WE WILL FIGURE IT OUT. KNOW-HOW, HYBRID WAYS, AND COMMUNICATIVE (INTER)ACTIONS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2020.3.02Keywords:
Know-how, Intellectualism, semantic analysis, embedded questions, wh-complements, mentions-some readings, de re knowledge, hybrid ways, communicative interactions; interrogation; context-sensitivity, situated pragmaticsAbstract
The goal of this paper is primarily to pinpoint some substantial analytical and conceptual difficulties with the account of knowledge how proposed by (Stanley & Williamson, Knowing How, 2001) [henceforth S&W] and (Stanley, Knowing (How), 2011), (Stanley, Know How, 2011) based on (Groenendijk & Stokhof, 1984) [henceforth G&S] semantic analysis of embedded questions. In light of such difficulties, (1) we propose supplementing their account with an integrated approach of knowledge how, and suggest adding a mereological layer to the semantic framework of embedded questions (2) we argue that the characteristics of what we call hybrid ways and hybrid knowledge strongly indicate reopening the issue of the proper account of questions towards the complementary relevant account of interrogation in communicative interactions, and the role of the context (in)forming knowledge-how. As a methodological principle, we remain neutral on the intellectualist vs anti-intellectualist debate. We also remain silent on the nature and explanation of the modes of presentations or ways of thinking that should be developed in order to adequately account for hybrid ways and hybrid knowledge.
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