regius alone in medicine; in zoology, Regius, Scribonius and Alstedius; in mineralogy Scribonius, Regius and Alstedius: in botany Scribonius and Regius; in mechanics Alstedius, Amesius, Metius; in ethics, economics, politics, law and theology Fennerus, Amesius, Althusius, etc.; in general grammar, Ramus; in special Greek and Latin grammar also Ramus, in Hebrew and its dialects Martinius, in Arabic Erpenius; in general rhetoric Talaeus, in special Greek, Hebrew and Arabic rhetoric different writers, and in Latin Talaeus."[4] (Apáczai Csere 1959, 34–37; 1977, 84–85)

Apáczai Csere treats dialectic and logic in the second and third parts of his *Encyclopaedia*. The contents are the following:

[4] Or in Hungarian: "Így hát az általam követett szerzők a tárgykörök különfélesége szerint a következők: a metafizikában Cartesius; a logikában Ramus és Amesius; az aritmetikában Ramus, Snellius, Schonerus; a geometriában csak Ramus (véteknek tartottam ugyanis összezavarni az ő módszerét, egy dolog kivételével, hogy tudniillik az ő kommentáraiból nem kis fáradsággal összekeresgettem és napfényre hoztam a dichotomiákat, melyek többnyire kimaradtak a hannoveri, úgynevezett tizenkettedrét kiadásból. Mivel történetesen ez az egy kiadásom volt, csudálkoznom kellett, hogy ilyen módszeres író ennyire megfeledkezett saját módszeréről. Csak később jöttem rá, hogy ez a kiadó hibájából történt); az általános természettudományban Cartesius és Regius; az asztronómiában Copernicus, Cartesius, Regius, Phocylides, Alstedius, Scribonius; a föld- és vízrajzban, valamint a zenében Alstedius; a meteorológiában Cartesius, Regius és Scribonius; az antropológiában Scribonius és Regius; az orvostudományban egyedül Regius; a zoográfiában Regius, Scribonius és Alstedius; az ásványtanban Scribonius, Regius és Alstedius: a botanikában Scribonius és Regius; a mechanikában Alstedius, Amesius, Metius; az etikában, ökonómiában, politikában, jogtudományban és teológiában Fennerus, Amesius, Althusius stb.; az általános grammatikában Ramus; a speciális, mégpedig a görög és latin grammatikában ugyancsak Ramus, a héberben és annak dialektusaiban Martinius, az arabban Erpenius; az általános retorikában Talaeus, a speciális, mégpedig a görög, héber és arab retorikában különböző írók, a latinban viszont Talaeus." For a discussion of Apáczai Csere's background, inspiration, studies, and contributions as an encyclopedist, see Hotson 2020, 352–359. For a visualisation of Apáczai Csere's sources, see *ibid*., p. 357.

Hungarian	English
II. Dialektika. A dolgoknak közönséges tekintetei és azoknak feltalálások - Ok-okozat - Ellentmondások - Rész-egész - Bizonzosság	II. Dialectic. On the ordinary view of things and their finding/invention - cause-effect - contradictions - part-whole - certitude
III. Logika. A dolgoknak egybeköttetett tekintetek - Következtetés - Szillogisztika - Általánosítás - Származtatás	III. Logic. On the gaze at things in an interconnected manner - consequence/inference - syllogistic - generalization - derivation

The direct source of Apáczai Csere, as for the second and third parts of his *Encyclopaedia*, is Ames – his *Demonstratio logicae verae* (1632) is actually an explanation of Ramus' *Dialectice libri duo*. He also partially relies on Ramus' texts. However, Apáczai Csere does not link logic and dialectic with grammar and rhetoric in the fashion of Ramus; instead they are used as tools for science. As regards content, Apáczai Csere is mostly unoriginal since all he usually does is a fragmentary translation from the textbooks he encountered in his studies abroad. And he justifies this, since „borrowing" from great predecessors was what many prominent authors have done (Apáczai Csere 1959, 38–42; 1977, 85–87). The content of the *Magyar logikácska* is compiled analogically, but this time it is intended for the education of younger students, the first part starting from ontological concepts, discussing causes, genera, species, definitions, etc., and the second part being dedicated to argument construction.

Another place where we can find information about Apáczai Csere's views on logic is the *Oratio de studium sapientiae*, published as an appendix to the *Hungarian Encyclopaedia* in Utrecht in 1655 (Apáczai Csere 1976). Here, logic and dialectic are considered in the light of a Platonist, Neo-Platonist, and Ramist traditions, i.e. as a "divine gift", the logical method being "stolen" for the benefit of humanity by a Prometheus (cf. the *Philebus* of Plato, 16c). The question tackled by Apáczai Csere was the following: why is encyclopaedic knowledge fundamental and why logic, as an essential part of it, relevant?

Dialectic and logic were taught as a fundamental part of encyclopaedic learning. Encyclopaedic knowledge is essential to understanding and explaining the Bible (Apáczai Csere 1959, 16–17; 1977, 75–76). Also, it has a utilitarian purpose

regarding human life (Apáczai Csere 1959, 42; 1977, 87). Apáczai Csere's encyclopaedic endeavours were inspired, as he professes, by the *Encyclopaedia* of Alsted (Apáczai Csere 1959, 16–17; 1977, 76). Apáczai Csere emphasizes the importance of efficient memorisation, and requires any student to write down common places when he or she studies his *Encyclopaedia* (and any other book for that matter). Practical exercise and use of memory are to be intertwined in this respect (see Apáczai Csere 1959, 50–52; 1977, 90–92; see also Hotson 2020, 353).[5]

IV.

Did these studies of logic and dialectic have any result and significant improvement on the person of Miklos Bethlen, besides, as we have seen above, him being named the "little philosopher" in the age of c. 12? If we are to believe what he wrote in his autobiography, then the answer is yes. An interesting detail about what Pál Keresztúri taught is the one related to the teaching of *Localis memoria* and *Ars Lulliana*, something that he only taught, somewhat similar to the Sophists of Ancient Greece, to earn money (see Bethlen 2004, 74; cf. Dénes 2001, 94–95). Bethlen expresses ambivalent thoughts about this art of memory: he does not consider all of it to be a genuine art, on the other hand, he himself found and developed a personal method of memorization. This memorization of common places was an essential part of dialectical and logical knowledge insofar as the use of common places is used in the actual practice of argumentation when the arguer is required to produce a proof or an authoritative passage in order to force consent from his or her. Since, as mentioned above, these argumentative encounters were in many cases dedicated to theological issues, or because authoritative passages from the Bible had a highly persuasive value in debates about other matters as well, it can be surmised that the art of memorization was mainly concerned with biblical content, and only eventually, secondarily, with *loci* from classical authors.

It seems that Keresztúri's sophistic endeavours were quite expensive. Credulous aristocrats, Transylvanian "Calliasses",[6] were the perfect victims of the charming "secret" methods, promising to bestow a perfect memory to anyone who

[5] It seems that Apáczai Csere read Joachim Sterck van Ringelbergh (Joachimus Fortius Ringelbergius, c. 1499–c. 1531), *De ratione studii*. Cf. Apáczai Csere 1959, 26–27, 52; 1977, 80, 91–92. In a parallel, Komenský strived to boost diligence of his pupils in Sárospatak using two works of the same name – *De ratione studii* – by Erasmus (Strasbourg, 1512) and Fortius (Antwerp, 1529). However, he was unsuccessful. As a follow-up, he wrote his own work for this purpose: *Fortius redivivus* (written 1652–1654 in Sárospatak, first published 1658 in Nuremberg). Cf. Murdock 1996, 98.

[6] For who was Callias, one of the wealthiest Athenians who could afford an education in Sophistry, see some of Plato's dialogues (e.g. the *Apology* or the *Protagoras*).

needs to impress his acquaintances or adversaries with his or her knowledge of the Bible. First of all, Keresztúri dismissed his pupils when a nobleman came to learn the secret wisdom of the *loci*. Bethlen mentions at least two Calliasses, Kemény Ferenc and Bocsárdi Ferenc. Keresztúri proceeded thus: he excerpted from the Bible a couple of thousands common places and presented them to the student in combination with signs, images and stories (laughable stories in Bethlen's view), in the fashion of Giordano Bruno (1548–1600) and other early modern proponents of *ars memoriae*. And eventually through repetition and psychological inclination towards memorizing ridiculous stories and images, these Calliasses managed to remember at least certain parts of the Bible (Bethlen 2004, 78).

Bethlen, however, derides the efficiency of this method and professes that he was able to develop one of his own, more efficient, which would put him on a par with Keresztúri. For this, Bethlen claims to have found two "secrets" that he considered quite helpful to advance greatly his knowledge of the Bible:

1. One should extract several hundreds or thousands of passages (places) from the Bible considering one of the following two ways of doing it: either considering the biblical books and historical chronological order, or considering an initial classification of common places, i.e., a thematic taxonomy of disputable theological issues. He adds that it is recommended that all these should be written down in different booklets, depending on the chosen criterion. Moreover, the booklets should have two columns, one for questions and one for answers, and then practice should involve covering one of these columns and trying to remember what the answer to the question would be and what the question corresponds to, that is, a certain answer and a passage from the Bible. All this practice and repetition should involve alternation between these, so that the pupil would eventually develop his memory of *loci*.

2. The second "secret" involves the usage of "markers" or "signs" that one needs to put next to every usable common place. It appears that Bethlen believed that the role of these markers is differentiating the common places from the perspective of the possible encountered adversaries – a certain mark will indicate that a locus is efficient against Catholics, another that a common place is usable against Anti-Trinitarians, etc. (cf. Bethlen 2004, 79).[7]

To sum it up, due to the efforts of certain singular scholars and unique networks, the Transylvanian pupils were able to receive logical instruction that became useful later in life, as the career of Miklós Bethlen demonstrates. Even though from pan-European perspective originality was lacking in terms of both method and content, didactics of logic of this sort is a telling evidence of the local,

[7] The most important scholar who has imported Lullism into Transylvanian context seems to be Alsted (Murdock 1996, 79).

Eastern-European reception and adaptation of the top early modern science, considering the diverse interdenominational context of the Principality of Transylvania in the 17th century (Keul 2009), where a good training in dialectic/logic could seriously improve one's chances to win a debate.

Conclusion: Komenský on learning logic

In conclusion, it might be worth of consideration to investigate what Komenský said about the teaching of logic/dialectic.[8] From the beginning, it must be underlined that Komenský was not an advocate of a „dialectical" approach in education, and he considered it to be more important for the pupils to study nature (Lewalski 1994, 204). Although Komenský's perspective in education does not include much details regarding the teaching of logic/dialectic, he is nevertheless influenced by the Ramist approach (via Alsted, e.g. *Theologia scholastica didactica*, first published 1618, Hanau) to method and dialectic from a pedagogical perspective (Triche & McKnight 2004, 53–54; also Ong 1958, 163–164, 298, 305, to name just a few). He proves that he had rigorous training in dialectic through Ramus' writings (see Hubka 1978).

In the *Didactica magna* (written 1633–1638 in Leszno and first published 1657 in Amsterdam as an important part of the first volume of *Opera didactica omnia*) one can find information regarding the teaching of dialectic/logic in relation to matters such as the place of dialectic in the curricular ordering, the necessity of a similar method of teaching as in the case of other disciplines such as grammar, the importance of practical application, and the order of proper teaching from simple to more complex, from the items of knowledge known to the student towards something unknown.

The teaching of dialectic should take place at a pre-university level, in what Komenský calls "Latin-school":

> "[…] in the Mother-School the external sense should be exercised and taught to distinguish the objects that surround them. In the Vernacular-School, the internal senses, the imagination and the memory, in combination with their cognate organs, should be trained and this by reading, writing, painting, singing, counting, measuring, weighing, and committing various things to memory. In the Latin-school, the pupil should be trained to understand and pass judgment on the information collected by the senses, and this by means of dialectic, grammar, rhetoric, and other sciences and arts that are based on principles of causation. Finally, to the University belongs those subjects that

[8] For this topic, see the pioneering but extremely concise contribution of Berka 1972.

> have special relation to the will, namely, the faculties, of which theology teaches us to restore harmony to the soul; philosophy to the mind; medicine, to the vital functions of the body; and jurisprudence, to our external affairs" (Comenius 1896, 408–409).

When it comes to the place of dialectic/logic in the curriculum, Komenský insists that it should not be taught simultaneously with other disciplines from the *trivium* such as grammar or rhetoric. Moreover, before teaching any specific discipline, a general panorama of knowledge should be presented to students. This is done with a twofold purpose and at two levels: at the first level – understanding the role of any discipline and its relation with other disciplines; and at the second level - grasping of the central concepts of any discipline and also understanding the relations between these concepts. Komenský insists that true proficiency involves these and recounts a personal example of bad teaching referring in part to dialectic: "I remember well that, when we began to learn dialectic, rhetoric, and metaphysics, we were, at the very beginning, overburdened with long-winded rules, with commentaries and notes on commentaries, with comparisons of authors and with knotty questions" (Comenius 1896, 274).

After this general outline of sciences and arts is provided, it is important to teach all disciplines in an arranged order. Comenius seems to favor the following ordering: grammar, then dialectic, and then rhetoric. This goes somewhat against the generally accepted method of the *trivium* that involves teaching these three disciplines in parallel. This would be the case because, Komenský insists, "it is impossible to concentrate the mind on any one thing, when it has to busy itself with several things at once" (Comenius 1896, 271). This is explained in more detail later on in a "naturalistic" fashion ("*Nature does not overburden herself, but is content with a little*"), in a chapter discussing the efficiency of teaching and learning: "The mental energies of the scholar are therefore dissipated if he has to learn many things at once, such as grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, poetic, Greek, etc., in one year" (Comenius 1896, 288).

Komenský grounds his method of teaching in what he considers to be a principle of uniformity: "*Nature is uniform in all its operations.*" This means that the teacher should focus mainly on common features and similarities between the objects of learning, not the differences, and on what Komenský calls "the harmony of the universe, and the universal and intimate relations that exist between objects and words." Such uniformity not only warrants but also requires a single method, in order not to confuse students: "The same method of instruction must be used for all sciences, the same for all the arts, and the same for all the languages," and this also involves the teaching of dialectic (Comenius 1896, 292–293).

This natural grounding provides, in order to facilitate learning for students, a propensity towards understanding the essential nature of practice and relevance of practical application: "*Nothing is produced by nature of which the practical application is not soon evident.*" This should be considered as true not only in the case of languages, mathematics and sciences, but also dialectic. This is possible, in Komenský's view, because the student can draw satisfaction if he is able to apply and use what he learns (Comenius 1896, 292).

The recommended sequence of teaching dialectic is the following (similar to the sequences in language learning and later rhetoric): 1. understanding of concepts and references to things by means of genera and species with the purpose of comprehending the classification of things; for this, first, a student needs to understand similarities, and then differences, and this way he will be able to produce definitions of things and understand what is their place in nature; 2. then the student can pass on to questions regarding other (Aristotelian) categories (quality, time etc.) and distinguish between what is necessary and what is accidental or contingent. 3. Only after mastering this, the student is to move on to syllogistic, conclusions grounded on premises; 4. The final step, after sufficient practice in syllogistic, should contain the teaching of argumentative reasoning with the purpose of the student being able to participate in argumentative disputes (Comenius 1896, 348–349).

Komenský also provides illustrations for these:

1. For the learning of conceptual basis:

> "In dialectic, for example, a tree may be taken, and its genus, its species, its relation to other objects, its characteristic peculiarities and the logical definition and distribution of the term may be treated of. We may then proceed to the various ways in which a statement may be made about a tree. Finally, we may show how, by a perfect train of reasoning, and by taking the facts already ascertained as our starting-point, we may discover and demonstrate other properties of a tree. In this way, if, in each case, the use of the rules be illustrated by the same familiar example, the boy will easily master their application to all other subjects" (Comenius 1896, 349–350).

2. For the learning of more advanced reasoning, practice with what the tradition calls the stoic indemonstrables, *modus tollendo ponens* and *modus ponendo tollens*:

> "So too in logic, if the well-known dilemma be given: 'It is either day or night. But it is night; therefore it is not day'; the boy may learn to imitate it by similarly opposing contradictory conceptions to one another. As, 'He is

> either unlearned or learned. But he is unlearned; therefore is not learned'; 'Cain was either pious or impious, but he was not pious'; and so on" (Comenius 1896, 350–351).

At the very end, what can be said of the relationship between Pál Keresztúri and Jan Amos Komenský? Both Keresztúri and Komenský considered visual education very important (Horn 2014, 48). Sometimes Apáczai Csere is considered to be even a disciple of Komenský (Buisson 1882, 1286). But, Pal Keresztúri is also considered as being familiar with the works of Komenský by historians (see Dénes 2001, 96). We can corroborate it as highly probable, given what we have described above. However, the intellectual-genealogical ancestry is much clearer in the case of Komenský–Apáczai Csere relationship: they both were students of Alsted, the first at the Herborn Academy in 1611–12, and the second later in Alba Iulia (see Hotson 2020, 211). Still, there is much work to be done in research on the intellectual genealogy of early modern Transylvanian pedagogy and encyclopaedism.

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BOOK REVIEW

Diana Mărgărit, Ciprian Jeler (eds.). *Seriozitatea jocului. O abordare multidisciplinară a ludicului*, Editura Universității "Alexandru Ioan Cuza", Iași, 2021, 224 p.

"Seriozitatea jocului. O abordare multidisciplinară a ludicului" (*The seriousness of playing. A multidisciplinary approach to playfulness*), coordinated by Diana Mărgărit and Ciprian Jeler, was published in 2021 at the "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University Publishing House, introducing the topic of game, as seen from the perspective of ten original contributions of researchers and authors dedicated to this vast topic. Playing, an activity that does not seem to raise major epistemic issues, comes out unfolding its multiple dimensions such as semantic, aesthetic, historical, social, anthropological or ontological relevance. As a philosopher interested in topics that encompass a wide range of extended applicability disciplines, the subject of play seems to me as much fascinating and spectacular as it is peculiar, mysterious, enticing. I found myself delighted to encounter in contemporary philosophy a paper work that gathers in its content such a vast repertoire of meanings, approaches and tensions related to the proposed topic. Thus, this volume represents a bold proposal to reconsider the playing's multidisciplinarity - this human activity that firmly supports the psychological, emotional and intellectual development. Last but not least, this volume illustrates through its articles an organic development of perception concerning the play, from its most obvious meanings to overthrowing nuances of meaning and practical intuitions to a pellucid approach regarding the individual - community and otherness relationship, which is closely related to game functionality.

I thus consider this paper work being an act of courage destined to the mind as the act of thinking - arousing the imagination, proposing to broaden the relational and existential horizons regarding the way we actively participate through play in the evolution of the world as a philosophical topic. The work proposes the research of a vast repertory of playing meanings, reconsidering old definitions, anchoring nuances of meaning into the fertile ground of lucid and penetrating thinking, revealing unusual dimensions of the semantic we use when referring to play. We are now witnessing an openness to unusual, provocative interpretations of different significances of play into the social, cultural, historical, stylistic, philosophical, naturalistic, etymological dimensions. I joyfully discovered complex argumentative structures easily accessible to readers, I permanently had the feeling of an availability reserve from all of authors willing to open themselves to those desiring to dip into their work.

At the same time, the authors emphasize the significance of being open to receive a constantly movement of meanings arising from the interaction of those who are playing, I mean those who make themselves available to others by willing to share a temporary common destiny. The fascination of the play comes illustrated by the manner in which enforces itself into the intimacy of the subject as as default. Appointed right in front of existence, carrying with it all that is and does, the play gently removes the individual from the lucidity callings, allowing him to relax, to suspend in time part of his daily duties, express himself, know oneself, to diminish a little bit the metaphysical weight of gravity. The archaeology of the way playing becomes a serious concern is slowly built with a natural fluidity, easy to follow, with an intense and provocative rhythm; a playfulness matching outfits with the intellectual auspices it is analized with. The play rests, imitates, initiates, defines and diverge; its meanings interact and interfere, delivering new, surprising conceptual categories. The play represents a very well defined system of rules - remember, though, not every system of rules is a play. It must be an act standing between seriousness and ambiguity, between clarity and magic, routine and surprise, connecting thus all aspects of psychological life, assuming interpretation, anticipation and revelation of a world of experiences one is capable of. The play also means co-experience, a world of otherness, an encounter on a rule-based field, powered by the very strangeness of the other stranger.

Analyzing the articles that constitute the reference volume it is obvious that playing has its own requirements, proposes its own stake, managing the performance of being simultaneously the activity, the action, experience and context. Starting from those little games among children for the purpose of amusement and fun to the games of economic markets, power games, dynamics and secret services, language games providing dialogues; this astonishing universe looks to the world with deep soberness, a mesmerising mixture of fascination, effort and sacrifice. There are no clear borders, they are constantly moving, they adapt to a continuous flow of goals, ideals, expectations and gains. The borders between tradition and novelty are also continuously changing due to the fact that the concepts we use to interpret or question the game content are not always fulfilling our need for ideal consensus or continuity. When not taken seriously, the game becomes inaccurate, illogical, impossible. The expressiveness and clarity of the language in the game reveals its consistency, integrating it in daily life like a valuable activity, socially trustworthy and thus its participants becoming reliable, serious, willing to take risks, to discover themselves, to have hope.

A game promotes a more propitious world for the sake of cooperation; it represents a bold gesture that places the individual as subject of a paradoxical rigourosity where rule-imposed limits do not diminish the metaphysical movements of quest, exaltation or disappointment. Unexpected situations lead to new ways of acting symbolically, to explore unfamiliarity with creativity and curiosity. Taken seriously, the game becomes tender, a tension relief. There is a certain level of engagement that allows the individual to move freely. Bonds of trust and loyalty embody intense emotional gestures, make possible an exchange of postures and points of view, an abundant semiotic field in a well-defined context anchored in space and time. From

an interactive participation arises the rhetoric of a person dealing with the unknown, trying to figure out how to react in order to properly act. The game reveals the beauty of self-questioning and broadens the limits of our boldness and the springs of our fear. We need discernment and courage to join social games, language games, economic, intimate. In fact, the moment we are willing to identify ourselves as vulnerable beings we start to fully appreciate life, to have fun, to explore new possibilities of understanding interaction and engagement as a form of living. Thus, the game achieves authority and a destiny of its own, branched in various experiential contexts, from mutual-aid financial circuits to deception games and espionage field, from the legal form of language-games to game theories and the role of play in the paradigm of visual contemporary arts.

The structure of the paper does not present constraints meant to interrupt the argumentative thread of the exposure, but rather is an invitation to openness, showing well-defined meanings, theoretically sustained and linguistically accessible, maintaining throughout its content the feeling that there is something more to be found, that the meanings of the game have not yet been fully revealed. Analytical consciousness meets the imaginary and the dreaming, and the paper dares to inspire by using an original style, an unique beauty sprung from all the authors who contributed to this work. Cognitive tensions are determined by the vastness of the meanings of the subject of the game, highlighting the multidisciplinary nature of the studies illustrated in the paper. We identify philosophical refinements that reflect the sincere and intense preoccupation on the subject, the volume representing in this sense an organized ensemble of surprises and surprising findings, caught in their enchanting movement, even graceful here and there. The work therefore has an authentic individuality that manifests itself without restrictions, imposing itself on the territory of reality as an extremely fluid compound of many semantic influences coming from anthropology, phenomenology, politics or art. We are therefore witnessing the emergence of deep ties belonging to distinct concerns, but aiming at a common stake.

By reading this paper, I found myself delighted to discover vast discursive universes, well-founded explanations and the pure honesty of admitting that each and every addressed topic, any contribution to the development of the main subject is encouraged, useful and precious. I found out meaning and consistency, vitality and presence, and I felt a sense of solidarity regarding human experience, which by playing the game, transcends the uniform, rigid-thinking territories, succeeding to expose itself, wanting to want. The tensions between seriousness and amusement, chaos and order, wisdom and childishness, freedom and rules are harmoniously reconciled by elegant reasoning, by expressions of the sublime and exemplarity. Playing as an epistemological constant, having its contemplative and spontaneous expressiveness, manages to be present in this work as a historical, philosophical and cultural heritage. We thus discover the human in its most diverse forms, through *homo ludens* to *homo aesteticus* or *homo significans*, and the game then fertilizing all the aspects of our lives, from the social, verbal, actional or situational, suggesting a complementarity of the contexts where we actually meet.

What is left after reading this volume is the feeling that the most obvious things, the most easy-to-understand facts are revealed to us by hiding; they have their own way of moving into the world, yearning for presence and significance. Our tendency to reject the calling for lucidity most often leaves us scarcely prepared in meeting the deep meanings of our intimate being. Whether or not we hide ourselves by playing the games of our subpersonalities or we play our own life with the questionable naivety of a man who already knows all the answers, it is obvious that we must consciously take part in our own destiny. I am now the astounded witness with new meanings and illustrations of the most obvious games we play and this seems to be the destiny of this work: the emergence of a thought that strives for exemplarity, lucid thinking, inquiry, poetry. As same as in the games, ingenuity without courage restrains the capability of doing more, of living more. I have felt the audacity of the authors blending into the apparent forms of the game the chance, the unexpected, the entropy. And that so, the game phenomenon becomes a microcosm in an infinite universe of possibilities, a sensual juxtaposition of Eros, the principle of relationship with the Logos – the rational norm that organizes, synthesizes and values. Finally, it might be the game that is the ultimate destiny for those creatures looking at the stars to remember the rules.

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