THE EASY APPROACH TO GROUP AGENCY. A SIMPLE REALIST VIEW ON GROUP AGENTS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2021.2.04Keywords:
Analytic Entailments, Deflationism, Group agency, Group agents, Simple Realism.Abstract
We talk about groups as doing something, we talk as if groups have agency. Is our talk legitimate? Are there group agents? Is there something like group agency? In this paper, I discuss two ontological frameworks concerning existence questions: the Quinean framework and the Thomasson-Carnap framework. I apply them to the problem of group agency. I review the Quinean-oriented literature debating the existence of group agents and its methodological background. I argue, via Thomasson’s easy approach to ontology, that deflationism can simplify the debate surrounding group agents. Thus, I argue for a Thomasson-Carnap framework and show that it is better suited to answer the particular question whether there are group agents. More specifically, I argue for a non-reductive simple realist view on group agents, i.e. I argue for the truth of “There are group agents,” via analytic entailments, by truths about the actions and deeds of groups.
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