THE SPEECH ACT OF REFERRING
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2017.spiss.03Keywords:
Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, referring, description, names, sense, meaning, referenceAbstract
The Speech Act of Referring. According to the speech-act theory whenever we utter a sentence, we perform two acts: the act of referring and that of predicating. By referring, we set out an object that we speak of, and by predicating, we attribute a feature to the object. My paper is a short presentation of Gottlob Frege’s theory of meaning and Bertrand Russell's theory of description. I will try to outline the core concepts and thoughts/arguments that even today define the debate about reference in the analytic tradition.
References
Frege, Gottlob, “On Sense and Meaning”, in Ed. Brian McGuinness, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, Basil Blackwell, 1984.
Márton Miklós, “A referencia problémái”, Kellék, 2005, 27–28.
Russell, Bertrand, “On Denoting” Mind, Vol. 14, No. 56, (Oct., 1905).
Ruzsa Imre, “Russell kontra Frege”, in Tertium non datur, Ed. Máté András, Ruzsa Imre, Osiris, 2000.
Sainsbury, Mark: “Filozófiai logika”, in Ed. A. C. Grayling, Filozófiai kalauz, 1997.
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