WORLDS, OBJECTS, AND THEORIES OF FICTION

Authors

  • Mihai RUSU Lecturer PhD, Faculty of Philosophy, Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca; Department of Environmental Engineering and Protection, University of Agricultural Sciences and Veterinary Medicine, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. Email: mihaimcrusu@gmail.com. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7112-6987

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2020.1.03

Keywords:

possible worlds, modal logic, modal metaphysics, fiction, David Lewis, Thomas Pavel

Abstract

The main aim of this paper is to provide a critical discussion of some key issues concerning the possible-world analysis of fiction. After a review of the most important philosophical questions concerning truth, reference, names and identity, and their bearing on fiction, I outline the possible-world framework, as used by David Lewis (1978) in his analysis, and examine its most important problems. A special interest is granted to the limits of the Lewisian pretense interpretation of fiction that are highlighted by works of cinema. I conclude with an appraisal of the puzzles generated by the attempts to draw borders between and within the worlds of fiction, and emphasize the need for a better mutual understanding of the two perspectives that are essential for a possible-world interpretation of fiction: literary theory and philosophy.

References

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Published

2020-04-20

How to Cite

RUSU, M. . (2020). WORLDS, OBJECTS, AND THEORIES OF FICTION. Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia, 65(1), 39 –. https://doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2020.1.03

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Articles