Intentionality and Autonomy in Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Comprehensive Analysis of Conscious Decisions and the Transcendental Ego
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2024.1.03Keywords:
Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology, Conscious Decisions, Transcendental Ego, Intentionality, Free Will, Consciousness, Epistemology, Temporality, Rationality, Autonomy, Phenomenological Reduction (Epoché), Intersubjectivity, Self-awareness.Abstract
This essay embarks on a thorough exploration of Edmund Husserl’s seminal contributions to the philosophical discourse on consciousness, with a particular focus on the dynamics of conscious decisions within the framework of phenomenology. By delving into Husserl’s nuanced examination of consciousness—its temporal structure, the nature of self-awareness, and the foundational concept of intentionality—the analysis reveals the intricate ways in which Husserl posits the transcendental ego as the nexus of meaning, judgment, and perception. The discussion illuminates how Husserl’s theory of intentionality and the intentional act’s matter and quality serve as the cornerstone for understanding the will’s engagement with the world. Through a detailed exposition of Husserl’s ideas on the phenomenological reduction, the essay articulates the active role of consciousness in constituting reality and the ethical dimensions underpinning the exercise of free will. The paper argues that Husserl’s insights into conscious decision-making challenge conventional views by framing free will within the contexts of knowledge, ethical deliberation, and the ego’s autonomy. This essay contributes to the ongoing dialogue between phenomenology and contemporary philosophy of mind by highlighting Husserl’s profound impact on our understanding of consciousness, agency, and the existential significance of human decisions.References
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