REFERENCE, INTUITION, AND INTUITION ABOUT REFERENCE – NOTES ON THE EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE DEBATE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2019.2.07Keywords:
philosophy of language, experimental philosophy, reference, philosophical expertiseAbstract
The introduction of experimental techniques as a tool of philosophical investigation has created quite a stir in analytic philosophy in the last two decades. Experimental results have shed a new light on traditional debates in various fields and have led to a reappraisal of the use and merits of various methods and types of arguments in philosophy. This paper provides an overview of the central debate regarding Machery et al.’s results and conclusions about the interplay between theory and various methods that are supposed to provide evidence for (a certain) theory. The debate is connected with the initial setting of the question of reference and, more generally, with the main staples of the philosophy of language. A large part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the most important arguments and perspectives that have been developed or reformulated as a result of the debate on experimental philosophy. The final aim of the discussion is to provide a basic description of the contemporary landscape of philosophy of language and related epistemology, to inform future research designs and developments.
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